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Toward an Aegis BMD Global Enterprise U.S. Navy (Daniel Viramontes) ANY Sensor, ANY Shooter Toward an Aegis BMD Global Enterprise By JOHN F. MORTON and GEORGE GALDORISI John F. Morton is a Senior Analyst with Gryphon Technologies. Captain George Galdorisi, USN (Ret.), is Director of the Guided-missile cruiser Corporate Strategy Group at PAWAR USS Monterey under way Systems Center Pacific. in Mediterranean ndupress.ndu.edu issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 / JFQ 85 FEATURES | Toward an Aegis BMD Global Enterprise he Aegis ballistic missile powerful messages to would-be aggressors shipboard components for Aegis BMD are defense (BMD) system aboard that we will act with others to ensure collec- the AN/SPY-1 S-band radar system and the the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) tive security and prosperity.”3 Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS). T guided-missile cruisers and In the Middle East and Asia, the United Phased upgrades of these components have Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) guided-missile States, its allies and partners, and naval joint given the Aegis BMD system the ability to destroyers has become a primary high-end and combined commanders are contending counter short- to intermediate-range bal- enabler for U.S., allied, and partner maritime with the high-end threats posed by accel- listic missile threats both in the lower and forces as they execute the full range of opera- erating Iranian and North Korean ballistic upper tiers of the atmosphere. tional tasks in regions where threat vectors missile and weapons of mass destruction The Navy in mid-2011 had 21 Aegis are accelerating and proliferating. Warship- development. In addition, naval command- BMD–capable warships: 5 cruisers and 16 focused Aegis BMD and its foundation, the ers in the Western Pacific now must counter destroyers. Sixteen of these BMD ships were Aegis Combat System, serve as the flexible antiaccess/area-denial capabilities such as in the Pacific supporting U.S., Japanese, and and adaptive capability to provide “regionally China’s development of the Dong-Feng 21D allied efforts to counter the ballistic missile concentrated, credible combat power,” as “ship-killer” ballistic missile. threat presented by North Korea. Five were articulated in the national maritime strategy.1 With Aegis BMD going global in the in the Atlantic to support the expanded Ballistic missile defense is a mission face of such regional high-end challenges, NATO requirements vis-à-vis Iran. The that involves all the Services, and regional U.S. coalition partners increasingly have the commitment of the Nation and the Navy to BMD is a mission that increasingly supports option to “plug into” Aegis. The question Aegis BMD is clear, with 94 Aegis-capable the U.S. geographic combatant command- then becomes the extent to which their naval ships planned for by 2024.4 ers. Aegis BMD is only one component of assets—sensors and shooters—should be able MDA and the Navy are also devel- the larger national ballistic missile defense to provide and receive BMD capability. Our oping the Aegis Ashore program, a key system (BMDS). This article focuses primar- maritime partners are making calculations component that comes online in Phase II of ily on Aegis BMD, particularly current and based on their perceived national interests, the European PAA (EPAA), the four-phase planned roles supporting the combatant commands. Importantly, Aegis BMD is the centerpiece of the Phased Adaptive Approach Aegis BMD builds upon the success of the Navy’s Aegis Combat System (PAA), the four-stage framework for regional ballistic missile defense announced by Presi- threat assessments, and the inevitable budget regional PAA for the NATO area of respon- dent Barack Obama in 2009. tradeoffs that must be made in the midst of sibility. Initial deployments in Europe will Proven Aegis BMD capability directly the ongoing worldwide debt crisis and con- occur later in the decade. In Phase 1 (2011 supports or will support the three operational comitantly flat or declining defense budgets. timeframe), existing sea-based Aegis missile imperatives identified in the national mari- defense ships and radars were deployed to time strategy, as well as those implicitly or An Advancing Capability defend against short- and medium-range explicitly stated in the national security and Funded by the Missile Defense Agency ballistic missiles in Southern Europe. In military strategies: (MDA) and Navy, Aegis BMD builds upon Phases 2 (2015 timeframe), 3 (2018 time- the success of the Navy’s Aegis Combat frame), and 4 (2020 timeframe), Aegis SM-3 ■■ secure the United States from direct System with its more than 60 years of missile missiles will be successively upgraded to attack research, development, and testing; real-world provide coverage against medium- and ■■ secure strategic access and retain performance; and some $50 billion invested intermediate-range missiles. By Phase 4, the global freedom of action in technologies, systems, and ships. Aegis Block IIB variant of the SM-3 should have ■■ strengthen existing and emerging alli- entered the U.S. fleet in 1983 as a blue-water an intercept capability against some inter- ances and partnerships and establish favorable air defense system to defeat massed raids of continental ballistic missiles as well.5 security conditions.2 Soviet naval aviation antiship cruise missiles. In March 2011, the United States and In 1991, the Strategic Defense Initiative Orga- NATO began EPAA Phase I implementation Aegis BMD is evolving into a global nization, the predecessor to MDA, provided with the deployment of the Aegis cruiser USS enterprise as the system migrates from the the initial funding for the first Aegis BMD Monterey (CG-61) to the Mediterranean.6 U.S. Navy to allied navies. As such, the capability for area-wide and theater missile Armed with SM-3 Block IA interceptors, the system is becoming the interoperable “glue” defense. ship arrived on station with an immediate that binds the United States and its regional Since then, regular upgrades have capability to track and intercept short- and allies and partners into a credible combat provided increased capabilities at every medium-range missiles that comprise the force and, by extension, into a credible deter- step of Aegis development—guided by its Iranian ballistic missile threat to NATO ter- rent. Here, too, the maritime strategy states, trademark “build a little, test a little, learn ritory and populations. While other Aegis “Integrated maritime operations, either a lot” philosophy. The 2011 configuration BMD ships have deployed to the Mediter- within formal alliance structures (such as the of Aegis BMD, which was operationally ranean since 2009, Monterey was the first North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) certified in 2009, teams the Aegis 3.6.1 sustained 6-month deployment of such a ship or more informal arrangements (such as the weapon system with the Standard Missile-3 specifically to support the EPAA. Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send Block 1A missile. The other two major 86 JFQ / issue 67, 4 th quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu MOrtON and GALDORISI C2BMC and Link 16 enable TPY-2 radars to Aegis integrated weapons system aboard provide sensor data to shipboard SM-3 inter- USS Hopper launches RIM-161 SM-3 Block U.S. Navy ceptors to allow an Aegis BMD ship to cue its IA during exercise Stellar Avenger sensors. With the addition of the launch-on- remote (LoR) capability, Aegis BMD ships will be able use this data to launch their inter- ceptors. And these interceptors—no longer constrained by the range of the Aegis radar to detect an incoming missile—can be launched sooner and fly farther. Existing Aegis BMD–equipped ships already embody the LoR capability, as demonstrated by the 25th Aegis BMD flight test FTM-15 on April 15, 2011. This was the first LoR test of the system against an As part of EPAA Phase II, Aegis Ashore The C2BMC application relies on the intermediate-range “separating target”— is a relocatable, land-based Aegis BMD Link 16 tactical data exchange network to a warhead separating from its booster system that, together with the shipboard ensure that sensor and shooter systems have missile. FTM-15 featured the Aegis BMD Aegis BMD, will provide the near-term the interoperability required for accepting system installed in the guided-missile deterrent framework against regional threats and sharing target and tracking data. Link destroyer USS O’Kane (DDG-77) firing to Europe from short- and medium-range 16 is on all Aegis cruisers and destroyers a Standard Missile-3 Block IA missile in ballistic missiles. Aegis Ashore will reduce and permits all elements of the national response to remote sensor data provided by the Navy’s need to maintain multimission BMDS to accept and share data with other a forward-based TPY-2 radar. This pitted Aegis BMD ships on station that would oth- tactical platforms. U.S. allies in the U.S. for the first time an in-service SM-3 Block erwise constrain their availability for other Pacific Command area of responsibility, 1A missile against an intermediate-range BMD and general purpose naval missions. Republic of Korea, and Japan rely on Link (1,800–3,400 miles) modified Trident In the NATO area, these conjoined elements 16 and their Aegis systems for accepting I/C-4 ballistic missile target called the of the PAA are the U.S. contribution to the and sharing information in their missile- LV-2. This test was well beyond the NATO territorial missile defense mission defense constructs. In Europe, NATO’s expected capability of the current version and requirement adopted at the Alliance’s missile defense committee is monitoring of Aegis BMD, Version 3.6.1, which was November 2010 Lisbon Summit.7 systems development to ensure interoper- developed to counter only short- and In May 2011, the United States and ability there as well.
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