How to Get Rid of Post-Sovietness?

HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Кyiv 2012 The project was implemented by the Institute of World Policy with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent those of the Black Sea Trust of the Ger- man Marshall Fund.

Study prepared by expert groups:

UKRAINE:

Alyona Getmanchuk Zhanna Bezp’yatchuk Volodymyr Kravchenko Oksana Pyliavets Sergiy Solodkyy

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA:

Leonid Litra Cornel Ciurea Eduard Tugui

GEORGIA:

Teimuraz Kancheli

The Institute of World Policy expresses its sincere gratitude for the support in the realization of the project to Dr. Martin Brusis (Ludwig Maximilian University of Mu- nich), Mr. Volodymyr Fesenko (Center for Applied Political Studies ‘Penta’), Yevhen Golovakha (National Academy of Scinces of Ukraine, Institute of Sociology).

INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………… 4

Politics ……………………………………………………… 6

Society ……………………………………………………… 9

UKRAINE Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Politics ………………… 12

Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society ………………… 41

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics ………………… 70

Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society ………………… 87

GEORGIA

Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics ………………… 103

Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society ………………… 121

10 RECOMMENDATIONS TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS ………………………… 137

3 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

INTRODUCTION

How does the post-Sovietness man- mental changes and correction of be- ifest itself in politics and public life, haviour patterns. and how to minimize its most harm- This study was inspired by the ful displays for the development of a transformational changes that have European state — these are two key taken place in recent years in the questions that the IWP tried to an- three countries of the region. In par- swer in the course of the project «How ticular, in Ukraine, it concerns the to get rid of post-Sovietness?» with coming into power of a team, which the support of the Black Sea Trust for predominantly represents the sector Regional Cooperation of the German which has kept Soviet traditions the Marshall Fund. best. In Georgia, personalities, who Thanks to project partners from were shaped after the Soviet Union Moldova and Georgia, the Institute collapse, initiated radical reforms. In for Development and Social Initia- Moldova, meanwhile, the ruling «Al- tives «Viitorul» and the Georgian liance for European Integration», in Foundation for Strategic and Inter- a short period of time, has changed national Studies, respectively — the the perception of Moldova from the IWP had the opportunity to consid- last bastion of communism in Europe er the issue of post-Sovietness in a to the recognized leader of the «East- broader context. These three coun- ern Partnership» of the EU. In the tries were selected for the study not meantime, post-Soviet attitudes, be- only because all of them were part of haviours and discursive practices are the Soviet Union in the past, but also still very common in all three coun- due to the officially declared inten- tries and hinder their Europeaniza- tions of Ukraine, Moldova and Geor- tion. gia to become full members of the Eu- ropean Union in the future. Because The post-Sovietness in this study in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia only was defined as a kind of socio-politi- regime changes predominantly took cal mutation, when old Soviet values, place unlike the countries of Central practices and standards get modified, and Eastern Europe, where the fall combined, mixed and interlinked with of communism was accompanied by Western counterparts, generating a

4 INTRODUCTION pretty new eclectic context. It is no communication in organizations; re- longer Soviet, but to call it Western jection of any kind of corruption and European is impossible as well. It is the misperception of propaganda in post-Soviet. peaceful times. Sometimes post-Sovietness is pret- The study «How to get rid of post- ty close to Sovietness. Sometimes it Sovietness?» consists of two inter- is quite new socio-political reality in related parts «Politics» and «Soci- which the market has a significant in- ety». It is based on analyses of the fluence. In general, this is quite an post-Sovietness attributes or mani- abnormal status quo, which has to be festations that were identified dur- overcomed. ing brainstormings involving both ex- The post-Sovietness is considered, pert groups from the three countries in this project, as a transit period be- and invited political scientists, so- tween Sovietness and Europeanness. ciologists and researchers of the Ho- Although it is possible that the post- mo Soveticus phenomenon. The Eu- Soviet conditions may appear to be ropean experts, who have venerable much longer than it was expected af- experience of developing methodol- ter the collapse of the USSR. One of ogy in the framework of internation- the proofs of this is the restoration al projects aimed at the evaluation of of Soviet values and attitudes among the transformation processes in po- young people, who were brought up litical management and society, were or even born in already independent involved in the development of this countries and not Soviet republics. research methodology. Also in the framework of the project a relevant When talking about European val- discussion took place in the format of ues, norms and practices during the a video conference with Lev Gudkov, project we had the respect for indi- the president of the Russian Levada viduality in mind, high levels of so- Center - the most recognized research cial trust, social solidarity, limiting institution on the phenomenon of the status privileges of politicians, civil Soviet and post-Soviet man.1 control over the government, moral These attributes were grouped as and/or legal sanctions for public un- follows: attitudes, behaviour patterns truths; information and knowledge and discursive practices. They were exchange for the common good; re- analyzed using various methods and jection of plagiarism; preventative benevolence; the rule of law; social, 1 Lev Gudkov: 20 years after USSR’s col- cultural, political tolerance; high so- lapse the soviet man attitudes re-appear cial mobility based on meritocracy; among young generations, .

5 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? ways of collecting information: opin- infractions has evolved. This is due, ion polls, interviews with experts, not least, to the expectations of the case studies, discourses and content majority of society that believes that analysis. there must be severe punishment and Some of these groups, for example, permanent control. But in the post- attitudes are more applicable to So- Soviet reality, unlike the Soviet, the vietness as such, due to the fact that systems of control and punishment attitudes take much longer to change are ineffective, burlesque and utter- than behaviour and discursive prac- ly corrupt, which only devalues the tices. As for behavioural patterns, post-Soviet state itself. the majority of the attributes in this group are related to the weaknesses of 2. Hierarchy absolutization. It is es- institutions and the situation where pecially inherent in the post-Soviet these institutions are substituted by policy when people’s merits are not personal informal ties. The analysis of determined by the level of their edu- discursive practices was based on pol- cation, knowledge, experience and ex- iticians’ statements, public debates pertise, but by their standing in the and materials published by them etc. hierarchy. Once a person appears in a governing position, they do not per- In each of these groups the attrib- ceive others as equal and do not listen utes present in the three countries to the people that are at least slightly were more or less defined. The overall lower in the hierarchy. structure, which expert groups followed during the preparation of the 3. Intolerance. The post-Soviet pol- study in three countries, was as fol- iticians can openly resort to inciting lows: hatred rhetoric and discriminatory statements in their speeches. There are no penalties, neither moral, elec- POLITICS toral nor legal, for intolerance.

ATTITUDES BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS 1. Total control as necessity. In 1. The dominance of nepotism, cro- post-Soviet countries the practice nyism, favoritism. Links with crimi- in which all decision makers, as well nals on the one hand, and law enforce- as law enforcement officers are con- ment agencies on the other hand, tele- stantly trying to set total control phone law, cronyism and nepotism are and punish severely even for minor the basic tools of lobbying and making

6 INTRODUCTION. Politics decisions profitable for the represent- 5. No sanctions for public lies; pla- atives of authorities and individuals giarism. A characteristic feature of close to them. The laws thus have only the post-Soviet politician is that they a decorative value. Personal contacts can always publicly tell lies and not completely or partially replace formal bear any responsibility for it. Unlike, rules. say, in European countries, moral and formal sanctions for public deception 2. Business on state functions (pow- in politics are largely absent. A re- er as a business project). The system vealed untruth may also not affect the of the state providing services to cit- electoral support of a politician. izens is not aimed at the service, but Many post-Soviet politicians ac- in the making of money using them. tively engage in various forms of pla- The quality of post-Soviet services giarism, again without any penalties. are usually very low, and regulatory approaches are deliberately confused, 6. Status privileges of politicians. creating fertile ground for corrup- Typical post-Soviet politicians try tion. to get the maximum personal benefit from their positions and state re- 3. Prevention and elimination of un- sources, access to which is guaranteed controlled competition. Political lead- by their position. Post-Soviet politi- ers usually choose people for their cians desperately need ostentatious teams who cannot compete with them luxury and the worship of subordi- and challenge them. There are no pre- nates for self-affirmation. There are requisites and conditions for a true special country cottage towns, sur- meritocracy. Political opponents can rounded by high fences, special doc- be withdrawn from political life or tors and health resorts. Double secu- even thrown in jail with the help of se- rity barriers are installed in front of lective justice. buildings, where events involving dignitaries are held. The streets on 4. The dominance of personalization the route of president or prime-min- over the institutionalization. A leader, isters cortege get closed in advance. political persona, in a post-Soviet sys- They without any worry allow them- tem is much more important than any selves and, society allows them to ride institution. The latter can easily be the most expensive cars, use the VIP modified or tailored to the interests lounges of airports and enjoy the best of every politician. service, unaffordable to most citizens.

7 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 3. Rejection of ideologies. The decline of ideologies is a worldwide 1. Paternalism. The post-Soviet pol- trend, but in post-Soviet political cul- iticians like to position themselves as ture ideologies are discredited and de- the masters (owners) of the country, valued far more and for another rea- promising to solve all issues, although son: people got oversaturated with in practice they rarely even solve sim- ideology in Soviet times and today ple problems. Most of them do not in- they want freedom from any political tend to establish a real partnership ideology and politics in general. They between government and civil soci- are more likely to support economic ety. In their opinion, the state must pragmatism or professionalism rath- control and dictate its rules alone. er than any right or left ideology. And even if political parties position them- 2. Propaganda as the basis of po- selves as ideological projects, in reali- litical rhetoric. Even the most power- ty they do not stick to serious ideolog- ful politicians, not just marginal and ical attitudes. radical, use propaganda techniques in their daily political rhetoric. Prop- 4. Critical need for enemies — in- aganda is not seen as something external and external. Post-Soviet politi- traordinary, peculiar in a country cians tend to deliberately create imag- which, for example, is at war. In post- es of enemies — internal and external, Soviet politics the verge between to shift the responsibility of their own propaganda — incomplete or dis- narrow-mindedness, mistakes, fail- torted information about the results ures, ignorance, inability to carry out of the government offices work — reforms and the lack of success stories and political arguments is extreme- onto them. ly subtle. The complete devaluation of words takes place in post-Soviet Obviously, some of the mentioned political reality. The primary mean- attributes are also inherent to politi- ing of what was said gets washed out. cians and societies in Western coun- Words that are uttered by politicians tries in general. The main difference do not have much value. The post-So- lies in the degree of use of such attrib- viet politicians often like to appeal to utes and the attitude to voters and so- democracy, human rights, fair jus- ciety. Because it is clear: politicians tice and values, without being fully behave the way their constituents al- aware of what they are saying. low them to.

8 INTRODUCTION. Society

SOCIETY Soviet era was cultivated by collectivization and industrialization. ATTITUDES 4. Intolerance. Despite the Soviet 1. Paternalism. Post-Soviet people concept of internationalism, post-So- usually consider the state as a sacred viet people are not always willing to almighty authority, which should of- understand and consciously tolerate fer solutions to all problems. The dei- something with a cultural, social, re- fication of the state often leads to the ligious or sexual difference. Especial- opposite effect: rejection of it and an ly, if it differs from their identity and attempt to circumvent all its require- requires efforts to understand. ments. 5. Denial of individuality. Individu- 2. Conformism as a dominant life ality is not a value for the Soviet peo- strategy. Post-Soviet people, when ple. They can be rude to each other, making decisions and producing belittle others, because the individu- plans, often resort to attitudes «What ality and personality of another per- people will say?» or «I want to be like son does not significantly matter to everyone else». Such a strategy in life them. Frequently, the phenomenon hardly compatible with an individual that they do not even appreciate the choice and thinking. The egalitarian value of their own personality can be mentality, developed during the Sovi- observed. et period and multiplied by the inertia of pseudo-patriarchy, is evident. 6. Social alienation. Post-Soviet people feel alienation even from their 3. Belated adoption of innovations closest social and infrastructural envi- and fear of reforms. Even the younger ronment. They can throw out the gar- generation accepts innovations with bage out right where they live, spoil caution. Post-Soviet people do not the walls of their apartment block ele- often understand the meaning of re- vator, feel only minimal responsibility forms, do not accept them and do not for their environment and the level of like changes. They are convinced that interpersonal trust is extremely low. the status quo is always better than changes, even if as a result of these 7. Devaluation of talents, knowledge changes their standard of living will and success. The vast majority of be improved. Fear of reforms in the Post-Soviet people do not know how to

9 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? appreciate the talents, knowledge and dissatisfaction with life as well as the skills of others. They do not support uncertainty in anything and anybody. them for the sake of a better future for all. They have nothing to be proud 4. Preservation of Soviet symbols of. Accordingly, they wish the worst in the infrastructure. Post-Soviet peo- for others. It is a kind of compensato- ple do not feel the need to get rid of ry mechanism for those condemned to the tragic symbols of the past. For hopeless life. example many of them do not mind the demolition of the statues of Len- BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS in and other communist figures. Even of those who are directly to blame for 1. Trade of values. In a post-Sovi- massive repressions and despite the et society, the values which a priori fact that people are aware of these cannot be a subject of trade, are being crimes. Many streets are still named sold and purchased. Ph.D. thesis, di- after communist leaders. plomas, researches and positions has become a subject of corruption and 5. Irrational consumption. Excessive trade in the post-Soviet society. individual consumption by post-Sovi- et people compensates for the histor- 2. Dominance of short-term over ical experience of a deficit economy. the long-term. Due to constant politi- The emphasis on individual economic cal and economic turmoils and uncer- success is needed to stand out in socie- tainty in the country and its own fu- ty, which has not defined its attitudes ture, post-Soviet people have devel- to traditional norms and status priv- oped a habit to only plan everything ileges. The idea of «a status item» is in the short term and they fear having especially common among post-Soviet long term plans or to invest in the fu- people, who are willing to save money ture by different means. They do not on everyday things to acquire status believe in future prospects. items like a mink coat or an expensive car, which are often not cheap. 3. Preventive unfriendliness. Post- Soviet people got used to being un- In the course of the project, it was friendly and rude in everyday life. It also taken into account that certain is particularly acute in services and elements of post-Sovietness are close- phone communication. They are not ly related to signs of a post-totalitari- used to smiling at each other. A rough an society in general, or, for example, manner and aggression act as a pro- some Orthodox traditions. tective shield. This is partly due to the

10 INTRODUCTION. Society

This study did not intend to prove that post-Sovietness is an entirely negative phenomenon. Instead, we focused on the negative aspects, since the primary objective of the study is to identify and recommend how to get rid of post-Sovietness on the path towards the European integration of Ukraine.

The IWP believes that this study is extremely important to the conditions of the transformation processes which are nowadays taking place in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. We also hope that this study will be useful for both the representatives of the political elite and the ordinary citizens to identify and then overcome the wa- tershed between the post-Soviet and European practices and behavioural patterns. Accordingly, it will foster the Europeanization of three countries and the European integration process of Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi.

Viktor SHLINCHAK, Chair of the Supervisory Board Institute of World Policy

Alyona GETMANCHUK, Director Institute of World Policy

11 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

UKRAINE

POST-SOVIETNESS IN UKRAINIAN РOLITICS

Attributes of post-Sovietness are of the bureaucratic personnel, inherit- present in Ukrainian politics both at ed by Ukraine after the collapse of the the level of mental attitudes, and at Soviet Union. Only a cultivated strict the level of the elites’ behavioural hierarchy and bureaucracy reached us patterns. Equally, they are character- during twenty-one years of independ- istic for public discourse as well. ence. But representatives of regional It should be noted that in the early and financial-industrial clans came to 1990’s, the traditional Soviet Union the forefront. process of political elite formation was The Ukrainian elite mostly consists interrupted in Ukraine. At this point, of people who, in the early 1990’s, the political establishment at national were able either to legalize shadow and regional levels was formed mainly capital, or to convert the power and by several groups — the former Com- connections into a capital, or take part munist Party of Ukraine (CPSU) activ- in laundering so-called grey or black ists, Komsomol activists, bureaucrat- money2. Today, the oligarchy, which ic personnel, «red directorate», secu- actually became a source of power at rity officers, dissidents, «tsehoviks» national and regional levels, had a (entrepreneurs who worked illegally great influence in forming the politi- in Soviet time) and semi-criminals. cal establishment. In the 2000’s, the situation changed. The Ukrainian establishment, «Red directors» virtually disappeared which grew out from the Soviet era, from the scene. Not as many security is currently stuck in the transitional officers and dissidents came to power. stage of its development. It already Most of the ex-members of the Komso- mol and party activists preferred busi- 2 Horbulin V., Lytvynenko O., «Na- ness ventures instead of working in tional Security: Ukrainian di- the authorities, only to return to pow- mension», Kyiv, Intertechnologi- ya, 2008, p. 38. http://www. er later (eg Serhiy Tihipko, Oleksan- dsaua.org/index.php?option=com_ dr Zinchenko, Oleksandr Turchynov, content&view=article&id=83:2010-10- Mykola Martynenko and many others). 25-06-34-15&catid=38:2010-09-14-11- There were almost no representatives 22-47&Itemid=71&lang=uk

12 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics differs from the Soviet nomenclature, The average age of the Ukrain- the party and state bureaucracy, there ian political elite today is over 50. is less professionalism and more cyni- Although it is still possible to meet cism since the establishment protects young faces in the parliament, the personal interests. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is But it also differs fundamentally steadily aging. According to the from the European political elite due Ukraine’s National Agency on Civ- to the absence of real Ukrainian state- il Service, when the average age of hood within seventy years. The exist- Yulia Tymoshenko’s government, in ence of the Ukrainian SSR led to the 2005, it was 45 years; in the Cabi- fact that, in early 1990’s, there was net of Ministers of Mykola Azarov, no nation oriented elite, which would it is 53 years.3 Thus, in their vast clearly be aware of goals and tasks majority, the current political elite Ukraine was facing or had a compre- of Ukraine existed under decompos- hensive idea of how to solve existing ing socialism for most of their adult problems and carry out reforms. life. The Ukrainian establishment also differs from the European Un- Moreover, the world-view and ion and the United States in its lack value system of the vast majori- of firm mechanisms for reproducing ty of modern Ukrainian politicians elite through competition and unhin- was formed under the USSR educa- dered career development. This repro- tion system that was known as «the duction process in Ukraine is virtu- forge of socialist personnel.» Such ally out of societies control; largely, Soviet educational background only the career of the establishment’s rep- strengthens post-Soviet attitudes of resentatives is determined by person- political leaders in Ukraine, narrow- al loyalty while professional education ing their horizons and limiting their and work experience are sporadically willingness to accept and imple- in demand. ment reforms to a European stand- Thus, it is no coincidence that there ard. In comparison, the situation in is any «counter-elite» system, despite Georgia was quite different, when the fact that opposing clans gener- most of the ministers of the gov- ate some semblance of political strug- ernment which carried out reforms, gle that is actually waged for power, resonance for post-Soviet territo- which will eventually allow taking ries, received a western education. control of financial resources. There- fore, even the Orange Revolution did 3 «Эликсир Топ-молодости»-Top not lead to a significant and substan- theme — «Expert» #8(294) March 07, tial renewal of the establishment. 2011.

13 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Recently, Ukraine’s southwest- quality of governmental personnel ern neighbor, Moldova confidently recruitment (table 1). caught up to Georgia concerning the Table 14

Ukraine Georgia Moldova Viktor Yanukovych, Mikheil Saakashvili, Nicolae Timofti, President of Ukraine President of Georgia President of Moldova 1) Donetsk Polytech- 1) Institute of International Re- nic Institute lations of Taras Shevchenko Na- State University of Mechanical Engineer tional University of Kyiv Moldova, Law Fac- 2) Ukrainian Acade- 2) Columbia University ulty my of Foreign Trade 3) The George Washington Uni- versity 4) Strasbourg University 5) Academy of European Law, Florence 6) Hague Academy of Interna- tional Law

Mykola Azarov, Vano Merabishvili, Vladimir Filat, Prime Minister of Prime Minister Prime Minister Ukraine of Georgia of the Republic of Moldova Lomonosov Moscow Georgian Technical University, State University Faculty of Mining 1) Cooperative Col- lege of the Republic of Moldova 2) University of Al- exandru Ioan Cuza in Iaşi — Law Depart- ment

4 The table was composed in September 2012, before the composition of a new government in Georgia based on results of parliamentary elections in October 2012

14 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics

Valeriy Giorgi Baramidze, Eugene Karpov, Khoroshkovskiy, Vice Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister First Vice Prime Minister for Euro-Atlan- Minister of Ukraine tic Integration 1) National School of Politi- cal and Administrative Stud- Taras Shevchenko 1) Department of Chemi- ies (Bucharest)-Public Admin- Kyiv State Universi- cal Technologies of the istration Department ty, Law Department Georgian Technical Uni- 2) State University of Moldo- versity va, Law Faculty 2) George C. Marshall Mihai Moldovanu, Center for European Se- Deputy Prime Minister curity Studies and De- fense Economics, Ger- 1) Medical College Orhei many 2) State Medical and Pharma- ceutical University of Nicolae Testimitanu 3) School of Public Health Management

Raisa Bohatyriova, Zurab Tchiaberashvili, Andrei Usatîi, Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Health, Labour and Minister of Health Minister of Health Social Affairs 1) State Universi- 1) Kharkiv Medical 1) Faculty of Philosophy, Tbilisi ty of Medicine and Institute State University Pharmacy of Nicolae 2) Law Faculty at 2) Institute of Philosophy, Geor- Testimitanu Taras Shevchenko gian National Academy of Sci- 2) Central Institute Kyiv National Uni- ences of Advanced Science versity for physicians, Mos- cow 3) York University 4) Michigan State Univeristy

15 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Sergiy Tigipko, Valentina Buliga, Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Labour, Minister of Social Social Protection Policy and Family

Dnipropetrovsk Met- 1) State Universi- allurgical Institute ty of Medicine and Pharmacy of Nicolae Testimitanu 2) Academy of Pub- lic Administration of the President of the Republic of Moldova

Borys Kolesnikov Ramaz Nikolaishvili, Anatol Salaru, Vice Prime Minister, Minister for Regional Develop- Minister of Trans- Minister of Infra- ment and Infrastructure port and Road Infra- structure structure 1) Georgian Technical Institute 1) Donetsk Techni- 2) Tbilisi State University State Medical Uni- cal secondary school 3) Tbilisi State University versity of trade 2) Donetsk State University of Man- agement Petro Poroshenko, Vera Kobalia, Valeriu Lazăr, Minister of Econom- Minister of Economy and Sus- Minister ic Development and tainable Development of Economy Trade 1) King George Secondary School, 1) State Agrarian Department of In- Canada University of Moldo- ternational Rela- 2) British Columbia Institute of va, Department of tions and Interna- Technology (business Administra- Mechanization and tional Law of Taras tion and Informational Technolo- Authomatization Shevchenko Na- gies) 2) European Insti- tional University of tute of Public Ad- Kyiv ministration (Brug- es) 3) International In- stitute of Public Ad- ministration (Paris)

16 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics

Yuriy Kolobov, Dimitri Gvindadze, Veaceslav Negruta, Minister of Finance Minister of Finance Minister of Finance

1) Dnieper State 1) Tbilisi State Technical Univer- 1) Academy of Eco- Academy of Con- sity nomic Studies of struction and Archi- 2) Diplomatic Academy of Paris Moldova tecture 3) Hague International Institute 2) Joint Vienna In- 2) V. Karazin of Social Studies stitute Kharkiv State Uni- 4) John F. Kennedy School of versity Government at Harvard Univer- 3) Kyiv Higher sity School of Finance, 5) International Monetary Fund 4) International Institute Business Institute

Mykhailo Kulynyak, Nika Rurua, Boris Focşa, Minister of Culture Minister of Culture and Monu- Minister of Culture ment Protection 1) Tchaikovsky Na- 1) State Universi- tional Academy of 1) Faculty of TV Directing at Tbi- ty of Arts, Theatre Music (Kyiv Con- lisi State Shota Rustaveli Insti- Department, drama servatory) tute of Theatre and Film Theatre Director 2) International Sci- 2) Georgia State University Col- 2) Apprenticeship in entific and Technical lege of Law (USA) the USA in Artistic University Management 3) National Acade- 3) Academy of Pub- my of Public Admin- lic Administration istration under the of the Government President of Ukraine of the Republic of Moldova

17 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Dmytro Tabachnyk, Khatia Dekanoidze, Maia Sandu, Minister of Edu- Minister of Education and Sci- Minister of Educa- cation, Youth and ence tion Sports Tbilisi State University, Faculty 1) Academy of Eco- History Depart- of International Relations nomic Studies of ment at Kyiv Taras Moldova Shevchenko Nation- 2) Academy of Pub- al University lic Administration of the President of the Republic of Moldova 3) The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Har- vard University

Vitaliy Bachana Akhalaia, Dorin Recean, Zakharchenko, Minister of Internal Affairs Minister of Internal Minister of the In- Affairs terior Tbilisi State University, Law Fac- ulty 1) Academy of Eco- 1) Riga Special Sec- nomic Studies of ondary School of Mi- Moldova, Interna- litia of Interior of tional Business Man- the USSR agement 2) Riga branch of the 2) Newport Universi- Minsk Higher School ty Belgium branch of Interior of the USSR 3) National Acad- emy of Internal Af- fairs of Ukraine 4) Poltava Economy and Trade Univer- sity

18 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics

Kostyantyn Grigol Vashadze, Iurie Leancă, Hryshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs and Europe- Affairs 1) Moscow State Institute of In- an Integration ternational Relations Moscow State Insti- 2) Diplomatic Academy (Tbilisi) State Institute of tute of International International Rela- Relations tions of Moscow

Oleksandr Zurab Adeishvili, Oleg Efrim, Lavrinovich, Minister of Justice Minister of Justice Minister of Justice 1) Faculty of Law, Tbilisi State State University of 1) Physics Depart- University Moldova, Law Fac- ment of Kyiv Taras 2) Institute of State and Law ulty Shevchenko Nation- 3) Law Faculty at University of al University Groningen 2) Yaroslav Mudry National Law Acad- emy of Ukraine

Yuriy Boyko, Alexander Khetaguri, Minister of Energy Minister of Energy and Coal Industry 1) Faculty of Energy (Master of Mendeleyev Moscow Energy Management) Institute of Chemi- 2) Courses on Regulation of Com- cal Technology munal Facilities and Strate- gies within the framework of the World Bank program (Florida) 3) Tbilisi Business and Marketing Institute (Master of Accounting and Audit)

19 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Dmytro Salamatin, Dimitri Shashkin, Vitalie Marinuţa, Minister of Defence Minister of Defence Minister of Defence

Mining Faculty of 1) Faculty of International Law 1) Military School of Karaganda Poly- at Aristotel Greek-Georgian Uni- Air-Borne of the city technic Institute versity of Riazani; Military 2) Law Faculty at Tbilisi State Translator (French University language) 2) U.S. Army Com- mand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth) 3) Naval Post-Grad- uate School of the city of Monterey, California) 4) Department of In- ternational Rela- tions at the Univer- sity of European political and economic studies

Serhiy Arbuzov, Giorgi Kadagidze, Dorin Dragutanu, Governor of the Na- Governor of the National Bank Governor of the Na- tional Bank tional Bank 1) European School of Manage- Donetsk State Uni- ment (Business Administration) University of Alex- versity 2) Preston University andru Ioan Cuza in 3) Georgian Institute of Public Iaşi – Finance and Affairs Bank Administra- tion Department

A notable feature of the Ukrain- especially in behavioural patterns. ian political establishment is also its American researcher Paul D’Anieri, conventional division into several who has been working in Ukraine for a groups. Despite the overall similar- long time, distinguishes two groups of ity of positions, these groups have a Ukrainian politicians in this context: number of distinct characteristics, «Donetsk» and «Dnipropetrovsk»

20 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics

Table 2 Donetsk Dnipropetrovsk • post-Soviet identity, which incorporates • effective use of populism and po- particular respect for Soviet past and com- litical technologies mitment to the practices of the 1990’s • the ability to manipulate groups • understated assessment of public policy of different ethnic and cultural and soft power methods and values identities • pragmatism, a tendency to reach agree- • tendency to ideological mimicry ments only with those who are «friends»

• inability to achieve political goals using political methods ones (today, the specific emphasis is Sovietness. And when the «Donetsk» on the Donetsk group, because it is in ones tend to use hard power, black- power). Of course, Ukraine’s politi- mail and pressure, «Dnipropetrovsk cal spectrum has wider regional rep- group» prefers more sophisticated resentation, but such division is pri- political techniques and manipula- marily determined by world-view and tive methods. Representatives of the behavioural models (table 2).5 «Donetsk» group follow a definite position in their political career and do In general, it should be noted, that not go beyond the ideological bound- Soviet attitudes prevail among rep- aries defined by the party leadership. resentatives of the «Donetsk» wing, The «Dnipropetrovsk group» feels while the «Dnipropetrovsk» wing is comfortable in any coordinates of an the embodiment of post-Sovietness. ideological system, depending on cir- Representatives of the «Dnipropetro- cumstances, and does not scorn ideo- vsk» elites adapted faster to new re- logical mimicry. alities after the collapse of the USSR, Unfortunately, the post-Soviet- while eastern regions of Ukraine more ness, which was envisaged as a tempo- or less continue to remain a basin of rary state dragged on for many years and became a distinctive feature of the Ukrainian establishment. Post- 5 Table based on Paul D’Anieri, ed., Or- Sovietness is an unnatural symbiosis ange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobili- zation, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine of verbally declared commitment to (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

21 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? democratic institutions and exercised their formation, and possible options undemocratic practices.6 for their further modifications. This state of society is also explained by the fact that the post-So- ATTITUDES viet political system is not able to regenerate itself. Post-Soviet institu- At the level of attitudes, post-Sovi- tions tend to self-reproduce, as they etness often attains characteristics of stimulate people to make every effort a classic Soviet system. This is logical, in order to get any benefit within the since attitudes* change much slower framework of existent system, not than behavioural patterns or discur- to change it, or break it. In Ukraine, sive practices. we see young politicians who do not One of the most important atti- remember the Soviet Union but eas- tudes functions for public conscious- ily adopt Soviet behavioural patterns ness is to function as a barrier. Deep- and adapt to the current situation.7 rooted in the consciousness of society, the attitude simply weeds out any Thus, today, the Ukrainian estab- information that could contradict it. lishment continues to live in its own Thus, the Soviet way of the thinking world of impunity, irresponsibili- of the political elite is often unable to ty, limited perception of the outside accept alternative standards and prin- world and primitive in solving the in- ciples. ternal problems of the country; in a Commitment to European values, world, where personal, corporate and loudly declared by many politicians in regional interests prevail over na- Ukraine is rather a tribute to modern tional ones within governing struc- trends than genuine conviction. Such tures. a combination of deep Sovietness with European aplomb results in specific Let’s examine the post-Sovietness controversy and ambivalence natural attributes inherent in the modern for the attitudes of post-Soviet politi- Ukrainian political establishment in cians. more detail, focusing on features of In this study, we focused on the most common attributes of post-

6 Interview of the IWP conducted in the partnership with leading research fel- * It should be noted that we use the term low of the Institute of Political and Eth- «attitude» in this context to designate nic Studies of the National Academy of internal, often even subconscious, per- Sciences of Ukraine Galyna Zelenko. son’s tendency to react to certain situa- 7 Interview of the IWP with Paul d’Anieri tion changes in the way they are used to.

22 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics

Sovietness, summarizing them ac- ed from loyal party members by more cording to the following categories: than a dozen bodyguards8. need for total control; absolutization However, such fears, which could of power hierarchy and intolerance. be attributed not only to the President Yanukovych, are caused also by the Total control as necessity. Accord- prior experience of interacting with ing to the precepts of Vladimir Lenin, the criminal world that almost every socialism is primarily accounting and major political player in Ukraine has control. After adding supervision of somehow faced them.9 control, inspection of supervision and In such system of coordinates, the observation of inspection to this Sovi- desire to retain power is a natural im- et recipe we receive a widespread post- pulse, dictated by the instinct of self- Soviet attitude. The post-Soviet poli- preservation.10 The formula for suc- tician seeks to control everything and cess in this case is very simple, if one always reacts, extremely painfully, to wants to hold then the one has to be any delegation of authority. able to control. It is clearly illustrat- Turbulent 1990’s, years of shaped by the assertion of the second pres- ing the Ukrainian political establish- ident of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma. In ment, significantly contributed to the an interview before the publication of strengthening of this attitude. Abil- his memoirs «After Maidan», he said ity to control everything that hap- «Anyone, who knows the secret of pens in your patrimony sometimes Ukrainian politics, will never say that saved lives, but the loss of vigilance, during my term the country was ruled in turn, often led to irreversible con- by «oligarchic»capital. I ruled them sequences. Total distrust in the surroundings, natural for Soviet leaders, 8 Yanukovych had 15 bodyguards at the is also a feature of their post-Soviet Congress of the Party of Regions // successors. The most striking example Press Agency: http://ipress.ua/news/ is the current President Viktor Yanu- na_zizdi_partii_regioniv_yanukovy- kovych. For instance, at the Congress cha_stereglo_15_ohorontsiv_5400. of the Party of Regions on July 30th, html 2012, Viktor Yanukovych was guard- 9 Interview of the IWP with Deputy director of programs for Russia and Eura- sia at the Carnegie Endowment in Wash- ington, Matthew Rojansky 10 Script of the video conference with Lev Gudkov, Director of Levada Center (Russia) //The Institute of World Pol- icy, June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org. ua/ukr/public/569.html

23 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? all «with a rod of iron.» I would rath- as Minister of Defence many experts er agree with those who called my re- did not see a selection of profession- gime authoritarian.»11 al qualities, but rather a selection of Traditional Soviet methods often people on the parameters of personal help to hold everyone with an «iron commitment and the willingness to fist.» For example, as recognized in fulfil any order from the President. many departments, the Ukrainian Vitaliy Zakharchenko, the Head of administrative system inherited the the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Soviet principle where there are rep- Oleksandr Klymenko, the Head of the resentatives of intelligence agencies State Tax Service, are connected by a among the top managers of each min- long term trusting relationship with istry. They regularly «report» to the Oleksandr Yanukovych, the eldest son top leadership of the country in cases of the President.12 of dissent or signs of disobedience in The absurdity of the post-Sovi- the hierarchy of power. et system is that such a comprehen- It should be underscored that in- sive control practically does not intelligence services continue to play a volve the responsibility for decisions particular role in the post-Soviet po- taken by executives. In a conversa- litical systems. They are rather a tool tion with an expert of the Institute to protect interests (including busi- of World Policy, the Ukrainian offi- ness ones) of senior officials, not law, cial who worked within state struc- as it is accepted in democratic coun- tures for more than fifteen years stat- tries. The vivid example is especial- ed «our post-Sovietness is primarily ly common phenomenon in Ukraine is manifested in the fact that everyone «raiding» (ie takeover of companies manages and controls everyone, but with help of intelligence services staff no one is responsible for anything.» A on the basis of contradictory and not former head of a Ukrainian represent- always legal court decisions). ative office of a foreign fund, who has In order to establish control, post- lived in Ukraine for a long period of Soviet leaders often appoint particu- time, also agrees with this. Accord- larly trusted people, mostly relatives, ing to him, most western diplomats to key positions. This way is more re- have the impression that people go in- liable and safer. For example, in the to politics in Ukraine not to make de- appointment of Dmytro Salamatin cisions. The people in government obviously have completely different mo- tivation, and decisions are only made 11 Leonid Kuchma: I ruled them all «with a rod of iron» – Rossiyskaya Gaze- ta №4349, 24.04.2007// http://www. 12 «The total strenghening of the family», rg.ru/2007/04/24/kuchma.html Glavcom.ua, November 7, 2011.

24 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics when there is absolutely no chance to «Even Laozi said: «More laws — more avoid it.13 Moreover, the characteris- bandits»15. As a result, total control tic feature of post-Soviet members of actually turns into complete lack of the administrative staff, both in poli- control and chaos. This, in turn, stim- tics and in any other field, is a tenden- ulates certain electoral expectations cy to shift the responsibility onto the and nostalgia for the Soviet «order,» shoulders of executive officers and cosy for an ordinary citizen. severely punish subordinates for the The ghost of the «strong» (but al- slightest mistake. ways fair) hand still roams across the post-Soviet space. For example, ac- The former Latvian President, cording to the results of sociological Vaira Vike-Freiberga, also discussed monitoring «Ukrainian society,» the the sense of responsibility of post-So- percentage of respondents who agree viet politicians in the course of the with the statement «Few strong lead- videoconference with the Institute ers will be able to restore order in the of World Policy «the main difference country faster than making new laws between the post-Soviet and West- and debates» increased from 52.3% ern politicians are their attitude to in 1992 to 63.5% in 2010.16 And the work, to the position, to the author- «European Values Study» survey, ity, which is caused by the position’s conducted in 2008, contained quite duties and sense of responsibility to frightening figures about 66.8% of the people and to history.»14 interviewed Ukrainians tend to per- Even the high level of legislative ceive a strong leader in power, who is regulation is unable to overcome the not burdened by legislative offices and atmosphere of permissiveness and elections, positively, and only 33.2% impunity that prevails in Ukrainian believe such phenomenon in politics politics. Commenting on the Ukrain- to be negative.17 Interestingly, in the ian experience of reforms, an ideolo- same survey, 72% of respondents say gist of Georgian reforms Kakha Bend- that the best form of government for ukidze stated that it is excessive over- regulation that promotes corruption.

13 Interview with a former head of repre- 15 Georgian kitchen. — «Forbes Ukraine», sentative office of an international fund №6(16) June 2012. in Ukraine. 16 Ukrainian society 1992-2010. Social 14 Vaira Vike-Freiberga. Female politi- monitoring. // Institute of Sociology – cians need assistance. – The script of Kyiv, 2011 a video conference at the Institute of 17 European values Study Survey,Ukraine World Policy. — http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/

25 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Ukraine is democracy.18 This, in fact, professionalism. In Ukraine, very of- most clearly demonstrates the duality ten, competent people remain in the of consciousness of a post-Soviet per- lower positions, while they are man- son. aged by very narrow-minded individuals. In Western political systems, Hierarchy absolutization. Ukrain- such situation occurs rarely. 19 ian politicians, unlike their Western Prerequisites for keeping this trend counterparts, are characterized by are serious. According to the «Euro- their anxious attitude to their official pean Values Study» survey, 37,2% portfolios and chairs. The lucky ones, Ukrainian will follow the instructions who step up in the hierarchy, almost of a senior management, even if they instill their subordinates with awe, disagree with them.20 This trend is al- and at the same time completely lose so traced in the political sphere. all their importance and vanity in the While observing the Ukraini- offices of their own bosses. Modern an multi-party system, the famous Ukrainian political management is in- dictum of the former Ambassador herent in increased, sometimes delib- to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin, erately underlined, respect of subor- comes to mind «whatever party we try dination. The experts, familiar with to create we end up with the CPSU!» the internal Ukrainian political real- Faith in the wisdom of party leaders ities, off the record recall many ex- sometimes takes grotesque forms. amples when senior officials who just For example, the member of the Par- a couple of seconds ago reprimanded ty of Regions, Elbrus Tedeyev, in his their subordinates, disregarding ex- interview with the information-ana- pressions, then cowardly and obedi- lytical agency «Glavkom» stated «for ently were squeezed for hours in the me, Victor Yanukovych, literally and waiting rooms of senior management. figuratively, is the God and the tzar. A well-known European diplomat, He is Ukraine’s only hope, who can who faced Ukrainian political reali- get us out of the economic disaster ties, indicates that the hierarchy itself is not a problem. According to him, hierarchical management structures are quite common in the West too. The destructive role of the hierarchy in the post-Soviet context is that it is not based on competence and 19 Interview of the IWP with a diplomatic representative 18 European values Study Survey, Ukraine 20 European values Study Survey, Ukraine — http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/ http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/

26 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics and political chaos that was here all both businessmen and government this time ...»21 representatives.23 However, not all party members The fact that ordinary party mem- call Viktor Yanukovych the tzar. bers are hardly involved in the devel- Most often the word «leader» is used opment, adoption and implementa- regarding him. In such a form of ad- tion of any decisions also underline dress, political analyst, Dmytro Vy- the distance between the party lead- drin sees a «softening» of the political ers and the latters. The most striking sphere, giving politicians some nick- example is the unanimous voting in names that is, probably, a worldwide the parliament by entire factions ac- practice, not only related to post-So- cording to the instructions of the fac- vietness.22 Ukrainian political analyst tion leader, the party conductor. Such Viktor Nebozhenko disagrees with a practice is especially well adopted him and considers such nicknames in the Party of Regions, whose rep- to be specific post-Soviet legacy. Ac- resentatives vote with the wave of a cording to him, the nickname «lead- hand by Mikhail Chechetov. No con- er» contains rather skeptical atti- vocation of the Verkhovna Rada of tude. «Today, «leader» has ironic con- Ukraine goes without the procedure notation. «Leader» is rather the one of voting by cards for absent MPs, who cannot cope with his duties,» — which was nicknamed by the people as the expert says. A different situation «playing the piano.» was observed under the second Pres- Duality is a distinctive feature ident of an independent Ukraine, Le- of the post-Soviet hierarchy absolu- onid Kuchma, whose most popular tization in politics. Besides the for- nicknames were «Dad» or «Daddy.» mal hierarchical structure, there is The nickname «Daddy» means recog- a «shadow» hierarchy, consisting of nition of leadership, inherent, prima- the leaders of large financial-indus- rily, in mafia structures», — the ana- trial groups involved in the political lyst explains, adding that such an ex- process. Usually, they do not occupy pression of mafia «affinity» satisfied high positions in executive authorities in order to avoid excessive public- ity. These include Rinat Akhmetov, Dmytro Firtash, Oleksandr Yanuko- vych etc. 21 Elbrus Tedeyev: Viktor Yanukovych is the Tsar and God for me// Glav- In summary, hierarchy remains to com News Agency http://glavcom.ua/ be a regular form of building political articles/2013.html 22 Interview of the IWP with Dmytro Vy- 23 Interview of the IWP with Viktor drin Nebozhenko

27 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? relationships in Ukrainian post-So- system left a significant imprint in viet politics. Hierarchical structures the set of values of the political estab- appeal to the post-Soviet man (and lishment. For a Post-Soviet politician not just a politician) by its simplici- it is difficult to understand the need ty. Hierarchy for the average Ukrain- to adopt behaviours and beliefs that ian primarily represents stability and differ from their own.25 the usual order of things; hierarchy is Now, we observe the situation a condition when you know to whom where political leaders, regardless of you have to refer, how much and to ideological beliefs, express intoler- whom you must pay to ensure the solu- ance towards political opponents and tion to a problem. That’s why, Ukrain- their constituents, to members of oth- ians, unlike, for example, Americans, er races and nationalities, as well as are more sluggish in terms of career representatives of sexual minorities. growth. They are much more comfort- Intolerance towards own people is a able to stay in a usual place.24 Indeed, a distinctive feature of Ukrainian post- close intertwining of the political and Sovietness. The phrase uttered by Vik- financial components is a distinctive tor Yanukovych (at that time a presi- feature of the Ukrainian state and par- dential candidate) on October 21st, ty hierarchy. This is a prerequisite for 2004 at a meeting with voters in Lu- the emergence of complex structures, hansk is a landmark in this context «I within which peculiarities of subor- believe that there are much stronger dination are clear to a narrow range and healthier people than these jerks of political process actors. It serious- that hinder us to live!» The citizens ly undermines the principle of the of Ukraine, who supported another transparency between political actors, presidential race participant, Viktor which is inherent in European systems Yushchenko, fell in the category of and negatively affects the process of those who «hinder to live».26 In this making political decisions and effec- context it is relevant to mention the tiveness of their implementation. odious Minister of Education, Youth and Sports, Dmytro Tabachnyk, who Intolerance. Many post-Soviet pol- has repeatedly indulged intolerant iticians in Ukraine are alien to the principles of tolerance. Is this the leg- 25 Interview of the IWP with Matthew Ro- acy of the post-Sovietness or a par- jansky ticularity of cultural development? 26 20 of the most iconic statements of The experience of being in the Soviet Ukrainian politicians / / Comments, 25.08.2011 http://politics.comments. 24 Interview of the IWP with Matthew Ro- ua/2011/08/25/283190/20-naibolee- jansky znakovih.html

28 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics remarks against the Galicians, citi- it may not happen soon: homopho- zens of Ukraine who live in the west- bic attitudes prevail in the Ukrain- ern part of Ukraine, mostly in the ian society, and in recent years this Lviv region. According to the theory trend has only intensified. Accord- of Dmytro Tabachnyk (by the way, he ing to the study, conducted in March holds Ph.D. in history) a special psy- 2011 by sociological company «TNS chotype of people was formed in west- Ukraine,» the question if citizens of ern Ukraine, who are «ready to agree Ukraine, who have a homosexual ori- with their owner to his face, who are entation, should have the same rights willing to praise and adore him, and as other citizens of the country, re- at night with the same composure and ceived positive response only by 36% thoroughness cut his throat.»27 of respondents (in 2002 — 43%, in Ukrainian politicians are not al- 2007 — 34%). The option «No, there ways politically correct in their state- must be some limitations» was select- ments concerning other nations. Re- ed by 49% of respondents (in 2002 — peatedly, manifestations of ethnic 34%, 2007 — 47%).28 The leader of intolerance were expressed by Oleg the LGBT movement in Ukraine Svy- Tyahnybok and his political allies of atoslav Sheremet noted that often the party «Svoboda» («Freedom»), the ideas of rejecting gays are inter- which represents the extreme right linked with the ideas of the «Ruskiy wing of Ukrainian politics. Mir» («Russian world»), annexation Another issue is the discrimination of Crimea to Russia, the entry into against sexual minorities. According the Eurasian Union.29 to estimates of «Nash svit» organi- In Ukraine, homophobia is nour- zation, representatives of the Com- ished not only by religious beliefs, but munist Party of Ukraine are the most also by the Soviet legacy since the mid- aggressive towards homosexual citi- 1930s, prosecution for homosexuality zens. Other political forces either ig- was introduced in the USSR. In the nore these issues, using the presence scientific and educational literature, of other major problems as an excuse, or they express willingness to actively promote tolerance, but only if Ukrain- 28 Step forward and two steps back. Homo- phobic attitudes in the Ukrainian soci- ian society is inclined to it. Howev- ety // http://maidan.org.ua/2011/12/ er, as confirmed by the opinion polls, krok-vpered-dva-nazad-homofobni-nas- troji-v-ukrajinskomu-suspilstvi/ 27 The propaganda attack. Ukrainskiy Ty- 29 Statement of Svyatoslav Sheremet, gden, № 17, April 30 — May 6, 2010 / / leader of Gay-Forum, Rosbalt Ukraine, http://www.ukrrudprom.com/digest/ http//www.rosbalt.ru/ukraina/ Ataka_agtpropu.html 2012/05/28/985979.html`

29 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? homosexuality was considered only as anti-discrimination legislation that is a mental illness, abnormality, which under consideration of the Verkhovna «not only opposes normal heterosex- Rada of Ukraine is assessed by many ual sexual relations, but also the sys- lawyers as superficial and ineffective. tem of society’s cultural and moral heritage. Therefore, it is reprehensi- BEHAVIOUR PATTERNS ble both as a social phenomenon and as a mental state and course of conduct Prevalence of string-pulling, nep- of a particular person.»30 These atti- otism, cronyism. A distinctive fea- tudes of scientific secularism got en- ture of Ukrainian politics has long trenched in the subconscious of Sovi- been nepotism and cronyism. The lat- et citizens and also received religious ter was especially true for the period justifications shortly after the col- of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, lapse of the USSR. which even resulted in the appearance One can expect that the situation of an expression marking the repul- will not change soon, even taking into sive specifics of Ukrainian politics: consideration the European integra- «dear friends». tion aspirations of Ukraine. In mat- Among them there were Petro Po- ters of tolerance, Ukrainian politi- roshenko (in 2005, the Secretary of cians hold double standards while sup- the National Security Council), Myko- porting initiatives against discrimi- la Martynenko (the Head of the parlia- nation at the international level, the mentary faction «Nasha Ukrayina»), government ignores these problems Oleksandr Tretyakov (then the First within the country. Undoubtedly, in- Assistant, Director of the Cabinet of tolerance exists in Western societies the President of Ukraine) and others. too, but the post-Soviet terrain often They were part of the President’s lacks effective mechanisms to combat entourage, occupying high state po- its manifestations. For example, the sitions. And often their activity gave Article 161 of the Criminal Code of reason for politicians, experts and Ukraine «Violation of equality of citi- journalists to say that «dear friends» zens based on their race, nationality or were using their positions for selfish religion» is rarely applied.31 And new ends.32

30 I.S. Kon «Blue and pink» — http://re- 32 Zinchenko also accuses Poroshenko, ocities.com/westhollywood/2118/kon. Tretyakov and Martynenko of cor- html ruption. Poroshenko visited his press 31 Racism and xenophobia in Ukraine: an conference/ Ukrayinska pravda, overview. — http://library.khpg.org/ 5.09.2005, http://www.pravda.com. files/docs/1242226191.pdf ua/news/2005/09/5/3012997/;

30 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics

But these phenomena, danger- the Donetsk clan, (to be more specific ous for any state, did not make Vik- residents of Makiyevka), Yanukovych tor Yushchenko respond according- appointed for this position the former ly. This, in particular, was one of the Interior Minister Anatoly Mogylyov, causes of the political crisis in au- another representative of Makiyivka. tumn 2005, which eventually led to This appointment was perceived as an the resignation of Yulia Tymoshen- endeavor to strengthen «Makiyivka» ko’s government and the group of vertical power structure established «dear friends». on the peninsula by Vasyl Dzharty.34 But, since Viktor Yanukovych has That is why a large number of jokes come to power, the growing influence dedicated to the influx of people from of the Head of the state family has be- the Donetsk region within the govern- come a distinctive feature of Ukrain- ment agencies were created by Ukrain- ian political life, in which the eldest ians. For example, Yanukovych is son of the president, Oleksandr, plays asked whether he could govern China. the first fiddle. In two and half years, He takes a calculator, does long calcu- he became one of the wealthiest (with lations, and finally says: «No, I can- capital of 99 million US dollars) most not, I do not have enough Donetsk influential men in Ukraine, among people...»35 those, who surround the Head of the The story of Mykola Korovitsyn, state.33 the son of the Ukrainian President’s Today, in the Ukrainian political es- adviser, Hanna Herman, is a vivid ex- tablishment, the leading role is played ample of nepotism in recent years. His by representatives of the Donetsk mother lobbied him for the position of clan, headed by Viktor Yanukovych, Deputy Minister of Emergency Situa- and not only in the capital of Ukraine. tions.36 For example, after the death of the The youngest son of Yanukovych, Head of the Council of Ministers of Victor, at the age of 24, was elected to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Parliament using the quota of his Vasyl Dzharty, who established a rig- id chain of command on the peninsu- 34 Dear friends of Oleksandr Yanukovych / la and supported by representatives of Sehiy Leshchenko, Ukrayinska Pravda, 07.11.2011, http://www.pravda.com. ua/rus/articles/2011/11/7/6738086/ 33 100 Ukraine’s rich men: debut of Yanuk- 35 Political anecdotes: // http://politiko. ovich’s son and Pinchuk’s triumph / Big- ua/groups/talk_topic?id=1999 mir.net, 10.04.2012, http://finance. 36 Hanna Herman: last spurt, Serhiy bigmir.net/news/economics/14296- Leshchenko, Ukrayinska Pravda, 100-bogachej-Ukrainy--debjut-syna-Ja- 27.03.2012, http://www.pravda.com. nukovicha-i-triumf-Pinchuka ua/articles/2012/03/27/6961557/

31 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? father. He again appeared in the Party public services is usually very low, of Regions list for the 2012 parliamen- and regulatory approaches are espe- tary elections, at the 22nd place that cially complicated, which creates fa- guaranteed him the seat in Verkhovna vorable ground for corruption. Those, Rada with the quota of the President. who have used the services of Techni- And, a son of Prime Minister Mykola cal Inventory Bureaus, State Land Ca- Azarov, Oleksiy, received a chance to daster and other government agencies be a candidate in the last parliamen- in Ukraine have faced it many times. tary election at a ‘pass-through’ ma- Often these organizations are inter- joritarian, in the electoral district of linked with private companies which Slov’yansk, in the Donetsk region; de- are controlled by officials from spe- spite the fact that he has never lived cialized agencies.38 there. Post-Soviet politicians are known In the case of Ukraine, personal for their special attitude to money contacts completely replace formal and are interested in the possibilities rules. Therefore, the «telephone law» of enrichment and personal gain. One is widely used to solve problems. That of the reasons for the intertwining of is even admitted by representatives money and politics is that money as a of the Party of Regions that current- tangible thing is a new phenomenon ly hold power. The former Prosecutor for post-Soviet countries, and atti- General, Svyatoslav Piskun asserted tude to it was formed in 1990’s. For «unfortunately, we observe a situa- the vast majority of the Ukrainian es- tion today when judges are called and tablishment, money makes it possible told in whose favor they must make a to get into power, and power provides decision.»37 access to cash flows. Politicians demonstrate their be- Business on state functions. In con- lief in that money talks even by imi- trast to today’s Georgia, in Ukraine, tating democratic institutions. In the system of providing public servic- Ukraine, for example, the phenom- es is targeted not at serving citizens enon of «paid-for meetings» is wide- but on making money. The quality of ly spread; people go to protests and meetings as if to the office, and they 37 Former Prosecutor General: courts are paid hourly for this. Particularly problem is in ‘telephone law’, Lev- yi bereh, 31.03.2011, http:// lb.ua/news/2011/03/31/90776_ 38 «Dzerkalo tyzhnya. Ukraine», №36, bivshiy_genprokuror_ 07.10.2011, http://zn.ua/ECONOM- problema_v_s.html»>http://lb.ua/ ICS/sergey_timchenko_kazhdyy_den_ news/2011/03/31/90776_bivshiy_gen- prostoya__eto_ne_odin,_a_tri_shaga_ prokuror_problema_v_s.html nazad-89219.html

32 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics active citizens, willing to make mon- methods of selective justice) to get rid ey, manage to participate in both ‘proof competition in the next election. power» and «pro-opposition» protests in one day. Status privileges of politicians. Sim- ilar to post-Soviet politicians in Rus- Prevention and elimination of compe- sia, the Ukrainian establishment of tition in the political environment. Clas- 1990’s-2000’s seeks to maximize per- sical political parties have not been sonal gains from their positions and formed in the country after twenty- access to public resources. And de- one years of an independent Ukraini- monstrative luxury (prestigious for- an state. There are political projects, eign cars, expensive real estate, use of with all the necessary attributes of a VIP-lounges, etc.) and worship from party, but they are made for certain subordinates are essential as means politicians: the party «Batkivshchy- of self-affirmation. na» (Yulia Tymoshenko), the Party of Double, even triple security barri- Regions (Viktor Yanukovych), «Front ers are installed in front of buildings, zmin» (Arseniy Yatsenyuk), «UDAR» where events involving dignitaries are (Vitalii Klitschko), «Svoboda» (Oleg held. The streets on the route of the Tyahnybok) and others. According- president or prime-ministers cortege ly, there is no struggle between politi- get closed. High-ranking officials are cal parties but there is an intense con- ostentatiously separated from people frontation of party leaders. by security barriers. It only deepens mistrust between authorities and citi- Strong commitment to the leaders zens. results in the lack of connection of the Former President of Ukraine Leo- party with the society; hence there is nid Kravchuk stated that today, «any no possibility to mobilize their sup- footman who has just laid his hands porters. It was demonstrated during on power, drives around with flashers the trial of the former Prime Minister and ambulances. I always say, if you Yulia Tymoshenko when only a few need to be accompanied by an ambu- thousand people gathered in front of lance, then stay at home, why do you the court building. And the announce- go to work?!»39 ment of her sentence caused a sluggish response in the country where 11,5 million people voted for Ty- 39 Kravchuk about corteges: if you are accompanied by resuscitation ambulance, moshenko. The case of Tymoshenko for which hell do you go to work?», is a striking example when the politi- Ukrayinsla Pravda, 26.07.2012, ht- cian was artificially removed from ac- tp://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/ tive political life (in this case by using news/2012/07/26/6969580/

33 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

There are special country cottage attitude of Ukrainian politicians and towns, surrounded by high fences businessmen to titles leads to the de- and barbed wire, special hospitals and valuation of personal distinctions, be- health resorts. It includes, first of cause titles and academic degrees are all suburbs of Kyiv, Koncha-Zaspa, often not obtained by real merit, but where state summer houses are pro- by money and connections. Plagiarism vided to presidents, prime ministers, is one of the symptoms of this «cargo ministers, MPs and regional state ad- cult.»40 ministration executives. Meanwhile, This is typical not only of Ukraine. politicians tend to keep these state But if in developed democracies poli- summer houses for their personal use ticians accused of plagiarism resign (using lifetime usage rights, by pur- (and that means the end for his politi- chase or long-term lease) after they cal career like in the case of Hungari- vacate their government position, an President Pal Schmitt and German that provided premises for granting Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu them accommodations out of the city. Guttenberg) in Ukraine, the one con- For instance, former President of tinues to occupy the post. The Speaker Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko, despite of the Parliament Speaker Volodymyr the fact that he had not been the head Lytvyn, the President Viktor Yanu- of state for 3 years, and postponed kovych, the Minister of Health Rai- moving out from the state summer sa Bohatyryova, the MP Viktor Ya- house in Koncha-Zaspa to his house in nukovych Jr. often were in the midst Bezradychi village near Kyiv. of scandals over misappropriation In contrast, Viktor Yanukovych of intellectual property, but did not turned a state summer house «Mezhy- consider it necessary to apologize for hirya» near Kyiv into his own resi- such behaviour. dence. Unprecedented scale and luxury of the house, where the current Plagiarism is a blow to the trust president lives, is a constant object of and the reputation of an individu- attention of public activists and jour- al politician as well as trust from the nalists. citizens.41 But the instances of plagia- The desire to get all attributes of a successful representative of Ukrain- 40 ian society such as degree, honors and Cult Cargo implies blind copy of the source without awareness of internal processes as other personal distinctions (eg, the ti- well as formal compliance with rules and tle «Hero of Ukraine»), a prestigious regulations without understanding of its es- foreign car, summer house in Kon- sence. cha-Zaspa has become a feature of the 41 Interview of the IWP with the Doctor of Phi- Ukrainian establishment. This sacred losophy Mikhail Minakov

34 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics rism is primarily possible in a country DISCURSIVE PRACTICES with a poorly developed civil society and politicians who have got a blurred Post-Sovietness is present in the sense of responsibility and duty. Ukrainian political discourse as well. The occasions when a politician or Political discourse can be defined as an official simply buys a graduate de- interrelated texts, conversations and gree are not rare. There are solitary practices associated with political ac- cases of resignations of officials when tors and objects. Critical discourse such facts become publicly known. analysis is employed to determine how The most notorious of them is one language is used for political manipu- of employee of Viktor Yushchenko’s lation. Discourse is also useful to un- Presidential Secretariat, the former derstand who benefits from certain deputy head of the Security Service of rhetoric, which, in turn, gives an idea Ukraine Andriy Kyslynsky. In 2009, of some of the social models of society the fact, that Mr. Kyslynsky did not and their further development. Mas- study at the historical faculty of Kyiv tering the latest techniques of oratory University. As a result, the official and successful public speaking, with was removed from the position of the the assistance of political technolo- deputy head of the SBU. But this de- gists, Ukrainian politicians are pay- cision was indeed caused by the weak- ing too little attention to the actual ened position of Mr. Kyslynsky in the content of their speeches.43 power structures and the absence of al- Generally, in Ukraine, politicians lies among high ranking officials who treat journalists in a very peculiar could «cover up» the former official manner. If in Europe every politi- by confirming the legality of his docu- cian is eager to talk to reporters, and ments on higher education. However, is personally interested in being in- in May 2010, when the Party of Re- terviewed in Ukraine, on contrary, it gions was firmly in power, the Pech- is very difficult to reach out to min- ersk Court in Kyiv closed the crimi- isters or even some MPs. Whenever nal case against Andriy Kyslynsky in they, after long negotiations, do agree which he was charged with forgery of to an interview, it seems that they do higher education documents.42 a huge favor.44

42 Moscal is confident that the Party of 43 Interview of the IWP with an observer Regions paid Kyslynskyi// Ukrain- of a English-language publication ska Pravda 06.05.2010http:// 44 Interview of the IWP with the journal- www.pravda.com.ua/rus/ ist of English-language publication in news/2010/05/6/5012554 Ukraine

35 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Foreign journalists are also sur- Intensification of their usage is prised with the common practice of usually observed during election cam- interview «proofreading» in Ukraine. paigns. Before elections, members of In the West, the material is sent for the political process compete in the the reconciliation of facts and men- sophistication of promises, ensuring tioned data (dates, numbers). In the solution of number of socioeco- Ukraine, the post-Soviet approach nomic issues in the case of their vic- prevails when verbal spills from sen- tory. Examples of such promises can ior officials (sometimes quite inco- be found in the program of any can- herent) are made to look favorable didate and any political party. Typi- and, sometimes get «embellished» or cal expressions of Viktor Yushchenko completely rewritten by press service such as «My nation ...», «My people» officers. Editors may decide to pub- indicate to certain extent his pater- lish non-edited interviews, but they nalistic beliefs.46 should be ready for sanctions. For ex- Election programs of political forc- ample, a great resonance of a scandal es are rather formal texts, prepared was the interview with Agrarian Pol- at the request of the Central Election icy Minister, Mykola Prysyazhnyuk, Commission, and they rarely differ in a KyivPost edition, in 2011.45 from each other. However, content Now, let’s focus on the most impor- analysis of programs of five political tant, in our view, attributes of post- forces that entered Verkhovna Ra- Sovietness in Ukrainian political dis- da as the result of the parliamentary course. elections of 2012 allows making some noteworthy conclusions. Paternalism. An ordinary post-Sovi- Lists of the most frequently used et Ukrainian still hopes that the state words in political programs are as fol- will provide him with all one needs lows (table 3) 47. and will undertake the lion’s share of The programs of political parties solving his problems and concerns. are full of promises to raise wages, Since the common post-Soviet citizens and the frequency of use of the epithet form the Ukrainian electorate, politi- «state» indicates the appeal to nostal- cians actively exploit paternalistic gic sentiments of the society. And, language in public discourse. the appeal to the past, as a «golden

46 Interview of the IWP with Volodymyr 45 Bonner will be reinstated as Kyiv Post Fesenko chief editor: http://www.mediabusi- 47 Khomenko S. Parties’ programs: the ness.com.ua/?option=com_content&ta tongue ever turns to the aching tooth. — sk=view&id=23664&Itemid=59 http://glavcom.ua/articles/7833.html

36 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics

Table 3 Party Batkivshchyna UDAR CPU Svoboda of Regions Ukraine – 14 power – 11 citizen – 13 state – 29 state – 19 hryvnia – 10 law – 8 provide – 12 provision – 12 Ukrainian – 11 region – 9 right – 8 system – 11 social – 9 introduce (imple- country – 9 Yanukovych – 6 taxes – 10 supply – 8 ment) – 11 person – 8 pension – 6 Ukraine – 9 society – 7 property – 10 construction – 7 salary – 6 local – 9 Ukraine – 7 entrepreneurship – 9 citizen – 7 Ukrainian – 6 state – 8 institution – 6 state – 8 state – 7 state – 6 introduce (im- status – 6 Ukraine – 7 affordable – 7 create – 6 plement) – 8 tax – 7 new – 7 enterprise – 7 power – 7 right – 7 provide – 7 year – 7 era» is typical of post-Soviet coun- foreign banks and so on. Thus, about tries. In the West, political discourse 20% or even more of «Svoboda»’s often aims at the future.48 proposals are identical to the program It should be noted that the Com- of the Communist Party. 50 munists referred the theme of «past» Such political statements, despite golden days most aptly in their 2012 the extremely low probability of their election campaign. Such slogans as subsequent implementation, cause «Luxury tax!», «We will return the sympathy among the disappointed, country to its people!», «Oligarchs to nostalgic for the Soviet past popula- jail!» helped Communists to double tion. These sentiments are skillfully their number of voters.49 It is inter- used by post-Soviet political technolo- esting, that the expressions, identical gists. To declare promises which dis- to those present in the program of the regard the economic situation and the Communists, were actively used by state budget is typical post-Soviet- the right wing party «Svoboda». They ness. It is indicative that post-Soviet include the nationalization of major politicians place the state at first place industries, deoligarchization, revi- (Ukraine should become a strong, de- sion of privatization results, the fight veloped country, etc.) while Western against big capital, and the ban on land sales and on the development of 50 20% of Svoboda’s proposals are identical with the Communistparty– 48 Interview of the IWP with Mathew Ro- Censor.net http://censor.net.ua/ janski news/215127/20_ili_bolee_predlojeni- 49 Berdinskih К. Red heat. – Коrrespondent yi_svobody_identichny_programme_ №28(516) , July 20, 2012. kompartii_ekspert

37 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? politicians in their public statements because they do not believe in the ful- primarily oriented at society.51 fillment of its promises.52 Despite that pre-election promises Post-Soviet person also tends to be- are in most cases not fulfilled and the lieve that reforms should take place level of trust in public institutions, as soon as possible. However, they in Ukraine, is one of the lowest in Eu- believe that such reforms should be rope, paternalistic expressions remain carried out by the authorities, while an effective tool to achieve political post-Soviet citizens themselves re- goals. A politician who promises state main passive observers. Perhaps, the support in all areas is much more like- Orange Revolution became the only to succeed in the elections than his ly exception in the post-Soviet histo- opponent, who calls voters to take the ry of Ukraine when President Viktor initiative themselves, improving the Yushchenko received unprecedented quality of life on their own and using public trust and confidence that he the support of the state for this. could transform the country. This did not happen, which was followed by the Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov effect of frustration and a return to explains this trend by the profound waiting for better times. essence of the post-Soviet person, who is formed under the restrictive system Thus, paternalistic rhetoric is a and used to adapting to these restric- lullaby for society when politicians are tions. This person is afraid of eve- convincing post-Soviet people, who rything new, unknown, they are en- are extremely dependent on the state, dowed with many phobias, already do that the rules remain the same, and not believe propaganda and have no the government will continue to pre- idea about the future. They perceive tend that it deals with social issues. government as a paternalistic power, By voting for politicians, the citizens which should ensure their very mod- signal in turn that they agree to fur- est existence and guarantees for the ther simulate the trust in the state and future, but, meanwhile, they treat a respect for the government. This se- this government with great suspicion, riously undermines the effectiveness of the institute of elections, which in a situation of such a kind turns into

52 Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center 51 Interview with a former head of an in- (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, ternational fund’s Ukrainian represen- June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ tative office ukr/public/569.html

38 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Рolitics a regular ritual of negative social en- The monitoring of the contempo- ergy release, rather than a real mech- rary political discourse in Ukraine anism for the people’s declaration of allows us to state that a lot of Soviet will and legitimization of power. propaganda structures are preserved in the rhetoric of current politicians, Absence of sanctions for lies and experiencing minor changes. For ex- fraud. In post-Soviet Ukraine, public ample, the image of a brighter future lie and propaganda are still integral remained in the political discourse. elements of political discourse. Vir- Only the construction of world com- tually all Ukrainian politicians apply munism (the USSR) has given way propaganda techniques in their dai- for the construction of a democratic ly rhetoric. The effectiveness of us- state and a market economy. Instead ing this tool is explained, in particu- of talking about the implementation lar, by the fact that some of the social of a five-year plan for the economy in strata of post-Soviet society still tend three/four years, post-Soviet politi- to accept propaganda better than com- cians tend to think about joining the plex political arguments. EU in record time (five/ten years), Under propaganda, in this context, the abolition of the visa regime with we mean the deliberate spreading of the European Union or record GDP incomplete or distorted information growth in the coming years. The pur- about the results of the governments pose is different, but the lines are still performance, activities of politi- less realistic. cal forces, etc. Every government of Another problem of political com- Ukraine reports on their progress and munication is the devaluation of often uses exaggerated or incomplete many terms and general tendency to statistics. The news line on the uni- washing out of the essence of certain fied web portal of the executive bod- words and hence society does not ac- ies of Ukraine could be an illustration cept their intrinsic meaning.53 Today of this. Ukrainians, both politicians and ordinary citizens do not tend to treat Official information, the Ukraini- such words as «democracy,» «free- an government essentially reports on dom,» and «human rights» seriously the success and dizzying «improve- and thoughtfully. Their frequent use, ment» of standards of life from now not supported by practical actions, ac- on, which is very similar to the com- tually depreciated these terms which munist slogan of Stalin era, «life has negatively affects political discourse. become better, life has become more fun!» 53 Focus-group at the Insitute of World Policy

39 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Furthermore, «newspeak» is also the rejection of ideology as such57. It actively cultivated in Ukraine as a is difficult to classify the current po- specific language of the modern polit- litical forces in Ukraine according to ical elite. It is based on a vocabulary ideological grounds.58 especially popular in 1990’s. Slang The Communist Party of Ukraine, phrases and the use of indecent lan- without a doubt, bears the palm in di- guage have become common in the vergence of the party ideology and Ukrainian public discourse. 54 practice. Ideological fighters against oligarchs did not consider it shameful Ideologies devaluation. Today the to enter into a government coalition world political thought returns to the with the party of big business — the question of the role and importance of Party of Regions. ideology in political processes. Simi- lar trends have allowed American political scientist John Jost to name the 57 Sambros A., Ukrainska pravda// current stage the «the end of the end http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/col- umns/ 2010/09/17/5379709/ of ideologies»55. What is happening in 58 Myklashchuk І. М. Ideological princi- Ukraine? In Ukraine, we observe not ples of political parties of Ukraine (ac- the death of ideologies, but their utter cording to pre-elections documents of devaluation.56 2006–2007.) – Strategic priorities, №3(12), 2009. – p.85 Indeed, the ideological postulates do not have any value for the post-So- viet political forces in Ukraine. One of the explanations is the lack of interest of Ukrainians in the development of ideological political projects and

54 Interview of the IWP with Volodymyr Fesenko 55 The End of the End of the Ideology // John Jost http://www.uky.edu/ AS/PoliSci/Peffley/pdf/Jost%20 2006%20The%20End%20of%20 the%20End%20of%20Ideology_ American%20Psychologist.pdf 56 Interview of the IWP with Volodymyr Fesenko

40 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society

POST-SOVIETNESS IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

The consciousness of a post-Sovi- Ukraine, and only 22.1% — answered et man is «ambiguous» with mutually «negatively». The number of those exclusive features; for example, post- who support such a geopolitical pro- Soviet people may say «yes» to democ- ject is the same today as in 1998, de- racy and liberal values, but not to say spite the fact that in 2000 it dropped «goodbye» to authoritarian methods to 40.8%. However, the country has of rule. Ambivalent consciousness of- not been reformed or refreshed and ten cannot rationally evaluate various society has returned back to the old alternatives and scenarios of events attitudes. However, a positive atti- and processes: post-Soviet people ei- tude about the idea of joining the Eu- ther uncritically accept political al- ropean Union was shown by 45.5%. ternative or completely reject it. Thus, the conflicting geopolitical strategies are supported by a relative The tragedy of the Ukrainian post- or absolute majority of respondents. Soviet society is that it tried to turn This is another manifestation of the collectivism into atomized individu- ambivalence of the post-Soviet con- alism, which denies the establishment sciousness. of civil connections.59 Thus, 83.6% of Ukrainians in 2010 did not belong to 8% of Ukrainians still consider any political or social organization. themselves above all «Soviet» people, In addition, the consciousness of the 26% just «people» and 57% — citi- Ukrainian people was dominated by zens of their country. People living in the feeling that they live in a social Donbas most often answer the ques- space, in which no matter what you do tion «who am I?» with «just a per- nothing positive will be achieved. son», among the representatives of different regions of the country. This Mentally and philosophically they data was collected by the sociological remain entirely in the (neo) Soviet group «Rating» in 2010. «Ordinary geo-cultural space. So, 61.4% of re- people» and «Soviet people» are those spondents «positively» answered the whose identity, since the independ- question about the possibility of the ence of Ukraine, either did not change accession of Ukraine to the Union of largely or did not change at all, or Belarus and Russia, in 2010, posed by changed slightly. the Institute of Sociology of NAS, in The distinctive feature of a post-So- 59 Interview of the IWP with Yevkhen Golo- viet person is hypocrisy, which was to- vakha tally and undividedly inherited from

41 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? the post-Soviet system. The post-Sovi- post-Soviet mentality from the Sovi- et man adapted as well as learned to co- et one. If a government is generous in exist with a repressive state and gov- giving social benefits, many are ready ernment and determined survival to to support it, even though it is evident be his or her life strategy.60 A post-So- that there are no economic resources viet person, the same as the Soviet one for this. The fact that the budget can- before, is ready to compete for second- not guarantee allocating social ben- ary things that don’t have much use, efits, the economy of the country is like a beautiful business-card, which in crisis and the foreign policy, cul- does not entail any real achievements ture, education, all of the strategic or status, however, will never fight sectors of state’s development are ei- for something as important or essen- ther failing or chronically stagnant, tial as changing the rules of the game, are weaker arguments then offering the resolution of some long-standing of «Yulia’s» or « Vityna’s thousand problems at the system level, values of hryvnias.»61 and professional ideals. A post-Soviet In March 2012, President Vik- person does not have a developed intu- tor Yanukovych announced his deci- ition as to the constructive and long- sion to resume the payment of the de- term values, things and perspectives. valued deposits of Sberbank to their However, researchers do not recom- owners in the amount of one thou- mend considering it as infantilism. sand hryvnia. Prior to this, such pay- This is a completely rational choice ments were carried out by the govern- and rational strategy of consumption ment of Yulia Tymoshenko. Accord- in a particular historical and institu- ing to data received from the survey tional context. The following part will of the Razumkov Center, as of Janu- discuss the characteristics of this life ary 1, 2012, the rating of the Party of strategy. Regions, the party represented by the President, had 14% support. In April ATTITUDES 2012, after the implementation of these payments, the support went up Paternalism. Paternalism is inher- to 19.5%, and on the 1st July 2012 ent in the post-Soviet mentality. It, did it reached 21.5%. actually, just inertly flowed into the Who isn’t familiar with the image of the usual grandmother «babysia»

60 Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center 61 «Yulina» and «Vityna thousand of hry- (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, vnias» are phrases that denote payments for June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ people who kept their savings in the Soviet ukr/public/569.html Sberbank.

42 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society

Chart 1. What should be the role of government in regulating the economy?

0,8% 5,3% The role of the government has to be minimized – the market will regulate 13,8% everything Governmental control has to be united 31,6% 48,4% with market control Planned economy has to be back with total government control

Hard to say

No answer

(grandmother) in lines, in the corri- this idea and in Lithuania, where it dors of state committee of Ukraine on actually functions, only 30%. land resources or of polyclinics, which According to the survey of the In- insists that nowadays there is noone to stitute of Sociology of NAS of Ukraine, complain to. During Soviet times, the in 2010, a third of Ukrainians sup- common belief that problems had to be ported a return to a planned economy dealt with, not through self-organiza- with full governmental control. Only tion or creation of civil organizations, 5.3% supported the minimalization but through directly approaching the of governmental interference in the ruling powers, was formed and estab- economy. In addition 61.3% showed a lished. It is precisely the big boss, who negative attitude towards the privati- has to deal and rule out all of the so- zation of large enterprises. cial, economic and household prob- 30.6% of Ukrainians, in 2010, lems. This is an extremely ineffective voiced their readiness to have their social model. 62 own private business, however 28.4% According to the information pro- said they would never do this. 28.3% vided by the international sociologi- of Ukrainians would not agree to work cal survey, Life in Transition, around for a private company however 21.6% 36% of Ukrainians supported a mar- would be happy to find a job in such ket economy in 2010. In comparison: a way. From these numbers it is evi- in Belarus, where such an economy dent that the amount of Ukrainians does not exist, more than 50% of re- ready to work in the corporate sector spondents showed their support for or to open their own business is close to the number of those who are not 62 Interview of the IWP with the deputy head ready for this. In regions, especially of the Sociological Service of the Razumkov in little towns, many believe that it is Center Mychailo Mishchenko better to work in government-funded

43 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? institutions, because it is stable and a post-Soviet system often consider there are certain social guarantees and order to be, is the «conservation of the protection. Working for the owners status quo» according to the principle of private firms sometimes turns out «as long as things do not get worse». to be moral and even physical work- 78.4% of Ukrainians are certain loads when employees are not prop- that there is no equality amongst citi- erly registered at their jobs, forced zens before the law in their country, to work overtime. The less economi- either completely or on the whole (ac- cally developed and the more «third cording to the survey of the «Demo- world» like province of the country is, cratic Initiatives» Fund, held in May- the more paternalism blossoms there. June 2012). A post-Soviet person in Precisely, it is province of post-Sovi- Ukraine does not believe in the pos- et countries that could be regarded as sibility of a true social or political the reservoir of «soveitness». justice. In order to survive, the only thing left is integrate into the existing Conformism as a dominant life strate- unjust system and adapt to it, with- gy. Ukrainians, in general, do not give out taking the initiative to change it. the impression of hopeless conform- In this way, the system reproduces it- ists. There is even the tendency that self. Twenty years after the collapse they are against their government in of the Soviet Union, we can trace how power.63 In fact, all parliamentary the young generation reproduces the elections in Ukraine over the past dec- attitudes of a Soviet person64. ade (2002, 2006, 2007) led to a change The same thing has been noted by of government. Herve Bourdon (a French restaura- It is interesting to note, that the teur and chef working in Ukraine for question posed by the Razumkov the past ten years). He took part in Center what is better to suffer from the opening of ten Ukrainian restau- financial difficulties in order to pre- rants, one of which is the restaurant serve order in the country or, in the in Donetsk owned by the richest man case of a significant deterioration of in Ukraine, Rinat Ahmetov. «A dec- living conditions, go to the streets ade ago I saw 20-23 friendly Ukraini- and protest — 52% of Ukrainians an- ans who, it seemed, would change eve- swered that they would rather protest rything. Today, looking at the same and 23.3% considered order more important than protest. What people in 64 Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center 63 Interview of the IWP with the vice-di- (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, rector of the law consulting department June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ of the Konrad-Adenauer Fund ukr/public/569.html

44 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society

Chart 2. Do you belong to a particular religious community? 0,1% 1%1% 0,9% 0,6% Is not a religious person 0,8% 7,4% 11,7% Christian Orthodox church Catholic church Greek-Catholic church Protestant confession 76,7% Islam Judaism Other No answer people ten years on it is clear that they and uncritically, benefit at the cost have become just as Soviet as every- of those who are «humble» and show one else.»65 «humility» since they use their votes It is interesting to trace whether in elections, exploit them at work by there is a connection between religious setting very low salaries, do not pro- confessions and conformism as the vide proper working conditions and main strategy of life. Is there a kind finally call them to the rescue of the of orthodox conformism? Christiani- «Rus» and «faith» from their oppo- ty, in particular Orthodox Christian- nents and competitors. ity, teaches humility in difficult cir- On the other hand, by appealing to cumstances. This orthodox value can God’s will, people can legitimize any- easily be manipulated, for example a thing. If you combine the cultivation religious person can be convinced that of these virtues with the out-of-date he ought to be humble before the pow- views on social life (the intolerant at- er, before those who are stronger, and titude towards a religious or cultural that all the hardships of earthly life Other), it is possible to create an en- and its poverty, are inevitable chal- vironment in which it is possible to lenges. Thus one’s will and ability to conserve a post-Soviet culture. Reli- fight and seek a better life is with- gious scholars believe that when ap- ered away. At the same time, a minor- proaching the question of the rela- ity of those who accept such an inter- tionship between orthodox Christi- pretation of humility not as seriously anity and post-Sovietness, one ought to look at it through an institutional 65 Interview of the IWP with restaurateur lens, examining particular churches. Herve Bourdon If we are talking about the Ukrainian

45 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Orthodox Church (UOC) of Moscow Delayed adoptions of innovations and Patriarchate, then the dependence fear of reforms. In the Ukrainian post- on (neo) soviet power, non-modern- Soviet system, a clear tendency can be ization of own social doctrines and traced. Even though, the rules of the the lack of reforms are all increasing- game seem to change as a consequence ly usual properties of the church just of the reforms, the people do not. On as they are for the Russian Orthodox the one hand, the question whether Church. In the case of other Orthodox the internally corrupt government Churches in Ukraine, they are more can reform the system arises. On the open to change although they remain other, the question whether the so- conservative due to their nature. cial agent which would be able to un- For Greek-Catholics, it is easier to derstand, support and help realize re- be modern as they do not depend on a forms exists? Post-Soviet Ukrainians repressive secular government. They are often afraid of any changes. The work together with Ukrainian dias- historical memories of the Holodo- poras across the world and try to give mor, Soviet collectivization, industri- their priests, more importantly their alization, and the economic difficul- hierarchs, a modern education of in- ties of 1990s, although not yet fully ternational standards.66 It is interest- reflected upon, are still alive. ing to note that a large number of those The reforms, which every new who were hard-line communists and Ukrainian government talks about, atheists during USSR, became con- in reality are never carried out. There scientious believers after its collapse. have to be social forces, which would However, it is important to talk about have the will to implement these re- the problem of declarative religious- forms. The majority, however, is in- ness and declarative orthodox Chris- terested in guarding their own posi- tianity, since religion in a post-Soviet tions, just so that they would remain society is only a social attribute and an untouched.68 In addition, in a post-So- element of identity 67, not a world out- viet system it is very hard to accom- look. plish any reform and put a logical full stop at the end. The system, somehow, seems to always be doomed to half-im- 66 Interview of the IWP with the mem- plementation of any reform. For ex- ber of the Ukrainian Association of ample, in 2012 Korean high-speed Religious Studies Anna Tregub trains Hyundai were implemented 67 Script of a video conference with Lev Gudkov, director of Levada-Center (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, 68 Interview of the IWP with the vice-pres- June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ ident of the Razumkov Center for soci- ukr/public/569.html ology Mykhaylo Mishchenko

46 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society between the capital of Ukraine and realities of their life with those of oth- the host-cities of Euro 2012. They ers, and therefore it is hard for them can reach a speed of 160 km/h. For to understand the necessity and value Ukrainian train tracks a speed of low- of reforms. When a person travels ex- er than 100 km/h could be too high. tensively and receives a large baggage Therefore, Ukraine had to inevitably of experience and knowledge, he or change the tracks across the country she begins to compare different socie- to ensure the security of the trains. ties and thinks more critically. There- This, however, did not happen, and fore, the person becomes more inde- the Hyundai trains were put on the pendent, nonconformist and individ- rails. Therefore some Ukrainians are ualistic. In a post-Soviet society, for still reluctant to risk taking these the majority, these windows of oppor- trains. This is because people do not tunity are closed shut due to poverty see such an institutional and econom- and visa limitations. Ukraine holds ic surrounding in which any reform the 110th place in the 2011 global rat- would actually represent any progress ing assessing the freedom of travel to or be accomplished. different countries. In comparison: However, the psychological aspect Moldova holds the 124th, Georgia — in the case of the trains is also impor- 125th. This assessment takes into tant. In particular, Ukrainians turned consideration the amount of countries out not to be ready for such a dras- to which citizens of the participating tic change: instead of taking the usual countries can enter without visas, the trains from the Soviet times in which amount of countries these citizens re- they are used to certain rituals (from ceive their visa right on the border, the traditional ‘feast’ with previously according to a simplified procedure packed food, changing into a track suit and how many states trust them as and a frank conversation with a random much as to accept all documents in an companion, who often acts as a kind of electronic format. therapist) to taking the modern ones. Another big problem, due to which 77% of Ukrainians, according new technology is accepted and under- to the survey carried out by the Re- stood very slowly or even generally search and Branding Group, have nev- not implemented at all, is the outdat- er travelled outside of Ukraine. Ac- ed material and technological base of cording to the results of the Interna- colleges and universities. On the oth- tional Sociological Institute in Kyiv er hand, due to total corruption and a survey, 36% of Ukrainians have nev- lack of the culture of fast diffusion of er travelled outside their own region. innovations (which is well developed As a result, it is hard for a person in in say, the USA or Germany), availa- a post-Soviet country to compare the ble funds to update the material and

47 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? technical basis for all technical educa- The respondents chose this option tional institutions in the country can- for an answer from the following list: not be realized. The only possibility is family members, close friends, neigh- if sponsors will help or if the institu- bors, colleagues, citizens of Ukraine, tion will be lucky with its governance tourists and «would not allow them and they will win a grant from abroad. to enter Ukraine». This is measured However, this does not neutralize the according to the Bogardus social dis- backwardness of the entire system. tance scale (table 4). As seen above the citizens of Moldo- Intolerance. According to the re- va are the most welcomed in Ukraine. sults of the sociological survey of the Ukrainians are also ready to accept Razumkov Center, in December 2011 Jews, Russians and Belarusians as 32.3% of Ukrainians were ready to go out on the streets to take part in lawful Table 4. protests if they did not receive their Integral Index of National Distancing wages, 38.1% if they saw a sharp rise National distancing in the price of necessities, 20.4% — between Ukrainians 2002 2010 would protest against the highhand- and other nationalities: edness of local governments and on- Azerbaijanians 9.7 11.8 ly 5% would protest against racial or ethnic discrimination. The problem Americans 9.7 7.9 of discrimination, in all its forms, Arabs 10.4 5.1 turned out to be the least significant Afghans 6.4 5.8 and important for Ukrainians. Belarusians 21.5 21.9 Sociologists measure the level of Hungarians 14.3 15.4 tolerance of Ukrainians towards other nationalities by questioning how will- Georgians 13.3 14.1 ing they are to admit the representa- Jews 21.2 23.8 tives of these nationalities to different Chinese 8.8 7.1 social roles. Therefore, an interesting Moldovans 21.8 24.2 indicator is the amount of Ukrainians Africans 8.9 6.8 who are ready to accept these representatives as citizens of Ukraine (%). Germans 12.2 12.1 Poles 15.4 17.7 Russians 20.3 20.3 Source: Institute of Sociology, NAS Slovaks 14.2 16.4 Ukraine, Yevhen Golovakha, Natalya Panina, Olena Parakhonska (2011). Gypsies 19.2 19.1 Ukrainian society 1992-2010: social Chechens 5.6 4.9 monitoring.

48 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society citizens or residents of their own studied, how they like their jobs and country. However, Africans, Arabs, which political party they support, Chechens and Chinese do not fit into post-Soviet tourists teach their chil- the Ukrainian picture of their world. dren to «stay away from those foreign- However it is still hard to judge the ers» and they themselves do not talk level of tolerance from the results to the Egyptians about anything but provided above. In order to avoid false their massages, drinks and in the best judgment it is important to look at the case scenario the salaries of the em- following results of the same survey: ployees. The interest in the culture of 51.1% of Ukrainians would not let others and the others themselves, who Chechens into their country if they could, 44.8% said the same about Gypsies and 34.1% about Afghans Table 5. The amount of Ukrainians who (table 5). would not let representatives of certain The Ukrainian society can be char- nations in Ukraine (%) acterized by a kind of tolerance, Nationalities: 2002 2010 which is a continuation of Soviet in- Azerbaijanis 32.9 22.7 ternationalism. This kind of tolerance Americans 17.2 10.4 comes in an ‘isolated’ form, meaning Arabs 41.3 27.4 that many agree that «we don’t care about others, as long as they don’t Afghans 47.6 34.1 touch us». People also think that it is Belarusians 6.4 3.1 better not to show interest in others Hungarians 13.2 7.6 so that there would be no problems in Georgians 22.1 18.6 the future69. It is also evident that un- Jews 16.5 12.7 like western Europeans, people from Chinese 25.3 19.4 post-Soviet countries are not actively Moldovans 16.3 11.3 interested in the cultural Others. Africans 29.2 19.3 Let’s imagine the Egyptian re- Germans 13.6 7.8 sort destination of Sharm el-Sheikh. Poles 10.0 5.9 Whilst tourists from Germany and Russians 3.9 2.9 Great Britain delightfully chat to em- Slovaks 11.3 6.6 ployees of their hotel in cafes and next Gypsies 42.9 44.8 to the pool about situations in their Chechens 56.3 51.1 country and, about where the workers Source: Institute of Sociology, NAS Ukraine, Yevhen Golovakha, Natalya 69 Interview of the IWP with the vice-director Panina, Olena Parakhonska (2011). of the Institute of Sociology NAS Ukraine Ukrainian society 1992-2010: social Yevhen Golovakha monitoring.

49 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Chart 3. The level of tolerance towards different ethnic groups (February 2010) 100.0

80.0

60.0

40.0

20.0

0.0

Jews Poles French Russians GermansGypsies CanadiansAmericans Belarusians Romanians Black people Crimean Tatars

Russian-speaking Ukrainians Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians As citizens of Ukraine Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011. are different, is embedded in Europe is often considered as an expression an communication traditions. This is of inadequacy: someone isn’t minding what active tolerance is. A post-Sovi- their own business, or if it is a conver- et person, therefore, can be character- sation between a man and a woman, ized by passive tolerance, which can they are trying to flirt. be considered as a synonym to indif- It is for this reason that when a ference. Apart from that, talking to a post-Soviet person visits the U.S. stranger and asking how he or she is, for the first time, traditionally he or

Chart 4. Dynamics of tolerance towards Jews.

100.0

80.0

60.0 Tolerance 40.0 towards Jews

20.0

0.0

1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

50 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society

Chart 5. Anti-semitism and xenophibia in Ukraine by age category 4.4

4.3

4.2 Anti-semitism 4.1

4 Xenophobia 3.9

3.8

3.7

3.6

3.5

3.4 20 21-30 31-40 41-50 52-60 61-70 71+

Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2006. she feels confused and puzzled when Germans, French and Romanians was someone says «Hi! How are you?». somewhat the same, as well as towards Some Ukrainians openly do not under- Gypsies and Chechens, whom Ukrain- stand why, all of a sudden, a stranger ians are not extremely happy to see in in a shop or on the street would ask their country (see chart 3). how they are. A majority also do not KIIS noted a decline in the attitude understand why it is important to say towards Jews over the years following «hi» in hotels and shops, or engage the independence of Ukraine. From in «small talk». This is yet again not 1994 till 2010, the level of tolerance a usual thing for a post-Soviet person towards Jews declined by almost by when they find themselves in an unfa- 10% from 74 to 63% (see chart 4). miliar environment. In 2011 the Kyiv International In- It is interesting to note that anti- stitute of Sociology, using the Bog- semitism is more prevalent amongst ardus social distance scale, received young people whereas xenophobia is results that illustrate that the level more prevalent amongst those of an of tolerance in the attitude towards

51 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Chart 6. «Do you think that Ukrainian citizens who are homosexual should have the same rights as other citizens of our country?» 60

40 Yes 30 No Do not know 20

0 2002 2007 2011

Source: «Our World» Center, 2011. older age, those who were born and so- to members of sexual and certain eth- cialised in the USSR. nic minorities ans certain ethnic in in- The attitude towards representa- dependent Ukraine can be explained tives of sexual minorities is less indic- by the fact that they do not fit into ative, when we talk about a post-Sovi- the Soviet picture of the world70. If 20 et mentality. This is illustrated by the years after independence the general following question in the survey: «Do picture of the world in foundation re- you think that Ukrainian citizens who mains Soviet, then those who are con- are homosexual have the same rights sidered to be outcasts since the USSR as other citizens of our country?» cannot integrate into it. The Kyiv International Institute of From the graph above, it is evident Sociology, in 2011, found out wheth- that over the past decade the numer Ukrainians would vote for a presi- ber of those who do not consider that dential candidate who was Jewish or members of the LGBT community should have equal rights has grown: 70 Interview with the deputy of the Insti- 49% of respondents answered the tute of Sociology NAS Ukraine Yevhen question above with ‘no’. Intolerance Golovakha

52 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society

Table 6. If a party, which you trusted, would have chosen a well-qualiﬁ ed candidate who was either black or Jewish, would you vote for him/her?

Category Ukraine- 2011 USA — 2003 Jewish 36 89 Black politician 18 92

Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011. black. The question was formulated Social Exclusion. Social exclusion as follows: if a party, which you trust- has at least two aspects: first, is dis- ed, would have chosen a well-quali- trust towards other people and sec- fied candidate who was either black or ond, the exclusion from their every- Jewish, would you vote for him/her? day environment, in particular the The percentage of those who an- infrastructure for the condition of swered ‘yes’ is compared to similar in- which, a person does not feel respon- formation from a survey in the USA sible. (see chart 6). «At first I was very puzzled as to why Ukrainians were not bothered It is interesting to note that 70% about the condition of the common of Ukrainians and 87% of Americans area of their apartment blocks, the would vote for a qualified female can- road across from their block and their didate. Longitudinally sociological yards. How can you throw cigarette surveys of a group of young Ukrain- buds right outside doors?» — these ians explicated that at the age of 20 were the impressions of a German they were tolerant, at the age of 40 filmmaker who worked in Ukraine they were no longer so. This means from 2011-2012. From Soviet times, that at a young age people are more Ukrainians have inherited the exclu- open to the world and think positive- sion from their closest environment ly, whereas when they are older, after and habitat, which together with the going through a secondary socializa- fear of reform gives a synergetic ef- tion in a post-Soviet society, they be- fect: people could dislike the state of come intolerant in their attitudes to- their environment, but they do noth- wards the Other.71 ing about it. Thus, experts recognize that people in Ukraine massively oppose the 71 Interview with the deputy of the Insti- creation of apartment building own- tute of Sociology NAS Ukraine Yevhen ers associations. Altogether this in- Golovakha hibits the development of housing

53 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? Chart 7. Level of trust towards closest social surroundings

100% 90% No answer 80% 70% Fully trust 60% Trust more than do not 50%

40% Hard to say 30% Distrust more than 20% trust 10% Fully distrust 0% Compatriots Neighbours Colleagues

Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011. and further reduces the quality of and playgrounds that contrast with life. People do not get enough infor- their building, and also begin to act. mation, they believe that they will be As soon as people look carefully into deceived and they will lose money. It the details of spending on the mainte- is hard for them to imagine that mon- nance of their building, and actually ey they give for maintenance of their perceive that 50-60% of these spend- apartment buildings and surrounding ings go towards the maintenance and territory will not be collected by hous- not the needs of the housing office ing office but by someone who lives in they start thinking. However again their house.72 and again the fear comes back. If we However it is interesting to note create apartment building owners as- that as soon as they see the success sociations, elect its head, he will defi- story of a neighboring apartment nitely steal our money. The post-Sovi- block, where people had the will to et society, just like it needs air, needs change things, they note the cleanli- a success story, leaders who will act ness of their entrances, courtyards honestly in any situation.

72 Interview of the IWP with the experet The comfort zone, where trust of UNDP Leonid Tulowskiy. dominates distrust, in a Soviet,

54 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society person remains limited or even min- dangerous thing in life is to trust no imal. Such a person only depends on one. 56.1% said that the majority of him/herself, the circle of their values people do not want to have the burden is very narrow: family values, rela- of helping others. tives and friend. And, when it comes Sociologists study the phenome- to government and other institutions non of social exclusion, in particular, the person demonstrates loyalty, a through the index of anomie of de- higher declarative feeling of trust, moralization. They determine anomie takes part in social rituals and elec- as a state of disorder and conflict be- tions, although they do not see any tween social expectations and goals point in this.73 versus legitimate institutional mechanisms for their achievement. In oth- At first it seems that the sociolog- er words, they are talking about a sit- ical information is very encouraging: uation when people wait for and hope around 40-50% of Ukrainians trust for one thing, but get something to- their fellow-citizens, neighbors and tally different. As a result, mass so- colleagues. However when you look cial exclusion occurs as a way to run, at the amount of those who distrust escape and fence off from the world. more than trust, those who fully dis- The compensating mechanism in this trust and those for whom it is hard case is the disrespect and refusal to to say whether it is hard to trust sur- support the achievements and talents rounding peoples, the added num- of others. This brings about the prin- bers equal 45-50%. It is exactly this ciple «if I am feeling bad so should amount of people that do not feel re- everyone else». As a result, a post-So- al trust towards others in their soviet society loses the feeling of a com- cial surroundings. 49.6% of Ukrain- mon good. People exclude themselves ians in 2010 agreed that the most from one another. 45.7% of Ukrain- ians in the survey of the Institute of Sociology NAS of Ukraine admitted 73 Script of a video conference with Lev that people feel as though they are not Gudkov, director of Levada-Center (Russia) // Insitute of World Policy, in «their place» in society. June 27, 2012 — http://iwp.org.ua/ In Ukraine in the years between ukr/public/569.html 1992-2010 the index of anomie of

Table 7. Index of anomie of demoralization 1992 1999 2000 2001 2005 2006 2008 2010 13.6 14.0 13.8 13.8 12.4 12.7 13.1 12.9

Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2011.

55 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? demoralization was consistently above of them in a certain community, can average (scale of 1 to 18) (table 7). pull all those who are consciously or unconsciously different — being non- Devaluation of talents, knowledge, losers, those who could bring change, success, and disappointment in own down with them. abilities. In a post-Soviet society, there is high number of losers, who do not Apart from that, in a post-Sovi- understand that defeat is just a step et system, individual achievements on the way, not a disaster. A total- come into conflict with an ineffective ly corrupt, intellectually weak, nep- and unsuccessful system. A majori- otic government, that does not have ty is certain that in such a system it a clear view of the future is interest- is impossible to honestly achieve suc- ed in; that society remains consisting cess. Everyday life provides many rea- of losers. Such a society is easily ma- sons for such ideas. However, due to nipulated, you can buy a loser’s vote, such a preventative and negative atti- and it is easy to guarantee his loyalty. tude, people get in the way of real suc- However, the most dangerous part in cess stories. Here is an example of the this is that losers, when there is a lot village Tyenyste in the Bakhchsarai

Chart 8. What does your life depend on? 40 Largely on external 35 circumstances

30 Somewhat on me but largely on external 25 circumstances

20 Equally on me and external circumstances 15 More on me than exter- 10 nal circumstances

5 Mostly on me

0 No answer 1992 2000 2010 Source: Institute of Sociology NAS Ukraine, 2011.

56 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society region of Crimea. Local residents of others, «not to be jinxed» or «not to the village created a civil association be envied.» for the organization of water sup- It is clear from the graph that in ply. The case was assigned to a local 2010, the number of those who con- entrepreneur, who was able to organ- sidered that everything or to large ize, and even provide the technical extent in their life depends more on component of the case. He also devel- their own efforts than on external cir- oped the technology to remotely con- cumstances altogether in 2000 and trol the water supply, which made it 2010 made up about 20%. Thus, com- possible to turn the pump on and off pared to 1992, this number increased from a distance. However, this in- by only 2-3%. novative idea did not last long. The In an unfavorable institutional envi- villagers grew suspicious of the fact ronment of a post-Soviet mutated sys- that the entrepreneur had some un- tem, which kept the worst legacy of the heard of and therefore illegal prof- Soviet regime and combined it with new its, they thought that he had stolen ineffective democratic and market rules their money. The UNDP was involved and procedures, young people became in this project to ensure the transpar- quickly disillusioned as to their own ency of the documentation, formula- ability to change something through tion of the wages of the workers and their own knowledge, work and persist- tariffs. However the villagers did not ence. External factors begin to domi- trust the UN officials, the entrepre- nate over people’s personalities. neur or their own eyes. The business- One of the most phenomenal attri- man refused to cooperate with them butes of post-Sovietness is the trade and therefore the system of water in valuables which apriori, cannot be supply was frozen. In another village an object of trade such as Ph.D. and of Sevastianivka the situation was masters dissertations, medical docu- similar: people came to meetings and ments, working places, places in uni- asserted a system which paid a person versities, participation in protests or who managed the water system. The protests in support of political parties person did this effectively. However, and votes in elections. In a post-Soviet they soon began to complain that the society it is possible to buy or sell any person was stealing, though there was of the above. no evidence of this. For example, due to the chron- Generally, as explained by social ic unemployment in a depressive psychologists and sociologists, many Ukrainian province, the practice of post-Soviet people are ashamed to be giving a bribe for getting hired, even happy. If they still feel so they are for a low-paid job, has become com- afraid to share their happiness with monplace. In the town of Dybno,

57 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Rivne region, in order to get a job defend their thesis as well as for eve- one has to pay from $200 to $2000 rything to run smoothly. as you can find out from the locals. However, absolutely every ordi- For example, for the job of a nurse nary post-graduate student has to ei- in one of the hospitals in Rivne, one ther pay or in a similar way to «please» has to pay $2000. For the job of a sec- their reviewer and two (for candi- ondary school teacher, one has to pay dates) or three (doctors) of his or her through an intermediary. From the opponents. The student has to pay for data from the Unified Public Regis- the publication of his work in Ukrain- ter of Court Decisions we can find out ian journals and organize a feast once about the existence of much larger they defend their dissertation. Alto- bribes for jobs: $ 200 thousand, $ 30 gether this may cost from 5 000 hry- thousand, $ 14 thousand. A post-So- vnia to a couple of thousand dollars. viet person is often ready to pay for Those, who employ real, but poor pro- a job in a public institution, because fessionals, or firms who specialise in there they will receive a guaranteed writing dissertations, have to pay sig- income. nificantly more for the satisfaction In 2012, 18% of the members of of seeing «Dr.» instead of «Mr./Ms.» parliament of the German Bunde- in front of their name on a business stag had doctorate degrees in various card. «Essays, dissertations etc.» — fields. In comparison: in the Verkhov- you can see such advertizing in the na Rada of the 6th convocation, 32% subway in Kyiv, on advertising pillars of the members of parliament had a and also on the internet. This is all ab- doctorate degree. In 2011, according surdity if you look from the Europe- to information provided by the State an culture and educational/scientific Statistics Committee, 23,655 candi- tradition point of view. dates and 5,469 doctors worked in the A large separate scenario is the economy of Ukraine. trade in diplomas of secondary and higher education. Foreign employers The vast majority of Ukrainian who need to hire low-qualified work- parliamentarians defended their dis- ers (mechanics, waiters, couriers) for sertations in the spheres of econom- their businesses gladly tell what the ics or jurisprudence. In informal consequences such a trade are: people talks about academic affairs, peo- come with their secondary or high- ple say that because of such popular- er education diplomas, however they ity among the establishment for these do not know anything or know how scientific specializations, one has to to do certain jobs even if they require pay and have connections in order to a low-qualification level. It seems,

58 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society

Ukrainian employers are not sur- happy with it. In sociology, this is prised by this since they have already the indicator of the degree of peo- gotten used to this. ple’s social adaptation. Post-Soviet The purchase of votes during elec- people adapt to society in such a way tions and the payment for participa- that they can survive in it, but then tion in mass demonstrations — is the do not feel happy. They are not sure talk of tongue in Ukrainian political about the future, thus, think mostly life. During the demonstrations for in short-term categories and, consider the Party of Regions, as told by the and plan everything in their life from participants, you can receive around such a perspective. The most strik- 40 to 150 hryvnia. Some members of ing example of it is the attitude to of parliament and those who want to be- customers in the service industry. If come members hand out food parcels a customer does not like something it and money to potential voters before is often regarded as his problem, and elections. The voters gratefully ac- not that of the service provider. The cept them. fact that a customer who is unhappy Such rigorous trade in things that with the quality of service will nev- in reality cannot be sold or bought is a er come back again, is not a matter of consequence of the loss of many values concern. in the transformational period and is a consequence of poverty. In the sit- Significant part of their lives, a uation of a chronic state of hopeless- post-Soviet people spend following ness, poverty and backwardness; peo- meaningless, not directed at achiev- ple degrade and adapt to the unaccep- ing constructive outcome, institu- table social practices and behaviour. tions of the state bureacracy. First of Thus people begin to sell those things, all it includes long hours standing in that priori cannot be objects of trade. queues at passport offices, state land Therefore, market mechanisms mu- administrations, state tax inspec- tate under the influence of the post- tions, at railway stations and pub- Soviet uncertainty and lack a clear lic clinics. Even if there is a chance system of values. to avoid this queue, post-Soviet people will not believe that it is real. For PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR example, railway ticket offices which serve the privileged category of citi- Short-term planning. In 2010 in a zens, can usually also sell tickets to survey of the Eurasian Monitor 64% ordinary citizens. However, these of Ukrainians said that they are dis- citizens do not use them, reflexive- satisfied with their life, 32% were ly seeking long lines at other offices,

59 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Table 8. Society’s reaction to the overall situation in the country

Optimism, hope for the best 16,8 % Sadness 22,5 % Must be patient and wait for better times 16,9 % Feelings of shame and guilt 11,2 % The desire to run protest actions 20,8 % Indifference 10,7 % Everything is fine 4,8 % Political leaders deceived us 39,3 % The people are also to blame for the current situation 16,2 % Hard to say 7,2 %

Source: Opinion of Ukraine’s citizens on the situation in the country, assessment of authorities actions, electoral orientations. Results of 2011/Razumkov Center, 2011. because it is right and standard thing day and year by year with their small to do. As a result, you can observe a problems. Their horizon of conscious- situation where there is no one at the ness narrows to a minimum. They booking-office for privileged people, have no vision of the future, and have and the other ones are overcrowded. only one wish for their children — to A Post-Soviet man does not trust the go abroad, away from this absurdity. option to book tickets online and pre- Only the prospect of emigration gives fers queues. Another example of inef- the inspiration to think in long-term ficient bureaucracy is medical exami- categories. nations when you enter college or get According to a survey by the Ra- employed. They are purely formal, zumkov Center, in 2011, 67.3% of just done by ‘tick-box’ approach, ex- Ukrainians believed that events in amination by various doctors with no Ukraine are moving in the wrong di- individual differentiation or prop- rection. For example, in the survey by er modern diagnostics. These exami- the Razumkov Center, Ukrainians de- nations convert into endless running scribed society’s reaction to the over- around at the offices of physicians all situation in the country as follows and collecting health certificates. (respondents could select multiple an- Life in a system built on such reg- swers) (table 8). ulatory procedures can lead to com- Among Ukrainians the feelings of plete dependence on the circumstanc- shame, sadness and humility domi- es and futility. So, people live day by nate over optimism and a protesting

60 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society mood. Under such chronic psycho- profession, complain that their ideas logical pressure people cannot believe can be picked up by someone else or that anything can have medium or use the list of references, which was long term prospects. prepared with enormous efforts. We can assume that representatives of Poor practices of knowledge and in- other academic disciplines think al- formation sharing. More dynamic, in- most the same. For lecturers of west- novative and developed a society is, ern universities it is not a problem more open are the people to sharing to publish curricula, because, first- information, knowledge and technol- ly, they update them very often, hav- ogy and vice versa. The post-Soviet ing favorable working conditions society consistently lags behind the and resources to do so, and secondly, West in technological development; it is mentally important for them to it lacks the resources to upgrade their spread their achievements across the approaches in different areas. As a re- academic community. sult, a post-Soviet person is also more Thus, the main barrier to informa- closed and ‘greedy’ when it comes to tion is not the threat that somebody a proposal or a need to share their will steal it, but the mental stand- knowledge. In the post-Soviet system, off triggered by the entire system in it is so difficult to achieve a certain which the person exists. result that people are not really motivated to share it with others. There- Preventive unfriendliness. Preven- by, a vicious circle is formed, mov- tive unfriendliness is rudeness, just ing on to the country not being able to a frown from a post-Soviet person is make any information and intellectu- the norm, and the inability to smile al breakthroughs. stranger on the street, especially if he There is a striking example of addresses to you. The former Latvi- this statement. Specialists, who con- an President Vaira Vike-Freiberga duct training for lecturers of journal- (1999-2007) defined such a difference ism, noted the existence of the prob- between the Western and post-Soviet lem when they explain to their audi- man: the Western man is first of all ence that the curriculum of courses a polite man, and the post-Soviet — taught should be uploaded to the uni- rude. versities’ web sites, they hear the re- One British journalist who worked sponse that it cannot be done, because in Ukraine as a stationed reporter for someone can simply ‘steal’ it. Lectur- Western publications, says, that, in ers, who, indeed, should prepare rep- his opinion, this preventive hostili- resentatives of the most open and fo- ty, in other words, the rudeness and cused on the exchange of information intolerance of some Ukrainians is a

61 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? consequence of a sense of weakness you?». As a result, people are trained and vulnerability: «Even when I ob- to suppress their positive emotions. served this unfriendliness towards Preventative unfriendliness does myself, I understood that it was gen- not always provide outright rude- erated in people by a particular social ness. It may manifest itself, for ex- context where nobody trusts anyone. ample, in the style of writing e-mails. In fact, it is very difficult to live when One of the organizers of the Summer you think that you cannot trust any- School of Jewish History and Cul- one at all». ture, that takes place in Lviv, shared In general, you can often hear an interesting observation. She has a complaint from foreigners that to communicate via e-mail with stu- Ukrainians smile little. In Ukraine, a dents and young scientists from all smile to a stranger is often interpret- over Ukraine. They, according to ed as a manifestation or strangeness, her experience, mostly, do not have or as flirting. a European culture of communica- However, those foreigners who tion, which, in turn, implies a po- have visited Russia and Belarus, occa- lite appeal in the beginning of a let- sionally remark that, compared with ter, thanking for anything and polite people over there, Ukrainians are «in- wishes at the end. credibly kind and friendly». Also, It is also not accepted in European they admit: Ukrainians are actually culture to send letters with requests mostly friendly and willing to help, in the imperative mood or e-mails but the problem is that in post-Sovi- with attached files without a brief et culture it is not accepted to trans- cover letter. Failure to comply with fer your natural kindness to your pro- these rules is perceived as a manifes- fession, communication with stran- tation of ill will and bad tact. Instead, gers in the street and broader social a letter without a polite salutation or communication. People, as if they a thanks-giving ending and with the have a switch: as soon as they appear «I need» context is a usual thing in in a professional role, for example, of communication with young educated a seller or a waiter: they must ‘bark’ Ukrainians. and be strict. Psychologists also talk about the The Institute of Sociology of NAS lack of emotional intelligence of of Ukraine found, through its sur- Ukrainians. Children are taught that veys in 1995-2006, if Ukrainian’s feel they should be restrained and not to a lack of kindness from people around laugh out loud in public, because peo- them: on average one third of Ukrain- ple may think that «you are like a ian lacked it, and another third found fool» and «what people will think of it difficult to answer this question.

62 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society

Table 9. What is the least European in Ukraine?

People 8 % Good quality 30 % Services quality 27 % Culture, mentality, legacy 19 % Cities infrastructure 28 % Leisure facilities (restaurants, cafes, clubs, cinemas, exhibitions, etc.) 19 % Stadiums 14 % Transport 30 % Shops 21 % Hotels, accommodation 31 % Government 47 % Security 29 % Knowledge of English and other EU languages 41 % Other 0,48 % Nothing 18 % A European social survey public benefit from you, when they have a poll in 2009 revealed that Ukrainians, chance to do so, or will they be fair in on a scale of ten, assessed their readi- their attitude?». Only in Greece, Tur- ness to help other people as 3.6 points key, Bulgaria and Romania, this indi- (0 — people care only about them- cator was lower. selves and do not help others, 10 — 30.53% of EU visitors of the Eu- people really try to help each other). ro 2012 recognized hotels and ac- This is one of the lowest rates among commodation in Ukraine as the least the 32 countries surveyed. This indi- European, 26.53% — quality of ser- cator received even a lower value in vice, 19.47% — leisure facilities (res- Greece, Poland and Slovakia. And, taurants, cafes, clubs, cinemas, etc), the highest was in Ireland (6.24). 18.7% — the culture and mentali- Ukraine also received one of the ty. This is the data from the 1st Eu- lowest rates on the same ten-point ro exit poll conducted by the Institute scale — 4.64 — among 32 Europe- of World Policy in cooperation with an countries for the indicator of fair GfK Ukraine. That is about a third treatment of people towards each oth- of Europeans critically evaluated the er: respondents answered the question Ukrainian service sector, where much «Would other people try to get some depends on the human factor: how

63 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? tourists are met, greeted, how their action and certain psychological com- wishes for the service are fulfilled, pensatory mechanism. how those, who primarily are to do Secondly, for example, «waiter» is it (hotel staff, waiters, taxi drivers), not considered a profession in Ukraine help them in a strange country. while in other European countries In the ranking of tourist attractive- this profession is taught and treated ness of the World Economic Forum in with the same respect as any other. 2011, Ukraine finds itself at the very Thirdly, even if the Ukrainian youth bottom: out of 42 European countries gets some training or education in the it was ranked the 39th, being ahead field of tourism and restaurant busi- of only Armenia, Bosnia and Herze- ness. Still, they to a great extent are govina, Moldova; out of 139 countries trained to work in a Soviet canteen around the world – 85th. The tourist but not in a modern European restau- attractiveness of a particular country rant. And these young workers should is based on many indicators, combined not only be taught from scratch but in fourteen categories. By the atti- re-trained. It takes months and even tude of local people towards foreign- years.75 ers Ukraine is rated 127th (!) in the world, by police reliability — 122nd, Preservation of Soviet symbols in by openness to tourism – 52nd. the infrastructure. The Soviet legacy in Ukraine remains, primarily, in in- «According to my observations, frastructure and symbols. Journal- all that has changed in Ukraine since ists of the online edition texty.ua con- the fall of communism is the color of ducted research: they counted which the flag. Internally, Ukraine remains sort of names prevail in the names of 200% Soviet,»74 — Hervé Bourdon downtown streets, in 20 000 Ukrain- says. He believes that the phenomenon ian settlements listed in the directo- of «preventive unfriendliness» in the ry, of the administrative structure of service sector, particularly in restau- Ukraine — Soviet, neutral or related rants and cafes, is triggered by vari- to independence. It turned out that ous factors. Firstly, the stereotype amount of names in Ukraine associat- that the job related to serving some- ed with the Soviet period and the fig- one puts a person in a lower position ures of the totalitarian era is 20 times before a client dominates in Ukraine. more than of those related to the his- As a result, rudeness and disrespect tory and the period of independence: towards that client is a protective re- 52% of the names were of Soviet

74 Interview of the IWP with Hervé Bour- 75 Interview of the IWP with Hervé Bour- don don

64 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society genealogy, 45% — neutral content, possible to keep everything like it is and only 2,4% — related somehow and that there is no harm in this sym- to an independent Ukraine. The lead- bolic state of urban culture, are: first- ers of Soviet urbanomics were Kiro- ly, it costs money, because maps must vograd, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia re- be changed and documents of any in- gions. stitutions registered to addresses in Anatoly Bondarenko, one of the these streets must be amended. Cur- study’s authors, explains «there was rently, the biggest achievement is re- no consensus in Ukrainian society on naming of some cities: Donetsk in- what to do with the previous 70 years stead of Stalino, Mariupol instead of Soviet rule. And this is a problem of Zhdanov, Luhansk instead of Vo- that would not be resolved on its own. roshilovgrad, and Radivyliv instead Ukrainians actually continue to live in of Chervonoarmyisk. The most pop- the Soviet Union. Minor mechanisms, ular Soviet urban street names, ac- which reproduce the Sovietness, con- cording to this study, are: Lenin, So- tinue to operate. Streets’ names are viet, Peace, October, Gagarin, Vic- not the biggest problem, but it is a tory along with Central, School and very clear indicator.» The main argu- Youth. But in Cherkasy and Kherson ments of those, who believe that it is there are still Chekists streets.

Chart 9. Ukraine-2012: names of main streets On the map, for each settlement, only streets with local authorities are marked with color.

Soviet times Neutral names Names connected with Independence 0 6000 12000

Source: www.texty.ua.

65 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Table 10. The ratio between streets named after Taras Shevchenko and Vladimir Lenin, on which local authorities are located in Ukraine.

Regions «Shevchenko» «Lenin» AR of Crimea 3 65 Vinnytsia Oblast 22 279 Zakarpattia Oblast 21 25 Kyiv Oblast 46 176 Luhansk Oblast 5 92 Lviv Oblast 26 0 Kharkiv Oblast 4 72 Chernivtsi Oblast 9 2

Source: Public Initiative «Bureau of Popular Research», Crimea Development Fund

The Public Initiative, the «Bu- Lenin across Ukraine over the past reau of Popular Research», counted few years. The recent one was opened the ratio between streets named af- in Tairovo village, the Ovidiopolskiy ter Taras Shevchenko and Vladimir district of Odessa Oblast, in Novem- Lenin, on which local authorities are ber 2011. Yevgen Tsar’kov, a commu- located in Ukraine. And, this is what nist MP, called the children, brought they got (data is provided for some re- to that event by grandmothers, «the gions, full survey included all oblasts youth that came at their souls’ be- of Ukraine): hest». But if Lenin statues remain unnoticed and, a marginal phenome- Thousands of letters from citizens non, the erection of Stalin’s statue in go to these state and local authori- the yard of the local regional commit- ty addresses every day, which are the tee of the Communist Party, in Zapor- venues for a variety of events that izhia, in May 2010, caused a real reso- somehow or other involve state and lo- nance in Ukraine. The bust was blown cal authorities. up at night by unknown persons. Af- The brand new statues of Lenin ter that there was a wave of arrests of perhaps surprise even more than the NGO «Tryzub» members, and, ulti- old Soviet names of the central streets mately, the Zhovtnevy District Court in Ukraine. In 2011, the Ukrainian sentenced eight young «Tryzub» communists reported that they re- members to probation for two or three stored and opened (!) 80 statues of years for damaging the bust of the

66 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society totalitarian regime leader, who or- the Wehrmacht, in the village Pan- ganized the Holodomor (famine) and taliya, in the Dubno district of Rivne other crimes against humanity. Oblast. According to historians, those During the presidency of Viktor NKVD members participated in the Yushchenko there were attempts to mass murder of the local population somehow deal with the monuments of before the Soviet army retreated. In totalitarianism in Ukraine. A registry June 2012, St. George ribbon images, of totalitarianism era monuments and which had already been forgotten be- memorials in Ukraine was compiled. It fore the arrival to power of the Par- totaled 2,700 units and it was planned ty of Regions, appeared on infrastruc- to eliminate them. President Yush- ture and on billboards in cities. In chenko issued several decrees calling May 2012, a 15 km long ribbon, which to intensify efforts to dismantle the once was used for decorating military monuments of the 1932-1933 Holodo- awards in the USSR, was stretched in mor and political repression instiga- Luhansk. tors and executors. MPs Ivan Zayets Ukraine’s authorities today do not and Jaroslav Dzhodzhik submitted a raise the question of that old totali- bill to parliament in 2009 to ban the tarianism monuments should neces- Communist ideology and eliminate sarily be destroyed, but also interpret- totalitarian and communist regimes ed in a new way. The museum «Pris- symbols. However, it failed to even be on at Lontsky» located in the former put on the agenda of the current par- NKVD prison in Lviv is so far the on- liamentary session, and voting for it ly example of a new interpretation of was not even mentioned. the historical totalitarianism sites in And if the «Orange» politicians did Ukraine. Instead, the central SBU of- not take any practical steps to elimi- fice of independent Ukraine, for ex- nate or give new interpretations of ample, is located in the same building the communism monuments, with the on 33 Volodymyrska Street, where the advent of Yanukovych and the Par- KGB was stationed in Soviet times. ty of Regions, starting in 2010, there The building of the Presidential Ad- was sporadic return to the totalitar- ministration of Ukraine is situated ianism era symbols and heroes. The in the building of the Central Com- monument to Stalin became the most mittee of the Communist Party of the resonant example. But there are oth- Ukrainian SSR. ers, less evident ones. In the sum- The industrial sector is another mer of 2012, Rivne SBU department powerful reservoir of Soviet symbols laid flowers at the monument to those and Soviet mentality. It is the indus- NKVD members who died during the triality, not only as a kind of materi- Second World War in a battle with al culture, but also as a world-viewing

67 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? system of norms and values preserv- their income to buy an expensive fur- ing Sovietness76. It is not a coinci- coat. Many Ukrainian businessmen dence that Eastern Ukraine is called (politicians), at the beginning of their the «reservation of Sovietness».77 careers, primarily, buy Swiss watch- Although, Sovietness can be both of es, Brioni suits, and golden cufflinks philistine and peasant kind. with the first money they earn. A post-Soviet man cannot boast Irrational consumption (demon- about essential results such as sig- strative luxury). A life experience in nificant achievements in their field, a country, where you had to stand quality and honesty in their business, in long queues to buy sausage and a winning in a tough fair market com- coat, and where many products sim- petition, modern education and confi- ply could not be obtained, Post-Soviet dence in the future. Post-Soviet peo- people compensate with an irrational ple cannot change the circumstances consumption in a wild capitalism. The of their life, but they can buy some, Post-Soviet man demonstrates his sta- in contrast, and get pleasure from it. tus and achievements through golden They do not reflect upon the infanti- toilets and the most expensive Ital- lism of this behavioural pattern. It be- ian tiles. Having gained a large for- comes a kind of compensatory mech- tune by fraud, he builds zoos for os- anism of self-realization that parents triches and other exotic animals, buys transmit to children. And so the post- the most expensive cars and wears the Soviet attitudes regenerate. most expensive watches. And this is a Meanwhile, quite a peculiar atti- feature not of only post-Soviet politi- tude to the external attributes of lux- cians, but also all those who laid their ury and wealth is cultivated amongst hands on the ‘sinecure’. the poor in a post-Soviet society. For example, a foreign journalist, who The so-called phenomenon of «sta- worked for a long time in Ukraine, tus items» is noteworthy. It is when, said with surprise that he saw a girl in for example, young people with their a restaurant in Luhansk who was look- last money buy a «Lexus»on credit, ing through a glass window at a «Bent- while living in a tiny apartment in ley» on the street with admiration and a non-prestigious suburb; or, when endorsement. «Isn’t it clear that such young women use a large share of an expensive car in such a poor country is the result of corruption? How 76 From Volodymyr Fesenko’s speech at Ukrainians can condemn corruption expert panel / IWP. and adore others’ «Bentleys»?»- many 77 Video conference with Lev Gudkov/ guests who come to Ukraine form IWP. much wealthier and richer countries,

68 UKRAINE. Post-Sovietness in Ukrainian Society where, still, a «Bentley» next to a res- benefits in full even with their mon- taurant is a rare happening, ask this ey. String-pulling and connections rhetorical question. may help when dealing with the State It is interesting that VIP-servic- Tax Administration. But at the same es have become the fashion in post- time jeeps that cost hundreds of thou- Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainians have got sands of dollars, are doomed to ride accustomed to the presence of VIP- from the luxury state summer hous- lounges in airports, VIP-boxes at sta- es in Pushcha-Vodytsa, a resort in the diums and VIP-halls in restaurants. northwestern part of the Kyiv city, It exists in more developed and dem- to the center on destroyed roads, cov- ocratic countries as well, but the ered with holes and cracks in a part Ukrainian VIP- segregation some- of the village, where ordinary people, times takes surprising shapes. For ex- mostly retirees, live. It is not always ample, you can be offered a VIP-tick- possible to construct a VIP bypasses. et instead of a standard one at the Another example: there is a sewer on Semiyiz (Crimea) aqua park. Munici- an expensive VIP-hotel’s beach at one pal officials have arranged a VIP-lane Crimean resort. This fact is not even for themselves on the one way Lenin known by the wealthy clients, who so Street in Dnipropetrovsk with the op- much desire to dissociate themselves posite to rules to the direction of the from the mainstream of Soviet Crime- traffic, and it causes traffic jams. an service. Meanwhile, traffic police are imposing fines upon ‘non-VIP’ drivers, who dare to use this lane in rush-hour.

Indeed, the tradition of nomenclature ‘members-only outlets’ is preserved. It took on new forms, labels and codes of admission. Earlier, status was the code, now — first of all, money. Such a system is dominated by the belief that everything can be bought: comfort, good attitude and a sense of security. There is no understanding that if the socio-political and economic systems as a whole do not work accordingly to the schemes that guarantee these values for the majority then the VIP-minority will not get desired

69 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

POST-SOVIETNESS IN MOLDOVAN POLITICS

ATTITUDES proclaiming itself as the successor to the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, The Republic of Moldova was the which included the re-forming of the first country from the Community of Soviet Union in its agenda until 2008, Independent States to become a mem- democratically came to power and had ber of the Council of Europe; it has two consecutive mandates. This civic developed an institutionalized gov- conduct of citizens cannot be attrib- ernmental dialogue with the Europe- uted only to «ideological misunder- an Union and negotiates its political standings» or Soviet nostalgia, but association and economic integration should be approached in a more com- with the EU. The Republic of Moldo- prehensive context. Thus, «the insti- va is the sole ex-Soviet state connect- tutional determinism», suggested by ed to Balkan integration structures. Lev Gudkov and his colleagues from It finds itself within a joint neigh- the Levada Center for elucidating the borhood framework with the Europe- political features of post-Sovietness an Union, alongside Ukraine, Georgia should be anchored in a larger civili- and another three post-Soviet states. zation perspective. Two classical civ- It also benefits from the financial as- ilization prospects which have devel- sistance and instruments of the main oped in the last decades (the material democratic transformer in the region, one promoted by Alvin Toffler, and destined for Europeanization/ West- the spiritual one updated by Samuel ernization. Nevertheless, the dem- Huntington) urge us to consider the ocratic transition is a difficult pro- economic development and spiritual cess in these societies and a cultural values within a cultural «screening» resistance exists in all social sectors. exercise. The Republic of Moldova is the only state in Europe where the Communist All-embracing control as a neces- party — The Party of Communists sity. The material world in which a of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), new cultural archetype is developing

70 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics

Chart 1. Moldovan citizens’ doctrinaire affection. 23% 26% Communist Liberal Christian-Democratic Social-Democratic 15% 17% Nationalist Do not know/Do not answer 15% 3% 1% None Source: IMAS. Social-political barometer, November 2009, p. 26.

Table 1. Human development index 2011. Human devel- Mean years Gross National In- Life expectancy opment index of schooling come (GNI) per from birth (years) (HDI) Value (years) capita (US Dollars)

Georgia 0,733 73,7 12,1 4,780 Moldova 0,649 69,3 9,7 3,058 Ukraine 0,729 68,5 11,3 6,175 Europe and 0,751 71,3 9,7 12,004 Central Asia World 0,682 69,8 7,4 10,082

Source: Adapted by author according to: United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report 2011. is important for detecting the quali- Human development, implicitly ties of post-Sovietness, representing the population’s standard of living, the environment which feeds and pre- is a compulsory component of consol- disposes a certain political behaviour. idating democracy in terms of West- Living conditions are part of this ma- ern values and freedoms78, and the terial world, determining, to a great reality which exists at present in the extent, the political attitudes for which the Human Development Index 78 Linz J., Stepan A. Drumul spre o (HDI) and other indicators of the Hu- democratie consolidată. / Diamond L. man Development Report represent s.a. Cum se consolidează democratia. Ia- an incomplete but relevant synthesis. si: Polirom, 2004, p. 51-67.

71 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Table 2. Key ﬁ ndings (%, weighted). Average Average Georgia Moldova Ukraine Transition region Western Europe Satisfied with life 25 30 30 43 72 Trust in each other 29 41 49 34 42 Perceive less corruption than four 78 13 10 21 9 years ago Support both a market economy 38 52 26 34 42 and democracy

Source: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Life in Transition. three states hinders such consolida- of the Republic of Moldova. It is true tion. Authentic democracy is impos- that the surveys conducted under the sible without a participative political research «Life in Transition» do not culture, but a participative culture necessarily convey a causative liaison is created depending on private prop- between the standard of living and erty and welfare. The Moldovan so- the support for democracy and a mar- ciety, for half a century, lived with- ket economy, particularly in the case out any guarantee of private property of the Republic of Moldova. Although and for two decades of independence being the citizens with the lowest in- without sustainable development, but come per capita in Europe, 52% of it was condemned to poverty. At the Moldovan respondents support de- same time, the poverty of the major- mocracy and market economy, while ity of the population makes it more the West-European average consti- vulnerable to manipulation regular- tutes 42%. ly used by politicians, when they appear to be provident, promising social The spiritual component for de- packages without funds, or distrib- termining political attitudes is not at uting «electoral gifts.» The data ex- all irrelevant. The absolute majority posed in the Table 2 denotes a position of the population of the three coun- over the world average for HDI, but is tries is Christian-Orthodox: 83.7% far below the level of Western liberal of Ukrainians, 83.9% of Georgians democracies, as well as a much lower and 98% of Moldovans79. Through income per capita as compared to the world average, especially in the case 79 CIA. The World Factbook, 2012.

72 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics religion, the three societies inherit- the aesthetic tradition in the age of Eu- ed a Byzantine tradition, which fore- ropean nationalism. Most frequently, saw an intimate association between however, nationalism had a conserva- the Orthodox state and the Orthodox tive formula, which rejected Western Church (Byzantine symphony) into liberalism and supported the suprem- a single state-ecclesiastical body, al- acy of society’s elite. In this context, though, practically, this meant the Mihai Eminescu claimed: «The elite supremacy of the secular power over are liable both for the rise and decline church power. The idea of an almighty of people and man himself»80. country stemmed directly from this Therefore, the need for absolute state-church relationship existing un- control over politics is not only a der the Russian empire, which domi- quality of post-Sovietness, but also nated the region both territorially and an intrinsic component of the evolu- ecclesiastically. The totalitarian Sovi- tion of national spiritual life, even if et regime and its own Communist re- state institutions do not enjoy an in- ligion definitely led this absolute con- creased trust from citizens. Thus, ac- trol over politics in extreme propor- cording to the recent Public Opinion tions. At present, the religious insti- Barometer (POB) from the Repub- tution continues to play an essential lic of Moldova, the main state insti- role in nurturing a parochial culture tutions enjoy a low level of trust of and interpreting «the almightiness» the population: Head of the state — of public authorities. Especially post- 28%, Parliament — 25%, Govern- Soviet politicians, those from the Re- ment — 30%, political parties — public of Moldova implicitly have a 20%81. Simultaneously, the majority habit of taking part in religious servic- perceives the state as an almighty re- es surrounded by video cameras, pray- sponsible for the life of society, pre- ing in public and frequently mention- disposing, thus, the political class ing God in their public discourse. In to absolute control attempts. Each such a way, they associate themselves second grown-up from the Republic with the institution which mostly en- of Moldova claims it would be bet- joys the trust of society — Church. ter if the country were governed by a

Furthermore, here, the attempts to detach from Soviet totalitarianism, 80 Apud Bădescu I., Dungaciu D., Baltasiu as well as from Russian intellectual R. Istoria sociologiei — teorii contem- traditions, which ruled the region’s porane. Bucureti: Editura Eminescu, cultural life, persisted in history un- 1996, p. 558. til the national intelligentsia of the 81 Barometrul Opiniei Publice, aprilie-mai XIXth century; the latter grounding 2012.

73 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? single party82. Finally, the tendency was also creating the necessary incen- of absolute control is only a cultural tives for overall control: a single par- trance, as, in reality, politicians are ty has the majority and is governing incapable of supplying society with but also the President of Moldova was vital services. Moreover, for exam- the president of the party. ple, economic crimes and organized crime registered a boom in Republic It is difficult to say that nowadays of Moldova lately, whereas the public the willingness of politicians to con- authorities seem to be distant from trol everything is lower, but the envi- the actual situation. ronment is not all that permissive. A In day-to-day life, the necessity coalition government formed by three for an all-embraced control of pow- parties (formerly four) is creating er is often seen in small details that natural checks and balances between are not evident to everyone, but could the players participating in the gov- be observed by those who are dealing erning process. In addition to this, a with the system. One can often hear strong opposition leaves small room in Moldova that one or another person for manoeuvre. Despite this, given in a certain ministry or institution is the Moldovan context when many rich a representative of the Intelligence people (often called oligarchs) often service (or informator), which some- pay too much attention to economic times places their «agents» in order to assets that they would like to control ensure that the state controls every- rather than control issues where they thing. Of course the degree of control see little personal gains. depends from one leader to another. Just a few years ago, when the Com- The post-Soviet behaviour of munist party was in office, in Mol- many public servants could be also dova one could observe a heavy foot- observed when interacting with third print of the presidency in the life of parties, i.e. NGOs or journalists. all institutions. Many changes were There are many examples when cer- decided by the president and only for- tain information, which is by default malized by the government, in order public, is not published and when an to comply with the laws. When, for organization or a journalist asks for instance, a minister was fired, with- it, the public servant needs the ap- out even consulting the Prime Minis- proval of the minister or the head ter and everyone was asking why, the of the institution to deliver this or answer was quite simple — «the First that information. The fear of public wants this». The institutional set-up servants is generated by the fact that nothing should be delivered without 82 Ibidem.

74 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics the consent of the head of the institu- hierarchy «peak» is different in dif- tion, even if this is not classified in- ferent institutions, personal contacts formation. being more important than the functional task of the those who demand Absolutization of hierarchy. Over meetings. Given Moldova’s size and the last two decades, the Republic of also the fact that many in the current Moldova has developed a vicious ax- government were formerly working iological hierarchy. Due to the lack in NGOs, newspapers or other entities of an efficient mechanism for select- that imply a high degree of socializa- ing values, political elites are the ones tion, the hierarchy is not protected by that foster the absolutization of hier- a fence. People could more or less eas- archy in this society. The events that ily engage in discussion, drop a mes- took place in April 2009 (during the sage on Facebook, send a tweet or just so-called Twitter Revolution) repre- meet them. Thus, one can assume that sent the most illustrative case of blind the abolutization of hierarchy is a subordination to higher authorities, matter of the human factor and size of when, in the night of April 7 to April the apparatus of the minister in ques- 8, enforcement bodies were hunting tion. for young people on the street, arrest- ing and maltreating them, and organ- Intolerance. Political intolerance, izing trials in police stations during warlike rhetoric and discriminato- the night. Most of these actions were ry statements represent the realities illegal, as police officers and judg- of the political process in the Repub- es are aware of legal norms, but they lic of Moldova. Moldovan politicians were blindly executing orders coming scored the counter-performance to from superior staff. profoundly divide society on ethni- cal, religious, age, and profession- However, in terms of hierarchy, al principles, only for the sake of po- Moldova is slightly different from litical gain and votes. The actual po- other countries, like Ukraine or some litical context was widely sieged by other European states. In European the Party of Communists of the Re- states, especially within the EU insti- public of Moldova (PCRM), immedi- tutions, a clear hierarchy exists to the ately after April 5th, 2009 elections, same extent as in non-EU countries, when its leader, Vladimir Voronin, confesses an employee of one of the Head of the party in office, declared EU institutions, but in contrast to the he had nothing to negotiate with «lib- EU, in Ukraine or other post-Soviet eral doggies», i.e. the anti-Commu- countries, the rules for access to the nist opposition which stood for half

75 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? of the country’s population. From the EU countries, but one should also here on, a real war of statements com- pay attention to the repercussions of menced, insults and mutual accusa- these statements, which usually end tions, absolutely inconsistent with up with a request for dismissal. a liberal democracy. All these nour- The (in)tolerance of politicians ished the political instability which from different groups is often ob- has ruled Moldovan society for almost served during the debates of new three years. The lack of a communica- laws. One of these laws was the Anti- tion culture and discursive democra- discrimination law. Moldova took the cy furthermore antagonizes the polit- responsibility to adopt this law with- ical forces of the Republic of Moldova in the Action Plan of Visa Liberaliza- and, as a result, society on the whole. tion with the EU, given the fact that The statements that showed intoler- many minorities, as well as people ance and inadequate behaviour to dif- with disabilities were being discrimi- ferent categories of society became nated against. In the end, the law was usual business for politicians and of- adopted, though, under a different ficials in Moldova. One can remember name (law on equal chances) but it was when the former president said in par- indeed an interesting debate to fol- liament that the current minister of low. First of all, the law was returned transport is ‘faggot’. It is important to government after protests by reli- to notice the observations of political gious groups that were arguing that analysts in Moldova, who believe that the anti-discrimination law is not the intolerant behaviour of the politi- complying with the Christian tradi- cians was rooted in the Soviet times tion of Moldova. After having anoth- and is a conscious behaviour. er round of consultations the law was sent to parliament and voted by the One particular dimension of the coalition parties. In fact, most of the intolerance phenomenon in Moldo- politicians were not against this law. va and other post-Soviet countries is However, the unstable political situ- the lack of reaction from the popula- ation marked by the inability to elect tion. The fact that society is reacting the President for almost three years poorly to such inadequate behaviour, was a time bomb able to generate ear- in fact, encourages these officials to ly elections at any moment, that is continue making statements contain- why parties were carefully delaying ing intolerant rhetoric, this is not the the vote on the anti-discrimination case in other European countries. law, because in light of possible elec- Of course, one can say that there tions, the parties which would have are cases of intolerant behaviour in voted in favor would be punished by

76 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics their electorate, which was suppos- PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR edly reluctant in this regard. As soon as a president was elected by parlia- Political string-pulling over law, nep- ment, the law was adopted and appar- otism and favoritism. The establish- ently things are moving on the right ment of a hierarchy in the Moldovan track. political process does not only rep- A pretty similar situation was the resent a reality of state institutions, registration of the Muslim League in but is also the current practice of po- Moldova. A decision over their regis- litical parties. Too much party dis- tration was pending and Moldova was cipline and the interests of some fi- warned several times by different in- nancial groups (or, frankly speaking, ternational institutions that the reg- criminal groups) which control some istration should proceed without any parties, have personalized the Mol- arguments, especially taking into ac- dovan political process to a large ex- count that the legislation in place al- tent and are depriving the state insti- lowed such step. tutions of power. Numerous public in- Both examples above show that the stitutions are paralyzed by such prac- population in Moldova still fears al- tices; the phenomenon of nepotism ob- terations and especially changes that structs the structural reforms and po- are bringing differences to their nor- litical modernization of the country, mal daily lives. The church proves to while justice is very frequently pow- be a conservative institution that is erless and trapped in political games trying to keep the homogeneity and and financial interests. Throughout delay the effects of the Europeaniza- the last two decades, the alternation tion, which in this case means to ac- of the government in the Republic of cept diversity. One should remember Moldova was accompanied by massive that the motto of the EU is «United in re-recruitment in the public sector, diversity». Certainly the inability to where even the technical staff within accept «others», whether it be sexu- ministries (porters, drivers etc.) are al or religious minorities it is not on- replaced as soon as a new minister un- ly proper for post-Soviet countries. dertakes a position. Countries in the EU like Poland are al- The most common occurrence of so known for their resistance against nepotism, favoritism, etc. in Moldova, minorities, even if the roots of Pol- is related to the sons and daughters ish attitudes lie on Catholic traditions of officials. If you had asked some- and not necessarily inherited Soviet one 4 years ago who the most success- behaviour (when being a satellite of ful business man in Moldova was, you the Soviet Union). would have most probably heard that it

77 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? was the son of the president Vladimir be made through tenders. Moreover, Voronin — Oleg Voronin. People who the reports of the Court of Accounts were closely observing the political that audited state institutions show life of independent Moldova know an enormous amount of money was that Oleg Voronin had a startup busi- spent illegally and purchases which ness before his father became the pres- were not tendered for. There are cas- ident, however, the biggest increase es of fake tenders in EU countries as in his assets was exactly during Vo- well, but the difference is that justice ronin’s presidency (2001-2009). Both is served and those who abused their the president and his son were denying position are punished, while in Moldo- the fact that the business was grow- va one can observe exceptions. ing. Only in December 2009, when the newspaper «Timpul» published an in- Business on state functions. Al- vestigative article with copies of bank though remuneration in the pub- account statements for last 1,5 years, lic sector is not necessarily tempt- where Oleg Voronin spent about 16 ing, such an interest in politics and million dollars, out of which 6 million public jobs is not accidental. Poli- was only on Louis Vuiton and other ex- tics and public jobs have become one pensive brands. One would say that it of the most lucrative businesses in is nothing exceptional for a business- the Republic of Moldova, which, af- man to spend so much money, howev- ter investing initially (the financing er the declaration of income showed a of election campaigns becomes more way smaller income than the amount expensive, public jobs are frequent- actually spent. ly bought with money), bring guar- Another area where favoritism is anteed profit and are not hostages of clearly evident is in public tenders. economic cycles. Therefore, all servic- Although many efforts are made to es provided by public authorities are conduct tenders more transparently either of low quality or «against un- and fairly, these are still being ques- official payments», corruption being tioned by watchdog organizations. one of the most serious problems in In some cases, as the research on cor- the Republic of Moldova. The dynam- ruption practices prove83, tenders are ics of the Corruption Perceptions In- not organized at all, even if the law dex furnished by Transparency Inter- provides that all purchases should national represents one of the strong- est arguments for the above thesis. 83 Lilia Carasciuc, Coruptia in Moldova: Impactul macroeconomic, http://www. Thus, the public sector of the Re- transparency.md/Docs/Coruptia1_ public of Moldova is one of the most pp221-383.pdf corrupt in Europe, being overrun only

78 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics

Table 3. Corruption Perceptions Index.

Country/ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Year Georgia - 2,4 1,8 2,0 2,3 2,8 3,4 3,9 4,1 3,8 4,1 Moldova 3,1 2,1 2,4 2,3 2,9 3,2 2,8 2,9 3,3 2,9 2,9 Ukraine 2,1 2,4 2,3 2,2 2,6 2,8 2,7 2,5 2,2 2,4 2,3

Source: Adapted by author according to Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2001-2011.

Chart 2. % of respondents who believe that irregular payments are used, by category. 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Official Дорожня Запит Громадські ДержавнеPublic Системи Допомога ІншіOther види documents Public Unem- поліціяRoad офіційних судиCivil навчанняeducation охорони безробітним соціальногоsocial request health sys- ployment police документів courts (Професійне)(voca- здоров'я забезпеченняsecurity from au- tem benefits від влади tional) benefits thorities

2006 2010

Source: The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Life in Transition, p. 91. by Ukraine, while more than 20% of the so-called «raider attacks», when Moldovan respondents believe that the assets of several banks and com- people use irregular payments in rela- panies were illegally taken by firms tion to public authorities84. Citizens’ from offshore zones, with the sup- perception is exposed in Chart 2 in de- port of court decisions. Given the tail. immediate actions taken by the au- The recent history of the Republic thorities, the assets were returned of Moldova is full of examples where and the public servants involved in officials and public servants are in- these actions are being prosecut- volved in corrupt affairs. The cases of ed. However, there were many cases when companies were taken illegally 84 The European Bank for Reconstruction and no action from law enforcement and Development. Life in Transition, p. 91. agencies was observed, which might

79 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? also mean that the authorities knew another. It happens that in post-Sovi- about this or were paid to give their et countries political competition in- «consent». volves instruments that are beyond the rules. These kinds of instruments Prevention of political competition. are usually selective justice, political The prevention and annihilation of prosecution, mass use of administra- uncontrolled competition is one of the tive resources and a lot of black PR. major concerns of Moldovan politi- Moldova witnessed pretty much all cians, the entire political class is very of these instruments. Just before the attentive to its own image and rank- end of the communist rule in 2009, ings of politicians which are regularly the current prime minister (formerly issued in various surveys. The most re- one of the main leaders of the oppo- cent example was the candidacy of the sition) was prosecuted in three crim- Head of state which had been sought inal cases, which were later dropped. for three years. The institution of the In general, in countries where politi- president these days is very limited cal culture is low and no tradition es- in action, due to the fact that in real- tablished, the «ping-pong» with po- ity the president Nicolai Timofti was litical prosecution is quite difficult to elected mainly to overcome the politi- assess. It often happens that a certain cal deadlock, despite the fact that the opposition leader is/was indeed in- majority of people are willing to see a volved in illegal affairs and once the strong head of state. The Parliamen- prosecution is started, the opposition tary majority agreed to elect a Presi- leaders are quickly labeling the ac- dent lacking political experience just tions of the law enforcement authori- to avoid potential competion with a ties as political persecution. strong and active political figure. As The same goes for black PR., Mol- a matter of fact, the behaviour and dovan electoral campaigns are full the popularity of the fourth President of black PR artifice. The latest one confirm the expectations of the Parlia- was held at the elections in 2011 (lo- mentary majority, since he enjoys the cal general elections) when unknown trust of only 4.1% of citizens so far85. polit-technologists (as the image- Nevertheless, fierce political com- makers are called in the post-Soviet petition is found in any corner of the states) were publishing fake newspa- world, including the US, but the rules pers of important media brands (Tim- are different from one country to pul, Capitala) with declarations of certain politicians (especially the cur- 85 Barometrul Opiniei Publice, aprilie-mai rent mayor of Chisinau — Dorin Chir- 2012. toaca) which they never made. The

80 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics confusion was indeed very strong, for lies. Politicians lie every day in given the fact that those who did this front of video cameras, in plenary ses- kept the same layout and font as the sions of parliament and during press original newspaper. conferences or «work on site». The lie A relatively recent example, which constitutes as one of the most com- was considered as a political prosecu- mon definitions of politics in Moldo- tion by the opposition, was the shut- van society, the latter being a sub- ting down of the NIT tv channel which ject of such an exercise for two dec- was the main media tool of the Com- ades already. The citizens feel cheat- munist party. NIT was warned sever- ed, beginning with promises of a real al times that its news content was not sovereignty and a decent standard of reflecting events impartially. Follow- living, but, practically, they uncon- ing these warnings, the Audiovisual sciously vote for the same politicians. Council decided to suspend their li- And politicians again lie since they cense to broadcast. The action was im- do not bear any responsibility and are mediately labeled as a political pros- hardly punished from the electoral ecution of the free media and of the point of view, whether it is the case of opposition. Reactions also came from patrimonial bonds and privatization, EU which asked for a just treatment periodically re-writing history in ac- of the NIT case. cordance with the preferences of al- However, one can say that in Mol- ternating governments, or the ever- dova political competition is becom- lasting justice reform. In 2001, in the ing more and more in line with inter- election campaign, the PCRM prom- national rules, even if there are ex- ised that Republic of Moldova would ceptions. But looking at the last OSCE join the Russia-Belarus Union and the reports and those of other organiza- two-ruble sausage, and the population tions, it seems that the situation is voted believing that a party from the improving every year. Republic of Moldova could reanimate the Soviet Union by feeding it with Absence of sanctions for lies. Lying cheap sausage. After the two man- is a «fundamental institution» of pol- dates of the Communist regime, the itics in the ex-Soviet area, and the Re- Republic of Moldova became the poor- public of Moldova is no exception to est state in Europe, and some Moldo- that. The difference between the ex- van communists became very rich. It union republics and the Republic of is true that at present the PCRM is in Moldova resides in the proportion of opposition (an aggressive one), how- the phenomenon, as well as the lack ever it remains the largest Moldovan of any moral or political punishment political party.

81 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

In the same context, it is important they block the streets and drive with to take note of another example when flashing lights from parliament to the electorate punished a politician the Presidency and backwards, al- for not respecting their promises. Iu- though the two buildings are mere- rie Rosca had been a top politician ly several hundred meters apart. for many years leading the Christian Moldovan citizens work abroad to Democratic Peoples Party. He was the build or buy a house, while the Mol- one that always fought against the dovan political elite dwell in luxuri- Communist Party, but in 2005 he un- ous villas with underground park- officially entered into a coalition with ing for their entire car collection. communists, being appointed the Moldovan citizens queue at Consu- vice-speaker of parliament and a few lar offices and crowd bus stations years later the vice-prime minister re- and Chisinau airport, while the po- sponsible for law-enforcement agen- litical class travels with diplomat- cies. This step made the party elector- ic passports and take private flights ate furious and during the elections of through Europe, negotiating the lib- 2009, Rosca’s party did not pass the eralization of the visa regime with threshold. the European Union. Moldovan cit- In the light of the above examples, izens face serious problems in the one has to say that politicians in Mol- health system and bribe the unjust dova are being punished for their be- doctors, while Moldovan politicians haviour from time to time and a cer- benefit from the services of private tain degree of awareness is being doctors and unfold periodical medi- made, the only drawback is that the cal treatments at the best sanatori- punishment happens quite rarely, at ums in the world. Finally, Moldovan least once in four years. citizens endure the consequences of a chronically-sub-financed education- Status privileges. Of course, in such al system, whereas Moldovan politi- a tolerant and permissive social con- cians send their children to study in text, determined by the amorphous the best private schools and Europe- mechanism of the circulation of the an universities. Despite this, Moldo- elite, the latter has become a specific va is a poor state as far as resources caste of people, loaded with opportu- are concerned and does not have the nities and privileges. ability to provide too many opportu- Citizens feel totally insecure in nities for politicians this is why the the Republic of Moldova, but the po- politicians create opportunities for litical elite is constantly surround- themselves. ed by public and private guards,

82 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES and efficient intervention in society or the failures of governmental poli- Paternalism. In the Republic of Mol- cies, remain the actual utensils for dova, the model of the European pol- preserving the image of divinity and itician alternates with Soviet or Ori- for discrediting political opponents. ental party models, or even with the During the last period in the Repub- model of a strong and divine politician lic of Moldova, alongside the liberali- governing in the ex-metropolis. Each zation of the mass-media, propaganda time Moldovan politicians attempt and manipulation are also being liber- to appear as absolute masters of the alized, unlike other post-Soviet socie- country’s fate, capable of sorting out ties. The main political forces possess all society’s problems within a single their own propaganda strategies and mandate, competing with dry promis- institutions, by which they «legalize» es in all election campaigns. The evo- all warlike actions conducted against lution of events proves that Moldovan political opponents. It is interesting politicians are incompetent and can- to notice that pretty much all the im- not even solve a part of their assumed portant political players have their tasks; the financial stability and eco- own media resources that «voice» nomic growth are ensured by foreign the ideas of certain political parties. donors and Moldovan citizens who Thus, the media in Moldova have un- work abroad and send money home; dergone a process of «berloscuniza- agriculture is dependent upon nature; tion» which seems to create a sort of public officials and road police are balance between the media sources. charging citizens unofficially, while judges remain immune in front of all Corruption charges to disqualify threats to reform justice. The govern- political opponents. Corruption ac- ment is definitely engaged in imple- cusations made to political oppo- menting structural reforms and mod- nents are the most frequently used ernizing the country, otherwise the propaganda mechanisms. Moldovan European Commission and other for- politicians mutually accuse them- eign donors would not transfer money selves of corrupt acts and misap- to the country; but many processes de- propriation of public funds, begin- velop their own course, while other re- ning with the first government since forms are purposefully delayed. the country’s independence. In 2001 the PCRM came to power, throwing Propaganda-based political rhetoric. accusations at previous democrat- Political manipulation and propagan- ic governments and invoking mas- da, covering the incapacity of a radical sive fraud since privatization, as

83 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? well as the misappropriation of tens External and internal enemy. Anoth- of millions of US dollars given by the er political propaganda component World Bank. The democratic oppo- represents the identification of inter- sition accused the Communist gov- nal and external enemies, who con- ernment of economic monopolization spire against the state of the Repub- and fraud in tax management, illegal lic of Moldova and, as a result, block enrichment as well as the many fam- any of the country’s development ef- ily properties that helped Voronin to forts. Apart from the propaganda in- build his main electoral message in struments and the habit of disclosing 2009. Regarding the opposition, the «the country’s enemy», the phobia of PCRM accused the Government, the an external enemy is not only a quali- Alliance for European Integration ty of a failed state or a trace of the So- of fraud in customs and tax manage- viet regime. Such a small state as the ment, smuggling and maintenance Republic of Moldova, which has no of monopolist schemes which suffo- political tradition and which fought cated the economy. More than that, the 14th Army of the Russian Federa- the coalition partners from the Par- tion to maintain its territorial integ- liamentary majority periodically ac- rity and which, unwillingly, has for- cuse each other of corruption, smug- eign military bases on its territory, gling or raider attacks. The accu- is somehow rightful to accuse Rus- sations grow during election cam- sia for many of its failures. Russian paigns, when many politicians pre- troops and munitions from the east of sent all kinds of proof, figures and the country, as well as the secession- pictures with land parcels and lux- ist regime Russia protects, are one of urious cars. The paradox lies in the the main reasons for the Republic of fact that few politicians were ever Moldova’s under-development and in- taken to court and none of them were security of its European future. Cer- condemned for anything. The ghosts tainly, with regards to internal po- of some files, closed or hidden for be- litical fights, accusations were also ing revealed upon necessity, has been thrown at neighboring states, espe- haunting the Republic of Moldova for cially Romania, which was called the a long time, but any attempt by civil last empire from Europe by Moldova’s society to debate specific corruption third president. cases are rejected by politicians, as the latter always request evidence. Death of ideologies. Finally, the Since they are the ones who hold the ideological support of the Moldo- evidence, the accusations remain the van political process represents one prerogative of politicians only. of the main features of this hybrid

84 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Politics civilization. The ideologies mostly The Moldovan academic world is created in the XIXth century are not not seriously concerned with the ide- actual in the XXIst century any more ological basis at present, while poli- and while basing on a political culture ticians associate and load their party different from the one which existed programs with all kinds of ideologi- two centuries ago, the growing inter- cal fragments, hardly classifiable ac- dependence of the modern world fre- cording to classical types. Another quently imposes policies which are «ideological paradox» of Moldovan not necessarily related to the doc- political life is the frequent implica- trines or programs of the governing tion of businessmen in politics, most parties. The European left-wing me- of whom institute or become mem- dia vehemently criticized the policies bers of left-wing parties. Regarding of the French socialists or the British legislative initiatives or governmen- labourists, for instance — for contin- tal policies, this ideological disability uing the predecessors’ conservative has several weird expressions. Dur- policies, while the actual economic ing its governance, the PCRM came crisis imposes the reduction of sala- forth in 2007 with three neo-liberal ries and social packages regardless of economic initiatives: the fiscal am- governing party’s ideologies or doc- nesty, legalization of capital and quo- trines. A serious academic debate in ta zero for re-invested profit. On the relation to the ideological support other side, the Liberal Party, which of the modern world exists, which is comprises of the actual Parliamenta- most frequently nourished by left- ry majority forwards all types of con- wing intellectuals. Immanuel Waller- servative initiatives such as: chemi- stein, one of the greatest modern so- cal castration of pedophiles, fines for ciologists and (neo)Marxists claims those who make use of prostitute’s that liberalism stood for an ideologi- services etc. Not forgetting, in this cal centrist synthesis which has dom- context, the support that Moldo- inated politics for more than a hun- va Metropolis provided to a political dred years (since 1848), whereas the party during the 2010 election cam- XXIst century steps into a «post-lib- paign, and not to a simple party, but eral» stage, generated by an ideolog- to a humanist party, regardless of the ical re-organization within the world fact that since the Renaissance, hu- system86. manism advocated for reducing the influence of church.

86 Валлерстайн И. После либерализма. Conclusions. In his later works, Москва: УРСС, 2003. Samuel Hungtinton warns against

85 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? the possibility of a democratic reces- Seemingly, post-Sovietness is a sion in the world, where the democra- transitory phase, a moment of part- tization wave produced only electoral ing, after which: a part of the ex-So- democracies, and the two alternatives viet countries will turn to Asian au- to Western liberal democracies — Is- thoritarianism, probably combined lamism and Asian authoritarianism. with Islamism; the second part will If post-Sovietness represented a dis- join the Western liberal democracy, tinct and consolidated civilization although not easily; and the third form, it could produce a third alter- part will try together with Russia native to Western liberal democracy. under the name of «sovereign de- Obviously, a «Soviet man» existed, mocracy» to shape a distinct cul- just as obvious are some of the cultural profile, supported by strong- tural and political features of the ex- er institutions within a Euro-Asian Soviet area, nourished by a series of integration project. It might hap- symbols, glorious memories and in- pen that the failure of such a Eu- stitutions which are very difficult ro-Asian integration project would to be transformed. There are simi- lead to their closeness, separation lar political attitudes, behaviours or the formation of a common bloc and speeches in ex-Soviet republics by choosing one of the two big op- as well, but it is hard to explain their tions — liberal democracy or Asian «post-Soviet exclusivism». They are authoritarianism. The Republic of rather the effects of a delayed tran- Moldova, alongside Ukraine and sition, typical of other regions in the Georgia, have a serious development world. Finally, other cultural pecu- alternative in European integra- liarities are foreshadowed in the ex- tion, the latter, if well negotiated Soviet area, forerunning the Soviet and implemented, might approach Union or the Tsarist Empire. Apart the three societies to Western liber- from those similarities in the charac- al democracies. teristics of the ex-Soviet area, it becomes much more difficult to com- These are three countries under the pare press freedom in the Republic of Eastern Partnership that are taking Moldova with press freedom in Bela- the European integration process se- rus, the fondness for Western values riously and are negotiating the politi- in Ukraine and Turkmenistan, or the cal association and economic integra- perception of corruption in Georgia tion with the European Commission, and Tajikistan. whose laws, norms and related standards are able to articulate new institutions likely to shape a new society. If

86 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society the institutions maintain their post- of legal norms. Condemnation of Sovietness and the politicians that get communism and forbidding commu- into power continue to conserve the nist symbols in the Republic of Mol- institutions by which they had been dova are also a part of the measures educated, then the solution of getting to leave the soviet past behind. It is out of this vicious circle could be the also important to adopt a lustration implementation of European insti- law, it is not necessary to adopt a tutions, norms and ways of develop- radical Polish model that will help in ment. selecting Moldovan politicians. Fi- Meanwhile an important precon- nally, the input of young people that dition for creating a prosperous Eu- have studied and been active in the ropean future and a democratic polit- West could accelerate the institu- ical system with accountable and re- tional modernization and transition sponsible politicians is the adoption to the liberal democracy.

POST-SOVIETNESS IN MOLDOVAN SOCIETY

The behaviour of the post-Soviet a fundamental contradiction between man in the Republic of Moldova is a strictly individual solutions that the unique blend of traditional and patri- post Soviet man can apply and struc- archal reactions, dictated by rural ed- tural problems that society still cre- ucation and quite a close contact with ates for people. In other words, soci- nature, Soviet habits like listening ety produces further problems such as to the speech of the country’s presi- poverty, unemployment, inequality, dent on December 31st with a glass over which individuals have no influ- of champagne in hand and newer ac- ence but, within contemporary Mol- quired habits, inspired by the wild dovan society, individuals are forced capitalistic sphere. Plunged into the to find personal recipes to adapt and social domain, the Moldovan is fagged solve these problems. The state as- out, subject to major contradiction — sists citizens only in a highly selective been used in Soviet times to knowing and symbolic manner. Therefore, in- that his particular problems will find a dividually used recipes are largely de- collective response, today he is forced termined by previous experiences and to find his own solutions to daily chal- the role of the Soviet way of life is of- lenges, while preserving the nostalgia ten crucial. of lost social unity. These patterns of Even after twenty years since the behaviour derive from what is called breakup of the Soviet Union, we can

87 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? realize that many of the codes of be- pomp in front of guests, even though haviour rooted in that period have re- it is much more reasonable to pur- mained valid, they are defining for chase canned products from super- a large part of the population. Many markets. Men’s parties imply drink- people begin their working day by lis- ing significant amounts of alcohol al- tening to the news on the radio in- though this way of «removing stress» stalled in their kitchen. Then, the day does not take the grotesque form of goes on in public transport, which, the famous Soviet principle of «split largely, keeps the Soviet «standards» the bottle three ways» when three of crowding and the rudeness of driv- people meet on the street, chip in one ers. Exclamations like «Hello, boss, ruble each and together buy a bottle of you do not carry sacks of potatoes (or vodka (which then cost three rubles). wood)» or «Do not get in, the trans- However, Soviet behaviour codes port is not of rubber» remain in use, were heavily diluted by postmodern even if the political system seems to lifestyles, borrowed from the west- have changed. At work, we often see ern patterns so that pure Sovietism the same old bad habit of the skiv- may only be found in the form of rem- ing of employees, a tradition second- iniscences, a phenomenon that is now ed by an old fashioned trend of em- called the post-Sovietness. The col- ploying more people than are needed lapse of the Soviet Union significant- at an enterprise (particularly the case ly altered the behaviour and attitudes of state enterprises). The relation- of people in the Republic of Moldova, ship between employer and employee by ruining, first of all, the perception is built on the well-known principle of unity that used to create bonds of «point one — the employer is always solidarity across the USSR. People in right, if the employer is not right, Moldova vividly experienced this jolt see point one.» Holidays and week- which took the form of a civil war, ends are dominated by departures to called the Transnistrian war and ex- country houses where the main inter- perienced willy-nilly divisions and est is to grow vegetables, which is de- separations based on the criterion of termined not so much by the short- identity. Nationalist discourse and age of markets or financial difficul- idiosyncrasies were revived, surpris- ties of campers or «fazendas owners» ingly overlapping and even replacing but by the habit of being self-reliant Soviet behaviour. Revision of histo- under conditions when you always ex- ry textbooks, changing the name of pect crises or wars. Therefore, house- the state language, less frequent use wives continue to preserve and put of the Russian language especially in the sealed food jars on the table with education, identity quarrels in urban

88 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society transport and the kitchen and recon- money than those living in Moldova, figuration of urban space by creat- becoming what is called gastarbeiters ing new symbolic centers have caused in the current language. a profound change in the set of hab- Gastarbeiters are people who are its of Moldovans, while cultivating a not yet Westerners and are no long- widespread aversion to the way of be- er Soviet. It is a transitional state of ing Soviet implying a tendency of its mind, characterized by a high degree eradication. of flexibility and adaptability, open- In a short period of time, the mer- ness to new modes of behaviour and an chantability process of public space exceptional capacity to mimic West- started, with citizens of Moldova dis- erners, sometimes to the point of to- covering a taste for money and re- tally confusing them with local peo- considering the importance of prof- ple. They take over their traditional it in daily life. The merchantability customs, attitudes, behaviour, ways of Moldovans’ lives are carried out of speaking and try to be more Catholic on two interchangeable levels. First, than the Pope in their host countries. there has been a criminalization of so- Gastarbeiters are also characterized cial lives, criminal groups taking over by a vivid and incurable contempt for certain powers of the state by — col- their past and the life in Moldova, con- lecting taxes, ensure security, etc. sidering it as something outdated and This trend of criminalization evolved unworthy of wasting time on. At the at the beginning of this century and same time, they frequently go back to transformed gradually passing to the Moldova and behave in the same way oligarchy structure, which has great as people who don’t migrate. The old implications for political life. Second- habits reappear instantly, being a co- ly, there was «marketization» of the gent proof that the process of mimicry life of ordinary citizens; they are in- is very superficial and doesn’t touch creasingly being attracted by the pos- the cultural hard core. sibility of obtaining considerable in- Another important type of Moldo- comes. In the 1990s, citizens of Mol- van man who was subjected to the pro- dova left in droves to nearby countries cess of ethnicization and merchant- to sell and buy goods in demand in the ability is the so called Transnistri- markets of these countries, thus solv- an man, i.e. the persons who are living the huge deficit problem. Later, ing in the secessionist region, on the after the exhaustion of these oppor- left bank of the Dnester river. This tunities, Moldovans migrated heavily kind of person was obviously roman- to the East and the West, looking for ticized, being considered as a never sources of earning more significant dying fortress of Slavism against the

89 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? predatory forces of Westernization jargon from the Soviet period. The and a capitalist economy. The Transn- Merchantability of social life creat- istrian man is imagining himself as a ed some paradoxical combinations of true cosmopolitan in the Soviet style contradictory behaviour. The popu- paying due respect to all nations liv- lation rushed into lucrative economic ing on the territory and not discrimi- ventures that created a huge inequal- nating among them, at the same time ity between different social segments. nurturing a fierce hate against Roma- Meanwhile, the categorization of the nianism, which is considered by them poor and disadvantaged often proved as the basic identity feature on the impossible due to the existence of right bank of Dnester river. Addition- huge gaps between officially declared ally, he is cultivating a kind of per- and undeclared income. Thus, so- sonal glory as a Russian soldier who is cial policies aimed at specific target constantly fighting the advent of cap- groups fail miserably because the eco- italism which could erode the nobility nomic activity of citizens is confined and chastity of a population that lives to the informal sphere, which allows on a plot of land being surrounded the channelling of some social aid to- by very rich enemies eager to ruin it. wards people with real incomes above This cultural repudiation of capital- the levels reported. ist wealth is going hand in hand with Also, the merchantability of social an active economic life in the region, life has created subcultures unknown where new oligarchs concentrate pow- until recently. In particular the life er and affluence in their hands, living of plenty and social prestige are wor- according to the capitalist precepts. shiped by promoting a VIP culture. The Merchantability and ethni- Such an attitude to spotlight the os- cization of social life had a huge im- tentatious luxury and glamorous life- pact on Soviet behaviour codes, of- style was a stinging reply to the idea ten changing them to total disfigure- of a celebrity from the Soviet time ment. Much of the population whose when people worthy of respect were political and electoral behaviour is considered the heroes of socialist la- influenced largely by the ethnic el- bor, writers and intellectuals. Thus, ement still have Soviet features im- society has not given up the idea of bued in everyday life. Many of them fame but found other items worthy of continue to watch the news in a Rus- being imitated and glorified. sian broadcast by ORT (being, at the The post-Soviet man reinterpret- same time, advocates of pro-Europe- ed the idea of poverty. During So- an and pro-Romanian options), read viet times, there was a collective re- books in Russian and use slang and pudiation of poverty as a financial

90 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society situation, the state having the re- with humanistic values in public, spe- sponsibility not to allow too a large cifically about the educational sys- gap in living standards. At the same tem of the former regime. He is still time, the poor man as an individu- attached to the idea of rupture and al was not despised like the rich one, split, perceiving society as a cluster poverty being acceptable if it re- of groups on a collision course but ob- ferred to many people. On the con- stinately uses concepts and principles trary, in our today’s mercantile soci- that refer to consensus and unity. ety, there is a collective refusal to as- As inevitable consequences of such sume the status of poverty as an indi- a duplication of the post-Soviet man vidual state although it is admitted at in the Republic of Moldova, we may a society level. The shame of poverty consider the individual hypocrisy sep- as personal status is also seconded by arately displayed by each individual an inherited contempt of individual and the organized duplicity in the com- riches, accompanied simultaneously munity accepting the multitude of in- with a feeling of undisguised envy of dividual bigotries, finding universal- the rich. ly acceptable codes to decipher them. Thus, the post-Soviet man is an ox- Individual hypocrisy is inevitable, de- ymoron, made from a very few associ- riving from the contradictory behav- ated elements. He is greedy and eager iour elucidated above. In more direct to gain wealth but detests those who terms one can state that the post-So- were more efficient and more fortu- viet man can talk for hours about hon- nate than him and have accumulated esty and honor but to be eminently wealth that he cannot match. There- corruptible. Or, one can organize lav- fore, the modern man is an egalitar- ish weddings with hundreds of guests ian under the factual conditions who but be poor. One can be an ex-commu- wishes, at the same time, to stand nist and ask with serenity to condemn out of the uniform crowd and get in- communism without recognizing his to the VIP groups. The post-Soviet own role in committing crimes, con- man hates poverty and does not accept sidering himself absolved of punish- it in any way as a personal status, al- ment because of his participation in though he is often forced to face it as a the abyss of nationalist movements. real state but never confessed in pub- Or, one can vehemently blame Moldo- lic. The post-Soviet man is becoming van oligarchs of the contemporary pe- progressively more mercantile and at riod and at the same time make secret the rank of virtue begins to harbor the plans of a takeover, by abuse, of lands idea of a consumer society but contin- owned by neighbors. ues to use discourse notions instilled

91 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Society does not record these little keeping an egalitarian discourse, with tricks and individual deceits, treat- a strong social connotation. ing them with understanding, making everyone a part of this process in the ATTITUDES whole society. The lamentations of university professors and high school Paternalism. In general, paternal- teachers (like those of doctors or judg- ism is a constant feature of the citizens es) regarding small salaries are treat- of Moldova. The solution to all prob- ed with indulgence and allowed with- lems depends largely on the state’s ef- out ever seeing teachers receive the forts, the citizen does not realize that required salaries. The internation- he also has a say in this regard. For ex- al community is promptly assured ample, to the question — To improve that in Moldova, society will fight in- people’s lives, what should be done tensely against corruption without first? — about 33% of respondents providing any real support to this in- answered that the state should cre- tention and without at least one law- ate well-paid jobs in 2011. The share suit against the so called «gangsters of these responses is three times high- of transition». All social subsystems er than the percentage of the response operate under the perverse logic of in the second place, which shows cit- compensatory mechanisms, using in- izens’ concern for the way the state formal practices, on a large scale, to acts in the social field and they pin make the system functional but try- all their hopes eminently on the ruling to present the system as being ing role of the state. Also, people are completely focused on formal and le- tempted to put responsibility for the gal practices. problems and crises in society on polit- This hypocrisy in all structures ical parties which are often seen as the conditions Jesuit behaviour, very sim- expression of state. Thus, about 55% ilar to the way people talked in Sovi- of respondents have considered the et times. And then as now, they prac- ruling political parties responsible for ticed duplication, saying one thing at the difficult situation the country is work and another in the kitchen. The going through. Another 23% believe difference however is in areas affect- that the political class is in general re- ed by imposture. During Soviet times, sponsible for this predicament.87 the lie mainly included political and economic spheres. In the current period, the social sector suffers the most 87 www.viitorul.org, National survey: because of the real withdrawal of the «The European Union — the great chal- state from these areas, but it is still lenge of Moldova II», September 2011,

92 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society

However in contrast to paternal- a kind of selfishness such as «manism, the citizen of the Republic of age by yourself at any price without Moldova also has an acute sense of de- taking your relatives into considera- tachment from the affairs of society tion.» Thus, paternalism gradually and the state, feeling isolated and not dilutes into the opposite, without ever involved in social life. For example, seeing new attitudes to contribute to only 20% of citizens believe that the setting society on a solid foundation. state takes into account their view And yet, Moldovan society still re- which contrasts sharply with 51% of mains much attached to the Soviet positive responses referring to direct past. This is demonstrated by a sur- involvement of citizens in commu- vey conducted in November 2009 by nity life and 82% — in family life. the IMAS for Public Policies Insti- Thus, the more distant the group is tute. The results are surprising giv- to which the citizen belongs the less en that 18 years had passed since the he thinks that this group will ask him collapse of the USSR. 48.6 percent for a specific contribution (except for of respondents regret the disappear- tax payments). 88 ance of the USSR compared to 32.4% Thus, on the one hand, citizens which have no regrets. The situation consider that the state has the task to is even worse if one takes into ac- solve society’s problems and, on the count the difference in perception of other hand, the same citizens feel iso- living standards — 56.9 percent belated and unwanted, with no impact lieve that living standards in the for- on government policy. In these condi- mer USSR were higher compared to tions, a new attitude is born to react 18.8 percent who believe that now to the impossibility to change state it is better. And in terms of hous- policies — going abroad, which is the ing conditions (51.1 vs. 18.7), health opposite of paternalism and demon- system (55 vs. 17.9), education (52.1 strates the awakening of the active vs. 18.8), order (55.4 vs. 12), etc. the spirit which obliges the citizen to seek differences are visible and clearly in means of survival on his own. Such an favor of the USSR period. The larg- attitude, however, representing the est gap exists in terms of job crea- opposite of paternalism, is not able to tion — 68 percent of citizens consid- create solidarity capable of strength- er that during the Soviet times the ening Moldovan society but rather situation was better compared to 9.9 percent who have a good opinion of 88 www.viitorul.org, National survey: the current period. Only in terms of «The European Union — the great chal- access to information (23.2 to 42.1), lenge of Moldova I», March-April 2011. the freedom to travel (34.0 to 37.3)

93 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? and freedom of expression (19.9 to admit that living standards in the 44.6) the situation is reversed. Sur- USSR were higher — give preference prisingly, the field of the respect of to values reflecting human freedom.90 human rights was evaluated by cit- Together with another 20% who cat- izens in favor of the USSR period, egorically believe that the current pe- 36.5 percent deeming the USSR bet- riod is preferable to the past one (re- ter in this aspect and only 23.9 per- sponding consistently in favor of the cent giving preference to the cur- regime after 1991). The rest are at- rent period. In these circumstances, tached to the egalitarian values of so- it is not surprising that to the ques- cialism and wish a return to the sta- tion whether the Moldovan citizens bility the past used to offer them. would like to see the reestablishment of the socialist system, 40.3% reply Conformism as a dominant life strat- in favor of this and 32.2 are against egy. Although the preeminence of this. And to the question — If next egalitarian values seems to be over- Sunday a referendum were held and whelming, we note that the post-So- you were asked to vote for Moldova viet man changes his habits and no to again become a part of the USSR longer entirely obeys the collectivist restored totally or partially — 43.7 norms, often being compelled to act percent of respondents replied that on their own, assuming risks and go- they would vote for and 29.9 would ing against the tide. This is due to the vote against.89 mass migration of people from villag- On closer scrutiny, we see that the es to cities and abroad. Ending up in preference for the lifestyle of the for- fast-paced urban societies with a hec- mer USSR is dictated by economic tic rhythm of life, post-Soviet peo- considerations, such as living condi- ple cannot allow the luxury to remain tions, availability of jobs, afforda- slaves of the collective judgments; be- ble prices while the sympathy for the ing tempted to take actions that may current period derives more from the be negatively perceived at home but protection of human rights — free- due to the new environment in which dom of expression, access to informa- they will not be subjected to severe tion, freedom to travel. In these con- judgments. Thus, the conformity of ditions, only a small part of the population — about one fifth of those who 90 The figure of one fifth is approximate and stems from the difference between the 50 percent supporting the USSR pe- 89 http://www.ipp.md/public/files/ riod on the economic grounds and the 40 Barometru/2009/final_bop_noiem- percent that, ultimately, would vote in brie_2009_recap.pdf, BOP November the referendum to restore the Soviet re- 2009 gime.

94 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society the past gives way to an open-mind- change which may bring, in their opin- ed individualistic behaviour, often ion, only unpleasant surprises. These characterized by lack of scruples and negative expectations arise from an- obtaining personal benefits as the ul- swers to the question — What impact timate goal. Society is no longer able did the collapse of the USSR have on to suppress dissident individual be- the development of Moldova? Over 51 haviours that are lost in a multitude percent believe that the USSR’s col- of individual actions driven by purely lapse had a negative and very nega- selfish motivations. tive impact and only 23 percent consider the same impact as positive and Delayed diffusions of innovations very positive. Such predispositions and fear of reforms. Such an individu- are not at all favorable to positive- al dynamism is backed up by a prefer- ly perceive the reforms and induce a ence for a social status quo. Negative- pessimistic mood that discourages rely assessing the reforms in the early forms. For example, citizens consider 90’s. Individuals in Moldovan socie- that things are going in the wrong di- ty have a tendency to look, with eye- rection more often than vice versa. brows raised, at any innovation and

Table 4. Question. «Do you think our country is moving in the right or the wrong direction?» 91 2010 2011 2009 May 2012 May 2010 November November November May 2011 June 2009 April 2008 March 2009 October 2008

Wrong direc- 26,1 27,9 29,2 19,6 29,1 21,8 24,5 19, 0 10,7 24,0 tion Right direc- 59,7 50,5 58,8 67,4 54,6 64,2 60,4 65,0 83,5 69,0 tion

91 http://ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/Brosura_BOP_05.2012_anexe_dinamica.pdf, BOP May2012

95 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Table 5. Question: I think ﬁ rst of all I am...?

Identity Gagauz Russians Bulgarians Romanians Ukrainians Moldovans/

Moldovan / Russian / Ukrainian / 81% 58% 71% 81% 79% Bulgarian/Gagauz Citizen of the Republic of Moldova 57% 68% 64% 46% 55% European 6% 7% 3% 6% 10%

This discontent caused by a positive ethnic Moldovans and Russians. How- valuation of the past in relation to the ever, the post-Soviet man seems to be present and future causes hostile re- able to gradually overcome the intol- actions towards people from different erance towards «others». The same groups. Individuals lose touch with study concludes that the relationship the state and seek affiliation and iden- of Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and tification with smaller and «warmer» Bulgarians with Moldovans is per- groups like ethnicity and nation. In ceived more as improving; yet it has the Ethno barometer realized by the a specific: in the row of the relation- Institute for Public Policies in 2005, ship with Moldovans we find a sig- Moldovan citizens did not complete- nificant share of those who consider ly identify themselves with the state, that this relationship was better be- preferring national identity. 92 fore 1990. Meanwhile, the relations between Russians, Ukrainians, Gaga- Intolerance. These responses show uz and Bulgarians are generally per- that ethnic identity is the most val- ceived in the direction of an apparent ued among citizens of the Republic of improvement. Moldova, the least ethnicized being paradoxically the Russians. The same Negation of individuality. For this study showed that the climate is char- reason, we may believe that the ten- acterized by ethnic tensions between dency of the merchantability of the post-Soviet man gradually weakens ethnic tensions and «normalizes» 92 http://ipp.md/public/files/Baromet- life, pushing it into the area of civ- ru/Etnobar ometru/Prezentare_a_re- ilized coexistence. Ethnic tensions zultatelor_Etnobarometru.pdf, Etno- barometru 2005 are not cancelled and stereotypes are 96 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society not eliminated, but people manage This tendency of the dominant to find a modus vivendi in common group to look carefully and through without going on the path of conflict ethnic lenses at the other ethnic escalation. Only politics can awaken groups is a sign that individuals do not this dormant rivalry and it does this see stronger social bonds than those by means of the radical parties that ethnicities which are the only able to wave the national symbols and call provide certainty. Thus, in Moldova people to continue the ethnicization the post-Soviet man has abandoned of social life. the communist dogma and replaced it, but not in full measure, with a nation- Social alienation. The level of trust alist principle. He is not entirely so- between these groups is not very high cially alienated, because he shares the even though it usually exceeds 50 same beliefs and ideas with his peers percent. In particular, the Moldovan of the same ethnic group, thus having stands out as the dominant group — a common space for dialogue, but is that are not always inclined to treat isolated from the other groups which other groups with trust. he does not understand and accept.

Table 6. Question: How much do you trust ...? 93 (% for a lot of trust and very much trust) Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians

Citizens of the Republic of Moldova 58 69 75 66 68 Moldovans in the RM 63 71 73 65 70 Russians in the RM 36 78 75 76 77 Ukrainians in the RM 31 70 80 67 68 Gagauz in the RM 18 56 43 78 63 Bulgarians in the RM 21 58 45 67 81 Romanians in the RM 42 52 44 38 47

93 Idem

97 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

The «marketization» trend of social groups are expelled. Unlike people in life has however, a significant dilu- the West, learning to accept and tol- tion impact on this ethnicization be- erate diversity — immigrants, peo- cause it creates connections between ple with disabilities, sexual minori- people that transcend ethnic fracture ties, etc., the post Soviet man prac- lines through material interests. tices old habits, is extremely reluctant to adopt new practices of behav- Devaluation of talents, knowledge, iour and therefore isolate themselves success. In a society that has become with like-minded individuals, by lock- highly competitive, with a retired ing in some dogmas of their own man- and even absent state even if still pro- ufacturing — «suitcase, railway sta- claimed by the majority of citizens tion and go to Russia», «down with with quite fragile social ties (except the Communists», «no man is born for those ethnic), envy and the depre- from a homosexual», «money defeats ciation of genuine qualities are defin- evil» — these and many other beliefs ing elements for many Moldovans. condition defensive, sectarian and en- The drama of these post-Soviet indi- clave behaviours. viduals who are solicited to make spe- At the same time, an opening, due cial efforts to exit ubiquitous pover- to an entry into a new phase of devel- ty, while knowing that success is not opment with access to the capitalist the result of personal efforts gener- world, tested the flexibility of Mol- ally determined by an inefficient sys- dovans’ behaviour. Even if within tem, but simply the consequence of their country, Moldovans show stiff- throwing a dice, is the inability to ex- ness and are reluctant to make ma- it the systemic contradiction between jor changes in lifestyles, while abroad the individual need to act alone and they demonstrate amazing capaci- many insoluble problems that society ty to adapt to foreign living condi- creates, far beyond the individual’s tions by being flexible and adopting ability to find solutions to them. behavioural patterns that are totally strange to them. This versatility indi- PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR cates a huge potential for change that post Soviet people have and certifies The behaviour of the post-Sovi- that the myth about the indestruct- et man in the Republic of Moldova is ibility of the Soviet heritage can be determined by the constant tendency easily shattered. to find and populate the well-known, Perhaps the most obvious mani- secure areas, out of which «the oth- festation of Sovietism in the behav- er», i.e. strangers, members of other iour of the post-Soviet man in the

98 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society

Republic of Moldova is the daily rid of constraints and rules and de- slang used by most Moldovans. The velops by its own paradigms, cancel- everyday language of Moldovans is ling the dictatorship of philologists far from respecting the canons of lit- and linguists. This is also an example erary speech and inherits from the of post-modernism in the life of the Soviet period a bizarre mixture of post-Soviet Moldova. Russian words with Moldovan end- Recently, the presence of commu- ings or the hallucinating insertion of nist monuments in different parts Russian words in sentences spoken of the country reactivated the bat- in the Moldovan language. This way tle of history, dividing society, on of speaking was transmitted from the one hand, into the camp of those the Soviet period and suffered con- who want the removal and reloca- textual enrichment by introducing tion of monuments in places away new Russian words borrowed main- from public sight and, on the other ly from the underworld speech. And hand, the camp of those who wish, at yet, even this mode of expression, ex- all costs, to protect these remnants perienced substantial changes, with of the past. This «politicization» of a different purpose than that of the the topic of communist monuments, Soviet period. If during the Soviet seems to be a little bit artificial, it is period this speech was natural, hav- being caused by the inability of par- ing a crucial role in expressing ideas ties to find more exciting topics to at- in the absence of the required num- tract votes. The local elites install or ber of Moldovan words, in the cur- demolish Lenin’s monuments in dis- rent situation it rather has the func- trict centres, depending on the politi- tion to make the discourse more «es- cal coloration they have (like it hap- thetic», by finding word combina- pened in Riscani raion, where Lenin’s tions able to shock and to give more monument was demolished then in- flavor to their speech. Although this stalled). In itself, the monuments way of speech is strongly opposed by no longer provoke fanatical adher- linguists, the «theatrical» way of ex- ence and only rarely provoke numer- pression can be seen as a compensa- ous manifestations, like the celebra- tory element creating a new reality tion of May 9th 2011, they had a rath- thus allowing the speaker to get ac- er festive commemoration role. The cess in the imaginary area and cy- presence of these monuments does berspace, escaping the pressure of not have a major educational role and the «tough» and «solid» reality. In are not, in any way, a revenge of the fact, we witness a phenomenon of past as some right-wing parties want making speech more fluid that gets to present it (even if at first they may

99 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? have had this role). Being novel ele- (medieval one) is becoming more im- ments of decor, they have acquired portant than the attempts to reclaim the role of an attraction pole for tour- the Soviet past. ists in locations which generally do At the same time, informal practic- not boast any fascinating sights. Any es are rampant in the post Soviet soci- person visiting these places takes pic- ety and they represent compensatory tures in front of these monuments to mechanisms that „regulate» the „nor- signal their presence near these stat- mal» way of life established by offi- ues whose value is precisely the fact cial rules and principles. These prac- that they belong irreversibly to the tices can be likened to the Soviet expe- past, as mere museum pieces. And rience of boiling «samogon — a kind here we are witnessing an aesthetici- of homemade distilled spirit (moon- zation of social life through a theatri- shine)» in times of shortages of alco- cal «recovery» of the past that is in- holic beverages or purchasing defi- stalled in a paradoxical way outdated cit goods «on the black market». The and obsolete symbols in the center of general feeling is that the area of in- cities. And only the political interest formal practices during the post-So- is able to reinvest with the real sense viet period expanded enormously and these relics and turn them into tar- this is due, primarily, to the state’s gets of special-stakes political fights. inability to control and monitor social Beyond politics, however, the mon- life; while at the same time, an enti- uments from the communist period ty giving rules and promulgating val- have a pleasant presence and do not ues. Therefore the education, judi- provoke violence aimed at their dem- ciary, police, health systems and the olition. mass media, etc. function according Concurrently, the politicians ad- to principles other than those stated dicted to the past, feel that the com- in the law, which contributes to the munist symbols are not enough to cre- spread of corruption. The state does ate political thrills in the hearts of the not offer rewards necessary for the electorate. For that reason, in 2012 sacrifices it asks of its citizens (pay they started to invent new patriot- taxes, low paid jobs) which pushes the ic symbols, like bicolor flags of Ste- former Soviet citizens into fraudulent phen the Great, which, as they pre- practices. tend, were very popular in the 15th At the same time, different rules century, in this way trying to silent- apply to climbing the social ladder ly replace or diminish the importance than those of Soviet times. The role of the official tricolor Moldovan flag. of family ties and nepotism is often In this way, the battle for history crucial; individuals trying to create

100 REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA. Post-Sovietness in Moldovan Society groups of people as faithful as possi- predetermined borders which could ble around them, which forces them forbid access to such kind of groups to promote their relatives. This phe- based on cumatrism. In fact, cuma- nomenon of nepotism (called «cumatrism is a kind of formalized friend- trism») clans of Asian societies do not ship. have, being much more subtle, the At the same time, the role of diplo- links between people are much harder mas and certificates decreases dras- to discern. Nevertheless, the trust of tically, they are still needed to rise the employer is often granted to those further. Being important but, at the of a certain kinship and not based on same time, affordable, university di- an objective assessment of the skills plomas have become an object of trade of the applicant for the job. between the student and the univer- «Cumatrism» is an interesting sity, obtaining them most often re- phenomenon which describes a situa- quires greater financial effort than tion when people who were invited to intellectual effort. Under these condi- baptize a child, starts to be very close tions, everything becomes marketable friends to that family, entering into and possible to buy, which further in- a kind of kinship relationship. These creases the propensity for corruption. people enjoy help and special defer- One of the basic features of Post- ence and could be promoted to differ- Sovietness is considered to be «pre- ent positions by the father of the bap- ventive impoliteness» when people tized child. This phenomenon was al- by default are not smiling, not polite, so present during the Soviet times but etc, unlike in the west. This preven- it was much less important as an in- tive rudeness is common for Moldo- strument of climbing up the hierar- va too, but it was not proper in Sovi- chical ladder, having a familiar char- et times. It could be explained by the acter (during Soviet times, the par- dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union ty membership and person’s origins and the difficult transition undergone were much more important routes for by these people. This unwillingness to ascending the social hierarchy). To- establish links and contacts is a form day, people resort to cumatrism, at- of preserving the status quo in a situ- tempting to build loyalties around ation when the person in front of you them in conditions of a very insecure could happen to be a potential enemy and uncertain environment. It could (a person of another identity, a crimi- be mentioned that cumatrism is wid- nal, a thief or an oligarch). Neverthe- er than clan relationship, because any less, this quality will slowly vanish member of the society could enter due to the increasing standards of life this kind of kinship and there are no and forgetting past confrontations.

101 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

The post-Soviet man’s behaviour The stagnation, or slow progress of is, for these reasons, influenced by transformations, requires hardiness the desire to escape from state custo- and willingness. Therefore, Moldova dy while the state does not have much should continue on its European de- to offer. Therefore, individuals evade marche which will help it to get rid of paying taxes, receive salaries in en- its post-Sovietness. velopes, transfer money from abroad In this respect, it is important that «in stockings», buy diplomas and ex- Moldova continues to «purify» the ams, pay doctors and police officers political elites. This process already secretly, and get their own justice started with adopting a law in 2012 on by bribing judges. At the same time, condemnation of communism, which each of these individuals maintains a bans the propaganda of communist good image of themselves, consider- symbols and crimes of the Soviet coming the obvious wrongdoings the communist regime. mit don’t matter since «everybody Furthermore, it would be recom- does it like this.» Thus, the organized mended that Parliament adopts the hypocrisy of Moldovan society grows Lustration Law, which would allow and all efforts to reduce the negative «new blood» to take key positions in phenomena noted above creates soli- different institutions. Even though darity and surprising alliances, as in the law on lustration was supposed to the summer of 2012, when parents be adopted right after Moldova got its and students joined with politicians independence, this did not happen. As to combat the efforts of the Ministry the former head of the Moldovan In- of Education to stop cheating during telligence Service put it back in the baccalaureate education. 90s — «if the lustration law will be adopted, Moldovan parliament might The Republic of Moldova has un- remain without MPs». dergone a process of transformation from a soviet society and culture to a western model of behaviour and values. No matter how experts assess the progress recorded in Moldova in recent years, the transformation process still goes on and Moldovan society remains largely tainted by Soviet reminiscences, which became known as post-Soviet.

102 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics

GEORGIA

POST-SOVIETNESS IN GEORGIAN POLITICS

ATTITUDES and building civil society, narrowing the space for political and social dis- While Georgia’s achievements in course. economic development are recognized There are many traces and scars by independent studies94, in other ar- inherited by Georgia’s inhabitants, eas old legacies are still hindering the their way of thinking and their per- state’s progress. This heritage has a sonalities left from the Soviet past. fundamental impact on all aspects of In the first place, there is a deep dis- public life, having influenced not only trust and fear felt toward any state modern political reality, but also the agency, political institution or ide- social and cultural aspects of Geor- ology, compensated or replaced by gia’s post-Soviet existence. The cur- relying on traditional kinship and rent situation in Georgia is charac- personal networks of friends and rel- terised by high volatility and unpre- atives, or paternalistic hierarchies; dictability. Equally uncertain is the by caution and social passivity, in- geopolitical environment. The herit- ternal censorship and lack of criti- age of the Soviet past in the form of cal thinking or evidence-based anal- underdeveloped democratic institu- ysis, weak democratic culture and tions and political culture along with values, and dichotomous division in- scars of authoritarian suppression, to black and white, us and them and civil wars and ethnic conflicts, still friends and enemies. Ironically, dis- continues to haunt political processes trust toward the state is mixed with a strong dependency on the state it- 94 For example, according to the World self, and expectations for its pater- Bank/IFC’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ nalistic support in many aspects of rankings for 2010, Georgia has ris- public life. en from 112th to 12th in the world since 2003. See also: Л.А. Буракова. Still, political events that took Почему у Грузии получилось. Москва: place during the last 20-25 years ap- «Юнайтед Пресс», 2011. — 271 стр. Fighting Corruption in Public Servic- peared to be of enormous importance es: Chronicling Georgia’s Reforms. The for the re-formation of values, atti- World Bank, 2012. 108 p. tudes, and orientations of Georgia’s

103 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? population. Changes in popular atti- Another characteristic feature tudes by actually served as the main is the absolute dominance of the ex- factor of the dramatic political tran- ecutive branch of power, essential- sition. It is evident from the results ly the presidential power, over oth- of a number of surveys (partly pre- er branches, and the particular weak- sented further on in the text) that ness of a subservient judiciary sys- there was an increase in the readi- tem, which to a great extent serves ness for and confidence in civil par- and legitimizes decisions made by the ticipation, optimism, self-confi- executive. Parliament is mostly dom- dence, pro-democracy and pro-West- inated by the executive and used as a ern orientation of the population, al- symbolic agency for rubber-stamping though this is mixed with social con- the decisions parachuted from above. servatism, lack of democratic skills, In a paradoxical and maybe even and the ability to understand com- ironic sense, once popular concept of plex political and social processes de- the ‘end of history’ voiced by Francis veloping in society. Fukuyama, is found all over the post- Soviet South, including Georgia, — a One of the most important aspects spectacular though somewhat specif- of Georgia’s political reality is the ic illustration of the phenomenon — system of governance. One may speak while the advent of Western-style lib- of the ‘post-Soviet governance con- eral democracy is still a remote pos- tagion,’ when post-Soviet elites bor- sibility, governments have learned row various models and approaches to imitate, although with different from one another, especially related skills, the formal aspects of democrat- to a way of strenghtening the power ic institutions, and the leaders just of the ruling party and weakening the love to talk about democracy and the opposition. This, in the first place re- rule of law, most probably interpret- fers to the presidential model as the ing those concepts in their own sur- one dominating the post-Soviet space, reptitious way. Such imitational de- even though some states initially mocracy, to some extent is rooted in tried a parliamentary model as well, the old Soviet tradition of organizing and Georgia has currently moved to fake elections with a single candidate a more mixed model with a relative- and no competition but also no rely strong Prime-Minister’s position al power wielded by elected officials, post (its initiation is delayed, howev- although the pattern can be discov- er, until the incumbent president is ered in transitional societies beyond replaced after 2013 presidential elec- the post-Soviet space. As a result, tions). imitations replace real democratic

104 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics

Chart 1. Is Georgia a democracy now?

60 June 2012 50 February 2012 40 30 September 2011 20 May 2011 10 July 2010 0 April 2010 YesТакНіВ Noаж DKко відповісти institutions, presenting empty fa- plays a very important role, and cor- çades with little, if any democratic respondingly politics is personality- content. centred, politicians becoming more Often group loyalties are much important than any formal political more important than state patriot- ideology, agenda, or declared values. ism, professional ethics or sense of These, in turn, lead to the even more responsibility. This, in turn, leads imitational nature of institutions to anti-meritocratic personnel poli- borrowed from the Western models, cies and the ineffectiveness of gov- and bring about more political cyni- ernance. The leader’s personality cism and opportunism.

Chart 2. What does democracy mean to you?

Freedom of speech/media/hearing different views 3399 Equality before the law/protection of justice 36 Protection/defense of human rights 30 Jobs 1188 Free and fair elections 16 The ability to do what you want (liberty) 1414 Government responds to me concerns 7 Ability to purchase a variety of products 4 Instability 1 Other 3 DK 11 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

105 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Despite the above-mentioned short- the government apparatus with em- comings, there is still certain and in- ployees. At that time, there were two creasing public optimism about the sources of manpower known to Ed- condition of democracy in the count- uard Shevardnadze (and maybe objec- ry95. One of the evidences is the par- tively existing): former high-ranking liamentary elections in October, 2012 Communist party leaders (headed in which were recognized by OSCE/ Georgia by Shevardnadze during the ODIHR as free and fair. A lot of Geor- Soviet period) and family members gian citizens also assessed their coun- and the people close to these families. try as democratic one (38% in June, Just few examples Otar Patsatsia, 2012; 49% in February, 2012; see who served as the country’s Prime charts 1 and 2). Minister in the mid 90-s, was a former Communist bureaucrat and an enter- PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR prise manager. Vazha Lortkipanidze the former Prime Minister of Geor- Political string-pulling over law, nep- gia and the Ambassador of Georgia to otism, favoritism. Actually, among Russia was second and then first sec- these three phenomena, nepotism was retary of the Central Committee of not as widely spread in the Soviet real- the Georgian Komsomol during Ed- ity taking into consideration the full uard Shevardnadze’s tenure as the historical period of its existence from First Secretary of the Georgian SSR. 1917 until 1991. But since Georgia Another interesting phenomenon declared independence, after a short in Georgia is the fact that criminals period of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s pres- played a significant role during She- idency Post-Soviet phenomena swept vardnadze leadership and presiden- across Georgian politics. They were cy. Mr. Jaba Ioseliani, who spent 17 observed on two levels. years in Soviet jails, was given a posi- The first wave began when Eduard tion in government and was Shevar- Shevardnadze started establishing a dnadze’s deputy. Thief-in-law Tari- state system. Аt this stage, nepotism, el Oniani also was in tough contacts favouritism, and cronyism were visi- with the Georgian government. De- ble and used as technology to fill out spite the fight against criminals She- vardnadze failed to eradicate evil- 95 Luis Navarro, Ian T. Woodward. Pub- doers. Mikheil Saakashvili carried lic attitudes in Georgia: Results of a out an extremely ferocious battle June 2012 survey carried out for NDI with them which ended up with the by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012. // .

106 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics complete liquidation of the«thief-in- of Georgia and then, the Minister for law» institute in Georgia96. Reform Coordination. Good example that string-pulling The second stage began after the over law has changed in Georgia is Rose Revolution on 23rd November, Sandro Girgviliani case. On January 2003, when newly elected President 27th, 2006, the dead body of San- Mikheil Saakashvili decided to funda- dro Girgvliani was found on the out- mentally change the government ma- skirts of Tbilisi, with overt signs of chine. He only invited young people, torture. According to Girgvliani’s who had received education abroad, family, he had been murdered af- to take high positions in the Govern- ter an altercation with close associ- ment. «Don’t take bribes and don’t ates of the powerful interior minis- give jobs to your relatives,» was Mr. ter (later the Prime Minister) Mr. Saakashvili’s first advice to his new Vano Merabishvili. Four officers team97. At that time, string-pull- from the Interior Ministry’s Depart- ing, nepotism, and favoritism were ment for the Constitutional Securi- not widespread. For instance, Vladi- ty were arrested on March 8th, 2006 mer «Lado» Gurgenidze a success- in connection with the murder. The ful banker in Georgia and abroad was courts found the accused guilty on appointed as the Prime Minister of all charges but one, and sentenced Georgia in November 2007 to stabi- one of them, the first deputy direc- lize the financial system of Georgia tor of constitutional security of the and bring investments to the Geor- Ministry of Interior, to seven-and- gian economy. Grigol Vashadze — up- a-half years imprisonment, and the on his return to Georgia from Russia other three to six and a half years in 2005 was appointed as the Minister in prison. Following a presidential of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Kakha pardon in November 2008, their re- Bendukidze left Russia, sold his huge maining sentences were reduced by interest in a company and accepted one half. In this case, we can see that Saakashvili’s offer to take the posi- even omnipotence of the Interior tions of the Minister for Economics minister did not save the four men from prison. On the other hand, we can see that the President pardoned them, but this is his right and no- 96 Interview with Alexander Rondeli, President of Georgian Foundation for body could officially blame him for Strategic and International Studies. doing so. Appointments in the Gov- 97 Shevardnadze son-in-law arrested, BBC ernment of Georgia in July 2012, News, 20.02.2004. // . Prime Minister had nothing to do

107 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? with string-pulling, nepotism or fa- suffering from unemployment would voritism. This was purely a strate- receive more work places. Some ex- gic political decision by the Presi- perts express their doubts regarding dent aimed at: the real reasons for moving the Par- 1. Keeping the course of the re- liament to Kutaisi. A Senior fellow of forms, which started after the Rose the Georgian Foundation for Strate- Revolution, under the initiative of gic and International Studies, Profes- the President. sor Vladimer Papava says that with 2. Strengthening the existing dom- possible complications related to the inant political party prior to the par- 2012 parliamentary elections and the liamentary election in 2012 and Presi- 2013 presidential election, authori- dential elections in 201398. ties would prefer to keep protesting people far away from the center of the Saakashvili’s proposal to relocate capital city100. the Parliament of Georgia to Kutai- The Government that was formed si and the Supreme Court to Batumi after the parliamentary elections of is considered as a significant feature, 2012 has caused concern about its abil- which could exemplify the decen- ity to continue the reforms initiated tralization of power in the post-Sovi- by the President Saakashvili after the et country. Moreover, this initiative Rose Revolution. For instance, the was launched to recover the econom- Financial Times stressed that «even ically and socially depressed West- Ivanishvili’s critics have little to say ern parts of Georgia like Kutaisi. The against the appointment of Irakli Ala- political elite understands this chal- sania, a highly-regarded former dip- lenge and obviously has no objections. lomat, as defense minister» (served The fact that nearly 500 out of 735 as Georgia’s ambassador to the UN parliament employees might be left from 2006 until December 2008). At without a job99 could be considered as the same time, the article notes that a positive fact — the population from the appointment of the former AC Mi- the second biggest city in Georgia lan player, Kakha Kaladze as the Min- ister of Energy «smacks of blatant 98 Interview with Alexander Rondeli, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies 99 Gabekhadze G., Move to new Kutaisi creates unforeseen challenges for many parliament employees, The Messanger 100 Interview with Professor Vladimer Pa- Online. July 19, 2012. // . tional Studies

108 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics populism.»101 Moreover, Transpar- Nowadays, political parties do not ency International Georgia drew at- play any role in a direct influence on tention to the conflict of interests re- the economy. They are only the instru- lated to Kakha Kaladze who allegede- ments of promoting and moving their ly aquired shares in energy sphere102. leaders to power. Here again we can The Georgian media also drew atten- distinguish between two periods in tion to the fact that the new Minister the independence of Georgia — dur- of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Maya ing Shevardnadze presidency the ma- Panjikidze, is a relative (wife’s sister) jority of high ranking Governmental of Irakli Alasania, may also be regard- staff were involved in different cor- ed as a manifestation of nepotism.103 rupt activities which were quite simple — just demanding bribes from cit- Business on state functions. During izens. For instance, the artificially in- the Soviet time only the Communist creased (in order to scale down unem- party’s structures were undertaking ployment) police contingent was pro- important decisions and the Soviet vided with scanty and irregularly paid Government was the only implement- salaries and advised to go to the city ing body. Since private property that streets to find additional «income»104. could foster income generation was Since official services and tax rates outlawed in the Soviet economic sys- were higher than those asked by gov- tem, the triad: Communist Party — ernment racketeers, the popula- Soviet Government — Business was tion used to pay the bribes not think- the only known and existing form of ing about the general consequences management. and was quite comfortable with this. Large enterprises were gradually owned by criminals and people close 101 Wagstyl S., Georgia waiting for Ivan- ishvili, Financial Times, October 16, to Government and, were free of com- 2012. // . associated «families». This resulted 102 Possible conflict of interests of Kakha in complete deterioration of indus- Kaladze, 22 October 2012. // . 104 Georgian example shows that police can 103 Maya Panjikidze: Georgia will restore actually be reformed, Georgian Daily, relations with Russia, Georgia Times, February 20, 2012. // . id=133>.

109 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? infrastructure, social, education and reportedly paid 1.49 million USD to healthcare and other vital sectors of the state budget, knows very little the economy and social life. about amount withdrawn from these actions. Nowadays, all SMEs in Geor- After the Rose Revolution in 2003, gia are registered, must have a cash the situation has drastically changed. register and, government officials Public services (e.g. Police, Civil Reg- and tax services do not bother them istry, Pubic Registry, courts, etc.) if they do not break the law and regu- serve Georgian citizens quite well lations. and in an efficient way. However, the fee of some of them is not relevant to On the other hand, there are many the average income in the country, or signs that large scale enterprises in other words services are current- are the targets of the keen interest ly quite expensive. Government hav- of the Chamber of Control of Geor- ing no legal leverage to deal with the gia and fiscal authorities106. For in- large enterprise’ owners (they were stance, Civil Georgia, informed in not members of the newly set up gov- June 2012 that Georgian authori- ernment anymore and have turned in- ties had impounded the shares of the to rich entrepreneurs) who privatized leader of the Georgian Dream oppo- huge state properties through «loop- sition coalition, Bidzina Ivanishvi- holes» in old legislation and direct li, in two Tbilisi-based banks follow- bribing for scanty sum of money, just ing his refusal to pay a multi-million forced them to give back some mon- fine imposed on the billionaire poli- ey; the amount of which was calculat- tician, which seems to correspond ed by relevant governmental bodies. with existing Georgian legislation. These, in fact, expropriated amounts We are not in the position to judge were transferred to extra-budget- whether these kind of decisions are ary funds which were out of civil so- legal or not but it is clear that large cieties control. Society despite a few scale businesses in some circum- cases such as 15.5 mln USD bail to stances could be treated as sources of free Shevardnadze’s son-in-low Gia state treasury replenishment. And it Jokhtaberidze from jail105, Georgian is not clear if Georgian legislation is Railways Director Akaki Chkhaidze

105 Shevardnadze’s daughter pays $15.5 mln for release of hus- band, Pravda.ru, April 26, 2004. // 106 Papava V., On the Privatization Geor- . 2012.

110 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics equally applied to all parties107. The In the aftermath of the Rose Rev- main characteristic of Soviet legisla- olution, Georgia was able to achieve tion was its selectivity. that holding power is no longer associated with personal enrichment. There Corruption at a citizens’ level is ac- are many reasons to believe that many tually weeded out108. According to the officials actually live on their wages, sociological survey executed by the which by Georgian standards are quite TNS and presented in July 2012: decent, and those who came to power • 99% of Georgian citizens were nev- with exceptional incomes, do not use er asked to pay a bribe last year. it as a source of personal enrichment. With this result Georgia ranks 1st Furthermore, there is a bonus system among European countries. that further motivates Georgian min- • Among NATO-aspirant states in isters. For example, the Minister of Europe, Georgia stands as the Economy and Development of Geor- most successful country both in gia receives substantial bonuses for terms of the fight against corrup- the growth of direct foreign invest- tion and the accessibility of public ment or the number of tourists visit- 109 services. ing the country. • 77% of Georgians consider that the Government has been effective Table 1 presents the high lev- in fighting corruption. el of government official’s asset income declaration reported for 2009 Georgia is ranked the fourth clean- (USD)110. One can find that they dif- est country in terms of corruption in fer from ministry to ministry, from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (be- position to position, but they are hind Turkey, Croatia and the FYR of rather high. Of course, the popula- Macedonia). And this is the main dif- tion perceived these salaries as rath- ference between the «Shevardnadze» er high in comparison with average time and after «Rose Revolution» pe- rate of salaries existing in the coun- riod (since 2003). try. We can assume that in 2012 they

109 Interview with Vera Kobalia, ex-Minis- ter of Economy and Sustainable Devel- 107 Interview with Archil Gegeshidze, Sen- opment. ior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation 110 Ryan C., and Khotivari R., Tracking for Strategic and International Studies, top-level ministry officials’ income and Security Expert, July 2012. bonuses, Transparency International 108 Interview with Kakha Gogolashvili, Di- Georgia, February 1, 2011 // .

111 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Table 1. The high-level Government ofﬁ cial’s asset income declaration reported for 2009 (USD) Position 2009 Income (USD)

Minister of Foreign Affairs 51754.49 Minister of Energy 50990.2 Minister of Agriculture 45508.98 Minister of Internal Affairs 27968.86 Minister of Justice 25437.13

Chart 3. Net worth in USD bln. Aslan Abashidze — the leader (until 2004) of the Adjarian Autonomous Republic. David Bezhuashvili, a former member of the Parliament of Georgia from the ruling United National Movement party and brother of the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Gela Bezhuashvili. Irakli Okruashvili — had served in various important posts in the Government of Georgia, including being the Minister of Defense. Valery Gelashvili — a former member of Parliament. Vano Chkhartishvili — a former Deputy of State, a former member of the Parliament and the former Minister of Economics. Pridon Injia a former minister of Communications. Zurab Noghaideli a former minister of Finance and a former Prime Minister.

1 1

0,8

0,6 0,6

0,4 0,25 0,25 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,075

0 Injia Vano Irakli Aslan Zurab David Valery Pridon Gelashvili Abashidze Noghaideli Okruashvili Bezhuashvili Chkhartishvili

112 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics are even higher than they were in his estimated wealth assume by ex- 2009. perts was 75 mln USD. However, as in all post-Soviet states, Georgia has politicians that Personalization vs. institutionaliza- were allowed either to keep or to action. Prior to the parliamentary elec- crue their fortune in the public ser- tions in Georgia on October 1st 2012, vice. The following civil servants there were few influential leaders and political leaders are incredibly (Michael Saakashvili, Vano Merabish- rich (see chart 3). All of these per- vili — Prime Minister, Zurab Adeish- sons gained their wealth in Geor- vili — Minister of Justice — Prose- gia (in comparison with some other cutor General of Georgia, Giga Boke- Georgian billionaires (B. Patarkat- ria — Secretary of the National Se- sishvili, B. Ivanishvili and some oth- curity Council of Georgia). One of the ers) who became rich abroad (mainly main principles promoted by the Gov- in Russia). There is a common view ernment was to develop strong and in public discourse that all of these sustainable institutions that will have people utilized their positions in gov- frequent personnel rotation in order ernment to do business. to avoid corruption, creation of personal relations networks and getting It is indicative that the young gen- unneeded political weight. To prove eration inherited some negative post- the above mentioned just recall that Soviet habits such as ostentatious Georgia has enjoyed 14 ministers of magnificence, constructing country defense, 14 ministers of Justice and cottages surrounded by high fences, 12 ministers of Health since 1991111. driving extremely expensive cars, buying huge plots of land which they President Saakashvili, as a lead- actually do not cultivate but access to er, is charismatic, dynamic, and these plots is forbidden to shepherds enormously energetic with a high and farmers who need grassland to level of personalization which, in feed their cattle. fact, gives him the possibility to Zurab Nogaideli was 46 years old make real reforms in the country. when he was appointed to the capaci- Of course, Mr. Saakashvili possess- ty of the Minister of Finance. He was es the Western style of behaviour considered a member of a political but with Georgian national patterns team of young reformists headed by Zurab Zhvania and Mikheil Saakash- 111 Election Profile for Georgia. .

113 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? of private life. For instance, to ad- Another vivid example of lies dress middle level and high level of a social nature was made couple people use «batono» Mikheil, or «ba- years ago by the authorities (Mikheil tono» President. Representatives of Saakashvili) to secure 100 USD pen- government call him just «Misha». sions by 2012. Actually pensions had And, vice versa, he uses «batono» been increased but not to that extent. or «kalbatono» (to address women) It is difficult to conclude if this in fact to speak to his ministers and com- actually constitutes a «lie» since the mon people. Even ordinary aged per- situation is constantly changing, and sons such as workers, peasants could couple years ago nobody was speak- greet the president in more informal ing about world economic crisis, but manner, which does not exist in Eng- still promises were being proclaimed lish, but in Russian it is known as and, of course, nobody was punished «ty» and is absolutely acceptable in or lost their job for this. Georgian society. He drives his car, There is another kind of lie relat- a Toyota Prius, by himself; though, ed to misrepresentation of opponent’s one could see him using more special plans, actions and activities results. means of transportation like heli- For instance, former Head of the Par- copters or diving in the Black Sea, liament Nino Burjanadze said at an etc. opposition rally that the Government plans to host 3 million foreign tour- Absence of sanctions for lies and ists per year is impossible, in general, fraud. Nowadays, politicians in Geor- since Georgia’s population is about gia are smart enough not to use bla- 4 mln and in case of implementation, tant lies. Unrealistic future plans are it will pull down Georgian identity. more frequently used. For instance, Of course, it was easy for Mrs. Bur- Georgian politicians during the pre- janadze just to take a look at relevant election campaign promised voters to web-sites on the Internet and find out double the amount of pensions, cut that Spain with 47 mln population re- down gas, electricity, petrol, medi- ceives about 60 million foreign tour- cine and consumer prices etc. These ists annually, and the Spaniards have kinds of promises can influence a cer- not lost their identity, but she pre- tain pool of the population especially ferred to use spurious facts in order the older generation, who still think to blame the Government for plan- that prices could be sufficiently reg- ning the wrong economic policy. And ulated in cabinet regardless of real there are no facts known to the inter- economic trends. viewed experts of punishing politicians for their lies to the population

114 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics

(e.g. not being reelected, losing their Future political leaders were rankings, etc.) . more thoughtful in this regard. These lies or incorrectnesses might President Saakashvili declared a be disclosed later on but the «word» broad social consensus through tol- was said and there are no sanctions erance and civic integration113. The being imposed. It is impossible to ap- Georgian Government not only stat- ply sanctions as this is the preroga- ed but also elaborated and adopted tive of the courts only, which lack the judicial grounds114 for a new ideolo- relevant article of law. But there is gy of reconciliation related to people another way to reveal the truth with who currently consider each other as the help of civil society organiza- enemies — Georgians, Abkhaz and tions and the mass-media. But NGOs Ossetians115. Some experts criticize are inherently weak and very few are different parts of the proposed pro- really independent. Journalists are gram116 but nobody says that it is not either politically motivated or ama- needed at all. teurish. It is true that nowadays Geor- DISCURSIVE PRACTICES gians are fed up with political ideologies. Tiredness of ideology spawned Death of ideologies. After the dis- indifference to politics in general. integration of the Soviet Union, com- This could be seen from chart 4 which munist and socialist ideas definitely shows that people are reluctant to vanished in Georgia. In the 1990s, due to the political maneuvers of the President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the nationalistic ideology substituted idealistic communistic ideology 113 On the development of the National and had been spreading widely across Concept and Action Plan for Tolerance Georgian society including Govern- and Civic Integration, №639, August 8, ment officials112. The genie of war, 2005. blood and hatred was freed from the 114 State Strategy on Occupied Territories, Engagement through Cooperation, Jan- bottle. uary 27, 2010. . 115 Interview with Kakha Demetrahsvili, 112 Keith D., and Grzymała-busse, A., The Consultant at Chancellery of the Gov- Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, ernment of Georgia; SMR. and the Communist Collapse, World 116 Interview with Giorgi Katcharava, in- Politics, 2006, Vol. 59 (1), p. 109. dependent expert.

115 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Chart 4. How often politics is discussed by common citizens? 70

60 52 51 50

40 Close relativesРодичі Друзі 30 Close friends

20 15 15 11 9 10 7 6 1 0 Always 4 3 2 Never DK discuss politics anywhere117. People The ideological vacuum in Geor- do not speak about politics, not out of gia was partially filled with the grow- fear, but because they are tired of nu- ing role of religion and the church in merous meetings and political rallies the lives of Georgians: a total of more which actually, in their view, have led than 80% of Georgians perceive faith to unemployment, misery and politi- to be an important or very important cal and economical instability118. part in everyday life (see chart 5)

External and internal enemy. Point- 117 Georgian get-togethers: Private Prob- ing out the existence of and the nam- lems versus Politics, Social Science in ing of external and internal enemies the Caucasus, April 12, 2012. . tential threat through increasing the 118 Perceived Poverty in Georgia: Results support of the existing political pow- of the 2011 Caucasus Barometer, So- er. On the other hand, it gives author- cial Science in the Caucasus, July 13, 2012. .

116 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics

Chart 5. How important are your own religious beliefs in making decisions in daily life? 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Very important 36

Important 48

Neutral 14

Not important 2

Not important at all 0

Source: Luis Navarro, Ian T. Woodward. Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a June 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012 they could be labeled as «agents» of political weight in Georgia (internal external enemies (just recall Sovi- enemy). There was an incident during et litigations related to «agents of the 2012 election campaign when peo- foreign intelligence services»). The ple were chanting toward Ivanishvili: threat of an internal and external en- «Russian agent, go away.» emy could sometimes be regarded as As always, the external enemy fac- an interconnected phenomena. Like tor could be sorted out in three ways, the Ivanishvili case who is considered as fully proven, solid evidence and as a pro-Russian politician and who unproven. A very important example got his wealth from his enrichment of creating external enemies for the in the post-Soviet Russia119 (external strengthening of own positions and enemy) and now is declaring to gain leverages is the case of Russia as an eminent threat, targeting the nation- 119 Bidzina Ivanishvili: The odd Franco- al security and sovereignty of Geor- Russian oligarch out to conquer the gia. The Russian factor can explain Georgian Parliament, May 4, 2012. many negative events that happened . an external enemy?

117 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

1. The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 completed this shift. Pro-Russian that took place on the territory of the politicians are no longer attractive to sovereign state of Georgia. the Georgian electorate. For instance, 2. Internationally recognized oc- Mrs. Nino Burjanadze with her old cupation of 20% of Georgian territo- nomenklatura family has lost politi- ry120. cal dividends122. 2011 Caucasus Ba- 3. Announcing of two breakaway rometer demonstrates this attitude of Georgian territories as independent the population of Georgia. According states. to the survey, 69% believe that Eng- 4. The 2006 Russian import ban on lish should be a mandatory language Georgian wines. in schools, while only 14% give this 5. Forced deportation of Georgian preference to Russian (see chart 6)123. citizens from Russia121. Therefore, the new generation of polit- However, in the case of Georgia, ical elite prefers English. it is important to note that the cre- «We are not against the Russian ation of an enemy is not happening language,» Saakashvili said in April on the principles of post-Sovietness, 2011. «If tomorrow Russian becomes when an enemy is located in the West a universal language for communi- («decaying West,» «American impe- cation and the Chinese, Norwegians, rialism», «NATO boot»). Even more, Americans will need Russian to suc- in the Georgian context, fighting ceed in social and political life, we will against an external enemy is to some have to study it as well.»124 extent fighting with post-Sovietness. Corruption charges to disqualify po- Mixture of the Russian-national lan- litical opponents. Abuse of corruption guage in political rhetoric. In Geor- gia, the Russian language has lost its 122 Why did Saakashvili win? Despite nu- importance and influence. The post- merous efforts, Burjanadze failed to revolution period and the Georgian- turn into a charismatic leader, Geor- Russian war of 2008 facilitated and gia Today, June 9, 2011. . cy Through Law, (Venice Commis- 123 Education in Georgia: Results of the sion). Law on Occupied Territories Of 2011 Caucasus Barometer, . view/>. 121 Russian Official: ‘Thousands of Geor- 124 Saakashvili closes down Russian schools gians are in Russia Illegally’, June 13, in Georgia, RT, July 1, 2001, . schools-education/>.

118 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Politics

Chart 6. Which language should be mandatory at schools in Georgia?

80 69 70

20 14 10 7 8 2 0 No foreign Other for- language English Russian eign lan- DK/RA should be guage mandatory is one of the main instruments to dis- and the businessman Levan Pirve- qualify political opponents or to dis- li126, Irakli Okruashvili127 who had miss some colleagues who are out of served in various important posts in favour is a frequently used political the Government of Georgia, David technology in Georgia, like in most de- Mirtskhulava,128 the former minister veloping countries. Many high ranked of Energy of Georgia and many other Georgian politicians were blamed for political figures. corruption and ended in jail or fled away from Georgia. Here could be 126 Fugitive MP, businessman Levan Pi- mentioned Aslan Abashidze,125 the rveli plans to return to active politics, leader (until 2004) of the Adjarian The Georgian Times, May 14, 2010. Autonomous Republic, former MP . 127 France Grants Asylum to Okruashvili, 125 Aslan Abashidze buys chocolate fac- Civil.ge, April 23, 2008. . line, August 9, 2010. . php?a=main&pid=8976&lang=eng>.

119 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Here, it is important to note that it was going to charge him with a num- there were two kinds of charges of ber of corruption-related crimes.131 corruption. In the first one was a Irakli Okruashvili created the political group of high-level officials who were Movement for a United Georgia and charged almost immediately after the then, in 2007, he left Georgia and was change in power (Rose Revolution for granted political asylum in France. In instance). They were arrested on the March 2008, he was sentenced in ab- spot or managed to flee. 129 sentia to serve an 11-year prison term Freedom House announced, «Over in Georgia . In October 2010, he, re- the course of 2004, a number of offi- maining in France, joined Sozar Sub- cials accused of corruption or embez- ari, Levan Gachechiladze (Georgian zlement during the Shevardnadze era businessman, millionaire) and Ero- have been arrested. In a number of si Kitsmarishvili (Georgian business- these instances, these former officials man, millionaire) in a new Georgian have paid substantial fines as part of Party and warned President Saakash- the adjudication of their cases. More vili about his political comeback. than $50 million is believed to have been collected in this fashion. This approach has raised questions about the soundness of a process by which lump- sum contributions paid by a suspect can simply be transferred to the Geor- gian treasury, or if criminal charges can actually be dropped on the basis of this sort of payment.»130 The second group consists of high- level officials who worked with the existing government over a significant period of time. A striking example is Irakli Okruashvili’s case. The Prose- cutor General’s Office announced that

129 Ex-Adjarian Leader Sentenced to Pris- on in Absentia // Civil.Ge, 22 January 2007 . 131 M. Saakashvili: «I’ve fought corruption 130 Freedom House, Georgia (2005 Report). all my life», RT, September 29, 2007. . fought-corruption-all-my-life/>.

120 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society

POST-SOVIETNESS IN GEORGIAN SOCIETY

ATTITUDES among Georgians and in public institutions. This significantly distin- Post-Sovietness inculcated for guishes Georgia from many post-So- many Georgians a habit of relying on viet countries, because the police, the the care and the omnipotence of the army and the administration of the political elite that generates a lack of President have a high credit of trust initiative and limited social activity. in this country. Georgians appreciate A paternalistic model of power rela- the democratic development of the tions and civil rights in Georgia was a country and believe in the need for relatively stable trend, which remains further reform. What priorities does essentially unaltered despite the ar- Georgian society have? The most im- rival of new political leaders. How- portant issue for Georgians is unem- ever, the citizens of Georgia are also ployment (for 78% of the citizens), very susceptible to abuse by authori- poverty (47%), territorial integrity ties: more than half (52%) of Geor- (28%), inflation (38%). To examine gians believe that «a good citizen» in more see the table 2.132 should take part in protests, 66% of the population believe that «a good Paternalism and conformism as a life citizen» should be critical to the gov- strategy. Two decades after the disso- ernment. Perhaps, the coincidence of lution of the USSR, large segments of such sentiments allowed Georgia to the population still expect the state to convey the democratic Rose Revolu- deal with the majority of their prob- tion; such a protest fervor occasion- lems, which, on the one hand, hin- ally compels citizens to go en masse ders individual initiative and inno- to the main square of Tbilisi to de- vation expressed by ordinary peo- fend democracy and human rights ple, maintaining what can be called in the country. Georgian society was ‘public infantilism’, but, on the oth- tired of any ideologies, it was criti- er hand, promotes paternalist atti- cal to the Soviet past, and new ideol- tudes, arrogance and lack of responsi- ogies did not find any fertile ground bility among decision makers who are (the vacuum was occupied by religion; the church plays an important role in 132 Attitudes towards the judicial system the daily lives of Georgians). In gen- in Georgia. CRRC, Tbilisi, January 24, eral, apathy towards politics did not 2012. .

121 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Table 2. Which problem do you think is currently the most important in Georgia? (%) 1. NATO membership 5 2. Corruption 2 3.Low pensions 18 4. Relations with Russia 11 5. Protection of property rights 1 6. Fairness of elections 3 7. Unemployment 78 8. Independence of courts 3 9. Freedom of speech 2 10. Protection of human rights 6 11.Poverty 47 12.Territorial integrity 28 13. Rising prices 38 14. Affordability of healthcare 14 15. Low wages 11 16. Independence of journalists 0 17. Quality of education 6 18. EU Membership 0 19. Political stability in Georgia 6 20.Other 4 supposed to be public servants, and pre-electoral promises of populist pol- their disinterestedness in public par- iticians but quickly forgetting them ticipation or involving the actors of soon after elections. Another illustra- civil society in decision making pro- tion of the personality-centred poli- cess 133. tics in Georgia, is that many political Infantilism comes in many guis- parties would not really care to pre- es such as naivety, believing the sent a consistent and thought-through

133 «Public officials often fail to see the benefit of involving a wide range of stakeholders in the policy formulation process, since non-profit organizations are often considered interest-driven and biased…» David Aphrasidze. Nations in Transit 2012: Georgia. Freedom House, 2012.

122 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society

Chart 7. When deciding who you want as your Majoritarian MP, what is important for you? – Name up to three.

Ability to assist me with solving my problems 48 Their qualifications (education, profession) 38 Their honesty 35 Their connection to my district 24 Their experience in politics 23 The party / bloc that nominates them 15 Their past 12 The promises candidates make 12 Their family 2 Their age 1 Their gender 0 Other 2 DK 8

0 10 20 30 40 50 political programme or agenda, if any was the «ability to help in solving my at all134. problems»135(see chart 7). A striking example is Bidzina Ivan- ishvili. A lot of people voted for him To fight paternalism in a political because he is very rich and will share system, which did not give the oppor- with everyone. It is such a belief in tunity to develop democratic political the father-breadwinner. In fact, for institutions was one of the messages the half of Georgians, the main crite- of Rose Revolution. «Georgian soci- ria for determining the ideal deputy ety expects order from above. Conse- quently, the authority understands 134 Georgian National Study, Internation- al Republican Institute, Tbilisi, October 27-November 11, 2011. . Survey-Results-0212.pdf>.

123 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

‘order’ as maximum control which tools and terrorists,»139 which was al- is masked under paternalism. Some- so political propaganda attempting to times society protests against solve Ossetian separatism problem. that, but the state cannot offer any While having generally a positive alternative.»136 outlook with regards to the devel- Traditionally, there is a notion of opments in the country, at the same a Georgian people whose will could time, people ascribe quite a signifi- be expressed by the actions of one po- cant importance to public activism, litical leader. In this regard, we re- being non-conformist i.e. critical to- call Georgia’s permanent aspiration ward the government and participat- to seek for the leader who might save ing in protest, even if protecting tra- the country. And the first President ditions (although the question seems of Georgia — Zviad Gamsakhurdia, to be somewhat vague) is still the who was much more an intellectual highest priority140 (see chart 8). than a politician,137 is a good example It is interesting to note a not too of an important political figure who uncommon fact is that mostly the used to bare political rhetoric in order supporters of the Saakashvili party to reach popularity and to change the (about 20% of respondents, largely country through it138. For instance, he representing rural and less educated declared the Ossetian separatists to groups of the population) who tend to be «direct agents of the Kremlin, its be more conformist. Also, the biggest part of the National Movements supporters, i.e. respondents who evaluate democracy in the most positive way, does not consider the participation of people in decision-making process as necessary. Only 40.1% of this group 136 Interview with Emzar Jgerenaia, Soci- thinks that any person or organiza- ologist tion has the right to organize protest 137 Mikhail Saakashvili: new romantic or action against state initiatives. modern realist?, Open Democracy, De- cember 11, 2003. . les Times, September 3, 1991. . 1996), Contested Borders in the Cauca- 140 Knowledge and Attitudes toward the sus. Vrije Universiteit Brussel Press. EU in Georgia. CRRC, December 2011.

124 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society

Chart 8. To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to...? (%) Very important Very Rather important Rather not important Not important at all DK RA

2011 79 16 2 1 1 1 Protect traditions 2009 77 18 3 1 2 0 2011 77 20 1 0 1 0 Support people who are worse off 2009 76 21 1 1 1 0 Pay taxes 2011 72 23 2 1 1 1 2011 70 24 2 1 2 1 Obey laws 2009 64 27 4 1 3 1 2011 68 24 2 0 5 1 Form own opinions 2009 51 32 6 1 9 0 2011 67 25 3 1 3 1 Vote in elections 2009 60 26 7 2 4 1 2011 31 35 14 5 14 1 Be critical towards government 2009 25 27 21 8 17 2 2011 31 24 19 11 14 2 Participate in protests 2009 12 18 27 19 22 2 2011 26 31 21 7 13 1 Work as a volunteer 2009 21 27 19 12 19 1

Delayed diffusion of innovations and and support that enabled reforms, fear of reforms. During the last decade, one should note that while its popu- Georgia has undergone rapid reforms larity has to some extent eroded, es- in various areas of public life such pecially after the crisis of 2008, the as police and penal reform, taxation, general attitude towards the reforms healthcare, education, social welfare, and the direction in which Georgia de- local governance, and so on. velops is positive, as demonstrated by

While during the first years in power the Saakashvili government enjoyed a high level of public trust

125 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Chart 9. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the current government is making the changes that matter to you?

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Completely agree 8

Somewhat agree 50

Somewhat disagree 15

Completely disagree 1188

DK 8

the diagrams 141 (see chart 9). This, According to the survey142, 71% in turn, means that, in general, pub- residents expressed their trust in the lic attitude toward innovation and re- administration of the President of form is positive, unless these are fol- Georgia, 69% — to the Parliament, lowed by the dramatic worsening of 68% — to the government. This is the socio-economic conditions of life. the result of a sociological survey con- Some surveys demonstrate the suc- ducted across the country in March- cess of certain Georgian reforms. In April 2012 by the U.S. Internation- particular, after the successful real Republican Institute (IRI) and the form of law enforcement agencies, Gallup Institute with the funding the level of police support reached from the USAID. 90%. Interestingly, the Georgians One of the most prominent inno- generally began to treat public insti- vations initiated in Georgia was the tutions, including the administration opening of the Public Service Halls. of the President, with higher level This is an unprecedented example on of trust, which significantly distin- the post-Soviet terrain when the coun- guishes Georgia, from such countries try has taken specific steps in order to as Ukraine. break up with the typical attributes of post-Sovietness — powerful and

141 Navarro L. and Woodward I. T., Public 142 In Georgia, 90% of citizens trust po- attitudes in Georgia: Results of a Febru- lice and military, Georgia Times, 2012. ary 2012 survey carried out for NDI by .

126 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society inefficient bureaucracy, long queues accepted in Georgian society, show- and the impolite treatment of citi- ing that even legally possible motions zens. The Public Service Hall provides may be disliked and are as distasteful various services — including the Civil as opposing the spirit of democratic Registry Agency, the National Agen- transition. According to recent opin- cy of Public Registry, the National ion poll, only 33% of Georgians sup- Archives, the National Bureau of En- port such a scenario while 36% are forcement and the Notary Chamber strongly against this idea144. of Georgia. The Chief Public Service Still, the list of the most desirable Hall in Tbilisi provides up to 300 ser- reforms demonstrates how much the vices. population expects to be done, and in which exact spheres (see сhart 10). Even such ‘exotic’ innovations as Because Saakashvili’s government building a new city on the Black Sea, had not successfully carried out the called Lazika, rather unexpectedly top priority reforms for people (name- announced by the President Saakash- ly: healthcare reform), is one of the vili in winter 2011-2012, without any explanations for the loss of his party clear concept or justification, is wel- at the parliamentary elections in Oc- comed by population, which is, how- tober 2012. ever, reluctant to accept the alloca- tion of huge resources that need to be Intolerance. The highest level of the spent to implement the project. Geor- underdeveloped tolerance or conserv- gians who know about this initiative atism in Georgia is observed on the is- are supporting it, despite the fact that sues of non-traditional religious de- only the first phase of the construc- nominations and sexual minorities. tion of the dream-city will cost 1.5 bil- Religious practices of other con- lion lari (around $ 900 millions).143 fessional denominations is one of the However, not all innovations that areas where public tolerance is rather the population expect from the gov- limited, particularly with regards to ernment are equally welcomed. So, so called non-traditional confessions the idea of President Saakashvili be- (such as e.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses). coming the Prime Minister after the Still, in general the tolerance to other presidential elections in 2013 a la than the Georgian orthodox denomi- Putin-Medvedev castling, is not well nation is low. Polls showed that only

143 Navarro L. and Woodward I. T., Public 144 Navarro L. and Woodward I. T., Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a Febru- attitudes in Georgia: Results of a Febru- ary 2012 survey carried out for NDI by ary 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012. CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012.

127 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Chart 10. Which three reforms do you think would be most important for Georgia/which do you expect to see achieved during the next 6 months?

Healthcare reform 5858 25 Agricultural reform 42 16 Pension reform 33 26 Education reform 2288 15 Electoral reform 22 16 Judicial reform 1188 5 Tax reform 1188 6 Business environment reform 11 4 Property rights reform 8 3 6 Media reform 2 0 None 15 9 DK 2929 0 RA 0

Most important Most likely to be achieved during the next 6 months

Source: Luis Navarro, Ian T. Woodward. Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a June 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC. NDI Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012

23.7% of respondents would think Eastern Orthodox by self-definition, that other religions should have the do not demonstrate great zeal in ob- same rights as the Georgian Ortho- serving religious practices; religious dox church145. All generations dem- affiliation is an important dimen- onstrate more of a readiness to permit sion of their identity, and it is still be- religious activities to followers of the lieved to be the sole ‘true’ religion. main religions, such as Muslims, Ar- menian Gregorians, or Catholics. However, it is not the representa- At the same time, while Georgians, tives of other confessions that rank the absolute majority of them being the highest on the intolerance scale, but homosexuals, as elevated hom-

145 Sumbadze, N. Generations and Val- ophobia is a persistent characteris- ues, Institute for Policy Studies, tic of Georgian society, especially 2012. among the older generations — unlike

128 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society

Chart 11. Lack of desire to have members of different out-groups as neighbors.

Homosexual persons 51

Drug addicts 45

Persons with mental problems 40

Alcoholics 3838 Criminals 33

Persons with HIV 2277

Representatives of other religions 12

Foreigners 5

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Source: Nana Sumbadze. Generations and Values. Institute for Policy Studies, 2012.

religious intolerance, more visible give birth outside of marriage has de- among the younger cohorts, in gener- creased from 63% to 50%.146 al due to their higher religiosity (see chart 11). Social alienation. While Soviet policies have to a great extent weakened However, the number of people interpersonal trust and caused the who consider homosexuality unjusti- alienation of individuals, in Geor- fiable remains unchanged at the lev- gia strong family and kinship ties el of 90%, at the same time, there is were able to resist such pressures, al- a gradually more relaxing attitude to- though a specific pattern of intra- wards such social phenomena as ex- societal connections have been de- tramarital sex. The number of peo- veloped. Social capital is considered ple who think that it is never justified as a concept reflecting such connec- for a woman to have sex outside of tions and interpersonal trust. Geor- marriage has decreased from 78% to gia has been frequently characterized 64% during the last two years alone, as a society with high «bonding» so- while the number of people who think cial capital, but low «bridging» social it is never justified for a woman to 146 Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia. CRRC, December 2011.

129 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? capital, i.e. strong in-group solidarity efforts.147 However, despite the pub- and out-group mistrust, revealed in lic’s low level of formal participation weak civic engagement, low rates of in the civil society sector, widespread group membership and participation norms of openness and altruism seem in public events. Indeed, according to to underlie the vibrant forms of bridg- the 2007 Caucasus Barometer survey, ing social capital.148 Respectively, the only 0.7% of Georgians had attended generalized social trust (i.e. predispo- a meeting of any sort of club or civic sition to trust people in general), con- organization in the six months pri- sidered a manifestation of social capi- or to the survey (compared to 1.7% tal and social cohesion, shows signif- of Azerbaijanis and 2.4% of Arme- icant growth in Georgia, particularly nians); less than 5% of the Georgian when comparing with neighbouring population have attended a meeting Caucasian societies149. organized by an NGO, participated in an NGO training, or visited the of- Trust in people is among the oth- fice of an NGO over the last two years. er things that is positively correlated Moreover, just 1.7% of the popula- with economic well-being150, and will tion reported belonging to a political probably continue to grow with eco- party, 1.0% of the population report nomic development. (In the CRRC sur- membership in an officially recog- vey (see chart 12), 24% of respond- nized NGO or professional union, and only 0.77% say that they belong to a 147 Social Capital in Georgia: Final Report cultural or sports club or union. and Recommendations. CRRC, Tbili- si, 2011. . Centers Social Capital Report (2011) 148 Hough L., Social Capital in Georgia. identified the four key obstacles in- Caucasus Analytica Digest #31. http:// creasing the bridging of social capital www.ge.boell.org/web/126-1125.html. in Georgia as: 1) apathy toward col- 149 Paturyan Y., (Dis)Trusting People and laboration, 2) distrust of social entre- Political Institutions in Armenia. Cau- preneurs, 3) a challenging socio-eco- casus Analytica Digest #31. . 150 Mestvirishvili N., Social Exclusion in Georgia: Perceived Poverty, Participa- tion and Psycho-Social Wellbeing. Cau- casus Analytica Digest #40. .

130 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society

Chart 12. Trust in people.

60 56 50 50 48

40 39 40 34 Poor 31 29 30 Fair 22 Good 20 20 14 10 10 7 5 2 0 There There are There are plenty I experience are many enough peo- of people I can a general I often feel people I ple to whom rely on when I sense of rejected can trust I feel close have problems emptiness completely ents rated their households’ econom- of property rights are increasingly ic condition as poor or very poor, 68% numerous, frequently disguised by saw it is fair, and 8% rated it as good formally voluntary relinquishing of or very good). these rights by owners, or taken over under the pretext of national inter- Lack of respect for property rights. ests. As already mentioned above, the In some cases, even assistance from Georgian state claims to have creat- Western countries would serve as a ed a free market economy in the coun- trigger to depriving households of try. However, this cannot be achieved their properties, as a digital database at least if the state guarantees the re- is created with Western assistance of- spect of property rights, the courts ten was prone to conflict with already are fair and capable of protecting citi- existent ownership documents on pa- zens if their property rights are vio- per, or even enabled officials to ma- lated, and the respect toward private nipulate such rights. Such cases were property is universally acknowledged particularly frequent when the state and adopted by both the state officials has decided to develop important and the general public. However, this tourist or port sites (e.g. newly devel- is not yet the case, and the violations oped resort and port of Anaklia), or

131 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? when local developers were supported directed toward authorship rights by local officials. Seizures and demo- and piracy, as capturing real estate lition of private property had peaked is not so easy for common people. As in late 2006 and early 2007 and have copyright was virtually non-existent galvanised public concern about this in the Soviet Union, people, includ- issue, however, new waves of expro- ing publishers and producers of mu- priations and property losses contin- sical records, have difficulty in get- ued151. A number of NGOs in Georgia ting used to the necessity to pay when were quite instrumental in monitor- they want to reproduce some work of ing and reporting property rights vi- art or literature. Still another mani- olations, but the trend is still on the festation of this difficulty is the ever rise152. too frequent reliance on plagiarism by One should note that neglect to- students when preparing their essays wards property rights is quite com- or dissertations (though a worldwide mon among the general public as trend, it is still too conspicuous here), well, although in this case it is more often without due acknowledgement of borrowing the work of other peo- 151 Property Rights in Post-Revolutionary ple. Georgia. Transparency International, Trade with PhD dissertations, re- Georgia, March, 2012. ; Erickson A., The certain salary bonuses for PhD hold- Case of Georgia’s Disappearing Proper- ers (in medicine, education sector) ty Deeds, The Atlantic Cities, May 10, and there is an advanced possibility to 2012. ; sor of University which automatically Patsuria N., Property Rights Infringe- leads to higher salary. ment Practice Is Rampant in Tour- ist Zones, Georgian Journal. April 18, There are two instances of fabri- 2012. . fabricated and sold two fake higher 152 Transparency International Georgia in- education diplomas for 10000 USD153. vestigates property rights violations For the same reason 4 top manag- near the Red Bridge border crossing. ers (founder, rector, vice rector, and May 18, 2012. . www.heretifm.com/?2/1680/=1>.

132 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society study manager) of Georgian Inter- introduces additional measures aimed national Tourism Academy were de- at fighting against terrorism155. tained and prosecuted in 2011154. This practice is absolutely out of And what is important is that interest and practice for politicians these changes are not directed at Rus- since most of them graduated from sian cultural heritage — Aleksandr well-known universities abroad. They Pushkin bust still stands in the cent- simply do not need such forgery. Inci- er of Tbilisi, like Mikhail Lermontov, dentally, it is very easy to check up on Aleksandr Griboedov monuments, the validity of diplomas. Lev Tolstoy, Georgiy Tovstonogov streets. It is very interesting that the PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR statue of Jospeh Stalin that stood in Gori (his birthplace) outside the Town Preservation of Soviet symbols in in- Hall, until being moved to Joseph Sta- frastructure. All Soviet and commu- lin Museum, disregarding the Geor- nist symbols were actually destroyed gian Communist party, Russian Com- in Georgia in the early 1990s with full munist party and some other parties support of the population. Public hol- objections in 2010 as part of the coun- idays related to that epoch were also try’s de-Sovietisation process. What abandoned, except one — May 9th, is important Mr. I. Alasania, appoint- The Day of Victory over Fascism. No- ed as Minister of Defense after the body is even discussing, even opposi- 2012 parliamentary elections, an- tion parties, the possibility of the res- nounced earlier that if they come in- toration of former Soviet holidays. to power they would ask the popula- Georgian lawmakers passed a law on tion of Gori whether they want to re- May 31st, 2011, prohibiting Soviet store Stalin monument and would act symbols, and banning former high- accordingly156. This means that some- ranking Soviet officials from occupy- times important Soviet symbols could ing high state posts. The law, entitled be instruments of a political strug- the Freedom Charter, unites two bills: gle. It was proposed to reorganize and one restricts the rights of former So- rename the Joseph Stalin Museum viet special services and top Commu- to Stalinism Museum: then Culture nist party officials, and the other bans Soviet symbols in public places and 155 Georgian parliament bans Sovi- et symbols, former Soviet officials from high posts, RiaNovosti, May 31, 2011. . ge/?p=26647>. 156 Prime Time Georgia, May 28, 2012.

133 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

Minister Nikoloz Rurua presented the salary is 426 USD per month158 and initiative on April 9, 2012 while visit- such behaviour of certain part of pop- ing the museum in Gori. ulation results in internal social protest by the rest of people who are be- Irrational consumerism. Some Geor- low poverty line. This is the source of gians who have gotten rich during last political and social unrest, recollec- two decades really demonstrate exces- tion from «glorious chapters» of So- sive private consumption. Huge hous- viet history and some post-Soviet pat- es with swimming pools, dachas with terns in such people’s behaviour. high fences, luxury and extremely expensive cars, houses abroad — this is DISCURSIVE PRACTICES what these people and their parents lacked and dreamed about in the for- Intolerance to critique and need for mer Soviet Union (FSU). idols. Post-Soviet people are able to For instance, Bidzina Ivanishvili, wholeheartedly adore something or founder of «Georgian Dream coali- somebody or to hate. They accept ei- tion» ownes Glass House, a $50 mil- ther pathos or negation. The con- lion complex designed by the futuris- structive critique in-between is per- tic Japanese architect Shin Takamat- ceived as an offense. Saakashvili asks su on a hillside above the Georgian diplomats to listen to debates after his capital of Tbilisi157. Priceless sculp- State of Nation Address «In order to tures by Henry Moore, Damien Hirst avoid incorrect criticism — though and others occupy the gardens, while we will always accept construc- copies from an art collection worth tive criticism.»159. But at the same $1bn, including works by Picasso, time some authors note that Mikheil adorn the walls.

The problem is that Georgia is a poor country where pensions are about 80 USD per month and the average

158 In Georgian. April 5, 2012. . est politician. November 27, 2011. 159 Saakashvili Asks Diplomats to Lis- . cle.php?id=23134>.

134 GEORGIA. Post-Sovietness in Georgian Society

Saakashvili could not accept criticism Presidency was restored in Novem- and does not like public debates160. ber 1995, he was elected by 70% of Georgians, especially of middle the vote. Soon he was accused (2003) aged and aged categories, like peo- by many Georgians of shielding cor- ple from other FSU states still need rupt supporters and using his powers idols. For instance, despite national- of patronage to shore up his own posi- istic ideas Zviad Gamsakhurdia was tion and idol has fallen by young and elected as the President in the elec- ambitious politician Mikheil Saakash- tion of May 26th, 1991 with 86.5% vili — On 4 January 2004 he won the per cent of the vote with a turnout presidential elections in Georgia with of over 83% which clearly points out more than 96% of the votes cast (!) that people needed a leader, an idol and a new idol had born. It is difficult whose personality was cloaked with to predict Mikheil Saakashvili’s polit- the mystery of a fighter with the Sovi- ical career from now but, apparently, et machine rather than a professional he will not participate in presidential politician who would be able to solve elections 2013 and maybe a new idol social, economic and political prob- will emerge. Post-Soviet Georgians lems which were destroying the new- need idols, since they embody their ly established republic. Very soon, hopes for better future. Zviad Gamsakhurdia despite his de- It seems that all high level Geor- spair appeal to the population to sup- gian politicians tend to establish an port him161 had to flee from Georgia. authoritarian style of management The idol had fallen. Then another idol Zviad Gamsakhurdia was «widely had come — Eduard Shevardnadze criticized for what was perceived to and the population of Georgia again be an erratic and authoritarian style had hopes that he would manage to of government»162, and «Eduard She- lead them to better future and again vardnadze, the former Communist his rating was very high — when the Party boss in Georgia, who crushed the Georgian human rights movement 160 Papava V., But the end of the year, by and oversaw Mr. Gamsakhurdia’s parliamentary elections we should an- ticipate high level inflation. (In Geor- gian). . 161 Georgian Crowds Step Up Pressure to Oust Leader, The New York Times. Sep- 162 The History of Georgia. Post-commu- tember 22, 1991. . georgia_19>.

135 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? imprisonment,»163 and then «Mikheil Saakashvili who led the Rose Revolu- tion against the authoritarian Pres- ident Eduard Shevardnadze»164 and Saakashvili was blamed for the authoritarian style of governance in 2012165. But in the course of the parliamentary elections in October 2012, he knocked this trump out of hands of his opponents when ensured a democratic transfer of power to the winner of the race through elections.

163 Shipler, D. K., Democracy Is a Sys- tem, Not a Man, The New York. Janu- ary 09, 1992. . 164 Georgia Imposes Emergency Rule, Spiegel, August 11, 2007. . 165 Authoritarian President Saakashvili coming to DC, The Peace and Collabo- rative Development Network, January 27, 2012. .

136 10 RECOMMENDATIONS

10 RECOMMENDATIONS

TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS

In preparation of the study, ex- EUROPEANIZATION AND SOCIALI- perts came across some similarities of ZATION. Seen as a crucial process, Eu- post-Sovietness in Georgia, Ukraine ropeanization is able to produce qual- and Moldova. However, some achieve- itative change in governance and so- ments have been singled out in certain cial life. The process itself involves countries, their success stories, which two-dimensional approach to be im- could be helpful in the process of plemented: the institutional Europe- overcoming post-Sovietness in those anization and the socialization. states. On the basis of these factors, The institutional Europeanization, the Institute of World Policy has de- which is mainly focused on govern- veloped ten recommendations: ment and its institutions, is based on a normative approach by adopting the • Europeanization and socialization. aquis communitaire of the European • Demythologization of the Soviet Union in the countries that are will- legacy. ing to become the EU members. Geor- • Active civil society. gia, Moldova and Ukraine have al- • The key role of media. ready started to adopt EU legislation in different areas, given their com- • Implementation of e-governance. mitments taken in order to implement • Exchange programs between re- conditions for visa liberalization, a gions. deep and comprehensive free trade • Contests for public ofﬁ ces. agreement and, the association pro- • The ﬁ ght against corruption. cess overall. It is important to benefit, • Debureaucratization. to a higher degree, from the instruments that are offered by the EU in • Improving educational standards. order to strengthen the institutional

137 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? capacity and to align specific institu- Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, so- tions to European standards. These cialization is done through programs instruments vary from the Compre- like Erasmus, Youth in Action, pro- hensive Institution Building program grams designed to study visits to of- that was designed within the East- ficials, EUBAM and others. Howev- ern Partnership and is aimed at co- er, nothing could be more powerful in operation in areas important for EU- terms of boosting socialization than EaP countries, reform of the execu- visa-free travel to the EU (of course tive body system, increase institu- together with the implementation of tional capacity and incorporate cross- conditions) and the investment in peo- cutting issues like staff training and ple to people contacts that would lead e-governance, to other instruments. to a takeover of the European behav- Alongside the CIB, better use should ioural patterns and would generate a be made of more traditional instru- spill-over effect in society. ments like Twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA In the overall process of Europe- and CBC that may cover all the insti- anization, an important role should tutions and areas willing to reform be played by civil society that has to and Europeanize. be both, an example and a source of At the same time, socialization Europeanization. The process of Eu- is one of the most important tools in ropeanization does not guarantee the understanding the nature of the re- exclusion of post-Soviet patterns, forms that lead to Europeanization but in combination with other in- and the changing of behavioural pat- struments, like, for example, intro- terns. The most common understand- ducing e-governance and technolo- ing of socialization is seen as the pro- gy, could become the most powerful cess of “inducing behavioural and tool to uproot the habits and man- identity change through interaction ners which were inherited from So- with a partner at any or on all levels viet times. (e.g. government, business, civil society and students), which results in DEMYTHOLOGIZATION OF THE SO- social learning, model emulation and VIET LEGACY. In order to effective- lessons drawn, etc”166. In the case of ly uproot post-Sovietness, the process of demythologization of Soviet norms of behaviour, phenomena, and 166 Emerson M., Noutcheva G., From Bar- symbols should take place. Sanctifi- celona process to Neighbourhood Poli- cy: Assessments and Open Issues, CEPS cation of what is considered as “So- Working Document No 220, Centre for viet” is a notable trend, especially in European Policy Studies, March 2005. Ukraine, and to a certain extent in

138 10 RECOMMENDATIONS

Moldova. At the same time, Georgia the cultural field as well and could be has advanced the most in the process executed by gradually reducing the of demythologization. For example, number of film productions, which in Ukraine, more than 50% of street reproduce or exalt discursive prac- names have Soviet genealogy. Nearly tices of post-Sovietness. all towns preserve monuments dedicated to the notable Charts of the So- ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY. An impor- viet era; the most common, in this re- tant element of the transformation- gard, are the monuments of Vladimir al path is the willingness of citizens Lenin. Meanwhile, in Georgia, Sovi- to self-organize and to manifest civic et symbols were destroyed in the ear- engagement at a local level. A major ly 1990’s. In May 2011, the Georgian challenge of post-Sovietness is pater- parliament passed a law on the ban- nalism, that is, the belief in the om- ishment of Soviet symbols. In July nipotence of the state and that it is 2012, a similar law was adopted in the state, which has to solve citizens’ Moldova. The desecration of “Sovi- problems. Such civic passivity, conse- etness” depends on how long socie- quently, allows administrative bodies ties in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldo- to play on these paternalistic inclina- va will remain at the stage of post-So- tions of voters (politicians can eas- vietness, preserving its fundamen- ily “bribe” people with their promis- tal attributes: either paternalism, es). This indifference engenders stag- or interpersonal distrust, or intoler- nation, lack of reforms or their weak ance. Demythologization could oc- implementation. The active partici- cur through prohibition, which was pation of citizens in the pursuit of adopted by Georgia and Moldova, and their own interests will make poli- by debunking the cult of the “Soviet” ticians more responsible. Further- through extensive discussions (in- more, a high level of activity within volving the media) that would pro- civil society will strengthen its dem- vide citizens with essential sourc- ocratic traditions. In liberal democ- es for the assessment of the past. In racies, there is a noticeable tendency Ukraine, on the contrary, there is a in the shift of decision-making pow- boom in the consecration of Soviet er towards regions and the empower- life that is expressed at the entranc- ment of citizens. The policy of condi- es of various institutions with slo- tionality that was practiced towards gans such as “Tasty as in the USSR,” Central European countries did not “Available as in the Soviet Union,” always yield successful results. And, “Bolshevik”, etc. Demythologization sometimes the EU suffered criticism of the Soviet heritage is necessary in regarding its paternalistic policies

139 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS?

(when the judgment of the countries key achievements was the creation from the former socialist camp was of the European citizens’ initia- made according to the policy of “stick tive (it was launched on April 1st, and carrot” and, after becoming a 2012). Under this project, EU citi- member of the EU, certain countries zens will be able to make decisions violated their commitments). This, at the same level as the European in turn, led to the fact that the EU is Parliament. focusing on the self-manifestation of • Urban Lab (Estonia). Among their initiatives on the part of other coun- goals is working on new solutions tries to undertake Europeanization, for the improvement and diversi- not through orders from Brussels, but fication of urban life. To execute through their awareness of the great their projects, they attract sci- importance of implemented changes. entific, social and artistic meth- In the last decade, the EU focused its ods. One example of their activity attention on the participation of the is the transformation of a tunnel general population in the decision- for pedestrians, on Viru Street, in making process (in such a way, the Tallinn, into an art gallery. EU seeks to overcome the “deficit of democracy”). Here are some examples THE KEY ROLE OF MEDIA. The me- of the manifestation of civic engage- dia has the opportunity and tools to ment in the EU: expose the basic elements of post-So- • Comédie (France). The program vietness: cronyism, nepotism and in- was established in 2000 by two tolerance, etc. In countries that had associations (Geyser and AFIP). to struggle with corruption, intol- They have implemented nearly erance, and other manifestations of 400 projects in the environmental dishonesty in political or social be- field. haviour, the media played a crucial • The Initiative & Referendum In- role. In this case, representatives of stitute Europe (Germany) is a non- the media have truly become muck- profit association that coordinates rakers, a term applied to a group of the cooperation of leading experts American journalists in the early in the field of democratic theory. twentieth century, who actively in- Their goal is to conduct research vestigated corruption scandals im- and disseminate knowledge about plicating manifestations of nepotism the best practices of a modern di- and the government’s abuse of power rect democracy. The Institute was in the United States. Moreover, it is among the advisers and compil- muckrakers who laid the foundation ers of the Lisbon Treaty. One of its for today’s watchdog journalism,

140 10 RECOMMENDATIONS when a journalist takes the role and civil society and to the authorities responsibility for criticizing the au- on the need for institutional chang- thorities. The journalist, in this es and discursive practices in order case, truly becomes the “watchdog” to eliminate these elements. In 2011, of society. The effect of investigative a Group of eminent persons from the journalism on social and political life Council of Europe (it included Josch- in the West is very significant; me- ka Fischer, Javier Solana and others) dia activity fosters alterations in prepared a report aimed at fighting government circles and institutional the challenges, which are connected practices that are associated with the with increasing intolerance and dis- exposure of the dishonesty of politi- crimination167. They also emphasize cians. For example, in 2009, a group the key role of mass media to combat of British journalists from the The such negative trends, «we encourage Daily Telegraph published materials journalists and media professionals that indicated the misuse of public to exercise special care not to dissem- funds by members of the Parliament inate myths and stereotypes about of Great Britain. The publication of members of a particular ethnic or re- this information has led to a large ligious group.» The document calls number of resignations, dismissals, on governments to ensure that media public apologies and compensation of literacy programmes are included as costs. Moreover, the Parliament in- a core element in school curricula, itiated a series of political reforms and that children and young people that were aimed to change legislation are alerted to the expressions moti- for implementing tighter control vated by racist, xenophobic and anti- over the use of public funds. Another semitic or other related bias. example is the resonant case against The citizens of states on post-So- the former French President Jacques viet terrain have a high level of con- Chirac, connected to his 18-year fidence in the media. For instance, term as the mayor of Paris. He was in Ukraine, 46% of citizens ex- accused of embezzling public funds pressed their trust in the media.168 In and abuse of office. Most of the materials for the investigation were pre- 167 Living together. Combining diversity sented by journalists who carried out and freedom in 21st-century Europe, Report of the Group of Eminent Persons the investigation of Mr. Chirac’s vio- of the Council of Europe, 2011. . It is the media that is able to de- 168 Когут І., Ресурс недовіри, Известия, tect the main manifestations of 21 березня 2011 року. .

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Moldova, 16% stated that they high- and dizzily running around endless ly trust journalists and 59% gener- offices. ally trust media representatives.169 Another important advantage of Strength of the media could be ex- online communications is the ability plicitly perceived in a scandal that to reduce personal contact with offi- occurred in September 2012 in Geor- cials; most of whom, by using their gia. Georgian media showed foot- official position, establish unoffi- age, which recorded instances of vi- cial rates on certain services in the olence in the penitentiary system of public sector. It should also be noted the country. This event became one that the transfer of the government of the major reasons that led to the sector to a virtual space enhances its defeat of the ruling party «United transparency because this concept National Movement» in parliamenta- involves continuous interactive com- ry elections. munication between citizens (con- sumers of public services) and gov- IMPLEMENTATION OF E-GOVERN- ernment. The latter is constantly re- ANCE. Electronic Governance (e-Gov- porting to visitors of government ernment) is an effective mechanism web resources about its successes and for resolving a range of problems failures and responding to public re- that exist in the post-Soviet coun- quests, etc. For post-Soviet states, tries. The use of the Internet to pro- there is another significant advan- vide citizens with information and tage of e-governance, since it pre- services in the public sector (that is vents manipulation of facts and sta- the definition of e-government pro- tistics by state authorities that are vided by the UN) allows the reduc- often abused by Ukrainian officials. tion of extensive bureaucracy, inher- Undoubtedly, Estonia is the lead- ited from the Soviet system, while er in the use of advanced communi- significantly increasing the quality, cations in the public sector on the efficiency and the speed of the ser- post-Soviet terrain. Back in 1998, vice from public authorities. With e- the country approved the founda- governance, citizens can quickly ob- tional document “Principles of Es- tain or submit necessary certificates tonian Information Policy”, which and other documents to state institu- was updated in 2004. In 2007, “Esto- tions without wasting time in lines nian Information Society Strategy. 2013” came into force. In addition, the Estonian Parliament adopted 169 Barometer of Public Opinion, Institute of Public Policy, April 2012, Chisinau, several laws concerning information p. 36. . tion of personal data. The Estonian

142 10 RECOMMENDATIONS leadership undertook such consist- truly effective, it is also necessary to ent and robust steps in order to im- expand the audience of Internet us- plement Internet technologies in var- ers. For example, the European expe- ious areas of social and political life rience of creating Wi-Fi cities could and these efforts yielded substan- be useful for post-Soviet states. This tial results. According to the UN re- idea would be particularly relevant port “E-Government Survey 2012: E- in cities where there is large number Government for the People,” Estonia of youth communities. The younger was ranked among the top 20 coun- generation is more open to innova- tries on the dynamics of developing tion, and hence the electronic access e-governance. Recently, there has to government agencies could be in been progress in implementing ele- special demand. ments of e-governance in Moldova and Georgia. In the aforementioned EXCHANGE PROGRAMS BETWEEN UN report, in 2012, Moldova was REGIONS. In Soviet times, the mobil- placed on the 69th position compared ity of labor and social resources, in to the 80th in 2010. Even a better a wide area of the USSR, was quite trend in the application of informa- high. Ukrainian farmers took part tion technology in the public sphere in the Virgin lands campaign in the is demonstrated by Georgia. In 2010 Central Asia, Russian engineers had it was ranked 100th position, in 2012 been working in Ukraine and Moldo- it went up to 72nd position. Ukraine, van soldiers served in the Far East. on the contrary, showed the opposite With the collapse of the Union, this trend, by losing 14 positions in the type of social communication became ranking and moved down from 54th extinct along with the state, and the to 68th position. crisis of the 1990s induced the alien- So, e-government is an effective ation of the population even with- tool for optimizing the quantity of in specific nation states. The Soviet bureaucracy, which, besides provid- Man had lost his “grandiose and om- ing free public access and informa- nipotent” homeland. The post-Soviet tion services, also allows the over- Man has not obtained his homeland coming of corruption schemes in the yet and confined himself to the nar- public sector. With the introduc- row limits of the local world. Today, tion of e-government, officials will social mobility is limited to flows of lose their privileged position, which migrant workers from different vil- they had acquired in Soviet times, lages and towns to larger cities, par- while citizens get access to necessary ticularly in recent years, rapidly public services without bureaucrat- growing Kyiv. And to “unload”, over- ic hurdles. For e-government to be populated by Georgian standards,

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Tbilisi, President Saakashvili initi- imagery of their country. Particular ated the transfer of Parliament to attention should be given to the most Kutaisi. However, the level of inter- mobile populations, whose conscious- regional contacts in the post-Soviet ness has not come from the influence states is rather low. of an information cliche yet. First of Lack of experience in person- all, they are represented by children al communication with compatriots and students. The exchange programs from other regions of the country between universities, internships, opens a space for information ma- study trips, summer schools, tourist nipulation and imposing stereotypes travel are simple but effective steps that are freely used by many political that could assist in overcoming post- forces. This gives grounds to speak Soviet distrust and bias towards com- about the current division between, patriots. for example, West and East (in the Gradually, the understanding of case of Ukraine), and fuel adversary the necessity of interregional inte- attitudes in areas that exist in the gration is spreading within post-So- stage of ‘frozen conflicts’ (Georgia viet states. Mikheil Saakashvili has and Moldova). For example, the or- repeatedly emphasized that the re- dinary Ukrainian from the Eastern turn of Georgia’s breakaway regions region of the country imagines Lviv of South Ossetia and Abkhazia starts as a city where the streets are filled at the level of interpersonal contacts, with Banderas (developed by Soviet through which the common people of propaganda notion referring to the the breakaway regions will impar- extremist followers of the Ukrainian tially examine the practical achieve- far-right ideologist Stepan Bande- ments of the reforms in Georgia and ra), and many Moldovans tradition- lobby returning under the jurisdic- ally call Transnistrians at best ‘sepa- tion of Tbilisi. In Moldova, the ‘bot- ratists.’ tom-up solution’ for solving the To find common ground between Transnistrian conflict, i.e. raising citizens, who are trapped in stereo- the level of interpersonal communi- types, is extremely difficult and so- cation has been recently proposed by cial exclusion as well as interperson- experts Nicu Popescu and Leonid Li- al distrust hinders national develop- tra.170 In Ukraine, highly politicized ment and consolidation of society. division between East and West has Stimulating interpersonal contacts will assist in overcoming these post- 170 Litra L., and Popescu N., Transnis- Soviet phenomena. Frequent trips tria: A bottom-up solution, ECFR-IDIS, outside their own villages (town, re- 2012. .

144 10 RECOMMENDATIONS only exacerbated in recent years. for vacant positions in state and local The adoption of a controversial law government. on regional languages substantial- European practices applicable to ly contributed to the exacerbation of the process of competing for a posi- the issue. In solving the problems of tion in the public service are quite the consolidation of Ukrainian soci- simple. The document, issued by the ety and overcoming social exclusion, Civil Service Commission of Great one should count more on civil soci- Britain, proposed the following ety, and interpersonal communica- principles of selection for public of- tion rather than on a balanced state fice: the selection should take place policy. in an open and fair competition on the merit-based principle. Competi- CONTEST FOR PUBLIC OFFICES. tion for vacancies in the civil service The criteria in selecting a person for should be declared in the media, with a particular official position should the widest possible audience. The be a professional qualification and practice of commission for selection quality rather than family ties. This of candidates is noted for its trans- principle, which is widely accepted parency and openness. And a princi- in European democracies, encoun- ple of selection ensures that only the ters insurmountable hindrances in candidate who performs the proposed taking roots on the post-Soviet ter- work in the best way will receive the rain. Nepotism is common in govern- position. ment and almost impossible to erad- In the former Soviet republics, icate and, typical for post-Soviet these simple principles for hiring civ- countries cronyism is based on infor- il servants are still regarded as mere mal friendly relations, unlike fami- formalities. For instance, Georgia ly ties, even impossible to prove with has demonstrated certain advance- formal legal evidence. ment by substantially increasing the However, while eradicating en- number of young professionals, who tire dynasties of government of- were recruited through competitive ficials, including the executive selection, in the government. In Mol- branch, a balance should be main- dova, as a part of tender committees tained between punishment for mal- to select candidates for vacancies practice and evaluation of real mer- within the executive branch usually it of those who might be in the chair must be at least one independent ex- of civil servants due to family or oth- pert and representative of civil socie- er connections. Thus, the only effec- ty. For example, in autumn 2012, the tive mechanism, in this context, is traffic police attestation took place an open and transparent competition in Moldova and the certification

145 HOW TO GET RID OF POST-SOVIETNESS? committee included representative FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION. from the civil sector (resulting in Bribery is one of the main challeng- 50% of employees have not passed es that post-Soviet countries have to certification; only 10% were certi- face on their way to transformation. fied, 40% left on probation). According to the Corruption Percep- tion Index (Transparency Interna- In Ukraine, the new law “On Civ- tional), Georgia is currently ranked il Service”, adopted by Parliament 64th (this is noticeable progress of on the 17th November 2011, asserts the country if to compare that in that the commissions may include 2010, it was ranked at 68th posi- public servants and experts with ap- tion). This is not true of Moldova, propriate specializations. But most which in 2010 held 105th position of the activities of competitive com- and, in 2011, slipped to 112th. Even missions and principles of decision- more impressive are the trends in the making remain a mystery under sev- perception of corruption in Ukraine, en seals. in 2010, the state was at 134th posi- One of the reasons for rampant tion, and in 2011 went down to 152nd nepotism on the post-Soviet terrain position171. Thus, only Georgia has is the fact that civil servants are per- showed some progress in the field of ceived as a privileged caste, who can fighting against corruption. For in- get away from any persecution. How- stance, in 2010, Georgia held the first ever, in European countries, gov- place on the level of relative reduc- ernment officials are employees of tion of corruption according to the public institutions that are called Transparency International’s Global to work in the interest of citizens to Corruption Barometer. In 2012, the meet their needs. World Bank placed Georgia on the 12th place in the rating “Doing Busi- Openness and transparency in pub- ness” (in 2005, the country was on lic service, clear principles for the se- the 112th position). The experience lection of civil servants, fair compe- of Georgia is especially important be- tition for vacancies with the assis- cause this country has destroyed the tance of independent experts are es- common myth about the impossibil- sential elements that will further as- ity of eradicating corruption on the sist in transformation of post-Soviet bureaucratic systems in accordance 171 Corruption Perception Index, Trans- with European norms and practices. parency International, 2011, 2010, .

146 10 RECOMMENDATIONS post-Soviet terrain, and that corrup- • Limit the role of the state. The tion has become part of the regional strategy of the Georgian anti-cor- culture or even mentality. The World ruption struggle is based on the Bank has identified ten factors that understanding of the following allowed Georgia to end corruption principle: the higher the interven- (they could be useful for Ukraine and tion of government in the econo- Moldova on their struggle with this my, the higher the level of corrup- phenomenon)172: tion; • Exercise strong political will. • Adopt unconventional solutions. “Georgia without corruption” For instance, officials who were was one of the major slogans of accused of corruption had to pay Mikheil Saakashvili in 2003; big fines to the budget to avoid im- • Establish credibility early. The prisonment. Another method was Geor gian government has set a the use of extra-budgetary funds goal to demonstrate results of to increase salaries and the total fighting with corruption in eight dismissal of employees of the traf- months (to use the so-called win- fic police; dow of opportunity); • Develop a unity of purpose and co- • Launch a frontal assault on cor- ordinate closely. The crucial ele- ruption. Georgia decided not to ment that ensured the component fight against corruption gradual- of the success of reforms in Geor- ly and within specific sectors but gia was the ability of the President fast and on all fronts through a Saakashvili to create the team kind of blitzkrieg; that shared a common goal and the • Attract new staff. The Georgian same understanding of the need to government launched a search for eradicate corruption; young educated people with high • Tailor international experience ethical grounds that would not to local conditions. In particular, have connections to the previous the government of the President government; Saakashvili took into account the positive experience of the USA 172 Fighting Corruption in Public Service. and Italy. Moreover, reform- Chronicling of Georgia’s Reforms, ers have investigated the caus- The World Bank, Washington, 2012. es that led to the failure of fight- .

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that these methods have been also House) in Georgia could be consid- adapted to local conditions; ered as the symbol of debureaucrati- • Harness technology. Technologies zation. The institution gathered un- have reduced the number of direct der its roof such public agencies as contact between citizens and civil the Notary Chamber of Georgia, Na- servants; tional Agency of Public Registry, • Use communications strategically. National Agency of Public Registry, Georgian officials understood that the National Archives of Georgia institutional standards are insuf- and the National Enforcement Bu- ficient to eradicate corruption, it reau. Here, people can quickly and was important that ordinary Geor- comfortably receive more than 300 gians believed in the effectiveness services. of this struggle. Therefore, the But, it has to be emphasized that arrests of high-ranking officials reducing the number of officials were covered by broadcasters reg- must be followed by a number of oth- ularly. er significant measures. In particular, private initiatives and the devel- DEBUREAUCRATIZATION. Large- opment of small and medium busi- scale debureaucratization seems to nesses have to be encouraged. For be reasonable as an effective tool to the post-Soviet man, it is hard to fight corruption on the post-Soviet find confidence in his capabilities terrain, which is reducing the num- and initiate his own business. If bu- ber of officials and facilitating pro- reaucracy promotes the private ini- cedures for receiving certain doc- tiative instead of suppressing it and uments in government offices. A if all relevant procedures are trans- striking example is that of Geor- parent and open; the public service gia, a recognized leader in the fight will gradually lose its appeal to the against corruption among the for- public. And, those officials who are mer Soviet republics. The Georgian forced to cease doing business while government implemented maximum holding state positions, will seek new simplification of procedures in re- areas of employment with the same ceiving certificates, driver’s licens- level of income. The process of de- es, registration and other state ser- bureaucratization in the post-Soviet vices and hence changed the public states has to become the main task in perception of bureaucratic institu- order to ensure the spread of liberal tions and, even more, deprived many values, to fight against corruption officials of sources of illegal income. and to cease the trading of positions The Public Service Hall (Justice in public office.

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IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL STAND- the introduction of penalties for pla- ARDS. The process of rooting out el- giarism at the university level. ements of post-Sovietness is impos- Moreover, among the effective sible without changes in the systems methods in combating the manifes- of science and education. Recommen- tations of post-Sovietness is train- dations in this area could be summa- ing civil servants on basis of interna- rized in three main points: the de- tional education. A recent Georgian centralization of higher education, experience is a vivid example of the strict punishment of any form of successful implementation of this plagiarism at university level, and practice where representatives of the involvement of employees with the younger generation who received Western education and knowledge an education in Western universi- of foreign languages (especially Eng- ties entered the government after lish) in public administration. the Rose Revolution. Along with this Decentralizing higher education recommendation, the need of govern- and providing a broader autonomy of ment officials to learn English has to universities will allow them to raise be emphasized. English could be con- the level of self-organization that is sidered modern lingua franca in com- the antithesis of paternalism, one of munication on the international are- the main characteristics of post-So- na, especially on issues of the Euro- vietness. Moreover, academic, or- pean integration of post-Soviet coun- ganizational and financial independ- tries. In this context, it is necessary ence of universities from the Minis- that civil servants and parliamentar- try of Education and Science will en- ians involved in process of the Euro- sure better implementation of the pean integration of their countries, Bologna system of education. take the appropriate test on their Participation in the Bologna pro- knowledge of English within the in- cess, in turn, will allow universities ternationally recognized systems of to enter the European Higher Edu- examination (IELTS, TOEFL, etc.). cation Area (EHEA), which adopted a single system of degrees and academic qualifications, a high level of mobility and exchanges between educational institutions to accelerate a process of Europeanization and socialization. It should be noted that one of cornerstone of participation in the Bologna system of education is

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