INVESTMENT, REPROCUREMENT AND FRANCHISE CONTRACT LENGTH IN THE BRITISH RAILWAY INDUSTRY* Luisa Affuso a and David Newbery Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge This Draft: May 2001 Abstract This paper studies the interaction between repeated auctions of rail franchises of different lengths, uncertainty, and incentives for investment in rolling stock, following the privatisation of British Rail. Theoretical predictions are tested empirically using a unique panel of data. Theory suggests that short franchise lengths reduce incentives to invest in specific assets. Our empirical results suggest that competition and strategic behaviour at the re-procurement stage can create incentives for delayed investment. Investing just before the end of the franchise enhances the incumbent’s probability of having the contract re-awarded and provides it with a first-mover advantage, while raising the entry cost for other potential bidders. JEL Classification: L22, L92, D23, C23 Keywords: Railways, Investment, Contracts, Panel Data * We are very grateful to Manuel Arellano, Richard Green, Jonathan Köhler, Chris Nash, Volker Nocke, Richard Price, Roger Price, Mike Waterson, Helen Weeds, Melvyn Weeks and the participants to the CEPR meeting of December 2000 for very helpful comments and suggestions. Many thanks to Chris Bowdler and Philip Gaudoin for their valuable research assistance, and to the ESRC for sponsoring this research, Grant No. R000237928. The usual disclaimer applies. a Corresponding author: Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DD, United Kingdom. E-mail:
[email protected]. 1. Introduction The 1993 Rail Act resulted in a dramatic restructuring and subsequent privatisation of British Rail (BR).