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Islands of Good Government: Explaining Successful Corruption Control in Two Spanish Cities

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Islands of Good Government: Explaining Successful Corruption Control in Two Spanish Cities Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 128–139 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i2.2730 Article Islands of Good Government: Explaining Successful Corruption Control in Two Spanish Cities Eliška Drápalová 1,* and Fabrizio Di Mascio 2 1 Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, 41123 Gothenburg, Sweden; E-Mail: [email protected] 2 Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning, University of Turin, 10125 Turin, Italy; E-Mail: [email protected] * Corresponding author Submitted: 17 December 2019 | Accepted: 4 April 2020 | Published: 28 May 2020 Abstract Between 2012 and 2018, Spanish public opinion has been shaken by a seemingly endless series of corruption scandals, to the point that corruption has become one of the main long-term concerns of the Spanish population, according to nation-wide surveys. Despite the sharp rise in corruption scandals within local authorities, there are Spanish cities that have managed to limit corruption and build a transparent and efficient government, which stand out as islands of integrity and good governance. This article qualitatively investigates two cities in Spain—Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès— which, despite being in a region with comparatively lower quality of government, have managed to successfully control corruption. We argue that the key to success is the administrative reorganization prompted by the appointment of city managers that institutionalized professional management. Findings also have implications for practitioners, meaning that complex anti-corruption legislative frameworks will not work within an overburdened administration unless the adminis- trative structure is reformed. Keywords corruption; quality of government; integrity; political competition; Spain; transparency Issue This article is part of the issue “Fighting Corruption in the Developed World: Dimensions, Patterns, Remedies” edited by Fabrizio Di Mascio (University of Turin, Italy) and Simona Piattoni (University of Trento, Italy). © 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction gal toolbox,’ which primes certain tools such as whistle- blower protection, conflict of interest regulation, staff ro- Over the last two decades, interest in anticorruption has tation, lobbying for transparency, and so forth. Yet, the gained a global dimension through the signing of multi- most common measures recommended in the current ple international conventions and the emergence of a se- international anti-corruption toolkit have not proved to ries of transnational actors (UN, OECD, Council of Europe, be effective in reducing corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi & European Commission, and Transparency International, Dadašov, 2017). among the others). Anticorruption has become an in- This finding suggests looking at anti-corruption tools dustry (Sampson, 2010), meaning that there is a mar- in a broader context by taking specific institutional di- ketplace of initiatives, organized and prioritized by in- mensions into account. In the absence of a number of ternational organizations acting like ‘integrity warriors’ empowering institutional factors, the set of specific le- with considerable resources and policy reach (de Sousa, gal instruments promoted by the international integrity Hindess, & Larmour, 2009). The recommendations is- warriors is not likely to work (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dadašov, sued by these actors and their monitoring of national 2016). Our research focuses on professional bureaucra- anti-corruption measures have been focused on a ‘le- cies, which have long been recognized as an important Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 128–139 128 institutional factor in curbing corruption (Rauch & Evans, and the deterrents imposed by the state and soci- 2000). Yet, we lack empirical studies that explore the ety (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). In past decades, the ef- ways through which administrative reforms can enhance fort to control corruption by curbing opportunities and the professionalism of bureaucracy. In particular, re- strengthening legal and normative constraints has grown search on institutional factors that support control of cor- exponentially worldwide. Still, there seem to be few suc- ruption at the local level of government remains sparse cessful cases where anti-corruption programmes have (Beeri & Navot, 2013). been effectively implemented. For a growing number We address this gap in the literature by analysing of scholars, the failure of anti-corruption initiatives lies the administrative reforms in two Spanish municipalities. in the inappropriate theoretical foundations that in- The implementation of these reforms represents two ‘is- form their design. Anticorruption efforts are influenced lands of good government’ in a country that is marked mainly by principal–agent approaches which assume by widespread corruption at the local level (Jiménez, that corruption is solvable with policies to reinforce Villoria, & Quesada-Garcia, 2012). Previous research on transparency, monitoring, and sanctioning of public offi- corruption in Spanish municipalities highlighted the role cials who manage public resources. Critics have argued of political stability as a factor that may explain varia- that this assumption is flawed, especially in contexts tion in corruption practices (Jiménez, Quesada-Garcia, & ridden with systemic corruption where collective action Villoria, 2014). This finding is not consistent with most problems hinder the implementation of anti-corruption of the comparative literature on anticorruption reform, interventions (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013, 2019). which argued that incentives for the implementation of However, Marquette and Peiffer (2019) and others high- anti-corruption reforms are generated by sustained polit- lighted that collective action approach does not help anti- ical competition (Schnell, 2018). To address this inconsis- corruption practitioners decide what to do differently, tency, we identify under what conditions a low level of or how. The anti-corruption field has suffered from the political competition may support the launch and imple- quest for one overarching theory whereas researchers mentation of reform initiatives to raise the level of pro- and practitioners should pay more attention to the focus fessionalism in local bureaucracies. and locus of corruption, that is the different types and In doing so, we draw on two strands of literature. contexts in which corruption occurs (Heywood, 2017). First, we build on those few studies in the field of political The article joins the call for research underscoring science, which highlight the virtuous circles activated by targeted interventions as it focuses on appropriate con- the duration of political leadership; second, we build on texts, where political will is available to implement the in- those accounts of public management reform that con- stitutional fixes needed to curb corruption (Marquette & sider micro-level factors, that is changes at the level of Peiffer, 2018). The starting point of our research is the es- individual organizations (Ongaro & Valotti, 2008). The fo- tablished institutionalist approach to good governance, cus on micro-level factors allows for variation across in- which emphasises the role of professional bureaucracies dividual organizations at the subnational level in coun- in reducing the risks of corruption (Dahlström, Lapuente, tries that are marked by the existence of a larger, macro & Teorell, 2012). The expectation from this approach is institutional framework which acts as a barrier to the that in cases where bureaucrats are agents of their polit- implementation of reform. More specifically, our find- ical principals, they do not inhibit politicians’ opportunis- ings very much support previous research suggesting the tic actions. Conversely, in cases where bureaucrats act as importance of leadership by city managers for the suc- ‘trustees,’ they keep politicians’ abuse and misbehaviour cessful implementation of reform in local government in check. This approach draws on the agent–fiduciary (Nalbandian, 2006; Nelson & Svara, 2015). dichotomy developed by Majone (2001) who identified The remainder of the article unfolds as follows. In two different logics of delegation: One logic is informed the next section, we provide more detail on our theo- by the demand for policy-relevant expertise, in which retical framework. Then, we present the background of political leaders delegate executive functions to agents this study, namely the institutional patterns of Spanish within relatively constraining control mechanisms; the local government. We outline the case selection strategy second logic is guided by the demand for credible com- and methodology before tracking the progress of public mitments, meaning that leaders deliberately insulate management reform in two municipalities, Alcobendas their ‘trustees’ so that they may implement policies to and Sant Cugat del Vallès, which stand out for their suc- which their leaders could not credibly commit. cess in administrative modernization. Finally, we discuss We focus on the fiduciary relationship between may- our findings and consider their implications for both re- ors and city managers in local government. In past searchers and practitioners. decades, the post of city manager has been introduced in the organizational charts of municipalities acting
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