Geopolitical Reflections of Sino-Indian Conflict and Its

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Geopolitical Reflections of Sino-Indian Conflict and Its UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 Geopolitical Refl ections of Sino-Indian Confl ict and its Implication on Nepal’s Survival Strategy Gaurav Bhattarai Abstract the geopolitical expression of Sino-Indian confl ict in Nepal, this study reviews India’s Border disputes between China and India in perception of Nepal-China relations, and June 2020 almost lead South Asian countries China’s perception of Nepal-India relations. to take a side. But, Nepal, situated between Also, the reports and the press releases of the India and China, has always expressed a Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, historical facts, stern belief in neutrality and non-alignment. treaties, government reports and decisions Even though New Delhi doubted Nepal’s have been studied and analyzed. Media neutrality and non-alignment citing China’s sources are also reviewed to understand growing footprints in Nepal, Kathmandu the diverse narratives produced on the reckoned such suspicion as the result of a new geopolitical refl ection of Sino-Indian confl ict. map row between two countries connected by The themes that emerged from the reviews open borders. While Nepal’s repeated calls are thematically analyzed and interpreted, to diplomatically resolve India-Nepal border to discover that cultivating relations with problems remained unheeded by New Delhi, one country at the expense of the other may it provided room for the ruling communist be counterproductive to Nepal’s survival party in Nepal to reap geopolitical benefi ts strategies. out of the Sino-Indian dispute. But, interestingly, such geopolitical benefi ts Keywords: Geopolitical Refl ection, Nepal, are usually targeted in tempering Indian Sino-Indian Confl ict, Survival Strategy infl uence in Nepal, by getting closer with China. Apprehending the same, this study Introduction aims to assess the geopolitical implication of In June 2020, the border skirmishes Sino-Indian confl ict on the survival strategy between China and India almost generated of Nepal. To fulfi ll the same objectives, the an obligatory environment for the South Chinese perception of Nepal-India relations, Asian countries to take a side (Zheng, and Indian perception of Sino-Nepal ties 2020). Although Nepal’s foreign policy has have been critically assessed in this study. been driven by unyielding belief in non- This study is methodologically based on the alignment and neutrality (Ghimire, 2020), information collected from the secondary India mistrusted Nepal’s neutrality alluding sources. In order to critically evaluate China’s growing interest in Nepal (Gupta, 81 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 2020). But, Kathmandu deemed such mistrust The survival strategy of Nepal shouldn’t be as the upshot of a new map row between merely understood as a geo-political ambition two countries linked by the open borders directing the country’s foreign policy, while (The Times of India, 2020). Also, Nepal’s the two neighbors are engaged in confl ict. recurrent calls to diplomatically resolve Lack of meticulous diplomacy from Nepal’s India-Nepal border problems (Republica, side may also generate misperception in the 2020) are overlooked by New Delhi. Thus, psyche of neighbors. When a virtual meeting the geopolitical refl ections on Sino-India between the communist parties of Nepal and confl ict in Nepal, today, concentrates on China was organized by Nepal Communist how India’s reluctance has provided space Party’s (NCP) School Department on June for the ruling communist party in Nepal to 19, 2020, Indian media cynically interpreted reap geopolitical benefi ts out of the Sino- Nepal’s healthy bilateral ties with China Indian dispute (Giri, 2020a). Remarkably, by as anti-Indian. Actually, two communist getting closer with China, such geo-political parties had the virtual meeting while the benefi ts are mostly targeted in mitigating bilateral relations between India and China Indian infl uence in Nepal. Nepal’s endeavors had worsened because of border skirmishes for trade diversifi cation, along with the and scuffl es leading to a violent clash along rail projects with China, were also the the disputed border in Ladakh. The virtual result of burgeoning discomfort with New meeting coincided with re-ignition of Nepal- Delhi (Sangraula, 2019). Such geopolitical India border disputes, which not only made refl ections emanating from the Sino-India India cast doubt over Nepal’s neutrality, but dispute is not a new phenomenon in Nepal, also provided an apt opportunity for Indian however. In 1962, when India and China media to endorse the Indian army chief’s went to war, there were comments in the press remarks: “Nepal is acting on the behest of arguing that the war was to Nepal’s advantage. someone” (The Wire, 2020). Although the Although Nepal remained uninvolved, meeting was scheduled long before the clash Nepal’s neutrality was disparaged in the between Indian and Chinese troops on June Indian media as anti-Indian and pro-Chinese 15, 2020, the timing was not suitable. Such (Khanal, 2000, p. iii). Still, Nepal has always an avertible geopolitical ambitions drew been balancing both the neighbors with its widespread criticism, not only in New Delhi, foreign policy of neutrality, non-alignment but also in Kathmandu. Foreign policy experts and equidistance, which are also understood and security analysts were heard posing as the survival strategies of the small states the questions like: whether the Sino-Indian in dealing with the anarchic international dispute merely boosts Nepal’s geopolitical system. But, with the Sino-Indian confl ict, drive, or is it disastrous for countries like and its inescapable geopolitical implications, Nepal aspiring to bridge two economic giants. often such strategies have to undergo a India’s spectacular economic performance severe trial. Thus, the aim of this study is and China’s unrivalled development has to investigate how the geopolitical upshots of always given a hope of spillover eff ects to Sino-Indian Confl ict have impacted Nepal’s Nepal, whose search for economic prosperity survival strategy. is dependent on its transit diplomacy (K.C. & Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 75-96). But, quite often, the geopolitical dispute between India 82 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 and China prompts the spirit of geopolitical (Ganguly, 2020). To Nepal, their competition ambition in the leaderships of small states in for infl uence in South Asia remains a major South Asia, and as a result they take no less source of insecurity. Thus, fueling any time to prioritize the interest of one nuclear- thoughts in quest of geopolitical ambitions armed country against that of the other, mostly may prove more hazardous. However, it to protect their government back home, or at doesn’t mean Nepal has to always continue least to prolong their stay in power (Rose, with its conventional ‘survival’ strategy, 1971, pp. 177-207). which is driven either by the 18th century colonial narratives, or the cold-war narratives. Because of the geographical proximity, and But, most of the literature available to us, economic relations the two Asian giants have either prioritized Nepal’s geostrategic have, the relationship between them is often location, or on the possibility for Nepal to labelled as one of the most ‘electrifying’ of derive economic benefi ts from the rise of this century. (Martin, 2015). But, there are India and China. Realizing the same research certain similarities and unusual diff erences gap, this study aims to revisit the impact of in the foreign policy behaviors of India the neighborhood policies of India and China and China, particularly in dealing with the on Nepal’s survival strategy and refl ect on its small countries, like Nepal, whose position relevance amidst the changing geopolitical in international system is conditioned by dynamics in the region. either globalist, Indo-centric or isolationist approaches (Khatri, 1998, p. 12). Historically, Review of Literature Nepal has been balancing relations with its two immediate neighbors (Kissinger, 2014, Available literatures prioritizing on Nepal’s p. 197), to maximize economic growth, geostrategic importance and Nepal’s survival and sustain balanced political stability strategy can be thematically assessed by with both the neighbors. Having adopted classifying into two categories: A.) Geo- the Westphalian model, the two distinct strategic determinism (Dahal, 1998, pp. civilizational entities have been reduced to 25- 51); B.) Economic determinism (KC & geopolitical rivals, today. The communist Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 75-96). Geopolitically, system in China is depicted as a perpetual Nepal’s destiny is linked to the destiny of its threat to India – the world’s largest democracy two immediate neighbors. Both the countries – and thus a rivalry is constituted. Sino- are equally important for Nepal to enhance Indian rivalry has been a constant menace its economic performance. As the geo- to the neighboring countries like Nepal, strategic location between India and China who have been aspiring to draw benefi ts is a principal concern for Nepal’s security from the spillover eff ects of the economic and stability (Bhattarai, 2005, pp. 25-31), development in India and China, particularly the most challenging job for Nepal is to by exercising transit diplomacy (KC & maintain equidistance relations with both Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 75-96). Although India is the immediate neighbors. Exercising the perceived as a rising power, concomitantly, it foreign policy of equidistance is benefi cial has missed numerous opportunities to take its economically and geopolitically, for Nepal’s neighbors, including Nepal into confi dence, survival strategy too (Schmidt & Thapa, and has failed to lead the South Asian region 2012, p .11). 83 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 From the perspective of economic From the perspective of geo-strategic determinism, however, India’s enormous determinism, Gurkha recruitment in Indian economic performance and China’s army has further complicated Nepal’s unsurpassable development has always given survival strategy. At present, over 30,000 a hope of spillover eff ects to Nepal (K.C.
Recommended publications
  • Border Trade: Reopening the Tibet Border Claude Arpi the First Part of This Paper Concluded with This Question: Can the Borders
    Border Trade: Reopening the Tibet Border Claude Arpi The first part of this paper concluded with this question: can the borders be softened again? Can the age-old relation between the Tibetans and the Himalayans be revived? The process has started, though it is slow. This paper will look at the gains acquired from the reopening of the three land ports, but also at the difficulties to return to the booming trade which existed between Tibet and India before the invasion of Tibet in 1950 and to a certain extent till the Indo-China war of 1962. It will also examine the possibility to reopen more land ports in the future, mainly in Ladakh (Demchok) and Arunachal Pradesh. Tibet’s Economic Figures for 2012 According to a Chinese official website, the Tibetan Autonomous Region is economically doing extremely well. Here are some ‘official’ figures: • Tibet's GDP reached 11.3 billion US $ in 2012, an increase of 12 % compared to the previous year (Tibet's GDP was 9.75 billion US $ in 2011 and 8.75 billion US $ in 2010). • Tibet's economy has maintained double-digit growth for 20 consecutive years. • Fixed asset investment have increased by 20.1 % • The tax revenues reached 2.26 billion US $ (fiscal revenue grew by 46%) • And Tibet received over 11 million domestic and foreign tourists earning 2.13 billion US $ Tibet’s Foreign Trade Figures for 2012 The foreign trade is doing particularly well. On January 23, 2013, Xinhua announced that Tibet has registered new records in foreign trade. A Chinese government agency reported that the foreign trade of the Tibetan Autonomous Region reached more than 3 billion U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • समाचार पत्र से चियत अंश Newspapers Clippings
    July 2020 समाचार पत्र से चियत अंश Newspapers Clippings A Daily service to keep DRDO Fraternity abreast with DRDO Technologies, Defence Technologies, Defence Policies, International Relations and Science & Technology Volume: 45 Issue: 15 0 July 2020 7 7 रक्षा िवज्ञान पुतकालय Defenceरक्षा िवज्ञान Science पुतकालय Library रक्षाDefence वैज्ञािनक सScienceूचना एवं प्रल Libraryेखन क द्र Defence Scientific Information & Documentation Centre रक्षा वैज्ञािनक सूचना एव ं प्रलेखन क द्र Defence Scientificमेटकॉफ Informationहाउस, िदली -& 110 Documentation 054 Centre Metcalfe House, Delhi - 110 054 मेटकॉफ हाउस, िदली - 110 054 Metcalfe House, Delhi- 110 054 CONTENT S. No. TITLE Page No. DRDO News 1-14 COVID-19: DRDO’s Contribution 1-5 1. उघाटन / डीआरडीओ ने 12 दन म तैयार कया 1 हजार बेड का अथाई कोवड अपताल, 1 गहृ मं ी और रामंी ने कया उघाटन 2. DRDO ने 12 दन म तैयार कया 1000 बतर क मता वाला COVID-19 का 2 अथाई अपताल, शाह-राजनाथ ने कया दौरा 3. Just within 12 days Sardaar patel Covid Hospital started functioning, Amit Shah 4 and Rajnath Singh visited hospital (Kannada News) 4. World’s biggest Corona Hospital inaugurated in Delhi (Telugu News) 5 5. DRDO का कारनामा, सफ 12 दन म बनाया 1000 बेड वाला कोवड अपताल 6 DRDO Technology News 7-14 6. Akash Missile: BDL signs contract for licence agreement & ToT with DRDO 7 7.
    [Show full text]
  • India-Nepal,Kalapani,Nepal,Open Border
    APRIL 2020 ISSUE NO. 356 India and Nepal’s Kalapani Border Dispute: An Explainer SOHINI NAYAK ABSTRACT Neighbours India and Nepal, who share an open border, have not always had the most amicable of relations, oscillating from one extreme to the other. One of their long-standing disputes is over the border area of Kalapani. This discord has the potential to disrupt the other aspects of their ties, especially in the domains of the economy and cross-border security. Further, if the two countries fail to arrive at a resolution to the disagreement, it might give other stakeholders such as China an opportunity to interfere. This brief explains the Kalapani issue and in that context, explores what can be expected of the bilateral relationship in the future. Attribution: Sohini Nayak, “India and Nepal’s Kalapani Border Dispute: An Explainer,” ORF Issue Brief No. 356, April 2020, Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think tank that aims to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed analyses and in-depth research, and organising events that serve as platforms for stimulating and productive discussions. ISBN 978-93-89622-94-2 © 2020 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF. India and Nepal’s Kalapani Border Dispute: An Explainer INTRODUCTION External Affairs, Nepal, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali also In November 2019, the Home Ministry of India issued a statement for the media stating that, released a new edition of the Indian political “The Nepal government is committed to map, showing Jammu and Kashmir along with protecting the country’s external borders and it 1 Ladakh as the new union territories of India.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Influence on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia
    USIP SENIOR STUDY GROUP FINAL REPORT China’s Influence on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia DECEMBER 2020 | NO. 4 USIP Senior Study Group Report This report is the fourth in USIP’s Senior Study Group (SSG) series on China’s influence on conflicts around the world. It examines how Beijing’s growing presence is affecting political, economic, and security trends in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The bipartisan group was comprised of senior experts, former policymakers, and retired diplomats. They met six times by videoconference over the course of 2020 to examine how an array of issues—from military affairs to border disputes, trade and development, and cultural issues—come together to shape and be shaped by Chinese involvement. The group members drew from their deep individual experiences working in and advising the US government to generate a set of top-level findings and actionable policy recommen- dations. Unless otherwise sourced, all observations and conclusions are those of the SSG members. Cover illustration by Alex Zaitsev/Shutterstock The views expressed in this report are those of the members of the Senior Study Group alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org First published December 2020.
    [Show full text]
  • India's 2019 National Election and Implications for U.S. Interests
    India’s 2019 National Election and Implications for U.S. Interests June 28, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45807 SUMMARY R45807 India’s 2019 National Election and Implications June 28, 2019 for U.S. Interests K. Alan Kronstadt India, a federal republic and the world’s most populous democracy, held elections to seat a new Specialist in South Asian lower house of parliament in April and May of 2019. Estimates suggest that more than two-thirds Affairs of the country’s nearly 900 million eligible voters participated. The 545-seat Lok Sabha (People’s House) is seated every five years, and the results saw a return to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was chief minister of the west Indian state of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014. Modi’s party won decisively—it now holds 56% of Lok Sabha seats and Modi became the first Indian leader to win consecutive majorities since Indira Gandhi in 1971. The United States and India have been pursuing an expansive strategic partnership since 2005. The Trump Administration and many in the U.S. Congress welcomed Modi’s return to power for another five-year term. Successive U.S. Presidents have deemed India’s growing power and influence a boon to U.S. interests in Asia and globally, not least in the context of balancing against China’s increasing assertiveness. India is often called a preeminent actor in the Trump Administration’s strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Yet there are potential stumbling blocks to continued development of the partnership.
    [Show full text]
  • Jihadist Violence: the Indian Threat
    JIHADIST VIOLENCE: THE INDIAN THREAT By Stephen Tankel Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat 1 Available from : Asia Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org/program/asia-program ISBN: 978-1-938027-34-5 THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a living national memorial to President Wilson. The Center’s mission is to commemorate the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson by providing a link between the worlds of ideas and policy, while fostering research, study, discussion, and collaboration among a broad spectrum of individuals concerned with policy and scholarship in national and interna- tional affairs. Supported by public and private funds, the Center is a nonpartisan insti- tution engaged in the study of national and world affairs. It establishes and maintains a neutral forum for free, open, and informed dialogue. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. The Center is the publisher of The Wilson Quarterly and home of Woodrow Wilson Center Press, dialogue radio and television. For more information about the Center’s activities and publications, please visit us on the web at www.wilsoncenter.org. BOARD OF TRUSTEES Thomas R. Nides, Chairman of the Board Sander R. Gerber, Vice Chairman Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO Public members: James H.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: India
    Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific India Jonah Blank C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR4412z2 For more information on this series, visit www.rand.org/US-PRC-influence Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0650-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: globe: jcrosemann/GettyImages; flags: luzitanija/Adobe Stock Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) National Defense Strategy highlights the important role that U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Promotion of Trade and Investments Between China and India: the Case of Southwest China and East and Northeast India
    PROMOTION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENTS BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA: THE CASE OF SOUTHWEST CHINA AND EAST AND NORTHEAST INDIA BISWA N. BHATTACHARYAY PRABIR DE CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1508 CATEGORY 7: TRADE POLICY JULY 2005 An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1508 PROMOTION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENTS BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA: THE CASE OF SOUTHWEST CHINA AND EAST AND NORTHEAST INDIA Abstract Open regionalism and integration between the world’s two largest developing countries - the People’s Republic of China (China) and India - in trade, investments and infrastructure development can foster outward-oriented development and economic and social benefits that could result in poverty reduction. In view of the increasing trend toward regional integration, particularly the expanded European Union and North American integration, the opportunity costs of not moving toward greater economic integration between China and India involving common neighbouring countries could be increasing. This paper discusses the above subject in the context of possible areas of China - India economic cooperation and integration in the Eastern and Northeastern region of India and Southwestern provinces of China, including neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Nepal. JEL Code: F1, F2, Q1, Q4, R4. Keywords: India, China, economic cooperation and integration, trade, investment and infrastructure development. Biswa N. Bhattacharyay Prabir
    [Show full text]
  • Current Analyses on Shipki-La Trade, Kinnaur 2017
    Ethnologia Polona, vol. 37: 2016 (2017), 31 – 52 PL ISSN 0137 - 4079 CURRENT ANALYSES ON SHIPKI-LA TRADE, KINNAUR, 2017 RAFAL BESZTERDA DEPARTMENT OF ETHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY NICOLAUS COPERNICUS UNIVERSITY IN TORUN, POLAND This paper reflects on the most current trading activities through Shipki Pass in Kinnaur, Himachal Pradesh. Apart from presenting economic data it discusses the background context, political conditions and some future prospects of the trading process. * * * Tekst artykułu omawia współczesne przedsięwzięcia handlowe dokonujące się przez przełęcz Szipki w okręgu Kinnaur, Himaćal Pradeś. Obok danych ekonomicznych przedstawia tło kontekstowe, uwarun­ ko wania polityczne oraz pomysły rozwojowe tej działalności. K e y w o r d s: Himalayas, Kinnaur, trade, Shipki­la, Tibet, China. INTRODUCTION In my own previous publications some false predictions in relation to the declining tendencies of total border trade value through Shipki­la in Kinnaur (Beszterda 2015, 239–259; Beszterda 2014, 117–134) were made. In the light of more recent research findings, I wish to take the opportunity to revise some of my earlier conclusions and interpretations. For readers who are not fully aware of the issue, tax­free border trade between India and Tibet was reactivated in the 1990s. Until this reopening the Himalayan passes had been officially sealed since 1962. The first pass designated for this purpose was Lipulekh in Pithoragarh Distt., Uttarakhand (opened to all intents and purposes in 1992). The second was Shipki­la in Kinnaur Distt., H.P. – the subject of this paper (opened in 1994), and the third was Nathu­la in Eastern Dist., Sikkim (since 2006).
    [Show full text]
  • The China-India Boundary Crisis & Its Implications
    Emerging Global Issues: The China-India Boundary Crisis & Its Implications Tanvi Madan Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy & Director, The India Project, The Brookings Institution1 Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “U.S.-China Relations in 2020: Enduring Problems and Emerging Challenges” Washington, DC September 9, 2020 Chairman Cleveland, Vice Chair Bartholomew and Members of the Commission, thank you very much for your invitation to testify on the China-India boundary crisis and its implications. The China-India relationship has had elements of cooperation, competition and potentially conflict. When they met in October 2019, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian prime minister Narendra Modi sought to stress the cooperative elements in the relationship, which the two countries have tried to increase over the last two decades. However, since the beginning of the year, the novel coronavirus pandemic and the boundary crisis have ensured that the competitive and conflictual elements of the Sino-Indian relationship have dominated—and are likely to persist, if not increase. Recent developments have demonstrated that despite Delhi and Beijing’s efforts to engage and to stabilize their relationship, it remains a fundamentally competitive one that can spillover into conflict. Motives, Timing & Assessments Motives: The motivations for the People’s Liberation Army’s initial moves at the China-India Line of Actual Control (LAC) in May, which Delhi saw as a unilateral attempt to change the status quo, are still a subject of debate. Analysts have put forth various possibilities: a Chinese effort to incrementally salami-slice or nibble its way to additional territory and present India with a fait accompli; a desire to put India in its place; concerns about Indian infrastructure building; Delhi changing the status of Ladakh (separating it from Jammu & Kashmir, and centrally administering it); or as a warning against India further deepening its relations with the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Kmy-Guide.Pdf
    EAST ASIA DIVISION MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS GOVERNMENT OF INDIA KAILASH MANASAROVAR YATRA – 2014 INFORMATION GUIDE FOR YATRIS CONTENTS SL.NO. DETAILS PAGE NO. 1 INTRODUCTION 03 a) Eligibility 03 b) Applying for the Yatra and Selection Process 03 c) Confirmation of Participation by Yatris 03 d) Important Documents 03 e) Fees and Expenditure 04 f) Preparations for the Yatra 04 2 LEGAL 04 3 STAY IN DELHI 05 a) Day-1: Arrival of Yatris in Delhi and Accommodation 05 • How to Reach Gujarati Samaj Sadan 05 b) Day-2: Medical Check-up at DHLI and Chinese Visa 05-06 • How to Reach Delhi Heart and Lung Institute 06 c) Day-3: Medical Tests at ITBP Hospital 06 • How to Reach ITBP Base Hospital 06 d) Day-4: Briefing Session at MEA and Submission of Indemnity Bond 06 4 ROUTE OF THE YATRA 07 a) Delhi to Lipulekh Pass – Table 07 b) Route on Chinese Side – Table 07 c) Return Journey – Table 08 5 YATRA SCHEDULE 08 a) Day-1: Delhi to Almora 08 b) Day-2: Almora to Dharchula 08 c) Day-3: Dharchula to Sirkha 08 d) Day-4: Sirkha to Gala 09 e) Day-5: Gala to Budhi 09 f) Day-6: Budhi to Gunji 09 g) Days-6 and 7: Gunji 10 h) Day-8: Gunji to Navidhang 10 i) Day-9: Navidhang to Lipulekh Pass 10 j) Day-9: Lipulekh Pass to Taklakot 11 k) Days-9 and 10: Taklakot 11 l) Days-11 to 16: Kailash-Manasarovar Parikramas 11 • Parikrama of Mount Kailash 12 • Parikrama of Manasarovar 13 1 | Page SL.NO.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Intelligence : from a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors
    Occasional Paper July 2013 Chinese Intelligence : From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors Ajit Doval, KC Chinese Intelligence : From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors 2 of 28 About The Author Ajit Doval obtained his master’s degree in Economics in 1967 obtaining first position in the University of Agra. He joined the Indian Police Service in 1968 and in 1972 was seconded to the Intelligence Bureau. During over three decades of his service with the Intelligence Bureau, he held many senior positions both within and outside the country including North-East, Sikkim, Punjab, J&K, Pakistan, U.K. etc. In the Headquarters, he headed IB’s operation wing for long years and was founder Chairman of the Multi Agency Centre and Joint Task Force on Intelligence. He retired as Director Intelligence Bureau in 2005. A recipient of Kirti Chakra, one of the highest Defence gallantry awards of the country, Shri Doval was also country’s youngest officer to be awarded prestigious Indian Police Medal for Meritorious Service at the age of 29, a record that he still holds. A graduate of National Defence College, Shri Doval was elected President of the International Association of Chiefs of the Police for Asia and Pacific region in 2004. He is presently Director of the Vivekananda International Foundation, a New Delhi based independent Think Tank and research centre. http://www.vifindia.org © Vivekananda International Foundation Chinese Intelligence : From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors 3 of 28 Chinese Intelligence : From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors Whatever yardstick we choose to apply – size of the economy and its rate of growth, military hardware and pace of modernisation, stability of the polity and the government; size, population and geo-political setting – China qualifies for a major power status.
    [Show full text]