The Political Representation of the Poor
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The Political Representation of the Poor by Karen Long Jusko A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) in The University of Michigan 2008 Doctoral Committee: Professor John E. Jackson, Co-Chair Professor Christopher H. Achen, Princeton University, Co-Chair Professor Robert J. Franzese Jr. Professor James M. Lepkowksi Karen Long Jusko c All rights reserved. 2008 For my Mum and Dad, and for Ryan, with love and gratitude. ii Acknowledgements The offices and charges of the society should be apportioned for the good of the society itself, and in such mode that difference in degree or standing should not interfere with unanimity and good-will. It is most important that office bearers be appointed with due prudence and discretion, and each one’s charge carefully mapped out, in order that no members may suffer harm. The common funds must be administered with strict honesty, in such a way that a member may receive assistance in proportion to his necessities. Rerum Novarum (1891) Christopher Achen encouraged me to pursue questions about the common good with rigor and clarity, and it is because of Chris’s early enthusiasm for my research question – how do electoral rules affect the poor? – that I have found my research agenda. I am most grateful for his guidance and support, and hope that my research reflects the best of his mentorship. I would also like to acknowledge a few others who have contributed to this project in important ways. I hope they recognize their contributions in the pages that follow, and that I’ve competently reflected their insights and addressed their questions. To this group, I extend my heartfelt gratitude: My dissertation committee, John Jackson, my dissertation committee co-chair, Robert Franzese, and Jim Lepkowski. Larry Bartels, who provided an intellectual and physical home for me in the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics (CSDP) at Princeton University, and who en- iii couraged my interest in questions about the relationship between democratic values and democratic practice through his own research on economic inequality in the U.S.. The faculty in the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, especially Nancy Burns, Jenna Bednar, Don Kinder, Ken Kollman, and Scott Page. The faculty in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Pub- lic and International Affairs at Princeton University, especially Jason Lyall, Nolan McCarty, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Tom Romer, Jessica Trounstine, and Joshua Tucker (now at New York University). The faculty in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, especially Joseph Fletcher and Neil Nevitte. My fellow CSDP fellows, Ted Carmines, Patrick Egan, Daniel Gingerich, Tasha Philpot, and Robert Putnam, as well as fellows from earlier years, especially Hans Noel and Bethany Albertson. Fellow graduate students at the University of Michigan and Princeton, who were often my harshest critics and who I am proud to count among my closest friends, especially Dan Corstange, Sarah Croco, Katie Drake, Tom Flores, Stuart Jordan, Gil Krakowksy, Jonathan Ladd, Gabriel Lenz, Keena Lispitz, Irfan Nooruddin, Andrew Owen, and Joel Simmons. My new colleagues in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, especially Jim Fearon, Terry Moe, David Laitin, and Jonathan Rodden. Organizations that offered their financial support, specifically the National Science Foundation (NSF), which supported my first year in Princeton as a visiting graduate student through the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) program, the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), which pro- iv vided a doctoral fellowship and fellowship supplement, the National Poverty Center, the Luxembourg Income Study, and the Department of Political Science at the Uni- versity of Michigan. My most important expressions of gratitude, of course, are made in the dedication of this project. v Table of Contents Dedication ..................................... ii Acknowledgements ............................... iii List of Figures .................................. vii List of Tables ................................... viii Chapter 1. Electoral Politics and Poverty Relief ............... 1 2. How Electoral Rules Create Incentives to Represent Low- Income Citizens ............................ 22 3. Measuring Poverty Relief ...................... 41 4. How Changing Electoral Incentives Can Help the Poor ... 79 5. Electoral Politics and Poverty Relief in Contemporary Demo- cratic Societies ............................. 101 6. Conclusion: Looking Ahead ..................... 143 References ..................................... 148 vi List of Figures 1.1 IncomeInequalityandPovertyResponsiveness............ 9 1.2 PowerResourcesandPovertyResponsiveness............. 13 1.3 PathDependenceandPovertyResponsiveness............ 15 2.1 DistrictStructureUnderDifferentElectoralRules.......... 30 2.2 PolicyOutcomesUnderDifferentElectoralRules........... 38 3.1 SocialTransfersandMarketIncome.................. 67 3.2 SocialTransfersandMarketIncome:ParameterEstimates..... 69 3.3 ComparingPovertyRelief ....................... 71 3.4 PovertyReliefandConventionalMeasuresofSocialPolicy ..... 73 4.1 The Geographic Distribution of Low-Income Citizens in Italy, 1988-96 80 4.2 The Geographic Distribution of Low-Income Citizens in Germany, 1984-1990 and 1994-2001 ........................ 81 4.3 PovertyReliefandIncumbentPartiesinGermanyandItaly .... 97 4.4 Poverty Relief in Other EU Partner Countries, 1982-2002 ...... 98 5.1 ElectoralPowerandPovertyResponsiveness............. 113 vii List of Tables 2.1 CitizenVotingRulesUnderDifferentPolicyProposals ....... 27 3.1 LISObservations............................ 46 3.2 RelativePovertyandConventionalPovertyThresholds ....... 52 3.3 Summary of Antipoverty Policies in the European Community . 53 3.4 Support Received by Low-Income Citizens from Different Types of SocialPolicies.............................. 61 3.5 Support Received by Very Low-Income Citizens from Different Types ofSocialPolicies............................. 62 3.6 PovertyReliefinDevelopedDemocracies............... 74 3.7 Market Income Manipulation: Active Labor Market Programs . 76 4.1 ElectoralReformTime-Line...................... 83 4.2 Support for Italy’s 1993 Referendum on Electoral Reform, by Region 85 4.3 Allocation of Seats, Before and After Italy’s Electoral Reform . 87 4.4 AllocationofSeats,BeforeandAfterGermanReunification .... 91 4.5 Change in Responsiveness, Before and After Italy’s Electoral Reform 93 4.6 Change in Responsiveness, Before and After German Reunification . 95 5.1 Single-MemberDistrictSystems.................... 105 5.2 VaryingDistrictSize-MagnitudeSystems............... 107 5.3 PR “Highest Average” and “Largest Remainder” Seat Allocations . 108 5.4 MixedElectoralSystems........................ 109 5.5 SeatsElectedbyaLow-IncomeVotingBloc ............. 111 5.6 ElectoralPowerandPovertyResponsiveness............. 115 5.7 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Canada . 117 5.8 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in the UK . 118 5.9 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in the US . 120 5.10 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Australia 121 5.11 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in France . 123 5.12 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Ireland . 125 5.13 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Belgium . 126 5.14 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Finland . 127 5.15 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Luxembourg 127 5.16 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Norway . 129 5.17 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Spain . 130 viii 5.18 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Switzerland 132 5.19 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Austria . 134 5.20 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Denmark 136 5.21 Districts and Seats Won by a Low-Income Voting Bloc in Sweden . 138 ix Chapter 1. Electoral Politics and Poverty Relief 1.1 Introduction Late one evening in the early 1990s, the former Prime Minister Benedetto Craxi was met by a large crowd outside the exclusive Roman hotel where he lived. Huddled beneath his overcoat, and pelted with coins, Craxi heard the protesters’ angry cries: “Bettino, vuoi pure queste?” “Bettino, you want these too?” The immediate source of the crowd’s anger was Craxi’s claim, when accused with accepting over $30 million in bribes, that bribes were simply a part of politics (Waters 1994). That Craxi, the long-time leader of the Italian Socialist Party, came to sym- bolize the excesses of the tangentopoli (‘bribeville’) scandals is indicative of equally unprincipled social policy: “Welfare capitalism Italian-style” concentrated benefits within the powerful (unionized) industrial sectors, and other “protected” categories (e.g. old age and survivors contributory pensions), and left many vulnerable groups without support. There were few family benefits or services, nor was there any sup- port for the young and unemployed, the self-employed, or for those who had been unemployed for long periods of time (Ferrera 2004). The absence of a national policy to provide for income support was especially troubling to observers, and in its ab- sence, civil invalidity pensions became both an important source of poverty relief,