2020 Spruit Public Administration

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2020 Spruit Public Administration Hoe wordt privatiseren een succes Succesfactoren voor privatisering in Nederland, Verenigd Koninkrijk en Italië Master Thesis MSc Public Administration, IEG track 31 Augustus 2020 Student: Daniël Spruit Studentnummer: S1066420 Supervisor: dr. Jelmer Schalk Tweede lezer: dr. Petra van den Bekerom Universiteit Leiden Instituut Bestuurskunde 1 2 Master Thesis voor de graad van Master of Science (MSc) Universiteit Leiden Instituut Bestuurskunde Den Haag 3 4 Voorwoord Ik heb deze thesis geschreven aan het einde van mijn master Public Administration. Ik heb veel geleerd gedurende de studie en ben veel te weten gekomen over verschillende bestuurskundige fenomenen. Van deze intrigerende fenomenen heb ik er één gekozen om nader te onderzoeken, namelijk het fenomeen van privatiseren. Ik heb voor dit onderwerp gekozen omdat het van begin af aan mijn interesse opwekte door de discussie over publiek en privaat. Ook later, wanneer het onderwerp af en toe ter sprake kwam, wist het nog steeds te boeien en ik ontdekte dat ik me afvroeg waarom het onderwerp eigenlijk steeds meer naar de achtergrond is verdwenen. Dit raadsel is wat me uiteindelijk ertoe heeft gezet om deze thesis te schrijven. Deze thesis is bedoeld voor degenen die interesse hebben in het onderwerp privatiseren en daar meer over willen weten. Met name studenten en ambtenaren kunnen hun voordeel doen met de inzichten uit deze thesis. Het is een lange en zware weg geweest en ik wil graag de volgende mensen bedanken: mijn begeleider dr. Jelmer Schalk voor al zijn advies, behulpzaamheid en geduld, dr. Petra van den Bekerom die de verantwoordelijkheid van tweede lezer op zich neemt en alle respondenten die de tijd hebben genomen om te helpen bij dit onderzoek. Daarnaast wil ik in het bijzonder graag mijn ouders en vriendin bedanken voor alle begrip en steun. Daniël Spruit Augustus 2020 5 6 Inhoudsopgave LIJST VAN TABELLEN 10 ABSTRACT 11 1. INLEIDING 12 1.1 Algemene inleiding 12 1.2 Voorgesteld onderzoek 14 1.3 Relevantie 16 1.4 Opzet onderzoek 16 2. THEORETISCH KADER 17 2.1 Overzicht van onderwerpen 17 2.2 Privatisering 17 2.2.1 Definitie privatisering 17 2.2.2 Verwante termen 19 2.2.3 Privatisering in verschillende bestuurskundige stromingen 19 2.2.4 Variabelen die de mate van privatisering beïnvloeden 20 2.2.5 Historische trend privatisering 21 2.3 Succes van privatisering 22 2.3.1 Definitie van succes 22 2.4 Voor- en nadelen van privatisering 22 2.4.1 Voordelen van privatisering 22 2.4.2 Nadelen van privatisering 24 2.5 Succesfactoren voor privatisering 26 2.6 Ordening van succesfactoren 30 2.7 Landsafhankelijk en casusafhankelijk 31 2.8 Transportsector 33 3. CONTEXT 35 3.1 Privatisering in de transportsector 35 3.2 Nederland 35 3.2.1 Treinvervoer 35 3.2.2 Stads- en streekvervoer 37 3.2.3 Vliegvervoer 38 3.3 Verenigd Koninkrijk 39 3.3.1 Treinvervoer 39 3.3.2 Stads- en streekvervoer 40 3.3.3 Vliegvervoer 41 7 3.4 Italië 42 3.4.1 Treinvervoer 42 3.4.2 Stads- en streekvervoer 42 3.4.3 Vliegvervoer 43 4. METHODIEK 44 4.1 Selectie van landen 44 4.2 Selectie van casussen 45 4.3 Operationaliseren succes(factoren) 46 4.3.1 Voordelen en nadelen 47 4.3.2 De Financiële factor, Kwaliteitsfactor en Sociale factor 49 4.3.3 Operationaliseren succesfactoren 52 5. ANALYSE 56 5.1 Resultaten interviews 56 5.2 Analyse casussen Nederland 58 5.2.1 NS & ProRail (1995 tot heden) 58 5.2.2 Connexxion (2007 tot heden) 60 5.2.3 Qbuzz (periode 2008 tot heden) 61 5.2.4 KLM (1996 tot heden) 62 5.2.5 Succesfactoren in Nederland 62 5.3 Analyse casussen Verenigd Koninkrijk 63 5.3.1 British Rail & Railtrack (1989 tot heden) 63 5.3.2 London Buses (1994 tot heden) 64 5.3.3 British Airways (1987 tot heden) 65 5.3.4 Succesfactoren Verenigd Koninkrijk 66 5.4 Analyse casussen Italië 66 5.4.1 Alitalia (2008 tot heden) 66 5.4.2 Succesfactoren Italië 67 5.5 Verschillen tussen de landen 67 6. CONCLUSIES EN AANBEVELINGEN 70 6.1 Beantwoorden van de onderzoeksvraag 70 6.2 Discussie 71 6.2.1 contributie & limitatie 71 6.3 Aanbevelingen 72 6.3.1 aanbevelingen voor praktijk 72 6.3.2 aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek 72 REFERENTIES 73 BIJLAGE A: CASUSSEN PRIVATISERING 82 BIJLAGE B: INTERVIEWVRAGEN 86 BIJLAGE C: LOGBOEK 88 8 BIJLAGE D: DATABRONNEN 89 1 NS/ProRail 89 2 Connexxion 89 3 Qbuzz 89 4 KLM 89 5 British Rail/Network Rail 89 6 London Buses 89 7 British Airways 90 8 Alitalia 90 BIJLAGE E: INTERVIEWVERSLAGEN 91 Qbuzz 91 Connexxion 96 ProRail 102 NS 109 Ministerie van I & W (1) 115 Ministerie van I & W (2) 119 9 Lijst van tabellen Tabel 1: Voordelen van privatisering. 23 Tabel 2: Nadelen van privatisering. 25 Tabel 3: Succesfactoren voor privatisering, op volgorde van impact. 31 Tabel 4: Gekozen casussen. 46 Tabel 5: Samengevatte voor- en nadelen van privatisering. 47 Tabel 6: Geïnterviewden. 48 Tabel 7: Coderingscategorieën. 49 Tabel 8: Drie factoren en de operationalisering daarvan. 52 Tabel 9: Casus NS & ProRail. 60 Tabel 10: Casus Connexxion. 61 Tabel 11: Casus Qbuzz. 62 Tabel 12: Casus KLM. 62 Tabel 13: Casus British Rail & Railtrack. 64 Tabel 14: Casus London Buses. 65 Tabel 15: Casus British Airways. 66 Tabel 16: Casus Alitalia. 67 Tabel 17: Landsverschillen wat betreft de factoren. 69 Tabel 18: Casussen transportsector Nederland. 82 Tabel 19: Casussen transportsector Verenigd Koninkrijk. 82 Tabel 20: Casussen transportsector Italië. 84 10 Abstract The popularity of privatization has dropped dramatically over the last decade. During the early days of privatization it was said to bring many advantages. Over time however, many studies have discussed this and found that this is not always the case. A lot of research has been done on the subject of privatization, however most of the studies focused on describing the process and how it should be implemented. The purpose of this study is to try and explain the factors influencing the success of privatization. This study attempts to clarify what factors influence the success of privatizations, once it is clear what factors there are it should maximize the chances of success of future privatizations. All factors known to influence the success of privatization will be summarized, ranked in order of importance and will be tested to see if they differ between countries. The study is a comparative study between countries selected using the most similar design method. Several cases are selected per country, however due to constraints only public transport cases in those countries are examined. The data is gathered by conducting a literature study combined with in-depth interviews with experts who are knowledgeable about privatization. There are two kinds of interviews: interviews with individuals from privatized organizations who have experienced/knowledge about a privatized organization to gather in- depth data and also there will be interviews with individuals tasked with regulating/monitoring the transport sector to gather data on the results of privatization. The results show that all the factors do indeed influence the success of privatization. Also in all cases of full privatization the result was worse than cases where partial privatization was chosen. It can be concluded that due to many factors influencing the success of privatization, it is impossible to fully privatize successfully and therefore partial privatization (or public-private partnership) should be chosen. 11 1. Inleiding 1.1 Algemene inleiding Privatisering is een bestuurskundig fenomeen. Door de jaren heen heeft de populariteit ervan een flinke ontwikkeling meegemaakt. Vóór de jaren tachtig werd er niet of nauwelijks geprivatiseerd, of werd het althans niet zo genoemd. In de jaren tachtig werd privatisering geïntroduceerd als een breed inzetbare oplossing voor de toenmalige problemen met de te grote en trage overheid. Dit leidde tot een grote populariteit van privatiseren. Maar de laatste paar jaren is de populariteit ervan aan het afnemen (Stellinga, 2012). Privatisering wordt tegenwoordig nog maar zelden genoemd in het politieke debat dat in Nederland gevoerd wordt. Er zijn zelfs meerdere voorbeelden van deprivatisering, oftewel het terugdraaien van een eerdere privatisering (Diekman, 2017; Kishimoto, 2018). Hoe kan het dat het eens zo populaire privatisering zo in populariteit is afgenomen en vindt deze ontwikkeling ook plaats in het buitenland? Privatisering is binnen de bestuurskunde en politiek geïntroduceerd als middel om overheidsorganisaties efficiënter te laten functioneren. Goodman en Loveman (1991) definiëren privatisering als een verzameling activiteiten, gericht op het overdragen van de levering van goederen en diensten van de publieke naar de private sector . Goodman en Loveman plaatsen daarbij echter de kanttekening dat het fenomeen privatisering niet scherp afgebakend kan worden. Er zijn dan ook meerdere definities en beschrijvingen in omloop. Sommigen, zoals Smith Nightingale en Pindus (1997), gaan uit van een bredere definitie waaronder ook uitbesteding van goederen, diensten en programma’s naar de private sector valt. Privatiseren kan voordelen met zich meebrengen, zoals dat het de overheid klein en efficiënter houdt (Kuiper et al., 2012) en dat een concurrerende markt ertoe leidt dat de geprivatiseerde organisatie wordt aangezet tot innovatie en prijsverlaging (Stellinga, 2012; Veraart, 2013). Verschillende voordelen kunnen van toepassing zijn op dezelfde casus. De voordelen zijn als argumenten te gebruiken om een privatisering uit te willen voeren. In theorie kan privatisering dus meerdere voordelen met zich meebrengen, maar ook in de praktijk blijkt dat privatisering positief kan uitpakken. Guriev en Megginson (2005) en Marcelin en Mathur (2015) tonen aan dat privatisering kan leiden tot een hogere productiviteit en andere positieve effecten die de samenleving ten goede komen. Helaas is privatisering lang niet altijd een succes. Tegenwoordig is er zelfs een trend van deprivatisering te zien om mislukte privatiseringen terug te draaien (Diekman, 2017; Kishimoto, 2018).
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