UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021

Geopolitical Refl ections of Sino-Indian Confl ict and its Implication on ’s Survival Strategy

Gaurav Bhattarai

Abstract the geopolitical expression of Sino-Indian confl ict in Nepal, this study reviews ’s Border disputes between and India in perception of Nepal-China relations, and June 2020 almost lead South Asian countries China’s perception of Nepal-India relations. to take a side. But, Nepal, situated between Also, the reports and the press releases of the India and China, has always expressed a Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, historical facts, stern belief in neutrality and non-alignment. treaties, government reports and decisions Even though doubted Nepal’s have been studied and analyzed. Media neutrality and non-alignment citing China’s sources are also reviewed to understand growing footprints in Nepal, Kathmandu the diverse narratives produced on the reckoned such suspicion as the result of a new geopolitical refl ection of Sino-Indian confl ict. map row between two countries connected by The themes that emerged from the reviews open borders. While Nepal’s repeated calls are thematically analyzed and interpreted, to diplomatically resolve India-Nepal border to discover that cultivating relations with problems remained unheeded by New Delhi, one country at the expense of the other may it provided room for the ruling communist be counterproductive to Nepal’s survival party in Nepal to reap geopolitical benefi ts strategies. out of the Sino-Indian dispute. But, interestingly, such geopolitical benefi ts Keywords: Geopolitical Refl ection, Nepal, are usually targeted in tempering Indian Sino-Indian Confl ict, Survival Strategy infl uence in Nepal, by getting closer with China. Apprehending the same, this study Introduction aims to assess the geopolitical implication of In June 2020, the border skirmishes Sino-Indian confl ict on the survival strategy between China and India almost generated of Nepal. To fulfi ll the same objectives, the an obligatory environment for the South Chinese perception of Nepal-India relations, Asian countries to take a side (Zheng, and Indian perception of Sino-Nepal ties 2020). Although Nepal’s foreign policy has have been critically assessed in this study. been driven by unyielding belief in non- This study is methodologically based on the alignment and neutrality (Ghimire, 2020), information collected from the secondary India mistrusted Nepal’s neutrality alluding sources. In order to critically evaluate China’s growing interest in Nepal (Gupta,

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2020). But, Kathmandu deemed such mistrust The survival strategy of Nepal shouldn’t be as the upshot of a new map row between merely understood as a geo-political ambition two countries linked by the open borders directing the country’s foreign policy, while (The Times of India, 2020). Also, Nepal’s the two neighbors are engaged in confl ict. recurrent calls to diplomatically resolve Lack of meticulous diplomacy from Nepal’s India-Nepal border problems (Republica, side may also generate misperception in the 2020) are overlooked by New Delhi. Thus, psyche of neighbors. When a virtual meeting the geopolitical refl ections on Sino-India between the communist parties of Nepal and confl ict in Nepal, today, concentrates on China was organized by Nepal Communist how India’s reluctance has provided space Party’s (NCP) School Department on June for the ruling communist party in Nepal to 19, 2020, Indian media cynically interpreted reap geopolitical benefi ts out of the Sino- Nepal’s healthy bilateral ties with China Indian dispute (Giri, 2020a). Remarkably, by as anti-Indian. Actually, two communist getting closer with China, such geo-political parties had the virtual meeting while the benefi ts are mostly targeted in mitigating bilateral relations between India and China Indian infl uence in Nepal. Nepal’s endeavors had worsened because of border skirmishes for trade diversifi cation, along with the and scuffl es leading to a violent clash along rail projects with China, were also the the disputed border in Ladakh. The virtual result of burgeoning discomfort with New meeting coincided with re-ignition of Nepal- Delhi (Sangraula, 2019). Such geopolitical India border disputes, which not only made refl ections emanating from the Sino-India India cast doubt over Nepal’s neutrality, but dispute is not a new phenomenon in Nepal, also provided an apt opportunity for Indian however. In 1962, when India and China media to endorse the chief’s went to war, there were comments in the press remarks: “Nepal is acting on the behest of arguing that the war was to Nepal’s advantage. someone” (The Wire, 2020). Although the Although Nepal remained uninvolved, meeting was scheduled long before the clash Nepal’s neutrality was disparaged in the between Indian and Chinese troops on June Indian media as anti-Indian and pro-Chinese 15, 2020, the timing was not suitable. Such (Khanal, 2000, p. iii). Still, Nepal has always an avertible geopolitical ambitions drew been balancing both the neighbors with its widespread criticism, not only in New Delhi, foreign policy of neutrality, non-alignment but also in Kathmandu. Foreign policy experts and equidistance, which are also understood and security analysts were heard posing as the survival strategies of the small states the questions like: whether the Sino-Indian in dealing with the anarchic international dispute merely boosts Nepal’s geopolitical system. But, with the Sino-Indian confl ict, drive, or is it disastrous for countries like and its inescapable geopolitical implications, Nepal aspiring to bridge two economic giants. often such strategies have to undergo a India’s spectacular economic performance severe trial. Thus, the aim of this study is and China’s unrivalled development has to investigate how the geopolitical upshots of always given a hope of spillover eff ects to Sino-Indian Confl ict have impacted Nepal’s Nepal, whose search for economic prosperity survival strategy. is dependent on its transit diplomacy (K.C. & Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 75-96). But, quite often, the geopolitical dispute between India

82 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 and China prompts the spirit of geopolitical (Ganguly, 2020). To Nepal, their competition ambition in the leaderships of small states in for infl uence in South Asia remains a major South Asia, and as a result they take no less source of insecurity. Thus, fueling any time to prioritize the interest of one nuclear- thoughts in quest of geopolitical ambitions armed country against that of the other, mostly may prove more hazardous. However, it to protect their government back home, or at doesn’t mean Nepal has to always continue least to prolong their stay in power (Rose, with its conventional ‘survival’ strategy, 1971, pp. 177-207). which is driven either by the 18th century colonial narratives, or the cold-war narratives. Because of the geographical proximity, and But, most of the literature available to us, economic relations the two Asian giants have either prioritized Nepal’s geostrategic have, the relationship between them is often location, or on the possibility for Nepal to labelled as one of the most ‘electrifying’ of derive economic benefi ts from the rise of this century. (Martin, 2015). But, there are India and China. Realizing the same research certain similarities and unusual diff erences gap, this study aims to revisit the impact of in the foreign policy behaviors of India the neighborhood policies of India and China and China, particularly in dealing with the on Nepal’s survival strategy and refl ect on its small countries, like Nepal, whose position relevance amidst the changing geopolitical in international system is conditioned by dynamics in the region. either globalist, Indo-centric or isolationist approaches (Khatri, 1998, p. 12). Historically, Review of Literature Nepal has been balancing relations with its two immediate neighbors (Kissinger, 2014, Available literatures prioritizing on Nepal’s p. 197), to maximize economic growth, geostrategic importance and Nepal’s survival and sustain balanced political stability strategy can be thematically assessed by with both the neighbors. Having adopted classifying into two categories: A.) Geo- the Westphalian model, the two distinct strategic determinism (Dahal, 1998, pp. civilizational entities have been reduced to 25- 51); B.) Economic determinism (KC & geopolitical rivals, today. The communist Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 75-96). Geopolitically, system in China is depicted as a perpetual Nepal’s destiny is linked to the destiny of its threat to India – the world’s largest democracy two immediate neighbors. Both the countries – and thus a rivalry is constituted. Sino- are equally important for Nepal to enhance Indian rivalry has been a constant menace its economic performance. As the geo- to the neighboring countries like Nepal, strategic location between India and China who have been aspiring to draw benefi ts is a principal concern for Nepal’s security from the spillover eff ects of the economic and stability (Bhattarai, 2005, pp. 25-31), development in India and China, particularly the most challenging job for Nepal is to by exercising transit diplomacy (KC & maintain equidistance relations with both Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 75-96). Although India is the immediate neighbors. Exercising the perceived as a rising power, concomitantly, it foreign policy of equidistance is benefi cial has missed numerous opportunities to take its economically and geopolitically, for Nepal’s neighbors, including Nepal into confi dence, survival strategy too (Schmidt & Thapa, and has failed to lead the South Asian region 2012, p .11).

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From the perspective of economic From the perspective of geo-strategic determinism, however, India’s enormous determinism, Gurkha recruitment in Indian economic performance and China’s army has further complicated Nepal’s unsurpassable development has always given survival strategy. At present, over 30,000 a hope of spillover eff ects to Nepal (K.C. & Nepali Gurkha soldiers are serving in Indian Bhattarai, 2018, pp. 75-96). Nepal’s search army (Nepali Times, 2020), and most of them for prosperity can be reinforced with transit are deployed along the Sino-Indian borders. diplomacy (ibid). But, there are instances of If India alludes to growing Chinese presence Sino-India confl ict promoting the geopolitical in Nepal, while doubting Nepal’s neutrality, ambition in the leaderships of small states in China surely fi nds Gurkha recruitment going South Asia, whereby they take no less time to against Nepal’s refusal to take sides. While prioritize the interest of one country against the Sino-Indian rivalry has the elements that of the other, usually to defend their of confl ict, cooperation and competition, regime, or to protect their government back exploiting Machiavellian benefi ts out of the home (Sharan, 2017, pp. 157-166 & Nayak, rivalry might not favor Nepal’s equidistant 2014, p. 102). Also, small countries like Nepal foreign policy. Upon this realization, Nepal are fearful of being trapped in the great power has proposed a trilateral partnership (Giri, rivalry. In the early 70s, China was largely 2016). Thus, Nepal anticipates New Delhi and provoked when the Tibetan Khampa fi ghters Beijing to renegotiate their perceptions about in Nepal had received fi nancial support each other. Although the Xi-Modi Wuhan from the United States (Adhikari, 2012). meeting of 2018 aimed to stabilize relations Recently, following the death of 20 Indian between India and China, their relations soldiers in the most recent skirmish (BBC, today are clearly stirred by border problems 2020a & Gettleman et.al), Nepal’s security and competition for regional supremacy and threat burgeoned (Giri, 2020b), which was global infl uence. Nepal itself views Sino- clearly visible in the press statement issued Indian ties in three diff erent ways. Firstly, as by Nepal on 20th June, 2020 stating that the geopolitical rivals. Secondly, as economic two neighboring countries need to resolve giants. Thirdly, as two distinct civilizational in their dispute through “peaceful means in entities. Thus, the Sino-Indian dispute for favor of bilateral, regional and world peace Nepal shouldn’t just mean an opportunity and stability” (MoFA, 2020). It discerningly to boost its geopolitical ambitions as, owing impacted Nepal’s survival strategy. Although to Nepal’s geostrategic location, cultivating China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and relations with one country at the expense of Indian national security adviser Ajit Doval the other may be counterproductive to the expressed their commitments to disengage raison d’etre of Nepal’s survival capability their troops along the Line of Actual Control (Dahal, 1998, pp. 25-51). (Hindustan Times, 2020b), a future escalation cannot be ruled out. Indeed, just before the But, most of the available literatures on the Galwan crisis, China and India had decided foreign policy of India and China towards to strengthen the spirit of ‘positive consensus’ Nepal have dealt on the issues of security, through eff ective military and diplomatic economics, trade and investment. The communications (Aljazeera, 2020) – still the implication of their foreign policies on Nepal, tragedy befell. have been studied from the perspective of

84 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 dependency theory in political economy, and Discussion and Analysis geo-strategy in strategic studies. The study of the impact of their foreign policy on Nepal’s Nepal’s foreign policy of neutrality and survival strategy, however, will be a new non-alignment in dealing with Sino-Indian attempt, as this study concurrently aims to disputes is understood by the foreign policy unveil the relevancy and appropriateness of experts as Nepal’s survival strategy. But, Nepal’s survival strategy in today’s world. when China and India get closer, “will Nepal Also, it has been realized that there is a be uncomfortable for losing its strategic dearth of literature on how survival strategy space”? (Muni, 2016, p. 8). While Sino- has aggravated Nepal’s small state syndrome. Indian rivalry is a constant threat to the Equally, there is a need to introduce a new neighborhood. Beyond the neighborhood, discourse on how Nepal should go beyond however, the Sino-Indian rivalry is the conventional cliché of survival strategy strategically advantageous to the United and reap the benefi ts out of the eff ective States. It proliferates U.S assertiveness in engagement in the international organizations, the region as India and China may lose their regional bodies and sub-regional entities. image as responsible powers. Even though Upon the same realization, this study calls India is lured to the US-led Indo Pacifi c for further enriching the epistemological Strategy, New Delhi is not comfortable with literature on Nepal’s equidistance, neutrality U.S. assertiveness in its backyard (Hindustan and non-alignment, by assessing their Times, 2020a). China, too, has never been importance while going beyond survival comfortable with the U.S engagement in the strategy. South Asian region. For China, which has left no stone unturned to lure the South Asian Methodology countries towards its Belt and Road Initiative projects, U.S. assertiveness in South Asia This study follows qualitative research will be perilous. When U.S. President Trump design. The philosophic ground of the study tweeted,” United States is willing and able is pragmatic worldview treading on the to mediate or arbitrate their raging border interpretivist epistemological position. The dispute,” (Chiacu & Miglani, 2020), both the research approach is deductive. The reports disputing parties rejected the off er. But, India and the press releases of the Ministry of and China claim that they can resolve the Foreign Aff airs of Nepal and China, and dispute on their own (Laskar & Patranobis, External Aff airs Ministry of India, historical 2020), pointing to the Doklam crisis in 2017 facts, treaties, government reports and which was resolved bilaterally. Zhao Lijian, decisions are studied and analyzed. Reports the director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry published by the prominent think tanks spokesman responded that no third party conducting their research on Sino-India ‘intervention’ is required (Krishnan, 2020). relations are studied. Media sources are The Indian external aff airs ministry also reviewed to understand the diverse narratives stated that India was directly communicating produced on the geopolitical refl ection with China through established mechanisms of Sino-Indian confl ict. The themes that (Laskar & Patranobis, 2020). But the 2+2 emerged from the reviews are thematically talks between US and India indicate India’s analyzed and interpreted. interest to take help of the United States in

85 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 containing China (BBC 2020b; Nichols & attempts to get closer to Beijing (ibid). Miglani, 2020). It may not only alter the Thus, every move Nepal makes towards balance of power in the South Asian region, China is prompted by New Delhi. Firstly, but also has a signifi cant impact on the India attempts to limit Nepal’s engagement survival strategies of the small countries like with China to shape Nepal-China ties in its Nepal, as with 2+2 the U.S. aims to understand favor. Secondly, by exercising interventionist and assess the regional politics from the eyes policies in the neighborhood, India herself of New Delhi. Although Nepal’s strategy, at has pushed Nepal closer to China, which present, has been to await New Delhi and has shaped Nepal-China ties, not in its Beijing renegotiate their perceptions about favor however (Bhattarai, 2020a). When each other, but India perception of Nepal- India announced the new route to Kailash China ties has been more infl uenced by its Mansarovar in the Tibetan Autonomous Himalayan frontier theory that deems China Region of China, via the Lipulekh Pass, as an existential threat (Bhattarai, 2020a). Kathmandu impatiently waited for Beijing’s Consequently, Nepal’s survival strategies of response (The Kathmandu Post, 2020). neutrality, non-alignment and equi-distance Actually, Nepal was aware of the fact have been suspected by New Delhi. how the two nuclear powers had agreed, without Kathmandu’s consent in 2015 to India’s Perception of Nepal-China use the Lipulekh pass, which territorially Relations belongs to Nepal, for trade and pilgrimage Until modern India was established in (The Economic Times, 2015). Only two 1947, the bilateral relations between Nepal weeks after India’s inauguration of the new and China remained largely unharmed, route, Chinese foreign ministry remarked notwithstanding the sporadic presence of India’s announcement of the new road in the British India and as the critical factors trilateral junction, as the unilateral action infl uencing China-Nepal relations during (The Kathmandu Post, 2020). In those two the period of colonialism (Bhattarai, 2020a). weeks, Nepal unveiled a new map indicating But, subsequent to the Indian independence Limpiyadhura, not Lilupekh as the trilateral and Tibet being an integral part of China, junction (The Himalayan Times, 2020). But in the South Asian postcolonial setting, the the Chinese foreign ministry didn’t make it bilateral relations between Nepal and China clear whether Beijing recognizes Lipulekh as have passed through diff erent geopolitical the trilateral border point or accepts Nepal’s realities. Not only because Tibet was no claim of Limpiyadhura (Bhattarai, 2020a). longer between them, but chiefl y because Meanwhile, India’s response was superfi cially of the emergence of an independent India, hostile, reiterating its claim that Lipulekh is which since its independence has perceived Indian territory, and drawing references from Communist China as an existential threat a new map that India published in November (ibid). 2019 that included Nepali territory within India’s borders(ibid). New Delhi thus not Today also, the Indian perception of China- only expressed its reservations over Nepal’s Nepal relations sustains the same existential new map, but also erroneously hauled China threat perception, and because of the same, into the Nepal-India border disputes: Indian New Delhi tries its best in preventing Nepal’s news channels indiscriminately — yet in a

86 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 hilarious manner — held China responsible rejuvenated the colonizers’ security doctrine for Nepal’s issuance of its new map, which for Nepal because it saw its neighbor in the was actually not the case; China in fact northern , bordering China, as part has always wanted Nepal to maintain good of its defense. The 1950 treaty of peace and relations with India. But the Nepali public friendship between Nepal and India was the was astonished to see that India, which shares upshot of India’s “Communist China scare” many affi nities with Nepal, hasn’t actually (ibid). understood the Himalayan country. Most probably, this was due to India perceiving The treaty, for Nepal, is unequal and has Nepal as a security threat emanating from demanded serious revisions (Thapliyal, Beijing (ibid). 2012). New Delhi had signed the treaty with the authoritarian Rana regime in India has shaped Nepal-China relations Nepal, against which the people had fought in diff erent ways. India’s hegemonic to introduce a democratic system in 1950. ambitions, its asymmetrical relations with With the help of the same treaty, India even Nepal, and intermittent use of coercion attempted to limit Nepal’s independent has actually pushed Nepal closer to China. foreign policy, particularly its relations with (Ganguly & Brandon, 2015) Principally, China. Although the treaty did not specify a a regional power is anticipated to project a role for India in Nepal’s foreign aff airs, New sense of accountability towards the region, Delhi used the treaty to ensure that while but the post-colonial India has apparently maintaining relations with China, Nepal chose hegemonic ambitions in dealing with did not overlook India’s security concerns its neighborhood (Bhasain, n.d.). As a result, (Bhattarai, 2020a). For instance, Nepal was most of the South Asian countries have required to consult with New Delhi prior to been obliged to get closer to China. Use purchasing arms from any country other than of coercive measures including blockades India (Subedi, 1994). As late as 1989, when has compelled landlocked Nepal to creep King Birendra considered purchasing arms towards China (Bhattarai, 2020a; Ganguly & from Beijing, India imposed a blockade on Brandon, 2015). Whenever other countries Nepal (IFA, 2013, p. 8). or international organizations eye their considerable presence in the Himalayan Today, India perceives that Nepal’s closer country, it has always made India anxious. relation with China has aggravated the But, it’s not an approach introduced by ‘special’ relations between Nepal and India democratic India itself. Rather, India’s (Singh & Behal, 2020). Indian Nepal experts foreign policy towards Nepal has a colonial are often heard touting Nepal-India relations legacy (Thakur, 2014, pp. 58-64). With the as “special.” But, Nepalis often wonder treaty of Sugauli in 1816, the British East what makes it so special: blockades and India Company restricted Nepal’s strategic interference (Bhattarai, 2020a). In reality, and economic relations with other European the idea of “special relations” is a strategic countries and the United States (Bhattarai, approach that India undertook predominantly 2020a). But following the establishment to limit Nepal’s relations with China (ibid). of Communist China in 1949 and its Entering into a special relationship routinely incorporation of Tibet in 1951, New Delhi overrides other kinds of bilateral relations. Realizing this, King Mahendra in the 1960s

87 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 inaugurated relationships based on equality Indian independence movement; they also over special status, by going beyond the drew support from New Delhi to topple the immediate neighborhood and introducing authoritarian Rana regime in 1950. Almost Nepal to the comity of nations (ibid). While all the mainstream political parties that Nepal a relationship based on equality relies on the has today, from Communist to Congress, process of treating all bilateral relations as Maoist to Madhesh-based, had their political equal, a special relationship favors one over schooling in India (Bashyal, 2016, pp. 31-44 the other. In the name of open borders, cultural & Bhattarai, 2020a). But it is quite surprising affi nity and people-to-people relations, India to hear Indian TV channels imprudently always wanted Nepal to favor it over China. stating that the ruling Communist Party in But King Mahendra’s increasing closeness Nepal has always been closer to China, and with the United States not only caused the is often scheming against New Delhi. Is this Chinese leadership to raise an eyebrow, it a new China scare? (Bhattarai, 2020a) It also obliged Beijing to share with New Delhi shouldn’t have taken much time for Indian the evidence of Nepal’s budding intimacy journalists to understand that India’s actions with the US (ibid). While King Mahendra are actually pushing Nepal closer to China. received a warm welcome in the US from For instance, in 2016, Kathmandu signed a President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967, this transit and transportation agreement with was sure to incite the Cold War anxieties of Beijing that provided Nepal with access Nepal’s immediate neighbors (The New York to the port of Tianjin in China. Previously, Times, 1967). Still, the Chinese act of sharing Nepal had access only to the Calcutta and information not only indicated that Beijing Visakhapatnam ports in India. The agreement valued Indian interests in the region, but also was the consequence of India’s unnecessary refl ected China’s fi rm desire to contain the US attempt to dilute Nepal’s sovereign right to in Asia. Upon learning that King Mahendra promulgate its new constitution, followed by had a heart attack in 1968 while hunting in the imposition of a harsh blockade on Nepal Terai, President Johnson sent a physician to in 2015. This is how India has shaped China- assist the treatment of the king. Throughout Nepal relations: the China scare obliged India his rule, King Mahendra, who died in 1972, to take Nepal into its confi dence, but colonial successfully managed to thwart India’s policy remnants eventually made Nepal seek attempt to limit Nepal’s relations with China refuge with China (ibid). by adroitly balancing Kathmandu’s relations with New Delhi and Beijing (Bhattarai, Although India perceives Nepal-China 2020a). relations through the securitization of its foreign policy, the Gujral Doctrine, a set of The political socialization of Nepal’s leaders principles guiding India’s foreign relations in India (Thapaliya, ‎2019, pp. 142-161) is a with its neighbors( Murthy, 2008), off ered a predominant factor in the way India perceives diff erent approach toward Nepal( Bhattarai, Nepal’s relations with China (Bhattarai, 2020a). Espoused by former Indian Prime 2020a). Had the fi rst generation of leaders Minister Inder Kumar Gujral in 1996, the been educated and socialized in the West, doctrine believed India should not use its things might have been diff erent. But leaders power to demand reciprocity from smaller from Nepal not only actively supported the neighbors (Murthy, 2008). Thus, Nepal

88 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 was free to pursue an independent foreign the Indian establishment. Given that the news policy. Prime Minister ’s media, whether private or state-owned, can “neighborhood fi rst” policy initially echoed infl uence public perceptions, the airing of the spirit of the Gujral Doctrine. But with the unsubstantiated details and cockeyed analysis subsequent adoption of the neo-Kautilayan can contribute to a negative public image approach by Modi, suspicion over Nepal’s about Nepal and China. It may be startling for ties with China grew. Nepal’s entry into the Indian news channels to know that while the China-led Belt and Road and Initiative they were broadcasting misleading reports (BRI) is an apt example and is perceived by portraying Nepal’s new map as a covert act India as hostile. India continues to disparage directed by China against India, Kathmandu China-Nepal ties openly (Bhattarai, 2020a). was waiting for Beijing’s response over the Surprisingly, even Nepal’s sovereign acts are Lipulekh Pass (ibid). It was because the Nepali being seen by New Delhi as Chinese covert public suspected that India’s construction of actions against India. In October 2019, China a new road to Mansarovar was probably the pledged to provide 150 million renminbi in upshot of a 2015 quid pro quo between New military aid to the Nepal Army, predictably Delhi and Beijing over the Lipulekh pass. ringing alarm bells in New Delhi (ibid). China’s Perception of Nepal-India But no Nepali expected that the unveiling Relations of a new map by Kathmandu would be described by Indian defense offi cials as an China has always advised Nepal to maintain act to fulfi l Chinese interests on the Nepal- a healthy relation with the latter’s southern India border. Most possibly, Indian Army neighbor (Giri, 2017) India, despite the Chief General M.M. Naravane’s statement unhidden reality that New Delhi tries to that Nepal ``might have raised this problem” prevent every move made by Kathmandu to (referring to its new map that includes creep closer to Beijing (Bhattarai, 2020a). Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura) “at However, it appears as a mystery for the the behest of someone else” (The Wire, 2020) Nepali folks why China provides counsel to illustrates the new China scare in India. His Nepal in that line. Mainstream experts and remarks came at a time when China and India newspaper reports have surmised that China were experiencing border tensions in the doesn’t want to endanger its relations with mountainous areas of Ladhak and Naku-La. India over Nepal. Equally, it is a matter of Still, it was hardly expected that the world’s perception that itself occupies an important largest democracy would authorize its army place in international relations. How does chief to make unsuitable remarks about China perceive Nepal-India relations then? bilateral relations (Bhattarai, 2020a). General Quite explicable that Beijing reckons Naravane’s hypothetical observations, once Nepal-India relation as more cultural and made, quickly stimulated India’s commercial civilizational one driven by people-to-people TV news channels to portray Nepal-China ties, in comparison to Nepal-China relations relations in an abusive manner. Even though that is signifi cantly driven by the interests of they are private channels, Nepal and possibly the two states (Bhattarai & Ali, 2020). For China might reasonably wonder to what extent Nepalese folks, it’s not diffi cult to infer India’s the Indian media refl ects the perceptions of covert intentions than to merely observe the latter’s overt behaviors. But, historically,

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Nepalese have got very few instances to get Narendra Modi have agreed on Lipulekh acquainted with the Chinese mind (Baral, corridor without Nepal’s consent. The 2020). Thus, hitherto, they have been able to 41-point agreement signed on May 15th, observe only the overt behavior of Chinese. 2015 between China and India called for They have not been able to painstakingly “enhancing border areas cooperation through understand how China actually thinks, when border trade, pilgrimage…and expand it comes to Nepal and Nepal-India relations, border trade at and Qiangla/Lipu- in particular (Bhattarai, 2020b). Lekh Pass and Shipka La”( MEA, 2015). With India’s announcement of the new India considers South Asia as its traditional route for Kailash Mansarovar, which lies sphere of infl uence. However, with the in Tibetan Autonomous Region of China, alarming Chinese presence in South Asia most of the people in Nepal eagerly waited through investment and aids, India’s claim for China’s response over the same. And, over its traditional sphere of infl uence has only after two weeks of the announcement defi nitely shrunk (Ghoshal, 2010 & Bhattarai, of the new route, Chinese foreign ministry 2020b). But such aids and investments are diplomatically stated that no unilateral action the overt behaviors. What covert motives should be done at the trilateral junction. But, trigger such overt actions? The covert intent Lipulekh is not a trilateral junction. Actually, is, probably, not only limited to downsizing Limpiyadhura, the north-western corner of Indian infl uence in the region, because Nepal, is a trilateral junction, and Lipulekh there are some rare occasions where both territorially belongs to Nepal under an 1816 nuclear powers haven’t contested over the treaty with the British East India Company. claims, rather collaborated. India’s recent Already, Nepal has published a new map announcement of the route to Kailash including its territory up to Limpiyadhura, Mansarovar pilgrimage via Lipulekh pass against which India has reservations. Unlike of Nepal is the result of the same kind of China’s, deciphering India’s motives and quid-pro-quo India-China relationship. In intention is not diffi cult for Nepal, however. 2015, when Nepal was hectically engaged Amidst the spread of pandemic, while Nepal in post-earthquake relief, rehabilitation and has closed its land borders with India and reconstruction, India and China, without China, it is startling to see that New Delhi Nepal’s consent, decided to use Lipulekh of has inaugurated a new route for Kailash Nepal as a trading point. The quid-pro-quo Mansarovar pilgrimage via Lipulekh pass agreement between India and China not only that belongs to Nepal (Bhattarai, 2020b). stirred the controversy in Nepal, but also raised questions about the intention of its two What made the route strategic is that its immediate neighbors (The Economic Times, inauguration wasn’t done by the Ministry 2015). Besides anti-Indian sentiments, of Road Transportation and Highways, but the public in Nepal wonders how Beijing by the defense minister himself (The Print, agreed with New Delhi to use this route 2020). Having stationed Indian troops in given that China’s image has always been Nepali land since the 1960s, Indian strategic friendly and welcoming in Nepal (Bhattarai, interest in Nepal exactly dates back to 2020b). Actually, it’s reported that Chinese 1950, when Indian leadership revived the President Xi Jinping and the Indian President colonial posture, perceiving Himalayas as

90 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 the source of defense (Cowan, 2014). It the Nathula Pass is not a year-round route. was on December 6th, 1950 Prime Minister In fact, the pass was closed since the 1962 Nehru stated in the Indian Parliament that India-China war before it was reopened only “from time immemorial, the Himalayas have in 2006 (Bhattarai, 2017). Hence, Lipulekh provided us with a magnifi cent frontier… comes as the best alternative to the Nathula we cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated pass to increase their trade and connectivity because it is also the principal barrier to via land. It’s also notable that the year of India”. Construction of the Indian road 2015 wasn’t the fi rst time when the both linking ’s Pithoragarh with Asian giants agreed upon the Lipulekh Kailash Mansarovar via the Lipulekh echoes route, which territorially belongs to Nepal. the same geographical determinism of India’s Here, ‘historical amnesia’ of Nepal should security interests in Nepal, though the route is be condemned. In 1954, India and China ostensibly identifi ed by India as a pilgrimage had agreed to permit Indian Mansarovar route, “Kailash Mansarovar Yatra”. And it pilgrims to use the Lipulekh Pass for the fi rst is not a mere coincidence that India decided time. Even in 1999 during Indian External to announce the opening of the new route in Aff airs Minister ’s visit to the middle of the lockdown while no pilgrim Beijing, in 2005 when Chinese Premier will be able to travel to Kailash Mansarovar, Wen Jiabao visited Delhi, and in 2014 when at least in the foreseeable future( Bhattarai, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited India, 2020b ). both countries discussed the issue of using Lipulekh route for trade and pilgrimage But, how does China perceive India’s frontier (Dixit, 2020). It clearly indicates that India theory vis-à-vis Nepal? During the Cold and China do not have divergent views on War, China used to perceive the Himalayan Nepal’s claim to Lipulekh. But Nepalese folks frontier as the obsolete bourgeois pleas for shall wonder here why China is planning to imperialist control. When Araniko highway extend the Qinghai-Tibet railway to Nepal’s was being built linking the capital of Nepal border with India as New Delhi and Beijing with the Chinese borders, Chairman Mao have jointly decided to use Lipulekh pass as had commented that “once these roads are trade corridor (Bhattarai, 2020b). opened, India may be a bit more respectable towards you” (Upadhya, 2012). However, While Nepal was waiting for China’s today, accepting India’s new route to Kailash response on India’s construction of road in Mansarovar through Lipulekh not only Nepal’s territory, it was reported that Indian adulterates Nepal’s claim over Lipulekh, but and Chinese soldiers were injured in a cross- also severely exposes the limitation of small border clash during a face-off at a remote states like Nepal (Bhattarai, 2020b). crossing point near Tibet. Once again, it made Nepalese folks wonder about Sino- Now the trade volume between India and Indian relation (ibid) which has the elements China has signifi cantly increased, and they of confl ict, cooperation and competition are eying for all-weather trading route to (Indurthy, 2016). Whenever Nepalese folks further expand their bilateral trade via land. see China and India cooperate on the one side Although the two countries share a 3,488km of Tibetan Autonomous Region, and confront land border, the Nathula Pass is the only on the other side of TAR, they are wondering functioning trade route between them. Even

91 UNITY JOURNAL Volume II, February 2021 how China actually thinks( Bhattarai, 2020b). competition for regional supremacy and global infl uence that have also impacted Kathmandu has always looked up to Nepal’s survival strategies impelled by Beijing, whenever Delhi attempts to dilute Nepal’s foreign policies of neutrality, non- Nepal’s sovereign right as a modern state alignment and equidistance. But, Nepal (ibid). When Nepal promulgated its new doesn’t view Sino-Indian relations only as constitution in 2015, China welcomed it geopolitical rivals, but also as economic unconditionally, whereas India greeted giants, and two distinct civilizational entities, the statute with a blockade that eventually and eventually apprehends Sino-Indian obliged Nepal to sign the Transit and dispute not just as an opportunity to boost its Transportation agreement with Beijing in geopolitical ambitions. Because, cultivating 2016 which provided Kathmandu access to relations with one country at the expense of Chinese port of Tianjin. Today, Nepal has the other may be counterproductive to Nepal’s access to seven Chinese seaports and dry survival strategies. The same realization ports, and Beijing has become a signifi cant has motivated Nepal to exercise a ‘transit player in Nepali politics and economy. But diplomacy,’ so that the Himalaya country despite being a close and friendly neighbor, could benefi t from the spectacular economic Nepal isn’t even sure whether China would development achieved by the two neighbors. respect its territorial integrity or not. Actually, Kathmandu’s lack of surety is undeniably Also this study has emphasized on rise with prompted by its recurrent failures in grasping responsibilities. With the rise of India and how China actually thinks (ibid) In 2015, China economically, their responsibilities Nepal could have understood what China towards the immediate neighbors have also really thought when the latter paid no heed to increased. Thus, while a new world order is the former’s call over Lipulekh. Also, Nepal emerging, Nepal has new aspirations, and could have diplomatically lobbied after 2015, it seeks its neighbors’ support to realize brushing aside the small state syndrome, them eff ectively. Hence, to go beyond the and demanding Beijing not to ink further conventional survival strategies, the new agreements over Lipulekh. foreign policy has already directed the Nepali state in maintaining its relations Conclusion with neighbors, regional powers and great By using a qualitative method, the article powers on the basis of sovereign equality, tried to illustrate the geopolitical impacts mutual respect and mutual benefi ts. While of Sino-Indian rivalry on Nepal’s survival maintaining such relations, Nepal aims to strategies. Geopolitical impacts have been evade all the geopolitical implications, as discussed from the perspective of perception: friendship with all and enmity with none, has how India perceives Nepal-China ties and been the core principle of Nepal’s foreign how China views Nepal-India ties. Although policy, and is relevant too, in going beyond Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian the conventional survival strategies. Prime Minister Narendra Modi endeavored variously to stabilize the bilateral relations between India and China, their relations today are driven by border problems and

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