Allama Iqbal Open University Islamabad Tgan- COURSE DEVELOPMENT TEAM Prof

CHANGING DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: FROM BIPOLAR TO UNIPOLAR WORLD

Directorate of Information and Short Term Educational Programmes Allama Iqbal Open University Islamabad tgan- COURSE DEVELOPMENT TEAM Prof. Javaid lqbal Syed Syed Riffat Hussain Amanullah Memon

COURSE DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR Amanullah Memon

STEPS TEAM

Prof. Javaid lqbal Syed Vice Chancellor

Qasim Haider •Director Information & STEPS

•Muhammad Umar Farooq Assistant Director STEPS

Riaz Ahmed Materials Coordinator STEPS

S. Athar Hussain

ljaz Ahmed Designer

Directorate of Information and Short Term Educational Programmes Allama lqbal Open University Islamabad OP' CONTENTS

FOREWORD vii

COURSE DESCRIPTION

PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES Amanullah Memon 1. PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH USA a. First Phase (1947-1954) Reading 1: S. M Burke 11 Reading 2: G. W. Choudhry 29 Reading 3: Venkatramani 35

(b) Second Phase (1955-1962) Reading 4: S. M. Burke 53 Reading 5: Venkatramani 99

(c) Third Phase (1963-1969) Reading 6: S. M. Burke 105 Reading 7: G. W. Choudhry 109 (d) Fourth Phase (1970-1977) Reading 8: G. W. Choudhry 113 (e) Fifth Phase (1978 todate) Reading 9: Tahir Amin and Muhammad Islam 121

2. PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH FORMER UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (a) Pak-Soviet Relations before 1954 Reading 10: S. M. Burke 133 Reading 11: G. W. Choudhry 137 (b) Pak-USSR Relations after 1955 Reading 12: G. W. Choudhry 145 Reading 13: S. M. Burke 159 (c) Pak-Soviet Relations from 1965-1970) Reading 14: G. W. Choudhry 173 Reading 15: S. M. Burke 183 (d) Pak-Soviet Relations after 1970 Reading 16: G. W. Choudhry 187 Reading 17: Syed Riffat Hussain 195 (e) Pak-Soviet Relations in the Wake of Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan Reading 18: S. M. Burke 207 Reading 19: Syed Riffat Hussain 212 (v) 1 FOREWORD

The AIlama Iqbal Open University since its inception in 1974 has rendered valuable contribution in dissemination of learning in a wide range of studies through its framework of Distance Learning System.

Now, on the eve of its 20th anniversary, the AIOU cherishes to explore new possibilities by introducing exclusive professional study programme titled "Short-Term Educational Programmes (STEPS)" without traditions of degree- oriented and period-bound semesters and sequence of examinations.

These STEPS Courses are progressive in character and open new avenues for further indepth studies in respective disciplines. Such academic activities are successfully in practice in the universities and colleges of many developed nations. Thus AIOU STEPS provides this facility to professionals and other interested groups in Pakistan as well.

The study material contained in the given book is only to help enhance your working proficiency and knowledge pertaining to the profession and therefore does not entail any formal examination. However, the Evaluation Paper is supplemented with the purpose of self-monitoring at the student's end.

I would put on record my appreciation for efforts of STEPS Committee which made the dream of Short-Term Educational Programmes come true.

(Prof. Javaid Iqbal Syed) Vice-Chancellor ...

i COURSE DESCRIPTION

CHANGING DYNAMICS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: FROM BIPOLAR TO UNIPOLAR WORLD

By Amanullah Memon , fter the disunion of the Soviet Union, U.S.A. has emerged as a sole politico-military power of the world. The demise of Soviet Union paved A the way for the new international order of unipolarity and hence the post 1945 phenomena of the two super powers confrontation, called Bipolarity, ceases to exist. During the era of bipolarity for a considerable period (1954-1962), Pakistan remained allied ally, of the pro-western bloc. By aligning itself with one of the existing roles vis-a-vis India, Afghanistan and also against the ideological threat of communism. With the end of bipolarity new realities have emerged on global and regional levels have compelled the world actors to reevaluate their- foreign policy behaviour. The WARSAW Pact, a counter balance to NATO, was dissolved in 1989. The NATO was established in 1949 at the juncture when the

Soviet armies were at the Elbe and invasion of Western Europe seemed imminent. Today, Soviet armies stand 1000 miles to the East, the number of U.S. troops in Europe is being drastically reduced, and Germany's unification and growing power have over thrown the unspoken premix of Atlantic institution.'

These views reveal a significant change in the world order of Post Cold War era: In consequence of the liquidation of the WARSAW pact NATO has lost its relevance for certain powers of the Europe. Some NATO members question the relevance of spending huge amount of money on security when enemy has disappeared."2

The idea of a European Community (E.C.) is gaining a momentum. In this regard two different trends are rapidly emerging in the European political horizon. One is the Franco-German axis which pleads for the European Community. They are trying to establish a bloc of European countries which • includes the newly emerged East European democracies. While the other group of countries which can be termed as the Anglo-American axis, intends to maintain the status quo, which indicates that it wants to see a European bloc with the dominant role of the U.S. This situation has created doubts regarding the future of NATO: While the Americans are also suspicious of the true intentions behind the new Franco-German proposal for a joint bridge under the political control of the EC (European Community) and the US administration could not accept a situation where NATO might be bypassed or duplicated by a separate European army established under the aegis of the EC or the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe).4

These facts indicate that the end of the Cold War syndrome has proved a watershed in the world history. After the end of Cold War the geo-political system has gone under seminal change redrawing the world map to a considerable extent. A new equilibrium of power has emerged. Several new independent states have appeared in the Europe and Asia. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the emergence of several independent states have posed a new threat for the peace in Europe. The independent Central Asian Republics have given the new dimensions to the geo-political affairs of Asia. As the Central Asian Republics are predominantly Muslim populated, some Western politicians who consider 'Islam_ as a rival belief system to western liberalism, and democracy...- are cautious about the emerging wave of Islamic fundamentalism. A former U.S. Vice President, Dan Qual even did not hesitate to declare radical Islamism as dangerous as the Communism and Nazism were!' Senator Pressler has expressed his fears about the growing Islamic fundamentalism from. Pakistan to the Muslim countries of South Asia, Middle East in general and to the Central Asian States in particular.'

With the failure of communism in the U.S.S.R. the doctrine of Controlled Economy has lost its relevance, and in some Communist Countries it has been replaced by the doctrine of Open Market Economy. In several Communist countries including China the free market economic reforms have been introduced which aim to liberalize the economy and polity. So it seems that the Post Cold war world has brought the ideological victory of the Western political and economic liberalism over the Socialist doctrine. These realities have compelled Francis Fakuyama to comment

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.8

These views give an impression that the end of cold war has brought peace and tranquillity in the world and all the dialectical conflicts in global politics have been vanished. But the situation, however, is not that simple. In this regard there are still several questions to be asked and answered about the future of the Unipolar World and the supremacy of the U.S.A.

Does this Unipolar Order possess adequate strength to perpetuate? Or will it be translated into a more complex phenomena of the multipolarity? These and other similar questions need answers. Henry Kissinger has expressed his doubts regarding the perpetuality of Unipolarity. He believes that due to access of the other powers of world to the technology and anticipatory cuts in the American defence budget, it would be difficult for the Americans to maintain the status of

2 the sole supper power of the world. He also maintains that eventually this Unipolarity might culminate into a Multipolarity. He maintains

The widespread perception that the Gulf War certified America as the last. remaining supper power misses The real significance of that conflict. That war rnarked a glorious sunset to the Cold War world, not a new dawn for the period of American predominance. America remains militarily the strongest nation, but the spread() of technology and reduced military budget make this a declining asset.'

The Post Cold war era can be termed as an era of transition which has compelled the several states to reassess their policies. In the aftenbath of the end of cold war, the Post World War II equation of the .power has been disturbed. Consequently several sensitive spots have appeared in the different regions of Europe and Asia. After the end of the Cold War, Central Asian states have emerged as a strategically pivot because several states are trying to extend their sphere of influence in this region and get strategic advantages. These states have inherited many conflicts as the legacy of the 150 years colonial rule of the communists and Czar. These conflicts are of two types interstates conflicts and interstate conflicts.

Conflicts in the Central Asian Region

The Central Asian Republics after becoming independent states have inherited severe territorial and ethnic conflicts. These conflicts are certainly destined to further complicate the geo-political situation of the region in general and of the world in particular. The Central Asian region has become the center of diplomatic activities. Every state wants to secure its interests and expand its sphere of influence in the region. Due to this geo-political importance some experts have termed the Central Asian Region as a "world's strategic black hole"i n A Pakistani scholar analyzing the causes of conflicts in the region maintains

150 years of "Russification" and "Sovietization" policies has led to the complications of contentious matters affecting the Central Asian States at various levels, particularly economics, politics, ethnicity and security. The Soviet disunion not only paved the way for the independence of Central Asian countries from the Russian tutelage but also exposed the vulnerability of these states vis-a-vis various unresolved conflicts.'

The hurriedly departure of the Russians and the legacy of the past hundred years has left several issues unresolved which culminated into severe conflicts in the region. Among these, following three issues/conflicts are worth mentioning.

Ethno-Religious Conflicts

The Central Asian region is the mosaic of religio-ethnic groups like, Kazakhs, Russians, Uzbeks, Kyrghyzs, Tajiks, Turkmens and Slavics. These groups speak different languages. Tajiks speak Persian language, while Slavic and Russians speak Russian and Ukrainian languages respectively, while the remaining nationalities speakthe language close to Turkish.

3 Tajiks and Uzbeks claim cultural superiorities vis-a-vis Kazakhs, Kyrghyz and Kazakh. Tajiks consider themselves to be the most, cultural nation by virtue of belonging to the ancient and rich Persian civilization. They are the biggest non-Turk community in Central Asia. Turkmen are considered to be uncultured illiterate; whereas Kazakh and Kyrghyzs sometime seen called as semi-barbarian nomads who recently converted to the Islam:2

These facts possess adequate substance in indicating that the region is charged with the significant degree of ethnicity and at any time it could cause a severe threat to the security of the region. Inspite of the conflicts between local ethnic groups, presence of the countable minority of Russians and Slavics who are in conflict with local population, is another spot of menace in the peace and the security of the region.

Notwithstanding the conflicting area of ethnicity, other area of conflict in the Central Asian States is the religion. In consequence of seventy years suffocating restrictions on the religious activities during communist era, Muslim revivalism has emerged as a palpable reality in the Central Asian countries. The number of mosques and madrassas in the states are growing rapidly. According to some reports only in Uzbekistan, the number of mosques and other places of worship has increased" from "200" to "5,000. 13 Like ethnic complexity this area also has a diversity of religions. The majOrity of population is Sunni Muslim but there are about 10 million Shias living in different states:4

The above mentioned facts reflect the sensitivity of the situation in the Central Asia. These conflicts, particularly ethnic conflicts, are a real threat to the seeurity of the region.

Territorial Disputes

Notwithstanding the ethnic conflicts other sensitive area of conflict in the region is the intrastate territorial disputes which have been inherited by these republics from the communist legacy.

Out of 23 internal borders existing between 15 former republics of the Soviet Union, 20 are still disputed. Azerbaijan is resisting the Armenian claim on the Nogorno Karabakh region situated miles inside its territory. Tajiks have their chagrin over that transfer of Samarkand, Bukhara, Farghana, Sheher Sabz and Khiva to Uzbekistan as bulk of their population is Tajik. Osh, an oblast in Kirghizia is disputed by the Uzbek because a majority of that area belongs to this ethnic group.. ..Uzbekistan has territorial claims over most of its neighbours. It has claim over the whole Farghana Valley including parts of Tajikistan, part of southern Kazkhistan and eastern Turkmenistan. The states of Kyrghyzstan and Tajkistan also disagree their borders:5

In addition to these territorial disputes between the former members of the Soviet Union, Kazakhistan inherited territorial dispute with China.16

The ethnic and religious conflicts as well as territorial disputes are indicators of the gravity of situation in the region. These unresolved issues are 4 required to be settled amicably for the security of the region otherwise these disputes would jeopardize the peace of the region.

Besides another crucial and outstanding issue is the distribution of water resources between the states of Central Asia. Professor Arun P. Elhance realizing the ravity of the problem has proclaimed the dispute as a" looming Water Wars.'

Analyzing the above facts one can conclude that the issues like territorial, ethnic and the possible spread of the Islamic fundamentalism in the • Central Asian states are the matter of great concern for the core, periphery and intrusive states of the region.I8 The Central Asian Republics have great important for Russia because a huge Russian population is living in these states with perpetual threat of clashes with the local population. These former Soviet states are strategically important for the Russians and they "depicted (it) as an important buffer zone."' On the other hand Russia has also meaningful importance for the Central Asian Republics as they are highly dependent upon it for their defense and security needs. In order to ensure the security of the region the eleven former states of the Soviet Union including Central Asian States, have signed a declaration and joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S). This declaration reads:

In order to ensure international stability and security, allied command of the military-strategic forces and a single control over nuclear weapons will be preserved, the sides will respect each other's desire to attain the status of a non-nuclear and (or) neutral state.2a

The above mentioned arguments negate the notion that the post cold war period has brought peace and tranquillity in the world. Contrary to that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of cold war has made international - as well as regional political system more complex than before. This change has shaken the balance of power which forced the several states to reassess their internal and external policies to harmonize the New World Order.

The American Perspective of the N.W.O.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. has emerged as a sole political and military power of the world and the Americans apparently seem more committed to maintain their status. In a Pentagon document, 'Defence Planning Guidance' for Fiscal year 1994-1995, it is clearly mentioned that the American political and military ambition is to ensure that no other super power should be allowed to emerge in the Western Europe, Asia, or that of the former Soviet Union. In order to sustain and perpetuate their role of the unshared supremacy over the world affairs, they

riaust account sufficiently for the interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.-

For the purpose of maintaining the superiority over the world affairs Americans have come forward with the new international nile of law named the New World Order. In August 1990 Iraq occupied the oil-rich state of Kuwait. This

. 5 incident posed a severe threat to the economic interests of the industrialized nations of the Europe because Kuwait was the main source of oil supply to them. In order to protect the interests of these nations the U.S. took a firm stand against Iraq under the umbrella of the N.W.O. The military forces of 28 countries attacked Iraq with the mandate of the U.N. to liberate Kuwait. Iraq's defeat and Kuwait's liberation boosted American's image who proclaimed themselves as the 'sole military might of the world.

On January 16, 1991, President Bush talking about the Gulf crisis. maintained: .- N.W.O is the rule of law governs the conduct of nations and in which a credible U.N. can use its peace keeping role to fulfill the promise and the vision of the U.N's founders:

While Robert Oakley interpreted the N.W.O. in these words:

Under N.W.O. .... The U.N. has won new status and influence as an instillment of international peace keeping. For the first time, a regional conflict that aggression against Kuwait did not serve in regard to the U.S.'s new international role imposed by our success. It refers to new ways of working with the other nations to deter aggression and achieve stability, prosperity and above all, peace?'

According to Oakley, the main objectives of the N.W.O. are:

To bring the world closer together by much more active cooperation for the principles of the U.N. Charter...with staunch U.S. support; ( to use) the U.N. ( as a) a forum for achieving international consensus and maintain effective influence as an instrument for an international peacekeeping; (to promote the) principles (of): peaceful settlement of international disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduce and control the arsenals, just treatment for all people.-4

According to Dr. Panda J. Aziz, the following three areas are most crucial for the theorists of the N.W.O, to materialize their dream. These are:

1. The Non-Proliferation of the _ nuclear and mass-destruction weapons.

2. The reforms in the economic sector. According to their aid policy, American and their allies want to give economic, aid to only those countries who: introduce economic reforms and implement the policies of privatization frame their economic policies according the advise of the the G.A.T.T., and I.B.R.D.

Human Rights and Democracy: They intend to extend their cooperation only those states who show a tangible progress in the field of human rights. 6 A Critical Appraisal of the N.W.O

"The end of Cold War has made international policies more complex than in previous decades".- More complex in the sense that several nations have been forced to redefine their roles in the changed circumstances of the unipolar international order. The Post Cold War era is the era of "instability" says Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, and "instability forces nations to make decisions.-6 These views reveal that Post Cold War phenomenon has compelled the nations to re-evaluate their priorities in the light of changed circumstances. Some critics maintain that the N.W.O. is in fact, a form of 'Pax Americana' in which smaller nations would be compelledt to accept the peace imposed by the U.S. and its allies under the U.N. auspices:'

New World Order and the Nation State

Several small nations consider the doctrine of N.W.O. as an antithesis to the concept of 'nation state or territorial state. Several statesmen and intellectuals have interpreted this international political system (N. W. 0.) as a menace to the sovereignty and the security of the nation state. A German Professor, Wolfgang has critically viewed the ideas of "restructuring of international system", "re-determination of international political institution", "change in hegemonies relationship", "internationalization of capital or development of global society, propounded by the N.W.O. Analyzing the above mentioned elements of the N.W.O he tries to establish this in-fact, that new rule of law intends to alter the national/territorial state by the internationalization of statehood:8 The Malaysian premier 1)r. Mahater Mohammad, has bitterly criticized the developed world for imposing the colonial rule through the doctrine of the N.W.O. Fie maintains:

Today's crazy minds in some developed countries consider it their right to tell us how to rule our country. If we do not heed theme they consider it their right to destroy economy, impoverish our people and even over throw our governments, these tyrants and criminals catch on to various causes such as human rights, nuclear control, and the environment in order to reimpose colonial rule on us.-

N.W.O. and Pakistan

In this new international political setup Pakistan has also become the victim of the American pressure regarding former's nuclear programme and alleged involvement in promoting Islamic fundamentalism. The U.S. Senator Larry Pressler, the main author of the Pressler Amendment Bill, in his meeting with Pakistan's former Chief of Staff General Asif Nawaz expressed his deep fears regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme. tie had also conveyed his concern regarding the possible export of Pakistan's nuclear tec,imology to the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union."' Though Pakistan had received massive American aid during the period of Afghanistan resistance against Soviet invasion but with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan Americans once again imposed the military and economic embargo on Pakistan. Commenting on this attitude of American's, Maliha Lodhi

7 maintained:

For over 10 years, we (Pakistan) acted to counter alien aggression in Afghanistan, which resulted in withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 itself a seminal event that marked the beginning of the end of the cold war.-1

After the end of the Cold War, in addition to stopping economic and military aid to Pakistan the U.S also refused to deliver the military equipment and twenty eight F-16 planes despite having received their payments. This embargo on the part of the U.S indicates its selective and discriminatory approach. While commenting on the issue Agha Shahi declared American embargo, as a "selective and discriminatory approach". He maintained:

The aid Cut-off to Pakistan is a glaring example of the selective and discriminatory approach to non-proliferation of such weapons (nuclear and non-conventional). It raises the question: how equitable, the new order."

This discriminatory attitude of the proponents of the N.W.O., without realizing Pakistan's security concerns vis-a-vis India, has in-fact, posed a serious security threat to Pakistan. Maliha Lodhi correctly stated

It is difficult, however, for Pakistan to assume its full responsibilities in the new world political system until there is regional peace and stability. The world may have changed, the cold war may have ended, but on the subcontinent the cold war between India and Pakistan continues unaba ted .33

All the above facts adequately endorse the hypothesis that the emergence of the N.W.O. has in-fact, complicated the political scenario of the world. In Europe, liquidation of the WARSAW pact created a vacuUm of counter balance to NATO. Consequently Franco-German axis has emerged as a anticipatory power pole in Europe against the Anglo-American power pole. While in Asia, the future role of China in N.W.O., the emergence of anticipatory Islamic bloc, outstanding disputes between various countries of the region, apparently reflect that the future course of politics in the region would be more complex instead of a simple one as interpreted by the proponents of N.W.O.

As far as Pakistan is concerned despite some reservations, it is relatively in a better position to play its role in the proposed American N.W.O. Pakistani leadership seems intended to come upto" American requirements.34 The great irritant between Pakistan and the U. S. is the issue of N.P.T. The recent Brown amendment counter to the Pressler amendment is an adequate proof to support the view that both countries have paved the way towards mutual trust and reliability.35 This reveals that the Pakistani leadership has been able to resolve some major irritants in the Pak-U.S. relations and this situation may lead Pakistan to play its role in the N.W.O. The "trust and reliability" between U.S and Pakistan may affect Sino-Pak relations to a considerable extent.

REFERENCES

Henry Kissinger, "The Atlantic Alliance Need Renewal", International Herald Triabune, reproduced in, Frontier Post, (Peshawar), March 9, 1992. 8 2. Daya Kishan Thussu, "NATO seeks fresh sense of security" Dawn, (Karachi), March,25, 1992. 3, Dr. Panda J. Aziz, New World Order- 21st century, (Islamabad: Manza Corporation, 1992), p. 98. 4. Ibid. 5. Syed Talat Hussain, "South Asia's Nuclear problems need regional solution", News, (Islamabad), April 9, 1994. 6. Ibid. Syed Adeeb, "Nuclear proliferation policy toward Pakistan", Frontier Post, (Peshawar), May 19, 1992, 8. Francis Fa kuyama, "The end of history?", lhe National Interest, Summer 1989, p. 4. 9. Golam W. Choudhury, "Changing Global Politics and its Impacts on the Asian International System", Asian Perspective, Vol. 18, No. I, Spring-Summer, 1994, p. 95. 10. Dr. Gareth M. Winrow, "A Region at the Crossroads: Security Issues in the Post-Soviet Asia", Journal of South Asian and Middle &Istria' Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Fall 1991, p. I. I I. M 000 is Ahmar, "Conflict Resolution and Confidence Building in Central Asia", Strategic Studies, Vol. XVI, No.3, Spring 1994, p. 59. 12. ibid., p. 13. ibid., p73. 14. Eijaz I laider, "Wanna be in my gang?", /tier Post (I' sthawar), March 6, 1992. 15. Moonis Ahmar, op. cit., p. 74-75. 16. Ibid. 17. For the detail see, Arun P. Elliance."(. Asia's looming Water- Wars", The Christian Science Monitor, January -II, 1993. 18. Dr. Gareth has grouped the actors of the region of the Central Asia into three groups: I. Core Countries: Kazkhistan, Kyrghyzstan, Russia, Taikishin, 1 urkemanistan and Uzbekistan. 2. l'eriphery countries: Armenia and Azerbaijan. 3. Intrusive States:Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. For the detail see Dr. Gareth NI. Winrow, p. cit. pp. 1-18. 19. Ibid., p. I. 20. "The Commonwealth of Independent Slates- CIS", Orsini/ Asia, No.36, Summer 1995, p. 206. 21. Cam W. Choudhury, "Changing gh)bal pilitics and its impact on the Asian international system", Asian Perspective, Vol. IS, spring-Summer 1994, p, p. 94.95. Also see, Friudier, Posl, (Peshawar), March „12, 1992. 22. Henry Kissinger,"New World Order proposed by Bush can not be built I() American specifications", Dawn, (Karachi), February 24, 1941. 23. Robert Oakley, "The New World Order myth reality", Nation, (hahore), May 3, 1991, 24. Dr. Panda j. Aziz, op. cit., p.3. • 25. Richard 11 1" 11_Os' N Order G11 .n N 1 1 AItheoretical 1 over view", Asian Perspective, • Vol. 17, No.1, Spring, Summer 1992, P. 19. 26. Tansu Ciller, "The role of Turkey in New World". Strategic Review, Vol. 22, No. I, United States Strategic Institute, Winter 1994, p. 7. 27. Dr. Panda J. Aziz, op. cit., p. 5. 28. Wolfgang Hein, "The New World Order and 11 endI 0.1 ..le N State, 1-OW and Stale, Vol. 48, Tubingen, The Institute for Scientific Cooperation, 1904, p. 36.

29. Syed Adeeb, "UN and NWO". 1.ronlier Post, (Peshawar), March 8, 1992. 30. Syed Adeeb, "Non-Proliferation policy toward Pakistan', Frontier Post, (Peshawar), May, 1992. 31. Extracts from the speech delivered by Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S. at a meeting on Capitol I lill of the Pak-american Congress in Washington, D.C. Appeared in 1 he NVWS, (Islamabad), May 17, 1994, 32. A paper read by Agha Shahi at the international Seminar on Pakistan-U.S. relations held in Islamabad. The paper was reproduced in frontier Post, (Peshawar), May, 6, 1991, under the title, New World Order". 33. News, (Islamabad), May 17, -1994. 34. Ibid., 177. • 35. The American Senate passed Brown amendment bill with 55:45 ratio on September 20, 1995, In consequence of the passage of the Brown amendment American government would be able to lift the military and economic imposed on Pakistan by the Pressler bill since 1990. Source Dawn, (Karachi), September 21, 1995. .

rs.

— • READING I (Excerptsfrom, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis', by S. M. Burke, .1Carachi, Oxford University Press, 1975). Reproduced with Permission. n the eve of independence it was generally believed that, afterwards, India would not stay in the Commonwealth, while it was taken for granted that Pakistan would. For 0Britain to be able to reconcile India and manage to keep both the new Dominions within the Commonwealth was a notable diplomatic achievement, to understand the extent of which it.is necessary to go back some years. The Indian National Congress had committed itself to severing the Commonwealth link at least as early as 1930. On 2 January be observed as puma swaraj day' (complete independence day). A declaration drafted at that meeting was read to the people all over India on 26 January 1930 as part of the celebrations, and the recitation was repeated annually till independence became a fact. The declaration stated inter a lia: 'The British Government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom but has based itself on the exploitation of the masses, and has ruined India economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. We believe, therefore, that India must sever the British connection and attain purna swaraj or complete independence.'2 On the eve of 'independence day' Gandhi emphasized: 'Remember the 26th is the day not to declare independence but to declare that we will be satisfied with nothing less than complete independence as opposed to Dominion Status so called.'3 Nehru, who was the chief spokesman for Congress on external affairs, reiterated on numerous occasions that India would never agree to have any constitutional link with Bri-. tam n after independence. To Nehru the 'idea behind Dominion Status, of a mother country closely connected with her daughter nations, all of them having a common cultural background, seemed totally inapplicable to India'.4 In August 1940 he said the whole con- ception of Dominion S:atus for India was dead as a doornail.' The Muslim League, on the other hand, had no anti-British tradition. As a matter of fact, during the difficult years of the Second World War, when the Congress party first declined cooperation in the war effort and then launched the 'Quit India' movement, the more estranged Congress became from the British Government, the more were the latter forced to rely on the Muslims. For their part the Muslims fully realized that they had little chance of winning Pakistan against the opposition of the much more powerful Congress Party unless they were backed up by the British. The Muslimteague deprecated the 'Quit India' resolution and allowed the Muslims to co-operate in the war effort.

I I Naturally, however, this special relationship between the British Government anti the Indian Muslims could endure only as long as it suited both sides. It was clearly beneficial for Britain to lean towards the Muslim minority while she intended to rule India and had to keep the Hindu majority in check. But once she had decided to relinquish power, the balance . of her national interest immediately shifted in the direction of favouring the Hindus, for it seemed clear that, whether India remained united or was split into two, the Hindus of India under the banner of the Congress Party would be a far more important factor in international life than the Muslims. That the Labour Party at this time happened to be in office in the United Kingdom greatly facilitated the process of rapprochement between Britain and the Congress leadership. Labour traditionally had been sympathetic to Congress causes and many members of the top echelons in both parties had long been on terms of personal friendship with one another. Attlee, Cripps, Pethick-Lawrence and others in Labour ranks admired the Con- gress leaders as progressive intellectual and doughty fighters for the freedom of their country. Jinnah and the League, on the other hand, were pictured by them as reactionaries and treated with scant respect. This was vividly brought out in a BBC-TV 'converSation' between Attlee and Francis Williams in 1959:

Attlee:1 never liked Jinnahl knew him as long ago as 1927.

I never liked him.

Williams: Why?

Attlee: I don't think he was very genuine, you know...I thought a great deal of his ambition was for Master Jinnah rather than anything else.6

Personal friendships between Labour and Congress leaders notwithstanding, the task before the British statesmen was a formidable one, because a lot of lost ground had to be recovered. Britain had to soothe the feeling of hostility between herself and the Congress Party which only recently—during the 'Quit India' movement—had stood at its highest point, and she had to demonstrate by positive actions, to the satisfaction of the Congress leaders, that the game of favouring the Muslims had definitely ended.

A beginning was made by getting rid of Wavell, who had incurred the wrath of Con- gress/ and replacing him as Viceroy by Mountbatten, who was more acceptable to that party and who was directed to work towards 'a unitary Government for British India and the Indian States, if possible within the British Commonwealth's had been inserted in Attlee's directive at the special request of Mountbatten, 'who feels that he must strive for a solution which leaves such good feeling that the Indian Parties will want to remain within the Common- wealth."

By April, however, Mountbatten had lost the fifst round. Jinnah remained implacable and Mountbatten came to the conclusion that Pakistan was inevitable. This further concession to Muslim opinion, though wrested from the hands of an unwilling British Govern - ment, did not make Mountbatten's objective, of keeping India within the Commonwealth, any easier. Quite obviously, the only way in which he could now win Over new India was to side with her on the crucial issues of the day. How he managed to succeed, and at what price to Pakistan, must now be told.

Before Mountbatten's arrival on the scene in India, the. Indian Constitutent Assem- bly, on Nehru's motion, had, on 22 January 1947, passed the Objectives Resolution, declaring 12 'its firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an independent, sovereign republic'. Since the Commonwealth had always been a strictly monarchical organization, this measure was seen as presaging the fulfilment of the long-standing Congress pledge to cut off all constitutional ties with Britain. Mountbatten was, therefore, confronted not only with the task of he- aling Congress ill-feeling towards Britain and of persuading Congress to disregard its past resolutions, but also of finding some way of getting the Commonwealth to accept a republic within its ranks. In Campbell-Jonhson's words, the situation called for a 'face-saving formula'. '° When Gordon Walker, at that time Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Re- lations in Attlee's Labour Government, visited Delhi towards the end of February, Mountbat- ten prepared for him an aide-memo/re which made 'certain tentative suggestions as to how the structure of the Commonwealth could perhaps be altered, particularly in nomenclature, to allow Asian countries to remain more easily associated with it'. Mountbatten thought 'there is room for a republic within the Commonwealth'.

As compared with his deep concern to accommodate India within the Common- wealth, even if it meant changing the nature of the Commonwealth itself, Mountbatten was • notably brusque towards Pakistan. On 12 April 1947 Campbell-Johnson noted in his diary: '(At the Staff Meeting) Mountbatten reported on his latest meeting with Jinnah, who was apparently much shaken when Mountbatten failed to react in any way to his offer dramatically presented, to bring Pakistan into the Commonwealth.' 112 Some days later, at another Staff Meeting, lsmay pleaded 'that it would be virtually impossible, both on moral and material grounds, to eject from the Commonwealth any part of the Commonwealth that asks to remain in'. But 'Mountbatten came down heavily against the concept of allowing only a part' of British India to remain within the Commonwealth, as this would involve the 'risk of Britain being involved in the support of one Indian sovereign State against another'.13

Mountbatten's much greater concern for Indian than for Pakistani susceptibilities in the matter of Commonwealth membership was not the only question regarding which Pakis- tanis felt that the representatives of Great Britain had favoured India against Pakistan. They thought also that the Radcliffe Award was grossly unfair to them, and that the date of the transfer of power had been advanced, from June 1948 to August 1947, under Indian pressure to the detriment of Pakistan.' 4

As Pakistan's main problems related to India, her appraisal of the British attitude towards herself after independence depended on the British attitude on those issues. Here again Pakistan began to feel that in a real choice between the two, Britain would always come down on the side of India. Two cases in point, immediately after partition, which have already been described under Pakistan's relations with India. Two cases in point, immediately after partition, which have already been described under Pakistan's relations with India, were the premature closure of the Supreme Commander's headquarters upon India's insistence, enabling her to withhold Pakistan's share of military supplies, and the deaf ear Britain and the other Commonwealth countries turned towards Pakistan's request for help in controlling the communal carnage, which had led Jinnah to complain that Great Britain was shirking her responsibility in this respect. But Pakistan:simost painful experience at the hands of Britain was the complete change in the attitude of the British delegation towards the Kashmir question in the Security Council when that body reconvened in March 1948, after it had adjourned in February at the insistence of India. The interval, as we have already noted, was utilized by India for successfully pressing the British Government, through Mountbat- ten, to modify its policy in respect of Kashmir. I s Campbell-Johnson explains that Mountbat- ten was unhappy at the attitude of the British delegation to the Security Council because it was endangering his efforts to reconcile India to Dominion Status.' 6

13 In October 1948 the Prime Ministers of the newly independent Asian countries, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, for the first time attended a conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Mountbatten had retired from the Governor-Generalship of India some months earlier but, 'with his immense prestige in India', was believed to have played a full part in discussions relating to India's future relationship with the Common- wealth.' 7 Two months after the conference, the Congress Party in India acting no doubt under the influence of the Prime Minister, passed a resolution at the Jaipur session declaring that 'Congress would welcome India's association with independent nations of the Com monwealth for their common weal ad promotion of world peace'. I8

A special meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers was called in April 1949 to consider the constitutional implications of India's willingness to remain in the Common- wealth after becoming a republic. To smooth the way, attlee 'sent out personal envoys for preliminary talks with his fellow Prime Ministers': 9 and on 2 March he discussed the question with the Leader of the Opposition, Winston Churchill, as a result of which he was able to report to the King that 'Mr. Churchill gave it as his own opinion that it was most important to keep India within the Commonwealth. While fully agreeing with the importance of hot weakening the link of the allegiance to the Crown, he thought it should be possible to retain a republican India in the Commonwealth!' Under the circumstances, the outcome of the conference in April was an almost foregone conclusion. A joint communique of all the Prime Ministers signified that republican India had been allowed to continue her membership of the Commonwealth by accepting the King as 'the symbol of the free association of its member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth' .2 '

Liaquat concurred in the solution and, in fact, went with all the other Common- wealth Prime Ministers to the King personally to advise him to accept India as a republic.22 On the merits of the question Pakistan could hardly have raised any objection. If India wished to become a republic, and all the remaining members of the Commonwealth nevertheless were willing to let her stay on in the Commonwealth, it was obviously their concern. But Pakistan could not but notice some of the broader aspects of the matter, and these served to confirm the view that India would always command preferential treatment in the Common- wealth. The Economist had noted during the conference that the fixed point in India's policy was 'to make India an "independent sovereign republic", and on that point public opinion in India will make no concession.... The task of devising a means of incorporting such a.tepub- lic into the Commonwealth is, in the Indian view, a matter mainly for the other members ....It is the latter which must make the constitutional concessions.'23

At popular level, resentment in Pakistan at what was taken as a new proof of Bri- tain's deference to India was strongly manifested. The Times Special Correspondent reported from Lahore that anti-British feeling in Pakistan:

dates back to the partition, which many Pakistanis believe was arranged in India's favour; it was strengthened by Britain's refusal of Pakistan's request for Common wealth mediation on the Kashmir dispute and her alleged change of front on the same dispute when it came before the United Nations. The feeling is now taking the form of resentment at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' decision to allow India to 'eat ier cake and have it' by becoming &republic and remaining a member of the Commonwealth.'

Several observerrs thought that disappointment with Britain was one of the reasons vhy the Pakistani Prime Minister, at about this time, accepted an invitation to visit Russia. 14 Pakistan's decision not to change the par value of her rupee when Britain devalued her cur- rency in September 1949 was also taken, in part, as a mark of Pakistan's assertion of economic independence of Britain.

In spite of disenchantment with the Commonwealth on many issues, Pakistan never seriously thought that she would be better off by leaving it. The official attitude of the Govern- ment, as stated by Mahmud Husain, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Constituent Assembly on 23 March 1950, was that Pakistan would continue in the Commonwealth so long as it was 'convenient' for her to do so.

When Pakistan decided to become a republic she too expressed the wish to maintain her ties with the Commonwealth, and a communique of the Prime Ministers' Conference, identical to the one issued in the case of India, was published on 5 February 1955 to affirm that Pakistan would continue to remain within the Commonwealth. The final seal of approval to Pakistan's association with the Commonwealth was affixed by the Constituent As- sembly of Pakistan on 2 March 1956, by 42 votes to 2. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, during whose premiership the Assembly decision was taken, states that 'as the true character of the Commonwealth became more apparent, there was disillusionment, but not to the point of wishing to break away from it'. He thinks the main reason why Pakistan continued her association with the Commonwealth was her affinity with Western democratic institutions, reinforced by cultural and economic ties. Also, English was still the official language of the government and the higher courts, as well as the medium of instruction for university education. Pakistan was a member of the sterling area and had fairly large balances in London, trade with the United Kingdom predominated, the Colombo Plan brought benefits of aid in economic development, and as part of a worldwide community of nations Pakistan could exercise some influence in the shaping of world policies.'

II. Pakistan and the United States of America

The attitude of the Americans towards India and Pakistan initially was no exception to the general rule. The land of Gandhi and Nehru, they felt, having successfully fought for her freedom against the British, in much the same way as the Americans themselves had done, was destined to play a great role on the world slge. But the creation of Jinnah's Pakis- tan was a sad mistake and the future of that ill-conceived states was no more than a question mark on the surface of the globe.

During the Second World War, President Roosevelt had pressed Prime Minister Churchill for a settlement with the leaders of the Indian National Congress so that their help could be enlisted in the war effort against the expected Japanese invasion of India. The Roosevelt—Churchill exchanges show that the American leader was totally ignorant of the demands and strength of the Muslim League. His 'mind was back in the American War of In- dependence, and he thought of the Indian problem in terms of the thirteen colonies fighting George III' .26 Roosevelt's prescription for India, therefore, was that a temporary government in India be set up, 'headed by a small representative group, covering different castes, occu- pations, religions and geographies' — this group to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government.. it would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent Gov- ernment for the whole country.''s

Nearer the time of independence Henry F. Grady, Ambassador designate of the Un- ited States to India, was criticized by the Muslim League paper Dawn for 'harping on what he calls "national unity—.29 But Grady was simply giving expression to what Americans gene-

15 rally believed at the time. Edgar Snow described Pakistan as 'the queerest State in the world; you can't draw its map'.3° Within the portals of the Federal Capitol in Washington, D.C., Rep- resentative Emanuel Celler of New York, speaking the day after the announcement of the Partition Plan, called Pakistan 'a mistake, yes, a rank appeasement of Jinnah'.3I A few days later he declared: 'Pakistan is an engraved invitation to His Majesty's Government to remain in India. ...Pakistan is a menancing and overshadowing cloud.'n Time said, 'Pakistan fisj an economic wreck.'

The same Emanuel Celler, who had spoken of Pakistan so dispargingly, offered Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru congratulations upon the latter's 59th birthday and spoke of his 'wisdom, courage, and sacrifice', and also felicitated the people of India 'for having the services and talents of this great man at their disposal'.' Gandhi's assassination in January 1948 brought forth a tremendous effusion of tributes from Congressmen. Representative Keating said Gandhi was more than a political leader, 'almost a saint to uncounted millions of our brothers in the vast subcontinent of India'. Celler introduced a resolution to erect a monument to Gandhi's memory and ended his eulogy by joining Gandhi with Moses, Buddha, St. Francis of Assisi, and Abraham Lincoln. In contrast, the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951 attracted little attention, though the Pakistani leader had only the year before made an extensive personal tour of the United States and made numerous friendly speeches.

Until 1949 the United States could not take much direct interest in the affairs of the Indian subcontinent. The cold war had broken out in Europe soon after the termination of the hot war there and America, not wishing to make a gift to Cominunism of what she had only just rescued from Nazism, bent all her energy towards reviving the war-ravaged non-Com- munist countries of Europe. Winston Churchill sounded the warning at Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946 in words that have become immortal: 'From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.' On 12 March 1947 Presi- dent Harry S. Truman asked Congress to vote emergency military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, and on 5 June Secretary of State Marshall expounded a plan at Harvard for the recovery of Europe. In July the Russians walked out of the Marshall Plan meeting in •Paris, and the cold war began in earnest. So, when India and Pakistan commenced their respective careers as independent nations, Europe was already in the grip of the cold war.

But momentous events in Asia soon claimed America's attention. It became obvious in the summer of 1949 that the Communists in China would soon prevail over the Nationalists, and there would come into being in Asia an even more populous Communist State than Russia. American eyes now turned to India as the ideal counterpoise to China by virtue of her size and estimated potential. Hubert H. Humphrey, then a freshman senator from Minnesota and in later years to prove a consistent supporter of India, pleaded that India 'should be brought into the councils of the democratic world organization we are forming around the framework of the Atlantic Pact'.' In his address to the India League of America, at a dinner for Madam Pandit, Ambassador of India, on 24 May 1949, a copy of which he entered in the Congressional Record, Humphrey, forgetting that the Congress Party of India had in fact opposed the war effort, referred to India as 'a nation which fought beside us in the Sec- ond World War' and perorated: 'The interests of the United States and India are interdepen- dent. Together we can help build a world order and a world society based on freedom and democracy. Madam Pandit, in the agony of the world's crisis today, we urge you, your brother, your country, and your people, in your zeal for democracy, in your incisive cool thinking, to help give us a vision which will blaze the path toward the realization of the great ideals we share.'

16 Nehru's arid Liaquat's Visits to the United States

Before long, an invitation was extended to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to make an official visit to the United States. At first no.similar invitation was extended to Liaquat Ali Khan. It was only after Russia had invited the Pakistani Prime Minister that the United States extended the same courtesy to him. As neither Prime Minister had travelled to the New World before, these trips provided the first direct opportunity for the Americans to size up the two South Asian leaders.

The Indian Prime Minister started with all the advantages on his side. He was a household name in America already, and represented the largest non-Communist country in the world, located next door to the two Communist giants. Russia had recently exploded an atom bomb, breaking the United States supremacy in that field, and the Communists had proclaimed themselves overlords of China only a few days previously. The french-backed Bao Dai was not doing too well in Indo-China and many observers were already writing him off. 'So, it is to India', telegraphed the correspondent of the Hindu, that American eyes turn for saving Asia and the whole world from Communism.'35

American hopes for Nehru's collaboration did not seem unreasonable if one re- members that India at that time was putting down Communists at home with a heavy hand and was ahelping the government of Burma to do the same, that Russia and China were con- tinuously berating India for her alleged subservience to the United Kingdom and the USA, and that only a few months before India had decided to remain in the Commonwealth. The last mentioned event had been greeted by the New York Times a 'a historic step... in setting a limit to Communist conquest and opening up the prospect of a wider defense system than the Atlantic Pact.36

The Indian Prime Minister landed at the National Airport, Washington, on 11 Oc- tober 1949 to begin his four-week tour. In his words of welcome, Truman recalled that America had been discovered by Columbus in search of a new route to India and expressed the hope that Nehru's 'visit, too, will be, in a sense, a discovery of America'.37 The simile evidently pleased the guest because during his speeches afterwards he often stated that he had come to America on a voyage of discovery.

America went all out to give Nehru a hero's welcome. This was due partly to the genuine admiration the Americans felt for the Indian leader as a sort of George Washington of India, and partly because they visualized India as the counterpart of democratic America in the East. Owing to their pre-eminence in technology, Americans are inclined to look for neat breakthroughs in other spheres of human activity also. It was pleasing to visualize the USA, the greated democracy of the West, holdSoviet Russia in check in the Western hemis- phere and India, the greatest democracy of the East, similarly blocking China in the East. The New York Times called Nehru 'the world's most popular individual'; the Washington Post declared that 'he knows the art of being king'; Secretary of State Dean Acheson tanked him with Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, and Abraham Lincoln; Mrs. Roosevelt said that, while the USA had developed certain material values, India could give some of that spiritual leadership which Nehru represented. The New York Times wrote plainly: 'Washington wants India to be a bulwark against Communism... India is potentially a great counterweight to China.

,Though Nehru had accepted discovery of America as his slogan, in fact he strove to make Americans discover the inherent wisdom and superiority of the ancient land of India.

17 In his address at Columbia University he reminded the audience that wonderful civilizations had grown up in the East when Europe and America were still unknown to history. India was a newcomer in the modern family of nations, but she had certain advantages: she had brought no prejudices or enmities but a touch of idealism, and she had been taught by Gan- dhi never to subordinate means to ends. In an obvious reference to the cold war, he said that the very process of marshalling the world into two hostile camps precipitates the conflict which it has sought to avoid. It produces a sense of fear which leads men into wrong courses. The problem, therefore, becomes one of lessening and ultimately putting an end to this fear.

At another place Nehru said that, after thirty years of Gandhi's leadership, India was not a friad of external aggression. Urging that fear in international affairs should be removed, he declared, 'If there is an armed conflict we are weak, we have no atom bomb, and we re- joice in not having an atom bomb.''

India's policy, he explained, was not a negative and neutral policy: it was a positive and vital policy. India wished to make her full contribution but in her own way. Just as the Un- ited States had been thrust into a position of extreme importance almost against her wishes, and had to assume leadership in world affairs, so was India, in a different context, being inevitably drawn into the vortex of world affairs. Indians also knew very well that America sympathized in India's struggle for freedom but they did not admire everything in America. the United States had a reputation abroad of being ma terialistc and of being tough in matters of money.

Nehru said India would welcome from America a large quantity of wheat; mechanical and technological aid; and financial investments.39 But he had not come to carry out any deal, as 'no self-respecting country wants one-sided assistance' 40 However, while not car- ing to explain what America would get in return for the material assistance India expected from that country, he spelled out clearly what America could not expect from India. At the National Press Club he told a packed audience that any talk of an Asian defence Pact would be premature. What was amore important than a defence pact was the development of a psychological background of cooperation. India definitely did not want leadership in Asia or anywhere else. On the following day he declared in New York, 'We have no intention to con - mit ourselves to anybody at any ' He expressed the hope that India would have •.:1o..3e ties with the USA but enigmatically added, in the same breath, 'The most intimate ties are ties which are not ties.'42 Lowell Mellet of the Washington Evening Star disconsolately commented: 'A wise man came out of the East the other day and rode up Broadway. New York turned out to meet him.... Before the day was done, the visitor... [had} answered the question uppermost in the mind of the Government at least: Where does India, or he as India's leader, stand in the cold war between the United States and Russia? The answer, in effect, is that India wants no part of that war.'

The Indian leader's declaration, from the podium of the United States Congress, that 'where freedom is menaced, or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral', evoked the most enthusiastic applause and comment. Americans associated aggression with Communism, and took it for granted that Nehru's remarks were directed against that menace. 'But in India the interpretation was different and the Press contended that what Pandit Nehru meant by the threats to justice and freedom were the threats of imperial domination and discrimination.'43 This was not surprising because Nehru believed that, while to the West the issue of the day might be Communism, 'to us it is colonialism'."

18 Some in America bluntly expressed their disappointment as soon as it became clear that Nehru wanted no part in the-East-West confrontation. 'If India insists on remaining aloof in the cold war,' wrote the Washington Daily News on 17 October, 'cannot we, at least, start saving wear and tear on our welcome carpets for the candid visitor.' Others controlled their inner feelings, still hoping Nehru would eventually come round to their way of thinking. vot everyone was well aware that the tour, on the whole, had generated more irritation than goodwill. The remark of a Stale Department official summed up the result: 'We had a kind of sentimental image of Nehru and Indian independence, a feeling that nothing could creaft. any problems between us. The more we heard the less certain we were.'" Nehru's audienc- could hardly have failed to recognize the gap between his advice to others and his policies concerning India's own interests. He said that Gandhi's principle of non-violence had not been applicable in the cases of Hyderabad and Kashmir, and nimbly (vied Gandhi as having stated that people should 'resist aggression to the point of death'.46

The Soviet and Chinese comments on the Nehru visit to the USA were naturally in keeping with their generally low opinion at that time of Indian leadership.The New Times said that 'the vacancy left behind by Chiang Kai-shek is being offered to Nehru',47 while World culture informed its readers that 'American Imperialism Lays Hand on a New Slave'.

Liaquat's visit to the USA in May 1950 provided the first real opportunity for Pakis- tani leadership to explain the goals and aspirations of the new Muslim State to the leaders and people of the world's most powerful state. The Pakistani statesman personally was little known to Americans but he worked diligently to overcome the handicaps under which he started. Reversing Nehru's slogan, he said that the purpose of his visit was to assist America to discover Pakistan.

Being aware that the real reasons for the establishment of Pakistan were not sufficiently understood abroad, and that many thought of Pakistan as a backward theocratic state as compared to a forward-looking secular India, Liaquat's first effort was to enlighten his au- diences on these subjects. Partition came about, he explained, because a hundred million Muslims found themselves in a minority in British India and were convinced that under Hindu majority rule their culture was in danger of effacement and their already inferior economic position was likely to sink further. such a large discontented minority in the vast Indo-Pakistani subcontinent 'would have been the gretesl single unstable element in the world'. In the Islamic ideology of Pakistan there was no room for theocracy, because Islam stands for freedom of conscience, condemns coercion, has no priesthood, and abhors the caste system." Though Islam frowns upon large accumulations of unerned wealth, it fully respects the rights of private ownership and private enterprise.

In the world around them Pakistanis 'find dark forces at work threatening to extin- guish the torch of civilization which liberal institutions such asyours are trying to keep alive', but 'no threat or persuasion, no material peril or ideological allurement can deflect' Pakis- tanis from their chosen ideology. Pakistan's Islamic ideology not only gave stability to Pakis- tan herself but provided religious and cultural links betWeen her and the Middle East countries which would 'prove a stabilizing factor in Asia'.

Some utterances of the Pakistani Prime Minister and his wife were even more full of meaning. he said Pakistan attached the greatest importance to economic development through 'the good will and co-operation of free and peaceful nations'; ideologically and strategically Pakistan held a position of great responsibility and she was resolved 'to throw all her weight to help the maintenance of stability in Asia'; 'Pakistan extends her hand of

19 friendship to the freedom-loving peoples of the world'; should America decide that construc non is the best way to defy destruction, she would find 'the people of Pakistan amongst your staunchest friends', lie expressed the hope 'that the future will unfold itself in ways which will also make them [Pakistan and US] comrades, in the noble task of maintaining peace and in translating the great constructive dreams of democracy into reality'. Begum Liaquat Ali Khan declared in the course of her address at the City Hall, New York: 'We believe that a civilization or a society which concerns itself with material things alone cannot endure'..

Liaquat also tried to procure arms for the Pakistani forces, saying that such assistance would serve the interests of the entire free world. At a new conference in Washington he said that Pakistan occupied a very strategic position and that was the reason why he was interested in procuring up-to-date equipment for his armed forces. He said that because Pakistan had her own Islamic way of life, Communism was not likely to find fertile ground there; the two ways of life 'exclude each other'.49 A few days later Dawn reported that the Pakistani Prime Minister had had secret talks in Washington with defense Secretary Louis Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff during which he outlined Pakistan's arms needs. He stressed his nation's strategic position and the fighting qualities of her anti-Communist Mus- lim warriors.' At a press conference in Ottawa on 30 May he complained that the people who asked him why he was buying arms did not appreciate the fact that Pakistan defended the Khyber Pass through which the subcontinent had been invaded ninety times. He added that he did not know what forces the Russians, whose territory lay a few miles north of the Khyber Pass, had, because 'they have not given me any intimation'.5' Reviewing his visit to the USA and Canada on Radio Pakistan, he expressed himself satisfied with the talks he had had with the statesmen of both countries regarding 'the problems facing Pakistan and also the question of her integrity and safety', and the supply of 'such material which may be needed for strengthening and stabilizing Pakistan'.52

That Liaquat had gone to America in preference to the USSR was generally tken to mean that he preferred friendship with the United States to friendship with the Soviet Union. His American hosts also put a similar construction on the meaning of his visit to their country .and on his conduct and words there. His declaration before Congress that no risk of ideological allurement could deflect Pakistan from her chosen path of free democracy was taken by the New York Times as 'a pledge that the Pakistanis will stand and be counted among those who are devoted to freedom, regardless of the cost'." President Lloyd Cobb of International House, New Orleans, introducing Liaquat AU Khan at a dinner in the latter's honour, hailed Pakistan as a 'bulwark in the subcontinent and the Middle East against Communism as it seeks to press down from the north'.'

Not surprisingly, the USSR viewed Liaquat's activities in the USA with deep suspicion.ln a typical comment the Moscow Literary Gazette said that Liaquat Ali Khan had been 'transformed into the Pakistani variety of Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee'.55

Though Liaquat Ali Khan's visit roused considerable interest in the United States, it did not match the popular acclaim and attention lavished on. Jawaharlal Nehru. Newsweek reported that, when the distinguished Pakistani guest showed up at the Senate, it took this top US law-making body half an hour to round up a quorum, and then the visiting Prime. Minister addressed a listless third-full chamber." The fact of the matter was that India was still America's number one choice in Asia. Nehru's visit had been unfruitful, but he had not yet done anything markedly overt in the international field to make India look a hopeless case in American eyes. A New York Times editorial pleaded for a greater effort at mutual understanding between the United States and India because, it argued, the struggle for Asia

20 could be won or lost in the mind of one man —Jawaharlal Nehru—who was the counterweight on the democratic side to Mao Tse-tung on the Communist side and whose support was worth many divisions.52 It was not until 1951, after Nehru, amongst other activities, had shown his hand in the Korean War negotiations and refused to attend the Japanese Peace Conference, that responsible opinion in America began openly to despair of him.

Some years later when Pakistan's alliance with the United States fell from favour among Pakistanis, many tried to heap the entire blame for the pro-American policy on those who formally signed the greements and disregarded the fact that the last-named were logi- cally pursuing the trend set by their first Prime Minister. Liaquat's main anxiety was to ensure the survival of a virtually unarmed Pakistan in the face of recurrent threats of war from a much stronger neighbour. He realized that if Pakistan wanted outside material and moral support she had to lean on one side or the other, and both practical and ideological considerations pointed in the direction of America. That deep concern for Pakistan's safety over-, shadowed Liaquat's thoughts at all times was graphically manifested when he was shot by an assassin in 1951. His last words were 'May God protect Pakistan.'

The Korean War

In concrete terms Pakistan's contribution to the United Nations effort in Korea was 5,000 tons of wheat and India's an ambulance unit. India's assistance was the more significant because, as Krishna Menon put it, Indian units were there 'and they took the risks of war' 58 Prime Minister Attlee also approvingly said, 'We got Indian support, India didn't send troops but she sent the Red Cross:59 Indeed, the despatch of such a corps conformed to India's traditional method of showing solidarity with a cause. Gandhi had commanded an ambulance unit in the South African War and had also organized one to serve in the First World War. Nehru had referred to the medical mission sent by the Congress Party to China in 1939, during the Japanese aggression, as a method of 'asserting our foreign policy'.66 In the Korean War itself, though sixteen nations sent troops, others,including some NATO members (Italy, Denmark, and Norway), sent medical detachments only. But in the United States the image of India left behind by the Korean episode was of an appeaser of China and that of Pakistan of a staunch supporter of the West. Years later President Kennedy, welcoming Pres- ident Ayub to the United States, said, 'during the difficult days which faced our country at the time of the war in Korea, one of the first to offer us assistance was your country/61 The reason America viewed the Indian role in the Korean conflict with disapproval and the Pakis- tani part with approbation, does not lie in the actual contribution of the two countries to the United Nations military campaign but in their general policy towards that war.

It was on 25 June 1.950 that North Korea, a satellite of the Soviet Union, had crossed the 38th parallel and launched an attack on South Korea. Meeting on the same day, the Sec- urity Council declared it a breach of the peace and demanded a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces. It also called upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of the resolution. Two days later President Tru- man ordered the United States armed forces to intervene on behalf of South Korea. Later on the same day, the Security Council passed another resolution, recommending that members of the United Nations furnish to south Korea such assistance as might be necessary to repel the attack. India, then a member of the Security Council, voted for both resolutions. The Rus- sian delegation, not yet having returned to the Security Council.after walking out in January, was unable to block the passage of the resolutions by veto.62

At the outbreak of war Liaquat Ali Khan was still in the United States recovering

21 from an operation. He lost no time in declaring in a public statement that his Government 'will back the United Nations to the fullest' in any action it may take in the Korean War." On 30 June 1950 the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations formally confirmed, in a letter to the Secretary-General, that the Government of Pakistan 'will give their full support to measures proposed in the Security Council resolution to stop hostilities'. In New York Liaquat said that Pakistan accepted the United Nations resolution to aid South Korea, 'knowing full well what its implications arcs.'

A brigade of Pakistani troops was getting ready to leave for Korea and the Ameri- cans had offered to equip it with modern weapons. But Liaquat's advisers were not agreed on the wisdom of intervening in a manner which might irretrievably commit Pakistan to the Western camp without getting anything tangible in return." Accordingly, the United States was asked whether she would come to Pakistan's aid if Pakistan was attacked by India.66 As such an assurance was not forthcoming it was decided not to send any Pakistani contingent to Korea. A few days after Liaquat's assassination, his successor Prime Minister Nazimuddin told a correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune that 'a happy solution of the Kashmir problem would release our defence forces and put us in a position seriously to consider sending troops to Korea' 67

India had begun by supporting the United Nations resolutions of 25 and 27 June but, before long, assumed the role of a mediator between the contending parties. On 13 July Nehru addressed identical messages to Premier Stalin and Secretary Acheson. India's purpose, he said, was to localize the conflict and to facilitate a peaceful settlement by breaking the deadlock in the Security Council, so that the representative of China could take a seat in it and the USSR could return to it to negotiate peace and help in finding a permanent solution of the Korean problem. Stalin replied that he fully shared Nehru's point of view regarding the expediency of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council, 'with the obligatory participation of the representatives of the five great powers, including the People's Government of China'." Acheson, however, said that the termination of the aggression from North Korea could not be made contingent upon the determination of other questions before the United Nations. He pointed out that Russia's absence from the Security Council was solely due to her own unilateral decision, and added that the question of China's seat in the United Nations must be resolved on its merits and 'should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression'.69

These exchanges mark a turning point in India's relations with the United States on the one hand and with Russia and China on the other. This was the first occasion on which India and America had openly differed on a concrete international problem of great importance, while India and the Communist powers had fundamentally agreed. In the Lower House of the US Congress, Representative Mason of Illinois compared Nehru's proposal to Chamberlain's Munich Agreement, and in the Upper House Senator Knowland of California approvingly read into the Record an article in the Washington News which, referring to Nehru's letters to stalin and Acheson, said that the Indian Prime Minister's 'proposal could not have been more acceptable to Moscow if Stalin himself had made it'.7°

The United Nations forces had been initially thrown back in Korea but towards the end of september had regained control of South Korea and were poised to carry the fighting across the 38th parallel into North Korea. At midnight on 2 October 1950 Premier Chou En-lai summoned Ambassador panikkar and told him that China would intervene in Korea if the Un- ited Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel. The warning was duly conveyed to the USA and the UN but was disregarded. In a resolution passed on 7 October the General Assembly,7 '

22 by recommending that steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea and for the establishment of a unified Korea, implicitly authorized the United Nations command to move into North Korea. Though India abstained in the voting on the resolution, Nehru was in fact strongly opposed to the United Nations forces crossing the 38th parallel. When the line had 1,een passed, he said, 'The military mind has taken over.' This was too much even for the New York Times, which hitherto had worked so hard towards Indo—US cordiality. An editorial on 12 October addressed some 'Plain Words to Indians': 'Pandit Nehru purports to speak for Asia, but it is the voice of abnegation; his criticism now turns out to have been obstructive, his policy is appeasement. Worst of all one fails to find a valid moral judgement in his attitude.'

Pakistan, on the other hand, had been one of the co-sponsors of the 7 October resolution, and on 11 October Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan said in Parliament that the 38th parallel had never been recognized by the General Assembly as a permanent boundary and that, in any case, North Korea had destroyed the line by crossing it first. When the United Na- tions forces neared the Manchurian and Siberian borders, Chinese troops joined North Ko- reans (25 October 1950). The United Nations forces were once again compelled to fall below the 38th pprallel and did not cross it again till May 1951. Truce negotiations began on 10 July 1951 and an armistice was finally signed on 27 July 1953.

The entry of Communist China into the lists seemed to mariya prelude to World War III, and President Truman's annoucement on 30 November, that the United States might use an atom bomb in Korea, caused a flutter in the chancelleries of the world. Attlee promptly flew to Washington to dissuade the American President from escalating the Korean War into an all-out war between America and China. Both Nehru and Liaquat expressed themselves against the use of an atom bomb. The Pakistani Premier, deprecating the assumption that Communist China did not want peace, urged a cease-fire on.the 38th parallel."

Though India and Pakistan were one in their wish to avoid a world war, their policies in other respects remained different. In the General Assembly resolution of 1 February 1951, declaring that by directly assisting the aggressors in Korea Communist China had 'itself en gaged in aggression in Korea', Pakistan was content to remain neutral while India joined the Soviet bloc in voting against the resolution. Indian spokesmen gave two main reasons for their opposition to condemning China as an aggressor. First, as stated by the Indian representative in the Political Committee of the General Assembly, India was not convinced that the participation of the Chinese forces in the fighting in Korea was due to any aggressive intention; it was more probably due to the threats to the territorial integrity of China." Sec- ondly, as Prime Minister Nehru declared, the condemnation of a party 'would not help in solving the problem ... would only increase the tension and further inflame the passions of both the States" it could not lead to peace but only to an intensification of the conflict.'

After an interval of comparative inactivity, India again renewed her mediatory efforts when the negotiations between the parties became deadlocked over the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war, and ultimately a settlement was effected broadly on the lines which India had advocated. India also served as chairman of the Neutral Nations RCpiiihil. Lion Commission for Korea and exclusively supplied armed forces to assist the Commission in its task. Indian forces won high praise for the commendable way in which they discharged their onerous task.

Before the final curtain dropped on the Korean scene,- another controverv, in ‘vhiell the main actors were the USA and India, introduced a further note of acrimony ociwcen 23 them. This related to the membership of the Political Conference on Korea. The Armistice Agreement had stipulated that 'A Political Conference of a higher level of both sides be held' to resolve the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and settle the Ko- rean question peacefully." The matter of membership came up for consideration when the General Assembly met in special session in August 1953. In the Political Committee the majority favoured India's inclusion, but a two-thirds majority needed in the plenary session was not forthcoming and India persuaded her supporters not to press the matter further. American opposition to India's membership was for two reasons: first, that the armistice agreement had called for a conference of 'two sides' and India, not being identified with either the Communists or with the forces fighting aggression in Korea, did not fit into either side; and, secondly, because India's conduct had incurred the profound distrust of the Republic of Korea who was directly concerned in the matter. Once more, Pakistan supported the United States' position by voting against India's participation in the Conference.

Pandit Nehru spoke on the subject to Parliament on 17 September 1953. 'It is not realized by many of the Great Powers of the world,' he said angrily, 'that the countries of Asia, however weak they might be, do not propose to be ignored, bypassed and sat upon.' More temperately, he argued that it would be helpful if neutral countries were represented 'because they can sometimes help in toning down differences and easing tensions'.

Diplomatically, Pakistan came fairly well out of the Korean affair. The fact that she had not sent any troops to fight against the Communists enabled the People's Republic to continue trade and normal diplomatic relations with Pakistan. And the United States, though sorely disappointed that Pakistan had sent no fighting men, accepted Pakistani protestations that, but for her troubles with India, she would have supported the United Nations command militarily. 01 course, the United States satisfaction with Pakistan was heightened by the formers positive displeasure with India. Apart from the running differences already noted, Nehru repeatedly asserted that, if Communist China had not been wrongfully kept out of the United Nations, there would have been no Korean Warm As the United States was the main obstacle to the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, the Indian Prime Minister implicitly placed the entire blame for the Korean outbreak on America. Moreover, though purporting to be impartial, Indians seemed to be comparatively more sympathetic to China. As an Indian writer explains, new China's initial victories over Mac-Arthur 'were hailed all over Asia as a fitting reply to the humiliations suffered by the Asian peoples at the hands of the Western powers'.79 Ambassador Panikkar declared on 26 January 1951: 'Mao Tse-tung's leadership has raised the international status of the peoples of Asia.'8° In notable contrast to Indian acerbity towards America, Menon was significantly tolerant in the face of Chinese criticism of an Indian proposal regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war. In his cable Chou En-lai had used such epithets as 'ranting, degenerate, absurd, deceitful, sly', but Krishna Menon magnanimously said, 'They appear to be very angry with us, but we must not be angry with them and we must persevere as best we can for peace.'81 Early in 1951 Nehru gave his own interpretation of Chinese objectives to volney D. Hurd of the Christian Science Monitor: 'Communist China is not imperialist. It wishes most of all to carryout its own revolution. For this it wishes to see Tibet and Formosa under Chinese control and Korea freed of foreigners, considering this necessary for its own protection in this formative period.'82

A side effect of Indo—US differences over the UN resolution censuring China as an aggressor in Korea was that action by the United States Congress on the Indian request for wheat, already much delayed, was further postponed,83 with predictable further deteriora tion of the American image in Indian eyes. 24 Senator Knowland summed up American feelings concerning India's behaviour during the Korean conflict: 'When the first test came to the free world ... the Government of India contributed not a single soldier, not a single sailor, not a single airman to aid in resisting aggression in Korea .. when the chips were down India was not there.'84 Japanese Peace Treaty

The outbreak of the cold war between the erstwhile allies in the war against Japan had delayed peace-making with the latter after the Second World War but, with the emergence of a potentially strong Communist China and the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States felt impelled to take urgent steps to convert Japan into an ally against Com- munist inroads in the Far East. In September 1950 Truman nominated John Foster Dulles as his personal representative to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan, to be signed by nations who had been at war with her. Having issued a joint draft of the proposed treaty, the USA and Britain called a conference to meet at San Francisco in September 1951 to sign the treaty. The rule was that representatives could give their views but the conference would not be competent to modify the terms of the treaty. Communist China was not invited. Among those who were invited, but remained unreconciled to the contents of the treaty, were the USSR and India. The treaty was signed at San Francisco on 8 September 1951 by 48 of the 51 countries who had sent delgates. Those who came but did not subscribe were the USSR, Czechos- lovakia, and Poland; India, Burma, and Yugoslavia had refused to attend. On the same day, as a part of the peace settlement, the United States signed a security pact with Japan, granting the former the right to station her forces in Japan.

Chou En-lai declared the treaty was aimed at resurrecting Japanese militarism and was an instrument for preparing another aggressive war.85 The Soviet Union alleged that the territorial issues inthe treaty were 'settled ... in conformity With the aggressive strategical plans of the Pentagon' 86 India objected to the treaty on the grounds that it was not sufficiently magnanimous to Japan; that its terms were such that all interested parties could not sign it; that the security pact between the United States and Japan had been made a part of the peace arrangements; and that there was no provision for the return of Formosa to China."

In reply, the United States quoted the Prime Minister of Japan that 'the treaty, as at stands, reflects abundantly American fairness, magnanimity and idealism'. The American note also stated that the Allied Powers had gone to great pains to ensure that the treaty would be such as to enable all the Allies to subscribe to it; that the US—Japanese security arrangements conformed to the desire of the Japanese people, who 'do not want Japan to become a defenseless nation'; and that to postpone the conclusion of the treaty till all the Allied Powers were agreed upon the future of Formosa, would delay the treaty indefinitely.

Pakistan not only signed the Japanese Peace treaty but also voiced powerful support for it from the floor of the conference. Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan claimed it was 'a good treaty' offering justice and reconciliation, not vengeance and oppression.88 He referred to the Chinese as a 'great people' who had suffered the most at the hands of power-drunk Japan, and deplored their absence 'because of the difference among the allied nations as to who is entitled to represent' them. In Pakistan's judgement the matter of representation no longer admitted of doubt, but Pakistan had no right to impose her view on others. He also regretted that India and Burma had not attended the conference but pointed out that their absence was voluntary and for reasons Pakistan was 'unable to appreciate'. So far as the treatment ofJapan was concerned, India had found the treaty too restrictive and Burma had found

25 it too liberal. It was well not to forget, however, 'that there are represented among us Asiatic states numbering well over a quarter of the assembled allied nations', the people of some of which had suffered at the hands of the Japanese possibly more than the people of Burma and certainly more than the people of India.

Pakistan's unequivocal support at a critical juncture left a deep impression on the minds of the Americans. Two years later, Dulles, as Secretary of state, supporting Pakistan's request for the supply of wheat, recalled that at the time of the Japanese Peace Treaty the Soviet Union tried to portray the treaty as being imposed upon Japan by a few Western Pow- ers headed by the United States, and that 'at that juncture Pakistan furnished a leaderShip which brought to that conference a substantial number of Asian countries'.89

India's decision to boycott the San Francisco conference, on the other hand, caused deep resentment in the USA. The Washington Daily News observed that Nehru's country was saved from Japanese subjugation by the might of American arms, 'yet India's Prime Minister not only wants the Japanese Peace Treaty to be redrafted in accordance with his view, but also presumes to name the signatories to that document'.9° Inside the Capitol, senators Knowland and Bridges complained that India had sided with the Soviet Union, and the former declared, 'We had better start taking a realistic view of just who our friends are in the struggle for a free world.'91 The New York Times referred to the Indian Prime Minister as the 'Lost Leader' and called his reasons for staying away from the peace conference 'specious and misguided' 92 At the other end of the see-saw, India rose sharply in the estimation of Russia and China, and a basic change in their policy towards her soon became manifest.

Added to the divergent attitudes of India and Pakistan towards the Korean War, their diametrically opposed roles in the diplomacy relating to the Japanese Peace Treaty further accelerated the process of US estrangement from India and friendship towards Pakistan. Not long after calling Nehru the 'Lost Leader', the New York Times singled out Pakistan as America's 'one sure friend in South Asia'.93

In retrospect it seems clear that by 1951 circumstances were already pushing both Pakistan and the United States towards an alliance which they formally consummated in 1954.

REFERENCES

I. To this day India celebrates 26 January as her independence day, not 15 August on which date she became con- stitutionally independent. 2. For text of declaration see Pa ttabi Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, I, p.363. 3. D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, III, p. 8. Gandhi, however, was not consistent in his attitude towards Dominion Status. In 1939 he said he would accept such a status, if offered. H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide, p.318. 4. J. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p.428. 5. H. V. Hodson. The Great Divide, p.87. 6. Listener, 22 Jan. 1959. A British observer wrote in 1949, 'Too many British Labour Party members are still thinking in terms of a progressive Congress and a reactionary Moslem League.' Richard Symonds, 'Estrangement of Pakistan: Grievances against Britain', Manchester Guardian, 24 Aug. 1949. 7. See Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj, ch. 2. 8. John Connell, Auchinleck, p.864. 9. Alan Campbell—Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, p.31. 10. Ala,) Campbell—Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, p.66. I I p.291. 12. Ibid., p. 60. 13. /bid., p.81.

2.6 14. See in this behalf M. Ratique /that, Speeches and Statements of Quaid- i-Millat Liaquat All Khan, p. 209, where Liaquat reveals that the Muslim League protested that it would be impossible to set up a new country within the space of two months after the announcement of the 3 June plan to paftition India, but its representation was 'disregarded. For the Indian wish to hurry the transfer of power, see V.P. Menon, The Transferefrower in India, p.380 (quoting Nehru) and K. L Panjabi, The Indomitable Sardar, p. 155 (quoting Sardar Patel's disclosure that he had Agreed to partition on the condition that power should be transferred within two months). IS. See pp. 30-1. 16. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, p. 291 17. Round Table, Dec. 1948. IS. J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 138. 19. Patrick Gordon Walker, The Commonwealth, p. 182. • 20. 7Wilight of Empire/Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement Attlee, asset Down by Francis Williams, p. 21 S. 21. Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, 11, p. 846. 22. 7Wilight of Empire..., p. 219. 23. Economist, 23 April 1949. 24. The Times, 16 May 1949. 25. Chaudhri Muhammad All, The Emergence of Pakistan, p.379. 26. Wibston S. Churchill, The Second World War IV, p. 190. • 27. This obviously meant that the Congress Party should be asked to form the Government because it was only that party which claimed to represent all the interests in India. 28. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, IV, p. 185. 29. New York Times, 14 April 1947, 30. Round Table, Sept. 1963. It may be pointed out that with the states of Alaska and Hawaii separated from the main body of the United States, one would encounter a similar difficulty in drawing a map of the USA. Congressional Record (vol. 93, part 5, p. 634)) 80th Congress, 1st Session, 4 June 1947, House. 32. Congressional Record, Appendix (Vol. 93, part 12, p. 2968)80th Congress, 1st Session, 19 June 1947, House. 33. Congressional Record, Appendix (Vol. 93, part 13, p. A4279) 80th Congress, 1st session, 17 Nov. 1947, House, 34. Congressional Record, Appendix (Vol. 95, part 13, p. A23.74) 81st Congress, 1st Session, 25 April 1949, Senate 35. Hindu, 12 Oct. 1949. . 36. New York Times, 28 April 1949. 37. The thought was specially appropriate because the following day-12 October-happened to be Columbus Day. 38. However, after the short border war with China, Nehru said, at Rohtak, on 9 March 1963, that it was good China did not have an atom bomb. if she had it, nobody could say when she would use it. A. G. Noorani, Our Credulity and Negligence, p. 119. 39. Jawaharlal's Discovery &America, pp. 63, 81. 40. Ibid., p.71. 4 I . New York Times, 16 Oct. 1949. 42. Jawaharlal's Discovery ofAmerica, p.26. 43. K. P. Karunakaran, India in World Affairs, Aug. 1947-Jan. 1950, p.46. 44. Phillips Talbot and S. L. Poplai, India and America, p. 157. 45. Selig S. Harrison, 'Case History of a Mistake', New Republic, 1 0 Aug. 1959 46. Jawaharlal's Discovery ofAmenca, p. 143. 47. New Times, no. 42, 1949. 48. Unless otherwise stated, the subject matter of Liaquat's addresses has been taken from Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakis- tan: The Heart ofAsia. 49. NS York Times, 5 May 1950. 50. Dawn, 21 May 1950. ' 51. Ibid., 3 June 1950. 52. M. Rafique Afzal (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat baguet Ali Khan, p. 429. 53. New York Times, 5 MaY 1950. 54. Dawn, 25 May 1950. 55. Quoted in Hindu, 28 July 1950. 56. Newsweek, 15 May 1950. • 57. New York Times, 29 Aug. 1950. 58. Michael Brecher, India and World Politics, p. 36. 59. 7Wilight of Empire, Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement Attlee, as set down by Francis Williams, p. 238. 60. J. Nehru, Uniry of India, p.336. 61. United States Department of State Bulletin (henceforth USDSB), 7 Aug. 1961, p. 239. 62.. The Soviet delegation had walked out of the Security Council on 13 January 1950 following the defeat' of the Soviet resolution to exclude Nationalist China from the Council, as a step towards sealing the People's Republic of China, and did not return till 1 August 1950..

2 7' 63. Dawn, 28 June 1950. 64. /hid., 2 July 1950. 65. That Liaquat's advisers were split over the question .of sending troops to Korea has been related to me by more thanpne of the advisers themselves. 66. M. A. ft. Ispahani, 'The Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1947-64', Pakistan Horizon, 3rd Quarter 1964, p.237. Ispahani was Pakistani Ambassador to the United States at the time. 6%. Quoted by Mdian PressDigests, far the period 16 Sept. to 15 Nov 1951, Vol.!: no. 2,p. 5. 68. R Patine Dutt, Mdia Today mid Tomorrow, p. 289. 69. USDSB, 31 July 1950, pp. 170-1. 70. Congressional Record, Appendix (vol. 96, p. A5382), 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 25 July 1950; Congressional Reom rvoi. 96, p. 125764 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 25 July 1950. %I. Russia in the meantime having returned to the Security Council, further action through that organ was no longer feasible. 72. Vincent Sheen, 'The Case For India', Foreign AllahS, Oct. 1951. 73, Dawn, 8 Dec. 1950, quoted by Mushtaq Ahmart, The United Nations and Pakistan. p.91. 74. K. P. Karunakaran, India in World Affairs, Feb. 1950-Dec 1953, p. 106. 75. J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p.418. 76. J. Nehru, Speeches, II, p.273. • 77. K. P. Karunakaran, India /n World Mails, Feb. 1950-Dec 1953, p. 122. 78. For example: 'lam inclined to think that many of the subsequent dangerous developments, including the Korean development, might not have taken place' if China had entered the United Nations at an earlier stage (in Parlia- ment.on 3 Aug. 1950); 'lam convinced that there would have been no Korean War if the People's Government oi China had been in the United Nations'.). Nehru, Speeches, III, p.270. 79. K. Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy, p.49. 80. ibid. 81. 1 lindbstan Times, 17 Dec. 952, quoted by Indian Press Digests, Vol .11, 3 p.29. 82. Christian Science Mon/tot; 22 Jan. -1951. 83. New York Times, 26 Jan. 1951. 84. Congressional Record (vol. 100, p. 655), 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 22 Jan. 1954, Senate. 85. Ni. Markov, 'After San Francisco', New Times, no. 39, 1951. 86. New Times, no. 37,.1951. 87. For text of Indian Note and the US reply thereto see (15858, 3 Sept. 1951. pp. 385-8. 88. For full text of Zafrulla's speech see Govt. of Pakistan Handout E. no. 3414, 9 Sept. 1951. 89. Wheat to Pakistan. Hearings on H. R. 5659,5660, and 5661 before the House Committee on Agriculture and FOWSIty, 15 June 1953, pp. 8, 9. 90. Washington Daily News, 11 Aug. 1951, quoted in Govt. of Pakistan, Handout E. No. 3025, 13 Aug. 1951. 91. Cot igressional Record (tiol 97, pp. 10742-3), 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 28 Aug. 1951 92. New York Times, 28 Aug. 1951. 93. lb Sept. 1951.

28 READING 2

(Exceipts from 'India, Bangladesh and Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent," by 1,1/ Choudluv, New York, The Free Press, 1975).

Reproduced tvith Permission.

he first U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Paul II. Ailing, arrived in Karachi in 1947, and Governor General Jinnah referred to the great tradition of American democracy while T accepting his credentials. America's lack of interest in the new state, however, was indicated by the delay until 1950 of the replacement of the first Ambassador, whose stay in Karachi was limited to live months because of illness and subsequent death. The United "tales had no doubt attached greater importance to India because of its larger size and past •tory. Whereas such Indian leaders as Gandhi and Nehru were well known, those of Pak's- .n were hardly familiar to Americans. On the eve of Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the United States in 1950, the American press frankly admitted that Americans knew little about Pakis- tan.2 Indeed, Pakistan was so preoccupied by regional problems that it could scarcely play any role in international politics, and it had no illusions about its lack of capacity to do so- much less was heard in Karachi than in New Delhi about the new "spirit" of Asia. Nor did Pakistan appear much interested in the East-West tensions. Although Pakistan, like India, gave consistent support to anticolonialism, it had no pretensions about its role in Asian al- airs and did not entertain ideas of building an Asian grouping-which it knew would come • in almost any case under Indian leadership, an intolerable prospect.

Pakistan and its leaders continually sought to strengthen ties with Washington. The largest Muslim state, as Pakistanis proudly referred to themselves was ideologically aligned wiih the West; Pakistan can never go communist,"3 declared Fazlur Rahman, a prominent Bengali member of the Cabinet. In the early years of nationhood, Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammad, subsequently the third Governor General and a key actor in the alliances of the mid- 1950s, was engaged in strenuous efforts to secure American capital and investment for solving the country's desperate economic problems.4 The Defense Secretary, lskander Mirza, who became the fourth Governor General and the first President of Pakistan, led in July 1949 a military mission to the United States to explore the possibilities of securing arms supplies.' The Truman administration, however, refused; the United States worked for settlement 011ndo- Pakistani disputes, but as long as they remained unresolved, the State De- partment wanted to preserve "complete neutrality" in matters such as arms supplies.' Alter

29 Indians expressed "concern" over what they termed the "large scale of American ammunition" sent to Pakistan, in June 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson assured Ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit (who came to Washington in 1949 following her Moscow service) that "Pakistan was given no permission which also had not been given India."' Both nations, in this early period, bought ammunition from the United States as from other countries, but neither yet received American military aid.

Americans repeatedly expressed the hope that Indo—Pakistani relations would become normal, if not friendly. A group of American senators who visited the subcontinent in November 1949 expressed dismay that "the air of both dominions was charged with unusual tension, making one doubtful of the existence ofpeace in these two countries." This injected, the senators believed, a "disturbing factor" in the consideration of foreign aid. "Aid to One Dominion alone would create misunderstanding between the aiding country and the country not receiving it."8The assessment was correct, as subsequent developments proved.

There were, however, fewer differences on world affairs, and thus less chance of misunderstanding, between the United States and Pakistan than between the United States and India. Pakistan did not assail U.S. policy or actions in the Cold War. On the contrary, feeling threatened by Afghanistan and India, Pakistan appreciated problems inherent in the "search for security" and the "doctrine of defence by friendship."9 Its attepmpts to form a union among the Middle Eastern Islamic countries seemed reasonable to the policy makers in Washington, since the United States was already thinking in terms of defense arrangements in the Middle East as well as Southeast Asia.1° Pakistan's geographic location af- forded it special strategic significance: West Pakistan borders on the region surrounding the Persian Gulf while East Pakistan had a vital interest in problems affecting the countries of Southeast Asia.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan deemed his visit to the United States in 1950 "an impressive success," and his speeches sparked favourable comment in the American press. 12 President Truman's invitation to Liaquat seemed to be a natural sequel to Nehru's visit of the preceding year—a courteous intimation that the United State was equally the friend of pakistan and India. Truman wanted assurance that the subcontinent would not give passive support to the extension of Soviet influence in the direction of Central Asia,I3 and, as far as Pakistan was concerned, he received it: "No threat or persuasion," Liaquat told the U.S. Con- gress, "no material peril or ideological allurement," cold deflect Pakistan from its chosen path of free democracy. These words were interpreted to mean that Pakistan could be "counted among those who are devoted to freedom, regardless of the cost."" Liaquat's visit no doubt left U.S. policy makers with a better understanding of Pakistan and its policy and problems, but the immediate results were not spectacular. Liaquat was unable to obtain a promise of arms shipments, and he could not line up private capital and investment i5 the only economic aid pledged was through the government's Point Four Program, which also supported India.

Nevertheless, development in the Middle East and Southeast Asia were bringing closer the United States and Pakistan.18 While Liaquat, assassinated in 1951, did not live to see the fruits of his plans for U.S. military and economic assistance, the last two years of the Truman administration indicated a trend toward forging closer links with Pakistan that assumed formal shape in 1952 when Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower took office. Pakistan's role during the Korean War and its enthusiastic participation in the San Francisco Confer- ence arranged to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty made a favorable impression on Washington in contrast to India's role on these issues. On the U.S. side, Henry A. Byroade 30 (who became Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs):. Theodore Tannenwald (Deputy to Mutual Security Administrator Averell Harriman), and Major General George Olmstead (Director of the Office of Military Assistance) favored closer military ties with Pakistan.'7

In November 1952, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chief of the U.S. Naval Staff, arrived in Pakistan for discussions with Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and Commander-in- Chief General Ayub Khan, the two architects of Pakistani military alliance membership. These discussions, as well as previous negotiations between Major General Shahid Hamid and American Army officials in Washington, laid the foundations for subsequent military pacts between the two countries. 18 A careful analysis of the unpublished papers relating to these talks uncovers proof that these pacts were not solely what George J. Lerski labelled a "brainwave of John Foster Dulles," I9 although it was indeed Eisenhower's Secretary of State who provided the vision, clarity, and purpose to bring about the pacts. The defense scheme for the Middle East was yet to take definite shape, but it was clear by late 1952 that Pakistan would be included. Similarly, the idea of a Pacific pact, which had earlier been considered in- feasible by the Americans,20 was revived after the Korean War.

Pakistan's policy of noninvolvement in the East-West Cold War, a policy initiated by Jinnah and faithfully followed by Liaquat up to 1950, was coming to an end along with the American policy of noninvolvement in the subcontinent. The United States and Pakistan were moving in the same direction for different reasons: the United States was guided by its global policy of containing international communism, and Pakistan was motivated by problems of national security and defense. In U.S. relations with the subcontinent a new phase that had a profound impact on the South Asian Triangle had begun.

Deeper Involvement in the Subcontinent

Although the Republicans had been the opposition party for twenty years, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Cabinet did not make any radical changes in U.S. foreign policy once they assumed power in January 1953. They no doubt made a fresh assessment of the international situation, but containment of international communism continued to be the keynote. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Point Four program had all , been effected to achieve the main foreign policy objective— the prevention of Soviet expansion. By this time, the European scene had stabilized in two formal camps, and the division was complete between Western Europe and the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe.

In Europe, the problem of Russian expansion was thought to have been solved by the military alliance of NATO. But the Nato-type defense could not be applied to either the Middle East or Southeast Asia for three reasons; (1) as already discussed, the Asians and Arabs were not as worried about communism as was Western Europe; (2) partly because of (I) the Asians and Arabs saw their regional cohcerns as problems apart from great power politics—if the British feared the Soviets, it was colonialism that inflamed Indonesia and Egypt—and (3) Asians and Arabs were more reluctant than West Europeans to enter into major commitments with the United States because their cultural bonds with the Americans were much weaker. Despite the inapplicability of a NATO arrangement, however, something had to be done to protect the countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia —or, to put it bluntly, something had to be done to protect the interests of the Western powers in these regions.

31 A Visit and a Vision On May 9, 1953, new Cabinet Officer Dulles set out on a twenty-day fact-finding mission to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, and Libya —the first visit of this kind ever undertaken by an American Secretary of State.'

In India, Dulles's first discussions with Nehru dealt with bilateral Indo—American relations, particularly the U.S. assistance to India's development projects. These talks went well, but basic differences came out when Dulles began the dialogue on broad international issues, concentrating on the American plan of military groupings in the Middle East or in Southeast Asia. It is safe to assume that Nehru made it plain that any Military bloc violated the fundamentals of India's policy of nonalignment;22 he did not need to add that an Ameri- can-sponsored bloc, becouse it would probably include Pakistan, would violate as well the fundamentals of India's national interests. India would not be carried along by Dulles's enthusiasm for fighting the "menace" of international communism and abandon its cherished policy, a policy endorsed in Moscow, accepted in Moscow, accepted in Peking, and embraced in the new countries of Asia.

In Pakistan, Dulles found a completely different climate. Eager to line up allies, the Pakistanis promptly responded to the plan for a collective security pact. Dulles's talks with Pakistan's new government23 were cordial, and he was impressed not only by the people's apparent friendship for the United States but also by what he termed, in his report on his visit, their "strong spiritual faith and martial spirit" that made them a "dependable bulwark against communism."' Of new Prime Minister Mohammad Ali (Bogra), who was noted for his strong pro-American views, Dulles said that "he energetically leads the new government." The Secretary stressed Pakistan's strategic position

Communist China borders on northern territories held by Pakistan, and from Pakistan's northern border one can see the Soviet Union. Pakistan flanks Iran and the Middle East and guards the Khyber Pass, the historic invasion route "from the north into the subcontinent."25

Despite both the Pakistanis' enthusiasm for security pacts and Dulles's enthusiasm for the Pakistanis, the path toward closer association between the two countries proved tb be circuitous, complicated not only by U.S. policy in the Middle East and Southeast Asia but also by Indo—American relations. Involving as they did India's immediate and unfriendly neighbour, the proposed military pacts severely strained U.S. relations with New Delhi.26 Dulles and the Eisenhower administration, not for a moment underestimating India's importance and growing influence in Asian affairs and probably willing to go to any length to induce Nehru to join the collective security schemes, counted India out of their new global plans only because India itself did. But this did not mean that India was not a factor in U.S. calculations on South Asia. During the speech quoted above in which Dulles paid tribute to Pakistan, he also said:

India has 7,000 miles of common boundary with China. There is occurring between these two countries 'a competition as to whether ways of freedom or police- state methods can survive. This competition affects directly 800 million people in these countries. In the long run the outcome will affect all of humanity including ourselves."

Pakistan, only too eager to respond to Washington's new moves in the subcontinent, had to wait, sometimes in great suspense, for many months before it became America's most allied ally in Asia" through bilateral and multilateral agreements and pacts. Not effected until 1955, full alignment was the result of a long and complicated process, a string of many hesitations and reservations on both sides.

REFERENCES

1. Dawn, Oct. 9,1947. 2. Christian Science Monitor and New York Herald Tribune, May 1950. 3. New York Times, Oct. 13, 1947. 4. Ibid. 5. ibid., July 24, 1949. 6. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, .1971. 7. Hindu (Madras), June 17, 1950. 8. The Statesman, Nov. 18, 1949. 9. See Choudhry, op. cit., 222-2.A. ; 10. Avra M. Warren, "Pakistan in the World Today," Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1949, pp. 1011-1012. II. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan, the Heart of Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. xi. 12. New York Times, May 5, 1950; Christian Science Monitor, May 4,5, and 10. 1950. .13. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 14. New York Times, editorial, May 5, 1950. IS. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 16. Documents on International Mails, 1953, op. cit., p. 263. 17. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 18. Ibid. 19. George J. Lerski, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: A Re-evaluation of the Past Decade," Asian Survey, May 1968, pp. 400-415. 20. See Survey of International Affairs, 1951, op. cit., pp. 478-480. • 21. See Dulles's speech of May 29, 1953, Documents on International Affairs, 1953, op. cit., pp. 258-259. 22. Based on the report of the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi, May 25, 1953, uncovered in my rsearch and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. • ; 23. In April 1953, the month before Dulle's trip, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, backed by army chief Ayut) Khan, dismissed Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin, and Mohammad Ali (Bogra), who had been Ambassador to the United States, was appointed Prime Minister on April 17. 24. See Dulles's speech of May 29, 1953, Documents on international Affairs, 1953, op. cit. 25. ibid. 26. Nehnt's Speeche.s- Vol HE 1953-1957, op. cit., pp. 366-376. 27. Dulles's speech of May 29, 1953, Documents on International Affairs, 1953, op. cit., p.266.

READING 3

(Excerpts from 'The American Role in Pakistan 1947-1958c by M. S. Venkatramani, Lahore, Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984).

Reproduced with Permission.

hortly after Jinnah arrived in Karachi which was to be the capital of Pakistan, he received a message from Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Ironically, that first di- S rect communication from the US Government to the soon-to-be head of the Govern- ment of Pakistan made a confident prophecy that has remained unfulfilled to the present day. Greeting Jinnah in his capacity as the President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the Secretary of State wrote:

I am confident that the Constitution you will present to the people of Pakistan and to the world will reflect the steadfast devotion of the leaders of Pakistan to the principles of democracy and peace, and that it will serve as a living charter upon which may be based the political, social and economic progress of the people of your new nation.'

The message from President Harry S. Truman to Jinnah, as the Governor General of the newly-born nation, was couched in cordial terms. But it did not contain anything like the grandiose expressions used in the President's message to the Governor-General of India. "I wish to assure you," the President's message to Jinnah ran, "that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America.'t

In New Delhi a senior American diplomat, Henry Grady, was already in position as Ambassador. In contrast no Ambassador of the United States was present when the transfer of power took place in Karachi. Charles W. Lewis who had been serving as Consul General in Karachi, was named Counsellor and Charge d'Affaires ad interim pending the appointment of as Ambassador. (Paul H. Ailing, the first American Ambassador to Pakistan, presented his credentials only in February 1948. Barely five months later he was forced by ill-health to return to the United States. The Embassy continued to be looked after by officials of lesser rank until Avra M. Warren was posted as Ambassador early in 1950).

American policy-makers did not at that time see Pakistan as a factor of significance for the promotion of major US interests. Their attention was principally concenti died on Europe and, to a lesser extent on Japan. They regarded the "Middle East" with its oil resources as a region of critical importance. On the Asian mainland they had their anxieties over the continuing adverse fortunes of their protege, Chiang Kai-shek, in his civil war against the Chinese Communists. Such sporadic attention as they could manage to spare was directed more at the larger, recognizable, and better known "India" than the new entity whose very name was little known to the American public and whose leaders evoked little emotion in any influential section of the community.

35 Among the men who mattered in the highest echelons of the American Govern ment, there was hardly anyone with any sort of meaningful knowledge of or interest in Pakis - tan. The present researcher doubts whether President Truman would have been able to point to Pakistan on a world map without some coaching. Having spent three months at In- dependence, Missouri, in 1961, and having had several opportunities to talk with Mr. Tru- man, became aware of the fact that the former President's knowledge of South Asia was minimal. While Truman had some strange things to say in strong language concerning India and Nehru, his notions concerning Pakistan were exceedingly foggy.

Secretary of State Marshall, the war-time Chief of Staff and the "organizer of victory" was held in high esteem by Truman. Neither Marshall nor the Under Secretary of State, investment banker Robert M. Lovett, tended to regard South Asia as a region of major significance in terms of US objectives. in such a situation, the officials of the regional division deal ing with South Asia were enabled to have a relatively freer hand in formulating courses of action. I have not been able to identify any particular individual among them as having had a pronounced interest in advocating a special US commitment to promote the cause of Pakis- tan, They tended at this point to devote greater attention to India than to Pakistan.

Secretary of Defence James Forrestal was deeply worried over the Soviet threat to the oil-bearing countries of West Asia. His diaries contain no reference to Pakistan as a country that might be important for American purposes in that connection.' There was none among the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other senior military officers with any previous record indicative of special enthusiasm for Pakistan. They had some awareness of the usefulness of continued access to the South Asian region in terms of the global security requirements of the United States.

If Pakistan had no special pleaders in high places in the Truman Administration or in Congress, it had no antagonists either. There was simply no great interest in the region and in comparison with India, Pakistan was accorded even less attention.

US Policy on the Eve of Partition

The Truman Administration had, of course, a policy towards the subcontinent, it h d evolved during the war and it was postulated on broad support for the course adopted by I he British Government. Even after the end of the war South Asia and the Middle East were regarded by American policy-makers as falling within Britain's "sphere of responsibility". Their broad concern was that the facilities and resources of the region should not pass under the control or influence of the perceived "adversary"—the Soviet Union. It was believed that 'instability" in the region would facilitate penetration by the Soviet Union acting through indigenous communist and other dissident elements. Some of the specifics in US policy on the eve of partition were to have adverse consequences for Pakistan.

The Truman Administration was ready to welcome and endorse any British move towards a political settlement in India transferring power to responsible "native" hands. While conscious of the sharp antagonism towards the Congress Party shown by Jinnah and his Muslim League, the Administration voiced the hope that good sense would prevail among the contending groups in India and that a united India would emerge into freedom on the basis or a settlement acceptable to the Congress and the Muslim League.

American policy-makers were of the view that a "Balkanization" of India would he adverse to US security interests. Jinnah's insistence on Pakistan was thus not especially 36 welcome to the United States, though there was some feeling that the Congress led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru had not risen to the occasion with a statesmanlike approach that would allay the League's fears and preserve a united India.

The Administration's position was thus summed up by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a communication to the US Embassy in London on.4 April 1947:

...we have during the past year given full support to the efforts of the British Govern- ment to effect a peaceful transfer of power to Indian hands on the basis of a federally unified India. This support has taken the form of several statements to the press by high American officials and of many informal conversations between our diplomatic representatives and important Indian leaders.

In following this course we have been fully aware of the serious obstacles in the path of Indian unity. But for the excellent reasons against the division of India... we have inclined to the view that our political and economic interest in that part of the world would best be served by the continued integrity of India."

Eventually when the final decision of the British Government to transfer power to two Dominions—India and Pakistan was announced, the Administration endorsed it as the only solution possible under the circumstances. The State Department declared that whatever constitutional pattern was determined by the Indian people themselves, the US Govern- ment "looks forward to continuance of friendliest relations with Indians of all communities and creeds."5 But even at this point the Department made no public reference to "Pakistan" nor did the US Ambassador in New Delhi use the name when, at a press conference on 7 July, he stated that he saw no reason why "on the establishment of the two dominions, there should not be prompt recognition of the fact by Washington."6

Ambassador Grady was, however, of the view that because of the previously-held American position of support for a united India, it was necessary for the State Department to announce promptly the decision to extend diplomatic recognition to Pakistan in order to stem 'and misrepresentation. Secretary Marshall shortly thereafter submitted a memorandum to the President recommending recognition. Marshall wrote:

On August 15, 1947, a new Government, known as the Dominion of Pakistan will be established with territorial jurisdiction over a large section of northwestern India and a smaller section of northeastern India.

...I believe it would be in our national interest to accord recognition to the new Dominion of Pakistan at the earliest possible date by responding favourably to ...Rhel anticipated request for an exchange of ambassadors.

Pakistan, with a population of seventy million persons, will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world.'

Marshall, in his usual terse fashion, had highlighted two points which seemed to him to be of key importance: (1) Pakistan would be the largest Muslim country in the world; and (2) Pakistan would occupy "one of the most strategic areas in the world." If and when one or the other or both factors became important for American purposes, Pakistan might well have to be courted. Sometime in the future, perhaps—but not yet.

37 While the Administration hoped to have the "friendliest relations with Pakistan when it is established," it was concerned over the part of the British plan that gave the so-called Princely States of the subcontinent—several hundreds in number and of varying sizes—the right to opt for one or the other of the Dominions or even choose any other course that they deemed fit. The attitude of the United States towards the situation was thus described by Marshall:

...we have in the past.. followed [the] line that Princely States should be incorpo- rated in either India or Pakistan on assumption that Balkanization of Indian subcontinent would jeopardize and complicaCe political and economic tradition and create conditions of instability ultimately adverse to broad US interests in the area.8

That was the major US concern—that there should arise no circumstances that could create conditions of instability in the subcontinent. Should, however, problems emerge, the Secretary believed, the United States should act in accordance with the advice given by the British Government. As Marshall put it on a subsequent occasion:

We must take care not to be responsible for adoption of... [courses of action] which British from wealth of their experience consider unworkable and to which they would not give their full support.8

Travails of an Infant Nation

Stability in the ,subcontinent to which the United States attached importance from the point of view of its own global interests appeared to come under severe strain within weeks after the transfer of power to the Dominions of Pakistan and India. The problems arose out of the very issue of accession of the Princely States about which the United States harboured some misgivings. On developments relating to two such States the Truman Ad- ministration paid no attention to Pakistan's sentiments. When the Muslim Nawab of the tiny principality ofJunagadh—an area with a small Muslim population that was not contiguous to Pakistan—announced his decision to accede to Pakistan, Indian troops marched into the place and thwarted his plans. Pakistan's outraged cries made no impact on the Truman Ad- ministration. Nor was the Administration in any mood to support Pakistan in its effort to encourage the Nizam of Hyderabad to resist the popular demand of the overwhelming majority of the population of his large State for immediate accession to India. Even as early•as April 1947 the State Departthent had taken the position that any "separatist move" by Hyderabad would be undesirable since in might become "a prelude to a fragmentation process which might have far reaching effects on any plan for ultimate Indian unity.'"

• But the third issue which related to the state of Kashmir was to prove to be much ' more complicated. Charles W. Lewis, the US Charge d'Affaires in Karachi, cabled the Secret- ary of State that a serious conflict had arisen between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The Hindu Maharaja of that to overwhelmingly Muslim state had appealed to the Government of India for assistance, alleging that Pakistan had sent in Pathan tribesmen as well as its own soldiers into the state, the Charge d' Affaires reported. The following day, 27 October 1947, the Maharaja had signed an Instrument of Accession, taking his state into the Indian Union. In accepting Kashmir's accession, the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, had stated that "as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the state's accession should be settled by reference to the people.""

38 The prospect of a clash between the two new Dominions, loomed large. The Nehru Government rushed troops to Kashmir where the popular leader, Sheikh Mohammad Abdul- lah, had already taken vigorous action to mobilize substantial support against the raiders. Abdullah, who held Nehru in high esteem was a long-time opponent of the Maharaja's feudal rule. The frightened ruler called upon Abdullah to head an interim government. Jinnah and his lieutenants had taken little or no part in the struggle against the autocracy of the so-called Princes. As British withdrawal approached they had tried hard to induce the lacklustre Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. Jinnah, who had rebuffed Abdullah, found his hopes seriously endangered by Abdullah's determination to oppose the raiders and by Nehru's action in sending Indian troops. Pakistan's chagrin was, naturally and understanda- bly, enormous.

In the good old days of the Raj, the Quaid could strike up a defiant and menacing posture towards Nehru and his "Hindu" Congress, serenely confident in his knowledge that the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, were committed to a policy of supporting his intransigence as the surest way of countering the nationalists. Now, however, it was "a whole new ball game." He was Governor-General of Pakistan, but his counterpart in New Delhi was the dynamic and influential L9rd Mountbatten whose access to the corridors of power in London was far greater than that of Jinnah and his colleagues. Number Ten Downing Street was no longer Churchill's address but that of Clement Attlee, the Labour Prime Minister.

Jinnah harboured grave reservations concerning the attitude of most leaders of the Labour Party towards him. His Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, a future Quaid of Pakistan, was to speak in these sorrowful terms two years later:

The Labour Party, in power in the United Kingdom unfortunately, [placement of commas as in the text!] has a background of attitudes not altogether favourable to Pakistan...Many of them were close personal friends of the Congress and were influenced before 1947 by Congress propaganda that the Muslim League was a body of reactionary landlords and nawabs and zamindars and that the idea to partition India was retrograde. Therefore they feel they ought to back up India, which they think is a democratic state, more in harmony with the ideals of the Labour Party. Well, that thing has stuck and it will take sometime before it wears of ....This is a stark fact which we have to face.' 2

Ghulam Mohammed's lament was not wholly justified when he made it, but in the autumn of 1947 the Pakistani leaders were brought face-to-face with the stark fact that they could no longer depend upon Great Britain to pick chestnuts out of the fire for them. Over and above all there was the even more harsh fact that it was no longer Nehru, the Pandit, with whom Jinnah had to deal, but Nehru, the Prime Minister of a much larger and stronger country than his own.

As confrontation with India loomed ahead, Pakistan nurtured grave misgivings over the attitude of its neighbour on the north—Afghanistan. Afghanistan rejected Pakistan's contention that the border between the two countries that Pakistan had inherited from British India, the Durand Line, was a settled international boundary. It refused to recognize the val- idity of a British-sponsored plebiscite in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) that had resulted in the allocation of the Province to Pakistan. Afghanistan appeared to Pakistan leaders to be poised to advance its own claims to the area and, towards that end, to encourage local elements to demand the right of self-determination for the Pushtu-speaking people of the Province. 39 On top of domestic problems of immense magnitude, the leaders of the new nation confronted what - they regarded as hostile threats to its very existence from unfriendly neighbours.

The State of the Armed Forces

Jinnah could not contemplate with equanimity the prospect of an all-out military confrontation with India. Even as he nursed deep suspicions coneerning the motives of the Indian Government, Jinnah could not but take into account the fact that the armed forces of his infant nation were in sad disarray. Recalling the position at this time "Field Marshal" Ayub Khan, wrote:

When...Partition came, our men from units in India began to trickle back into Pakis- tan in small groups. In some cases they were unarmed and in others they had to tight their Way out. So we had to start our army with bits and pieces like a gigantic jig-saw puzzle with some of the bits missing.

...our army was badly equipped and disorganized... we had no properly organized units, no equipment, and hardly any ammunition. The position was so bad that for the firstfeW years we could only allow five rounds of practice ammunition to each man t*ear. Our plight was indeed desperate.I3 The historian of the Pakistani Army, Major General Fazal Muqueem Khan, gives the followincfigures of units allocated to India and Pakistan on the basis of an agreement announced on 24 September 1947:

Arms/Services Pakistan India

Armoured Corps Regiments 6 14 Artillery Regiments (all types) 8 40 Engineer Groups 2 (major portion) (and a part) Infantry Regiments 8 S (includes 6 Gurkha Regiments) Pioneer Companies 10 • Garrison Companies 8 S Army Service Corps: Supply Units 23 40 Transport (MT.) 24 53 Transport (AT.) 3 4 Ordnance Field Units 4 9 Ordnance Static Units 11 32 Workshop Companies E.M.E. 13 20 Medical Units: Field 9 1.8 Speciall ed 14 Remount and Veterinary Units 28 29

40 Major General Khan states that while it was agreed that ordnance stores were to be divided in ratio of 36 to Pakistan to 64 to India, deliberate changes by India, where much of the stores was located, seriously affected Pakistan's position. According to him, the position in regard to what Pakistan was promised and what it actually received was as follows:

Description Pakistan's Share Receipt

Ordnance Stores 160,000 tons 23,225 tons Vehicles—soft 1,461 74 Vehicles—armoured (including 118 Shei .:.an and 46 Stuart tanks) 249 Nil Ammunition of all types 40,000 to including explosives 60,00 tons Nil Engineering stores including machinery 172,667 1,128 tons

"Much of the mechanical transport was deficient and there were neither reserves to replace vehicles nor tools andspares to repair them," Major General Khan writes. "There was complete absence of procurement machinery for food, lubricants and oil." There were only 219 medical officers and a mere 11 nurses. In factories that produced ordnance stores, Pakis- tan was grievously deficient.14 Pakistan was seriously short in military supplies, reported the US MilitaryAttache in Karachi, Lt. Col. Nathaniel Hoskot. Its military stocks were so low that it would be unable to support war in any form. Pakistan would, therefore, welcome some sort of intervention by the United Nations that would bring fighting in Kashmir Loan end, he added.I5

The new nation, embattled and disorganized, needed to be raised to its feet. The people were in a state of euphoria and were ready to respond to vigorous leadership. But Jin- nah and his lieutenants had no programme for the consolidation of the nation through far- reaching measures to promote economic development and social justice. The landlords and businessmen who dominated the councils of the Muslim League and the senior civil servants and military officers who saw opportunities for rapid advancement acted with selfish shortsightedness. A sober appraisal of the situation and of the implications of alternative courses available to the nation was not undertaken. Emotionalism ran high and old stereotypes of Hindu pusillanimity inhibited clear thinking. Inciting its tribesmen to move into Kashmir or, at any rate, countenancing their action was to prove to be a serious blunder for which Pakistan was to pay dearly. The times called for a leader with the sagacity, cunning, shrewdness, resolution, and sense of timing of a Lenin. Jinnah was cast in a different mould. He had earlier shown himself to be a master tactician in the Indian political game in which the rules had been different and the umpire friendly. For the first time Jinnah was to know what it meant to stand in the ring, alone, with a much stronger adversary confronting him. Faced with the prospect of such a desperate situation, the Quaid-i-Azam turned to the United States for succour.

Ghulam Mohammed's Role

On I September 1947 the American Charged' Affaires in Karachi received a tele- 41 phone call from Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed inviting him for "a little informal talk." The Finance Minister had already given clear indication of his desire to cultivate friendly and informal relations with the American diplomat. When Lewis arrived at the Minister's office he sensed that Ghulam Mohammed had some serious issue on his mind. The Minister said that he wanted to talk to Lewis freely and frankly not as a politician but [as] a businessman" on a matter of great importance. He had not yet raised the issue in the Cabinet and might have to do so before long. Before taking that step he desired "to explore the question" with his American friend.

Would the United States be willing to give "a helping hand" to Pakistan by extending urgently needed financial assistance? That, the Minister said, was the question he was interested in posing. Pakistan needed capital and technical assistance for developing its economy rapidly. Aid arrangements could be worked out which would in time be quite pro- fitable to American capital. The second important area calling for US financial assistance to Pakistan would be in consonance with American security concerns, Ghulam Mohammed indicated. Would the United States provide funds "to meet the administrative expenses including in particular the defense needs of the Government of Pakistan?"

Lewis set forth in his report to the Secretary of State the arguments advanced by. Ghulam Mohammed in justifying his request:

As regards the second point, that of financial assistance to meet the operating expenses of the government, the Minister said that the burden of protecting India had been placed on Pakistan, at least the burden of protecting the Northwestern Fron- tier, which is the only possible source of danger. He said Russia was watching India. Pakistan, as well as other parts of Islam, had little in common with Russian ideology. He had no idea what move, if any Russia would make in the direction of India but that he and his colleagues felt that Pakistan must be ready, defensively to do what it could to bar the path should Russia decide to move South.

...The Minister said that at the present moment the Pakistan Army Was composed of about 95,000 officers and men, and there was also the Air Force and the Navy to support. They represented a costly load for Pakistan, but he did not feel that it would be sfe to reduce those forces.

Lewis, of course, was in no position to offer any assurances that the United States would be ready to shoulder any significant part of "the administrative expenses including particularly the defense needs of the government of Pakistan" He frankly told Ghulam Mohammed that he was not familiar with the US Government's position on providing loans to foreign governments to meet administrative expenses. He suggested that the Government of Pakistan should prepare a document describing its fiscal position and its requirements for assistance and that the newly-appointed Pakistani Ambassador should take up the matter with officials of the US Government in Washington. Ghulam Mohammed agreed that the course Lewis had suggested was the proper one and went on to plead that when the proposals were submitted to the US Government, Lewis should give them his "sympathetic support."

Lewis alerted the Secretary of State that on his arrival in Washington, the Pakistani Ambassador, M.A.H. Ispahani, was likely to launch a bid for substantial assistance from the United States.' 6

It was Ghulam Mohammed who was the originator of the concept of massive depen

42 dence on the United States for meeting the "administrative expenses" of Pakistan, especially in the field of defence. He had a, .parently no difficulty in winningfinnah's concurrence for his venture. The Quaid-i-Azam pr nptly named Mir Laik Ali to serve as his special emissary to negotiate with officials in Washington. Ispahani was to work closely with Laik Ali in implementing the move. Since the issue was a top secret, details were known only to a very small group of persons in the Pakistani Government. One shrewd decision that was made was to enlist the co-operation of an influential US financial organization to lobby in support of aid to Pakistan. The organization chosen was the Chase National Bank of New York.

Jinnah's Special Emissary Submits Memorandum

Early in October Laik All sought a meeting with Winthrop W. Aldrich, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chase National Bank. Laik All told the banker that he had a mes - sage for him from finnah. The Government of Pakistan would like to offer a "proposition" that Chase National should represent it "in connection with commercial matters. ..that might have to do with the future development of the economy of Pakistan." Aldrich responded that before accepting such a relationship Chase National would want to assure itself that the State Department would have no objection to the course. He also asked Laik Ali to give him a comprehensive document setting forth what exactly Pakistan wanted. The visitor subsequently gave Aldrich the document that he desired. The same document was subsequently to be submitted by Laik Ali to the State Department. Laik Ali did not know that the Depart- ment had already received a copy from Aldrich along with a report concerning Laik Ali's visit.' 7

On 8 October 1947 Pakistan's first Ambassador to the United States, Ispahani, presented his credentials to President Truman. Launching into an ethnological exposition, the Ambassador described Pakistanis as descendants of the great Muslim emperors of India, who originally came from the steppes of Central Asia and the Caucasian mountains— the original homes of the ancestors of the American people! The President did not hasten to acknowledge any bond uf common ancestry. "We stand ready to assist Pakistan in all ap - propriate ways which might naturally benefit our two countries and the world...," Truman said.18

And the rulers of Pakistan took the President at his word!

Ispahani wasted no time in seeking an appointment with senior officials of the State Department for himself and the special emissary of Governor-General Jinnah to discuss a matter of great urgency. On 17 October the Ambassador and Laik Ali were received by Wil- lard L. Throp, Roy Thurston, and two other representatives of the Office of Near Eastern Af- fairs. Laik Ali told the officials that the Government of Pakistan desired to receive from the United States a loan of $2 billion. He then made a presentation which, the State Department officials noted, closely followed the memorandum which the Pakistanis had handed over earlier to Winthrop Aldrich of the Chase National Bank. Since the memorandum was to be subsequently handed over to the State Department as the official submission of the Govern- ment of Pakistan, it may be appropriate to describe it in some detail at this point, especially the sections relating to defence.

• The memorandum made it clear that the Government of Pakistan was willing to designate the United States as its principal economic and military benefactor. It said:

Primarily defence, and secondly, economic development are the two vitally essen-

43 tial features of Pakistan's life and for both of these she has to look firstly to the U.S.A. and then to Great Britain for assitance....lt has been broadly asessed that to enable Pakistan to hold a proper place in the comity of nations and to attain a reasonably independent economic position and to allow her to make a fair contribution to the sta- • bility of world peace, the Government of Pakistan would need a loan of approximately two billion dollars from the U.S.A. Government spread over a period of about five years. The country would also need the assistance of the large American oil interests to develop and exploit its immense oil resources. She would require help of the experienced technical experts for establishment and development of certain specified industries and would need also a certain amount of preferential treatment in earlier supplies of capital goods. For the purposes of defence, she would need American supplies of armaments, ammunition, naval and air crafts and facilities to train its personnel in their use.

Pakistan's progress and security called for the implementation of a comprehensive programme of industrial development, the memorandum indicated. The country was, however, confronted by a difficult financial situation. The most urgent requirements on the "defence side" were the expansion of existing ordnance plants and the setting up of new plants for the manufacture of certain types of arms and ammunition and of basic chemicals. The implementation of any programme of industrial development depended on Pakistan's capacity to purchase capital goods and to obtain technical assistance, it stated.

The memorandum offered the interesting justification that US assistance to Pakis- tan would, in effect, be a contribution for the defence of India against Soviet encroachment" "In its external and defence policy..., the proximity and vulnerability of Western Pakistan to Russia, is the most dominant factor.

...If Pakistan yielded to any external threat, the defence of India will become almost an impossibility." The memorandum continued:

If Pakistan is to become strong enough to defend itself, even with the generous assistance of and close collaboration with Great Britain and the United States of America, it will first need to•be economically developed and extensively improved, the existing air and military bases modernized and expanded, and new ones established, the production of essential arms and ammunitions enlarged and speeded up and better facilities created for the overhauling and maintenance of aircraft and other more advances forms of machinery. Living conditions and training arrangements for regular troops will have to be improved, and an extensive system for training recruits will have to be introduced. With advancement of education, improved health conditions and a little better standard of life, and their traditional sense of pride and self-defence revived and stimulated, it is certain that the inhabitants of Pakistan will rise up to any occasion when the occasion does come. What is needed is finance, and more than that, a regular source of finance.°

It was in this fashion that barely two months after Pakistan was born, the Govern- ment headed byfinnah turned to the United States as "a regular source of finance" for industrial development and expansion of its militry forces. In making his presentation on the lines of the memorandum. Laik Ali emphasized that Pakistan "presently faced a Soviet threat on her northern frontier." He stressed that since "presently" there was little co-operation between Pakistan and India, Pakistan's military requirements were comparatively heavy.

44 The State Department officials listened to Laik Al's narration and then gave him the discouraging response that there was no source of credit available to the United States Gov- ernment to meet the "administrative expenses" of the Government of Pakistan. They, however, promised to study the memorandum and suggested that it would be helpful if Laik All furnished them a more concise statement of Pakistan's defence requirements.2°

Laik Ali forwarded to the Department two additional papers-one a breakdown of Pakistan's requirements and the other a justification of the various requirements. They indicated that Pakistan sought $700 million for industrial development, $700 million for agricultural development, and $510 million for building and equipping its defence services. The total amount of approximately $2 billion was sought as a loan to be utilized over a period of five years. Of the $510 million sought for defence, $205 million was specified as being needed to meet anticipated deficits in Pakistan's military budget. The remaining $305 million was to be expended, as mentioned earlier, in the following manner:

Army-$170,000,000

To provide for a Regular Army of 100,00 consisting of one armored division, five infantry divisions partly motorized, and a small section of cavalry; and to provide for replacement and remodelling of existing arms and equipment, equipment for ordnance factories, raw materials and payment of personnel.

Air Force-$75,000,000

To provide for 12 fighter squadrons (150 planes), 4 fighter reconnaissance squadrons (70 planes), 3 bomber squadrons (50 planes), and 4 training wings (200 planes), together with necessary replacements, ground facilities, and payment of personnel.

Navy-$60,000,000

To provide for 4 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 4 corvettes, 12 coast guard gun- boats, 3 submarines, and 120,000 tons of miscellaneous vessels with necessary ammunition, base equipment, etc.2 I

The Cold Shoulder

The State Department officials were not excited over Pakistan's plaintive bid to make the United States "a regular source of finance" for the administrative expenses of expanding Pakistan's defence forces, paying military personnel, and meeting budgetary deficits. There is no evidence to indicate their having rushed to the Secretary of State with the tidings concerning Pakistan's willingness to sign up as a stipendiary and to virtually open up its armed forces to substantial American influence. They were clearly aware that the Sec- retaries of State and Defence attached no high priority to the location and exploitation of opportunities for a major American role in Pakistan. The officials of the Near Eastern Division themselves, while directly interested in developments in the region, were still in the process Of adjusting their minds to the very concept of Pakistan as an independent nation. They were not inclined to regard Pakistan as capable of playing a potentially significant role in promoting US security objectives in West and South Asia. American policy-makers had designated the area as one in which the British Government was to have primary security responsibility. The lir,- was stated thus in a State Department document: "Bearing in mind the commit- 45 ments which the United States had made elsewhere, it would appear to be in our interest that the British continue to have, from the global point of view, the paramount responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in South Asia."22 The officials who dealt with Laik All and Ispahani could see that the Pakistanis had made their move without meaningful prior consultation with the British. The Pakistani request had little chance of being considered by Washington in the absence of active British sponsorship and support. To the officials of the State Department the plea from Pakistan was just one of those numerous appeals for assistance that were flooding Washington from the four corners of the globe.

The officials tended to view the Pakistani exercise as somewhat strange and even bizarre. Not a single representative of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs regarded the Pakis- tani paint as deserving a positive response. As a memorandum prepared by the Office put it: "It was obvious from this approach that Pakistan was thinking in terms of the U.S. as a primary source of military strength, and since this would involve virtual US military responsibility for the new Dominion, our reply to the Pakistan request was negative."23

The decision was taken at a meeting of four officials held in the office of Roy L. Thurston on 24 October 1947. The consensus at the meeting was that within a few days jinnah's special emissary should be given a reply on the following lines:

I. The United States does not have funds to loan of the magnitude contemplated for essentially development projects.

2. The US Export-Import Bank will give consideration to individual projects of moderate scope, which will be approved or disapproved on their merits.

3. The Government of Pakistan may consider addresSing its inquiries for larger loans to (a) private investment sources and/or (b) the International Bank.

• 4. However, in view of the considerable disruption of the economy and finances of the new nation of Pakistan, the United States will give sympathetic consideration to a request from Pakistan for an emergency loan of reasonable proportions.'

It is noteworthy that the officials did not even care to touch on that part of the Pakis- tani request which related to expansion and modernization of Pakistan's military forces. They simply ignored it. As a State Department internal memorandum put it: "The military items contained in this request [of Pakistan] were not considered because it was not yet clear what role the British were to fill in the military affairs of the new Dpminions, nor what US military policy towards South Asia would evently be."25

On 30 October 1947, Willard Thorp and his associates conveyed the US response to Laik Ali. finnah's special emissary could not grasp the fact that the United States had virtually turned down cold Pakistan's urgent request. Probably what kept his hopes alive was the vague statement by the American team that the United States would give sympathetic consideration to a request from Pakistan for an emergency loan of reasonable proportions."

The American officials not.only made no reference to any assistance in the military field but asked Laik Ali uncomfortable questions on whether the various programmes of economic development mentioned in Pakistan's memorandum had been worked out in detail. Laik Ali mumbled that technical details relating to a paper mill in which he was person- • ally interested had been fully worked out, but that details of several other projects were still

46 in very rough form. Had he approached the World Bank yet? The emissary said he thought he should do so after discussions with the State Department. Had the Government of Pakistan given thought to obtaining private capital for the projects? Laik All said that projects which, it was hoped, could be developed with private capital had not been included in the request that had been submitted to the US Government.

The meeting was winding down to a tame close when Laik All startled the American officials by introducing a completely new subject. He who had submitted a request for $2 billion for the transformation of Pakistan's economy and the modernization of its armed forces suddenly sought the State Department's assistance for acquiring a very large number of blankets! The special emissary said that he had justseceived instructions from his Govern- ment to seek the Department's help in obtaining blankets and medical supplies. He wanted an immediate loan of about $45 million. The detailc, had all been worked out, he said. Pakis- tan had three million refugees and, on the basis of $15 per person, $45 million would be needed for the purchase of blankets and medical supplies. He had already made enquiries and had found out that the blankets could be obtained through commercial channels. The United States might kindly offer immediately $45 million and treat it "as an advance against the larger loan" that was being contemplated....

Thorp intervened to state politely but clearly that the United States had no funds to finance commercial purchases of blankets and other such items for relief purposes. lie added that if in US surplus stocks blankets were available, he would explore the possibility of arranging some credit to enable Pakistan to purchase them from the War Assets Administra- tion (WAA).26

When the meeting ended, the State Department officials believed that they had clearly conveyed to Laik Ali the negative response of the United States Government to Pakis- tan's request. But Jinnah's emissary lived in a world of his own making. He could not bring himself to believe that his mission was over. Either because of some inexplicable inability to comprehend what the American officials had told him or because of anxiety to delay the communities of bad news to his Quaid, Laik All sent optimistic reports to Karachi concerning .the progress of his "negotiations" with the State Department.

As he eagerly awaited the outcome of the talks, Jinnah tried another gambit tdrein- force the efforts that his special emissary was making in Washington. He deputed Sir Feroze Khan Noon, the veteran Muslim League, to visit several Muslim countries on a goodwill tour. While in Turkey Noon contacted the US Embassy in Ankara and requested a meeting for handing over a "confidential" document. When he was received by the Counsellor of the Em- bassy, Herbert S. Bursley on 6 November 1947, Noon said that the main purpose of his "goodwill tour" was "to make representations to the American Embassy in Ankara which was known as a strong embassy .....Pakistan wanted military equipment urgently and would be grateful if the United States extended aid to Pakistan as it had done to Turkey. Pakistan was prepared to pay for the equipment and it required a substantial American loan. Noon mentioned that the Pakistani Embassy in Washington had made representations to the State De- partment and added that he did not know "how -h ell Pakistan's case had been presented." Noon emphasized that Pakistan and. the United States cnitld become "great friends." I Us country could absorb "great quantities of American products." The United States could count on Pakistan being a bulwark against Soviet Communism. Handing over a memorandum to the US official, Noon urged that it should be treated as "very confidential". The memorandum said: 47 The Mussalmans in Pakistan are against COmmunism. The Hindus have an Ambas- sador in Moscow, Mrs. Pandit, who is the sister of the Hindu Prime Minister in Delhi, Mr. Nehru, and the Russians have got an Ambassador in Delhi, the Hindu capital. We the Mussalmans of Pakistan have no Ambassador in Moscow nor is there any Rus- sian Ambassador in Karachi—our capital.

Noon obviously believed that this was a powerful argument! He went on to argue that while Pakistan was desirous of staying in the Commonwealth, it had serious, reservations over the attitude of Britain's Labour Government. Pakistan wanted real friends, he indicated.

...Pakistan will have to look round for friends and the obvious friends they could have like Turkey are the U.S.A. ...if...U.S.A. and Britain help Pakistan to become a strong and independent country, proud of their culture, then the people of Pakistan will fight to the last man against Communism to keep their freedom arid preserve their way of life."

Noon was not aware at the time that Washington had already turned down Pakis- tan's request for a $2 billion loan. His memorandum was consigned to the files of the State Department where it probably remained undisturbed till the present researcher came upon it.

Moscow Invites Liaquat Ali

Washington's invitation to Nehru was received with considerable distress by Pakis- tan. Should Pakistan woo the Soviet Union in order to attract Washington's attention? The relations between the two countries had been rather tepid. The Soviet leaders had sent no congratulatory message to finnah when Pakistan came into existence and had moved quite slowly in extending recognition. A Soviet Ambassador functioned in New Delhi, but ambassadors had not been exchanged between Moscow and Karachi. Would Nehru's projected visit to the United States evoke a counter-move from Moscow?

Washington did not think that the Pakistani Prime Minister would respond favourably even if Moscow were to initiate some gesture. It believed that the Prime Minister was scared of Soviet Communism. The State Department had received a long report on a conversation that one of its officials in Cairo had with Liaquat Ali early in May when the Prime Minis- ter was on his way home after attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Liaquat All had known the American diplomat, H. Gordon Minnigarode, while he had been posted in Pakistan and had invited him for a private dinner.

According to Minnigarode's report, Liaquat All spoke at length on "the growing menace of Communism." He said that highly organized and well-financed Communist groups inspired by the Soviet Union were.seeking to mount acts of terrorism, including as- sassinations of leaders. The aim, Liaquat Ali said, was to create disorder and demoraliza- tion—conditions under which coups could be engineered. He expressed regret that while the United State had moved with admirable determination to help Western Europe, it had failed to provide adequate assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. After China, it was likely that India would fall a victim to Communism because of its dissensions, poverty, and, ignorance. Pakistan would then be the last bulwark between the Middle East and the Communists. The western powers should strengthen Pakistan militarily and economically to enable it to meet what-

48 ever dangers the future might bring, Liaquat All told the diplomat."28

The Department received further corroboration of Liaquat Al's views from its new Charge d'Affaires in Karachi, Hooker A. Doolittle, who had talked with the Prime Minister shortly after his return. According to Doolittle, Liaquat Ali said that while he was in Egypt, Iraq, and Iran he had told his friends that they must ultimately opt for friendship with the Western countries. The West should reciprocate by providing help to the Muslim countries as they did to Greece and Turkey. That would bolster the economic and military potential of the Muslim countries, "prevent temptations towards Communism, and enable them to resist penetration from the North."

Liaquat All then went on to make an extraordinary suggestion. Doolittle reported:

He said that in each country the western powers as typified by the United States and Great Britain should observe those individuals or groups in power "able to deliver the goods" and then back those people to the utmost.29

Doolittle stated that he interpreted Liaquat All's suggestion as "a slight hint in regard to his own position here in Pakistan" where, exploiting certain controversial issues, opponents were mounting an indirect attack on the Prime Minister himself. If Doolittle had reported Liaquat Ali's suggestion correctly, what is one to make of the Prime Minister's calibre as a leader to whom the proud people of Pakistan had entrusted their destiny? Further, it was the sort of suggestion that could boomerang. What might be Liaquat All's fate if his suggestion were to be acted upon and a foreign power whose intervention one thoughtlessly invited were to decide that in Pakistan someone other than Liaquat Ali would be the right person to "deliver the goods"?

To the State Department, however, the reports from Cairo and Karachi were merely further indications of the Prime Minister's efforts to reiterate his opposition to Soviet Com- munism, to offer Pakistan's friendship to the United States and to seek American economic and military support.

Doolittle's meeting with Liaquat Ali took place on 3 June 1949. On 8 June Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan announced at a press conference that the Prime Minister had accepted an invitation from the Soviet Government to visit Moscow. Liaquat All himself said later: "Pakistan cannot afford to wait. She must take her friends where she finds them" Begum Ali told an officer of the American Embassy that while Truman had not seen fit to invite the Liaquat Alis to Washington, Stalin had seen fit to invite them to Moscow.3°

On 2 June 1949, the Soviet Charge di Affairs in Teheran varbally conveyed to the Pakistani Ambassador, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, an official invitation to Squat Ali Khan to visit Moscow. The manner in which the invitation came about was rather unusual and indeed strange. A couple of weeks earlier, while the Pakistani Prime Minister was on a visit to Iran, the Soviet diplomat had asked Begum Liaquat Ali whether !The and her husband would be interested in visiting the Soviet Union. The response was affirmative. When the invitation materialized, even though in a rather unusual manner, Liaquat Ali had accepted it promptly.3I

Washington received the news without any display of alarm or anger. It believed that Liaquat Ali had acted out of pique and it dismissed the glee displayed by those who had advised him to accept the Soviet invitation as the attitude of the little fellow who cries "see 49 what I can do!" From its representatives in London, Moscow, and Karachi the State Depart- ment received reports voicing no anxiety but reflecting the hope that if the visit did take place, it might have a useful "educational" effect on Liaquat Ali. Some doubts were expressed on whether the visit might take place at all:The Department took note of the fact that the Soviet media did riot appear to make any fuss over Liaquat Al's acceptance of Moscow's in vitation. On the other hand, it was told that Soviet media had carried a Tass story on alleged attacks on Afghan villages by Pakistani aircraft even while Pakistani newspapers were en - Musing over their Prime Minister's forthcoming journey to Moscow. When American and British officials discussed the "visit" in London, a little bit of fun did not seem out of place. An official of the Commonwealth Relations Office referred to a recent Moscow Radio broadcast criticizing Pakistan for its attitude towards Paklitunistan and described it as an "excellent drop of poison to put in Liaquat's cup before he sits down to dine in Moscow."32

A White House aide, Stephen Spingarn, sent a memorandum to Presidential Special Assistant, Clark Clifford, arguing that it would be "prejudicial to American interests in the Middle East and Far East to develop an Indian policy without taking into account Pakistan's legitimate interests."33 The State Department's conscience was clear on that score. Its support clan invitation to Nehru had not been intended as a slight to Liaquat Al! or to Pakistan. Nehru's name and work were widely known in the United States and the announcement of his visit had aroused considerable public interest. As a man and a Prime Minister, Liaquat AN simply did not figure in the consciousness-of many Americans. Nonetheless, the State De- partment had overlooked the obsessive Pakistani insistence on being treated at par with India on every imaginable issue.

The Department had no objection whatever to a state visit by Liaquat All at some appropriate time, but once Karachi had announced his acceptance of Moscow's invitation, it was not considered advisable that Washington should appear to respond precipitately with a similar move. Such a course, it was felt, might irritate Nehru and also give rise to an impression that the quickest was to get an invitation from Washington would be to wangle one horn Moscow. In view of these considerations the Department decided that the sensible thing to do would be to convey informally and confidentially to Liaquat Ali the information that a visit by him at a mutually convenient date would be welcome to President Truman.

The Slate Department appears to have believed that Liaquat Ali's course, in the ultimate analysis, would be determined by his evaluation of what the United States would be prepared to do to induce him drawn back from a Russian embrace. In this connection mention needs to be made of one of those "interesting concidences": 2 June 1949—the Soviet Charged' Aflairs in Teheran conveys to the Pakistani Ambassador Moscow's invitation to Liaquat All. 3 June 1949—the State Department informs the British Ambassador that the transfer of 200,000 rounds of 75 mm. ammunition to Pakistan is authorized. Could it be that the American decision was based on information from its owns sources in Teheran or Karachi about Moscow's invitation? In any event, once the decision on the transfer of ammunition had been conveyed to Pakistan, Washington could count on the fact that sensible men in Karachi, would appreciate the difference between a bird in the hand and two in the bush.

The American Embassy received "private comment" from such sources to the effect that the Prime MinVter had acted unwisely in accepting Moscow's invitation. They expres • sed concern that the action might erode the confidence of Western countries in Pakistan and thus hurt the interests of the country. Such thinking, Doolittle reported to the State Depart- ment, prevailPd to some extent "in official circles also." Thus Washington was reasonably 50 confident that Liaquat Al's acceptance of the invitation from Moscow did not represent or presage a drastic reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy. At worst it was an impetuous and naive gesture aimed at asserting That the United States should not take Pakistan for granted.34 Washington took note of the fact that important personages of the Pakistani Gov- ernment whose visit to the United States were scheduled in the weeks ahead, remained as eager as ever before to fulfil their programme and to meet their counterparts in the American Government. It was serenely confident that these sensible men would remain committed to the concept that the winning of American support would be indispensable for Pakistan's military security and ecom !Mc development. Some of the sensible men of' Karachi were soon on their way to Washington.

REFERENCES

"First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Conferences,"Lyartment ofState Bulletin (Washington), 17(17 August 1947), 336. 2. "Good Wishes Extended to New Domonions of India and Pakistan" ibid., 17(24 August 1947), 396. Truman's message to Mountbaten, on the other hand, contained such expressions as "memorable occasion," "this great new nation," "India's new and enhanced status in the world community", and India's place at the forefront of the nations of the world in the struggle to fashion a world society founded in mutual trust and respect. 3. The only reference to Pakistan in Forrestal's diaries dated 14 May 1948, related to repercussions of US recogni - lion of Israel and the possible outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab countries. Forrestal was woried over the impact of such a development in "other parts of the world and where United States interests are affected, such as Egypt, Pakistan and North Africa...." Walter Millis, The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 440. 4. The Acting Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 4 April 1947, FR 1947, III, 151-52. 5. State Department Press Release, no. 466, I 0 June 1947. 6. The AMhassador in New Delhi (Grady) to the Secretary of State (Marshall), 7 July 1947, FR 1947, III, 159. 7. Memorandum to the President (Harry S. Truman), by the Secretary of State (Marshall), 17 July 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, 8. The Secretary of State (Marshall) to the Embassy in India, 4 March 1948, FR 1948, III, 310-12. 9. The Secretary of State (Marshall) to the United Slates Representative at the United Nations (Warren Austin), 20 February 1948, ibid., 300-01. 10. The Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 4 April 1947, FR 1947,111,151-52. 11. The Charge &Affairs in Karachi (Charles 'N. Lewis, Jr.) to the. Secretary of State (Marshall), 26 October 1947, FR 1947, III. 12. Ghulam Mohammed, "Some Impressions of Europe and America," Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), 2 (December 1949), 169. A speech delivered at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 4 November 1949. 13. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masteis: A Political Autobiography (New York. 1967), 20-21. 14. Faza I Muqueem Khan, The Story ofthe Pakistan Army (Karachi, 1963), 29, 40,54. IS. Report of the Military Attache (Nathaniel Hoskoi) forwarded by the Charge d'Affaires in Karachi (Lewis) to the Secretary of State (Marshall), 12 January 1948, 845F.001/1-1248, Record Group 59, Diplomatic Branch, National Archives. Unless otherwise stated, all documents bearing the State Department's numerical classification number cited in this work are located in the Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives. 16. The Charged'Affaires in Karachi (Lewis) to the Secretary of State (Marshall), 2 September 1947, 845F,5 I /9-247. 17. Winthrop W. Aldrich to the Under Secretary of State (Will Clayton), 8 October 1947, 845F,51/10-1747. IS. New York Times, 9 October 1947. 19. Text of memorandum, enclosure, Aldrich to Clayton, n, 21. 20. Memorandum of Conversation by E.F. Fox, NEA: South Asia, 17 October 1947, 845F.51/10-1747. 21. "Appraisal of U.S. Military, Political and Economic Interests in South Asia," Records of the Military Advisor to NEA, n. 4. 22 Draft of a report on "Need for SANACC Appraisal of Possible United States Military Interests in South Asian Reg- ion," prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, and submitted to L.. ,v W. Henderson, Chairman, SANACC Sub-committee for NEA 19 May 1948. Records of the Military Advisor t• rIZA. 23. /Mc/ 21. Dike Memorandum by Gordon Strong, 27 October 1947, 845E51 /1 0-2747. 25. "Appraisal of O.S. military, Political, and Economic Interests in South Asia," Records of Military Advisor to NEA,

51 26. Memorandum of Conversation by E.G. Mathews, NEA: South Asia, 30 October 1947, 845E51/10-3047. 27 Memorandum of Conversation with Feroze Khan Nobn, by the Counsellor in Ankara (Herbert S. Bursley), fl November. 1947, enclosing a memorandum Mrnished by Noon. 845F.00/11 -647. 28 The Charge LI • Afidires in Cairo to the Secretary of Stale (Acheson). enclosing a Memorandum of Conversalk with Liaquat Ali Khan by H. Gordon Minningarode, Second Secretary, 11 May 1949. 845F. 002/5-- 1349 29 The Charye d'Affaires in Karachi (I looker A. Doolittle) to the Secretary of Stale (Acheson). 7 June 1949, 845f: 00 6--749) 30 Pakistan Ncw$: I 1 June 1949. quoted in S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy:A Ills:omit! Analysts (London, 1913) 99 The Chwye LI Mimes in Karachi (Doolittle) to the Secretry of Stale (Acheson), II June 1949, 84.51, 002 6-1149 • 31 C W ChOudhury, Pakishin, Bangladesh and the Major Powers (New York, 1975), 12. 32 ihe Charge cl.41/dires in Karachi (Doolittle) to the Secretaryof Stale (Acheson), 11 June 1949, 845F 002/6 -- 11 -I9) 30 July 1949:845F 002/7-3049. The Embassy in London to the Secretary of State, 10 June 1949, 8451- 002 6 • 1049 The Ambassador in Moscow (fry Kohler) to the Secretary of State. 21 June 1949. 84tif 002/6 -2149 The Ambassador in London (Lewis Douglas) to the Secretary of State ,22 June 1949,845F 002/6 - 2249 toy thin der son to the Secretary or State. 29 July I 949, 845.002/7-2949. The Secretary of State to the American Einba-!,,v in Karachi, 29 July 1949. 8451: 002/7-2949. 33. Stephen Spmgarn to Clark Clifford, 23 August 1949, Papers of Harry S. Truman. 34 The °huge cl ',Wanes in Karachi (Doolittle) to the Secretary of Sta (ACheson). 11 June 1949,845E002/6-1149

52 READING 4

(Excerpts from 'Pakistans Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis', by S. M. Burke, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission.

. efore we describe Pakistan's entry into the Western system of security alliances it would be pertinent to mention two common assertions which do not accord with B facts. The first is that Pakistan was completely neutral till a 'palace revolution', by which Prime Minister Nazimuddin was replaced by Muhammad All Bogra, suddenly brought with it a change in Pakistan's foreign policy, turning it from an independent policy to one subservient to the USA. The second is that the 'unwise' American decision to supply arms to Pakistan resulted in the 'loss' of Indian friendship to America. An ardent desire to cultivate brotherly relations with all Muslim states was, of course, an inherent element in Pakistan's make-up, and in that one respect she was never uncommitted. But as regards the East-West cold war, two different trends were discenible in Pakistan's foreign policy till 1950. First, there was the natural desire on the part of the Pakis- tani leaders to keep out of big-power conflicts. Three days after Pakistan became a sovereign state Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan announced that Pakistan would take no sides in the conflict of ideologies between the nations,' and six months later Governor-General Jinnah affirmed, 'Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world/2

At the same time, however, Pakistan did not consider neutralism an eternal pre- scriptions Nehru did. It was realized that it was not always easy to avoid taking sides in power politics, and there were clear indications where Paksitan's preference lay. Jinnah had realistically stated in 1946, 'Naturally no nation stands by itself. There will be an alliance with other nations whose interests are common.'3 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan told a press conference at Cairo on 10 May 1949 that Pakistan was making asocialistic experiment which would help combat Communist penetration in South-East Asia.4 Two days later in an interview with the Cairo correspondent of The Times, Liaquat said the countries of the world were divided into those who favoured and those who opposed Communism. The Muslim countries between Cairo and Karachi had an important part to play. It should be the concern of the Western powers to strengthen the Middle East countries.5 The Economist assessed in August 1948 that in the event of war India would remain neutral but Pakistan would side with the free countries against Russia.6 Dawn understood Pakistan's foreign policy to have been one of greater co-operation with the Anglo—American block.'

After 1950 when Liaquat, having received invitations from both the USSR and the USA, cast the die in favour of the latter, the situation was no longer ambiguous. Other manifestations of greater affinity with America, such as Paksitan's attitude towards the Korean War and the Japanese Peace Treaty, inevitably followed. The New York Times special correspondent from Karachi reported that 'in contrast to India's aloofness from the struggle between Communism and democracy, Pakistan has been almost aggressive in her moral commitment to the Western Powers'.5 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan complained to Marguerite Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune that the USA wrongly equated Pakistan's foreign pol - icy with that of Nehru's India. Pakistan, he stressed, was opposed to isolation in any sense and was prepared to make sacrifices for the collective security system being built by the democratic world.9 51 Liaquat's immediate successor, Prime Minister Nazimuddin, held office for some eighteen months only and scarcely had Lime to leave a distinctive imprint on his country's foreign policy. But it is not without significance that in 1953, when Pakistan was faced with a serious famine, it was to the USA that Nazimuddin turned for free help. Citing the incident as proof that Nazimuddin continued his predecessor's policy of greater freindship with America, Finance Minister Amjad All reminded the Pakistan Parliament, in a foreign affairs debate on 4 September 1958, that Nazimuddin had deputed him (Amjad Ali) to the USA to ask for one million tons of wheat as a gift, and not against a cash loan as India had done, because Pakistan did not have enough foreign exchange to pay for such a large quantity of grain.

Indeed, the need for economic assistance added much urgency to the existing trend towards friendship with America. Having started her independence with virtually no military hardware, Pakistan's greatest need had always been modern weapons, which are tremend- ously expensive and usually released from government control only for countries who are politically friendly. Though Pakistan's first years were prosperous, the strain of the aria •ment race with her larger neighbour had been keenly felt from the beginning. After the crisis with India in the summer of 1951, Pakistan's expenditure on defence inevitably escalated. At this critical juncture her political and economic fortunes suddenly faltered. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination in October 1951 introduced a new element of uncertainty into Pakistan's internal stability, and early in 1952 prices of jute and cotton fibres, upon which her foreign trade solely rested, began to drop precipitately. While the general com- modity nrice index dropped from 162 to 123 between June 1951 and December 1952, fibres fell from 193 to 98.10 Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings shrank from Rs.288 crores in 1951 to Rs. 192 crores during 1952, and were expected to fall to Rs. 150 crores in 1953. Gold and sterling reserves, which had stood at Rs. 148.7 crores on 1 January 1952, were reduced to Rs. 60.61 crores by the beginning cf 1953. The prospect of a severe wheat famine in 1953 thus greatly aggravated an already serious situation.

The second assertion—that the United States 'lost' India's friendship because of her decision to provide arms to Paksitan—is equally untenable. Undoubtedly, the augmentation of Paksitan's military strength was a matter of direct concern to India, and America's decision to give arms aid immediately became the biggest single problem between the USA and India, just as the arms assistance to India, following the October 1962 Sino-Indian border clash, was to become the biggest single irritant in Pakistani-US relations. But the irriplication that, apart from the,question of military supplies to Pakistan, all was well between India and the USA, is wholly misleading. Fundamental differences between India nad America were apparent long before any formal ties were forged between Pakistan and the USA, and, indeed, these differences were one of the main causes which drove the USA towards Pakistan. Chester Bowles complained that it was bad arithmetic to 'alienate' 360 million Indians in order to aid 80 million Pakistanis.' But the way Americans who worked for a US—Pakistani alliance looked at the problem was that, if 360 million Indians were not willing to cooperate •in the common cause, it was poor arithmetic to refuse also the proffered friendship of 80 million Pakistanis. In truth, India had not only spurned all US advances but in most ways had acted contrary to United States interests. Nixon's biographer states that Vice-President Nixon's recommendation of military aid to Pakistan 'was eventually carried through as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India'. '2.

We have already described the important respects in which the Indian attitude towards the Korean War and Japanese Peace Treaty was closer to the Communist than to the US point of view. These differences in policy, of course, stemmed from deep-seated differences between the Indian and the American outlook. First, the most crucial issue of the day

5_4 for the Americans was Communism; to Nehru and his fellow Indians it was colonialism.13 But this was npt all. Indians alleged further that the USA assisted colonial powers by her policies and herself exercised-economic imperialism, if not the outmoded territorial colonialism. On the eve of partition Krishna Menon believed that the object of United States policy was to create an economic, political, and military vacuum in India which America would fill." Prime Minister Attlee confirmed that, in the eyes of Asians, the 'number one ekploiter, even more imperialist than Britain', was now America. ' 5 Giving an 'Indian View' in a Foreign affairs article, Ambassador Panikkar wrote that in India most people were inclined to consider that the United States was deliberately opposing India at every stage and was following an anti-Asian policy with the object of reducing the new countries of Asia to a 'condition of political dependence'. ' 6 In the Eighth Session of the General Assembly the Indian delegate, alleging that the United States was establishing and perpetuating a new form of colonialism in Puerto Rico, sought to have the whole Puerto Rican matter investigated.17

Indian and America also held widely differing views on capitalism and socialism. Nehru believed that modern imperialism was an outgrowth of capitalism's and a Congress resolution, presumably drafted by him, declared that Fascism and Nazism were forms of intensified imperialism. 19 But Communism was not imperialistic;' a socialist economy could be made self-sufficient and had not need for expansion.' Nehru thought it was not justifable to equate private enterprise and democracy because, 'in the final analysis, real democracy and unrestrained private enterprise are incompatible.22 Nehru's socialist views were so anathematic to Truman that when Chester Bowles was appointed Ambassador.to India in 1951 he was asked by the President to 'find out if that fellow Nehru is a Communist at heart' .'Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas has also revealed that when he once quoted Nehru to Truman, Truman dismissed the Indian leader as a tommunists.24

On the supreme question of the day, how to preserve peace, Nehru's approach was that the psychology of fear should be converted to one of mutual trust and that this could best be done by creating and enlarging an area of peace, an area which 'does notwant war, works for peace in a positive way and believes in cooperation'.Th The Americans believed, on the other hand, that the only argument the Communists respected was superior force and that it was, therefore, necessary for the non-Communist countries to build up collective defence.

The author of the 'Indian View' listed three aspects of policy where the Untied States and India did not see eye to eye: in their attitude towards the menace of expansionist Com- munism; the colonialism of European nations; and China. 'All these three are basic factors in the complex international problem of today,' he observed, 'and while a difference on any one of them is sufficient to create misunderstanding, a difference on all three amounts to a major conflict of opinion.'26

While blaming both sides for the East—West cold war, Indians regarded the USA as the greater culprit. According to Panikkar, 'the course of the cold war, whatever its origins, was being determined by the opportunist policies of the US.'27 And Radhakrishnan, on his return to India after relinquishing his post as Ambassador to the USSR, declared: 'We find that at present there is a group of Western nations trying to crush Russia. If Hitler were alive today, he would have considered the present moment a supreme triumph of his philosophy.'28

Having zealously but unsuccessfully courted India, it seemed but logical to most Americans that they should turn to the second largest non-Communist country of mainland Asia, Pakistan. As the US—Pakistani alliance ws consummated during the Republican

55 regime of Eisenhower, its critics have ascribed it entirely to Secretary Dulles's susceptibility to 'pactitis'. But in fact the administrative wheels had begun to turn much earlier, and 'Dulles was carrying to its logical conclusion a policy which had been allowed to go very far within the Pentagon and the State Department before he ever took office.29 By Novemeber 1952 matters had sufficiently advanced for AdmiralArthur W. Radford, United States Commander- in-Chief in the Pacific, to pay a visit to Pakistan, to stay as the guest of the Governor-General in Karachi, to visit the Khyber Pass,and to be honoured at a reception given by the Prime Minister." Before leaving Karachi Radoford declared that Pakistan enjoyed a strategic position and had an important role to play in the world fight against Communism.3I

As already mentioned, both Russia and Communist China at first shunned Nehru's regime as a bourgeois government which must be overthrown by a Communist revolution. At its Second Congress, the Communist Party of India, meeting at Calcutta in February 1948, decided that a 'revolutionary upsurge' was seething in India, and that the phase of 'armed clashes' had arrived.' In response to a message of greetings from the Communist Party of India upon the inauguration of the People's Republic of China at Peking in October 1949, Mao Tse-tung predicted that, 'Like free China, free India will one day emerge in the socialist and People's Democratic family; that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind/33 The Government of India, however, reacted vigorously to the Communist offensive inside India, and by 1949 at least 100,000 Communists and their sympathizers had been jailed without trial. This failure of the Communist onslaught, taken together with new manifestations of Nehru's role in international affairs, led to 2 reappraisal of Communist policy towards India. sardar Patel's death in November 1950 removed from the scene the strongest voice in India against Communism, and gave Nehru an almost free hand to guide the destiny of his country in accordance with his own wishes. At the end of December 1950; R. Plame Dutt, one of Britain's leading Marxist theoreticians, said in London that Nehru's attitude towards the Korean War and Communist China were important signs of a change in Indian foreign policy which deserved to be promoted further. The call to armed rebellion was sus- pended soon afterwards, and Nehru was tentatively accepted as 'a potential friend of "peacew.34 With Nehru's refusal to attend the Japanese Peace Treaty, for reasons similar to Russian's objections to the Treaty, Communist doubts as to India's usefulness were finally resolved. Nehru had shown himself to be as anxious as the Communists themselves to remove American presence from Asia. To Nehru, the retreat of US power meant a step towards the resurgence of Asia under the joint ledership of India and China. To the Communists, the elimination of American power seemed a necessry pre-condition for successful Communist insurgency in Asian lands. The direct assaults on Korea had only served to bring back Ameri- cans in greater strength; a more patient approach was required. For the realization of long- term Communist objectives it appeared wiser to work with Nehru for the time being. In the spring of 1952 Stalin declared that the peaceful co-existence of capitalism and Communism was fully possible, and in October of the same year the I.9th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as well as the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peking, officially adopted the policy of peaceful co-existence with countries having different socialsystem.35 The door to friendship with Russia and China, at which Nehru had at first knocked in vain, was at last ajar.

Advent of Eisenhower and Dulles

Changes of regime in 1953 in Russia, America, and Pakistan all added new impulses to the moves already under Way. Eisenhower's inauguration as President, with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, brought a new look to politics in Washington; Muhammad Ali Bogra's shift from ambassadorship in the USA to prime ministership in Karachi brought an

56 . avowed admirer of America to the helm of affairs in Pakistan; and the death of Stalin removed that stoic hardliner from the Kremlin and brought the lively Khrushchev to the fore there.

Though Dulles's style of diplomacy made him the symbol of the American policy of collective security, military pacts were not his invention, nor did they die with him. After the Second World War America and Russia emerged as the strongest powers in the world, each standing for a way of life which the other thought incompatible with her own: rivalry for world supremacy between them was inevitable, and by 1947 the cold war had descended upon Europe with the possibility of a hot war and Communist-supported revolutions always in the offing. In a Foreign Affairs article George Kerman, head of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department during the Truman Administration, spelled out the appropriate action to meet the situation: The main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expan- sive tendencies....'36 Truman himself, in an address to Congress on 12 March 1947, enunciated the doctrine which was given his name: It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.' Two often overlooked aspects of this pronouncement are that: (I) though Greece and Turkey were to be the immediate beneficiaries of the statement, the scope of policy was not limited to any region; (2) the Doctrine would be opertive not only against external aggression but also against internal insurgency by armed minorities.

When North Korea, assited by Russia, attacked South Korea, Truman immediately ordered the United States armed forces to go to the assistance of South Korea. The direct intervention of Communist China further emphasized the fact that the Korean War was a part of the world-wide conflict between East and West. In Indo—China, too, the character of the war against France changed after the Communists assumed control in Peking in 1949 and began to train and equip Vietminh forces. To meet the situation, the United States decided in May 1950 to grant economic and military aid to France and the Associate States of Indo—China which averaged $500 million annually to the end of 1953.37 Thus when Eisenhower pssumed the Presidency in January 19531 the United States was already involved in both the trouble spots in Asia—Korea and Indo—China. The change of administration 'produced no change of policy but a more strenuous effort to make the old policy'.38

Besides attending to the conflagrations in Korea and Indo—China, the Truman Ad- ministration took preventive measures to meet furture emergencies. To give a bipartisan stamp to the American effort, the President, in April 1950, appointed John Sherman Cooper, Republican ex-Senator from Kentucky, and John Foster Dulles, another Republican, as con- sultants to the State Department. During 1951 Dulles negotiated security treaties, on behalf of Truman's Democratic Administration, with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan.39

In the late nineteen-fifties and during the Presidential campaign of John F. kennedy it became fashionable to ridicule Dulles's proclivity for defence pacts, and it was conveniently forgotten that the foundation of the policy had been laid by the Truman Administra- tion. However, when the Democrats under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were subjected to criticism for themselves escalating American participation in the South—East Asian conflict, they answered that in reality they were merely honouring a bipartisan commitment going back to the days of Harry S. Truman. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who had served as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Truman, told the Commit- tee on Foreign Relations that 'during the Truman Administration, there was a policy con-

57 clusion on the part of ourselves, the British and the French that the security of Southeast Asia was vital to the free world.... During the Truman Administration, I recall, there was a little ceremony welcoming the 200th ship carrying assistance to Indo—China.' The actual steps taken over the years in relation to what is required in South—East Asia, Rusk explained, had been conditioned by the action which the Communists took there.4° On the eve of President Johnson's trip to the Far East in October 1966 David Lawrence pOinted out that what was being said by President Johnson and Secretary Rusk about the purposes of the United States in cementing the relationship of the free countries of Asia, bore a remarkable resemblance to what Dulles said when the Manila Treatty was formulated in 1954.41

Whatever his other faults, Dulles left little scope for a misunderstanding of US intentions. Many competent observers think North Korea was encouraged on 12 January 1950, impliedly placing Korea outside the American 'defensive perimeter'. He said this ran along the Aleutians to Japan and the Ryukyus and thence to the Philippines.'' It is also interesting to speculate to what extent John F. Kennedy's criticism of the defence pacts encouraged the Communists to step up tension both in Europe and South—East Asia soon after he assumed the Presidency. Nor was Dulles's 'brinkmanship' without its own purpose. At times this can be the only way of preventing war by miscalculation. Indeed, it was not until Kennedy re- sorted to 'brinkmanship' over Cuba, a more hair-raising performance than any confrontation staged by Dulles, that the Russians felt convinced that the young President meant business and adopted a softer line towards him.

It is possible to argue that what made sense to Truman and Dulles is no longer a sensible line today. A militarily weaker opponent can be deterred from disturbing the status quo by a threat of massive retaliation, but when both sides attain the capacity to annihilate each other the only sensible course left is to talk things out. In a changing world no policy can be eternally sound. But the fact remains that Dulles had overwhelming bipartisan support in his day and the prestige of the United States stood much higher then than it does today.43 The afterwards much-maligned Manila Pact which set up SEATO, for instance, was ratifid by the Senate by a record margin of 84 votes to I.

Because national interest is not a partisan matter, foreign policy cannot be either. It was Democratic Truman who went to war in Korea and it was Republican Eisenhower who negotiated peace there; again, it was Democratic Truman who promised help not only against external aggression but also against internal revolution, and it was Democratic Ken- nedy and Johnson who had to intervene in the war in Vietnam, while it fell to Republican Nixon to shy away from the conflict and give notice to his allies to face local insurgency unaided. The question is not whether Dulles's policy was the perfect answer to the problems of his day. There can be no perfect answer to international troubles because whatever action one side may take the opposite side is bound to react to nullify it, and this zig-zag game can go on and on, calling for ever-changing responses. If in the face of American preparedness the Communists changed their tactics, calling for a different kind of response, it was proof not of the failure of Dulles's policy but of its success. even as late as 28 August 1968, when frustration with the war in vietnam was running high, Secretary Rusk, speaking before the Democratic Platform Committee, said that the question of collective security was still a central one and warned his audience, before they abandoned collective security, to 'be sure that we have something better to put in its place'.

Dulles, Nehru, Zafrulla

Dulles saw the struggle against Communism as a moral crusade: if it was only power

58 politics and did not involve a threat 'to the basic moral principles of our Judeo-Christian civilization, and indeed the civilization which is based upon other great religions', it would not be treated as a worldwide struggle. Unless the free nations met it everywhere, they would be defeated.44 The strong religious trait in his character went back to his childhood in a church-going family in Watertown, N.Y., where his father was a Presbyterian minister.

This intense commitment to his own cause as a moral issue made Dulles inflexible and uncompromising as a negotiator, effective for combating Communism but not capable of arriving at a working arrangement with its adherents.' In this he greatly resembled India's Jawharlal Nehru, who too passionately clung to his views as moral anchors without which the ship of state would founder. President Kennedy regarded Nehru as almost the John Foster Dulles of neutralism1.48

Both Nehru and Dulles purported to base their philosophies on the recent history of their respective countries, but this led them to diametrically opposite courses. Nehru believed Gandhi's successful leadership had demonstrated the correct psychological approach to the problems of the world; defence preparations only generated fear and increased the chances of war. Dulles thought the lesson of the two world wars, in which large coalitions had defeated the forces of evil, was that strength in the form of collective security was the right answer.'

On the other hand Dulles got on much better with Pakistani leaders, whose thinking was closer to his. Zafrulla and Dulles had a special regard for each other. Both had a legal background and Zafrulla, like Dulles, was devoutly religious. At the Japanese Peace Confer- ence Dulles warmly congrtulated Zafrulla on making 'the speech' of the conference.48 and in the United Nations General Assembly Zafrulla returned the compliment by declaring that he had 'long admired the lofty views and noble concepts of Mr. Dulles'.48

Straws in the Wind

With the installation of Eisenhower as President in January 1953 the process of Pakistani— US rapprochement was expected to be speeded up. During the Presidential election campaign the Republican platform had promised to encourage 'the development of collective security' and to 'end neglect of the Far East which Stalin had long identified as the road to victory over the West' .8° The Republican majority leader, William Knowland, said Pakistan was more realistic than India about the danger from Communism and he thought Pakistan could become another Turkey.' President Eisenhower said in his inaugural address that the strength of all free peoples lies in unity and that destiny had laid upon America the responsibility of the free world's leadership. His Administrtion would help 'proven friends of freedom' to achieve their own security and well—being.

While the new administration was raising hope in Pakistan, it was exciting suspicion in India. Nehru said in Parliament that 'even war is too serious a thing to be handed over to a soldier to control, much less peace. Now, this intrusion of the military mentality in the chancelleries of the world is a dangerous development of today!' This brought forth the rejoin - der in Congress by Representative Bentley that when, in return for US help, the head of the Government of India 'criticizes our President for his so-called military mentality and, by in- ference, states that Mr. Eisenhower's thinking is a menace to the cause of world peace, I say when that happens, by heaven, it is too mucht.53

59 Dulles's Trip to the Near East

Speculating on Secretary Dulles's projected trip to Asia, the New York Times opined that India was not likely to align herself with the free world but the Secretary 'will have made an additional contribution to the cause of peace' if he could bring about closer ties with ,Pakistan." On the eve of the trip the State Department told a Dawn representative in a written reply that the US would welcome Pakistan's joining forces with other Middle East countries in a regional defence organization.55 Dulles visited India, Pakistan, and other countries in the Near East during May and on his return reported to the nation in an address on radio and television." About India, he said that he had not always agreed with Nehru but did clear up some misunderstandings. On Pakistan he struck a warmer note and stated that 'the strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against Communism' and that his party had met with a feeling of warm freindship on the part of the people of Paksitan towards the United States. Regarding the prospects of a Middle East organization, he observed that many of the Arab League countries are engrossed in quarrels with Israel, Great Britain, and France, but there was more concern in the northern countries where the Soviet Union was nearer. Wheat Assistance to Pakistan The hiStories of the Indian and Pakistani Wheat Bills well illustrate the state of India's and Pakistan's relations with the USA at the time. India had at first desired one million tons of wheat from the USA in 1949, and during his trip to the USA Nehru had often referred to the Indian requirement. A satisfactory arrangement between the two countries, however, could not be evolved. Towards the end of 1950 India faced an even graver emergency, and on 16 December Ambassador Madam Pandit requested the United States Government for two million tons of food grains on easy terms. While the request was pending before the US Con- gress, the resolution proposing that China be censured as an aggressor in Korea came up in the United Nations, and, on 24 January 1951, Prime Minister Nehru strongly expressed himself against it. In a formal statement on the following day President Truman asserted that he believed in 'calling an aggressor an aggressor' and that his country was solidlybehind him in so stigmatizing Communist China. On the same day senator Tom Connolly, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, side-tracked India's request for wheat by referring it to the Near East Affairs sub-committee for considertion. It was plain he was in no hurry to provide aid to that country ... while it so strongly opposed the United States policy in the United Nations on China.'57 in a special message on 12 February Truman pressed Congress for prompt action, saying that India's stability was essential to the future of free institutions in Asia. There were important political differences between the US and India but that should not blind Americans to the needs of the Indian people.' Though the majority of the members of Congress were sympathetic to the Indian request, legislation was held up by the obstruc- tionism of a group of legislators opposed to Indian policies, and it was not till 15 June that the President was able to sign the India Emergency Food Act, granting a loan of $190 million for the supply of two million tons of wheat. In the meantime China and the USSR had fully utilized the situation to project themselves aS the true friends of India and to portray the USA as a heartless opportunist seeking to make political capital out of other people's misery. Untrammelled by democratic processes of legislation, the two Communist countries had been able to promise help at once, China offering one million tons of rice and Russia a similar quantity of wheat. By 16 March a total of 22,300 tons of Chinese rice had already reached India" and on 2 June the first Soviet shipment had arrived in Bombay.6° Communist supplies were given wide publicity and a warm welcome, while American tardiness was bitterly criticized.

60 in the case of Pakistan's request for US wheat, everything went right from the beginning. At a press conference on 9 April 1953 Prime Minister Nazimuddin declared that Pakis- tan must import a minimum of 11/2 million tons of wheat during the coming year if widespread famine was to be prevented, that it was beyond Pakistan's resources to purchase such a large quantity, and that it had been decided to seek aid from the US. lie emphasized that supplies must start within three months.'

Representative Javits surnorted Paksitangs request because he considered the 'Dominion of Pakistan to be an element of great strength to the people of the free world in South and Southeast Asia'.62 On 10 June President Eisenhower moved Congress to grant Pakistan's request because 'between the people of Pakistan and the people of the United States there exists a strong bond of friendship'.63 In the hearings before the Senate Commit- tee on Agriculture and Forestry Secretary Dulles said Pakistan and the USA were 'very freindly to each other, that the people of Pakistan were strongly in their Islamic faith which is absolutely opposed, as our faith is, to the view c.,1Soviet Communism which treats man as a mechanical thing to be dealt with on a purely materialistic basis', that the people of Pakistan had a splendid military tradition, that in Karachi he had been met by a guard of honour which was 'the finest' he had ever seen, and that at the time of the Japanese Peace Treaty when America needed help she 'got it in very full measure from our good friends of Pakistan', not in any way hoping at that time for favours from the United States but because 'they believed the same kind of things we believe'. Dulles pointed to Pakistan's and Turkey's positions on the map and called them 'two very strong bulwarks' in an area which was not clear about its mode of resistance to Soviet Communism.64

The BW was finalized by Congress so expeditiously that Eisenhower was able to sign it on 25 June. 'We are proud to hau such staunch friends as the people of Pakistan', the Pres- ident declared, adding that the swift action by Congress in making possible the aid within two weeks of his message, reflected the sympathy and concern of the people of the United States for the people of Pakistan. Within twenty-four hours after the President had assented to the Act, the Anchorage Victory, laden with 9,860 tons of wheat as the first instalment, sailed from Baltimore.

Visit of Pakistani Officials to the USA

In October 1953 General Ayub Khan, Commander— in—Chief of the Pakistani Army, arrived in Washington, followed in November by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad and Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan. Their activities in the American capital gave rise to rumours that Pakistan and America were negotiating a military alliance. But it seems no final decision was taken at this stage. Newsweek wrote that the informal talks had involved the possibility of a sizeable military assistance programme for Pakistan, similar to the aid given to Turkey.65

Americans no doubt had long been agreed that their global strategy against Com- munism demanded a military stronger Pakistan, but they sti!! hesitated to take the final plunge for fear of offending India. A State Department official admitted that informal discussions had been going on 'for the last year or two',66 but President Eisenhower said at a press conference that the US would be most cautious • Lout doing anything that would cause hys- teria in India, and his Administration's effort would be to produce friendship with the entire subcontinent, not with just one nation.67

6 Nixon's Visit

The last hurdle was crossed after Vice President Nixon, at the behest of the Presi- dent, had visited India and Pakistan, among other Asian countries.

During his three-day stay in Karachi, in the first part of December, Nixon told the Pakistanis that he was convinced the people of Pakistan had a firm determination to thwart Communist ambitions," and that the USA would be proud to support Pakistan in industrial development and also in defence.69

On his return the Vice President urged that the ring around the Soviet empire be closed by creating a military crescent comprising Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indo—China, For- mosa, and Japan. He recommended military aid to Pakistan and thought the United States decision on the subject must be guided by what was best for America and should not be de- flected by any fear of Indian reaction. Nixon's effective two-hour presentation at the National Security Council clinched the argument and it was finally decided to offer military assistance to Pakistan.'"

The Turco— Pakistan Pact and the US—Pakistan Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement

It was decided that US military assistance to Pakistan should be given in the context of a pact between Pakistan and Turkey. In the words of a New York Times despatch, 'once the nations on the Soviet Union's southern border have agreed to work together to defend themselves against Soviet aggression, then the United States will offer to become their arsenal!' I Accordingly, a joint communique released simultaneously in Karachi and Ankara, on 19 February 1954, declared that Pakistan and Turkey had agreed to study methods of closer collaboration in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, as well as ways 'of strengthening peace and security in their own interest as also in that of all peace-loving nations'.72 Prime Minister Muhammad All Bogra commended the announcement to his countrymen as 'the first concrete major step towards strengthening the Muslim world'.73

On 22 February Bogra told a press conference in Karachi that Security act. Three days later President Eisenhower announced in Washington that he had decided to respond favourably to Pakistan's request in the interests of increased stability and strength in the Middle East.

Bogra assured his own countrymen that the United States had not asked for any bases in Pakistan, nor had Pakistan offered any. He said a momentous step forward had been taken towards strengthening the Muslim world, and also that the US military aid would enable Pakistan to achieve adequate defensive strength without having to assume an increasing burden on her economy.Th In his monthly broadcast, Bogra said that the US Government's decision to grant military aid to Pakistan was 'perhaps the most effect1ve step ever taken to ensure the security and progress of our countrys.Th

The declaration of intent in the Turco—Pakistani communique of 19 February was given concrete shape in an agreement signed in Karachi on 2 April. Article IV, dealing with cooperation in defence, stated that this would cover exchRnge of information on technical experience and progress, endeavours to meet 'lie iequirements in .production of arms and ammunition, and cooperation under Articles! of the Unit,. Nations Charter, against unpro- voked attack.76

62 Next followed the conclusion of a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the United States, by which the United States undertook to give military equipment and training to the Pakistani armed forces. Simultaneously with the signing of the agreement, on 19 May, both governments announced that it did not establish a military alliance, nor any military bases in Pakistan for the United States/7

As Indians alleged during the 1965 Indo— Pakistani war that Pakistan had been furnished with American armour oh the condition that it would 'never be used against India, it is relevant to examine precisely what conditions were attached to the arms given to Pakis- tan. Article 1(2) of the agreement stipulated: 'The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation.'78 The meaning of these words is plain enough and Horace A. Hildreth, US Ambassador to Pakistan, was merely reiterating the obvious when he explained that the 'only limitation' on the use of US military aid given to Pakistan and other countries of the world was that it would not be used for the purpose of aggression but for repelling aggression, and that 'if Bharat attacked Pakistan there could be no limitation to the use of American military aid'.78

The Manila Pact

After the cease-fire in Korea in July 1953, China had been able to increase the scale of her assistance to North Vietnam, making the French position inindo— China progressively worse. On 13 March 1954 a large Vietminh force surrounded the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. :A few days later Secretary Dulles declared that the imposition of the Communist system on South—East Asia 'should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action'.8° Britain, however, thought direct intervention by the US would lead to a third world war. She counselled patience till the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, which was due to convene on 26 April to consider the situation in Korea as well as in Indo—China. The fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, a day before the Geneva Conference was due to take up the question of Indo—China, raised fresh fears of American intervention in the war. Prime Minister Chur- chill and Foreign Secretary Eden flew to Washington to dissuade the United States Govern- ment from acting precipitately. An Anglo—American study group was, however, set up in Washington to work out a scheme for collective defence in South—East Asia.

A settlement, consisting of three ceasefire agreements and a Final Declaration by the Conference, was finally reached at Geneva on 21. July. As the tide of war was definitely running in favour of the Communists, a majbr factor persuading them to accept the status quo was no doubt the threat of American intervention, go much criticized at the time by BriT' Lain and India. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were to be fully independent but would not join any militry alliance. Vietnam was to be divided at the 17th parallel, pending elections to be held in July 1956. India (Chairman), Canada, and Poland were together to provide Interna7 tional Armistice Commissions, one each for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, to supervise the carrying out of the armistices. Neither South Vietnam nor the United States signed the armistice agreements or endorsed the Final Declaration, but the latter made a Unilateral Declara- tion that she 'will refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them'.

As already arranged, the next step as to work out a collective defence arrangement for South—East Asia for which recommendations had already been prepared by the working group in Washington. A conference at Manila rsulted in the South—East Asia Collective De- fence Treaty81 of 8 September 1954, creating an alliance consisting of Pakistan, Thailand,

63 the Philippines, USA, United Kingdom, France, .^.-stralia, and New Zealand, and a proclama- tion of general principles entitled the Pacific Charters' Following India's lead, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia had declined to come to Manila. Pakistan, after some hesitation, had accepted the invitation and was represented at the meetinn by Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan.

The Manila Pact made no provision for any standing armed forces. The parties agreed to develop their capacity 'to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without' (Article II), and to cooperate to promote economic progress and social well-being (Article Illy In the case of an armed attack against the territory of any of the parties in the treaty area or against any State desl:nated by the protocol to the treaty, whose government invited or consented to such inter\ ention, each party would 'act to meet the common danger with its constitutional processes'. If the threat was other than armed attack, the parties would 'consult immediately' to agree on measures for common defence (Ar- ticle IV, 12). The protocol to the treaty designated Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam as the States to whom Articles III and IV would be applicable.

The promises of the Manila Pact as well as its membership and area are quite impressive, but its performance has belied expectations. Subversion is inherenly difficult to define and identify and it relates to the internal affairs of the treatened country. It is, therefore, difficult to plan any collective action to counter such danger. With regard to economic cooperation, it became clear at the first council meeting that donor members favoured continuation of economic cooperation mainly through existing channels—bilateral agreements, the Col- ombo Plan, and ECAFE.

SEATO also did not shape up as a strong shield against armed attack: As none of the major powers who belonged to it had their homelands in the SEATO area, the Manila Pact did not stipulate—as NATO did—that an attack against any member would be considered an attack against all, calling for instant action. The United States was against setting up any joint military command. Secretary Dulles said at Manila that the United States' responsibilities were so vast and so far-flug that she could 'serve best, not by earmarking forces for particular areas of the Far East, but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power, plus strategically placed reserves'.

Pakistan had good reason to feel dissatisfied with SEATO. It was made amply clear that she would receive no protection from SEATO against an Indian attack, which was her most immediate concern. The United States wrote a reservation into the treaty that her obli- gation under Article IV, paragraph I, would extend only to cases of Communist aggression." Zafrulla argued valiantly that 'all aggression is evil', but he was unable to prevent the US from entering the rider. In fact the US had proposed that the treaty should refer to Communist aggression, but this was not acceptable to the other members, specially to Australia and New Zealand who feared the possibility ofJapanese resurgence. Australia, moreover, had an unsettled dispute with Indonesia over New Guinea which could lead to confrontation with that non-Communist country. The deletion of the word Communist from the main text, however, brought no gain to Pakistan. Australia and New Zealand publicly declared that they did not regard themselves bound by SEATO to take military action against any fellow member of the Commonwealth." Britain did not make any similar statement publicly but no one had any doubt that her position was no different. That left France, the Philippines, and Thailand, and U was inconceivable that they would Fight for Pakistan against India while the USA and the three Commonwealth countries stood aside. 64 Pakistan's approach to SEATO had in fact been lukewarm from the beginning. Until 1959, when the Sino-Indian border trouble erupted openly, Pakistan was not conscious of any direct threat to the subcontinent from China. Moreover, the countries of 'tido -China, being predominantly non-Muslim, did not rouse Pakistan's concern as much as the countries of the Middle East. She attended the Manila conference without commitment. The decision whether to join SEATO was to be taken after Zafrulla had reported back to the Cabinet at home. Consequently, when Zafrulla appended his signature to the pact he wrote above it, 'Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistani.' As the date for the first Council Meeting approached, Anglo-American pressure on Pakistan to declare her adherence was intensified, and it was . at last announced on 19 January 1955 that Pakistan had decided to ratify the Manila Pact. In- deed, she could hardly have done otherwise because one of the purposes of US military assistance under the Mutual Defence Agreement was to 'permit' the Government of Pakistan 'to participate in the defence of the area'. If Pakistan had refused to join SEATO, the US could have declined to give the arms which she so desperately needed. The sharp increase in US economic aid from 1954 would also not have materialized.

However, once in SEATO, Pakistan became a zealous member of the organization till the 'reappraisal' of foreign policy in 1962-3. The reason for this was that alliance with the USA became the sheet-anchor of Pakistani foreign policy and Pakistan was genuinely anxious to contribute her full share to that relationship. In fact she complained that the organization was not strong enough to P.0111 its promise. In October 1956 Foreign Minister Feroze Khan Noon said Pakistan wanted the defence pacts to which she belonged to require that, like NATO, an attack on one member would be considered an attack on al1.86 At Wellington in 1958, when he had gone to attend the Council meeting, the then Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir told a press conference that Pakistan was in favour of SEATO being developed on NATO lines, with supreme headquarters and with SEATO forces earmarked for SEATO tasks in each member country.87 During the Laotian crisis in December 1960 President Ayub said more than once that Pakistan would never hesitate to carry out its responsibility as a member of SEATO."

The Baghdad Pact

The Baghdad Pact was designed to counter the long-standing Russian policy of expansion southwards, in the direction of the Caspian and the Black Seas, and into Central Asia, where the absorption of the ancient Muslim Khanates had already brought Russia to the borders of Afghanistan, close to the historical gate-way to the Indian subcontinent. Though the leaders of the Communist revolution outwardly disavowed Czarist policies, in fact they had never taken their eyes off the warm waters of the south. During the secret negotiations for a Soviet-German-Italian-Japanese treaty, in November 1940, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov proposed that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognized as the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

After the Second World War, the tremendous increase in Middle East oil production made the area even more important. Geographically, .the region lies astride the routes to South Asia and Africa. In wartime its control by Russia would outflank NATO, and its use by the Wetern coun!fies would provide a useful springboard for an assault on the USSR over . wide in Britain, who had traditionally barred the Russian ;.lvance towards India, was too weak alter the Second World War to checkmate Russian moves single-handed. In 1951-2 there were talks first about the establishment of a Middle Command sponsored by the 65 US, UK, France, and Turkey, and then of a Middle East Defence Organization. Both schemes, however, failed, principally because they did not attract the Near Eastern countries of the region on whose membership these arrangements were to be based. Iran and Egypt had unsettled disputes with Britain about oil and the Suez base respectively. And the Arab States were too preoccupied with their conflict with Israel to think of participating in an alliance under Western leadership to contain the Soviet Union.

During 1954 the question of Middle East defence grew in urgency because Britain abandoned the Suez base in October and the Anglo—Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was about to expire. A Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between Iraq and the USA was signed on 21 April 1954, and later in the year the Iraqi Premier, Nun es-Said Pasha, proposed that the moribund Arab League Collective Security Pact of 1950 be widened and strengthened. Nuni also journeyed to cairo, London, and Istanbul. He could not persuade Nasser to cooperate with the West but found the Turks more willing. A Pact of Mutual Cooperation was accord ingly signed at Baghdad by Iraq and Turkey on 24 February 1955. Britain joined the Baghdad Pact on 5 April, Pakistan on 23 September, and Iran on 3 November.90

The Baghdad Pact provided that the high contracting parties will cooperate for theft security and defence', but that such measures as they agree to take may form the subject of special agreements with each other' (Article I). Also, that this pact shall be open for accession to any member State of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both the high contracting parties.'' Like SEATO, the Baghdad Pact left much to be desired. It set up no joint military dommand.

After the July 1958 revolution, Iraq ceased to participate in pact activities; in October the headquarters were shined to Ankara; in March 1959 Iraq formally relinquished her membership; and in August the name of the organization was changed to the Central Treaty Or- ganization.

The USA had canvassed for the Baghdad Pact and late fully participated in its work but never officially signed the treaty. Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman, United States oh - server at the Council meeting in November 1955, gave two reasons why the US thought she could contribute more by remaining out of the pact: ( 1.) US adherence might further estrange Egypt and her Arab allies, and (2) America's alliance with Iraq, a member of the Arab League, would evoke an Israeli counter-demand for a mutual defence treaty, which could become an issue in the next presidential election. A treaty with Israel would cause the Arabs, including Iraq, to reject alliances with the US and make them receptive to Soviet overtures.' At a later date the reluctance of the US to join the Pact was ascribed to the State Department estimate that the Senate would refuse to approve it unless some special guarantees were given to Is- rael also. This would cause new trouble with the Arab states.93 Though the US actively participated in all the important committees of the Pact, including the military committee, her refusal to become a full member cast a doubt upon the degree of her commitment to the al !lance, and contrasted strangely with her conduct as the chief sponsor of the Pact.

Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact with greater enthusiasm than SEATO because she ° had always stood for special ties with Muslim countries. Further, she believed at the time that the Soviet Union really posed a threat to the Middle East.

However, Pakistan was once again told by her Western friends that she would not get from the alliance what she needed most: protection against an attack by India. When the

66 USA joined the military committee of the Baghdad Pact, she stated that her participation was 'related solely to the Communist menace and carries no connotations with respect to intra- area matters'.94 British Defence Minister Duncan Sandys declared that both Britain and America had promised to defend the Baghdad Pact region against Communist aggression only.95 After joining the Pact Pakistan worked hard to make it solid and strong. On the eve of the Council meeting in January 1958, Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon said that the Baghdad Pact should have the same rule as NATO, that aggression against one is aggression against all.% At about the same time it was reported that the Muslim members favoured the creation of a joint command under an American commander.97 President Ayub Khan revealed at a press conference in October 1959 that Pakistan had been insisting upon a command structure for CENTO but that one difficulty was that America was not a full member of the organization.95 Turkey, being a member of NATO, did not feel the need for a unified command under CENTO, but Pakistan and Iran, especially Iran who belonged to no other allinace, continued to press for putting more substance into the partnership, and at the ninth Council meeting (April 1961) succeeded in getting a military staff commander of the rank of full General appointed with a view to 'improve the coordination of defence planning'.99 But this was no more than a 'semantic victory' because the General was to command his military committee only, no troops."' In the following year Iran and Pakistan again proposed that CENTO should have a Central Military Command on the lines of NATO, but the USA, Britain, and Turkey showed little enthusiasm for the idea.' In the early sixties all three Muslim members of CENTO cooled off towards the West- ern powers and moved to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Iran felt she had received insufficient military hardware from her Western allies and also not enough moral support in her cold war with the United Arab Republic; Turkey complained of Western attitudes in her quarrel with Greece over Cyprus; and Pakistan had the painful experience of watching her closest Western allies, the USA and the UK, supply arms to India. But CENTO served to increase the physical contacts, friendship, and mutual understanding between these three members, already joined together by ties of culture, common religion, and geography, and they put these assets to concrete use by founding a parallel organization under the name of Regional Cooperation for Development. The Baghdad pact was criticized by the Arab countries for breaking Arab solidarity by enticing Iraq into its ranks. Some critics say it also spurred the Soviet Union to increase her influence in the Middle East, instead of keeping her out. The difficulty in rebutting this criticism lies in the fact that, while it is easy enough to point to what the Soviet Union has been able to achieve, there is no sure way of measuring what she has been prevented from getting. It is doubtful whether the absence of the Pact would have inhibited that super-power from interfering in the region that adjoins her for hundreds of miles and has been the subject other close attention at least since the days of Czar Peter the great. Indeed, a completely clear field could very well have facilitated the successful staging of Comunist-supported revolutions all over the Middle east. It is true no military command was set up, but no one doubted that any reckless move by the Soviet Union would be countered immediately by CENTO with United States help. A defence alliance is meant to serve not only as a physical deterrent to a potential aggressor but also as a psychological deterrent.

Without a doubt, the largest single factor which opened Arab doors to the Soviet Union was the planting of the state of Israel in the midst of Arab lands and the continuing US support to her, which preceded the Baghdad pact and continues unabated long after that pact has lost its original meaning.

67 PAKISTAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE Pakistan's contribution as a zealous ally of the West is best illustrated by describing her role in the important international developments of the period. The Colombo Conference

Towards the end of April 1954, when the international conference on Indo—China assembled at Geneva, the Prime Ministers of the five South Asian countries—also met at Col- ombo to deliberate the same problem. A joint commuique (2 May) recommended an immediate ceasefire in Indo—China, a declaration by France that she was committed to the complete independence of Indo—China, and a settlement by negotiation.

The Prime Ministers also regretted that colonialism still existed in various parts of the world and pronounced it a violation of fundamental human rights and a threat to peace. They further 'declared their unshakeable determination to resist interference in the affairs of their countries by external Communist, anti-Communist, or other agencies'. The mention of 'external Communism' alongside 'colonialism' was the result of a behind-the-scenes effort by the Pakistani Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, supported by Sir John Kotelawal? of Ceylon.

When the meeting opened, Pakistan introduced a resolution declaring that international Communism was 'the biggest potential danger to democracy in the region'.102 But Nehru, who strongly favoured condemnation of colonialism, fought 'tooth and nail' to bar condemnation of Communism from any formal resolution. w3 It was argued by India and In- donesia that colonialism represented an active threat while Communism was merely an ideology. Bogra rejoined that colonialism was a dying cult but Communism was a new and aggressive factor. 'We can rid ourselves of colonialism,' he said, 'but any country overrun by Communism would be lost forever.' um He indicated that if Communism also was not condemned, he could not support the resolution against colonialism. '°5 The Pakistani Premier was able not only to get external Communism condemned as the twin evil of colonialism, but he succeeded also in neutralizing another Nehru proposal. The Indian Prime Minister wished the communique to recommend that the USA, the USSR, the UK, and China should make an agreement on non-intervention, denying direct or indirect aid to the combatants in Indo—China. Bogra subscribed to the Western fears that this would deliver Indo—China to the Communists because, while the Western powers would feel restrained by the agreement, the Communists would not hesitate to breach it surreptiti- ously.' °6 In the end the joint declaration simply said that the success of the 'direct negotiations will be greatly helped by an agreement on the part of all countries concerned, particularly China, the UK, the USA, and the USSR on the steps necessary to prevent a recurrence of hostilities'. The Asian—African Conference at Bandung

During the Colombo Conference Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia proposed a larger meeting of Afro-Asian countries, and in their final communique his colleagues authorized him 'to explore the possibility of such a conference'.

After obtaining their agreement in principle, Sastroamidjojo invited the Colombo Prime Ministers to Bogor, Indonesia, at the end of December 1954, to plan the proposed con-

68 ference. The sponsors left it to the conference to decide its own procedure and agenda but in dicated that the objects olcalling an Asian-African conference were to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples P cialism andcolonialism, and to view the position of Asians and Africans in the world and the contribution they could make to world peace and co-operation. ] "7

They also decided which countries to invite. Bogra objected to Communist China being invited, but gave way when he found that even Kotelawala was partly siding with Nehru and U Nu on this issue)" The Pakistani Premier, however, was successful in opposing India's and Burma's bid to include Israel. He sal(' if Israel were invited the Arabs would not attend.")9

The conference opened at Bandung, Indonesia, on 18th April 1955 and concluded with a joint communique on 25th April. It was attended by representatives of twenty-nine nations with an aggregate population of 1.4 billion, more than half of all mankind. As the invites included countries of all shades of political colour—Communist, non-aligned, and those allied with the West—the final statement, which was subject to the rule of unanimity, was the product of animated debates. On paper China gained little, but in fact she benefited the most. India, the most important of the sponsoring nations and led atthe conference by Nehru, seconded by Krishna Menon, was expected to dominate the proceedings but fared the worst.

Pakistan approached the conference warily. Of the sponsoring countries she was the only one formally aligned with the West, though Ceylon at the time was also pro-West in her outlook. At Colombo Pakistan and Ceylon had barely held their own against India, In- donesia, and Burma. In the event Pakistan had good reason to feel satisfied with the outcome of the Bandung assembly. Bogra was not the only pro-Western leader there: representatives of Ceylon, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Thailand, and the Philippines all spoke the same political language as Bogra and were men of eloquence and experience. And Premier Chou En-lai of China declared at the very outset that 'the Chinese Delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarreL l°

The Western countries feared that Bancluilg might turn out to be a forum for venting long-pent-up anti-white and anti-colonial grievances and might start a concerted Afro—Asian movement to challenge Western supremacy. The crash, resulting from a 'timed infernal machine', of a chartered Indian airliner, 'Kashmir Princess', carrying several members of the Chinese delegation from Hong kong to Jakarta, was interpreted by China as an effort by the 'American-Chiang Kai-shek agents' to sabotage the conference.. But the gloomy Western forecasts proved groundless. The protagonist of neutralism and Communism remained on the defensive throughout the conference, and no permanent Afro-Asian organization was set up.

The most important visible achievement of the conference was its call to all nations to base their policies on the ten principles are specially notable for our purpose: 'Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations', and 'Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement'. Another pronouncement which emerged after much controversy was that 'colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end'.

Bogra's first success related to thu question whether th should be any public

69 opening speeches by the leaders of the various delegations. On 17th April, one day before the scheduled opening of the conference, Nehru had persuaded the twenty-one delegations which had arrived by then that there would be no preliminary speeches at the open session, and only printed texts would be circulated. His plea was that this would save time and avoid controversy. When Bogra, on arrival later, learned of the decisionvhe protested vehemently that such an important matter had been considered in the absence of eight delegations, including Pakistan who was one of the sponsors of the conference. He said the occasion was important and the delegates should have the right to speak in person if they wanted to do so. Backed by the other late arrivals, and some delegates who had had second thought, Bogra succeeded in getting the earlier decision reversed. This displeased Nehru so much that he walked out of the conference in a huff. He neither delivered an opening speech nor circulated one. Chou En-lai trod the path of compromise, as he was to do later throughout the conference. He circulated his main speech and also delivered a supplementary speech personally.' '2 This first wordy skirmish set the pattern for the rest of the proceedings. Bogra and Nehru would often take diametrically opposite stands and Chou En-lai would help resolve the differences by suggesting a compromise.

A heated argument erupted when India, Burma, and China pressed the conference to adopt the Five Principles of Co-existence as a guide to international conduct and Bogra proposed 'Seven Pillars of Peace' as a more realistic alternative. The two additional principles which Bogra sought to add to Nehru's five were the right to self-defence singly or collectively and the undertaking to solvc all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation and arbitration. Both weft.. unpalatable to Nehru. He said Bogra had put forward the right of self-defence with the object of asking the conference, 'undercover of words', to accept the principle of the military pacts of which Pakistan was a member. The second addition was seen as• a ruse to make it difficult for India to refuse arbitration of the Kashmir problem. Chou En-lai saved the situation by declaring that, as all the delegates did not agree to the five principles, 'we can add to these five principles or we can subtract from them'. I 13

The Cl5htrdverly OR the colonialism clause originated when the Irani delegate, Djala I Abdoh; referred to Soviet colonialism. Bogra, who, among others, supported him, said it was unrealiptic to ignore Soviet imperialism which had turned many countries into satellites and had brought ,so many people under its iron heel. But, he said, 'China is by no means an imperialist nation and she has no satellites.. .she has not brought any other country under her heel.' Bogra asked Chou En-lai not to misunderstand the criticism, which is 'not directed against an invitee, a fellow delegate who, we appreciate very much, has shown a great deal of conciliation'. 14 Nehru said the countries of Eastern Europe were not colonies because the United Nations, by admitting them to membership, had recognized them as independent. Once again it was Chou En-lai who first gave way, provided the word 'manifestation' was used instead of 'forms'. However, in the light of the debate in the conference, no one had any doubt that the expression 'colcinialism in all its manifestations' in the joint declaration was meant to cover both Western and Russian colonialism.

Nothing that some delegates had said that 'peaceful co-existence' was a term used by Communists, the Chinese Premier also offered to change that term.' 15 Consequently, the phrase 'peaceful co-existence' does not occur anywhere in the communique.

Other examples of Chou En-lai's diplomatic effort were his acceptance of the United Nations' Fundamental Principles of I Rigl- hi«leclaration that different social systems did not prevent countries ijum seeking cormnot !,round; his assurance that China did not wish to expand Communist activities outside her own )untry; his plea that China was

70 the victim of American subversion rather than a perpetrator of subversion abroad; his denial that there was any bamboo curtain round China and his open invitation to several delegates to come and see things for themselves; his support for the Arab position on Palestine; and his offer to sit down with the United States Government 'to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area'. Outside the conference, he pleased the Indonesians by concluding a treaty which ended the dual nationality of persons of Chinese descent in Indonesia. This was read as a hopeful sign by other South-East Asian countries apprehensive of the Chinese minority in their midst.

The Chinese Premier, moreover, had on the very first day said that, in order to avoid differences, he had decided not to ask the conference to support the People's Republic of China's claim to Formosa nor her right to sit in the UN. As a result, though the communique listed a number of countries Whom the conferees considered entitled to UN membership, it was silent about China's case.

What, broadly, were.the achievements of the conference? First, the tensions which were dangerously mounting 'ip at the time around Formosa were eased. Though Chou's offer to sit down and talk with the United States did not bear fruit, his repeated professions of peace and reasonableness before the representatives of the twenty-eight Afro-Asian nations, whom China wished so much to court, precluded rncort to violence at least for some time to come. Second, the sense of Afro-Asian solidarity amongst the participants increased to a degree, resulting in greater co-operation among them in the United Nations. Third, the conference increased the feeling of self-importance of the various participating Afro-Asian countries, lessening the feeling of inferiority resulting from prolonged subservice to the West.

China was the biggest beneficiary of Bandung. Chou En-lai proved to be the star of the conference and won universal acclaim for his spirit of accommodation and diplomatic skill. Both Bogra and Kotelawala, Communism's strony,est critics, publicly praised the Chinese Premier for his sincerity and reasonableness. As Chou En-lai himself said, 'The Asian-African Conference furnished a very precious opportunity for the leaders of China to make extensive contacts with the leaders of many Asian-African countries.'1 '6 China's isolation was ended. By 1957 she had established diplomatic relations with twenty-nine countries. In the brief Sino-lndian armed confrontation of 1962, China was able dramatically to demonstrate her superior physical power over her Asian rival, and the growth of her stature in the Afro-Asian world was not arrested till 1965, when circumstances complied her to turn inwards to stage a 'cultural revolution'.

For Pakistan, the chief significance of Bandung lay in the fact that the top leaders of Pakistan and China, in their very first personal encounter, 1:-.1 achieved a better understanding of each other's point of view. Chou En-lai revealed on 23 April that two days previously he had paid a visit to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and 'he told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear China would commit aggression against her... The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured that if the United States should take aggressive action under the military treaty or if the United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it just as it was not involved in the Korean War...through these explanations we achieve a mutual understanding.' ' 7 For his part Bogra, when asked afterwards to elaborate his own statement that he and Chou En-lai were beginning to understand each other's point of view, said, 'lam anti-Communist but! do • realize that China has its own problems, some of which may have been solved by Com- munism.' He said his meeting with the Chinese Premier would have no effect on the foreign 71 policy of Pakistan 'except that our relations with China will be more friendly'.' 18

Bogra was also prominent among those who had successfully pressed Chou En-lai behind the scenes to issue a conciliatory statement. on Formosa. However, the immediate response of the State Department was that the Nationalist Government must be represented as an equal at any such talks, and to list steps Communist China could take as evidence of her bona fides. 119 The Pakistani Premier was stated to have wrung a promise from Chou En-lai that, if the Americans responded favourably to his offer of negotiations, Chou En- lai would announce the release of American fliers then in Chinese custody, 120 and he was greatly disappointed at the American attitude.

Bandung opened the way to a greater exchange of visits between Pakistanis and Chinese. Chou En-lai had invited Bogra to China and advantage was taken of the offer by Prime Minister Suhrawardy in 1956. Chou En-lai returned the visit later the same year and the two countries also exchanged numerous other delegations. Though Sino-Pakistani relations inevitably came under occasional strain while Pakistan was committed to the West, the personal contacts initiated at Bandung helped smooth the transition to a more cordial relationship when both sides desired it in the following decade.

A major consequence of Bandung was the eclipse of India as the prospective leader of Asia. As an Indian writer said in retrospect, Nehru had brought China into the circle of brotherhood in Asia at Bandung but subsequent events showed that the Chinese preferred to use their new contact to pursue a diplomacy that would push India into the background and raise themselves to the leadership of Asia'.12I Though the Bandung communique had recommended that the sponsors consider the convening of another meeting of the Confer- ence, India was no longer keen to suffer another Afro-Asian gathering and preferred in the future to work for a conference restricted to non-aligned nations trom which both China Pakistan would be automatically excluded.

The Suez Crisis

The crisis in the Suez area, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal Com- pairy 4 22 by Egypt in July 1956, convulsed public opinion in Pakistan more than any other event since independence. For the people the issue was clear: a sister Muslim country was being threatened by two Western imperial powers, Britain and France, and by the Western protege in the Middle East, Israel. At government level the problem did not seem so simple. There was sympathy for Egypt, no doubt, but this was tempered by two other considerations. First, there was the desire not to ofend Pakistan's newly acquired allies, the USA and the UK, whose material and moral assistance was so essential for facing India. Secondly, 56 per cent of Pakistan's exports and 49 per cent of her imports passed through the Suez Canal and she had a vested interest in the effi (Jilt operation of the waterway. Pakistan evidently shared the Western view that Egypt did not possess the technical and managerial capacity to run the canal without outside help. In the result, there was a gap between public opinion, which was unreservedly in favour of Egypt, and official policy, which was pulled in more than one direc lion. On the whole the Government attitude seems to have been one of guarded support for the Western position, especially that of the USA who favoured international management of the canal but in Secretary Dulles's words did 'not intend to shoot our way through'. With the USSR fully backing Lgypt and the USA critical of Britain's and France's conduct, the two last - named countries inevitably had to climb down in the end and President Nasser not only kept the canal but made himself a hero into the bargain.

72 An outline of the salient facts will help in understanding Pakistan's role in the affair. It was on 16 November 1869 that the Suez Canal, which had been under construction for ten years under the direction of a Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesps, was declared open. Initially France owned 200,000 shares and Egypt 175,000. Britain purchased the Egyptian shares in 1875 and assumed the guardianship of the canal, which formed a vital link in communications leading to India, the Far East, Australia, and New Zealand. The canal was operated by a private company under a concession granted by Egypt, which was due to expire in 1968. A Conversion signed in 1888 at Constantinople declared that the canal would 'always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag'. Under pressure from the revolutionary government which had ousted King Farouq in 1952, Britain, in October 1954, agreed to evacuate her military bast in Suez, and left its defence to the Egyptians. In 1955 Egypt formulated a scheme to build a High Dam at Aswan on the Nile and it was believed the project would be financed by the UK, USA, and others. On 19 July 1956 the United States announced that she would not participate in the project because it had bec..iie doubtful whether Egypt could contribute her share of the cost.'23 Britain and the International Bank soon followed suit. Nasser responded a week later by nationalizing the canal company and declaring that Egypt herself would build the dam with revenues from the canal. Britain and France felt that the Egyptian move threatened the economic life of Western Europe, 50 per cent of whose oil supplies passed through the canal. Both countries, moreover, were emotionally stirred. Until recently they had between them dominated the Middle Fast and were sensitive to any new affronts there. A Frenchman had conceived and built the canal and Britain had long prized it as a symbol of her world stature. Nasser was getting arms from the USSR, had bitterly criticized the Baghdad Pact, and provided encouragement and asistance to anti-Western elements everywhere in the Middle East. His new bold venture, if successful, could boost his influence further to the detriment of the Western powers. In particular it would make the French position in Algeria much more difficult. Ultimately, it would make it easier for Russia to penetrate the Middle East. The USA had no comparable historical or economic ties with the Suez Canal and, moreover„ genuinely believed that the use of force by Britain and France smacked of old-style colonialism which had no place in the middle of the twentieth century.

Dulles flew to London whence a three-power statement by Britain, France, and the US was issued, stating that the Egyptian ,action had threatened the freedom of the canal and it was necessary that 'operating arrangements, under an international system' should be restored. '24 The three powers also called a conference of twenty-four nations principally concerned with the use of the canal. Egypt and Greece did not attend but the remaining twenty- two users met in London from 16. to 23 August. A United proposal, incorporating some amendments suggested by _Pakistan, Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey, was adopted by eighteen members Of the conference, including Pakistan, as their joint declaration. While recognizing the sovereign rights of Egypt, the declaration asserted the principle of international control and entrusted the operation of the canal to a board of which Egypt would be a member. 125 Four countries—India, Indonesia, Ceylon, and the USSR— favoured a purely advisory board, having no powers of control. A committee headed by Premier Robert Menzies of Australia tried to sell the proposals of the majority to Nasser in Cairo from 3 to 7 September, but was unsuccessful. The Egyptian leader said an international authority would mean 'the restoration of collective colonialism'.126

On 12 September the Western powers announced that they would create a Users' Association which would run the canal and pay Egypt appropriately for the facilities provided by her. Three days later Nasser declared that Egypt would 'resist any attempt on the part of any nation or group of nations to have an international body exercise Egypt's sovereign 73 rights...127 A second conference met in London on 19 September, and the Suez Users' Associ- ation (SCUA) held its inaugural meeting there on 1 October. As recourse to further direct negotiations with Egypt held no prospect of success, Britain and France took their proposals to the Security Council but their resolution was vetoed by Russia (13 October).

In the middle of feverish diplomatic activity and mounting tension, the world heard on 29 October that Israel had launched an attack on Egypt 'to eliminate the Egyptianfedayeen bases'. The United States immediately asked the Security Council to order the Israeli forces to withdraw and to all call upon all members of the United Nations to refrain from the use of force, but the resolution was vetoed by Britain and France. At twelve hours' notice, after calling upon Israel and Egypt to stop fighting and withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the canal, Britain and France commenced military action against Egypt. 128 An air attack was launched on 31 October, and on 5 November paratroops were dropped on Port Said. Ac- • cording to Sir Anthony Eden the purpose was 'to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit through the canal by ships of all nations'. 29

• At the request of Yugoslavia, the Security Council decided that the situation be , placed before an emergency session of the General Assembly to be summoned under the Uniting for Peace resolution. On 2 November the Assembly passed a US resolution urging an immediate cease-fire. Two days later the Assembly approved two motions, an Afro-Asian resolution asking the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties the implementation of the cease-firesand a Canadian proposal asking him urgently to submit a plan for setting up 'an emergency international United Nations force to supervise and secure the cessation of hostilities'. On 5 November the Soviet Premier, Marshal Bulganin, wrote to Eden that the war with Egypt could grow into a third world war and threatened the use of rockets. Pressed thus by friend and foe, Britain and France ordered their forces to cease fighting at midnight on 6 November. On 7 November the Assembly passed another resolution sponsored by Afro- Asian countries, once more calling upon the parties to withdraw their forces. The Assembly having also approved the Secretary-General's plans for a UN force, the first batch of the Un- • ited Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) reached Egypt on 15 November. On 24 November the Assembly again endorsed an Afro-Asian resolution demanding troop withdrawls, and by 22 December all Anglo-French forces had left Egypt. Two further resolutions had to be passed, on 19 January and 2 February 1957, insisting upon the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, before the Secretary-General could report, on 8 March, that the Israeli troops, too, had vacated Egyptian territory, marking the end of the Suez crisis.

Nasser's action in nationalizing the canal immediately evoked popular support in ' Pakistan, but official circles at first refrained from saying anything on its merits. In the first statement of any consequence a Foreign Office spokesman said that Pakistan would favour 'sucha control of the Suez as would ensure free transit of goods and reasonable dues' but declined to make any comment on the merits of nationalization.130 On 2 August Foreign Minis- ter Hamidul Huq Chowdhury stated that Pakistan had not questioned Egypt's right to nationalize a 'commercial concern' within the country and the only question was how far the exercise of that right affected other countries. 131 Prime Minister Chaudhri Muhammad Ali said Egypt had the right to nationalize the canal but that Pakistan and many other nations were 'vitally concerned with the canal. ' 32

At the First London Conference, Foreign Minister Hamidul Huq said that the act of nationalizing the Suez Company by Egypt was an exercise of her sovereignty', but added that nationalization 'at the time and under the circumstances had shaken the confidence' of a large number of interested countries and it was one of the principal objectives of the con-

74 ference to restore that confidence. lie proposed that an effective machinery be set up in active collaboration with Egypt to ensure the efficient, unfettered and cotinuous freedom of navigation of all nations'.133 Anthony Eden says that Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey were in favour of reasserting international control over the cara: but they 'wished to emphasize Egyptian sovereignty over the canal. it was no inroad on Egyptian sovereignty to ask for international control of passage through the canal in return for a financial return. At the conference we were (therefore] able to meet the Pakistani, Iranian and Turkish point of view by accepting their amendments.'134 This reasoning, however, was not acceptable to Egypt, who considered international control of the canal in any form inconsistent with her sovereignty over it.

Public opinion in Pakistan in the meantime was running far ahead of the Govern- ment moves. The secretary of the East Pakistan Awami League, Mujibur Rahman, called for observing a 'Suez Day'. A public meeting in Lahore, the biggest since partition, attended by over 300,000 persons, protested against 'lukewarm support from the Pakistani Government to the Egyptian cause', Protest meetings were also held in the other principal towns of both wings of the country."6 Dawn's London correspondent noted that the Suez conference was the first occasion on which Pakistan had lent her moral support to the West in its quarrel with a Muslim country."6 The Muslim League Parliamentary Party declared in a resolution that the imposition of international control was a direct interference with the sovereign rights of Egypt, and pledged wholehearted support to Egypt.'37

In September 1956 there was a change of government in Pakistan. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy took over as Prime Minister and Feroze Khan Noon as Foreign Minister. Pakis- tan sent Noon to the Second London Conference without commitment. At the conference the Pakistani delegate pointed out that, Nasser having already rejected the concept of a Canal Users' Association, there were only two alternatives left: (I) the use of force, and (2) reference to the Security Council. As pursuance of the proposal in its existing form would mean •an imposed settlement, Pakistan could not associate herself with it. Noon proposed that the users invite Egypt to negotiate a fresh settlement. If this did not bear fruit, the matter should be taken to the Security Council. '38 When the Users' Association was set up, Pakistan declined to join it.

, When the tripartite invasion of Egypt took place, the issue was clearer. Both the Gov- ernment and the people of Pakistan were one in condemning the aggression. But there was still a difference over how far Pakistan should go. The Government employed all the diplomatic pressure at its command to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from the soil of Egypt, but stood for a resumption of friendly relations with Britain and France after they had evacuated their forces from Egypt in obedience to the Security Council resolutions. The majority of the vocal people of Pakistan, on the other hand, demanded severance of Commonwealth ties, expulsion of the UK from the Baghdad Pact, and termination of diplomatic relations with France, Dawn greeted the Anglo;French invasion by writing b,n editorial, '1 litter Reborn'; public demonstrations erupted all over Pakistan; in Dacca angry crowds burnt down the British Information Services Office and smashed the windows of the French Consulate; at the British High Commission in Karachi thousands of students burnt the Union Jack; and the Working Committee of the Muslim League demanded Pakistan's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and Britain's expulsion from the Baghdad Pact.

Suez was the only issue on which the official policy of Pakistan lagged behind that of India in its support to a Muslim country. India was completely against any form of international control in operating the canal and Nehru, with his deep-seated abhorrence of any manifestation

75 of Western imperialism against any Afro-Asian country, condemned Anglo-French policy in much stronger terms. 'Asia is on the march,' he declared, 'and is emerging to take its rightful place in world affairs';139 also, the use of military force against Egypt by the United Kingdom and France was a 'reversion to past colonial methods.."°

Suhrawardy sent for American, British, and French envoys and demanded the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt. He told the British representative that, if Britain persisted in aggression, Pakistan would withdraw from the Commonwealth. He said also that the Baghdad Pact could not survive if one of the members continued such aggression."' The Premier declared publicly that if Britain and France refused to accept the UN directive, the rest of the world would be justified in using force against the aggressors. '42

At the initiative of Pakistan, the Prime Ministers of the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact met at Teheran and demanded the withdrawal of all invading forces froth Egypt and the settlement of the Suez problem under UN auspices. At Iraq's motion, Britain was excluded from the meeting.

Suhrawardy, however, refused to bow before public agitation that Pakistan leave the Commonwealth or the Baghdad Pact. 'I refuse to be isolated', he said. 'We must have friends.' 43 He said the British attack on Egypt had to be condemned, but it had been an attack to see that the Suez Canal remained free. Britain did not wish to reoccupy Egypt. Owing to the closure of the canal, goods came to Pakistan via the Cape and cost 30 per cent more.'" Nasser's action was not the right method. Britain must continue the Baghdad Pact to save four weak Muslim counties.'45 After Britain and France had withdrawn their forces from Egypt, the Pakistani Premier contrasted their conduct with that of Russia, who had refused to obey the United Nations demands in respect of Hungary, and said there was no longer any reason why the UK should not again participate in the Baghdad Pact.'" On 27 March it was announced that Iraq now had no objection to sitting with Britain in the Baghdad Pact meetings. Accordingly, when the next Council session took place at Karachi in June 1957, Britain resumed her place in the organization.147

The Crisis in Hungary

To the people of Pakistan generally, the crisis in Hungary was not of much direct concern. As a prominent Muslim Leaguer, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Daultana, put it, 'We had sympathy for Hungary, but for Egypt we felt as if our very bodies were being lacer- ated.'148

The di turbance in Hungary, which started just before the Suez invasion, resulted from Khrushchev's process of de-Stalinization in Russia. There were demands for greater freedom in Poland and Hungar. In Poland the movement was party successful but in Hungary it met a different fate. Starting in Budapest on 23 October, demonstrations erupted all over the country, and there were clashes between the Hungarian people and Soviet troops already stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact. The matter was first brought to the notice of the Security Council by the United States, Britain, and France. On 2 November Pre- mier Imre Nagy complained that large additional Soviet forces had entered the country and appealed to the Security Council for assistance towards withdrawal of those forces. A US resolution asking the USSR, the Council referred the question to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution. In a number of resolutions the Assembly condemned the Soviet action, proposed free elections under UN auspices, asked the Secretary-General to in- vestigate the situation and to depute observers to the scene. Jonos Kadar, who had ousted Nagy with Soviet help, declined to accept observers, and refused admission to the Secretary- 76 General as well as to a Special Committee appointed by the Assembly. Russian forces remained in Hungary and the popular movement was crushed. In its report the Special Com- mittee said the revolution in Hungary had been a spontaneous national uprising and declared there was no justification for Soviet intervention.

For the Government of Pakistan, Hungarian situation presented none of the complications of the Suez question. The Russian action seemed a clear violation of the principles of democracy and freedom. As an ally of the West, on poor terms with Russia in those.days, Pakistan had no compunction in• wholeheartedly joining the Western countries in condemning Russian action and in supporting proposals for UN intervention. With Kashmir in mind, Pakistan was specially interested in the Assembly's call for free elections in Hungary and the stationing there of UN observers. We feel', said Begum Ikramullah, 'that this organization, by allowing its decisions to be flouted or ignored with equanimity in the past, he has reached a stage when its own effective existence is in jeopardy. Its efficacy in the future depends on the manner in which it can handle the questions that are now engaging our attention.'149 During Prime Minister Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan he and Suhrawardy sharply differed on the Hungarian question. Chou En-la i defended the Soviet Union while Suhrawardy asserted that the USSR had interfered in the internal affairs of Hungary.15°

Nehru was slow in criticizing the Soviet invasion of Hungary. At first he said the situation was not clear. At a later date he played down Soviet guilt by saying that the invasion had resulted from the instinct of self-preservation. The Russians may have thought that the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was a prelude to a third world war and acted in Hungary to protect their flank.' In Parliament Nehru conceded, on 19 November, that the majority of the people of Hungary rose in insurrection to achieve a change but were suppressed. How- ever, in the United Nations Krishna Menon abstained on the resolution condemning the USSR on the ground that such action would not assist in a solution.I52 India also abstained in the condemnatory resolution of the Assembly based on the report of the Special Committee.

India, moreover, was the only non-Communist country to vote against the recommendation to hold free elections in Hungary under UN auspices. Nehru explained that 'the most objectionable part' of the resolution was that which demanded that elections should be held under the supervision of the United Nations. 'Any acceptance of intervention of this type, namely foreign supervised elections, he said, 'seemed to us to set a bad precedent which might be utilized in the future for intervention in other countries.' '3 The Indian Prime Minister here undoubtedly was thinking of India's own earlier promise of elections in Kashmir under UN auspices, which he now wished the world to forget and which, by a twist of history, had become Pakistan's most persistent demand.

The Middle East Crisis

The Suez crisis had boosted Nasser's prestige as a stout-hearted anti-imperialist. It 'had also enhanced Soviet popularity among the Arabs who believed that the invasion of Egypt had been halted mainly because of Soviet threats to intervene with 'volunteers' and rockets. Nasserite and leftist elements everywhere in the Middle East were much emboldened and Iraq, the only Arab country whose rulers had dared to join the Baghdad Pact, and the pro-Western regimes in Jorden and Lebanon, came under increased pressure. British influence, already on the wane since the end of the Second World War, having received a griev- ous blow from the Suez misadventure, the task of countering Russian designs in the Middle' East inevitably fell on American shoulders. The Middle East continued to rumble till it exploded in July 1958, with a savage revolutan in Iraq and near-revolutions in Lebanon and 77 Jordan. During this difficult period the Government of Pakistan continued to give unqualified support to US policies.

..; st overt sign that the 'northern tier' states were now under the direct protection of America was US declaration, on 29 November 1956, that 'a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members [of the Baghdad Pact] would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity'.154 Officials in Washington said the statement had been timed to make clear American concern for the welfare of those four countries at a time when the Baghdad alliance was being sharply assailed by other Arab leaders and Russia for allegedly playing an upsetting role in the Middle East.'

To obtain national backing for the policy, the President approached Congress on 5 January 1957 for authorization; (I) to assist the Middle East to develop its economic strength; (2) to undertake programmes of military assistance; and (3) 'to include the employment of the armed forces of the US to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by internatinal Communism'.,156 The Eisenhower 'Doctrine' was welcomed in Pakistan. It was taken to mean that America, though not formally a member of the Baghdad Pact, was now, to all intents and purposes, in the pact. Alter meeting in Ankara, the four Mus- lim members of the Baghdad Pact, in their communique of 21 January, supported Eisenhower's plan as best designed to maintain peace in this area and advance the economic well-being of the people'. I"

One criticism levelled in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against the proposals of the President was 'that the limitation to Communist aggression overlooked the real danger arising from conflicts that arose in other ways, as recent events had shown', but Dul- les rejected the suggestion of extending the commitment to cover non-Communist aggression on the ground that such a problem would be suitably handled by the United Nations'. 58

A Joint Resolution of Congress, signed by Eisenhower on 9 March, authorized the President

to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Further- more, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist anysuch nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism....159

In the meantime pressures were developing in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. King Hussein's firmness in dismissing his pro-Nasser Prime Minister, and a demonstration by the American Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, saved him from disaster. In Syria the drill towards Nasser culminated in Egypt and Syria joining together (1 February 1958) to form the United Arab Republic. In reply, the pro-Western Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq formed the 'Arab Union'. The rising tide of Arab nationalism also made the position of Camille Chamoun, the Christian President of Lebanon, increasingly difficult, and in May 1958 the country found itself in the throes of a civil war.

Since joining the Baghdad Pact, Iraq, a rival of Egypt for primacy in the Arab world,

78 had been Cairo's special target. In the end Nun's conservative regime proved no match for revolutionary forces for whom Nasser had become the symbol of Arab solidarity. On 14 July 1958 a startled world heard that General Abdul Karim Kassem had seized power in Baghdad and that the entire royal family had been slaughtered. Premier Nuni evaded capture for a while, but was caught a few days later and killed.

For the moment it seemed as if the entire Western position in the Middle East would collapse. Many observers thought the revolution in Iraq would mean the end of the Baghdad Pact, the collapse of King Hussein's regime in Jordan and Chamoun's in Lebanon, and fresh perils for the King of Saudi Arabia, who had displayed affinity with his fellow kings of Iraq and Jordan.

A meeting of the Muslini members of the Baghdad Pact had been scheduled in Istan- bul on 14 July, to prepare a joint protest at the forthcoming regular meeting of the pact Coun- cil in London. Their complaints were: refusal of the US to join the pact as a full member, soft- ness towards Nasser, and fear that the US would not assist Chamoun whose position was worsening. 160 On hearing of the developments in Iraq, it was decided to move the meeting to the quieter atmosphere of Ankara. In the meantime, in response to appeals from the Govern- ments of Lebanon and Jordan, American marines had landed in Lebanon (15 July) and British paratroops in Jordan (16 July). This demonstration of firm and quick action so impressed the. leaders who had foregathered in Ankara that, instead f formulating a list of grievances, the Presidents of Pakistan and Turkey and the Shah of Iran telegraphed to Eisenhower their lap- predation and gratitude for this momentous decision in which we have deep satisfaction and relief...16' In a joint declaration they also pledged their 'whole-hearted support by every possible means to any measures which might be taken to halt international gangsterism in the Middle East' .1 62

As the Eisenhower Doctrine was meant to cover only cases of 'armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism', the President claimed to have acted under the broader purview of the United Nations Charter which 'recognizes [that it1 is the inherent right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their independence'.163 He explained that the rebels in Lebanon were backed by 'official Cairo, Damascus, and Soviet radios' and supported by arms and money across the Syrian border. 'There are in Lebanon about 2,500 Americans,' the President said, 'and we cannot ... stand idly by when Lebanon appeals for evidence of our concern and when Lebanon may not be able to preserve internal order and to defend itself against indirect aggression.'

In contrast with the unqualified support of the Pakistani authorities to the dispatch of American and British troops to the Middle East, Prime Minister Nehru bitterly criticized the Anglo-US action. 'If outside powers intervene in the internal affairs of Iraq and Lebanon,' he declared, 'there is a danger of total annihilation of humanity.' I 64

et, With Iraq out of the Baghdad Pact, the remaining members met in London to mend their fences. Iraq's participation in the pact had orginally been regarded as a step towards broader Arab membership, but in fact it had served to intensify Arab opposition to the pact , and to isolate Iraq in the Arab fraternity. It was now hoped that Iraq's exit might prove to be a blessing in disguise. Secretary Dulles persoally attended the London meeting as an observer to rally the pact members, and he told them to have no fear that, if they faced situa- tions sithilar to Lebanon and Jordan, the US would fail to act, even at 'great risk', to maintain their independence and integrity. Pointing out that for the US to join the pact as a full member would mean the writing of a new treaty and its ratification by two-thirds of the Senate, he

79 adopted the simple expedient of signing the Declaration of the conference along with the full members. The first paragraph of the Declaration stated: 'The members declared their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect.'166 Dulles also orally promised increased military aid to the three Asian members. These steps were represented by 'American sources' as being just as good as signing a' treaty.166

The London Declaration promised further that the US would 'promptly enter into agreements with the other declarants to cooperate in their security and defence. Accordigly, identical bilateral Defence Agreements were signed by the US with Pakistan, Iran, and Tur- key on 5 March 1959. Article II assured the continuation of US military and economic aid to Pakistan and Article I, which roused some speculation as to its scope, said:

In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the USA in accordance with the Constitution of the USA will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Re- solution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East in order to assist the Gov- ernment of Pakistan at its request. '67

As the text did not contain the word Communist, some Pakistani spokesmen' interpreted Article Ito mean that the US had undertaken to defend Pakistan against aggression from any source, thereby implying that Pakistan could now count upon direct US assistance against Indian aggression also. But they had overlooked the import of the phrase 'as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution [of Congress dated 9 March 1957c, which had referred to 'armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism'. In view of the wider interpretation on the part of Pakistani spokesmen, the Government of India approached the American authorities for clarification and were 'specifically assured' that the agreement could not be used against India.169

The U-2 Incident

On 1 May 1960 a high-flying U-2 spy plane, equipped with advanced photographic equipment, was shot down in the interior of Russia. The incident was first revealed by Pre- mier Khrushchev on 5 May. At first the United States Defense Department stated that the plane had been engaged on weather reconnaisance but, as the pilot had been captured alive, the truth could no longer be suppressed. It transpired that the plane had taken off from Peshawar in Pakistan for espionage over the Soviet Union. Its destination was Bodo in Nor- way. Both Pakistani and Norwegian authorities denied having any knowledge that the plane was on a spying mission, and Khrushchev, in his report to the Supreme Soviet, conceded the possibility that countries where American aircraft were based did not know what was being done by the Americans. 'But', warned the Soviet Premier, 'they ought to know for their own good, because they might be the sufferers of the Americans' playing with fire.'

The Pakistani authorities denied that America had any military bases in Pakistan. They admitted there was an American communications base' 7° but said it had no airstrip of its own. It appears that the ill-fated U-2 had taken off from the Peshawar airport but Pakis- tanis were not privy to its purpose or route. The disclosure, therefore, that the plane had been engaged on an intelligence mission over the USSR came as a shock to them. It was felt that no country, however friendly, should be allowed to use Pakistani territory as a base for hostile activities against another country. A protest was lodged with the US Government and an assurance was obtained that there would be no repetition of the incident.

08 At the same time, however, Pakistan did not waver in her friendship with America and presented a bold front to the USSR. At the Czechoslovak National Day party in Moscow on 9 May, Khrushchev publicly threatened the Pakistani charge d'affaires that if any other spy plane flew from Peshawar into the Soviet Union, that city would be struck with rockets." President Ayub Khan, who was in London at the time, said, 'After all, Russian threats are not new things for us. We are not afraid of such threats.' 72 Dawn's editorial, 'So what?', ran:

After all, if war does come, none of us will escape its ravage, and whether we punctiliously keep our own bases inviolate or not, the Russians are not going to spare us on that account. They are not that sort of gentle people... there is something refreshing about Washington's disclosure that in order to safeguard the Free World against surprise attacks by Russia and her. allies the appropriate agencies of the American defence system have been systematically collecting as much as possible of Russian offensive and defensive installations.

Nothing that Russia had repeatedly refused the US proposal for 'open skies', 73 the article concluded that it was 'the Soviet Union and her flashy and boisterous leader Nikita Khrushchev at whose door the blame squarely rests'. 74

The State Department spokesman, Lincoln White said it was 'typical that the Soviet Union singles out as the objective of its threats, those smaller countries of the free world who ' bear no responsibility for the recent incident'. There shold be no doubt, he declared, that the US would honour her commitments for common defence to countries which the USSR was threatening.I75

Ayub, still in London, explained that the Americans were Pakistan's friends. Their planes visited Pakistan. Pakistanis did not know where they went after leaving Pakistan.' lb He alleged that Russian planes had been flying over Pakistan for some time.' 77 About Rus- sian threats, the Pakistani President said, 'These harsh things of life have to be faced.' If Rus- sia attacked Pakistan, the latter would not be alone. It would mean world war. The source of attack would not remain unscathed. The retaliation might not come from Pakistan but it would come from sortiewhere else.' 78

The American communications base was permitted to continue its surveillance. Its value had become even greater after the U-2 flights were terminated.

Other Questions

The Question of Tibet—As an ally of the US Pakistan also modified her attitude towards certain questions in which China had a direct interest. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan had remained neutral when the Chinese forcibly occupied Tibet in 1950. She modified her posture, however, when world interest in Tibet was revived in 1959, as a consequence of an anti-Chinese rising in Lhasa. To escape Chinese reprisals the Dalai Lama was compelled to flee to India. At a press conference at Mussoorie on 20 June he declared that the Chinese Communists had exterminated more than 65,000 Tibetans, demolished 1,000 monasteries, and done their best to stamp out the Buddhist faith. On 9 September he cabled an appeal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Malaya and Ireland took up Tibet's cause and ' submitted a resolution to the General Assembly calling for 'respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life'. 19 The resolution was carried on 21 October by 45 votes to 9, with 26 abstentions. Those voting for the resolution included the US and Pakistan. Britain and India figured amongst the abstainers.

18 Nehru had advised the Dalai Lama not to approach the UN because no good would come of it. Prince Aly Khan, speaking for Pakistan, rejected the 'cynical opinion that there is very little the United Nations can do about the situation in Tibet'. The Assembly had an effective means at its disposal, namely, world opinion. '8°

The Laotian Crisis

A fresh crisis in Laos was set off in August 1960 when Captain Kong Lae, a parachute battal- ion commander, occupied Vientiane and ousted the anit-Communist government headed by Prince Somsanith as Premier and General Phoumi as Defence Minister, and installed the neutralist former Premier, Prince Souvanna phouma, as head of a new Ministry. On 9 De- cember General Phoumi recaptured Vientiane and his nominee, Prince Boun Oum, assumed the premiership. Boun Oum's government received military supplies from the US while the neutralist and leftist' factions, who had joined hands, were backed by the Soviet Union. On 24 March 1961 President Kennedy accepted the proposal that Laos should have a neutral government. The 1954 Geneva Conference was thereupon revived and adjourned on 23 July 1962, after the Laotian princes had agreed among themselves to entrust the premiership to Souvanna Phouma, and after Phouma had held out the assurance that he would adhere to a policy of strict neutrality and Laos would not accept the protection, of any military alliance, thus repudiating SEATO's cover. The powers participating in the Geneva Conference affirmed that they would respect Laos's neutrality and refrain from medding in her internal affairs.

We have already noted that Pakistan was a zealous member both of SEATO and CENTO and that it was the USA, and some other members, who hesitated to give teeth to the pacts by setting up military commands under them. During the crisis in Laos, Pakistan, in line with her general policy at the time, favoured strong SEATO intervention in favour of the anti- Communist elements. President Ayub indicated that Pakistan was prepared to send an armed contingent to Laos if SEATO decided to intervene there. Pakistan would never hesitate to shoulder her responsibility as a SEATO member, he declared. 182 He repeated the offer a few days later.' 83

Representation of China in the United Nations

When the question of Chinese representation in the UN was first debated in that organization in .1950, Pakistan had supported the claim of the Communist regime to the seat reserved for China. During the ten years that followed, the question was not substantively considered in the United Nations. The United States was able to find sufficient support in the General Assembly to have it postponed. There was no roll-call vote in 1951, and the voting pattern for that year is, therefore, not known. During the remaining years Pakistan, in deference to US wishes, voted for the deferment resolution seven times and abstained from voting twice (in 1952 and 1957). 184

The Question of 'Two Chinas'

Communist China regards the island of Formosa as an integral part of China and her bitterest complaint against the US is that, by protecting Chiang Kai-shek and recognizing him as the lawful head of the Government of China, the US is not only depriving China of For- mosa now but intends to perpetuate the wrong by setting up Formosa as an independent state, thus creating two Chinas.

After forming an alliance with the US, Pakistan also began occasionally to speak in

82 terms of two Chinas'. During the 1955 Far Eastern crisis, Prime Minister Bogra said the For- mosan question should be settled in the UN and that 'Pakistan might recognize the Nationalist Government lilt styles itself as the Government of Formosa [only, and not of mainland Chinal' '85 A few days later he said the future of Formosa should be decided on the basis that the Western powers should recognize the Communist regime on mainland China and the claim of the Nationalists should be limited to Formosa. ' 86 President Ayub thought the Formosan question could be resolved on the basis of a formula to accommodate both the People's Republic and the Nationalists in the United Nations.'

From 29 June 5 July 1959 a Muslim Haj Mission from Taiwan visited Karachi on its way to Makkah. On 21 July the Foreign Office of the People's Republic handed over a strong protest note to the Pakistan Ambassador in Peking complaining that the Haj mission, with the connivance of the Government of Pakistan, had carried out 'a series of activities openly slandering China'; despite a protest by the Chinese embassy, the mission- had been received personally by the Pakistani Foreign Minister; and in the preceding few months Pakistan had stepped up her support for the US plot to create 'two Chinas'.188

The Cost of Alliance

Tension with Egypt—Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra had commended to his countrymen the security agreement with Turkey and the agreement for military assistance with the USA as major steps towards strengthening the Muslim world. After Iraq had joined the Baghdad Pact it was hoped her example would be followed by other Arab countries, making the organization a commonwealth of Muslim nations. However, instead of bringing the Muslim countries closer to each other, these developments served to alienate the Arab countries further from those who had signed the pact. In the van of the forces of opposition to the pact was Egypt, the most important Arab country, followed by Saudi Arabia, the cradle of Islam.

Tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan also reached new heights during the years of Pakistan's close association with the Western powers. There was no doubt that there had always been trouble between them, but Pakistan's new policy of commitment to the West, and Afghanistan's increasing reliance, for transit facilities and military and economic assistance, on the Soviet Union, could not but intensify the discord. Pakistan's over-dependence on America and continued political disruption at home, in fact, lowered her prestige among all her Afro-Asian peers. But the most painful price for alliance with the West was the bitterness it provoked with sister Muslim countries, the very reverse of Pakis- tan's fondest dream.

While the proposals for establishing a Middle East Command, or a Middle East De- fence Organization, were in the air, Egyptian spokesman had said that the evacuation of the Suez base by Britain, and a satisfactory settlement of the Sudanese question, were necessary conditions for Egypt's participation in any Middle Eastern defence alliance. In October 1951 Britain offered to hand over the Suez base to Egypt, on the condition that Egypt would join the USA, Britain, France, and Turkey in the Middle East Defence Organization, and that the British military base in the Suez zone would become the allied base. In Egyptian eyes, 'what was offered was the several foreign devils should take the place vacated by one foreign devil.'189 The proposal was, therefore, immediately rejected by Egypt. Towards the end of October the Egyptian Government unilaterally repudiated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, ending the authorization accorded to Britain to maintain troops in the Suez area. Egypt was also anxious that, until Anglo-Egyptian differences were settled to Egypt's satisfaction, Pakistan

83 ;Aid the other countries of the Middle East should not join the Western powers in any plan for the defence of the Middle East. It was feared that, if the Western countries were able to make progress in defence arrangements without Egypt, there would be less need and urgency for Britain to come to terms with Egypt.

Egypt was, therefore, most indignant when Pakistan and Turkey announced their intention to go ahead with their plans for collaboration in defence (19 February 1954), while Britain was still holding the Suez base and Anglo-Egyptian parleys were at critical stage.190 Cairo radio said the Turco—Pakistani Agreement would be 'a catastrophe for Islam...the first stab in our back. The nexi one will probably occur when Iraq joins the plot.' 91 The Govern- ment—owned paper Al—Garnhouria stated editorially that the military alliance between Pakistan, Turkey, and the West would be a sword severing the ties between Pakistan and the Arab world. '92

When Nuni Pasha announced at Baghdad (on 13 January 1955) that Iraq would soon sign a mutual assistance pact with Turkey, Nasser was furious and immediately summoned a conference of Arab Prime Ministers at Cairo to dissuade Iraq. Nuni failed to turn up at the meeting, whereupon a delegation was dispatched to Iraq to discuss the question, but without result. Nasser was, however, successful in making Jordan reverse her announced decision to accede to the pact.

Egyptian objections to the Baghdad Pact were that it was 'imperialist,' because it had been imposed from outside and had not sprung from the heart of the Arab world; that, by lur- ing Iraq into the fold, the pact had split Arab solidarity; that having evacuated the Suez base, Britain had re-entered the Middle East by conjuring up the Baghdad Pact; and that, by focus- ing on the danger from the north, the pact diverted Arab attention from the real danger which came from Israel.

During and following the Suez crisis, Pakistani—Egyptian relations reached their lowest. Nasser complained that Foreign Minister Hamidul Huq, who had seen him at Cairo on 14 August on his way to the First London Conference, had gone back on his promise to give full support to the Egyptian position. In a well-publicized interview with Frank Moraes of the Times of India, in the first week of September, the Egyptian President said, 'Do you know that before the London conference the Pakistani Foreign Minister, who came to see me, spoke for three hours and he vowed support for Egypt's cause? You know what he did?' 193

There was a brief relaxation when Pakistan refused to join the Users' Association, but a new pitch of acrimony was quickly reached when it was reported that Nasser had rejected the Pakistani offer of a contingent for the United Nations Emergency Force. That he had accepted Indian troops doubled the anguish in Pakistan. It was believed that the Egyp- tian Premier had decided to keep out Pakistani forces because he had been pressed to do so by Russia and India; because Pakistan was allied with Britain in the Baghdad Pact and with both Britain and France in SEATO; and because the Pakistani force, and troops from other countries with ties with the West, might not get out of Egypt when Egypt wanted them to do so.

A further blow to Pakistani pride was administered a few days later, when Suhrawardy was about to leave for Cairo. The Egyptian Ambassador to Pakistan hurried to the Pakistani Premier and warned him that President Nasser did not consider it a suitable time for a visit to Cairo. Suhrawardy had no option but to give up the idea. Dawn angrily denounced Nasser as 'Cairo's modern little Pharaoh'194 and 'this turbulent egoist' in whose veins 'not the blood of Islam should seem to fL a but the turbid waters of the Nile.' '95

84 by reportedly declaring that 'Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India,'196 Nas- • ser pricked Pakistan's tenderest spot. A campaign against Pakistan was sustained by Egyp- tian information media for months to come: Suhrawardy was called 'the tail of colonialism', 'a greater lover of Britain and America than the English and Americans themselves,' and Pakistan was painted as Egypt's enemy number one, who must be cowed before Egypt could handle the West effectively.' 97 Suhrawardy stood his ground and asked: When Egypt, which claims to be a champion of the Arab cause and the anti-Israel cause, chooses to recognize and make friends with India and to have thearmies of India on its soil, the India which recognizes Israel, and has trade relations with it, and amicable relations with it, and refuses to allow Pakistani troops as a part of the United Nations Force, am Ito consider that Israel is the pivot of Arab policy?198 ' He alleged that Egypt regarded the division of India as mistake and favoured Pakistan's reun- ion with India, and also treated Kashmir as a part of Indb. Pointing out that Egypt claimed to be a secular and not a Muslim state, he said Pakistan would have to delete Islam from her constitution if she desired to form a 'Muslim combination' with 'Arab nationalism/199

Tension with Saudi Arabia When Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Pakistan took the unusual step of issuing a press handout containing the text of a Radio Makkah broadcast, urging Pakistan to drop her membership for the pact and 'return to the right path.' The broadcast called Pakistan's act 'a stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim states' and said it had caused surprise and astonishment that Pakistan, who had always felt proud of her Islamic faith and declared her respect for all Arabs and Muslims, should have joined Turkey, who 'feels honoured by co-operating with the Jewish state.'200

Pakistanis, perennially critical of the discriminatory policy of the Government of India towards the Muslim minority, were further dismayed when King Saud, speaking as the guardian of the Muslim holy places, publicly thanked Prime Minister Nehru and his Govern- ment for their policy towards the Muslim. 'I desire to say,' he proclaimed, 'to my Muslim brethern all over the world with satisfaction that the fate of Indian Muslims is in safe hands.''' But worse was to follow.

When Nehru arrived in the Saudi Arabian capital on a visit in September 1956, he was warmly greeted with the slogan 'marimba rasnol al saliva' This immediately aroused idevre;II I re;e111111t1 It ill110ligst Pakistanis. The Saudi Arabian Embassy in Karachi hastily issued a press release explaining that the phrase meant 'Welcome Messenger of Peace' and not 'Welcome Prophet of Peace,' as interpreted by Pakistanis. Pakistani feelings, however, were not assuaged. Dawn wrote: 'Most Muslims in this country know what the literal meaning of the word rasool is, but they also know that it has acquired a sacred connotation since the advent of the Holy Prophet whom the Kalima specifically describes as "Mohammad-ur- Rasool Allah—Mohammad, the Messenger of God."

Reviewing King Saud's and President Nasser's unfriendly attitude towards Pakistan, the article advised fellow-Pakistanis to 'calmly and dispassionately take all these bitter truths into consideration and restrain to some extent their vain expectations from the so-called Muslim world' and to recognize that 'for the present' Pakistanis were the lone upholders of the ideology if Islam.202 85 Tension with Afghanistan

When it was rumoured that the United States might supply military aid to Pakistan, the Afghan Embassy in Delhi issued a statement that such assistance would strengthen Pakistan as a 'colonial' power over the 'freedom-seeking people of Pakhtunistan.'203

Afghanistan reacted sharply to the Pakistani announcement, in March 1955, that the various parts of the western wing of Pakistan would be amalgamated into one administrative unit under the name of West Pakistan. It was alleged that this would further erase the separate identity of the Pakhtuns in Pakistan.

Besides spewing out vile propaganda against Pakistan by all possible means, the Af- ghan authorities connived at a mob attack on the Pakistani Embassy and Chancery at Kabul on 30 March 1955. Both buildings were ransacked. The Pakistani flag at the Chancery was pulled down and torn and in its place the 'Pakhtunistan flag' was hoisted. The Pakistani Con- sulates at Jalalabad and Kandahar were similarly attacked. Diplomatic relations were broken off and the Afghan—Pakistani border remained closed for five months.

A reconciliation was temporarily effected by the good offices of some Muslim countries and diplomatic ties were resumed, but the situation again deteriorated in October when West Pakistan was officially inaugurated. Afghanistan's Grand National Assembly, the Loi Jirga, traditionally convened at times of national emergency, met at Kabul in the middle of November and passed a resolution declaring that Afghanistan did not recognize the 'Pakhtunistan' territories as a part of Pakistan and demanding that Afghanistan's defences be strengthened by all possible means?'

At this delicate juncture Russia, having a score of her own to settle with Pakistan for her openly pro-Western policy, took a hand in the game. In December 1955 Premier Nikolai Bulganin visited Kabul, accompanied by Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and declared, 'We sympathize with Afghanistan's policy on the Pushtunistan issue.'205

The Soviet Union also exploited the situation to increase Afghanistan's dependence on Soviet assistance. During their visit Bulganin and Khrushchev offered a credit of $100 million for economic development. In 1957 an additional credit of $15 million was provided for oil exploration. In 1959 the Soviet Union agreed to build the Kushk—Kandahar road and the Shindand military airfield at a total cost of $85 million. By the end of 1960 the total of Soviet assistance, including military aid, was estimated to be $300 million, and about 1,600 Soviet civil and military technicians were believed to be in Afghanistan.

Some improvement in Pakistani—Afghan relations resulted from an exchange of visits, starting with President Iskander Mirza's visit to Kabul in August 1956, followed by visits to each other's country, in the coruse of the next two years, by Premiers Dauds and Suhrawardy and a Transit Trade Agreement were made, and a direct radio-telephone link was established.

In October 1958 Ayub Khan assumed power in Pakistan. He desired good relations with Afghanistan but, himself a Pakhtun and heading a Pakhtun-dominated administration?' he could not understand the Afghan grievance that Pakhtuns in Pakistan were an oppressed people. A few weeks after a visit to Rawalpindi, in January 1960, Foreign Minister Naim said at Kabul that Pakistan had refused to discuss the 'Pakhtunistan' issue and complained that

86 Ayub Khan's regime Was even more adamant against the 'Pakhtunistan' demand than Pres- ident Mirza, who desired 'to find some sort of solution.'2' Not long afterward Khrushchev, now Premier of the USSR, again travelled through Kabul. A joint communique, marking his talks with the Afghan leaders, asserted that a solution of the 'Pakhtunistan' problem should be reached by implementing the United Nations Charter 'principle of self-determination.'208

In the meantime, besides a vilifying propaganda offensive against Pakistan,209 posters and handbills were distributed in the tribal area inciting the tribesmen to rise against the Government of Pakistan.' Towards the end of September 1960, a lashkar estimated to be 15,000 strong penetrated into Pakistani territory near Bajaur but was repulsed with heavy losses.

On account of harassment by Afghan Intelligence officials, shopkeepers, landlords of houses, and others, it became virtually impossible for Pakistani personnel attached to the Consulates in Afghanistan to discharge their duties. Accordingly, Pakistan informed Af- ghanistan on 22 August 1961 that the Pakistani Consulates at Jalalabad and Kandahar would be close down, and demanded that the Afghan Conculates and Trade Agencies in Peshawar and Quetta be also closed. Afghanistan retaliated by severing diplomatic relations with Pakistan and closing the border.

This phase of Pakistani—Afghan relations, the most unfortunate of all, ended • in March 1963 with the resignation of Premier Daud, a cousin of King Zahir Shah, who had ruled Afghanistan with an iron, hand for nearly ten years and made the demand for 'Pakhtunistan' one of the main planks of his policy. With him also went his brother, Foreign Minister Naim.

Relations with the Soviet Union

Even before Pakistan signed up with the West, the Soviet Union had suspected that she would let her territory be used as a spring-board for attacks on USSR. After Pakistan had subscribed to the Western security system, this suspicion became almost a conviction. Pro- test notes, warning Pakistan of the dire consequences of allowing military bases to be constructed in Pakistan, were regularly addressed to the Pakistani Government, and were as regularly rejected as being without foundation. Pakistan's participation in SEATO and CENTO was also criticized as collaboration in the intended Western aggression against Rus- sia and China. As retribution for Pakistan's unfriendly acts, the Soviet leadership openly supported India's claim to Kashmir and Afghanistan's demand for 'Pakhtunistan.'

At the same time, however, the door was never shut to reconciliation. It was clearly stated that if Pakistan mended her ways, the Soviet Union would be prepared to beam on her as beneficently as she did on neutral India.

According to New Times the immediate purpose of the Turco—Pakistani alliance was to convert Pakistan into an American military base.2 ' A Soviet note, protesting against U.S. military aid to Pakistan, accused her of placing military bases at the disposal of the United States and of placing the Pakistani Army under a foreign command by accepting foreign advisers.2I2 A Soviet Foreign Office statement published in Pravda on 15 September said SEATO was 'directed against the security interests of Asia and the Far East and, at the same time, against the freedom and national independence of the Asian peoples'. An article in New Times alleged that the Baghdad Pact constituted a threat not only to the Soviet Union 'but to all the peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa, and especially to those defending their national independence and opposing colonialism/213

87 In the meantime the Soviet Union had been going all out to win India's favour. By 1954 Russia had sufficiently recovered from the ravages of the Second World War to embark upon a programme of economic assistance to less developed countries. Among the earliest .beneficiaries of the new policy were Afghanistan and India. In February 1955 the Soviet Union undertook to build for India a modern iron and steel mill at Bhilai. In June Nehru was invited to Russia on a two-week visit and accorded an unprecedented welcome. lie said he had found 'a passion for peace' everywhere he had gone and was so deeply moved that when , taking leave of his hosts he told them that he was leaving a part of his behind.

Of even greater significance was the three-week return visit in November—De- cember of the same year of Premier Bulganin and First Secretary Khrushchev. Huge crowds greeted them wherever they went with chants of 'Hindi—Russi Bhai Bhai' (Indians and Rus- sians are brothers), and 'Hindi—Russi Ek Hai' (Indian and Russians are one). Besides calling India and the Soviet Union 'allies' in the struggle for world peace,71 4 and promissing all the help India needed to make her industrially strong,7I5 the Soviet leaders gave emphatic support to the political questions nearest India's heart. The Russians 'were grieved that the imperialist forces succeeded in dividing India into two parts.'21 6 Portugal in Goa was like a tick which fastens itself to a healthy body.2 I 7 At Srinagar Khrushchev noted that Kashmir was 'nearest of all to the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union' and said it was a pleasure to visit the State 'because it is the birthplace of your esteemed Premier Mr. Nehru'. He also declared that the fact that Kashmir was one of the states of the Republic of India had been decided by the people of Kashmir.'

In their Joint Declaration the Soviet visitors and Prime Minister Nehru condemned the formation of military alliances, alleging that they had extended to area of the cold war and increased tension.7I9 At the airport parting Nehru said, It appears that on this occasion a part of our heart has been separated from us.' Khrushchev, not to be outdone, replied, 'lam also leaving a small part of my heart behind to the people of India..270 Later he told the Sup- reme Soviet, 'As a beloved brother is welcomed in a loving family, so we were welcomed in the great family of the peoples of India.' On the way home Bulganin and Khrushchev stayed at Kabul for four days and there belaboured Pakistan further by siding with Afghanistan on the 'Pakhtunistan' issue.

Other moments of tension between Pakistan and the USSR followed when the Soviet Union accused Pakistan of supporting the 'colonizing proposals' of the Western powers for the future of the Suez Canal; when Pakistan strongly criticized the Russian invasion of Hungary; when, in February 1957, Russia cast her first veto in the Security Council proceedings on Kashmir to bar resolution stating that the use of a temporary United Nations Force to facilitate demilitarization deserved consideration; when Pakistan signed the bilateral De- fence Agreement with the U.S. in March 1959; when, in the autumn of 1959, President Ayub Khan referred to the possibility of a concerted Russian—Chinese drive toward the Indian Ocean in five years as part of their plan for Communist world domination; and when the American U-2 spy plane, having taken off from Peshawar, was brought down in Russia in May 1960.

However, running parallel all the time to these manifestations of strain, were declarations from the Soviet leadership that Pakistan could win their friendship at any time by abandoning her imprudent foreign policy. The nightmare of possible atomic launching sites so close to Soviet territory was too frightening to be ignored.

In his address to the Supreme Soviet in August 1953, Premier IvIalenkov said Russia 88 placed great value on good relations with both India and Pakistan.' Khrushchev, in his speech at Srinagar on 10 December 1956, while condemning partition as the old trick of 'divide and rule,' was careful to add, 'But establishment of two separate states—India and Pakistan—is a decided issue, and I have not stated my opinion on this score so frankly in order that the question might be re-examined in any quarter.' He castigated Pakistani foreign policy, but stated at the same time that the Soviet Union 'should very much like' to have •friendly relations with Pakistan, 'and it is not our fault that such relations have so far not de- yelped. But we shall persistently strive to improve these relations in the interest of peace.' 222 When reporting on the South Asian tour to the Supreme Soviet, Bulganin declared that the Soviet Union would like to have no less friendly relations with Pakistan than she had with India, Burma, and Afghanistan, and also that the Soviet Union would continue to endeavour to improve her relations with Pakistan.223

These gestures were followed by Bulganin's written replies to a Pakistani editor's questions, in the course of which the former said the Soviet Union could share her knowledge of the peaceful applications of atomic energy with Pakistan and that there were real possibilities for an expansion of trade based on an exchange of Soviet industrial and agricultural machinery for Pakistani agricultural and livestock products.224 While attending the Na- tional Day reception at the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul on 23 March 1956, Foreign Minister Molotov told the Pakistani charge d'Affairs that the Soviet Union was ready to build a steel mill for Pakistan like the one she was constructing in India.226 •

First Deputy Soviet Premier Anastas Mikoyan led a formidable forty-man delegation to Karachi in March 1956 to participate in the ceremonies inaugurating Pakistan as a republic under her newly framed consitution, and made a strong bid for Pakistani goodwill. He offered aid without strings, and stated that Premier Bulganin and Khrushchev were always ready to come to Pakistan and were waiting only for an invitation.226 In a somewhat involved • statement on Kashmir he conceded that the issue was a 'very important question' for Pakis- tan. He said that Bulganin and Khrushchev had expressed their views in India after assessing public opinion but significantly observed, in the same breath, 'It is not for us to decide finally the question of Kashmir. It should be decided by the people of Kashmir/227 Mikoyan also invited the Pakistani Parliament to send a delegation to visit the Soviet Union.

A trade pact was singed in Karachi between Pakistan and a visiting Soviet delegation in June 1956, resulting in transactions worth Rs. 20 million during I 957.228 The leader of the delegation said that his side would have been glad to discuss the question of assistance in oil-boring, drilling, or refining but that Pakistan had not raised such a question.2291

Mikoyan's offer of aid had been immediately turned down. A Pakistani Government official had declared publicly, 'Nobody wants aid from them and that is our policy.'230 His invitation to a parliamentary delegation to visit Russia, however, was accepted in August 1956. M. A. Khuro, leader of the delegation, revealed to Dawn's London correspondent after the tour that the delegation had been assured by Bulganin and Khrushchev, in a two-hour discussion on Soviet—Pakistani relations, that the USSR was anxious to cultivate close relations with Pakistan. Khuro gained the impression that the Russians had not yet said their last word on Kashmir, and thought it would be wreng to infer from Khrushchev's statement in Srinagar that the USSR had, on this issue, finally ranged herself on the side of India.231

By 1958, the Pakistani—U.S. alliance having come under strain,232 there was a noticeable softening of the Pakistani attitude towards the Soviet Union. The hurling into space of Sputnik I by the Russians on 4 October 1957, moreover, had been read as a clear sign

89 everywhere that the USSR was on the threshold of an impressive technical and economic breakthrough. The New York Times noted that the speeches of the had of the visiting Russian parliamentary delegation, offering aid 'without strings,' were prominently displayed on the front page of Pakistani newspapers and were winning the acclaim of the man in street.233 Dawn reported that Pakistan's foreign policy was under re-examination and that one of the suggestions was to improve relations with the Soviet Union in the cultural and economic fields.234 The newspaper also observed editorially that it was 'a far-fetched idea' that the Soviet Union or China posed any physical threat to Pakistan, but that if war came Pakistan was sure to be attacked, perhaps with nuclear weapons, 'not because we are a prize in ourselves but because we appear to Soviet eyes as having taken sides militarily with the enemies of the Soviet Union.'235

The growing uncertainly in foreign policy, however, was halted in October 1958 when Ayub Khan took up the reins of power. As one of the chief architects of friendship with America, he tried, to mend that deteriorating alliance. There was no move for some time towards an easier relationship with the Soviet Union. But after Pakistani—U.S. relations resumed their uneven course, the Soviet Embassy in Pakistan again broached the subject of petroleum exploration. This time the U-2 incident killed the negotiations before any noticeable progress could be registered. When excitement had subsided, Ayub gave the signal for a fresh start by saying, in June 1960, that he saw no reason why Pakistan could not 'do business' with the Soviet Union.236 Talks were thereafter resumed and ultimately resulted in the Pakistani—Soviet Agreement of 4 March 1961. Pakistan was granted to loan of $30 million and promised technical assistance and equipment for exploration for oil. Though the negotiations were accompanied by numerous Pakistani official statements that the proposed arrangement did not signify any change in her foreign policy, the successful conclusion of such an important agreement was not without significance. The ice was broken.

Relations with China

Chinese rhetoric tends to confuse the real tenor of her foreign policy but the rationale of China's endeavour, and its consistency, become clear if it is remembered that her central objective is to gain acceptance as the world's third super power, along with the USA and the USSR, and as the only one of those three who really cares for the welfare and independence of the Afro-Asian victims of colonialism and neo-colonialism. China deliberately presents a bold and defiant front to America and Russia, who did not yet accept her as an equal, and displays a comparatively benign attitude towards the Afro-Asian countries, who are weaker than herself. The former posture serves to impress the Afro-Asian, and the latter to lure them. To this general rule of leniency towards Afro-Asians, there is one exception, India, because she is too large to accept China's hegemony and is, in fact, China's potential rival for pre-eminence in the very family of nations which China wishes to rally, just as China herself in the Communist world is too big to be a mere satellite of the Soviet Union. China's policy towards Pakistan, in particular, is an object-lesson in law to attain long-term national goals by calm calculation, forbearance, and diplomatic skill. In her durable Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, China enjoyes the leadership of a past master of diplomatic finesse. After Bulga- nin and Khrushchev had pleased India, and angered Pakistan, by their visit to India in 1955, Cho En-lai went one better and made equally successful visits to both India and Pakistan in 1956. More than anyone else he is responsible for making compatible the two societies which, ordinarily, should constitute opposing international poles—China, the unabashed promoter of ex me "arxism, and Pakistan, the most zealous upholder of Islam.

We have already mentioned how China restrained herself in the early years in the 90 face of Pakistan's openly expressed dislike of Communism and her pro-West policies. When Pakistan formally joined the Western defence arrangements, China could very well have lost patience with Pakistan, but she continued to display exemplary foresight. It must be remembered that, from April 1954, when India signed a treaty with China recognizing Tibet as a 'region of China,' till the escape into India of the Dalai Lama at the end of March 1959, Sino- In- dian friendship was at its highest point. Indians and Chinese in those days were 'bhai bhai For China to have been able to enjoy India's close friendship during that period without un- duly straining her relations with India's enemy, Pakistan, was diplomatic tightrope-walking of the most skilful variety.

Though Pakistan's Western allies regarded both Russia and China as equally dangerous to world peace, China was able to covince Pakistanis that she was different from Russia. When Pakistan decided to accept American military assistance, William Clark of the Observer reported from Karachi that it was 'most noticeable that Communist China is not regarded as a grave menace, but rather a fellow Asian country dealing with common Asian problems of population, growth, food resources and land reform.'237 China also gave Pakis- tanis the comforting feeling that she appreciated the peculiar nature of Indo-Pakistani relations.

Addressing the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, on 23 September 1954, Chou En-lai criticized the newly formed SEATO but insisted that the principles of co-existence should apply to China's relations with all Asian countries including Pakistan.238 Even more significant was Chou En-lai's parting message to Ambassador Raza when the latter left for Teheran on transfer. The Chinese Premier said he had felt personally hurt at the time Pakistan joined SEATO because he regarded Pakistan as a friend, hut added that he fully understood her peculiar circumstances and hoped she would continue to play a decisive part in bringing peace to the world.239

At Bandung Chou En-lai had invited Bogra to visit China. China chose the time of Bulganin's and Khrushchev's Indian visit to repeat the invitation in more concrete form. The Manchester Guardian perceptively commented on China's move: 'If Moscow is hying to tighten its links with Inida, it is natural that China should examine the possibilities of a link with Pakistan.'240

Prime Minister Suhrawardy made a ten-day visit to China in October 1956 and was cordially received by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and others. Chou En-lai told Paksitani news- men that, although Pakistan was a member of SEATO, there was no reason why China could not be friendly with her. China and Pakistan had many points in common and, though they differed in some ways, the two countires had no conflict of interests.24 ' Dawn said Chou En-bits statement had made new history in international relations by giving so broadminded a lead/242

During Chou En-lai's own visit to Pakistan in December, his views were embodied in a joint communique: 'The two Prime Ministers are of the view that the difference between the political systems of Pakistan and China and the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the strengthening of friendship between their two countries... .They are happy to place on record that there is no real conflict of interests between the two countries/243 At Dacca the Chinese Premier was given a 'sepectacular ovation' by 100,000 citi- zens. The East Pakistan Chief Minister, Ataur Rahman, who presided over the meeting, paid tribute to Chou En-lai's statemanship and hoped he would assume the leadership of Aisa.244

Suhrawardy was so impressed by his exchanges with Chou En-lai that he wrote to

9 Eisenhower supporting the claim of the People's Republic to represent China in the United Nations, and also urging recognition of the People's Republic by the United States, but Eisenhower expressed his inability to accept Pakistan's point of view.245 The Pakistani Pre- mier also made a prediction in Parliament that was little noticed at the time but which in hindsight seems extremely shrewd: 'I feel perfectly certain that when the crucial time comes China will corhe to our assistance.'246

With Suhrawardy's visit to the USA in July 1957, however, Sino—Pakistani relations entered a difficult phase. Despite all the display of mutual cordiality between the two Pre- miers, Suhrawardy had lost no time in making it clear that Chou En-lai's visit had not in any way affected the charted course of Pakistan's foreign policy: 'both knew very well how far they could go.'247 In the USA Suhrawardy made several strongly pro-American speeches. At San Francisco he spoke critically of conditions in China but said he felt pround of Pakistan's alliance with the U.S., and added: 'We intend to place our resources are the disposal of the ideal which both of us are pursuing!' Considering how derisive and biting Chinese comments can be, the criticism in Jin Min Jih Pao of Suhrawardy's San Francisco remarks was comparatively mild. The paper said that, while it was quite understandable that Suhrawardy had to say something pleasant to Washington in asking for American aid, he 'had over- reached himself by joining in Secretary Dulles' slanders against the Chinese people's Repub- lic'. The article stressed, however, that friendship between the people of China and Pakistan would not be affected by Suhrawardy's utterances.'"

During the early part of the Ayub era Pakistan's relations with China touched their' nadir. In March 1959 the Dalai Lama took refuge in India to escape the consequences of the Tibetan rebellion against China, and later that year there were armed clashes on the Sino—Indian border. Pakistan, who had hitherto viewed Russia as the chief danger to the peace of South Asia, now began to see China in that light. Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir said in a television programme in Washington that 'expansionist tendencies were more noticeable in China than in Russia.'25° Ayub repeatedly invited India to join Pakistan in defending the subcontinent. Pakistan also caused offence to Peking in a number of other ways.

China's press called Pakistan's action in voting for the U.S., resolution designed to postpone the question of China's seat in the United Nations, despite herself recognizing the Communist regime, 'doubt-dealing tactics' and 'an unfriendly act.'' It said that, in criticizing the happenings in Tibet, the Pakistani papers had been 'playing imperialist propaganda tunes.'252 Ayub's efforts to build up a Pakistani—Indian system of joint defence were described as a 'vicious role' and the Pakistani Government was advised to 'pull up the horse before the precipice/253

Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of Chinese diplomacy concerned China's attitude on Kashmir during the heyday of her friendship with India. The Indians thought China fully supported their claim of Kashmir, but when the time came for China to please Pakistan, she was able to come out in full support of the Pakistani position without having to go through the painful forces of eating her own words. Khrushchev's handling of the same sizzling subject made the subsequent shift of his successors look much clumsier.

During his press conference in Calcutta in December 1956, just before he visited Pakistan, Chou En-lai was asked whether his offer to India to co-operate in defending her territorial integrity included Kashmir. He replied. 'The Kashmir question is an outstanding question between India and Pakistan. We hope that this question will be settled satisfactorily. India and Pakistan are sister countries. The peoples of these two countries are of the

same race. There is no dispute between these two countries which cannot be settled.'254 In Pakistan, a few days later, the Chinese Premier admitted that he had discussed the Kashmir problem with both Nehru and Suhrawardy but refused to make any comments on the merits of the case because he was 'still studying the question.' He expressed the hope, however, that Pakistan and India would settle this question directly between themselves.255

Later, at Colombo, Chou En-lai and his Ceylonese counterpart referred to Kashmir in their joint statement: 'We are deeply distressed by the unfortunate situation that has arisen in the dispute between Pakistan and India in regard to Kashmir. We appeal to both parties concerned, in their own as well as the wider interests of Asian—African solidarity, to strive further for a peaceful settlement of this problem. '256 Pakistanis, having already experienced the futility of direct talks with India, were annoyed at Chou En-lai's view that the problem should be settled bilaterally by India and Pakistan. Suhrawardy called it the Communist and neutralist line.252

But China's recommendation that the question be decided by direct negotiationsbe- tween the two disputes was, in fact, not meant to favour India but to prevent the United States from exploiting the dispute to her advantage. 'To have this question referred to the United Nations, which in the circumstances of today, is under the control of the United States,' explained Chou En-lai, 'can only give rise to the danger of foreign interference.'255 In reality the Chinese position was more favourable to Pakistan than to India. China's suggestion, that the dispute be resolved by bilateral discussions, related to procedure, but her recognition that the final disposition of Kashmir was still a matter of legitimate dispute struck at the very roof of India's basic position that Kashmir was already a part of India.

During the discussion of the Sino—Indian boundary by Indian and Chinese officials in 1960, China refused to discuss the boundary west of Karakoram Pass between China's Sinkiang and Kashmir'259 because of 'the present actual situation in Kashmir.' It was at this juncture that India, for the first time, woke up to the reality that China had 'declined to recognize the accession of Kashmir to India '26° In her note, protesting against the Sino—Pakistani boundary agreement, India wrote that she had 'so far believed' that China had accepted In- dian sovereignty over Kashmir 'without reservation.' Peking called the 'allegation' totally untenable and pointed out that: 'The Indian Government could not cite any official Chinese documents to prove this arbitrary contention but, basing itself sloley on the guesswork and impression of Indian diplomatic official who have been to China, insisted that Chinese Gov- ernment authorities had made statements to that effect.'

REFERENCES

I. New York Times,18 Aug. 1947. 2. Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed All Jinnah, Speeches as Governor—General of Pakistan, 1947-1948, p. 65. 3. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, II, p. 384. 4. Dawn, II May 1949. 5. The Times, l 3May 1949. 6. Economist, 14 Aug. 1948 7. Dawn, 21 Feb. 1949. 8. New York Times, 15 Sept. 1951. 9. Pakistan Times, 3 Oct. 1951. 10. The statistical information offered here is taken from Finance Minister Chaudhri Muhammad Al's budget speech in the Constitutent Assembly (Legislative) on 14 March 1953. 1 I. Chester Bowles, 'A US Policy for Asia', New Leader, 22 Feb. 1954. 12. Ralph de Toledano, Nixon, p. 164. 13. Nehru, quoted by Norman D. Palmer, 'India's Position In Asia', Journal of International Affairs, No. 2, 1963. 14. H. V Hodson, The Great Divide, p.243.

IS. Twilight of Empire, Memories of Prime Minister Clement Attke, at Set Down by Francis Williams, p. 238. -16. 'middle Ground Between America and Russia: An Indian View, by P. Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1954. See M. S. Raja n, • Indian in World Affairs, 1954-- 1956, p. 646, for the revelation that P stood for K. M. Panikkar. 17. Report °tithe Eighth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations: House Report 1695, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1953, p.2 18, J. Nehru, Eighteen Months in India, p.80. 19. N. V. Rajkumar (ed.), The Background of India's Foreign Policy, p. 62.. 20. J. Nehru, An Autobiography, p. 163. 2 I . J. Nehru, The Discovery ofIndia, p. 555. 22. M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-1956, p.622. 23. New York Herald Tribune, 19 April 1953. 24. Parade Magazine, St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press, 6 Aug. 1967. 25. J. Nehru, Speeches, II, p.326. 26. 'Middle Ground Between America and Russia: An Indian View', by P. Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1954. 27. K. M. Panikkar, In 7Wo Chinas, p. 168. -28. K. Gupta, Indian Foreign Policy, p.93. 29. Selig S. Harrison, 'Case History of a Mistake', New Republic, .10 Aug 1959. 30. Dawn, 10 Nov. 1952. 31. Dawn, 13 Nov. 1952. 32. Gene D. OverStreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India, p. 273. 33. P. C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy, p. II 34. Overstreet and Windmiller, Communism in India, pp. 304-5. 35. A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, pp. 96-7. 36. 'The Sources of Soviet Conflict', Foreign Affairs, July 1947, p. 575. 37. Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The United States and the Sino -Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia, p. 54: 3Q. Ibid. 39. See Secretary Dulles's statement on The SoutheastAsia Collective Defense Trea4P Hearings before Senate Commit- tee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Congress, 2nd cession, 11 Nov. 1954, p. 205. 40. Foreign Assistance 1966: Hearings on 52859 and 52861 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 18 April 1966, p. 108. 41. Minneapolis Tribune, 12 Oct 1966. 42. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 357, 691. Dulles called Acheson's statement 'a tragic mistake' -James Shepley, 'How Dulles Averted War', Life, 16 Jan. 1956. .43. I had the privilege of attending some conferences at which the American delegation was led by John Foster Dul- les. He was highly respected by all other delegates for the masterful exposition of his views; his dedication to principles he thought were right, and his reliability as a good friend. Even Khrushchev confessed his admiration for Dulles. A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 398. 44. 'Secretary Dulles Discusses US Foreign Policy For British Television Broadcast', USDSB, 10 Nov. 1958. 45. For example at the Geneva Conference of 1954, Dulles succeeded 'in never once acknowledging Mr. Chou En- lai's existence'. Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p. 117. 46. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 523. 47. Secretary Dulles's statement, Mutual Security Act of 1958: Hearings Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Congress, 2nd Cession, 24 March 1958, p. 145. 48. Related to me by a person who was present at the occasion. 49. In the General Debate on 18 Sept. 1953. 50. Adopted by the Republican Nation& Convention at Chicago, III., on 10 July 1952. 51. US. News and World Report, 30.0ct, 1953. 52, Lok Sabha Debates, 18 Feb. 1953, col. 454. 53.. Congressional Record, Appendix (vol. 99, p. A1492), 83rd Congress, 1st cecsion, 25 March 1953, House. 54. New York Times, 13 Jan. 1953. 55. Dawn, 7 April 1953. 56. For Dulles's 'Report on Near East Trip' see New York Times, 2 June 1953, and USDSB, 15 June 1953. 57, New York Times, 26 Jan. 1951. 58. For text of Truman's message see USDSB, 26 Feb. 1951. 59. New China News Agency, 19 April 1951. 60. V. V. Balabushevich and A. M. Dyakov (eds.), A Contemporary History of India, 1964, p. 5 I 5. 61. Govt. of Pakistan, Handout E. 1605, 9 April 1953. 62. Congressional Record (vol. 99, p 3487), 83rd Congress, 1st Sescion, 21 April 1953, House. 63. USDSB, 30 June 1953. 64. Secretary Lrulles's Statements: Wheat for Pakistan: Hearings on S. 2112, before the Senate Committee on Agricul- ture and Forestry, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 12 June 193, pp. 4-5, and Wheatfor Pakistan: Hearings on H. R. 56,59, 5660, 5661, before the House Committee on Agirculture and Forestry, 83rd Congress, 1st Cession, IS June 1953, pp. 8 9.

94 65: Newsweek, 30 Nov. 1953 66. New York Times, 13 Nov. 1953. 67. Ibid., 19 Nov. 1953. 68. Dawn, 9 Dec. 1953. 69. Ibid., 8 Dec. 1953. 70. Ralph de Toleclano, Nixon, p. 163. 71. New York Times, 14 Feb. 1954. 72. For text see Dawn, 20 Feb. 1954. 73. Dawn, 20 Feb. 1954. 74. Ibid., 26 Feb. 1954. 75. Ibid., 2 March 1954. 76. For text of Agreement see Pakistan Affairs, 9 April 1954:' 77. .Liawn, 20 May 1954. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid, 13 March 1957; see also ibid., 1 April 1954 for an earlier statement to the same effect. 80. Anthony Edne, Full Circle, p.91. 81. SEACDT being hard to pronounce, the organization became popularly known as SEATO, and in 1955 the latter term was officially adopted. Americans at first had been reluctant to accept the term SEATO because it sounded like NATO which maintained standing armed forces. 82. For texts of the Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter see George Modelski, SEATO, p. 289. 83. It may be pointed out that the US reservation is out of step with the UN Charter which does not make any distinction between different varieties of aggression. 84. Ralph Bra ibanti, International Implications of the Manila Pact, pp. 21-3. 85. These words do not appear on the published versions of the treaty and are, therefore, usually lost sight of. 86. • Dawn, 22 Oct. 1956. 87. Mid, 8 April 1958. 88. Ibid., 15 and 21 Dec. 1960. 89. Central Treaty Organization, R. 5296/64, Feb. 1964, p.2, Reference Division, Central Office of Information, Lon- don. 90. After the fall of Premier Mosaddeq in 1953, the Shah of Iran had begun to incline towards alignment with the West. 91. As Iraq did not recognize Israel, the inclusion of the latter in the Baghdad Pact was immediately ruled out. 92. New York Times, 27 Nov. 1955. 93. Ibid., 31 Jan. 1958. 94. Asian Recorder, 1957, p. 1395. 95. Dawn, 13 Feb. 1959. 96. Ibid., 12 Jan. 1958. 97. Ibid., 29 Jan. 1958. 98. Ibid., 24 Oct. 1959. 99. The Times, 29 April 1961. 100. New York Times, 30 April 1961. 101. Dawn, 27 April 1962. 102. International Studies, India's Relations with Pakistan, Vol 8, no. l-2, July-Oct. 1966, p. 169. 103. New York Times, 39 April 1954. 104. Dawn, 1 May 1954. 105. Times of India, 1 May 1954. 106. Ton That Thienindia and Southeast Asia, pp. 194-5, 299; M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-1956, pp. 126- 7; Economist, 1 May 1954. 107. For text of Bogor communique see Asian Recorder, 1955, p.9. • 108. George Modelski, SEATO, p.214. Also W. F. Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policyand the Border Dispute with China, p.51. 109. George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p.3. 110. Ibid., p. 52. Ill. For text of Bandung communique see Asian Recorder, 1955, p 19. 112. Dawn, 25 April 1955. 113. George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p.59. 114. Ibid., pp. 19-20. 115. Ibid., p. 57. 116. Address to Third Session of the First National People's Conference, 28 June 1956, People's China, supplement, p. 7, 117. George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p.57. Bogra was factually correct. Pakistan's obligations as an ally was to prevent aggression, not to become a party to aggression. I brace Hildreth, US Ambassador to Pakistan,

, 95

had conceded that Pakistan might adopt a neutral attitude In a third world war because there-was no agreement between Pakistan and America that Pakistan would join a war against the Russian bloc if she accepted military aid from the US. Dawn, 1 April 1954. 118. , Dawn, 29 April 1955. 119. Collective Defence in South-East Asia, A Report by a Chatham House Study Group, p. 70. 120. George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p.29; Congressman Adam C..Powell, Jr.'s statement on the Bandung Conference, Mutual Serer/b./Act 1955, Hearings Before theCommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 84th Congress, 10 May 1955, pp. 157-8. Powell had attempted the Bandung Conference as a visitor despite State Department efforts to dissuade him. 121. Hindu Weekly, 18 October 1965. • 122. Though Egypt was popularly stated to have nationalized the Suez Canal, in fact she had nationalized the Suez . Canal Company which had been operating under a concession granted by Egypt in 1856. 123. Egypt had made an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, followed by another with the USSR, Egypt's Western critics said that the purchases of arms would drain Egypt's treasury. 124. Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p.439. • 125. Ibid. 26. Ibid., p.470. 127. ibid., p.486. 128. Israel had accepted, and Egypt had rejected, the Anglo-French terms. 129. Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p.527. 130. Dawn, 2 .August 1956. 131. !bid, August 1956. 132. Govt. of Pakistan, Handodt, dated 14 August 1956. 133. For text of Hamidul Huq's speech at the conference on 18 Aug. 1956 see Govt. of Pakistan, Handout E. no 4463, dated 19 Aug. 1956. 134. Anthony Eden, Full Circle, p.450. 135. Dawn., 17 Aug. 1956. 136. Ibid., 9 Sept. 1956 137 Ibid., 14 Sept. 1956. 138. For text of Noon's speech see Govt. of Pakistan, Handout E. no. 4960, dated 20 Sept. 1956. 139. Hindu, 2 Aug. 1956, quoted by M. S. Fzajan, India in World Aireirs 1954-56 140. Lok Sabha Debates, 16 Nov. 1956, col. 261. 141. Dawn, 9 Nov. 1956. 142. Ibid., 3 Nov. 1956. 143, Daily Telegraph, 15 Nov.1956. 144. The canal was not reopened till 24 April 1957. 145, The Times, 3 Dec. 1956. 146. Statement in National Assembly on 22 Feb. 1957. 147. For tension between the Governments of Pakistan and Egypt during the Suez affair see ch. 10, The Cost of Al- liance, and for appreciation in Pakistan of United States policy during the crisis see ch. 12, The Course of Al- liance. 148. Mumtaz Muhammad Daultana, 'Reflections on Pakistan's Foreign's Policy', Dawn, 10 Dec. 1956. 149. General Assembly Official Records, 606th Plenmy Meeting, 4 Dec. 1956, quoted by K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, p.271. 150. Dawn, 24 Dec. 1956. 151, J. Nehru, Speeches, IV, p.383; K.P.S. Menon, India and the Cold War, p. 50. 152. Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India, p.54. 153. J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p.556. 154. USDSB, 10 Dec. I 956, p. 918. 155. Dawn, 1 Dec. 1956. 156. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 676. 157. For text of communique see Dawn, 22 Jan. 1957. 158, John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, p. 123. 159. USDSB, 25 March 1957. 160. Dawn, 15 July I 958; New York Times, 17 July 1958. 161: USDSB, 4 Aug. 1958. 162. Dawn, 18 July 1958. 163. USDSB, 4 Aug. 1958. 164. Hindu, I-7 .July 1958. The American and British troops left Lebanon and Jordan early in November in response to a resolution of the General Assembly which estti' -•.c.-(1 a 'United Nations Presence' in the person of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General with Ficaciquarters at Amman. 165. For text of the 28 July 1958 London Declaration see Dawn, 6 March 1959.

96 166. New York Times, 29 July 1958. 167. Dawn, 6 March 1959. 168. For instance, see comments of a Foreign Office spokesman in-Dawn, 7 March 1959. 169. J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 475. • 170, This base at Badaber, near Peshawar, had been leased out to the US in 1959. Selig S. Harrison, in 'America, India and Pakistan' (Harper's Magazine, July 1966), says the name of the base was 'Headquarters, 5235th Communica- Lions Group, USAF', and that Americans could 'listen in' from there on the Soviet military communications system, and monitor key defence testing-sites in Central Asia. Tyura Tarn, the Soviet Cape Kennedy, was only 675 • miles away, and the rest of the major Russian military research centres were all concentrated in the desert fastnesses of Tadzhikistan and Kazakhistan. 171. New York Times, I 0 May 1960. 172. Dawn, 11 May 1960; Morning News, II May 1960. 173. It was at a summit meeting in July 1955 that Eisenhower had first suggested that the Americans and the Russians should provide facilities for aerial photography over each other's territory as an assurance against a surprise attack. 174. Dawn, 1 I May 1960. 175. New York Times, II May 1960. 176. /bid., 14 May 1960. 177. Dawn, 17 May 1960. 178. Ibid., 18 May 1960. 179. For text of resolution see H. E. Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p. 286. 180. General Assembly Official Records 832nd plenary Meeting, 20 Oct. 1959. 181. The left-wing Pathet Lao was led by Prince Souphannouvong. 182. Dawn, 15 Dec. 1960. 183. Ibid., 21 Dec. 1960. 184. In 1957 Pakistan subsequently changed her vote in favour of the US move for the postponement of the question. • 185. Dawn, 26 Jan. 1955. 186. The Times, I 7 Feb. 1955. . 187. M. Ayub Khan, Speeches, IV, p.52. 188. For text of Chinese protest note see Survey of China Mainland Press, no. 2063, 27 July 1959, p. 39. 189. Hugh J. Schonfield, Suez Canal World Affairs, p. 141, quoted by K. P. Karunakaran, India in World Affairs, Feb. 1950-Dec. 1953, p.36. 190. It was in October 1954 that Egypt and Britain finally signed an agreement that British'forces would leave the Suez base in twenty months. 191. Dawn, Feb. 1954. 192. Quoted by lin Min jih Pao, 23 March 1954-Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 773, 24 March 1954, pp. 17-18. 193. The Times, 3, Sept. 1956. According to Egyptians, this was the second occasion on which Pakistan had led them down. They used to chide Pakistani diplomats that Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad had assured Egyp- tian leaders that Pakistan would not conclude any agreement with the West which could be used as pressure on Egypt. However,.Pakistan signed her first agreement with the West while Anglo-Egyptian negotiations about the evacuation of Suez were at a crucial stage. 194 Dawn, Nov. 1956. 195 /bid., 1 Dec. 1956. . 196 Round Table, March 1957. 197 Dawn, II Aug. 1957. 198. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 25 Feb. 1957, p 1099. 199. /bid., 4 -Sept. 1958, pp. 373-5. 200. Dawn, 26 Sept. 1955, . 201. Hindu, I I Dec: 1955, quoted by M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56, p.478. See alsoAsian Recorder, 1955, p. 535, for a similar pronouncement. 202. Dawn, 27 Sept. 1956. • 203. New York Times, 23 Dec, 1953. 204. Asian Recorder, 1955, p. 521. • 205. N. A. Bulganin and N. S. Khrushchev, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma and Afghanistan, p. 202. • . 206. Two of AyubPs Cabinet -Minister (General Azam and F. M. Khan) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army (General Musa) were Pakhtuns. , 207. Dawn, 29 Feb. 1960. 208. Ibid., 6 March 1960. 209. FOr example, Radio Kabul said on 21 Nov. 1959: 'The dictatorial military regime in Pakistan is turning Pakhtunis- • tan into hell and rubble.' The Bajaur Incident, an undated Government of Pakistan booklet, p.8. • 210. One of the Posters in Pushto, distributed by the Afghans in Sept. 1960, read: '0 all Pakhtunistani brethren! Your sacred land...today is being trampled under the dirty feet of Pakistani imperialism....Pakhtun warriors! rise up...and oust the aggressive Pakistani authorities from your land.' ibid., p. 14.

97 211. New Time:s, No. 9, 1954, p. 18. 212. Dawn, 5 May1954. 213. New Times, No. 50, I 955, p. 19. 214. N. A. Bulganin and N. S. Khrushchev, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma, and Afghanistan, p.13. 215. Ibid., p.52. 216. Ibid., p. III. 217. Ibid., p. 96. 218. /bid., pp. 107,112. Though Nehru's ancestors came from Kashmir, he had not been born there. He was born at Al- lahabad in India. 219. Ibid., p.304. 220. M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 1954-56, p.234. 221 New York Times, 9 Aug. 1953. 222.. • N. A. Bulganin and N. S. Khrushchev, Visit of Fn'endihip to Indid, Burma and Afghanistan, pp. 1 I 1 , 114. 223. Ibid., p. 249. 224. New York Times, 7 Feb. 1956. 225. Ibid., 24 march 1956. 226. Ibid., 25, 27 March 1956. 227. Dawn, 26 March 1956. 228. Ibid., 28 June 1956 and 7 Nov. 1958. 229. Ibid., 29 June 1-958. 230. New York Times, 27 March 1956. 231. Dawn, I 0 Aug. 1956. 232. See ch. 12. 233. New York Times, 31 Jan. 1958. 234. Dawn, 30 March 1958.. 235. Ibid., 31 March 1958. 236. New York Times, 27 June 1960. 237. Observer, 14 march 1954. 238. People's China, 16 Oct. 1954. 239. Hindu, 27 Nov.1954. 240. Manchester Guardian, 28 Dec 1955. 24 I . Dawn, 24 Oct. 1956. 242. Ibid., 25 Oct. 1956. , 243. Ibid., 25 Dec. 1956. 244. Ibid., 30 Dec. 1956. 245. Ibid., 31 Dec. 1956. 246. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 25 Feb. 1957, p. 1097. 247, Dawn, 30 Dec. 1956. 248. Ibid., 21 July 1957. 249. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1579, 29 July 1957, pp. 29-30 250. Government of Pakistan, Handout E. No. 2741, 31 May 1960. 251. Peking Review, 30 Sept. 1958. 252. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 2005,4 May 1959, p. 34. 253. Peking Review, 28 July 1959. For Ayub's offers of joint defence to India see chi II. 254. Hindu, I I Dec. 1956. 255. Dawn,-25 Dec. 1956. 256. Hindu, 6 Feb. 1957. 257. Dawn, 16 Feb. 1957. 258. People's China, 1 April 1957. 259. Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, p. I. 260 Summary of the Report of the Officials of the Government of India and People's Republic of China on he Boundary Question, p. I. 261 Notes, Memoranda, and Letters Exchanged Between the Government of India and China, White Paper No. VI, p. 99.

98 READING 5

• (Excerpts from, 'The American Role in Pakistan; 1947-1958' by M. S Venkatramani, Lahore, - Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984).

Reproduced with Permission. N SC 5409 set forth the courses of action lobe followed by the United States towards Pakistan in the following terms: '

Support the present government of Pakistan so long as it remains friendly to the Un- ited States, and seek to insure that any successor government is not Communist controlled and is friendly to the United States.

...In carrying out U.S. policies in South Asia, make maximum use of Pakistan's favourable attitude toward the West.

Seek greater participation of Pakistan in a common front against communism.

...Encourage Pakistan's participation in any defense association which is judged to serve the interests of the United States. Priority should be given to the establishment of such an arrangement between Pakistan and Turkey.

Seek to insure that in the event of general war Pakistan will make available man- power, resources and strategic facilities for mutual defense effort with the West.

Give special consideration to Pakistan in providing military assistance, including grant, in view of Pakistan's attitude and key position among the countries of South Asia with respect to military collaboration with the West.'

NSC 5409 was dated 19 February 1954. On that very day a joint communique was released simultaneously in Karachi and Ankara announcing that the Governments of Pakistan and Turkey "have agreed to study methods of achieving closer friendly collaboration in Polit- ical, Economic and Cultural spheres as well as of strengthening peace and security in their own interest as also in that of all peace-loving nations." The State Department announced immediately that the United States Government "warmly welcomes the announced intention" of Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistani Prime Minister hailed the development. as "the first concrete major step.. towards strengthening the Muslim World." The organ of the Pakis- tan Embassy in New Delhi described it as a "Turco—Pak Alliance."' Great men like Saladin, Mohammed lithe Conqueror, Suleiman the Magnificent, and Babar had in centuries past dis- tingUished themselves by strengthening the Muslim World; now Ghulam Mohammed and Mohammed Ali Bogra were staking their claim for similar distinction in the company of Jelal Bayar and Adnan Menderes of Turkey! In the interests of truth and equity, an equal, if not a

99 greater share, should properly belong to some fine, upstanding Christians in Washington like Eisenhower, Nixon, and Dulles. (Despite Eisenhower's frequent use of the title, it may be in- delicate to describe him and his colleagues at this particular point in the history of the Muslim World as "crusaders").

"Events and pressures have recently accelerated discussion between Pakistan and Turkey", the New York Times said in an editorial. It revealed that the actual negotiations for the accord "required less than two weeks." It did not identify what the events were nor who applied the "pressures" that accelerated discussion. In a statement that Ananias would have been confortable with, the newspaper asserted that "the United States has sedulously avoided any display of good offices at any point in the discussion.... "3 Among the stories that the newspaper had carried in previous weeks on the American role and objectives was, for example, a Page One report on 6 January under the headline: "U.S. Pushing Pact of Three Na- tions." The nations in question were Pakistan, Turkey, and Iraq. As the report put it:

A Pakistan—Turkey—Iraq grouping is regarded here [by authorities in Washington] as a partial answer to the absence of the bigger alliance [the projected Middle East Defence Organization including Egypt]. Authorities have begun to speak of Western defenses as a jig-saw puzzle, in which small units are at first fitted together, and then efforts made to find the pieces that tie them together into the whole picture.

On 8 'February the New York Times spoke of the leak of information concerning "a United States-backed Pakistan sTurkish alliance...." That officials in Washington were awaiting the conclusion "soon" of a treaty of military, economic, and cultural co-operation between Pakistan and Turkey was reported on I 3 February.4

Only two weeks earlier, a prominent Turkish politician, Dr. Nehad Rashad Belgar, who had been Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee till I November, had stated that "Turkey has no plans to come to any military arrangements with Pakistan" because any contribution that Pakistan could make would be "negligible." He added pret-_, ently: "If Turkey and Pakistan do find themselves co-operating with each other, it shall be as the result of an American alliance with Pakistan, not a direct arrangement between Turkey and Pakistan."5 The accord was a poly intended hopefully by American strategists to take some of the wind out of the sails of Nehru's strong ci it icism of projected US military aid to Pakistan. The only Muslim country that could be quickly bent to such a purpose was Turkey, America's NATO ally.

Military contacts had been established under US encouragement in October 1953 when the Pakistani Commander-in-Chief, Ayub Khan, had visited Turkey on his return journey to Pakistan after conferring with American military leaders in the United States. It had been followed by Ghulam Mohammed's visit to Ankara a few weeks later. Having approved the decision to provide arms to Pakistan, the National Security Council had concluded that "its formal announcement and military implementation" should follow the conclusion of a military accord between Pakistan and Turkey. It was clearly in pursuance of such a decision and in response to American prodding that Turkey and Pakistan had set out to work out post- haste some sort of an accord. By such a tactic, the NEC believed, the obstreperous Nehru would confront not a simple American programme to siipply arms to Pakistan, but a Turco—Pak alliance to which Iraq, and eventually Iran, were likely to accede. In the face of such a wider Islamic grouping Washington hoped, Nehru might be constrained to moderate his antagonism, especially in view of possible reacher among the large Muslim minority in his own country. "Policy-making officials here (in Washington]," the New York Times 100 reported on 13 February, "hope this broad approach to arming Pakistan will make the United States decision easier for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India to swallow."6

Despite the many reports that it had itself carried, the New York Times sought to argue editorially, with a very straight face, that Pakistan and Turkey had [ought it all up, entirely by themselves, with nary a word from the United States during their negotiations! De- scribing the two countries as "endangered friends," the newspaper voiced the hope that their alliance would make it possible for the United States "to assist a defence entity such as this alliance comprises without rousing the same degree of Indian apprehension over a stronger Pakistan." Turkey and Pakistan "stand at two ends of a crescent that is still military weak" and ''they are potential anchor positions in a line that must be held," the newspaper asserted.'

Apparently, the "pressures" contributing to acceleration that the New York Times had talked about did not subside after Mohammad All had proclaimed the launching of "the first concrete major step.. towards strengthening the Muslim World." A mere three days later, on 22 February 1954, he was ready to announce his second concrete step tor strengthening the Muslim World. At a press conference in Karachi he stated: The Govern- ment of Pakistan has made a request to the Government of the United States for military assistance within the scope of the United States Mutual Security legislation." The Prime Minis- ter added that before making the request, Pakistan had informed itself of the requirements of the US Mutual Security legislation and "fiRds itself in agreement with them."8

The President of the United States acted with truly remarkable speed. On 25 Feb- ruary Eisenhower announced that the United States intended to respond favourably to Pakistan's request. Eisenhower, it may be noted, specifically tied his action to the announce ment by Turkey and Pakistan of "their intention to study methods of achieving closer calla!) oration ...." The United States believed that it was by "increased strength and stability in tlic Middle East...that the aspirations of the peoples in this area for maintaining and developing their way of life and for realizing the social advances close to their hearts...." Here then, as adumbrated by the President himself, was a criterion for judging the consequences of the American action. A second criterion was also furnished by Eisenhower himself In a obvious effort to mollify Indian and Afghan opinion, Eisenhower stated that under the Mutual Sec- urity legislation, the recipient country was specifically directed to use the equipment received from the United States solely for its internal security and legitimate self-defence or "to participate in the defense of the area of which it is part." The President added:

Any recipient country also must undertake that it will not engage in any act of ag gression against any other nation. I can say that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggressing, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. 1 would also consult with Congress on further steps.9

Prime Minister Mohammad Ali hailed the decision of the US Government to give military aid to Pakistan as "an historic event of especial significance to the entire Muslim world." The future historian, he exclaimed, might well describe the month of February 1954 as ci nstituing a major turning point in Pakistan's career. The New York Times expressed its satisfaction with the manner in which Eisenhower had handled the matter. "The question of whether the United States would give military aid to Pakistan has been answered clearly, decisively and we believe correctly," it wrote.") 101 The principal reason, from Pakistan's point of view, for the "acceleration" in the process of public announcements concerning the Turco—Pak accord and the US offer of military aid was the Ghulam Mohammed regime's concern for its survival. The United States too perceived that the continuance of the regime for at least a few critical years immediately ahead was important for its own purposes. The Karachi regime hoped that the announcement of the American offer of military aid would blunt the edge of mounting opposition in West Pakistan and act as a trump card in provincial elections scheduled to begin in East Bengal on 8 March 1954. Would not Pakistanis joyfully understand that with mighty America standing behind Pakistan and ready to supply modern military equipment, P,akistan could deal with India in the way India deserved to be dealt with? It was a dream fulfilled for Ghulam Moham- med, Iskander Mirza, Zafrullah Khan, and, of course, for the future Field Marshal, Ayub Khan

Many Pakistani newspapers welcomed Eisenhower's announcement with enthusiasm. Dawn, prudently overlooking the rough treatment that had been accorded to it but lately by the Pakistani Government, declared that "the news will be joyfully received throughout the country because this is indeed a momentous step forward toward strengthening the Muslim world." The significance of the aid, wrote the Times of Karachi, lay in the fact that Pakistan had "declared her choice of friends in terms of her natural inclina- tions and sympathy...." "The great democracy of the United States has won the abiding gratitude of all Pakistanis by generously agreeing td give military assistance to this country...," proclaimed the Morning Newsi

But from the most populous of Pakistan's provinces, East Bengal, came ominous rumblings of opposition. Already the province was rife with disenchantment with its Muslim League Government and intense indignation over the contempuous negligence with which it believed it had all along been treated by Karachi. One of the main reasons for the Ghulam Mohammed regime's obsessive haste in concluding its deal with the United States was its belief that the promise of a big flow of arms as well as other "goodies" from the fabled Ameri- can cornucopia would turn the tide in favour of the Muslim League in the elections to the East Bengal Provincial Assembly scheduled to be held on 10 March 1954. Washington too shared the same hope concerning the impact of its decision. But the United Front of several opposition parties that had come into existence in East Bengal to fight the Muslim League and Karachi's domination, showed no disposition to hail the announcement of the President of the United States. From Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani, stormy petrel of East Bengal and a major figure in the United Front, came thundering denunciation of Karachi's course in seeking American arms and entangling Pakistan in US-sponsored military alliances.

REFERENCES

I. NSC 5409, "United States Policy Toward South Asia," 19 February 1954, Documents of the National Security Council. 2. Pakistan Today, I (I March 1954), 5-6. "Collective Security in the'Middle East: Statement by the Department of State, February 19, 1954", American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, n. 20, 2119. In a letter to Prime Minister Nehru, Eisenhower stated that the move was not "directed in any way against India,""And lam confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the UN to thwart such aggression." Eisenhower went on to state that if India were to require military aid of the type contemplated by US mutual security legislation, "please be assured that your request would receive . my most sympathetic consideration." "Defensive Purpose of United States Military Aid: Message from the Pres- ident of the United States to the Prime Minister of India," 24 February 1954, ibid., 2192. 3. New York Times, 21 February 1954, 4. New York Times, 6 January 1954; 8, 13 February 1954.

102 5. Interview in Istanbul to a correspondent of the Press Trust of India, Hindustan Standard (Calcutta), 25 Novernbei 1953. • 6. New York Times, 13 February 1954; Schmidt, "Pakistan to Get Arms," n. 58. 7. New York Times, 21 February 1954. 8. Text, Pakistan Today, 1(1 March 1954), 3. 9. "Increasing the Defense Potential of Pakistan. Statement by the President, Februaty 25, 1954,"American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, n. 20,2193-94. 10. Pakistan Today 1 (15 March 1954), 3, New York Times, I March 1954. II. Cited in Pakistan Affairs (Washington), 7(12 March 1954), 4. A publication or the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington.

103 .

. . READING 6

(Excerpts from, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Ailistorical Analysis', by S. M. Burke, Karachi Oxford Universi0/ Press, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission.

s already stated, the immediate cause of the brief Sino—Indian Himalayan war was Prime Minister Nehru's command to the Indian Army to throw the Chinese out of A NEFA. Nehru's injunction to the army was followed by Defence Minister Krishna Merlon's brave declaration, on 14 October, that India was determined to push the Chinese out 'whether it takes one day, a hundred days, or a thousand days' and would fight 'to the last man, to the last gun' if attacked.'

Americans had already viewed the Indian 'forward defence policy with favour. The Acting Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sparkman, had stated in Washington in June 1962: We know right now that India is pressing very hard against Com- munist China ... 1 feel that we ought not to be discouraging India [by reducing US aid] at the very time that she is moving in the direction that we have been wanting her to move for a long time.'2 When China routed the Indian forces in the Himalayas, the United States at last got the opportunity to further her long-cherished wish that India should stand up to China, and immediately initiated a programme of military assistance to India.

Though matters did not visibly move till after the heavier Chinese attacks in the latter part of October, President Ayub Khan has revealed that the US decision to furnish arms to India was arrived at early in. October. On 2 October the Pakistani Ambassador to the US learned from a State Department official that Nehru had seen Ambassador Galbraith in New Delhi that morning and asked for US Military assistance against China, and that Galbraith, on the authority of the US Government, had told Nehru that the United States would supply arms to India and it was for Nehru to indicate the requirements. 'Obviously, the United States government had ignored tv,. o very important points, that their decision to give arms aid to India was arrived at without prior consultation with Pakistan; and it was communicated to India before it was communicated to Pakistan.' On the following day the Pakistani Ambassador was informed that a specific request for arms had been received from Nehru. He was asked to take the United States' word that US arms would not be used against Pakistan and was advised that Pakistan should make a gesture of goodwill towards India aS this might lead to a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir problern.3 t Six days after the Chinese had launched their 20 October offensive, Nehru addressed a general appeal for 'support and sympathy' to all Heads of Government in the world (excel

105 Portugal and South Africa), and averred that the real issue involved in the Sino—Indian conflict was 'whether the world will allow the principle ot might is right to prevail in international relations'. He also claimed that India's struggle was directed to the elimination of deceit, dis- simulation and force in international relations'.4

The first consignment of British military supplies arrived in India on 29 October in two Royal Air Force Britannias,5 and on 3 November the first US arms shipment arrived in four planes which landed at Calcutta.° By 16 November the Indians were not only requesting the Americans for transport planes but, 'in further modification of the non-alignment policy', were also asked for pilots and crews to fly the airCraft.7 Shortly afterwards the Indians began to plead for 'military association' with the US: they wanted the US Air Force to back them up so that their own could fly tactically without leaving the cities unprotected.° A squadron of United States C-130 transport planes, having arrived during November, threw a 'crucial air bridge' across the Himalayas from central India to Leh and flew fifteen to seventeen runs a day to the front, moving 150 to 180 tons of desperately needed supplies, ammunition, and equipment daily.5

In order to assess India's needs a high—powered American team headed by Averell Harriman arrived in India on 22 November. A similar British team led by Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, reached Delhi two days later.

Though the fighting had by now ceased, the Western efforts to bolster up India militarily continued. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan conferred at Nassau in December and decided that military assistance to India worth $120 million would be furnished on an 'emergency' basis by the US and the Commonwealth, in equal shares. The question of long-range assistance was kept under study, and meeting again at the end of June 1963, at Birch Grove House (Macmillan's home in Sussex), the two leaders declared that they 'were agreed on their policy of continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of renewed Chinese Communist attack'.

American road engineers, and a United States Air Force airlift carrying road-building materials and equipment, helped Indians to build an all-weather highway from Srinagar to Leh, the capital of Ladakh, and to improve the airstrip at Leh. A joint defence training exercise, held in India by the Indian Air Force and the United States and British fighter squadrons, prepared 'the United States Air Force to come to India's aid if asked to do so'. Chester Bowles, Ambassador—Designate to India, said in a radio interview that the US was 'very anxious to help India' and the only question was 'the amount of military aid the Indians can absorb'. On 8 April 1963 Indian defence Minister Y. B. Chavan announced that it was proposed to double the strength of the army,' and early in 1964 a five-year defence plan was drawn up. The plan was expected to cost Rs.5,000 trores including foreign exchange worth Rs.680 crores.13

According to the Economist the Indian Government had secured, in May 1964, an offer of military aid from the US totalling £200 million over the coming five years. It also gave details of assistance from the USSR and the UK and commented that the build-up put India in a position to become, by Asian standards, a major military power. It would 'surely confirm the Chinese in their suspicion that Russia, India, and the Anglo—Americans have ganged up against them. Pakistan's view must be even gloomier.' Besides other assistance, Russia had decided to bring India's supersonic M1G fighter strength to three squadrons and to speed up assistance for the manufacture of MIG fighters in India. Russia was also helping India to develop defensive missiles."

106

By September 1965 United States economic aid to India exceeded $6 billion and to Pakistan amounted to about $3 billion. Military assistance to Pakistan came to $1.5 billion while India, out of the commitment for $200 million, had received military supplies worth $84.5 million.15 Thus, while Pakistan had received more arms from the US, India, having received far more economic aid, had been able to shop for military hardware internationally to a much larger extent than her own resources would have permitted.

Pakistani Reaction to Arms Aid to India

Pakistani spokesmen attacked the grant of American arms to India on all the grounds Indians themselves had put forward when the US had decided to furnish military assistance to Pakistan, and, for good measure, added some more. It was complained, first, that Pakistan was given defence assistance in return for the obligations she had assumed as an ally of the United States, but India was getting it IA rhile she was still a profer-sed neutral. Re- calling Khrushchey's threat at the time of the U-2 incident, Foreign Minister Bhutto said, 'Khrushchev did not say that India will be annihilated. He said Peshawar would be annihilated.' Secondly, India was four times larger than Pakistan but had nonetheless pleaded that American arms to Pakistan were threatening her safety. How much more reason was there for Pakistan's concern, when India was being strengthened with American weapons? Thirdly, India's increased strength would encourage those elements in India who stood for a merger of Pakistan with India. Fourthly, the disparity of strength between the two countries would ultimately become so great that India would be in a position to achieve her objectives by simply overawing Pakistan with a show of force.

Pakistanis, however, were realistic enough not to urge an absolute ban on Western military aid to India. What they desired was that the US and the UK should use the unique opportunity provided by the Sino—Indian confrontation to press India to accept a reasonable solution of the Kashmir problem. Ayub wrote to Kennedy on 2 January 1963: 'Only a speedy and just Kashmir settlement can give us any assurance that the contemplated increase of India's military power is not likely to be deployed against Pakistan in future.' '6

At the same time Ayub, initially, adopted a conciliatory attitude towards India. Re- plying to Nehru's letter of 26 October, he assured the Indian Premier that Pakistan was wed- ded to a policy of peace with all neighbouring countries, 'especially India', and further that Pakistanis were 'fully conscious of the great responsibility that lies on your shoulders for the maintenance of peace especially around this subcontinent'. He endorsed Nehru's plea that deceit and force should be eliminated from international relations and pointed out that Ind° —Pakistani disputes could also be 'resolved amicably should the Government of India decide to apply those principles with sincerity and conviction'.17 Ayub, further, conveyed in dications through the US and the UK that Pakistan would not do anything to worsen India's military problems,' 8 making it possible for the Indians to switch troops from the Pakistani frontier to the Chinese one. I 9

REFERENCES

. Quoted by A. G. Noorani, Our Credulity and Negligence, p. 90; Asian Recorder, 1962, p. 4910 2, India News, 2 July 1962. 3. M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 144-6. 4. A. G. Noorani, Our Credulity and Negligence, p.!!1. 5. L. J. Kavic, Quest for Security, p. 182. 6. J. K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal, p.456. 107 7. Ibid., p. 481. 8. Ibid., p.486. Galbraith also says that the Indians,at that time,yearned for the sight American uniforms (p.489). 9. New York Times, 2 I, April and 5 July 1963. 10. For text of Birch Grove communique see Pakistan Horizon, 3rd Quarter, 1963 11. ' Christian Science Monitor, 28 May 1963. 12. Asian Recorder, 1963, p. 5207. 13. Li. Kavic, India's Quest for Security, p. 193. 14. Economist, 26 Sept. 1964. See also Asian Recorder, 1964, p. 6099, for Defence Minister Chavan's statement of 21 Sept. 1964, describing the results of his visits to the USA (May) and the USSR (Aug.—Sept.) to obtain assistance for India's five—year defence plan. For 'Arms: Who Supplied What?' see Newsweek 20 Sept. 1965.. 15. Norman D. Palmer, 'India and Pakistan: The Major Recipier•!7', Current History, Nov. 1965; Selig S. Harrison, 'America, India, and Pakistan', Harper's Magazine, July 1966. 16: M. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 150. 17. The text of Ayub's reply to Nehru was published in Pakistan Affairs, 15 Nov. 1962, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C. • IS. New York Times, 10 Nov. 1962;J. K. Galbraith, Ambassador's/our-nil, p.463. 19. Economist, 4 Sept. 1965.

108 READING 7

(Excerpts from 'India, Pakistan Bangladesh and Major Powers: A Politics of Divided Subconti- nent' by G. W. Choudhiy, New York The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission.

t is tragic that India and Pakistan have looked upon one another as enemies since their independence and that their relations are charged with an envenomed load of bigotry, I prejudice and hostility, both religious and nationalistic. This has been a bitter disappointment not only to the people of the two countries but also to their friends and allies. In- stead of the peace and progress that the people of both countries needed urgently, the years since independence have brought warfare, vituperation, frustration, and fear.' Instead of de- voting all their resources to economic development, both countries have spent millions of' rupees on defense against each other. The United States gave military assistance to Pakistan and India to fight external enemies, but the two countries' military machines have been directed against each other instead. The United States has spent billions of dollars for the economic development of these two important South. Asian countries, but their corrosive quarrels have much inhibited that development.

So when India and Pakistan began to move in the direction of armed conflict in 1965, there was genuine concern, dismay, and anger in Washington, as in many other capitals. During the early limited war in the Rann of Kutch, U.S. Ambassador McConnaughy, saying that "the party providing military assistance has certainly some responsibility", informed Foreign Minister Bhutto on April 30 that the United States was unwilling to permit the use of its military equipment by either side in the conflict.' (The Indian Government had already complained to the United States about the use of U.S. arms by Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch; as the fighting spread, the Pakistanis as well as the Indians would complain about American arms being used against them). The Pakistani Foreign Minister referred to the U.S. assurance of aid against foreign aggressors and inquired about U.S. action "in the event of India implementing its threat of aggression". The Ambasciadoi 's reply was, "The Government stands behind its commitment and agreement", but he added, "The U.S. viev. Iz, that the situation is somewhat confused and belligerence is not justified on either side". Both the inquiry and the response were to be repeated in the days ahead.'

Thanks to the mediation of the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, the Rann of Kutch conflict was settled by arbitration. But then began the larger, full-scale war of August and September over the Kashmir issue. Both countries produced extensive legal and moral arguments to support their action in the conflict of September 1965. India claimed the war started on August 5 when 4,000 to 5,000 Pakistani-trained and equipped guerrillas crossed into Kashmir in an attempt to inspire and lead a general uprising. Pakistan held that the war started on September 6 when, without provocation, Indian troops crossed Pakistan's international border in the area of Lahore.4 The United States was approached by its ally to come to its rescue as a "victim of the Indian aggression". Pakistan insisted that India's crossing nr

109 the international frontier on September 6 constituted a case of "real aggression" requiring, under America's commitments to Pakistan, aid from the United States.

An analysis of the numerous confidential U.S. pledges and assurances, those aside from the formal commitments under SEATO and CENTO, leaves no doubt that the United States had promised to help even if the aggression was noncommunist and Indian. An aide- memoire handed to the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan when he met President Ayub on Sep- tember 6 invoked those assurances, calling for U.S. a„,.)tance "to meet aggression from India.5 The U.S. Ambassador replied on September 10 that the United States regarde India's strike across the Punjab frontier as a most serious development [but] India's attack across the Pakistan border must be viewed in an overall context—that immediate crisis began with a substantial infiltration of armed men from the Pakis- tan side to the Indian part of Kashmir. In accordance with our assurance to Pakistan, the U.S. is acting to meet this common danger by fully supporting immediate UN action to end hostility—the appeal of the United Nations' Security Council must be honored.6

In Washington, Ambassador Ghulam Ahmad, Aziz's brother, met Secretary of State Rusk on September 30 and reminded him that the United States and Pakistan were allies and that Pakistan wanted to know what the Americans would do to support it against Indian aggression. "What was relevant", Rusk replied, "was not alliances"; the U.S. had reservations about the SEATO treaty. More relevant to Rusk and his government was the bilateral arrangement (of 1954, renewed secretly in 1964), and this had been carefully "looked at". But the difficulty posed by the rapid development of events in the subcontinental conflict, according to Rusk, was that "the U.S. was being invited in on the crash landing without being in on the take off.'

In the American view, that "take off'—the action tio:i.L triggered the September fighting—was Pakistan's alleged infiltration of guerrillas into Kashmir; India had then over- reacted. The U.S. view, though not expressed fully to Pakistan, was that there was no clear Indian aggression against Pakistan (the U.S. did not share Harold Wilson's early opinion, which he later repudiated), and therefore the question of fulfilling U.S. assurances to Pakis- tan did not arise.-

Whatever the verdict of future historians as to who was the aggressor in the lndo—Pakistani war of 1965, the Pakistanis felt bitterly let down by their principal ally in their darkest hour. Not only did the United States fail to come to Pakistan's rescue, but on Sep- tember 8—within two days of the alleged Indian invasion—Dean Rusk announced that, after consultation with Congress, the administration had stopped all U.S. military aid to India and Pakistan, and would grant no further economic aid.9

The stoppage of arms supplies to both India and Pakistan was described as•"even- handed", by the U.S. government as it applied to both, but in practice it hit Pakistan much harder. The U.S. military shipments to Pakistan since 1954, according to some reliable sources, had cost $1.5 billion and had provided all of Pakistan's fighters, bombers, and modern transport aircraft, nearly all of its combat tanks and much of its artillery; U.S. arms supplies to India since 1962, on the other band, had totalled only about $75 million in value and for the most part had been lightweight, easily movable equipment and arms for high-altitude combat. Pakistan's armed forces were nearly 100 per cent American-equipped, while India's equipment was not more than 10 per cent American. India's best source of military supplies, the U.S.S.R., continued to provide it with military equipment.'° HO The cutoff of U.S. arms aid was decisive to both the war and the shape of the South Asian triangle. Without U.S. replacements, spare parts, and ammunition, Pakistan would have been left defenseless in a few weeks, and Ayub had no choice but to accept the cease- fire.' Relations between thL; U.S. and Pakistan therefore reached their lowest point in his, tory. India, on the other hand, was pleased to see proved hollow Pakistani expectations of U.S. assistance against it. India's worst apprehensions since Pakitan entered into military pacts and alliances in 1954 evaporated.

REFERENCES

1. For detail, see Choudhury, Relations with India, op. cit. • 2. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 3. Ibid. 4. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Report of the Special Study Mission to the Far East Asia, India and Pakistan (November 7—December 1.2, 1965) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p.36. 5. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 6. Ibid. 7. Mid. 8. Ibid. 9. Dawn and The Statesman, 'Sept 9, 1965. 10. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 11. Ibid.

READING 8

(Excerpts from 'India Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers', by G. W Choudluy, New York, The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1975).

Reproduce with Permission.

s a result of the new arms policy announced in April 1967, the special relationship between the United States and Pakistan came to an end; the commitments made A under bilateral military agreements of 1954 and 1959 virtually ended, though not legally or formally, and the process of disengagement from SEATO and CENTO, which Pakis- tan had begun after the 1965 war, was all hut completed.

As a protest against the new arms policy, the Pakistanis abstained from the SEATO advisory meeting held in Washington the month the new policy was announced, advising their representative, Group Captain Kama! Ahmud, who had already arrived in Washington, not to attend.' At the SEATO discussions, two flags were missing, those of France and Pakis- tan. "The green and white flag bearii ig stars and crescent was whisked away from desk space allotted to Pakistanis. ..before reporters were allowed into the conference room."2

In making a new assessment of its membership in SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan found that these pacts fell far short of its original expectations. The other members, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, ignored Pakistan's primary need for firm and active assurance against armed aggression from ans...,uurce, including India. Moreover, the economic benefits that were supposed to accrue were unrealized because of the low priority attributed by the United States to this aspect of SEATO—the preoccupation was with the containment of communism. Pakistan had proposed a number of projects to the SEATO Economic Council, including the improvement of Pakistani radio broadcasting facilities and the establishment of a marine diesel training centre in East Pakistan, a technical centre at Jhelum, a central mine rescue and safety station in Quetta, an education service for the Na-. tional Museum, and a regional agricultural research centre in East Pakistan. None of these projects passed beyond the stage of consideration by the member governments.

Turning to political problems, we find that Pakistan began to take an independent stand on the situation in Southeast Asia. In backing for Vietnam a peaceful and political settlement through negotiations, it disassociated itself from the position of the United States and its allies. This was evidenced in a special note to the communique issued at the end of the tenth Ministerial Council meeting of SEATO, held in London May 3 to 5, 1965, in which Pakistan, while expressing its concern over the consequences of armed conflict in Vietnam, advocated determined efforts to restore peacf., through negotiations on the basis of il,:i

113 Geneva agreements.3 In 1966, the Pakistani.delegation to SEATO took exception to certain paragraphs that condemned Peking and Hanoi for alleged subversion in Vietnam and LaoS and for violating the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1062. The gradual hardening of Pakis- tan's attitude on Vietnam was a clear manifestation of its reservations about membership in the pacts. The socialist countries took note of Pakistan's independence; China, indeed, expressed appreciation of Pakistan's role within these pacts.4

As Pakistan's "allies" made it clear—through their actions, such as America's role in 1965 war, rather than through their words—that they would not participate in its defence against noncommunist aggression, Pakistan began to show indifference to Western military commitments. It gradually disengaged from those activities of the pacts that conflicted with its recent trends in foreign policy. In view of its friendly relations with China and the Soviet Union, it became inconceivable that Pakistan could join with other pact members in stric- tures against China and Russia and in support of U.S. policy over matters like Vietnam. Such a course would be inconsistent with its policy of bilateralism. Thus Pakistan came to act as an observer to rather than a participant in political or military cooperation —as demonstrated by the role it assumed at meetings of military advisers groups, intelligence committees on counter-subversion and military intelligence committees. Pakistan ceased to take part in SEATO military exercises or in Intelligence Assessment Committee studies, and it banned the distribution in Pakistan of SEATO information materials because some of them were considered critical of China.

For similar reasons, Pakistan also reduced its participation in SEATO cultural programs. From 1960, it declined to host SEATO Council meetings and voiced reservations in SEATO and CENTO meetings and conferences' final communiques on most of the political issues considered. In this it followed a policy of detachment like that of France, and its delegates neither participated in discussions nor took part in the drafting of communiques.

In keeping with its policy of playing down the pacts, Pakistan was no longer in terested, as we have seen, in participating in matters related to the command structure or CENTO or in defining the pact's assumptions for global or local wars. CENTO and SEATO had lost their value of Pakistan as a defensive shield. It felt they had been used by the Wes; err powers, particularly the United States, to further global policies, with scant regard to thy legitimate fears of regional members regarding their own problems. The Pakistanis saw evidence of this in CENTO's failure to support Turkey on Cyprus, to reassure Iran over the future of the Persian Gulf, and, of course, to back Pakistan against India. (Partly because of this indifference to regional members' problems, not only Pakistan but also other members, such as Iran and Turkey, came to enjoy better relations with Moscow or Peking) .5

On top of all these considerations, strong public sentiment against both pacts, particularly after the September 1965 war, rendered impossible full or active participation. In a policy statement in the National Assembly on June 28, 1968, new Foreign Minister Mian Ar- shad Husain summed up Pakistan's attitude to the pacts:

With a change in the world situation these pacts have lost a good deal of their importance. Our own disenchantment with them was completed by the failure of some of our allies to assist Ed the time of Indian aggression in September 1965....

Our interest is...confined to their cultural and economic activities with which there are some beneficial and useful projects. If we are continuing our membership of the pact, it is out of deference to the wishes of other members, especially Iran and Turkey.6 1 I 4 Why did not Pakistan now formally withdraw from SEATO and CENTO as demanded by some critics, including Bhutto? As Husain said, one reason was deference to Iran and Tur- key, which had always supported its cause and with which Pakistan has special bonds of friendship. Another important 'consideration was Pakistan's desire not to incur the blame for destroying the pacts. Third, its membership was no longer a handicap in relationships with China and the U.S.S.R. Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated that Pakistan's role in these defensive pacts was no longer a hindrance to friendly relations between China and Pakistan. It took the Soviets longer than it had the Chinese to appreciate Pakistan's new role, but Pakistan made it clear that it would leave these pacts should it find membership incompatible with friendship with either communist power.

It was at this stage in U.S.—Pakistani relations that Pakistan, mainly in response to Soviet pressure, decided to close the communications centre at Badabar near Peshawar. Dean Rusk had told Foreign Minister SJPeerzada in October 1967 that special political relations with Pakistan had come to an end; now relations were "just normal," according to Rusk. If this were so, Pakistan concluded, then the communications centre should be terminated as well. The centre was a great source of embarrassment in Pakistan's new relations with the Soviet Union, as we have seen, and with China, and the Pakistani ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence recommended its termination. When Ayub took this advice in early 1968, both the United States and Pakistan accepted the decision gracefully; the United States seemed to have been mentally prepared for such termination, and Pakistan made no fuss about it. There was no uproar in the press of either country as the base closing was carefully played down.'

Meanwhile, the sincere U.S. desire to sloW the arms race in the subcontinent —so that both India and Pakistan could devote more of their resources to developrnent projects • proved unsuccessful. The Soviet Union continued as the largest supplier to India and in 1 068-70 also dispatched a limited quantity of arms of Pakistan, which—despite Mao's cultural revolution—relied most upon China but acquired some arms from other sources as Fr- ance. On the whole, after 1965 the military balance of power changed fast to the advantage of India. "India's arms grow in quantity, in modernity and the degree of sophistication," noted Ambassador Oehlert. "Meanwhile Pakistan's arms grow older, fewer and more obso- lete."8 So it was on the eve of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971.

The Subcontinent and Nixon's New Asian Policy

Richard Nixon's election to the presidency in 1968 was viewed with favor in Rawal- pindi but with little pleasure in New Delhi. Pakistanis always feel that they get a better deal from the Republicans, just as the Indians feel that the Democrats are more friendly toward them.9 Apart from this, Nixon was the most popular American leader in Pakistan on account of his past friendship toward the country, which he liad visited five times.1°

Thirteen months before his election Nixon, in an article in Foreign Affairs, gave his views on the future role of the United States in Asia. The United States was a Pacific power, Nixon claimed: "both our interest and our ideas propel us Westward across the Pacific not as conquerors but as partners." Nixon wrote that any discussion of Asia's future must ultimately focus on the role of four giants: India, the world's most populous noncommunist nation; Japan, Asia's principal industrial and economic power; China, the world's most populous na - lion; and the United States, the greatest Pacific power.''

As President, Nixon repeated the call for a ric w Asian grouping. Encouraged by 115 American policy makers during the Johnson administration, regionalism had been repeatedly stressed by responsible officers of the Shte Department. There had been a pheno- menal growth in the number of regional organizations, among them the Association of South East Asia (ASEA), which expanded and regrouped into the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asian and Pacific Council. These regional organizations, formed with US encouragement, deliberately played down the military aspect as to attract neutrals such as Burma, Ceylon, and perhaps even India. Ir :'ia's Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai was reported to be in favor of joining such a regional grouping.

During, his trip around the world in August 1969, when he visited five Asian countries including India and Pakistan, Nixon enunciated his new policy, defining the future role of the United States in Asia. While the United States would of course honor its treaty commit - merits, the President explained it must avoid the kind of policy that would make Asian coon - tries so dependent upon the United States that it would be dragged into conflicts such as the one in Vietnam. Nixon admitted that the policy would bL. difficult to conduct, but he believed that with proper planning it could succeed: Nixon recalled some advice that he had received in 1964 from former Pakistani President Ayub Khan: the role of the United States in countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand—or for that matter in any Asian country ex- periencing internal subversion—should be "to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them."12 Nixon hoped to apply this general principle to America's policy throughout the world.

While Nixon held the View that the United States is Pacific power, he wanted America to play an important role in the affairs of mainland Asia, hopefully in economic, political, and cultural rather than military spheres. The new s Li policy favored the emergence of a viable organization in South and Southeast Asia that would be Western-oriented and would maintain a sociopolitical pattern favorable to the United States. While America was not willing to undertake Vietnam-type military operations to enforce such a patern, the policy did not mean that the United States under Nixon would revert to isolationism of the traditional kind.13

Nixon's New Delhi meetings with Prime Minister Gandhi from July 30 to August. 1 proved rather formal, but the atmosphere was cordial enough. The two leaders discussed a number of subjects of international importance, including Vietnam, East—West relations, China, the Kashmir problem, and collective security in Aisa

Coming to Pakistan on August 1 for a twenty-two-hour visit, Nixon's party engaged in a dialogue with its counterparts (I was a member of the Pakistani delegation), but the most important discussions were carried on between the two presidents unaided by their advisers. It was during this Nixon —Yahya meeting that Pakistan's relationship with China, which since 1962-1963 had been the most disruptive factor in US—Pakistani relations, was endorsed by President Nixon. He asked Yahya to explore the possibility of providing links between Washington and Peking, an assignment that Yahya, who took little serious interest in his own administration, fulfilled most faithfully and with strict secrecy. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Yahya's closest military officers were excluded from his confidence. As usual diplomatic channels were forgotten, the messages from Peking were conveyed directly by the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan, and Yahya forwarded them through his Am bassador to National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and to Nixon."

President Nixon seemed to be fully satisfied with his talk with Yahya, who impressed him by his simplicity and frankness. Good feeling developed not only between the two 116 presidents on a personal level but also between the two countries. The relaxation in US— Pakistani relations culminated in Nixon's October 1970 decision to lift the ban on the sale of military supplies to Pakistan, but conflict arose again at the outset of the Bangladesh crisis.

In his statement US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A new Strategy for Peace Nixon, elaborating on his new Asian policy, quoted from a speech he delivered in Pakistan during this trip:

I wish to communicate my government's conviction that Asian hands must shape the Asian future. This is true, for example, with respect to economic aid, for it must be related to the total pattern of a nation's life. It must support the unique inspira- tions of each people. Its purpose is to encourae self-reliance, not dependence..

Elsewhere in A New Strategyfor Peace, Nixon noted:

The United States has a long-run interest in cooperation for progress in South Asia The one-fifth of mankind who live in India and Pakistan can make the difference Ibr the future of Asia.'

Both Indira Gandhi and Yahya Khan visited the United States on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, but only Yahya travelled to Washington to see President Nixon and attend his banquet in honor of visiting heads of state and government. "Nobody has occupied the White House who is friendlier guest during their fruitful talks.' 6 A month later, Yahya visited Peking (I was a member of his entourage), and his discussions with Cho En -lai concerned not only the bilateral relations between Pakistan and China but also ways of improving relations between Peking and Washington. Finally, Henry Kissinger made his secret trip to Peking via Rawalpindi in July 1971.

That the American role in the subcontinent from Nixon's inauguration up to the outbreak of the crisis in Bangladesh was characterized by warm relations with Pakistan and less than warm relations with India has been demonstrated above. That these relations had a crucial impact was most clearly evidenced in the American response to the turmoil of De- cember 1971.

Bangladesh: The American Role

"Few if any postwar American policy ventures," recorded William J. Barnds, have brought forth as immediate and widespread opposition as the Nixon Administration's policy toward the Indian subcontinent during 1971."17 True enough, yet the United States has shown more consistent and sincere concern for the welfare of the people of East Bengal than either of the other great powers.

It is ironic that, in the months and years before the crisis, the Pakistani intelligence services, both civilian and military, never tired of "discovering" the "grand American designs" to encourage secession in East Pakistan.18 Almost all American visitors, including intellectuals, were harrassed, sometimes humiliated, as "agents of the Central Intelligence Agency;" and almost all Bengalis, intellectuals not excepted, were haunted and harangued if they had innocent dialogue with visiting Americans. The American economists associated with the Pakistan Planning Commission were constantly watched and suspected because of their objective and honest concern about economic conditions in East Pakistan; if their

1 1 7 recommendations to remove the economic grievances of the Bengalis had been followed, the tragedy of 1971 might have been averted. (It must be said here, however, that some of the economists earned the suspicion cast their way, passing out political as well as economic advice to the Bengalis). On March 26, 1971, the New York Times reported from Rawalpindi that "in Pakistan, the United States is a villain" American Ambassador Farland, the Times reported, "is regularly portrayed as a CIA agent subverting Pakistan's interests—often in favor of India." Even Farland's predecessor, Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.—who was to advocate military support for Pakistan in December 1971—was vilified by the Pakistani press.' 9

Despite the criticism and disappointment both within the United States and abroad over American policy during the Bangladesh crisis, neither the American government in general nor Richard Nixon in particular condoned Pakistan's military atrocities in East Ben- gal and opposed the aspirations of the Bengali nationalists. It was Nixon's intervention that saved the life of Mujib, whom the hawkish Pakistani generals, backed by Bhutto, were plan - ning in August and September 1971 to execute; Bhutto told me in September that Yahya should execute Mujib before departing the following month for Tehran, where President Nixon would also be in attendance at the two thousandth anniversary of the Iranian monar- chy. Yahya withstood the severe pressure to do away with the Awami League leader only because of Nixon's strong pleas to refrain from such a course. Similarly, President Nixon's pressed Yahya to make a political settlement with the Awami League leaders exiled in India, and Yahya agreed. It is not certain that even if all parties had fully cooperated Nixon's efforts for a political settlement would have been successful, but those who know the inside story, as I do as a result of my private visit to Rawalpindi in September 1971, realize that the Nixon administration was doing its best both to avert lndo—Pakistani war and to achieve in the shor- test possible time the goal of the Bengali nationalists. President Nixon's personal sympathy for Pakistan, his cherished China policy, and the unpleasant image of Pakistan's dismemberment under the guns of Soviet-backed Indian forces motivated him and his government to work diligently toward an honorable settlement suitable to both the Bengalis and the West Pakistanis.

Islamabad and Calcutta, where the exiled Bangladesh government was functioning, but unfortunately not New Delhi, were responsive to the American campaign for a peaceful solution. By September—October 1971, Yahya —only slowly getting over his happy delusion that because of his "grand role" as a liaison between them the Chinese and Americans would bail him out of any problem he stumbled into—finally realised that his bankrupt government could not afford much longer the costly military operations in East Pakistan. 'lithe Ameni cans cannot continue the Vietnam war," the Pakistan President told me during my exclusive September 6 interview, "how can Pakistan, whose exchequer is empty, carry on this costly operation?" He bitterly attacked India for not allowing time to reach a political settlement ar ranged by Nixon and the Shah of Iran, and he took an unscheduled trip to Tehran to discuss such a settlement with the Shah, who was acting in perfect understanding with Washington. Contrary to Yahya's fears, when Mrs. Gandhi visited Washington in November, she seemed to accede to President Nixon's request for more time to achieve the objective of the Bengali nationalists without war. It appeared that Washington's mediation was working.

But within a week of the Prime Minister's return to India its troops began to cross the borders of East Pakistan in the name of "self-defence." "Self-defense" is a dangerous enough doctrine when confined to the realm of domestic. guar:J:1s. If it is applied to international relations and accepted as just cause for starting a war, then the terrPorial integrity of any sma 1 ler country is unsafe and the principles and premises of the UN Charter are negated. India holstered its self-defense claim by pointing to the millions of East Bengali refugees who were

1 1 8 creating an explosive situation in its turbulent state of West Bengal, but its justification in resorting to war was still debatable in terms of international law and UN Charter obligations— particularly because it rejected not only Washington's proposals for a political settlement but also the UN Secretary General's suggestions for stopping or reversing the flow of Bengali refugees. Some say India was justified on humanitarian grounds,2° but when the issue was brought before the UN General Assembly, the overwhelming majority urged India to accept a cease-fire. India refused and, with the Soviet Union behind, it pressed its operations until Dacca fe11.21 In an account of America's role during the Bangladesh crisis in his report to the U.S. Congress on February 9, 1972, President Nixon a.ssed that "the United States did not support or condone" Islamabad's harsh repression of the East

Immediately in early April, we ceased issuing and renewing licenses for military shipment to Pakistan, we put a hold on arms that had been committed the year before and we ceased new commitments for economic development loans. This shut off $35 million worth of arms. Less than $5 million worth of spare parts, already in the pipeline under earlier licenses, was shipped before the pipelines dried up completely by the beginning of November.22 The Nixon administration claimed after March 25, 1971, that total stoppage of aid to Pakistan would leave the United States without influence on Yahya, but in loud protests India and large segments of the Western press decried the policy.

Indeed Nixon's policy, overoptimistic about the amount of American leverage, was in some ways misguided. Washington did not realize the extent, to which the military junta would fight against complete independence for East Bengal or the extent to which the Ben- galis, furious at what had happened to their homeland since March 25, would fight for it,23 and in any case, continued military shipments to Yahya's regime were hardly justified. In an April 15 statement, the State Department gave the impression that an airflight embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan had been imposed, yet in June it was found that U.S. arms were bound for Pakistan by sea.24 Indignation was great both in the United States and abroad. But if the United States was not serving the cause of humanity with the arms shipments, at least for better or worse if was fulfilling its commitments to defend the government of Pakistan.

When President Nixon labeled the Indian military action "aggression," he reflected a sense of betrayal; had Mrs. Gandhi delayed the invasion, Nixon felt, his efforts toward a peaceful solution might have made the invasion unnecessary.25 But a U.S.-orchestrated "Tashkent type" solution would have represented a diplomatic coup for Nixon that neither the U.S.S.R. nor India was prepared to give. On the countrary, through Indian force of arms, India and the Soviet Union were the diplomatic winners, taking the title of "liberators" of 75 million Bengalis.

The tone and content of U.S. policy during the Bangladesh crisis offended many lib- erals and friends of democracy, and many believed that the United States stood with the forces of militarism against democracy. Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Mas- sachusetts charged that President Nixon "watched this crisis in silence,"26 and a Louis Harris survey found that the American people, who had never shown much interest in South Asia, disapproved by a two-to-one margin Nixon's handling of the crisis.22 But Nixon's policy was not basically wrong or unjustified. If Washington's attempts at mediation had succeeded, enormous loss—human, physical, social— would have been avoided in Bangladesh. Full- scale war would have been avoided but independence secured. 119 rn

REFERENCES

Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, I 967 1971 was/wig/on Post, Apr. IS, 1967. 3 Down, May 6, 1965 4 See Chapter 9. See Alvin 1 Cottrell, "Iran, the Arabs and the Persian Gulf," Orbis, Fall 1973, pp. 978-988, Pubstan !ernes, lune 29, 1968. The centre Was not a direct result of the bilateral agreement of 1959 between the U.S. and Pakistan, but it could not be detached from this agreement and the other pacts with the West. The formal agreement relating to the centre had been signed in 1959, but the base functioned from 1955. Providing facilities for intelligence on the borders of the Soviet Union and China, it warned of strategic activities of the Soviet military, monitored important wireless transmissions and radar emissions from other countries in the region as well as from the U.S.S.R. and China, and tracked signals from the U.S.S.R.'s earth satellites, deep space probes, and missiles fired from ranges in the eastern and southeastern U.S.S.R. (Based on research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971) 8 Oehlert, op 01 9 Choudhury, "U S. Policy" op. cit. IO See New York Times, Aug. I I, 1974, in which Bhutto is quoted as saying that Pakistan would never forget Nixon's friendliness toward it during the 1971 crisis: see also Dawn, editorial, Aug. 10, and Dawn, Aug. I 1, 1974. I I Richard M Nixon, "Asia alter Vietnam," Foreign Ajtiiirs, October 1967, pp. III -125. 12 New York Times, July 26, 1969. 13 Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. For the Nixon Doctrine, seeAt-amain F ire/pi kaanotis, 1969, op. at 4 Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. On one occasion, Yahya showed me the mass ol messages between China and the United States that he handled in absolute secrecy. 15 US Foreign Polity/Or the 1970's: A NewStrategy/Or Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Feb. 18, 1970. 16. I was told of Nixon's remarks by President Yahya during his trip to China in November 1970. 17 ViIIiamj Barnds, "India, Pakistan and American Realpolitik," Christianity and Crisis, June 12, 1972. 18 Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967- 1971. and Choudhury, Last Days, op. cit. i 9 Dawn, Dec. 7, 1971. 20 G W Choudhury, "Bangladesh: A Review Art icle,"Joumar of International Affairs, No. 2, 1973, pp. 282 -286. 21 M S Frairm, "Bangladesh and After:Pacific Affirirs, Summer 1972, pp. 191-206. 22 Nixon, Emerging Structure, op. cit. 23 Choudhury. "U S. Policy," op cit., pp. 97-112. 24 See the lune 29, 1971, statement by the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Afrairs, in United States lnibnnation Service Analysis (London: American Embassy). 25 Choudhury, "0 S. Policy," op. cit. 2e William Millinship. "Has Nixon Paid a Smuggler's Debt to Pakistan?" Observe- Foreign News Service, Dec 10, 1971. 27 Cited in Barnds, op. cit.

120 READING 9

(The article, Pakistan-United States kid Deal, by Tahir Amin and Mohammad Islam in Pakistan Journal ofAmerican Studies', Vol. Z No. I, March 1984).

Reproduced with Permission.

akistan and the United States signed a package aid deal of $3.2 billion on June 15, 1981 in the wake of certain dramatic regional political developments such as the Islamic Revolu- p tion in Iran (February 1979) and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (De- cember, 1979). Pakistan and the United States have a chequered history of mutual relations. Now that a new chapter in Pakistan—United States relations has begun, it is of utmost importance to critically evaluate the past relationship in order to provide guidelines for the future. More specifically, this paper has two purposes: (a) to make a dispassionate cost-benefit analysis of the present aid deal in the light of past experience from Pakistan's point of view and, (b) to draw lessons both for the donor and the recipient in order to establish a durable, credible and re- spectable relationship between the two. The term cost-benefit is usually understood in the narrow economic sense only, however, our perspective is wider and encompasses political, economic and military dimensions.

Alliance—Formation and Erosion (1954-65)

We briefly analyse the convergence of interests between the two countries which led to the formation of alliances (SEATO and CENTO) during 1954-55 and the divergence of interests, which subsequently eroded this relationship.

Power politics between the US and the USSR in the wake of World War II prompted the US policy of containment of communism at the global level. American decision-makers perceived Pakistan as "a dependable bulwark against communism." Pakistan's religio-cultural ties with the Middle East; its Westemised elites; anti-communist orientation; the martial traditions of its armed forces; the possible use of its air bases for spying purposes against the corn- munist countries — all these factors were considered important for the defence of the 'free world'. Besides the containment of communism, an equally important dimension of American foreign policy was the advancement of the concept of world order favourable to the Americans and the transformation of developing societies in the American image.

Pakistan's primary interests were three: (1) to seek security against both the Indian and communist threats, (2) to seek support of a powerful ally in resolving the Kashmir dispute and •(3) to obtain economic aid for development.

In May 1954, the US and Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Agreement. Subsequently Pakistan also became the member of American sponsored alliances, SEATO (Sept. 1954) and CENTO (Sept. 1955). With the signing of another mit ial defence agreement in March 1959. Pakistan became America's most allied ally in Asia." However, divergence in

121 the interests of the two allies way clear right from the beginning. It was obvious that Pakistan was pre-occupied with the imminent threat from India and was less concerned with the relatively remote communist threat. On the other hand, the United States accorded high priority to the communist threat and was indlfferent that the Americans were unaware of Pakistan's con - cern with India. Americans were not aware that Pakistan's main concern was India but some of the responsible American decision-makers gave a clear impression to Pakistan that - American support, would be available against India as wel1.2 We feel that there existed a com- monality of interests between Pakistan and the United States, vis-a-vis communism, but oppor- tunism on the part of the United States, over estimation of its capability to woo both India and Pakistan, under estimation of the depth of Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir and several other factors led to the erosion of alliances, which we briefly summarise below:

a. Because of its geographic location, great size, vast population and democratic values, India held a 'mesmeric' influence for the American decision-makers and they considered it a countervailing ideoln-ical model to communist China. Al- though Pakistan was 'the most allied ally, in practice the United States followed an even-handed policy towards both the countries keeping in view its 'enlightened interest'. During the period 1954-65 Pakistan received $3 billion in economic aid and $730 million in military aid, while India received $6 billion in economic aid and $120 million in military aid.3 Massive economic aid to India enabled her to free her indigenous resources to develop her own weapon industry as well as to buy weapons from abroad. In fact, America was 'paying for the military bills on both the sideL. _Lrld also earning ubad image on both the sides. Pakis- tan was frustrated that India without having any special relationship and without paying any price was getting double economic aid as compared to Pakistan. The conclusion was clear for Pakistan: it was more beneficial to be non-aligned than to be aligned.

b. The security prespectives of each ally differed considerably. The American concept of Pakistan's security included the communist threat only and the threat from India was entirely discounted by the Americans in their practical policy considerations towards Pakistan. This total indifference to Pakistan's security concern led to a lot of bitterness between Pakistan and the United States.

c. The United State's indifference Lu Lhe Kashmir problem was also a major irritant in Pakistan-US relations. The US l•1"•-,lly gave lukewarm support to Pakistan's case in the UN but when Pakistan insisted that United States should link its relationship with India to the solution of the Kashmir dispute, US leaders made it clear that they could not consent to do so. The US also put pressure on Pakistan during the 1962 Sine- Indian war not to take advantage of India's weak position on the Kashmir front and to extend assurance to India that Pakistan would not make things difficult for her. Alter the Sine-Indian war, the US supported the In - dian scheme of a partitinn plan of Kashmir, emphasising India's strategic interest vis-a-vis China in retaining the occtr-1 -I part of Kashmir.

d. With the Kennedy Administration in power, US policy changed towards the sub continent. The group around Kennedy believed that "India is the great power or South Asia. It is not the business of the US to subsidise Pakistan as a permanent garrison state with a military capability swollen out of all propor-

122 lions to her size." The Pakistan-US relationship came under severe strain when, in the wake of the Sino-Indian War, the US and the Western powers rushed massive militry aid to India over Pakistani protests.

e. The US decision during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War to stop all military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan proved to be the last straw. The move was clearly discriminatory against Pakistan as the Pakistan army was solely dependent on American arms. Kissinger admits: The seeming even-handedness was deceptive; the practical consequence was to injure Pakistan, since India received most of its arms either from communist nations or from its own ar- mories."')

In the post 1965 era, the geo-political environment of the region considerably changed, giving birth to a new context and to new issues. South Asia generally became a low profile area for the US. The US had restored economic aid to !ndia and r-aki.:1 an, but allowed the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region particularly through India in the post-Tashkent period. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War the lack of US active !Merest in the initial phase of the crisis emboldened India and the Soviet Union to seize upon the opportunity to disintegrate Pakistan. In the aftermath of the dismemberment of Pakistan, the US unhesitantly recognised India as the 'leader' of South Asian nations. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 but Pakis- tan's limited nuclear programme became suspect in American eyes. America started taking 'punitive action' against Pakistan. Pakistan-US bilateral relations on this point assumed an "adversary form." American spot-lc-flied alliances SEATO in 1972 and CENTO in 1979 became dead formally. And Pakistan and America developed divergent orientations in their respective foreign policies at all level: bilateral, regional and global.

Factors Leading to Rapproachrnent

Dramatic regional developments- the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Feb. 1979), the Soviet military intervention in AfOar 'stan (Dec. 1979) and the Iran -I,,rq war fundamentally altered the geo-strategic situation in South-West Asia, Iran served as the US 'Policeman' in the area as long as the Shah ruled the country; however, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, not ony the US strategy in this sensitive region was blow:', to shrats, but the revolution's potential spill -over created "further dangers" for the "regional stah!'ity" from Washington's perspective.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan shattered Carter's belief regarding the Soviet Union as a 'complacent power' and the US feared further overt and covert Soviet expansionism, ultimately threatening US vita! interests in the region.

The spectrum of US worries regarding the Iran- Iraq war ranges from its deep concern about regional instability, prospect of interruption in oil supplies, spill over of war and conse- quential security problems of regional friendly states, likely to be sucked into the vortex of this war. An early end to the war, but not at the expense of instability of any of the warning parties, is in the US interest. When Iraqi forces retreated to their borders and Iran threatened to over-run Iraqi defence lines. Reagan expressed his deep conce, n that "Iran's rout of Iraqi forces threatens Baghdad's long term stability and is creating a situation potentially more dangerous to Western interests than the Arab-Israel conflict."'

The US interests in South-West Acha, in the wake of the present situation, can be summarised as the containment of Soviet expansionism, access to Gulf oil at a tolerable

123 economic and political price and denial of a preponderent influence in the area to adversary powers.

Pakistan's interests and threat perceptions have also equally and significantly contributed towards the formation of recent Pakistan—US rapproachment. Pakistan's supreme need is to achieve territorial security and to have internal harmony. Pakistan, in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan perceives a Soviet threat materialising in any of the following four forms:

a. A direct fullfledged invasion to vanquish Pakistan or to amputate some salient tract out of NWFP or Baluchistan.

b. Cross-border reprisals in hot pursuit of guerrillas in order to intimidate Pakis- tan.

c. Subversion and instigation of secessionist movements.

d. Soviet collusion with India to harm Pakistan.

Pakistan's abiding fear is that the conflict between the Soviet—Karmal forces and Afghan guerrillas may spill oyer into its territory. The Soviet forces might choose either to attack Pakistan directly or might invoke the right of hot pursuit to wipe out guerrilla sanctuaries and refugee camps. The Soviet Union already alleges Pakistan as "a seat of tension",7 and a base for further upholding of "aggression" against Afghanistan. One Soviet official is reported to have unequivocally communicated to Pakistan's Ambassador in Moscow that Pakistan "is making undeclared war on the Soviet Union.'8 The Soviet Union is mounting considerable political and military pressure on Pakistan through veiled and iunveiled threats.9 There have been numerous air space violations and border skirmishs in Pakistani territory.

The Soviets may also fall back on a covert coercive programme of subversion and the manipulation of separatist movements. One Soviet official has warned Pakistan that "if it failed to cooperate, there could be subversion throughout the land."'

The possibility of Indo—Soviet collusion against Pakistan is also looming over Pakis- tan's threat horizons. Pakistan, keeping in view the experience of the 1971 War, strongly fears another Indo—Soviet collusion and the possibility of simultaneous aggression against Pakistan on two fronts.

Pakistan—US Rapproachment

It was in panic reaction to Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan that Carter reversed his policy towards Pakistan which in the US view had found itself thrust into the unwelcome status of a "frontline state." Carter in his State of the Union Message to the US Congress on Jan 23, 1980, said that one of his "highest legislative priorities:12 was a new military and economic assistance programme for Pakistan. Pakistan was informed that the Mutual De- fence Treaty of 1959 between Pakistan and the United States, which had remained operative only on paper in the past, could come into play against a Soviet attack through Afghanistan. Brzezinski, Carter's adviser on National Security Affairs, proclaimed that "Pakistan was a key-stone of the Carter Doctrine for the defence of the Middle East and South Asia." 3 The Carter Administration announced $400 million aid package over a period of two years. The

124 amount was to be equally.allocated to economic assistance and military sales credits, with 11% interest on the military component of the package.

Pakistan considered Carter's aid package hopelessly inadequate and President Zia spumed the offer calling it "peanuts." Zia was of the view that Pakistan could not "buy its security with $400 million" as it would "bring greater animosity from the Soviet Union which is now more influential in the area than the United States."" Pakistan's then Foreign Minister Agha Shahi also expressed his misgivings that the aid package "did not carry credibility com- mensurate with what (Pakistan) consider(s) to be the magnitude of threat."' A wide cleav- age of difference is reported to have existed between the Carter Administration and Pakistan in respect of threat perceptions and responses. After Pakistan's refusal, the Carter Administ- ration not only gave up courting Pakistan but also launched a malevolent propaganda against Pakistan. Carter's inept handling of the aid package to Pakistan created more bitterness instead of a sense of revived alliance.

With the Reagan Administration in power (January, 1981), a reappraisal of world strategic environment was made. It was decided that his administration unlike Carter's would deal with the world as it was rather than as the US would like it to be. j6 Unlike Carter, who had virtually decided to "write off' Pakistan, Reagan recognised that "Pakistan is in a very strategic position now in view of what has happened in Afghanistan. And it is in (US) interest to be supportive of Pakistan:"

The Aid Deal

With the signing of the Pakistan—US aid deal during James Buckley's visit to Pakis- tan in June, 1981, Pakistan—US relations entered into a new era.

The aid deal signed on June 15, 1981 'essentially consists of two packages: $3.2 billion over a period of six years and the direct cash sales of some military equipment urgently required by Pakistan and 40 F-1 6s. Direct cash sale of 40 F-1 6s is to be financed through a mix of cash and credit. The programme is opertive since the fiscal year 1982 and is subject to yearly congressional approval. The $3.2 billion .package consists of two components, economic development funds and military sales credits.

The economic component will, total $1.66 billion over a period of six years (I 982 —87) and includes development assistance, economic support funds and Public Law 480, 'food for peace'. The economic component of the deal has a 10 years grace period and 20 years for repayment at 2 and 3 per cent interest respectively. Repayment will peak in 1993-97 at approximately $219 million annually.

The military sales credits will total $1.55 billion over a period of five years beginning in fiscal year 1983. Interest at a commercial rate of 14% will be charged. Repayment will be over a period of 30 years with a 7-10 years grace period.

It has been disclosed that the economic programme has been designed in consultation with the Government of Pakistan. General areas of concentration would be water management and energy development, rural electrification, emphasis on productive uses of electricity for such activities as agriculture small industries (giving low priority to extension of domestic connections), population and health, fertilizer supply, research activity and network of farm-to-market roads. Some amount out:Of the $1.66 billion reserved for economic development assistance refers to .economic aid with military utility. It will be expended on

125 shoring up infrastructures in areas like NWFP and Baluchistan. Roads, railways, air fieldsand basic communications and some other projects are to be built out of it.

The portion of military sales credit falls under the foreign military sales which binds recipient country to pay for arms in cash or with the credits programme. Under the military component of the package deal, the US is reported to have agreed to sell the following items: anti-tank guided missiles, light field artillery, an integrated air defence system, radar SAMS, anti-aircraft artillery, self-propelled guns, armed helicopters with anti-tank capability, right vision equipment, sophisticated Cs system, tank and armoured personnel carriers. All military equipment will be purchased at prevailing market rates.

Outside the framework of the US assistance programme, the Reagan Administration has also agreed to sell some military equipment urgently required by Pakistan to be paid for from Pakistan's own resources. Pakistan has also been allowed to buy 40 F-I 6 multiple-role aircrafts. The cash sale of 40 F-1 6s is a separate deal from the large issue of military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan, which will be purchased in instalments through a mix of cash and US military sales credits. The US Defence Department formally intimated to the US Congress in October 1981 about its decision to sell 40 F-1 6s to Pakistan for $1.1 billion. The saldof F-1 6s was approved by the US Congress on November 22, 1981. Afterwards, Pakistan and the US signed a "letter of offer and acceptance" on December 4, 1981, which called for cash and carry sale of F-1 6s to Pakistan. Six F-1 6s have already arrived in Pakistan. The balance of 34 F-16s in batches of five will be handed over every quarter beginning in March 1984 and the last of these will reach Pakistan in late 1985.

The package deal was finalised in June 1981 , but the US Congress removed the last legal barrier — the Symington Amendment (Section 660 of Foreign Assistance Act) —on Oc- tober 16, 1981. The Congress authorised the President under section 620E to waive the pro- hibitions of section 669 at any time during the period beginning with the enactment of section 620E and ending on September 30, 1987, to provide assistance to Pakistan during the period if he determines that to do so is in the national interest of the United States.18 Al- though Pakistan was given a preferential treatment as section 620E specifically exempted Pakistan by name from subjection to the Symington Amendment, yet there still exists legislation which stipulates mandatory withholding of aid, including in pipelines, to any country (including Pakistan) found engaged in transferring, providing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear device.

Convergence and Divergence

Briefly identifying the areas of convergence and divergence between Pakistan and the United States, we shall embark upon an analysis of benefits and costs of this aid deal to Pakistan in the light of past experience with a view to suggest alternative measures in order to build a durable and credible relationship between the two Countries.

It is believed that the aid package shows the meeting of minds between the two countries on some vital issues of common concern. So far as the Soviet threat is concerned, both countries do share a common view to some extent, but Americans discount Pakistan's traditional security threat from india and they also do not share the Pakistani perception of possible lndo—Soviet collusion in the region. Former US Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. Ronald I. Spiers, categorically declared that the possibility of Indo— Soviet collusion is not "believed" by the Americans at all, 9 while to Pakistanis the lessons of the 1971 ludo—Pakis- tani war and Indo—Soviet collaboration are still fresh. The most worrisome prospect for

126 Pakistan is that in the event of another Indo-PakisCani armed conflict, the US will not only stay away but is most likely to stop aid to Pakistan. The second major area of divergence is regarding Pakistan's exact role in the region. The United States primarily associates Pakistan with the defence of the Gulf, which is more vital to US interest than to Pakistan itself But Pakis- tan does not appear to have harboured any aspiration to az,sume the role of Iran in the Gulf region. In fact, Pakistan views the Persian Gulf as an area outside the scope of its security consideration. The third major area of divergence between the two countries is Pakistan's nuclear programme. Pakistan maintains that its programme is limited in nature and is primarily meant for the country's long term energy needs, while the US is actively opposed to Pakistan's nuclear programme and suspects that it aims at becoming a nuclear power.'

Benefits and Costs

Benefits: We shall analyse the benefits and costs of this deal to Pakistan utilising three analytical categories: military, economic and political.

Military equipment worth $1.55 billion alonn, with 40 F-16s over the next five years would partially modernise Pakistan's outdated defence system, would enable Pakistan to meet local contingencies, would create limited deterrc, it effect by raising the cost calculus for a potential invader to a higher level and would help correct to some extent the regional balance of power which has dangerously tilted in favour of India.

Economic assistance will help Pakistani planners in the development of the under developed areas. As a substantial amount of aid will be spent on development projects and roads and railways in NWFP and Baluchistan, it will give a momentum to progress in the less developed provinces and improve transportation facilities in the backward areas. It will create more job opportunities for the inhabitants of these areas and will help increase trade links with other provinces. A substantial portion of the economic assistance package will be spent on agriculture, which has the potential to be improved to a point where it would not only meet the domestic requirement but may also enable Pakistan to export to other countries. Furthermore, the package deal has also increased the prospects of further economic cooperation and coordination between the two countries as the Reagan Administration has selected Pakistan as one of the ten developing countries as the immediate areas where economic development is intended to be accelerated through private investii icnt.21 .

Several delegations of US businessmen have visited Pakistan under the auspices of US-Pakistan Economic Council. US businessmen have' shown willingness to target Pakistan for large scale investment. The US-Pakistan Economic Council has increased its activities in seeking out ways for joint ventures. The Council has set tip an office in New York to help businessmen interested in joint ventures. A Joint Commission was also set up during the visit of , President Zia to the United States in December 1982, to facilitate Pakistan-US cooperation in the field of economics, commerce, science and technology, education and culture.

Politically, the new Pakistan-US aid deal would serve as a signal to the Soviet Union of renewed American interest in the security and integrity of Pakistan. This would boost Pakistan's morale and enable it to resist Soviet political pressure and to maintain its principled stand against the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan with steadfastness. According to an observer the -ackage deal will not only incur benefits in material terms but "the US assistance to Pakistan in economic and military fields will also strengthen Pakistan in the political. psychological sense as well."'

127 Costs: the most probable cost of this aid deal to Pakistan is that its peaceful and limited nuclear programme is likely to be affected in the long run. Buckley has clearly warned that Pakistan should have "no illusions about what might be the consequences if Islamabad developed a nuclear weapon."22 One objective behind the aid deal stretching over six years is to enable the United States to hold back the progress of Pakistan's nuclear programme during this period. An American Staff Study Mission report reads that the "6-year programme may give the United States time to influence Pakistan's intentions to go nuclear."' Throughout the scheduled period of the programme, the United States would be able "to influence favourably Pakistan's actions by engaging it in an economic assistance and security support relationship, while making it clear that the programme would likely be compromised by a nuclear explo- sion."25 The US Congress, while passing the aid deal, has also passed certain amendments which call for a prompt cut-off of aid if any country is found engaged in developing a nuclear capability. The yearly approval of instalments of the package deal by the US Congress and its lin- kage with a report to the US Congress on Pakistan's nuclear programme is an ample leverage available to the US. A Pakistani observed complained, "in plain words, our conduct will be closely watched during the course of a year and an instalment of equipment will be released if we are deemed to have behaved properly."26 In short, either Pakistan will have to limit its nuclear programme according to US wishes or will have to defer it to the landing of the last F-16 and last shipment of other military equipment. The United States seems to be well on the way to achieve its declared objective of influencing Pakistan's nuclear programme. First of all, the US is trying to shut avenues of supply of technology usable in nuclear plants in Pakistan. A US warning to the Turkish government 27 and strong opposition to tenders which the Government of Pakistan floated for the 937 MW plant at Chashma25 are significant examples in this context. Moreover, Pakistan has accepted additional safeguards by IAEA on KANUPP outside the existing agreement,29 despite its previous stand that it would not accept any unilateral additional safeguard on any of its nuclear plants. According to unofficial and unconfirmed reports, Pakis- tan has slowed down its nuclear programme.

Military equipment provided by the United States will only partially modernise Pakis- tan's armed forces but by no means will provide an effective answer to all the threats looming over Pakistan's horizons. Military equipment including 40 F- 1 6s will not be sufficient to create an effective defence and deterrent system. The 40 F- I 6s are neither going to tip the conventional air balance against the Soviet military force in Afghanistan, nor are they going to out- weigh 2.5 to 1 advantage in combat aircraft that India has over Pakistan. We believe that this arms acquisition only partially meets Pakistan's security needs and will rather create a false sense of security among Pakistani policy-makers. In the light of past experience we believe that the supply of off-the-shelf weapons will create merely a vulnerable and dependent military structure and will not contribute to real security of the country.

Alongwith economic aid, the US advice through bilateral and multilateral agencies, has also started trickling to Pakistan. The terms and conditions of the present Pakistan-US aid deal mean that our development strategy and economic policies must conform to US interest and policies. Various delegates from the US have started coming to Pakistan to inspect utilisation of economic aid in the specified areas.36 The proposed levels of economic assistance would undoubtedly give the United States an influential role in advising Pakistan on economic matters. In the past (1954-1970) the US was involved with Pakistan's economic planning through various aid giving agencies, private foundations and multilateral agencies. The results of that advice were disastrous for the country. These effects came into limelight in 1970 when the politico- economic system of Pakistan collapsed, Mahboob-ul-Haq summarised these effects:

128 In Pakistan, which experienced a healthy growth rate during the 1960s', unemploy- ment increased, real wages in the industrial sector declined by one third, per capita income disparity between East and West Pakistan nearly doubled and concentrtion of industrial wealth became an explosive economic and political issue. And in 1968 while Pakistan was being cited as a model of development, the system exploded not only for political reasons but for economic unrest.3I All the indications are there that the US advice particularly in economic matters more or less will assume the same form as it did during the Ayub Khan era.

The most important cost to Pakistan, ho—tver, lies in the political sphere both in foreign policy and domestic arena. US military planners are interested in very specific agenda • which places Pakistan within a much broader vision. US economic strategic interests fundamentally lie in the Persian Gulf. Military bases of friendly countries and their active cooperation are indispensible for the US to ward off threats to its interests in the area. In fact, the regional countries are also needed either to pick up some defence cost, to assume a role or to provide the United States with access to facilities for use by the American forces (including RDF). The Reagan Administration strove to achieve a strategic consensus in an area stretching from Pakistan to Egypt. Since efforts made so far in this direction have not been a success, the United States is not actively pursuing the idea but it has by no means abandoned it. By joining strategic consensus or by assuming soine specific responsibility in the region, Pakistan's non-aligned image would be affected. Without getting any credible guarantee from the US for its total security, Pakistan would be embroiled in super power conflict with all its frightful consequences. Of course, Pakistan has so far maintained a principled stand on certain international issues. But the danger of losing independence of action in foreign affairs is increasing. The US Congress has recently made an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill. The amendment conditions American aid to the good behaviour of the recipient countries.32 Being a member of the Corporation of Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistan is obliged to take positions not in con Ibr- mity with US policy on issues like Arab— Israel conflict, aparthied in South Africa, independence of Namibia and the North-South dialogue. These differences of policy, if not properly managed, could incense the US Congress enough to cut off or reduce aid to Pakistan.

If the past is any guide, the aid deal will have adverse consequences of the domestic policy of the country. Because of extensive military, economic and political contacts the US had acquired a considerable influence and leverage in Pakistan's domestic politics. Paul Y. Ham- mond notes that the US had a definite role (even if indirect) in the coup d'etatof 1958.33 Relation- ship between the US and Pakistan distorted the natural balance between the army and other political forces and hindered the process of establishing and institutionalising a democratic political system.

Conclusion

It is, perhaps, too early to draw a full cost-benefit balance sheet of the new relationship Rut past experience and present indicators show that Pakistan might find itself in the long run, at the loser's end. A relationship of dependence seldom works to the advantage of a small state.

In the present grim strategic situation around Pakistan this deal is certainly in Pakis- tan's nL,' ional interest. However, the new deal should avoid the pitfalls of the old relationships to prove more fruitful for both Pakistan and the US. With this in view we make the following suggestions:

129

a. Orders for off-the-shelf weapons be rLailcd to the minimum necessary equipment. If Pakistan wants to build a credible and meaningful capability, it must buy less weapons and import more technology; n 'clan must be helped to improve defence production capability.

b. The economic aid portion is largely allocated to the agricultural and infrastruc- tura! dc' Hpment. This must be allocaLtifd to develop an industrial and technog- ical base which would also sustain the continuous growth of the agricultural.

c. Economic advice ancl'American advisers be avoided as far as possible. Advice is usually irrelevant to the Pakistani situation and experts are too expensive, gobbl- ing a good portion of the aid money.

Although this draw mentally approaches the problem from the recipient's perspective, yet some important lessons emerge for the donor as well: .

a. American decision-makers must formula!—. (like the Soviet Union and China) a consistent and long-term policy towards their allies: It will earn America both credibility and respectibility.

b. America must not impose its economic and political advice on the smaller coun tries, because the experience of the past advice l-ias been disastrous not only for the recipient countries (e.g. Iran, Turkey, Pakistan) but for America as well, creating strong anti-American feelinn, in many countries. America must let the developing societies grow and evolve' naturally.

c. The United States should respect Pakistan's serious concerns over its peaceful nuclear programme. The US must not tie rid to Pakistan's amandonment of its quest for nuclear technology. The aid to Pakistan is subject to yearly review. Should any misunderstanditig about Pakistan's nuclear programme surface between the two countries the aid h; likely to be cut off. This uncertainty makes long terms planning difficult for Pakistan and keeps the Pak—US relationship always under shadow. Some methods be evolved „:. put both :he aid and the relationship on surer, endurable and more reliable foundations.

REFERENCES

I. Speech hy John Dulles on May 29., 1953 cited in C. W. C11.,u.11iry. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers (til The Free Press, 1975). p. 83. HenryKissinger, White House Years (Boston, little, Brown and Co. 1979). p. 895. 3. N.D. Palmer, India and Pakistan: "The Major Recipients" Carrera History, MAX (Nov 1965), p. 263. 4. Selig S. Harrison, India, Pakistan and USA: "Case Ifistiicy Of A Mistake," The New Rellublic, August 10, 1959. 5. 11(nry Kissinger, oi). cit. p. 846. 6. The International herald Tribune, May 27, 1982. 7. Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation (Washington) June 4, 1980, p. 6. 8, The Washing,ton Post, June 10, 1981. 9. /ha 10. Ak1/2sweek, June 15, 1981, p.9. .11 US Department of State, Bulletin, Nov. 1981, P. 82. 1). :t)e ",..'uslun, January 26, 1980, A. The Internvhonal I took! Tribune, March 20, 1980. 14. US News and World Report February 4, 1980, p. 21. IS. The Alas,' May 20, 1981.

130 16. 8 Days, July 25, 1981, p. 26. 17. US Alms and World aport June 29, 1981, p. 22. 18. tkgiskition on ForeignRelations Though 1981, Current legislation and related executive order, Vol I,11S Government Printing Office, Washington, 1982, p. 143. 19. The Muslim, Feb. 21, 1982. 20. Staff Study Mission Report, "Proposed US Assistance and Arms Transfer to Pakistan: An assessment," US Goveni ment Priming Office, Washington Nov. 20, 10'. , pp. 5, 25. 21. The Musfitn, May 23, 1981. . 22. Mug, March I , 1982,p. 16. 23. Dawn, Nov. 4, 1981. 24. SiaffStitc/y Mission Report, Nov. 1981, pp. 5--6. 25. Richard P. Cronin, "Arms sales and Security Assistance to Pakistan. The Library of Congress, Issue Brief No III 8!122, July 22, 1981, 26. The Muslim, July 21, 1981. 27. Voice opmelica, July 28, 1981. 28. The International herald Tribune, August 26, 1983. 29. The Muslim, November 20, 1982. 30. Daily Neuva-i4Vaqt, July 30, 1983. 31. Mahboob-ui:claq, Planning Machinery in Pakistan, March 1954, p-3. 32: pawn, November 14, 1983. 33. Paul Y. I lammond, Aid and 11:13 :, Ice in Ali:11SM 19.54-63 (Santa Monica, California, The Rand Como; atir in 1969).

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(Excerpts from 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy. A Historical Analysis', by S. M. Burke, Karachi, Oxford Universio, Press, 1975),

Reproduced with Permission.

e have already briefly referred to the adverse Soviet estimate of Pakistan When describing the sudden intervention of the Soviet Representative in the Security W Council debate in January 1952.1 Having no direct knowledge of the complicated Hindu—Muslim question in India, the Soviet Union failed to appreciate that the demand for Pakistan represented the genuine desire of the Muslims to escape both from British rule and perpetual Hindu domination. The Soviets believed that the British decision to divide the In- dian subcontinent into two was nothing but a new manife5tation of the old British strategy of divide and rule. British 'calculations are based', wrote the New Times (4 July 1947), 'on an ag- gravation of national antagonisms... on the creation of a situation that will favour British interference in India's inter .al affairs.' Though both Indian and Pakistani leaders were critiCized for accepting the division of the country, Pakistan, beingforemost in the demand for separation, was viewed as the favourite tool of imperialism.

The Course of Soviet—Pakistani Relations

Not surprisingly, Soviet—Pakistani relations got off to a cool start. Nehru, on the other hand, stretched out a friendly hand to the USSR even before India became constitution- ally independent. In a broadcast, upon assuming charge of the External Affairs portfolio in the Interim Government, the Indian leader greeter the Soviet Union and said, 'Inevitably we shall have to undertake many common tasks and have much to do with each other.' To signify the great importance he attached to Moscow he nominated his own sister, Vijaya Lak- shmi Pandit, as Ambassador to the USSR. Liaquat, Who headed the Muslim League contingent in the Interim Government, said that he did not wish an ambassador appointed to Mos- cow,2 but he was unable to block the move and Mrs. Pandit duly presented her credentials to the President of the Soviet Union on 13 August 1947. For her part Pakistan felt miffed with Russia because the latter hid moved slowly in extending recognition to Pakistan and Rus- sian leaders had sci./.. to congratulatory messages to Jinnah when Pakistan came into existence. It also irked Pakistan that, while all the Western members of the Security Council initially strove to have the Kashmir dispute solved on fair terms, the Soviet Union remained

133 impassively neutral. Because the status quo was quite acceptable to India and not at all to Pakistan, the Soviet attitude in effect favoured India.

The first move to establish diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Russia was not made till 13 April 1948, on which date Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan in New York prop - &)sed to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that their countries exchange ambassadors. It was believed that Pakistan took the initiative in improving relations with the USSR to offset the shift, then under way, of the Western countries towards liJia on the Kashmir question. But the Pakistani move ran out of steam because, though the Soviet agreement to establish diplomatic relations was announced within a month, it was not till another seventeen months had passed that Pakistan named her first Ambassador to the USSR. The nominee finally presented his credentials in Moscow on the last day of 1949. His counterpart from Russia took even longer to show up in Pakistan and assumed charge of his office on 22 March 1950.

Two events in the first part of 1949 caused Russia and Pakistan to sit up and take a fresh look at their relationship. The first was India's decision in April to remain within the Commonwealth. That the Commonwealth had gone to the extent of shedding its cherished monarchical character to keep republican India within its ranks, was taken by Pakistan as further confirmation of her view that India could always gel her own way in the Common- wealth while Pakistan would continue to be taken for granted. Russia, already suspicious ()I India, thought India's agreement to maintain her ties with the Commonwealth, in contraven- tion of India's own past declarations, was a clear sign that she was leaning towards the Western countries in their cold ‘var with the USSR. The second development, coming close on the heels of the first, was the announcement by Prime Minister Nehru in Bombay on 7 May that he had accepted an invitation to visit the United States in October. This news caused a flutter in Karachi, because Liaquat had received no such invitation, and in Moscow, where it was read as further proof of India's proclivity towards the West.

The Pakistani—Soviet response was not long in coming. It was announced in Karachi on 8 June that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and his wife had accepted an invitation from the Soviet Government to visit Moscow. The Daily Telegraph noted that the Pakis- tani Prime Minister would be the first Commonwealth lie.ad of Government to go to Russia and was 'expected to time his journey to coincide with the visit of Pandit Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, to the United States in October'. Liaquat complained of Britain's step- motherly treatment of Pakistan and said meaningfully, 'Pakistan cannot afford to wait. She must take her ftiends where she finds them.'3

In the end, however, Liaquat's visit to Moscow never materialized and the result of the entire episode was a further setback to Soviet—Pakistani relations. But the manoeuvre did succeed in shaking the United States out of a posture of comparative indifference towards Pakistan. On 10 December it was announced in Pakistan that the Prime Minister and his wife had received a personal invitation from President Harry S. Truman to visit the USA in May 1950. Though 'well-informed circles' in Karachi maintained that the acceptance of the American President's invitation did not in any way affect the position as regards the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow'4 the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph opined that Pakistan's ith Russia appeared to have ended.5

134 In the meantime Soviet criticism of Pakistani policies picked up again, and increased in intensity after Liaquat had given expression to friendly sentiments towards his American hosts during his tour of their country in the following spring. On the eve of the International Islamic Economic Conference at Karachi, the New Times observed that the purpose of the conference was to prepare the ground for an anti-Soviet Muslim military and political lilt ie.° Commenting on Liaquats visit to the USA, the same periodical wrote that the upshot of his visit might be unmistakably guessed from the 'servile zeal' with which he hastened to proclaim his solidarity with the ugly deeds of American imperialism in Korea.7

The Pakistani Prime Minister appeared willing to journey to Moscow after his trip to the USA, but the Soviet Union on the one hand assumed a sphinx-like silence about the visit and on the other became increasingly acrimonious about Pakistan's alleged anti-Soviet moves in partnership with 'imperialist' Britain and America. Liaquat Ali Khan's intended trip to Moscow thus simply faded away in the course of time.

The Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan did not Fs:- Moscow but went instead to the USA has been rightly interpreted b.; most Pakistani commentators to mean that he had openly chosen friendship with the United States in preference to cordiality with the USSR. Analysing the reasons why he went to the USA and not to the Soviet Union, a Study Group of the Pakistan Institute of Internal An airs wrote: 'There are important divergences of outlook between Pakistan, with its Islamic background, and the Soviet Union with its baekground of Marxism which is atheistic....pakistan had noticed the subservience which was forced upon the allies of the Soviet Union....Furthermore, there was the question whether Russia could supply the aid, both material and technical, which Pakistan so urgently needed.'s

Another consideration that must have weighed with Pakistan policy makers in choosing Western friendship at the time was the fact that in the United Nations, where the Kashmir case was pending, the Western countries enjoyed a far greater voting strength thatt Russia and her satellites.

Liaquat's cold-shouldering of the Soviet Union sorely wounded the pride of the Soviet leaders who are highly sensitive to political snubs of any sort. Moscow's grievance on the subject was amply expressed to Pakistani diplomatists for years to come, and Ayub took special care in 1965 to fix the dates of his trips to China, Russia, and the US in the order in whch the invitations had been received.

REFERENCES

1. Ch. 2. 2. Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, p. 114. 3. Pakistan News, I I June 1949. 4, Dawn, 12 Dec. 1949. S. Daily Telegraph, 12 Dec. 1949. 6. No. 47 of 1949. 7 New Times, No. 28 of 1950. ri. Pakistan / torizon, March 1956. For other similar views see K. Sarwar liassan. The Strategic Interests of Pakistan, p. 2; Ha feez-ur-Rahman Khan, 'Pakistan's Relation with the U.S.S.R.', Pakistan Horizon, 1st Quarter 1961; and Aslam Si ddiqi, Pakistan Seeks security, p.97.

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(Excerpts from 'India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers: A Politics of Divided Subconti- nent', by G. W. Choudluy, New York, The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission.

en the British Raj in India was voluntarily dissolved on August 15, 1947, and the sovereign states of India and Pakistan emerged, the Kremlin leaders, unlike their Whczarist predecessors, hardly glanced toward the subcontinent. Stalin and his ruling elite were preoccupied with East European and Far Eastern affairs. Moreover, they harbored prejudice and misunderstanding about the great events during the liquidation of the British Empire in India. They dismissed the whole process of the peaceful transfer of power as a set of new imperialist devices to retain British political, economic, and strategic influence in South Asia; their dogmatic interpretation of major political events, in strict accord with Mar- xist—Leninist theory, blinded them to political realities and dynamics in Asia.

Through the early postwar period, the two major potential catalysts to revolutionary upheaval in Asia were agrarian discontent and, more important, demands for national independence from foreign rule. At the second meeting of the Communist International in June 1929, Lenin recommended close alliance of all national liberation movements with the Soviet Union and suggested that the nature of alliance should be determined by the level of development in each country.' Subsequently Stalin amplified Lenin's theory. Stalin contended that the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries would split into the revolutionary group and the compromising group. In a colonial country such as India where capitalism was already more or less developed, the compromising bourgeoisie, according to Stalin, had come to an agreement with imperialist powers.2 Thus, though not deeply involved in South Asia at the time of Indian independence, the Soviet Union, alone among the great powers, had a comprehensive theory to back up its policy toward the new countries of Asia.

During the area of Stalin the whole approach to India's struggle for freedom and the Muslim demand for a separate state based on religion—and to the two new nations that resulted—was one of utmost skepticism and prejudice. The Soviets, leaning hard on their Mar- xist —Leninist—Stalinist doctrine, took hardly any note of the great appeal of nationalism in both India and Pakistan, they distorted the dignified response of the British authorities to the legitimate aspirations of the people of the subcontinent. The Soviet press maligned the new governments and their leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Moham- med All Jinnah. Nehru's government was described as "an Indian variant of bourgeois pseudo-democracy."3 Nehru was described as the "Chiang Kai-shek of India" and as a "running dog of imperialism."' Gandhi was treated with scarcely more gentleness. According to . the Soviets, the reactionary, bourgeois landlords who came to power in India in 1947 exploited Gandhism, a "reactionary political doctrine"; the Indian authorities were alleged to have adopted a policy of terror on the widest scale against the masses fighting for national independence and social liberation.°

137 The harsh Soviet analysis of both the Indian National Congress movement and the Muslim nationalist movement provided the background for the indifferent, even hostile attitude to the two new South Asian states. The Soviet leaders were not inclined to embrace two new sovereignties in which the great political changes had not been brought about by a revolutionary proletariat or an armed peasantry. Despite the sanguine declaration of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in I 928—"the vast colonial and semi-colonial world has become an unquenchable, blazing hearth of the revolutionary mass movement"7 — the liquidation of the British raj in India was carried out peacefully; independence came as a result of agreement between the imperial power and those whom Marxist—Leninists labelled "the national bourgeoisie."' A Soviet specialist on Oriental affairs, E. Zhukov, claimed in lzvestia that the Indian leadership had capitulated to imperialism because the big industrialists feared the masses more than they feared the British.9 A strong Soviet delegation attended to • unofficial Asian Relations Conference in India in February 1947—Nehru's first attempt to form a third, or Asian, bloc—and the Soviet skepticism persisted. Zhukov's report on the conference praised Egypt, Indonesia, Indochina, and Burma but severely attacked Nehru for his alleged pro-British sentimentsi°

On Pakistan, Soviet comments were even more hostile. The Pakistan gOvernment was described as antipopular, tied up with the imperialists, dominated by feudal elements, and more reactionary than India's government. The Muslim League, Moscow charged, col- luded with the British authorities to disrupt and thwart the struggle of the people for liberation. If India was villified during the era of Stalin, Pakistan was damned as "lost" to the "imperialist powers." (However, as we shall see, the Soviet Union made some overtures to Pakistan in 1949-1950 in its efforts to win Pakistan away from the "clutches" of the "imperialist powers.") Reactionary and suspect in Soviet eyes were the Muslim nationalist movement in India, the creation of Pakistan, and the Pakistani government's leaders policies. The Soviet particularly scorned Pakistan's concept of "Islamic socialism" and "the Islamic state" as well as its calls for the creation of an "Islamic bloc" comprising the Muslim countries of the Middle East.''

The Kremlin's Unexpected Overture to Pakistan

Nehru's invitation to the United States prompted an unexpected and spectacular development in Soviet—Pakistan! relations.

The Soviet Union had noted carefully Pakistani resentment over the Western countries' wooing of Nehru— the perennial tensions and conflicts between India and Pakistan had been (and continue to be) such that if any country or bloc made a friendly gesture to the one, the other became suspicious if not hostile. On the whole, as Geoffrey Hudson pointed out in 1955, "the Soviet Union appears to have perceived more clearly than the British or the Ameri- cans have done that antipathy to Pakistan is the pivot of India's foreign policy."12 The Soviets have also recognized the pivot of Pakistani policy. When Pakistan felt frustrated over Tru- man's invitation to Nehru and over the special provision to keep India in the Commonwealth even as a "republic," the Soviet government, in spite of its consistently unfriendly attitude, asked Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat All Khan, to visit the Soviet Union. The news of the Soviet invitation, a countermeasure to Truman's invitation to Nehru, surprised Pakistan as much as the rest of the world. Pakistan had not vet exchanged ambassadors with the Soviet Union.

What led to this developmnnt?' 3

138 On May 15, 1949, while Liaquat was on a visit to Tehran, the Soviet charge d'affaires there inquired of Mrs. Khan at a dinner party if she and her husband would visit the U.S.S.R.; she replied that they would be receptive to an invitation. Subsequently, on June 2, the Soviet charge conveyed verbally through Pakistan's Ambassador in Tehran an official invitation to Liaquat and his wife to visit Moscow. Liaquat accepted on June 7.

The Prime Minister was hailed for his acceptance by two senior political advisers, Ambassadors Raja Ghazanfar All Khan in Tehran and M. A. H. Isphani in Washington. Is- phani wrote Liaquat on September 7, 1949:

Your acceptance of this invitation to visit Moscow was a masterpiece in strategy....Until a few months ago, we were unable to obtain anything except a few sweet words from middling State Department officials. We were taken much for granted as good boys: boys who would not play ball with communism or flirt with the left; boys who would starve and die rather than even talk to communists;...we were treated as a country that did not seriously matter. On the other hand, the US Government paid much attention to India. It was out to appease and pamper India.... [With the Liaquat acceptance] overnight Pakistan began to receive the serious notice and consideration of the US Gov emment....Every effort [is] being made to rid us of the feeling that US is being partial to India... Effort is now being made to rid us of our suspicions and to impress on us that we shall be accorded just treatment and the attention we deserve. •

Isphani's letter reflected the mood of the group headed by the Prime Minister, who wished to use the Russian gesture to enhance Pakistan's importance—one of the basic objective of Pakisani foreign policy has always been to attain parity with India in politics and diplomacy if not in military might. Indeed, the public in Pakistan welcomed the Soviet invitation as a way to balance the setback of Nehru's invitation from Truman.

Some, however, were not so enthusiastic. Foreign Minister Zafrullah made the announcement of the invitation, but he added that though the Soviet Union and Pakistan had agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives, the exchange could not be achieved immediately. A "shortage of housing in Karachi" was the problem, he said. This flimsy explana- tion for the delay in the exchange of ambassadors betrayed the negative attitude of the , Foreign Minister towards Liaquat's proposed trip in particular and toward the warming of Soviet—Pakistani relations in general. Zafrullah reflected the views of the powerful clique— • which included Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed, who subsequently became the Gov- ernor-General of Pakistan, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah, and some other senior bureauc- rats—that was accustomed to making decisions on external relations. Apprehensive about the Kremlin's intensions and motives, this group sought to sabotage any move toward Mos- cows. Its members regretted that the partition of India had exposed Pakistan to Soviet attention, and they discerned clear links between present policy and the traditional Russian interest "in the general direction of the Persian Gulf?"4 Moreover, they argued, Pakistan was in dire need of the both economic and military assistance, neither of which could be expected from the Soviet Union at that time.

To back up their arguments against the Prime Minister's trip, Zafrullah's group sought influential foreign support. The British government was contacted, and it responded with subtle pressure on Pakistan. On September 28, 1949, the Pakistani High Commissioner in London, Habib Rahimtullah, wrote to Liaquat that Lord Addison, the Undersecretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, had given him a long list of things that Britain had done for

139 Pakistan and had asked if Pakistan harbored any grievances against the British. This seemed to indicate that Britain looked upon Pakistani moves toward Moscow as a lossening of ties with London. Another indication of British displeasure was the October 27, 1949, letter of the British High Commissioner in Pakistan to Liaquat relaying the concern of the British Ambas- sador in Moscow that, in the event of a Liaquat visit, "he [the Ambassador] may be prevented from showing the Prime Minister the courtesy which he [the Prime Minister] deserves." (At that time, the British Ambassador was representing Pakistan in Moscow).

Tehran•Ambassador Ghazanfar claimed that he himself had greatly improved relations with the Soviet Union: "The same Russians who did not attend our Independence Day celebrations last year [1948] and did not offer condolence on the death of the Quaid-i-Azam (M. A. Jinnah] are now eating out of our hands." Zafrullah replied that "eating out of his [Ghazanfar's] hand would have to be taken with a pinch of salt; I would be careful if! were the Ambassador"; similarly, Ikramullah advised Ghazanfar, "If I were you, I would be extremely careful in dealing with the Russians." Ghazanfar reported, "While fear of Russia is as yet a mere bogey, there are others [the Western powres] who have let us down so often."

The tussle between the two groups frustrated Liaquat's visit to the Soviet Union. At the Soviet Union's suggestion in date of the visit was first postponed from August 20 to November 7, 1949. Russia wanted the exchange of ambassadors before Liaquat's visit; Zaf- rullah did not consider this essential, but the Soviets were firm. By the time Pakistan finally appointed her first Ambassador to Moscow, the Soviets were starting to show coolness— they approved the Pakistani Ambassador's appointment, but they gave no indication regarding the appointment of their own envoy. By the middle of November Liaquat's visit to Mos- cow was becoming more and more unlikely. / In the meantime, President Truman and Liaquat agreed upon a May 1950 trip to the United States, and the Soviets' charge d'affaires in Tehran, in discussion with Ghazanfar, expressed regret that the Moscow visit would not come up earlier. Thus, iri April 1950, the visit was postponed indefinitely. Able and seasoned diplomats, the Soviets realized that a powerful group inside Pakistan was not interested in developing closer links with Moscow.

In this manner a great opportunity to cultivate better relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union was lost. Now the Soviet attitude toward Pakistan, never friendly, began to turn harsh, and it was not until the mid-1960s that the two nations exchanged visits by heads of state or government. When Ayub Khan journeyed to the U.S.S.R. for his first state visit in April 1965, Soviet Premier Kosygin's greeting was apt: "At last the head of the Pakistan government could land in Moscow!"

Kosygin's Regional Economic Grouping

The idea of such a regional grouping was not new when, in early 1969, Kosygin suggested in Kabul that a cooperative organization be established by Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iran, and the Soviet Union. The Afghan Foreign Minister put forth a similar proposal in 1966, and the United States endorsed the idea for the subcontinent in 1967 when it resumed economic aid to Pakistan and India.' 5 Pakistan itself was an exponent of regional cooperation, taking the initiative for collaboration and development among Iran, Turkey, and itself. But Kosygin's plan only appeared innocuous: it was intended to consolidate the Soviet position and to contain the Chinese in South Asia. Moreover, Pakistan had always maintained that meaningful economic cooperation was not possible when political relations among the potential partners were strained —as were its own with Afghanistan and India.

I 40 During his second Pakistani visit within thirteen months in May 1969, Kosygin met at length with Yahya Khan, who had assumed the presidency on March 25, and urged him to accept the regional grouping proposal.' 6 Kosygin shrewdly stressed only the economic aspects. He said that in the past the Pakistani government, aided by the capitalist countries, had engaged in "vain efforts" to eliminate the nation's widespread poverty—in this context he apparently sought to please Yahya by referring to the failure of Ayub's economic policy. Pakistan welcomed Kosygin's offer of Soviet development aid and trade, but the President was warned by his foreign policy experts, including me, "to be cautious of involvement in the Soviet Union's more far-reaching economic proposals with political overtones." Kosygin pushed ahead, pressuring Yahya to accept his proposal for a conference of Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union at the Deputy Foreign Minister level "to discuss the question of transit trade." He added that "Iran and Turkey could also be brought into this arrangement [the conference of deputy ministers]." Yahya, a simple man'and a novice in diplomatic dialogues with a major power, accented Kosygin's conference proposal in the belief that this acceptance did not represent a commitment to join the proposed grouping; the Soviet Pre- mier got the impression that Pakistan had endorsed his economic proposals.

In the meantime, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the military intelligence pointed out to Yahya the grave implications of a Soviet-built political grouping on China's south-west flank. Such publications as Dawn and the Pakistan Times also lambasted the idea of Pakistan's joining the Soviet-sponsored economic community, and Yahya finally realized his mistake.

When the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan began to remind him of his previous intention to send representatives to the deputy foreign ministers' conference, the President tried to avoid the issue. On July 10, 1969, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, calling the Soviet plan of "little economic advantage," said that Pakistan would not join art "alliance opposed to China."i7 Analyzing Pakistan's turn away from the Kosygin plan, the Indian newspaper Hin- dustan Times on May 23, 1969, mentioned Pakistan's concern that a system of cooperation which includes a "giant-like Soviet Union" might work to the disadvantage of the Asian countries. It was, however, the suspicion that Moscow was forming a political league against China that was the main factor in Pakistan's refusal. Kosygin himself had firmly planted this suspicion. "China is not interested in peace in this region," the Premier told Yahya during their talks on the proposed group, "while the Soviet Union wants peace and stability in the region." The Pakistanis found it as hard to agree with this assessment as they did to believe what Kosygin said to Yahya next. During their meeting in Peking in fall 1964, said Kosygin, Mao told him that "China should be given a free hand in Asian affairs while the Soviet Union should have a free hand in Europe." Kosygin claimed ttlat the Soviet Union could not agree and that this refusal caused "friction between the Soviet Union and China." Kosygin also levelled charges concerning "China's involvement in East Pakistan." Yahya replied, "there is no such evidence." In fact, Pakistan was more worried about direct Indian and indirect Soviet involvement in East Pakistan.

New Delhi and Kabul received Kosygin's proposals more favorably. This was evident from the joint communique issued after Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Afghanistan in June 1969 and from an Indo—Soviet agreement signed in March 1970. Ur der this agreement India agreed to finance a road from Kandahar in Afghanistan (linked) by road to the Soviet border) to the Iranian border, there to join an Iranian-built road to the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas. The Soviet Union would thus obtain an outlet, much needed since the closing of the Suez Canal, for its trade to South and Southeast Asia—the route would pass through Af- ghanistan and Iran but bypass Pakistan. In July 1970 the Soviet Union also completed

141 another sector of highway in Afghanistan, a highway that ultimately will lead from the Soviet Union to modern roads reaching down to Pakistan; the Soviets may hope to use this route, in preference to the sea route via Vladivostok, for the delivery of naval stores to their growing Indian Ocean fleet.

Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security System

One of the ironies of the feud with China is that it led the Soviet to the very "Dul- lesism"— the propagation of military pacts—that it had damned for more than fifteen years. The proposed Soviet collective security system in Asia wail' introduced to the world by First Secretary Brezhnev in his speech to the international meeting nr the Communist parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969.18 A few days before, lzvestia gave some details of the proposed security plan, which was described as a defensive measure to safeguard the independence of Asian countries against "imperialist aggression and neo-colonialism:18 That its real aim was to restrict Chinese influence becomes clear from an analysis of the Soviet envoys and leaders' diplomatic dialogues with the Pakistanis, the Indians, and others. In fact, as I told Yahya after carefully reading the minutes of his July 1969 talks with the Soviet Ambassador, the plan called for nothing but "the Russian version of SEATO."2°

Following a Moscow conference of Soviet envoys, the Ambassador to Pakistan called on Yahya as well as the Pakistan Foreign Secretary to try to sell the Brezhnev scheme. He described the proposed plan in lofty terms, stressing such features as "non-interference in internal affairs of signatory countriesM and "economic, cultural and scientific cooperation." The Ambassador pointed out to the Foreign Secretary "the inadequacy of economic collaboration" under SEATO and CENTO in contrast to the more worthwhile collabortion under the Soviet plan.

But upon being questioned about security aspects of the plan, the Soviet Ambas- sador had to reveal its main purpose, which had to do, not with economic cooperation, but with China. The specifics of the proposed security agreement also made this plain. For example, the signatories would not enter into any alliance, formal or informal, with a third country that might be hostile to any member countries, nor should they "make any commitment inconsistent with the proposed Asian Security Plan"; in addition, the'signatory countries "will consult each other in case of an aggression by a third party." The anti-China slant was also indicated by the fact that Brezhnev announced the plan only three months after the most serious armed conflict todate on Sino—Soviet borders; the chances of a full-scale Soviet attack on China could not be ruled out, and there was speculation, not entirely baseless, that the Soviets might strike at the Chinese nuclear installations. Moreover, if the proposed security plan could be used against a nation that Pakistan considered a friend, it apparently could not be used against Pakistan's true enemy. Yahya wanted to know what help, if any, the Brezhnev plan would offer "in case of an aggression committed by one member country against another—such as would be the case in a repetition of the 1965 Indo— Pakistani war. The answer was as evasive as it was rhetorical: "The Asian Security Plan will put an end to such regional conflicts which the Imperialist countries like U.S.A. and expansionist ones like China encouraged."

Pakistanis were practically unanimous in opposir.:i, the Brezhnev plan. The army made it clear to the policymakers that it would not allow them to respond favourably (although trie9 were not inclined to do so anyway), ana the press also scorned the plan.21 Yanya. sent one of the top members of his militaryjunta, Air Marshal Nur Khan, to assure Peking that Pakistan would never be a party to any direct or indirect anti-China move, economic, politi- 142 cal, or military. "Pakistan shall not succumb to Soviet pressure," Nur Khan told Premier Chou En-lai during extensive talks on July 13 and 14.

Reaction to the proposed Asian collective security system was not much encouraging elsewhere. On a September 1969 Moscow visit to discuss the plan, Indian Foreign Minis- ter Singh first commented rather favorably: "India welcomes the proposal ... the essence of the Soviet Plan is the development of cooperation among the Asian countries for the purpose of strengthening peace".22 But in view of India's traditional opposition to any form of military pact, Singh had to modify his position after he returned to New Delh. Enthusiasm for the plan in other Asian countries was no greater than that for Dulles's Manila Pact (SEATO) in the mid-1950s.

The Soviets continued to extol the proposed security system's virtues and advantages to Asian countries—just as they denounced any form of allinace to which "the imperialists belong" —but without much apparent effect. The Soviet press launched a major campaign in December 1969, when the third ministerial meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) took place in Malaysia. On December 15 Moscow Radio proposed that a new regional grouping be formed with the assistance and participation of the Soviet Union as a "state with territory both in turope and Asia." The Soviet claim that it was not merely a European power was first advanced, as we have seen in 1964 by Indian in the attempt to include the U.S.S.R. in the Second Afro— Asian Conference, and since the Tashkent Conference the Soviet Union had been working particularly hard to establish its Asian credentials. During his visit to Pyongyang in the summer of 1970 Brezhnev claimed that Soviet ideas on European security were gaining approval and support from European publics and governments; "in the opinion of the Soviet Government," he said, similar ideas would also prove "quite acceptable" for the Asian continent's But the Asian countries approached about the Soviet collective security system remained unimpressed.

President Yahya Khan scheduled a five-day vist to Moscow beginning June 22, 1969, and both the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan and the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow indicated that the Kremlin leaders would give top priority to the Asian security system in the dialogues. I was among those advisers in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Economic Affairs who prepared the President for the trip; having joined his Cabinet in Oc- tober 1969, I was in active consultation with Yahya in his final planning sessions before heading for Moscow. Since joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1967,1 had consistently warned both President Ayub Khan and President Yahya Khan of the Soviet designs in South Asia. I harbored no illusion about Soviet "friendship" for Pakistan.

During Yahya's lengthy talks with Kremlin leaders, Pakistan was assured of larger Soviet economic aid for the fourth flie-year plan (1970-1975). Soviet assistance was promised for several industrial projects, including a million-ton steel-melting plant in Karachi.

But when Yahya raised the question of continued arms shipments to Pakistan, the Kremlin leaders demurred. Kosygin told Yahya, "You cannot expect Soviet arms while you are unwilling to endorse our Asian Security System." He added that the system would be "the • best guarantee for her [Pakistan's] territorial integrity," pointing ominously to an "explosive . , situation in East Pakistan," "dangers of foreign involvement there," and "China's role." Yahya and his gm,Prnment disagreed. "China," said the President, "is sincerely interested in Paksi- tan's territorial integrity and sovereignty." Yahya, who by this time was acquainted with the technique of dealing with soviet blackmail and blandishment, ended the dialogue with a polite but firm rejection of the Brezhnev and Kosygin proposals.

143 The Russians also sought to establish a radio relay communication center near the site of the former American Badabar base. While innocuous in theory, the proposal was revealed upon closer scrutiny as another clever Soviet device to make Pakistan sacrifice much more than it could hope to gain. As Communications Minister of the Yahya Cabinet, I examined the Soviet proposal and warned Yahya on the eve of his visit to the U.S.S.R. In a note to the President, I referred to the proposal as nothing but a "Russian version of the Badabar base" and worse; while it was easy to give notice to a Western country such as the United States to close a base, I said, "once you are in the Russian parlour, you are there forever."

Pakistan's rejection of the various proposals put forth by the U.S.S.R. as the price" of military supplies doomed the era of better understanding and warmer relations between Moscow and Islamabad. In addition to their unwillingness to conform to Soviet plans and proposals, the Pakistanis annoyed the Soviet Union by providing links between Washington and Peking; their middleman's role was begun at the request of President Nixon during his twenty-two-hour visit to Pakistan in August 1969, and it culminated in the secret trip of Henry Kissinger to Peking via Rawalpindi in July 1971. The Soviet attitude toward Pakistan waxed harder and harder. On February 7, 1970, even before Yahya's June visit, New Times wrote a highly unfavorably article on Pakistan, thus reversing the attitude of the Soviet press, which had stopped its hostile comments on Paltistan after 1965.

Thus the Soviets were frowning at Pakistan when the Bangladesh crisis began. in 1971. The relationship between this soured attitude and the prompt Soviet support for the Bangladesh movement was more than casual. -

REFERENCES

I. V.!. Lenin, The Communist International (London: Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., 1983), p.24!. 2. See Hugh Seton-Watson, "Five Years of Cold War," in George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds, The Year Book of World Affairs (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., under the auspices of the London Institute of World Af- fairs, 1953). 3. New Times (Moscow), no. 22, 1950, pp. 30 f., cited in Peter Sager, Moscow's Hand in India (Berne: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966), p.30. 4. Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India," Foreign Affairs, July 1971, p.637. 5. Harish Kapur, "India and the Soviet Union," Survey, Winter 1971, p. 195. 6. Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 2d ed. (Moscow: 1952), Vol. 10, p. 203, cited in Central Asian Review, no. 2. 1957. 7. See or. Hudson, "Communism in Asia." India Quarterly, January-March 1949. 8. /bid., See also "Upsurge of the National Liberation Movement," Soviet Encyclopedia, 2d ed., cited in Central Asian Review no,!, 1957, pp. 55-56. 9. lzvestia (Moscow), July 5. 1947. 10. Pravda (Moscow), May 1.' and 16, 1947. II. "Borderlands of South Central Asia-India and Pakistan," Central Asian Review, no. 2, 1957, pp. 163-209 (hereaf- ter cited as "Borderlands," with number and years of issue). 12. G. F. Hudson, "Soviet Policy in Asia," Soviet Survey, July 1955, pp. 1-4. 13. Except where otherwise indicated, all the foregoing comments on the Soviet invitation and what followed are based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 14. J. C. Hurewitz. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, N.J. P. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), Vol. 11, pp. 229-230. IS. See Chapter 6. 16. Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based on my research and personal interivews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 17. Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), July II, 1969. 18. Pravda, June 8, 1969. 19. See V. V. Matveyev, "A Filled Vacuum," lzvestia, May29, 1969. 20. Exeept where otherwise indicated, the remainder of this section is based on my research and personal interviews in •akistan, 1969-1971. 21. See Pakistan Times and other Pakistani newspapers, June—July, 1969. 22. Pravda, Sept. 21, 1969. 23. /bid., Aug. 16, 1970. 14 4 READING 12

(Excerpts from 'India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers: A Politics of Divided Subconti- nent', by G. W. Choudhly, New York, The Free Press Macmillan Publishing Company 1975).

Reproduced with Permission.

talin's successors thoroughly reassessed Soviet policies in the East. G. M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, dcuidred in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on SAugust 8, 1953: The position of so large a state as India is oi great importance for strengthening peace in the East. India has made a considerable contribution to the efforts of peace- loving countries aimed at ending the war in Korea, and relations with India are growing stronger; cultural and economic ties are developing. We hope that relations betwgen India and the Soviet Union will continue to develop and grow, with friendly co-operation as the key-note.'

Two and one-half years later, in the spring of 1956, the shift in Soviet attitude toward the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa was highlighted at the Twentieth Con- gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. According to a lengthy article reprinted from Sovetskoye Vostokovedeniye (No. 1, 1956), which analyzed the congress, the study of Eastern affairs had previously been "gravely prejudiced by failure to understand the character and depth of the contradictions existing in the non-socialist countries of the East between the forces of imperialism and internal reaction on the one hand and the forces of national , progress on the other." The author argued that Soviet Oriental economists, stressing the activity of foreign capital, had not fully appreciated "independent capitalist development which has undermined the dominant position of imperialism." The author further contended that the new countries no longer needed to rely on "their former oppressors" for aid and modern equipment; the socialist countries could ni* supplythem "without any conditions or military direction." Thus, in a sharp break with earlier Soviet opinion, it was held that "the dominant position of foreign capital in the economy of some countries of the East is no longer such that imperialism irresistibly dominates their political life." •

The author went on to cite the Marxist—Leninist proposition that in colonial and dependent countries Where capitalism is comparatively developed, the proletariat may supply the leaders of a national liberation and antifeudal revolution; this occurred, he said, in China. . While embracing this "unquestionable, correct proposition," the author attacked "the incor- rect deduLtior that only the leadership of the proletariat can ensure victory in a struggle for national independence" [italics added]. India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, and other countries

145 won actual sovereignty with the formal end of colonialism; "independence" was not merely a ruse of the imperialists to preserve their old control in new forms. But because the independence movements were "under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, many Eastern experts were unable to appreciate objectively enough the great importance of this occurrence in the history of the East." The author showed that the Soviets no longer regarded this great development as a "final deal of the grande bourgeoisie with imperialism."?

Why did the successors of Stalin make such a voile-face in the assessment of so-called national movements of the bourgeoisie in countries such as India? There were a number of reasons. First, Stalin's rigid attitude had not served the Soviet global strategy of winning the support of a large number of Afro—Asian countries. On the contrary, the Western powers, particularly the United States during the Eisenhower—Dulles era, had made serious efforts to draw closer the new nations of the Middle East, South Asia, and South-east Asia through various forms of alliance and economic assistance. Moreover, China, which shaped its strategy and policy independently of Moscow even before severe Sino—Soviet conflict erupted, had begun to woo India through recognition of the Nehru-led "progressive elements" in Indian bourgeois society. As early as July 9,1950, during a period when the Soviet press was full of hostile comment for India's policies, thP People's Daily (Peking) discussed India without criticizing Nehru. On July 13 the newspaper described India as an important member of the "peace camp." Finally, on January 1,1951, people's Daily recognized "the In- dian national liberation as part of the great tide of liberalism sweeping over Asia." China, like the United States and the West, threatened to undercut the inflexible Soviets.

Second, as already indicated, the Kremlin leaders began to appreciate the genuine- ness of the independent foreign policies of countries such as India. Neither India's goal to have a "Third World of nonaligned countries" nor India's importance in the world could any longer be ignored or discounted.

Third, as noted in the SoveLskoye Vostokovedeniye article, by the mid-1950s iiie Soviet Union was in a position to give assistance, both economic and military, to the coun - tries of the Third World. The Soviets could now compete for the affections of the national bourgeoisie, and foreign aid began to enter into the political rivalry of the two superpowers.

Finally and perhaps most important, Pakistan, as we shall note, became a Western ally in the mid-1950s, and Moscow—quickest among the major powers to exacerbate Indo— Pakistani tensions for its own ends—immediately turned its attention to New Delhi. In complete reversal of its official attitude, the U.S.S.R. began to cultivate the friendship of Nehru's India.3

An Exchange of Visits

Nehru and India happily responded to the Soviet gestures, which they regarded as recognition of the success of India's foreign policy and the importance of the country in Asia. An Indian interpreter of the new Soviet policy, M. S. Rajan, pointed out that another reason for establishing closer relations with the Soviet Union and the communist bloc was dissatisfaction with the West, dissatisfaction that flowed from Western annoyance at India; since the Korean War, he noted, the Western powers, particularly the United States, had been sharply critical of Nehrirs policies.'

As his ever-growing involvement in Asian affairs increased India's differences with the West, Nehru began to emerge as the izreatest contemporary Asian leader, particularly 146 through his role at the conferences of the Colombo powers—Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. At the second conference of the Colombo power prime ministers, held in December 1954, Nehru argued that although the countries of Asia had secured political independence, they continued to be economically dependent—a theme that the Soviet Union stressed again and again. Nehru severely attacked the U.S.-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which, according to him, had add:d "tensions in Southeast Asia."5 At the 1955 Bandung Conference, despite the more pro—West stands of Pakistan, Turkey, Ceylon, and other countries, Nehru again condemned Western military pacts in the Third World.6 The Soviet press was full of praises for India's "contribution to peace" and "independent foreign policy," and Nehru was the hero.7

It was in this highly favorable climate that on June 7, 1955, the Indian leader began his first Soviet state visit as Prime Minister. During his two weeks' stay he was accorded what was described as an unprecedented welcome from the Russian crowds. And he pleased the crowds. In an address to an audience of 80,000 in the Dynamo Stadium in Moscow he stated:

Almost contemporaneously with your October Revolution under the leadership of the great Lenin, we in India started a new phase of our struggle for freedom.... Even though we pursued a different path in our struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi we admired Lenin and were influenced by his example there was at no time an unfriendly feeling among our people towards the people of the Soviet Union. . . . Wherever I have gone in the Soviet Union I have found a passion for peace ... in India we have been devoted to the cause of peace!'

Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin had introduced Nehru to the stadium audience as "One of the outstanding leaders of the struggle of the Indian people for national independence." He had added that "the Soviet people are following with great interest and sympathy the efforts which the great Indian people are making to establish in their country a society on socialist lines."9

In the joint communique issued upon the Indian's departure, Nehru and Bulganin reiterated their belief in the principles of co-existence (panch shed), acclaimed the results of the Bandung Conference, and described the construction of a steel plant in India with Rus- sian help as a notable example of economic cooperation between the two countries; such cooperation,' they noted, they intended to strengthen.1°

Particularly at a time when the United States had developed special links with Pakis- tan, Nehru was no doubt pleased with the friendship of the Soviet Union. But he also seemed to be cautious about the Soviet Union; he told his people after his return from Moscow about the "differences" between the Soviet and Indian sociopolitical systems. He did not become a "fellow traveler," as some elements of the U.S press contended 12 in comments that represented a narrow approach an did harm to relations between India and the United States. India continued to receive much more aid from the United States than from the U.S.S.R., and Nehru paid a visit to Britain for talks with Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden on his return journey from Russia. Nehru's policy leaned toward Moscow, but Nehru himself was keen to observe the spirit and meaning of nonalignment.

The Soviet leaders promptly paid return visits in response to Nehru's invitation. Bul- ganin and First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita S. Khrushchev made a number of friendly gestures and speeches during their November—December Indian visit. They sought public approval through enunciation of several well-worn themes, including devotion to the 147 principles of Gandhi and loyalty to panch shed, a concept that Was India's contribution to world peace. Even more important, they openly and unequivocally declared support of India's vital interests in relation to Pakistan. '3 This declaration of support served twin purposes: (I) it pleased the Indians to see their principal adversary condemned (even the creation of Pakistan on the basis of Muslim nationalism was challenged, and Kashmir was declared an integral part of India), and (2) it penalized Pakistan for its alliance with the Western countries.

The significance of the Soviet leaders' visit was considerable. It was an effective psychological weapon from the standpoint of the Soviet policy makers, who, as we have seen, were beginning to seek closer relations with the uncommitted world. If the Soviet objectives in India were to create a favorable image among policy makers and public and to spread Soviet influence in the "third bloc," the visit was clearly a success. It laid the foundation for a closer, if not special, relationship between India and the Soviet Union, and India moved farther from its initial Western orientation in attitudes. India was already critical of the United States for, among other things, its arms deal with Pakistan and its sponsorship of defense pacts. On Goa, Dulles's support of Portugal and the U.S.S.R.'s open support of India contributed to India's edging toward Moscow.

In their report to the Supreme Soviet immediately after their return, 13ulganin and Khrushchev spoke in highly optimistic terms for both home and international consumption:

•The visit has great significance primarily because the correctness of the basic Leninist principle of Soviet foreign policy—the principle of peacefull coexistence among states with different social and political systems—was confirmed again and again.... Asian countries which comprise over half the world's population are assuming growing independence in contemporary international life....The identity of views between the Soviet Union and India on important international problems in explained, not by reasons or considerations of the passing moment. It stems from the deep-rooted interests of the policies of the two states who desire peace and security."

But the Kremlin leaders were disappointed if they thought that India would completely break relations with the West, forsake the Western liberal system, and become a member of the "Socialist Commonwealth." The Indians enthusiastically applauded many of the Soviet leaders' speeches in India —such as those condemning SEATO and CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization), those endorsing the Indian case on Kashmir and Goa, 'and those promising more Soviet economic aid, particularly for the ensuing second five-year plan. On the other hand, the Indians, particularly Nehru, appeared embarrassed by the Soviet leaders' seemingly inflammatory speeches on several occasions. In a speech at Bombay, as well as in his speech in the Indian Parliament, Khrushchev used his platform for a propaganda drive against the Western countries.' Strained Relations with Pakistan

During the August 8, 1953, speech in which he praised India, Malenkov noted that the Soviet Union "attaches great importance to the successful development of relations with Pakistan."I6 Within the next few years, however, Soviet relations with Pakistan worsened considerably. Pakistan's adhesion to a number of bilateral and multilateral defense agreements sponsored by the Western powers infuriated the Kremlin, and not a single opportunity was missed by Soviet publicists to vilify Pakistan as "the stooge of the imperialist powers."

148 Four strongly worded protest notes were delivered at Rawalpindi between 1953 and I 955' 7 as Pakistan concluded military agreements with the West. The Soviet Union bristled at American bases, such as the communications center at Badabar near Peshawar and the nearby airfield from which U-2 spy aircraft—including that of the luckless Francis Gary PoW- ers — took off for missions over Soviet territory. At that time Khrushchev was reported to have encircled Peshawar with a red pencil as one of the targets of annihilation by rocket.' 8 In its replies to the Soviet protest notes, the Pakistani government, which considered the Soviet notes interference in internal matters, denied that American bases existed on Pakistan territory. A senior Pakistani diplomat told me that during this period his whole task was to receive Soviet protest notes and threats and give suitable but polite replies.

All this not only worsened Soviet—Pakistan relations but also strengthened Soviet ties with other nations and aggravated regional tensions. As India and some of the Arab states, particularly Nasser's Egypt, were equally opposed to the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, the Soviet protests to Pakistan improved Soviet relations with these countries; Nehru and the Kremlin leaders denounced Pakistan's participation in. military pacts in almost identical terms.' 9 Thus Indo—Pakistani tensions were exacerbated, as the Kremlin leaders grabbed a wonderful opportunity to serve their own interests at the cost of peace and harmony in the subcontinent.

The Soviet Union, however, did not abandon all hope of good relations with Pakis- tan. It sometimes employed the carrot as well as the stick—now it would threaten with rockets, now it would entice with the possibility of aid. The Soviet leaders must have recognized inherent contradictions in Pakistan's membership in Western-sponsored alliances; during the early 1960s they set to work exploiting the gap between the regional interests of the small power and the global interests of the American superpower.

The Third Phase of Soviet Policy In Pakistan, Soviet moves in the early 1960s were more striking: the Kremlin's links with India were already well established from the mid-1950s, and now—seeking to impede Pakistan's growing friendship with China and to weaken its pro-Western policy— the Soviets smiled at Pakistan. Thus began the third phase of Soviet policy toward the subcontinent, a phase of some gestures toward Pakistan, warm friendship with India, and neutrality in the two nations' quarrels. During this phase, lasting until the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, the Soviet Union took no step in the direction of Pakistan that might jeopardize its good relations with New Delhi, which it considered far more important than those with Rawalpindi. About Pakis- tan, still a member of SEATO and CENTO and a close fr,iend of China, the U.S.S R. always had doubts and misgivings. Despite their limitations, however, the U.S.S.R.'s nc,vv bonds with Pakistan offered some advantages and no liabilities; the Soviets acquired new leverage on India. As one commentator put it, "If New Delhi shows signs of wavering on issues affecting major [Soviet] interests, Moscow need only cast a nod in the direction of Rawalpindi to induce clear thinking."20

Soviet press comments indicated some, but not all, of the change in feelings toward Pakistan, On April 15, 1962, Pravda published Ayub's message of thanks for President Brezhnev's greetings on Pakistan's National Day, March 23; Ayub expressed his hope that "good relations will develop in the future in a spirit of durable peace and friendship between our two countries." On May 1, 1962, lzvestia and several other newspapers reported on the award oi toe Lenin prize to Pakistani pc.. : Faiz Ahmad r AIZ (now Prime Minister Bill itto's cultural adviser). The Soviet press also briefly reported the ending of the martial law in Pakistan in June 1962.

149 An even more significant indication of the new Soviet attitude toward Pakistan was the signing of an oil agreement in February 1961, an agreement that represented the first soviet economic and technical assistance to Pakistan.2 ' Ayub, his close advisers, and the Cabinet discussed for months the Soviet oil offer. Bhutto, who was then Minister for National Resources but participated regularly in foreign policy matters, was strongly in favor of accepting; Finance Minister Mohammed Shoaib, who was noted for his pro-Western views (he is now vice president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Washington), vigorously opposed acceptance. Finally, Ayub decided to go ahead. Uncertain- ties and misgivings on the part of both nations, however, delayed finalization of the agreement from August 1960 until March 1961.22

The agreement was signed soon after the stern Soviet warnings to Pakistan on the U-2 incident. The Soviet notes of May 14 and June 22, 1960, accused the Pakistani government of "complicity" in the flight of the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet territory. The first note mentioned ominously that the Soviets had means to destroy military bases used for aggressive acts against them; the second note threatened that in the event of further "pro- vocative flights" the Soviet government would be compelled to undertake appropriate measures, not excluding strikes at the bases used to conduct such flights.'

When asked by journalists if he was worried over the Soviet notes, Ayub was cocky: "Do 1 look shaky?" he asked sarcastically.' But Ayub was shaken, and the U-2 era had great impact on his subsequent moves to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Ayub had already begun a thorough reassessment of foreign policy. The U-2 incident demonstrated Pakistan's dangerous exposure as a result of total commitment to the West, and Ayub now questioned whether that commitment was worth the risk. The U.S.S.R. had helped to initiate the questioning. Just as it had tried in the past to exploit dissatisfaction with the West—Pakis- tani dissatisfaction in the late 1940s and Indian dissatisfaction in the mid-1950s — the Soviet Union capitalized in the early 1960s upon Pakistan's frustration, which stemmed from its American allay's new, increased defences toward neutral India during the Kennedy era. "We support India and Afghanistan against you because they are our friends, even when they are in the wrong," Mihail Kapitsa, the Soviet Ambassador in Rawalpindi, told the Pakistanis. "But your friends do not support you, even when they know you are in the right."' It was a shrewd comment, part of a clever strategy, and it scored heavily. Among other factors leading to the Pakistani foreign policy reassessment were India's rebuff of Ayub's proposal for joint de- fense26 and, most importantly, the emergence of China as a major power.

, On their part, the Soviets had waxed conciliatory by December 1962 for several reasons, among them those discussed by Pakistan's Moscow Ambassador in the following note home:

Recently an expectation has grown in the Soviet Union that Pakistan may follow a more neutralist policy in her foreign relations. This is partly due to the recent debate in the Pakistan National Assembly [over the U.S. decision to give arms to India after the Sino— Indian border war of 1962] and the trends in some sections of the [Pakis - tani] press.

The Ambassador pointed out also that the Soviets would welcome withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO and a declaration of non-aggression toward the Soviet Union along the lines of that acIrl Led by Iran (that no national territories might be used for aggressive purposes against the U.S.S.R. or any other power).27

A dialogue was conducted throughout 1963 and 1964 between the Pakistanis-

150 including President Ayub and Bhutto, the new Foreign Minister —and Soviet officials— among them Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Lapin, who made a goodwill visit in November 1964, and the Soviet Ambassador.28 An analysis of the minutes of the important discussions reveals that it was not correct to say, as such American interpreters as Professor Werner Levi had predicted,29 that.the initiative for improvement in the relationship would come mainly from Pakistan (because of its dissatisfaction with American policy and action). In fact, the Soviets' moves and overtures in 1963-1964 showed that like Pakistan they wanted to improve the relationship; as we have seen, improved relations with Pakistan were an integral part of the third phase of Soviet strategy toward the subcontinent.

When Bhutto and India's Swaran Singh, Minister for Railways, met in 1962-1963 for talks on the Kashmir dispute, the Soviet Union was not as disinterested as India would have wished. In the past, the Soviets had shied away from the issue; Pakistan's Ambassadors in Moscow and the United Nations had almost always been rebuffed when they had sought to discuss Kashmir. But the Soviet Union could not continue to witness passively developments in Kashmir, particularly after March 2, 1963, when China signed a boundary agreement with Pakistan that gave it direct access to the strategically important areas in Kashmir.38 During President Radhakrishnan's 1964 visit the Kremlin leaders reportedly advised India to adopt a "flexible attitude" on Kashmir and stressed the "risks" of continued tension, risks arising from "China's entry into the area."3I

But serious problems persisted in the Soviet—Pakistani relationship. In January 1964 the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan told Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad that the Soviet Union did not favor referring the Kashmir matter to the Security Council, which indicated that the Soviet hands-off policy on the Kashmir dispute remained basically intact. The Ambassador pointed out that the Soviet Union could not be expected to worsen its relations with other countries, e.g., Afghanistan or India, in its quest for better relations with Pakistan..32.

In dealings with Pakistan, the Soviet Union was interested mainly in what it termed "non-political matters": "The Soviet Union will discuss subjects like trade and economic collaboration, expansion of cultural and scientific exchanges," the Soviet Ambassador told Bhutto on April 4, 1964. "Political and international problems that concern the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan will be taken up later on." Pakistan felt it imperative to discuss first vital issues, which included (in addition to Kashmir) Soviet arms supplies to India and links with Af- ghanistan. Under an agreement concluded in September 1964, the U.S.S.R. agreed to extend to India $400 million of additional military aid, consisting of three squadrons of MIG 21 supersonic fighters, missiles, and other weapons;33 On October 16, 1963, the Soviets reaffirmed in a joint communique with Afghanistan their support of Kabul's demand for Pakhtoonistan, a claim involving a substantial part of Pakistan's territory.34 Pakistan had no alternative but to accept the Soviet procedure of stressing the nonpolitical in bilateral discussions, but the dialogue bogged down in mutual distrust. On June 5, 1964, the Soviet Ambas- sador complained to Bhutto that about twenty proposals were pending to which the Pakis- tani government had not satisfactorily responded. Without a favorable political climate, the Foreign Minister replied, repeating his government's position, the process of normalization was likely to be delayed.35

A complicating factor that arose rather unexpectedly was the Indian move to invite the Soviet Union to the Second Afro—Asian Conference, sciieduled for 1965 in Algeria. At a meeting ol the preparatory committee, held at D. .,arta in April 1964, the Indian delegate was apparently trying, very shrewdly, to create a spit between Pakistan and the U.S.S.R. by proposing that the latter he invited to the conference. Pakistan was caught in a dilemma

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ce) 4 because China was totally opposed—"as a matter of principle," said its delegation—to Rus- sian participation.36 Bhutto hedged on the issue, saying that because "the matter was of con- .siderable importance," he had to consult with his government. Ambassador Kapitsa called on the Foreign Minister on April 30, expressed disappointment that Pakistan was not supporting the Indian proposal, and read aloud a lengthy statement refuting the argument advanced by the Chinese Foreign Minister that the Soviet Union was not an Asian country. Bhutto replied that the Soviet Union should have started preparing ground several years before ilk was going to seek, on the grounds that it was an Asian country, to join the conference, which had been under discussion for three or fouryears. He added, 'To an average person the U.S.S.R. is a European power and the present claim of the U.S.S.R. was a new concept."37 Subsequently, the Soviet Union decided not to press the matter.

Indicative of the atmosphere in this period was President Ayub's response to an Apr.il 6, 1963, suggestion by the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow that he visit the U.S.S.R. to expedite the process of normalization. Nothing Bhutto's prompt approval of the suggestion, Ayub, who always acted cautiously and with statesmanship, vetoed the idea: "I believe that he [Bhutto] is overoptimistic and-dragging me into a futile venture. If the Soviets wish to improve relations with us, they could have done it in many ways. At present they wish to play with us."38

Yet the game continued throughout 1963-1964 and resulted in a series of agreements between the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan: the aviation agreement (October 7, 1963), the bat ter trade agreement (April 30, 1963), and the cultural agreement (June II, 1964). These agreements opened new avenues of cooperation and, more important, of understanding that finally led to discussion on political and international issues.

The Political Dialogue

As the political dialogue started, the Soviet Union wanted to discuss Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO; U.S. bases in Pakistan, including the communications center at Badabar near. Peshawar; and the possibility of issuing a Pakistani "Iranian type" declaration, which would prevent the establishment of Pakistani territory of rocket or nuclear bases poised against the Soviet Union. Pakistan wanted to talk about the U.S.S.R. 's continued support, which included votes in the UN Security Council, for India on the Kashmir issue; the Soviet's Pakhtoonistan stand, in favor of Afghan irredentist claims on Pakistani territories; and the Soviets' massive Indian arms supply program, particularly heavy since 1963, that had upset the balance of power in the subcontinent.39

Both sides realized that these important political issues should be discussed at a higher level than the ambassadorial level that had been used since 1962; indeed, both sides believed that one of the main reasons why the Soviet—Pakistani relationship remained strained was the lack of contact between the leaderships. Even Ayub, who until 1963 did not favor any summit-level discussion with the Soviets, now seemed to have changed his mind. Since the abortive invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan in 1949, no Pakistani head of state or government had gone to the U.S.S.R. nor had any topranking Soviet leaders visited Pakistan— despite their regular trips to Afghanistan and India. In November 1963 Pakistan informally invited Premier Khrushchev to visit in conjunction with his expected trip to Nepal and Ceylon. Although he could not accept the invitation bee:. -.e of the cancellation of his visit to Nepal and Ceylon, Khrushchev's reply to Pakistan in December 1963 sounded friendly and encouraging. In expressing thanks for the invitation, he referred to the Soviet principle of coexistence amor. g countries of different social systems and claimed that the Soviet Union 0

152 . 0 would always seek friendly relations with all its neighbors, including Pakistan; he added that good relations could be promoted by personal visits and by the development of economic, cultural and commercial ties. The reply indicated the changed atmoshphere.

In the next important development, Khrushchev invited President Ayub to visit the U.S.S.R. The invitation, which came through the Soviet Ambassador on June 22, 1964, was promptly accepted. Before the summit meeting, political dialogues were to be held at the ministerial level. With the changes in the Soviet government after the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, the Soviet Ambassador promptly called on Ayub and explained the new government's desire to promote better relations with Pakistan, assuring the President that the invitation extended to him by Khrushchev was still valid and that the Soviet government attached great importance to his visit.

In the meantime, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey G. Lapin went to Pakistan on November 21, 1964. During the visit, Bhutto gave a full account of Pakistan's "independent" foreign policy so as to dispel the notion that Pakistan was still "aligned." He told Lapin how Pakistan, although a member of SEATO, was riot in agreement with U.S. policy in Vietnam, he pointed out that while Pakistan opposed the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the In- dian Ocean, "India had gone along with the U.S." Bhutto also tried to justify his opposition to the Indian call for Soviet participation at the proposed Second Afro—Asian Conference. Lapin did not comment on Bhutto's claim that Pakistan should no longer be considered an aligned country, and he could not agree that India "is now tied to the U.S." Lapin noted, however, that "in all sincerity, the Soviet Union wants to cultivate better relations with Pakistan." The new leaders in the Soviet Union, he added, had "reinforced their foreign policy on principles laid down by Lenin of peaceful co-existence between different states. There is no real problem," he concluded, "that stands in the way of improvement in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Pakistan."

Lapin had also a cordial meeting with Ayub. "The Soviet Union is looking forward to receiving their dear guest," he said, referring to the President. In reply, Ayub told the Soviet Minister that the people of Pakistan trace their origin to Central Asia and that it was his desire to reestablish the traditional links. Lapin then brought up the "U.S. 's intention to use Article 19 of UN Charter to suspend the Soviet Union's right to vote." According to Lapin, the UN financial debts in question, which the U.S.S.R. refused to help cover, stemmed from "Western aggression" in the Congo and the Near East. Lapin told Aytib that the Soviet Union might be compelled to leave the UN if the United States did not change its position, and Ayub expressed his concern.

Ayub then began the discussion on Soviet—Pakistani affairs by stating that Pakistan wanted "the best of relations with the Soviet Union." He complained about the continued Soviet support for India on Kashmir and with military supplies, and he said that Pakistan had exercised a moderating influence in SEATO and CENTO on such issues as Vietnam. The Chinese, Ayub added, now appreciated Pakistan's role in these defense organizations. As with Bhutto, Lapin was noncommital on most of the issues raised. Again Lapin simply ex- . pressed the sincere Soviet wish to improve relations with Pakistan." Candid in discussing with Bhutto and Ayub the general international situation, the • Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister was reticent on issues that were of vital interest to Pakistan. It seems that Lapin's visit was one of mere goodwill and exploration; the crucial discussions were left for Ayub's visit to the U.S.S.R.

Less than two months later, on January 12; 1965, Bhutto journeyed to Moscow for

153 more talks. Bhutto was now at his zenith as Ayub's Foreign Minister; he had already made visits to Peking and had led the Pakistan delegation at the UN. Advocating a policy of "confrontation with India," he was in favor of closer links with Peking and claimed to be a great champion of Afro—Asian solidarity. At this point Ayub had full confidence in his Foreign Minister, and in consultation with Bhutto he was formulating Pakistan's new "policy of .bilateralism"— the essence of which was to maintain simultaneously good relations with the U.S.S.R., the United States, and China.

Bhutto met with his Soviet counterpart, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, and subsequently with Premier Kosygin and President Anastas I. Mikoyan. This was the first time of Pakistani Foreign Minister engaged in a political dialogue with the Kremlin leaders, and although .they were a prelude to Ayub's, Bhutto's talks in Moscow were significant in.themselves. The Soviet leaders were more willing to commit themselves than Lapin had been in Rawalpindi, and they gave some significant hints and indications of their current thinking on the affairs of the subcontinent. Shrewdly beginning his discussion with Gromyko with a reference to the American threat to use Article 19 of the UN Charter against the U.S.S.R., Bhutto moved on to an analysis of the recent trends in Pakistan's foreign policy. He argued, as he had with Lapin, that although Pakistan still belonged to SEATO and CENTO, it was in practice nonaligned. Bhutto pointed out that Pakistan had refused to make any contribution, substantial or token, to America's Vietnam efforts; he claimed that on the contrary Pakistan was playing a moderating role inside SEATO in preventing escalation of the war. Pakistan, Bhutto disclosed, played the same role at the Commonwealth prime ministers' conference in 1964, when it had advocated reconvening the Fourteen Powers Conference that originally sought to bring about a settlement in Southeast Asia. Gromyko apparently expressed appreciation for Bhutto's exposition of Pakistan's stand on such international issues as the Vie- tnam War, nuclear free zones, and the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean. Bhutto claimed that on all these issues the Soviet and Pakistani views were identical. (In this light, it is ironic that theSeventh Fleet's presence in the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war raised great hopes in Pakistan).

Bhutto then gave Gromyko an account of Pakistan's growing links with China —a factor that, as pointed out earlier, was largely responsible for the Soviet interest in Pakistan in the 1960s. "We have had political, economic and commercial relations with China for a long time," Bhutto noted; "in recent years these have grown considerably." He gave an account of the Pakistan —China boundary pact, which had aroused great interest in Moscow, and he vehemently denied an allegation voiced in Moscow and Washington as well as New Delhi that "Pakistan—China relations are based on common hostility towards India," that "there is some collusion, some secret understanding between Pakistan and China against India." Having listened carefully and without comment to Bhutto's analysis of the China—Pakistan relationship, Gromyko said simply, "The Soviet government welcomes the improvement of our relationship with all our neighbors including the People's Republic of China." The Kremlin leaders were not now openly expressing displeasure over Pakistan's friendship with China; that was to come later.

The next day, meeting with Kosygin, Bhutto again depicted Pakistan's foreign policy as more "independent" than that of India. When the question of Pakistan's adherence to military pacts arose, Bhutto asked why this should hinder improvements in relations in the light of the Soviet Union's comparatively harmonious dealings with Iran and Turkey. Kosy- gin, like Gromyko, expressed "satisfaction" with Pakistan's recent trends in external relations. But he also said, rather bluntly, that he did not share Bhutto's opinions on the relative independence of Pakistan's and India's foreign policies. What is more, in assuring Bhutto

154 that the Soviet Union "understands the complexity and delicacy of relations between India and Pakistan," Kosygin embraced a view that was advocated by India and opposed by Pakis- tan: "It is a question which according to the Soviet Union should be resolved between the two countries." The most significant remark made by Kosygin to Bhutto on the eve of Ayub's visit summed up—and repeated—the Soviet altitude: "I want to tell you, in all sincerity, that we do not want our friendship with Pakistan at the cost of our friendship with other countries." Pakistan could not take exception to this avowed policy because its bilateralism was based on the same principles of not favoring one nation over another. The rationale of such an approach: by both sides was understandable, but that approach made the prospect of any big change in relations between the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan remote; it was clear that the response to Pakistan from the Kremlin would be less encouraging than that from Peking.

Despite this, the long-expected Ayub Khan state visit to. the U.S.S.R. took place in April 1965.4° Ayub was received at the Moscow airport by Kosygin and other top Soviet leaders, and he was given a correct diplomatic reception. But compared to the President's reception in Peking less than a month before, the Soviet performance was rather cool. Banners across the deserted streets through which Ayub rode read "Welcome President Ayub Khan," "May Friendship and Cooperation Develop between Peoples of the Soviet Union and Pakis- tan," and so forth. Observers held that this kind of purely formal welcome—with far more protocol than warmth—for a visiting head of state had not been seen in Moscow for several years.4' The talk began at Kosygin's office on a bitterly cold and gloomy afternoon...the atmosphere inside the room was no less cold in spite of central heating," wrote Ayub, in his autobiography, on the Moscow discussions that began April 3, 1965. "The Soviet delegation looked stolid and sullen.' 42

Thanks to Ayub's honest, patient, and straightforward efforts the atmosphere relaxed, but Bhutto represented a great liability for Ayub and a hurdle to ariy meaningful talks. Bhutto's irrational harping on India's "warlike" actions and policies toward Pakistan irritated the Soviet leaders—particularly Brezhnev, who appeared to be most rigid. Ayub later told me that on several occasions he had to stop Bhutto's speaking to him in Urdu so as to avoid embarrassment. Fortunately, the most meaningful talks were held, not at the conference table, but by Ayub on his own, in informal exchanges with the Soviet chiefs—particularly with Kosygin, who was friendly on such occasions as when with the President in an automobile or at a ballet.

There were several formal meetings between the Soviet leaders and Ayub and his team between April 3 and April 8. After a general review of the international situation— in which the leaders of the two countries agreed on a number of important issues—the two sides considered their bilateral relations, touching particularly upon such matters as the Soviet stand on Kashmir, Soviet supplies to India, Pakistan's membership in Western pacts, American bases in Pakistan, and Pakistan's request for Soviet arms.

Ayub tried to convince the Soviet leaders of the threat to Pakistan's security and territorial integrity as a result of India's huge military buildup—to which the U.S.S.R. was the biggest contributor. The Soviets replied that they had sold some "small quantity of arms" only since 1964, only after "the Chinese had inflicted a humiliating defeat on India," only after rightist elements in India had started a campaign to make India ally with the United States and Britain and join the West's military pacts. According to the Soviet leaders, "if the Soviet Union had refused to supply arms to India, it would have crippled liberal elements in India who wanted India to remain non-aligned." Defending the military aid to India, Kosygin pointed out that "the Soviet Union provides arms to those countries who were fighting cob-

'55 nialism and imperialism.. India is in this struggle." Ayub was skeptical. "Which imperialism is India suffering from?" he asked. Brezhnev went further and dismissed Pakistan's fears of India's military buildup. "India is a neutralist country," he said, "and non-aligned countries do not participate in war." Ayub replied, "Pakistan is one-fifth of India in terms of resources, military strength, etc., and if India were to fear Pakistan, it would be like the Soviet Union fearing Poland." Imperialism's legacy, not U.S.S.R. arms to India, seemed to be what the Soviet leaders thought was the cause of Indo— Pakistani tension. (One might ask how the Soviet policy led any more surely to lessening of that tension than the so-called imperialist policy).

Countering Pakistan's objections to Indian arms supplies, the Soviet leaders questioned Pakistani membership in CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan was forced to join the pacts "owing to constant Indian threat," Ayub said, adding that Pakistan had begun a process of disengagement from them. Besides, Ayub claimed, Pakistan's membership in SEATO had prevented American reliance upon the treaty organization in the Vietnam War. As for CENTO, according to Ayub, "there is no life in it." Ayub claimed that by initiating the Regional Corporation for Development (RCD) with Iran and Turkey, Pakistan had virtually put CENTO "in cold storage."

At one stage Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union would not insist upon Pakistani withdrawal from the defense pacts as a condition for the improvement of relations, but Pakistan should consider three steps: (1) prohibition of foreign military bases on its territory, (2) prohibition of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and (3) limitation or termination of military cooperation with military blocs. Initially the Pakistani leaders got the impression that if they were willing to accede to these demands, the Soviet Union might reconsider its stand on kashmir, on military assistance to India, or on military supplies for Pakistan. But subsequently it became clear that the Soviet Union was not willing to make any important departures from its policy regardless of Pakistani actions.

The Soviets did not accept fully, or publicly, Pakistan's analysis of the situation in the subcontinent as a result of Ayub's April 1965 visit. They did not substantively change policy. Ayub effectively presented his country's case, however, and the Soviet leaders certainly gained understanding of Pakistan's difficulties; developments would show that they seemed to have realized that Pakistan's concern over the Indian arms buildup was not altogether unjustified. The soviet leaders also came to realize that Pakistan truly wanted to follow an independent foreign policy and to reduce its commitments to the Western allies. Thus Soviet—Pakistani relations were no longer bogged down in suspicion and distrust, and Ayub's visit can be labeled an event of momentous importance in the changing pattern of the politics of South Asia. Pakistan, an ally of the United States and later a close friend of China, had begun a new era of understanding, if not friendship, with the U.S.S.R.

REFERENCES

I. Pravda, Aug. 9, 1953. 2. "Political and Cultural Affairs: Revaluation of Bourgeois Nationalism," Central Asian Review, no. 4, 1956, pp. 343-345. 3. See Arthur Stein, "India's Relations with the USSR: 1953 —1963," Orbis, Summer 1964, pp. 357-373. 4. M. S. Rajan, India in World Affairs: 1954-56 (New York: Asia Publishing House, under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs, 1964), P. 301. 5. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 6. Ivison Macadam. ed., Annual Register of World Events, 1955 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd.), pp. 107-108. 7. See Molotov's speech before the Supreme soviet on Feb. 8, 1955, in Pravda, Feb. 9, 1955.

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8. Nehru's Speeches-Vol. III: 1953-1957, op. cit., pp. 301-306. 9. Pravda, June 22, 1955. 10. Ibid. I I. See Nehru's speeches-Vol. 111: 1953-1957, op. cit., pp. 313-319. 12. "India: Mr. Nehru's Travels-Round Table, September 1955, pp. 382-383. 13. Pravda, Nov. 20-22 1955; see also Khrushchev's speech at Srinagar, Kashmir, in Pravda, Dec. II, 1955. 14. Pravda, Dec. 30, 1955. 15. Eastern Economist and The Statesman, Dec 16, 1955. 16. Pravda, Aug. 9, I 953. I 7. Mid., Apr. 7 and Dec. 3, 1953. IS. Ibid., May 14 and June 22, 1960. 19. For Egypt's opposition to military pacts, see the text of the Indo-Egyptian treaty of friendship and Nasser's speech on the occasion of the treaty signing. Apr. 6, 1955, in Hindu, Apr. 7, 1955. Also see "Baghdad Pact "Round Table, June 1957, pp. 215-224. As regards Nehru's opposition to military pacts, see Ne/wa 's Speeches-val. 111: 1953-1957, op. cit., pp. 319-321, 344-346. . 20. Harrison, op. cit. . The Time; (London), Feb. 14, 1961. 92. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 19677-1971. 23. "Borderlands-The U-2 Incident," no. 3, 1960, p. 334. 24. Morning News (Dacca), June 29, 1960. 25. Oa ily Tele.5,7raph (London), July II, 1960. 26. See Chapters Sand 9. 27. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 28. Ibid. 29 Werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," POCUIC Mails, Fall 1962, p. 216. 30. See Chapter 8. 31. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 32. ibid. Also, see Kavic, op. cit. 33. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 34. Pravda, Oct. 17, 1963. 33. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 36. The Indian proposal on the Soviet Union, which had not participated in the First Afro-Asian Conference at Ban- dung in 1955, had the support of two delegations; five or six delegations, including China's, insisted that the Soviet Union was a European power and, as such, not eligible for participation. The preparatory committee made no decision for lack of consensus. 37. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 33. Ibid. 39. Except where otherwise indicated, all the information in this section is based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 40. 1 was a member of the President's entourage for the visit, and after his retirement in early 1969 Ayub gave me a comprehensive account of negotiations. 41. Times of India, April 4, 1965. 42. Moha min ad .Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 169.

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. READING 13

(Excerpts from 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy a Historical Analysis', by S. M. Burke, Karachi, (Dx fOni University Press, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission.

he Soviet Union at first had taken no substantive stand on Kashmir during the Security Council debates. On 17 January 1952 the USSR representative, Jacob Malik, took the T floor, and suddenly launched a bitter attack on the UK and the US for their alleged imperialist designs in Kashmir. He said the two Western powers wished to introduce Anglo— American troops into Kashmir under the guise of a United Nations force and to turn that territory into a military base. The Kashmir question, he asserted, 'can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without outside interference. This can be achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people.'

Malik's strong participation in the Kashmir debate under the roof of the Security Council was something new, but the content of his remarks was not surprising, lie was merely voicing inside the Council what Soviet spokesmen had all along been saying elsewhere. It was the Soviet belief that Britain had divided the Indian peoples into two in order to keep them weak so that she could perpetuate her own domination in the subcontinent. Though both Indian and Pakistani leaders were criticized for playing into British hands, 'in Pakistan the reactionary elements are stronger than in Hindustan...Pakistan is being converted into a British bridgehead in the East, into a second Trans-Jordan of enormous dimension'.2 About Kashmir, 'the Anglo—American strategists felt that, if they were to retain Kashmir as a strategic military base, they must get it included in Pakistan.13

The Soviet Union could hardly fail to notice that Pakistan's foreign policy was dis- tinctly biased in favour of the Western powers. In 1950 Liaquat had given precedence to the invitation to visit America over an earlier invitation to visit the USSR, and afterwards Pakis- tan had given diplomatic support to the Western position in the Korean question as well as in the matter of signing the Japanese Peace Treaty.4

Direct Negotiations

Three weeks after Graham had proposed that India and Pakistan should have recourse to direct negotiations over Kashmir, internal develo: inents in Pakistan facilitated just such a (-nurse. Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Nazimucldin and appointed Muhammad Ah Bogra as Prime Minister. The n, v Prime Minister had been a successful Ambassador to Burma, Canada, and the US anu had a certain amount of boyish charm and optimim. He was conscious of Pakistan's lack of weapons and economic weakness and believed that she could best be strengthened by allying herself with the US. At the

I 59 same time he was aware that it was essential for Pakistan to establish good neighbourly relations with India, and he was genuinely anxious to work towards that goal. He saw no con- tradiction between his two objectives because it was his conviction that a healthy relationship between India and Pakistan could only built up if the existing wide margin between India's strength and Pakistan's weakness could be reduced.'

Ten days after he had taken office, Bogra said he looked upon Nehru as 'an elder brother and would like to meet him 'soonest'. The two Prime Ministers first met informally in London in June 1953 on the occasion of Queen Elizabeth ll's coronation where they were fellow guests.

Bogra and Nehru met for serious negotiations at Karachi on 25 July. Nehru was spontaneously cheered by the people on arrival and thought his reception was 'very remarkable' and 'not a put-up job'. A joint press note issued on 28 July said the two leaders had talked together cordially but that the discussions had necessarily been of a preliminary nature and would be resumed in Delhi.

Before Bogra and Nehru could meet in Delhi the political cauldron inside Kashmir, which had been bubbling for sometime, boiled over.' Abdullah, who had-been denying the fi- nality of Kashmir's accession to India, was dismissed from the premiership bn 9 August and clapped in jail, being replaced by Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad, who had been affirming Kashmir's affiliation with India. Dawn strongly advised Bogra not to undertake the expected journey to Delhi but to pursue the Kashmir question in the United Nations. If Nehru could not tolerate even his 'dear friend' Abdullah 'expressing views which he [Nehru] does not like, how can he be expected to tolerate the ordinary man in Kashmir going to the polls and voting against accession to Bharat in a plebiscite?''

At Bogra's insistence Nehru agreed to receive him at short notice and he arrived in the Indian capital on 16 August. A joint statement of the two Prime Ministers reiterated that the Kashmir dispute should be settled according to the wish of the Kashmiri people 'with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State'. The most feasible method of ascertaining the people's choice was an impartial plebiscite and this method had been agreed to some years previously but progress could not be made because of lack of agreement on certain 'preliminary issues'. the Prime Ministers agreed that these issues should be resolved by them 'directly'. The next step would bethe appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator. It was decided that he should be appointed by the end of April 1954. On the Plebiscite Administrator's appointment and induction into office by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, he would examine the situation and report on it.8

A number of commentators have suggested that this communique showed that India and Pakistan were well on the way towards a settlement of the Kashmir question and that Pakistan foolishly upset the whole arrangement by accepting US military aid and anger- ing India. This view overlooks certain important implications contained in the communique. First, though it agreed that the Kashmir dispute should be settled in accordance with the wish of the people of Kashmir, the basic objectives were stated to be to promote the 'well-being' of the people and to cause 'the least disturbance to [their] life'. A favourite Indian interpretation of these goals was that India being a progressive secular country, and Pakistan a bigoted backward one, the well-being of Kashmir's lay in joining India; also that, if the vote went in favour of Pakistan, the life of the Hindus and Sikhs in the state would be disturbed, setting off a fresh wave of communal frenzy in the subcontinent, and this had to be avoided. Secondly, the joint declaration totally omitted any mention of the United Nations resolutions on

160 Kashmir. The two Prime Ministers were now required to resolve differences directly but it was hot spelled out what would happen if the customary deadlock between them took place. The role of the United Nations, on which weaker Pakistan had relied so much, was totally eliminated. Thirdly, the Plebiscite Administrator, who was previously a nominee of the Sec- retary-General of the United Nations, was now to be solely a creation of the Government of the state. Fourthly, the important question of conditions under which a plebiscite was to be. conducted was not even touched on in the statement. It soon became clear from the Bogra —Nehru correspondence that followed9 that India remained adamant, first, that the pro-Indian regime in the state should remain in power while the plebiscite was being conducted and, second, that no neutral troops should replace Indian troops to ensure freedom of the vote (Nehru's letter of 3 September 1953). Nehru also said publicly that Nimitz should be replaced as Plebiscite Administrator by a person from a small neutral country. Nimitz there - upon resigned, and this turned out to be the only concrete result of the Bogra—Nehru effort.

Nehru blamed the receipt of US arms by Pakistan for the breakdown of the In- dia —Pakistani negotiations over Kashmir but Prem Nath Bazaz, an astute observer of the Kashmir scene, says that, in fact, 'by this time the Hindu revivalists and reactionaries had been able to exert sufficient baneful influence on the policies of the Central Government', as exemplified by Abdullah's dismissal and imprisonment, and 'blame for the basic change in policy was irrelevantly laid at the door of Pakistan for entering military pacts with Western powers'i°

It should not be difficult at this juncture to perceive there double standard employed by Nehru towards the Kashmir dispute on the one hand, and towards other international conflicts in which India had no direct interest, on the other. In the case of Kashmir he inces- santly pressed the allegation that Pakistan was an aggressor, and consistently refused to allow a UN force in Kashmir or to submit the issue for mediation or arbitration, completely disregarding the following facts:

(a) that he had condemned those who wished to brand China an aggressor in Korea on the ground that this would only increase the tension and reduce the chance of a peaceful settlement;"

(b) that he had claimed that Indian representation on the proposed Political Con- ference on Korea would have helped because the intervention of neutral countries helps in toning down differences and tensions;1 2

(d) that not only does the UN Charter recommend arbitration as a method of solving disputes but it is also one of the 'Directive Principles' of India's own Con- stitution that 'the State shall endeavour to encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration' (Article 5Id).

Internal Developments in Kashmir

A politician's utterances over the years seldom form an even pattern, and Abdul- lah's statements are no exception to this rule. On the whole, however, it would appear that he would have preferred the Valley to become independent even if the remaining parts of the state broke away and joined India or Pakistan. Because of his personal friendship with

161 Nehru, close association with the Congress Party, and known antipathy to Jinnah, he had no option, in the emergencycreated by the tribal invasion, but to declare for India. And once the Indian Army had marched into Kashmir it was not easy to get rid of it. Abdullah's hope now lay in securing autonomy for Kashmir within the Indian Union, but the agitation of Kashinin Hindus, backed Up by other Hindus of India, for the complete integration of the state with their country, not only dashed Abdullah's hopes for an autonomous status for his homeland but also showed him that Hindu India's veneer of secularism had a very thin coating. It was too late and too dangerous for him now to turn round and talk about joining Pakistan. He therefore revived his idea of a Kashmir free from the control of both India and Pakistan, and paid for it by dismissal from office and imprisonment. A brief review of Abdullah's own statements, and the developments inside Kashmir, will make this clear.

A month after taking over the Administration in Kashmir, Abdullah told the Maharaja that 'it would be a good thing if India and Pakistan were made to recognize the state as an independent unit like Switzerland'.13 In an exclusive interview with Michael Davidson of the Observer in May,1949, Abdullah said accession to either India or Pakistan could not bring peace to Kashmir. If Kashmir joined India, Pakistan would fight; if she went to Pakistan a 'ghastly exodus of Hindus from the state would take place." .

In the Constitution of India, inaugurated on 26 January 1950, Article .370 had accorded Kashmir a special status. According to Nehru this provision 'made clear that any change in, or addition to, that position would depend upon the wishes of the people of the State as represented in their Constituent Assembly. The subjects of accession were three, namely Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications.' Is

On 27 October 1950 the National Conference proposed that a Constituent Assembly be summoned to determine 'the future shape and affiliations of the State'. '6 In the elections to the Assembly that autumn all the 75 seats were captured by Abdullah's National Confer- ence, 73 of them without contest. The Praja Parishad of Jammu, which stood for complete ia- tegration of the state with India and the preservation of the rights of the Dogra dynast, , boycotted the polls, alleging that the state Government had brought undue pressure, and re jected the Parishad nomination papers 'wholesale'. I 7 Noting the entirely one-sided resL Ilc of the election, Korbel comments: 'No dictator could do better/ I 8

In his opening address to the Constituent Assembly (5 November 1951) Abdullah argued that Kashmir could not become independent because she was a small country and could not join Pakistan because of that country's 'reactionary' politics. He declared his preference for India because she had respected Kashmir's 'internal autonomy' for the previous four years and because she was a 'secular democracy' which negated the fear that Kashmiri Muslims could not feel secure in Hindu majority.'9 Critics of Abdullah, who accuse him of having gone back on his professions, would do well to recall the reasons which led him to opt for India in the first instance. They would discover then that Abdullah did .not change his mind perfidiously but as forced to do so because India belied the expectations on which he had originally acted.

Abdullah—Nehru Agreement of July 1952

To clarify the constitutional relationship between Kashmir and India, discussions were held in Delhi as a result of which Nehru and Abdullah reached a broad agreement. Ab- dullah explained the nature of this understanding to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on II August 1952:

162 ....the fact that Article 370 has been mentioned as a temporary provision in the Con- stitution [of India] does not mean that it is capable of being abrogated, modified, or replaced unilaterally. In actual effect, the temporary nature of this Article arises merely from the fact that the power to finalize the constitutional relationship between the State and the Union of India has been specifically vested in the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly. It follows that whatever modifications, amendments or exceptions that may become necessary either to Article 370 or any other Article in the Constitution of India in their application to the Jammu and Kashmir State are subject to the decisions of this Sovereign Body.

He warned that 'any suggestion of altering arbitrarily this basis of our relationship with India would not only constitute a breach of the spirit and letter of the Constitution, but it may invite serious consequences for a harmonious association of our State with India'.20

The Rise of Hindu Communalism and Dismissal and Incarceration of Abdullah

The decline in the power of the Dogra ruler and the corresponding rise in the power of Abdullah was watched with apprehension by Hindus in Kashmir as well as in India. Early in 1948 the Hindus organized themselves under the banner of Praja Parishad in Jammu, the Dogra hotneland, where the Muslims were being forcibly transformed from a majority into a minority. In 1949 Abdullah's administration apprehended a large number of Dogra workers, including the seventy-year-old Parishad President Prem Nath Dogra. At the time of the elec.- tions to the Constituent Assembly, the Parishad agitation once more raised its head and the Parishad boycotted those elections on the ground that Abdullah's government was indulg- ing in malpraCtices. Nehru said publicly that by trying to bring down Abdullah, the Praia Parishad, Jan Sangh, and RSS were doing Pakistan's work1.21

Despite Nehru's criticism, the Parishad continued its demand for a complete integration of Kashmir with India and on 20 April 1952 passed a formal resolution to that effect. 'During the course of this agitation,' writes Bazaz, 'Hindu nationalism threw aside the mask of secularism and came out in its true colours. All differences between Congressmen and non-Congressmen as well as between Hindu nationalists and Hindu communalists were virtually obliterated. It is true that officially both the Government of India and the Congress organization deprecated the agitation but there is no manner of doubt that Hindu India, which includes Congress rank and file, sympathized with the aims and aspirations of the Praj Parishad.'22

Renewed demonstrations in Kashmir and India were set off on 11 May 1953 when S. P. Mukerjee, President ofJan Sangh, was arrested on entering Jammu in defiance of a ban. In some places Abdullah's effigy was burned.

Abdullah was greatly upset at the intensity of the agitation and declared that, if they so desired, Jammu and Ladakh could integrate with India and leave the Valley free to main tam a limited accession.23 On 18 May 1953 he said the time had come for re-examining the entire question of Kashmir's relations with India.24 In his Id broadcast in the following month he wished success for the Bogra— Nehru talks because, so ion as tension prevailed between India and Pakistan, nobody in Kashmir could live in peace This emphasis upon Indo—Pakis - eani ....rniony as a sine qua non for Kashmir's welfare henceforth became a recurring theme in Abdullah's policy.

After the ugly anti-Abdullah demonstrations, following Mukerjee's death in prison 163 of a heart attack in June 1953, Abdullah felt convinced that everybody in India, expect Nehru, was a communalist. He said experience had 'made the Kashmir' Muslims aware of India's real intentions. India has thrown her net around us and we are in fear of being enslaved as in old days....I have....come to the conclusion that our relationship with India has been harmful to Muslims.'25 Addressing an 'enthusiastic gathering' on Martyrs' Day the Sheikh declared that Kashmir' martyrs had not sacrificed their lives for India or Pakistan. The purpose for which they had shed their blDod was independence. Why must Kashmir's be compelled to join either India or Pakistan? Why should they not have good relations with both?'

Evidently, even Nehru thought Abdullah by now had gone too far because the Sadar- i-Riyasat (Head of State) of Kashmir, Karan Singh, could not have dared to act against Abdul - lah in the harsh manner he did without the Indian Prime Minister's approval. By a corn rnunique, issued at 4.30 a.m. on 9 August 1953, Karan,Singhiclismissed Abdullah from office and installed Deputy Premier Ghulam Muhammad as Prime Minister. The new Premier asserted that Abdullah had been dismissed to avert the 'national disaster' of 'an independent Kashmir under the influence of an imperialist power'. Everyone took the unnamed 'imperialist power' to mean the USA, and US Ambassador George V. Allen had to issue a state - ment, denying that his country was interfering in Kashmir. By a twist of history India in 1962 had to solicit arms from the same 'imperiaLt power' to fight China, whom India for many years had courted as a fellow anti- imperialist.

Frank Moraes, editor of the Times of-India, who happened to arrive in Karachi on the day of Abdullah's arrest, found that 'every single Pakistani high and low' was confident that Pakistan would now win the Valley?'

(Foci-miner study see Reading 10 of this Block)

The U-2 Incident

On I May 1960 a high-flying U-2 spy plane, equipped with advanced photograpl equipment, was shot down in the interior of Russia. The incident was first revealed by Pre- mier f(hrushchev on 5 May. At first the United States Defense Department stated that the plane had been engaged on weather reconnaissance but, as the pilot had been captured alive, the truth could not longer be suppressed. It transpired that the plane had taken off from Peshawar in Pakistan for espionage over the Soviet Union. Its destination was Bodo in Nor- way. Both Pakistani and Norwegian authorities denied having any knowledge that the plane was on a spying mission, and Khrushchev, in his report to the Supreme Soviet, conceded the possibility that countries where American aircraft were based did not know what was being done by the Americans. 'But', warned the Soviet Premier, 'they ought to know for their own good, because they might be the sufferers of the Americans' playing with fire.'

The Pakistani authorities denied that America had any military bases in Pakistan. They admitted there was an American communications base28 but said it had no airstrip of its own. It appears that the ill-fated U-2 had taken off from the Peshawar airport but Pakis- tanis were not privy to its purpose or route. The disclosure, therefore, that the plane had been engaged on an intelligence mission over the USSR came as a 'Mock to them. It was felt that no country, however friendly, should be allowed to use Pakistani territory as a base for hostile ac; against another country. A protest was lodgec. ,vith the US Government and an assurance was obtained that there would be no repetition of the incident.

At the same time, however, Pakistan did not waver in. her friendship with America 164 and presented a bold front to the USSR. At the Czechoslovak National Day party in Moscow on 9 May, Khrushchev publicly threatened the Pakistani charge d'affciires that if any other spy plane flew from Peshawar into the Soviet Union, that city would be struck with rockets.29 President Ayub Khan, who was in London at the time, said, 'After all, Russian threats are not new things for us. We are not afraid of such threats.'" Dawn's editorial, 'So what?, ran:

After all, if war does come, none of us will escape its ravage, and whether we punctiliously keep our own bases inviolate or not, the Russians are not going to spare us on that account. They are not that sort of gentle people....there is something refreshing about Washington's disclosure that in order to safeguard the Free World 'against surprise attacks by Russia and her allies the appropriate agencies of the American defence system have been systematically collecting as rruich data as possible of Russian offensive and defensive installations.

Noting that Russia had repeatedly refused the US proposal for 'open skies',31 the article concluded that it was 'the Soviet Union and her flashy and boisterous leader Nikita Khrushchev at whose door the blame squarely rests' 32

The State Department spokesman, Lincoln White, said it was 'typical that the Soviet Union singles out as the objective of its threats, those smaller countries of the free world who bear no responsibility for the recent incident'. There should be no doubt, he declared, that the US would honour her commitments for common defence to countries which the USSR was threatening.33

Ayub, still in London, explained that the Americans were Pakistan's friend& Their planes visited Pakistan. Pakistanis did not know where they went after leaving Pakistan.' He alleged that Russian planes had been flying over Pakistan for sometime." About Russian threats, the Pakistani President said, 'These harsh things of life have to be faced.' If Russia attacked Pakistan, the latter would not be alone. It would mean world war. The source of attack would not remain unscathed. The retaliation might not come from Pakistan but it would come from somewhere else.36

The American communications base was permitted to continue its surveillance. Its value had become even greater after the U-2 flights were terminated.

The USSR and the Indo—Pakistani War

The gradual shift in Soviet policy from one of complete support of India to one of neutrality in lndo—Pakistani disputes, which had been perceptible to insiders for sometime, became manifest to all during the Kutch war. Reflecting the view of 'Soviet official circles', Tass, in a statement circulated on 8 May, expressed the hope that India and Pakistan would settle the Kutch dispute by peaceful means 'with consideration for the interests of both sides' 37

When the Consortium meeting was postponed, the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan declared that 'some concrete proposals' were being discussed between Moscow and Rawal- pindi for economic and other assistance to Pakistan.' On 20 August the Soviet Union made a Rs. 1.5 crore loan to Pakistan for the purchase of machinery for airport construction.

In the meantime the situation in Kashmir was becoming increasingly dangerous because of the escalating Indian military offensive across the cease-fire line. Pravda wrote: 'We

165 would like that Soviet—Pakistani relations like our traditional friendship with India, be a stabilizing factor in Asia and facilitate a normalization of the relations between Pakistan and

On 4 September Kosygin wrote to Shastri and Ayub, expressing concern at the military conflict 'in an area directly adjacent to the borders of the Soviet Union', and offered the good offices of the Soviet Union towards a peaceful settlement of Indo— Pakistani differences.' When India crossed the international frontier, Kosygin, for the first time, was more critical of one party than the other. He took exception to India's action and asked New Delhi to order cease-fire and withdraw Indian forces behind the cease-fire line in Kashmir and the international frontier elsewhere.4' The Soviet Union no doubt believed that, if China entered the war on the side of Pakistan, the USA would join India. Apart from the unpredictable consequences of a major war on Soviet borders, such a development would have brought Pakis- tan under the complete domination of China and India under that of the USA, undermining Soviet influence in both the major South Asian countries.

On 17 September Kosygin renewed his offer to mediate between India and Pakistan in 'bore specific terms. He invited the two Governments to confer on Soviet territory, at Tash- kent 'for instance', and added that he too could 'take part in this meeting', if desired by both sides.42 Ayub replied that, for such a meeting to be successful, the ground would first have to be prepared, and suggested that this be done in the Security Council in which the 'Soviet Union was a 'most influential and important member'.43 Shastri said the Soviet proposal could be considered only after the cessation of military activities and the creation of a calmer atmosphere.44 To convince Pakistanis of Russian's impartiality, the Soviet Embassy in Karachi issued a press commentary on 12 November which stated: 'Attempts are made at times to claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly not objective and is inclined to support one side at the expense of the other. Such opinions are far from the reality.'"

In the meantime it was becoming increasingly clear that, with the acceptance of the cease-fire by the parties and the withdrawal of the Chinese ultimatum, the Security Council had lost its sense of urgency to strive for a solution of the Kashmir dispute. The Russians, however, were still pressing India and Pakistan to confer at Tashkent. Dmitry Polyansky, a member of the Presidium of the CPSV Central Committee, said in Moscow, 'It is the sincere desire of the Soviet Union that the dangerous conflict between India and Pakistan should be completely extinguished.'46

Seeing the Soviet offer of mediation as the only possible chance for a Kashmir settlement, Pakistan now showed greater eagerness to avail herself of the Soviet invitation than India, who wished the status quo to remain undisturbed. Foreign Minister Bhutto announced Pakistan's affirmative response on 11 November.47 Shastri dragged his feet for sometime and consented to meet Ayub only after the latter had agreed to discuss 'total relationship' between India and Pakistan." A Soviet Government communique formally announced on 8 December that Shastri and Ayub would meet at Tashkent on 4 January 1966.

166 from all the territory they had seized in their offensive into Azad Kashmir during that month. August 5 was a convenient date because the parties were agreed that infiltration from Mad Kashmir into Indian-held Kashmir had begun on that day. In accepting it as the guidepost for withdrawal of forces, neither side gave up its basic contentions. Each held to its own position on the question of who the infiltrators were and why they had crossed the cease-fire line.

Neither party at Tashkent obtained what it had earlier declared to be its essential conditions for withdrawal behind the original boundaries. The Pakistanis did not get a self- executing machinery for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. They had to be content with the pale assurances that both sides 'will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries', and that both sides had 'recognized the need to set up joint Pakistani—Indian bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken'. The Indians had to vacate all the territory in Azad Kashmir without obtaining any clear guarantee that there would be no repetition of armed infiltration from Azad Kashmir. 'The issue of the infiltrators to which Mr. Shastri and India attached great importance,' commented an Indian columnist, 'practically faded out of the Tashkent discussions.'5° Other Indian demands that were also rejected by Pakistan were: (a) that the Declaration should contain a clause to dissuade Pakistan from having relations with third countries of a nature that might injure the vital interests of India: this was obviously meant to circumscribe Pakistan's friendly relations with China;51 (b) the freezing of the cease-fire line as the permanent border; (c)a no-war pact, without a definite arrangement for the settlement of disputes.52

The Indians claimed that the parties' reaffirmation, in the Declaration, of 'their obli- gation under the [UN] Charter, not to have recourse to force', amounted to a no-war declaration. Bhutto quoted Article 51 of the Charter that 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' and argued that nothing in the Charter precluded Pakistan's right to assist Kashmiris, who are victims of Indian aggression.53 According to the Indians, the agreement in the Declaration not to interfere in the 'internal affairs of each other' barred Pakistaft from interference with India's possession of Kashmir. Pakistanis replied that a disputed territory cannot be regarded as the internal affair of one of the claimants.

Of the three participants in the discussions at Tashkent, the Soviet Union was the only one to emerge with unqualified satisfaction. Emphasizing the difficult nature of the task facing Kosygin at the conference, The Times had observed that the Soviet Union was trying 'to open a lock that has no key'.54 Soviet success in getting Pakistan and India to talk on neutral ground, and agree to a statement, was a feat no other country had performed before. it greatly raised the prestige of the Soviet Union in the Afro—Asian arena where she was competing for influence with China. Soviet diplomacy, long successfully excluded from the subcontinent by the British presence there, had made a dramatic breakthrough and proved itself a major factor in the power politics of South Asia. Finally, Russia, hitherto often labelled a potential aggressor by the West, was able dramatically to project herself as a peacemaker at a time when the US was escalating the war in Vietnam.

Perhaps Pakistan's most substantial gain was a further erosion of India's special relationship with the USSR. Soviet economic assistance to Pakistan progressively increased, and in due course Russia offered military aid to Pakistan, on the same terms as to India. The Soviet Union also quietly dropped her support of Afghanistan on the issue of 'Pakhtunistan'. Tashkent, thus, enabled Pakistan to practise her policy of friendly relations with all the three foremost world powers, the USA, the USSR, and China, on a bilateral' basis. 167 China did not relish the sight of the Soviet Union playing such an influential role in South Asian affairs. She must have felt, also, that the Soviet Union was trying to wean Pakis- tan away from the close relationship China had so assiduously built up with her. The Ren Min Ribao alleged that the Declaration was 'a product of joint US—Soviet plotting' and that the objective of the Soviet Union had been 'to weaken the united struggle against imperialism in Asia and Africa'.' A resolution of the Afro—Asian Writers' Conference at Peking, in June 1966, stated that the 'notorious' Tashkent Conference had been 'designed, under the fraudu- lent screen of "peaceful" settlement of Indo—Pakistani disputes, to get Pakistan to join with India for "joint defence against Chinam.56

Relations with the Soviet Union

In the years following the Tashkent conference, Russian economic assistance to Pakistan, and trade between the two countries, escalated smoothly, but on the sensitive question of the supply of Soviet military equipment matters moved at a slower pace. The Russians evidently were reluctant to do anything that would impair their relations with India. Pakistan, however, kept up the pressure. Before Tashkent, Pakistanis used to deplore the transfer of Soviet arms to India, but did not openly press that such arms be supplied to themselves. After Tashkent, they began to take the Russian profession of equal concern with the welfare of India and Pakistan as a reason for demanding the same facilities as India for acquiring Soviet arms. A mere cessation of the flow of weaponry to India was no longer deemed sufficient. Having armed India 'to the teeth', declared Ayub, if Russia were now to close off supplies to the subcontinent it could affect only Pakistan. It would be unfair to Pakis- tan.57

Of course the Russians, too, had a complaint of their own against Pakistan: the US still enjoyed the use of the American surveillance base at Badaber near Peshawar, and it was not till Pakistan decided to close down this base that the Russians agreed to supply her with arms.

President Ayub Khan journeyed to Moscow in September 1967, and Premier Kosy- gin returned the visit in April 1968, the first ever paid to Pakistan by a Soviet Head of Govern- ment. Promises of increased technical and economic aid were made on both occasions but Pakistanis were unable to obtain any Soviet commitment regarding the supply of arms. However, by serving notice on the US on 7 April, a few days before Kosygin's arrival in Pakis- tan, that the lease of the American communications base would not be renewed beyond the existing limit of I July 1968, Pakistan had removed the last cause of Soviet grievance, and the grant of Soviet military assistance was now only a question of time.

Following a trip to the USSR by a Pakistani military delegation headed by the Com- mander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army, General Yahya Khan, it was announced on 9 July that the Soviet Union had agreed to sell arms to Pakistan.58 The Washington correspondent of the Hindu enviously noted that Pakistan had become the first country in the world to get such supplies from all three major powers.59 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called the Soviet decision 'unexpected' and 'fraught with danger' as it might incite Pakistan to launch 'fresh offen- sives' against India.6°

During President Yahya Khan's visit to the Soviet Union in June 1970, Russia agreed to provide assistance for the Fourth Five-Year Plan as well as for the construction of a steel rnll in Karachi with an annual production capacity of one million tons. It was decided, further, to conclude a long-term trade agreement covering the period 1971-5. As Pakistanis

168 had long desired a steel mill, they found the Soviet promise to help in building the mill especially gratifying.

But on political matters neither side got all it wanted. Pakistan would have liked the Soviet Union to use her influence for the settlement of Indo—Pakistani disputes, but the Soviet side expressed the belief that those disputes should be settled 'through bilateral negotiations'. The Soviet Union would have liked the communique directly to condemn US involvement in Indo—China, but the statement simply expressed 'concern' over the expansion of foreign interference in Cambodia and called for the 'withdrawal of [all] foreign troops from Indo—China'.6'

On the economic front the volume of two-way trade, which had amounted to only Rs. 42.8 million in 1962, rose to Rs. 326 million in 1966, and Soviet aid by the latter year amounted to $91 million, including $30 million for oil exploration and $11 million for the purchase of agricultural machinery.62 A fresh loan agreement involving Its. 40 crores was signed in Moscow on 9 September 1966. Another credit amounting to 60 million roubles was granted in August 1968. The credit for the steel mill, promised during Yahya's visit in June 1970, was expected to come to a further $200 million.

Soviet-assisted industrial project in Pakistan include two plants for manufacturing electrical equipment, a 200-megawatt thermal power station on the Indus at Giddu, twenty radio stations, and a high-voltage grid more than 1,000 km long.63 The Soviet Government has also assisted in improving the port at Gwadur and has signed a ten-year agreement for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Though the Soviet Union doubtless wanted to wean Pakistan away from the West- ern embrace and also make it possible for her to avoid over-dependence on China, these were not only reasons she wished to cultivate good relations with Pakistan. India's rout in the brief Sino—India war of 1962 had dramatically demonstrated that she could not possibly stand against China alone. Accordingly, the Russians gradually came round to the view, so long held by the Americans, that India and Pakistan should compose their differences and face China jointly. Party leader Leonid Brezhnev said, at the International Meeting of Com-, munist and Workers Parties in Moscow on 7 June 1969, 'We are of the opinion that the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia."4 A month later lzvestia stated that the proposed Asian collective security system would be open to all Asian countries, including the Soviet Union, who, being' simultaneously a European and an Asian power, is vitally interested in having all the'peoples in Asia live in peace' 65 But this idea appealed neither to India, who professes non-alignment, nor to Pakistan, who is anxious to avoid anything which would have the appearance of ganging-up against China. • The Soviet Union also suggested 'constructive co-operation between Pakistan, Af- ghanistan, India, Iran, and the Soviet Union As this proposal was in tune with India's policy, calling for Indo—Pakistani collaboration in secondary matters so that the main issue of Kashmir might be pushed into the background, Indian reaction to it was favourable. But Pakistan turned it down for two reasons: first, because it was unrealistic to talk about regional co-operation which included India and Pakistan while their relations remained be- devilled by major disputes, and secondly, because the proposal had the appearance of a step towards the creation of a system of collective security directed against China.66

The Soviet Union was not unaware that unsolved disputes were the basic cause of

169

the strain in Indo- Pakistani relations, and in his joint statement with Ayub, on 21 April 1968, Kosygin affirmed that a resolution of Indo-Pakistani disputes would 'meet the vital interests of the peoples of these countries as well as of universal peace'. After Pakistan, Kosygin went to India and there urged Indira Gandhi 'to enter into a dialogue with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue' 67 The details of the Indian Premier's reaction on that occasion did not become known, but a formal letter from Kosygin on 6 July 1968, pressing Mrs. Gandhi to settle the Farakka Barrage dispute with Pakistan on the lines of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960,68 brought forth sharp public reproof from Indian sources reminiscent of the fate of American initiatives in the past to compose Indo- Pakistani differences. As the World Bank had acted as mediator in the Indus Waters dispute, the Indians suspected that Kosygin was suggesting mediation in the case of Farakka also. An Indian Foreign Office spokesman stated that it was not necessary to agree with the Soviet Premier all along the line. The latter would be told that this way of thinking on the Farakka dispute 'is not right.°

All in all, however, there is not the same degree of community of interests between the Soviet Union and Pakistan as there is between China and Pakistan. Owing to her larger size and her confrontation with China, India serves Soviet interests better than smaller Pakistan who is friendly towards China. The USSR has invested much armour and treasure in India and, if compelled to make a clear-cut choice, would probably side with her in preference to Pakistan. On 9 November 1970, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh told the Lok Sabha that the Soviet Union had assured India that she would not supply any more military hardware to Pakistan/8

REFERENCES

I. Sear* Council Official Records, 570th Meeting, 17 Jan. 1952. 2. A Dyakov, 'Partitioned India', New Times, no. 3, 1948. 3 0. Orestoy, 'The War in Kashmir', New Times, no. 40, 1948. 4. For details see ch. Sand 6. 5. He often spoke to me on these lines on the eve of his appointment as Prime Minister in 1952, when he was Am- bassador in Washington and! was the Minister. Interestingly, in the context of Sino- Indian relations Nehru also said, 'Natural friendship does not exist if you are weak and if you are looked down upon as a weak country.' Quoted by Neville Maxwell, India's China War, p. 120. b. See the next section for details. 7. Dawn, 10 August 1953. 8. K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan, The Kashmir Question, p. 328. 9. For this see Negotiations Between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India Regarding the Kashmir Dispute, June 1953-September 1954, Govt. of Pakistan 1954. 10. P. N..Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible, p. 69. II. See 'The Korean War' in chapter 6. 12. Ibid. 13. M. C. Mahajan, Looking Back, p. 162. 14. P. N. Bazaz, The History ofStruggle for Freedom in Kashmir p.424. IS. Lok Sabha Debates, 10 August 1953, Part II, col. 440. 16. Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, p. 104. I 7. Sisier Gupta, Kashmir, p. 366. 18. J. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p.222. 19. Sisier Gupta, Kashmir, pp. 367-70. 20. For text of Abdullah's statement see Indian Press Digests for the period I Aug. to 30 Oct 1952, Vol II, no. I , pp. 125-36. 21. Indian Press Digests for the period 16 Nov. 1951 to 15 Jan. 1952, Vol. I, no. 3, p. I 1. 22. P. N. Bazz, The History ofStruggiefor Freedom in Kashmir, p. 659. 23. Ibid., p.573. 24. Indian Press Digests for the period 1 Apr. to 31 July 1953, Vol. II, no. 5, p. 20. 25. From a letter to Lohia from an unnamed correspondent in Kashmir, dated Martyrs' Day (13 July 1953) and published inJanata, 16 Aug. 1953. Indian Press Digestsfor the period 1 Apr. to 31 July 1953, Vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 38-9. Ram Ma nohar Lohia was General Secretary of the Praja Socialist Party of India.

I 70

26. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 27. Indian Press Digests for the period 1 Aug. to 31 Oct. 1953, Vol. H, no. 7, p.7. 28. J This base at Badaber, near Peshawar, had been leased out to the US in 1959. Selig S. Harrison, in 'America, India and Pakistan (Harper's Magazine, July 1966), says the name of the base was 'Headquarters, 5235th Communica- tions Group, USAF', and that Americans could 'listen in' from there on the Soviet military communications system, and monitor key defence testing-sites in Central Asia. Tyura Tam,.the Soviet Cape Kennedy, was only 675 miles away, and the rest of the major Russian military research centres were all concentrated in the desert fastnesses of Tadzhikistan and Kazakhistan. 29. New York Times, 10 May 1960. 30. Dawn, 11 May 1960; Morning News, 11 May 1960. 3!.It was at a summit meeting in July 1955 that Eisenhower had first suggested that the Americans and the Russians should provide facilities for aerial photography over each other's territory as an assurance against a surprise attack. 32. Dawn, II May 1960. 33. New York Times, 11 May 1960. 34. Ibid., 14 May 1960. 35, Dawn, 17 May 1960. 36. Ibid., 18 May 1960. 37. Asian Recorder, 1965, p.6464. 38. Dawn, 30 July 1965. 39. ibid., 25 Aug. 1965. . 40. Pakistan Horizon, 4th Quarter 1965. 4i. Hindu Weekly, 20 Sept. 1965. 42. Pakistan Horizon, 4th Quarter 1965. 43. Dawn, 26 Sept: 1965. 44. Observer, 26 Sept. 1965. 45. Dawn, 14 Nov. 1965, quoted in Pakistan Horizon, 4th Quarter 1965. 46. Soviet News, 9 Nov. 1965. 47. Hindu Weekly, 15 Nov. 1965. 48. /bid., 29 Nov. 1965. 49. For text of the Tashkent Declaration see Asian Recorder, 1966, p.11896. 50. K. Rangaswami in Hindu Weekly, 24 Jan. 1966 Shastri had said that India would not withdraw from Haji Pir even if the whole world went against her. K. C. Saxena, Pakistan, Her Relations with India, 1997-1966, p. 265. 51. Dawn, 21 Jan. 1966. 52. Ibid., 30 Jan. 1966; see also Hindu Weekly, 24 Jan. 1966. 53. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 15 March 1966, p. 504. 54. The Times, 3 Jan. 1966. 55. Quoted in Dawn, 16 Feb. 1966. 56. Peking Review, 1 April 1966, quoted by B. S. Gupta in 'A Maoist Line for India, The China Quarterly, Jan.-March 1966, p. 9. 57 The Times, 18 April 1967. 58. New York Times, 10 July 1968. 59. Hindu Weekly, I 5 July 1968. 60. Ibid., 15, 22 July 1968. 61. Text in Pakistan Horizon, 3rd Quarter 1970. 62. By June 1970, 5,000 Soviet tractors and 2,000 bulldozers were in use in Pakistan. 63. Dawn, 28 June 1970. 64. International Maks, no. 7, 1969. /65. Quoted in New York Times, 24 July 1969. 66. Dawn, II July 1969. 67. Hindu Weekly, 15 July 1968. 68. Asian Recorder, 1968, p. 8468. For details of the Farakka dispute see section IV of this charter. 69. Hindu Weekly, 22 July 1968. 70. Statesman Weekly, 14 Nov. 1970.

171 S READING 14

(Excerpts from 'India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Powers: A Politics of Divided .§ubconti- nents, by G. W. Choudhiy, New York, The Free Press Macmillan Publishing Company, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission. • yub's visit to the U.S.S.R. initiated a new era for the Soviet Union in subcontinent affairs. Now both India and Pakistan seemed to pay greater attention to Moscow; both A were. eager to have Moscow's goodwill. India was anxious that its long-standing friendship with Moscow—which• provided the most valuable diplomatic, economic, and military assistance in areas of vital national importance—not suffer as a result of the Soviet Union's new ties with Pakistan. Pakistan, on the other hand, was desperately trying to reduce the unqualified Soviet support to India. Thus the Soviet Union acquired considerable leverage with both countries. The Chinese viewed the new links between Moscow and Is- lamabad with concern, but Washington was little perturbed. Instead, like the U.S.S.R., the United States was worried about Pakistan's growing friendship with China; if the Soviet Union were successful in creating a rift between China and Pakistan, Washington would welcome the development. The global competition between the two superpowers persisted, of course, and an enormous increase in the Soviet influence in the subcontinent certainly would not have been looked upon favourably by the United States; but the United States seemed to have correctly assessed that Moscow's friendship with Pakistan could develop only so far. Aslhave implied, the Soviet attempts to have simultaneously good relations with India and Pakistan proved—in the end—no more successful than the American attempts to achieve the same objective.

Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, dashed to Moscow in May 1965. Soon after Ayub's first state visit, Shastri was given the now familiar general reception for Indian leaders in Moscow, and the familiar theme of Indian—Soviet understanding on international issues was repeated. For the Indians the visit was intended to uncover any substantive changes in Soviet policy toward India, particularly in Indo— Pakistani affairs; for the Soviets the objective was to determine if India was shifting internal or external policies in the post- Nehru era. The Soviet Union was deeply interested in limiting, if not eliminating, the influence of the right wing in the ruling Congress party in India. This was evidenced in January 1965, when there was speculation that ivkararji Desai might join the Indian Cabinet. The weekly New Times (Moscow) advised Shastri to keep Desai out, saying that as Finance Minis- ter he was one "who had done everything he could to defeat Nehru's socialist policies."

During their consultations with Shastri, the Soviet leaders may have assured the In- dian Prime Minister of a special and continuing relationship, but they did not publicly support

133 India or condemn Pakistan. With no mention of Kashmir or any other controversial Indo—Pakistani problem, the communique issued at the end of Shastri's visit contained nothing to which Pakistan could take exception. The Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow was gleeful. Quoting from diplomatic sources and drawing from his talks with officials at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador reported on "changed thinking in Mos- cow on Indo—Pakistan problems."2

This changed thinking became more evident during the unfortunate and ruinous armed conflict of 1965. The war between India and Pakistan erupted in April in the marshy lands of the Rann of Kutch, spread in August to the mountains of Kashmir, and finally, on September 6, 1965, hit the plains of Punjab when India crossed the international border and attacked Pakistan in what President Ayub called "the biggest tank battle since the Second World War began,"3 not surpassed until the Arab—Israel wars of 1967 and 1973.

The Soviet reporting of the war,was unsensational in style and scrupulously impartial in content. The Indian and Pakistani versions of actions and events were published either in sequence or, more commonly, in parallel columns with the laconic headings, "Delhi" and "Karachi." When fighting began in the disputed territories of Kashmir, on August 24, 1965, Pravda article "Urgent Necessity" noted the contradictory press reports put forth by the two sides "between which we are not going to adjudicate." No bias was betrayed in the Soviet press in respect to the competing claims, and no guilt was imputed to either side. The Soviets reported with satisfaction the April cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch, achieved through the mediation of Britain, in a terse message from Karachi. This contrasted markedly with previous Soviet attitude and practice. Even two years earlier, Indo— Pakistani fighting would have been condemned without qualification in the Soviet press as the work of the "Western stooge" Pakistan against "peace-loving, non-aligned" India. When full-scale war started on September 6, Brezhnev blamed the organizers of "aggressive military pacts" who, according to him, objected to the notion that India should be non-aligned; "lately," he added, "they have been displeased by Pakistan's determination to pursue an untutored policy:8

Subsequently Kosygin appealed to both Ayub and Shasrti to stop fighting. On Sep- tember 17 the second message from Kosygin suggested the talks between the two countries that ultimately took place at Tashkent inlanuary 1966.6 (At the Security Council in New York, the United States and the U.S.S.R. worked together to bring about a cease-fire, there was near identity of action and purpose between the two superpowers, particularly following China's ultimatum to India).2 When the cease-fire was signed, Kosygin again addressed the leaders of the two countries and expressed his government's satisfaction.

The Tashkent Conference

Although the September 20 cease-fire resolution of the Security Council had been accepted by India and Pakistan and the actual fighting ended on September 23, troops of both countries remained in positions occupied at the end of the fighting; tensions were still high; complaints of cease-fire violations were constant. Mediation was urgently needed to restore the prewar status quo, if not to resolve the causes that had led to the war. The United States could not play, the role of peacemaker because of President Lyndon B. Johnson's ab- rupt, even discourteous cancellation of his invitations to Shastri and Ayub to visit the United States in early 1965.8 The Commonwealth could not play the role because British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had denounced India's September 6 attack across the international frontier.9 China could not mocliine because it had openly favored Pakistan and even threatened to intervene.l° Only the Soviet Union, thanks to its new posture of neutrality in I 74 Indo— Pakistani disputes, could command the confidence of both India and Pakistan. And in sponsoring the Tashkent Conference, the peacemaking U.S.S.R. achieved what was regarded by large segments of the Western press as one of its greatest diplomatic feats since the Second World War.'

1 had opportunities to read the minutes of the conference, and I also conducted interviews with Ayub, his principal secretary, and other senior Pakistani participants in the conference. The following account is the fruit of this research.

Ayub and Shastri met separately with Premier Kosygin on January 3, the day before •the conference started; throughout the discussions, which culminated with the issue of the famous declaration at the end of the conference on January 10, Kosygin was the chief actor, holding long, separate consultations, with Ayub and Shastri and also bringing the two together at the conference table for direct talks. At the first Kosygin— Ayub meeting on January 3, the Premier suggested that a "good way to deal with Indo— Pakistan differences would be to take up the relatively small problems and then go to the more complicated issues." As listed by Kosygin, the "small problems" were restoration of diplomatic relations, troop with- drawals, reestablishment of the frontier, and exchange of prisoners. Ayub termed Kosygin's suggestion "one possible approach" and added that "the first thing needed was an agreement on the disengagement of the armies by withdrawing them to the previous position." Ayub emphasized, however, that "there must be a settlement of Kashmir." Kosygin replied, "As soon as the Kashmir question would be taken up, all sorts of complications would arise." The first essential, Kosygin repeated, "was to create mutual trust and confidence in order to create a better atmosphere for the discussion of more difficult questions." (India also favored what it called a "step by step" approach— tackling the minor issues first and then proceeding to more complicated issues). Pushing on, Ayub proposed that the question of reducing the respective armed forces to reasonable levels be discussed. Here Kosygin referred to India's "no-war declaration" offer that had been pending since 1950 and has long been debated in Indo— Pakistani dialogue.' Ayub told Kosygin that in his speech at the UN General Assembly in December 1965 he had offered to conclude such a pact with India, provided India agreed to a procedure for solving the Kashmir dispute; but a "no war" pact without such a procedure, the President said, would be totally unacceptable.

Kosygin's role as intermediary was crucial. Ayub made it clear that there would be no direct meetings between India and Pakistan without the Soviet participation, and Kosygin relayed Ayub's views to Shastri and Shastri's to Ayub. Speaking of himself, Kosygin told Ayub: "The question is not whether he agrees or disagrees with what Ayub thinks desirable or fair. It is for India and Pakistan to agree between themselves." Kosygin stressed the hope that "although the discussion will be very complex, some solution will be found."

Kosygin began the conference proceedings by welcoming the visiting parties and expressing the wish that fruitful results would emerge from the conference. Shastri and Ayub, avoiding polemics and bitterness, set a similar tone. The Prime Minister said he hoped that the conference would lead to a change in the political climate prevailing between the two countries. Shastri indicated that the discussion might be pursued on two levels—at the summit level among Ayub, Kosygin, and Shastri "to discuss the broad and complicated issues," and at the ministerial level to deal with "the other matters." This suggestion represented a compromise between, on one hand, India's earlier stand that secondary issues should be settled before talks began on such complicated issues as Kashmir and, on the other hand, Pakistan's demand that fundamental causes of the war be settled first. Ayub •termed the conference historic and a possible turning point in the affairs of the two coun-

175 tries. So conciliatory was Ayub that in his opening speech he did not even mention the word "Kashmir" —an omission that was appreciated by the Indian press and criticized by the Pres- ident's political opponents in Pakistan.I3

Held in Gromyko's presence, a ministerial meeting on January 5 was marked by sharp and polemical exchanges between Bhutto and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. Singh argued that Kashmir "is an integral part of India," that Pakistan realized that this was India's conviction, and that there was no need to discuss the issue; Kashmir, he stressed, "roused...even stronger emotions in India" than in Pakistan. Bhutto, on the other hand, repeated the gist of Ayub's remarks: "we must address ourselves," contended the Foreign Minister, "to finalizing a solution of the Kashmir problem." But it was clear that Bhutto's ef- fectiveness was limited: setting aside his exchanges with Swaran Singh, his talks with Gromyko were far from friendly. The significant dialogues were those at the summit level, where Kosygin worked vigorously to bring about a rapprochement between Ayub and Shas- tri, both of whom were sincere in trying to find a solution. A reading of the minutes of the conference discussions indicates that the Kashmir issue could have figured more prominently in the Tashkent Declaration—as the Pakistanis would have liked—had Bhutto and his Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad been more realistic: their insistence upon referring to UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir was anathema to India and hardened the In- dians' stand against any meaningful reference to Kashmir in the Tashkent Declaration.

With the Kashmir issue effectively buried, the crucial point at Tashkent was the withdrawal of troops by both sides to prewar positions. India would not agree to any withdrawal of troops unless Pakistan agreed to a "no war" pact, but it was impossible for Ayub or any other Pakistani leader to sign such a pact without some progress on the Kashmir issue. The result was deadlock, and the conference tottered on the verge of failure. India not only wanted to link the withdrawal of the troops with the signing of a "no war" agreement but also sought both nations' promise of "respect for each other's territorial integrity" —and Kashmir was to be counted as part of India's territory. This was totally unacceptable to Pakistan. Pakistan's draft stated that "all disputes should be settled through peaceful means"; Pakistan did not want the phrase "not resorting to force" included in the declaration.

Subsequently Kosygin offered a compromise: Pakistan and India "agree that disputes and differences between the two countries shall not be settled by recourse to means other than peaceful." Kosygin suggested this wording to Ayub during their meeting on January 9, and the President, complaining that Kosygin's formula was not an "improvement" over the India draft, presented Pakistan's own compromise formula: India and Pakistan "reaffirm their obligations under the UN charter not to have recourse to force and to settle dispute through peaceful means." Kosygin approved of Ayub's wording and promised to seek India's acceptance. At the same meeting Kosygin also reported to Ayub that India insisted upon an understanding that the cease-fire line in Kashmir would not be violated. Ayub fumed, perceiving that India wanted a subtle de fecto recognition of the cease-fire line as an international border between India ahd Pakistan. "India always wants from Pakistan the last pound of flesh and the last drop of blood," he sneered. Kosygin suggested careful wording — "both sides will observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire lines"—and Ayub approved. •The President made it clear, however, that he accepted Kosygin's suggestion only to avoid "embarrassing the Soviet Union"; he could compromise "no further." Thus Pakistan compromised, but it also gained at the January 9 meeting as Kosygin made his most significant remark on the Kashmir issue: "The Soviet Union appreciate that a dispute exists in Kashmir. ..of course there is a dispute," he said. Ayub thanked Kosygin for this major change in the Soviet attitude. Since the mid-1950s and the Khrushchev—Bulganin trip to India the 1 76 Soviet Union had persistently supported the Indian claim that the Kashmir dispute had been settled and that Kashmir was an integral part of India. The change represented a great success for Ayub's personal diplomacy. After his meeting with Ayub, Kosygin immediately called on Shastri to get India's approval on the compromise wording worked out with Ayub. With the fate of the Tashkent Conference depending on Shastri's acceptance, Kosygin applied all his fact and skill and finally achieved success. The Tashkent Declaration was signed by India and Pakistan on January 10, 1966. In lieu of the "no war" declaration sought by India, there was a "no force" commitment proposed by Ayub. On Kashmir, the declaration merely stated that "Jammu and Kashmir were discussed and each side set forth its respective position." The declaration solved none of the outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan, but it put an end to the state of undeclared war between the two countries with the withdrawal of troops to prewar positions." Neither India nor Pakistan was wholly satisfied; in Pakistan the conference, widely and violently criticized, marked the beginning of the fall of Ayub Khan. The Soviets' satisfaction, however, was immense: the Tashkent Conference made the Soviet position unique in the subcontinent until 1970. During the conference the Soviet attitude was described by both sides as impartial and fair, and Ayub and the Pakistani delegation were impressed by Kosygin's handling of one of the most complicated international rivalries on the contemporary scene. Only Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad— the hawks who had prevented Pakistan from faring better at Tashkent—complained about the Soviet conduct. But many conference participants complained of Bhutto's conduct. When Bhutto continued to rail about Kashmir's plebiscite, Foreign Minister Gromyko had to reminded him that since Pakistan had failed to achieve its goal by war, Bhutto should not expect the Soviet Union to be able to deliver Kashmir to Pakistan at the conference table. Similarly Gromyko pointed out to his volatile Pakistani counterpart that the withdrawal of troops was more important for Pakistan than for India; the former occupied desert lands of India near Sind, but India held the strategic areas near Lahore and Sialkot. Despite his complaints, Bhutto was one of those who prepared the declaration, and he immediately defended it both inside and outside the National Assembly of Pakistan. It was only after his dismissal by Ayub in 1966 that he became a great opponent of the Tashkent agreement and began threatening to disclose the "secrets" of Tashkent. In the course of his political attacks on Ayub in the Winter of 1968-1969, Bhutto stressed these "secret clauses" of the agreement and claimed that Ayub had "sold" Pakistan's interests under crude Soviet pressure. At the time, the Soviet government made the unusual gesture of officially denying the existence of secret clauses. 15 Later, after his retirement, Ayub told me that the only "secret" about the Tashkent Conference were Bhutto's irrational attitude and statements; Ayub said that he had to seek the help of the Soviet Premier to overcome the obstacles to agreement imposed by his own Foreign Minister. Trips to Moscow and Arms to Pakistan The Tashkent Declaration disappointed many people because it brought final solution to the lndo—Pakistani problems no nearer. After Tashkent India's attitude hardened, as evidenced by its refusal even to discuss the Kashmir dispute at the subsequent Indo— Pakis- tani ministerial conferences in January-February 1966. Thus Tashkent, like such other Indo—Pakistani agreements as the Liaquat—Nehru pact of 1950, produced no more than a short pause in the course of perennial Indo—Pakistani disputes and tensions. 177 ' As the architect of Tashkent, the Soviet Union was not happy to see its souring, and it urged both sides to keep up "the Tashkent spirit." Pakistan tried again to persuade the Soviet leaders that the stumbling block to improvement in subcontinent relations was India's refusal to discuss the basic issues. In previous years the U.S.S.R. had invariably heaped blame on Pakistan, but now, thanks to the better understanding between the two countries, Pakistan was not blamed alone for the evaporation of the Tashkent spirit." Moreover, The Soviet Union, while not admitting it publicly, seemed to feel that Pakistan's fears over the massive arms buildup in India were both genuine and reasonable. The Pakis- tani leaders believed that the Soviet Union, having finally grasped the complexities of the situation, realized that if peace in the subcontinent was to be maintained, something must be done to alleviate their apprehensions arising from the new military imbalance. The Soviet Union did not wish to reduce or curtail its military shipments to India, but it could not longer be flatly indifferent to Pakistan's requests for military supplies. 16

"The improvement of our relations with Pakistan is cause for satisfaction," Premier kosygin reported to the Supreme Soviet in 1966. "The Soviet Union, for its part, intends to take further steps to expand Soviet—Pakistan ties." I7 Indicative of the new Soviet openmin- dedness required for such an expansion of ties was an article by S. Mikoyan that appeared in Mhovaya ckonomika I mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (MEMO) (No. 2, I 966). This discussion of the Tashkent Conference included references to the history of Kashmir by armed tribesmen from Pakistan in October 1947. But, in a marked departure from earlier Soviet writings, the article summarized Pakistan's case on Kashmir as well as India's. Bbth sides must display fortitude, flexibility, and goodwill, said the author. "If India categorically refused to speak about Kashmir at all," Mikoyan added, "one could hardly expect Pakistan's president to remain at the conference table.'18

In this changed atmosphere both Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Ayub travelled to the U.S.S.R.

Mrs. Gandhi paid her first visit to Moscow as the Indian Prime Minister from July 12 to July 16, 1966. She received at least as warm a welcome as had her predecessors since 1955, and she held talks with the Soviets in what was reported by the Indian and Soviet press to be an "atmosphere of friendship and understanding." Indo—Soviet bilateral relations were discussed, and the two sides expressed identical views of many major international issues. Or: these, Mrs. Gandhi seemed to have gone farther than had Nehru and Shastri in endorsing the Soviet viewpoint. Pravda reported on July 17:

The two sides expressed concern in connection with the deterioration of the' international situation and the growth of the danger of war that has taken place recently as a result of aggressive actions of imperialist and other reactionary forces....

The Pravda article went on to detail Indo—Soviet agreement on "the dangerous situation in Southeast Asia" and on the "obstacle in the path to cooperation among states" imposed by foreign military bases. (The tensions caused in many parts of the world by Soviet policies, actions, and military bases were conveniently forgotton).

Earlier, from April 23 to April 30, talks were conducted in Moscow among the chiefs—First Secretary Brezhnev among them —of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and India. On May 1, 1966, Pravda noted that India "pursues a policy of non-alignment which is in its vital interest and promotes the preservation of peace and security"; and the Communist party of India, Pravda reported, "expressed satisfaction with the strengthening of

178 friendship and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and India and expressed the hope that this friendship would continue and develop...." The CPI, under the direction of the CPSU, thus endorsed Mrs. Gandhi's policy.

Mrs. Gandhi made a twelve-day tour of Eastern Europe in October 1967, and the Soviet press paid her high tributes. '9

Ayub journeyed to the U.S.S.R. for the third and last time in September 1967. He told Kosygin —who among Soviet leaders seemed particularly aware of Pakistan's difficulties— his version of lndo—Pakistani relations, and the Premier recalled his recent talks with the Foreign Minister and other Indian officials. "What they say," remarked Kosygin, "is 180 de- grees different from what you have stated."' Both Indians and Pakistanis wanted the same goods from the U.S.S.R.; with the Soviet attitude toward his country considerably relaxed, the President was seeking Soviet arms. Moscow did not need to be told that the U.S. decision to cut off military supplies to the subcontinent2I had hurt Pakistan more because its Chinese military assistance was no match for the huge Soviet military shipments to India.

The Soviet leaders listened to Ayub's pleas with 'greater understanding if not with more sympathy than in 1965, and they were no happy to see Pakistan becoming solely dependent upon China for military assistance. Kosygin's question for Ayub, however, was blunt: "Does Pakistan believe that it could stay in the pacts and yet ask for the assistance of the Soviet Union for the solution of its problems with India?" Pakistan had already begun the process of disengagement from the pacts, Ayub replied, but did not want to incur the wrath of the United States by wrecking the pacts through a formal walk out. To satisfy the Soviets, Ayub indicated that he would give notice of termination for the U.S. intelligence communications center at Badabar. This was a significant move, and Ayub secured Soviet assurance that this request for arms would be given due consideration. For his part, Ayub expressed readiness to promise that Pakistan "will not misuse the arms supplied by the Soviet Union"; . Ayub was prepared to "give any guarantee—any that will satisfy you or any reasonable person that peace will not be disturbed in that part of the world." He concluded: "Our policy is very clear: we wish security; our main problem is economic development. We do not wish to retard that process."

Having promised to consider seriously the question, the Soviet leaders asked for more time to decide on Pakistan's request for arms. Ayub pointed out that Pakistan had been seeking an answer for two years, and Brezhnev interjected, "Pakistan has already waited for two years, now that period may be reduced by one-fourth, i.e., wait for another six months." The decision came seven months later.

The notice of closure for the Badabar base was given in early 1968, and promptly in April 1968 Kosygin made the first visit to Pakistan by a Soviet head of state or government. The Premier expressed great satisfaction with Pakistan's decision regarding the Badabar base, which had been maintained for activity against the U.S.S.R. Kosygin also noted his concern about Pakistan's growing ties with Peking. (Similarly, the Chinese warned Pakistan about friendship with Moscow. "Just as you know India in a better way," the Chinese leaders told Ayub, "so we know the Soviet Union better than you." Pakistan was beginning to experience great difficulty in maintaining good relations with both Moscow and Peking as much difficulty as that of the early 1960s when it sought to have friendship with both Washington and Peking. For a nation of the subcontinent to maintain good relations with two major powers can be as tricky as for a major power to maintain good relations with the two leaders of the subcontinent).

179 It was during this visit that Kosygin agreed to sell a modest quantity.of arms to Pakis- tan. This marked a grand success for Ayub's diplomacy. It had been a long and complicated journey from Khrushchev's threats of rocket annihilation to arms supplies from Moscow. Analyzing the objectives of the Soviet decision, the Financial Times (London) wrote on July 23, 1968: _

The Soviet decision...seems to have been motivated from three considerations: (1) A collusion of interests between the Soviet Union and the U.S. to maintain the status quo in the Indian subcontinent; in other words, helping India and Pakistan in turn with military equipment just enough to ensure that one does not become so strong as to present a threat to the other.... (2) The Soviet Union was becoming so worried about the increasing dependence of Pakistan on Chinese military aid that Moscow thought it best to wean Pakistan away from Peking by offering her arms; the Soviets knew that this would offend India but they thought it was a risk they would have to take. (3) One direct concession which the Soviet Union probably hopes to win from Pakistan is permission to establish observation posts in Pakistan, particularly East Pakistan. Moscow has been getting increasingly worried about the Chinese influence in Cambodia, Burma and the Himalayan region and observation posts in East Pakistan would be a very valuable asset to Moscow in its long-term plans to check Chinese moves in the area....

With the decision to sell arms to Pakistan, which wrought new and powerful leverage, the Soviet Union emerged as the most important and influential of the three major powers in the affairs of the subcontinent. It was a remarkable diplomatic achievement; within fifteen years the Soviet Union had risen from a state of hardly any power in either India or Pakistan to become the dominant foreign agent, and perhaps the mostmenacing, both in the South Asian subcontinent and in the Indian Ocean.

That dominance was only possible, of course, through gingerly treatment of India in the wake of the announcement of the Pakistani arms deal, and gingerly treatment we.i applied. An episode in U.S.—Pakistani relations provides an interesting contrast here. Presi- dent Kennedy assured Ayub that Pakistan would be consulted if and when the United States initiated military aid to India; but in 1962, when the United States decided to give arms to India; that pledge was not honored.22 The Pakistani reaction was hysterical. Bitter debates raged in the National Assembly, a United States Information Service library at Rawalpindi burned, and much goodwill, laboriously built up over a number of years by both countries, went up in the flames that consumed the effigies of President Kennedy in city streets.

Both the Soviet Union and India showed much greater maturity and wisdom six years later, demonstrating that their friendship could stand time's test and that their diplomats could handle the most delicate issue in Indo—Soviet relations with the care it required. Kosygin expected adverse reaction from India over the decision to sell arms to its neighbor, and on his return from Pakistan he stopped at New Delhi to consult with Mrs. Gan- dhi. The Premier stressed that arms sales to Pakistan neither harmed India's vital national interest nor vitiated its ties with Moscow. Mrs. Gandhi officially protested the arms sales, but she accepted the Soviet assurances. In her first public statement on the question, the Prime Minister said in Calcutta on July 9, 1968, that although "naturally we are not happy with the Soviet decision," there would be no change in India's policy toward the Soviet Union."' In Lok Sabha, the Indian Parliament, members of the opposition Swatantra party sought to cen- sure the government for what they called the "failure of its foreign policy as evidenced by the Soviet decision to give arms tn Pakistan"; in response, Mrs. Gandhi stated that India was 180 bound to state its "misgivings and apprehensions," but she noted that she did not question the Soviet Union's right to supply arms to Pakistan or doubt that the Soviets acted in good faith. The opposition's adjournment motion was rejected on July 22, 1968, by 206 to 61.24

The idea of such regional grouping was not new when, in early 1969, Kosygin suggested in Kabul that a cooperative organization be established by Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iran, and the Soviet Union. The Afghan Foreign Minister put forth a similar proposal in 1966, and the United States endorsed the idea for the subcontinent in 1967 when it resumed economic aid to Pakistan and India.25 Pakistan itself was an exponent of regional cooperation, taking the initiative for collaboration and development among Iran, Turkey, and itself. But Kosygin's plan only appeared innocuous: it was intended to consolidate the Soviet position and to contain the Chinese in South Asia. Moreover, Pakistan had always maintained that meaningful economic cooperation was not possible when political relations among the potential partners were strained—as were its own with Afghanistan and India.

During his second Pakistani visit within thirteen months in May 1969, Kosygin met at length with Yahya Khan, who had assumed the presidency on March 25, and urged him to accept the regional grouping proposa1.26 Kosygin shrewdly stressed only the economic aspects. He said that in the past the Pakistani government, aided by the capitalist countries, had engaged in "vain efforts" to eliminate the nation's widespread poverty—in this context he apparently sought to please Yahya by referring to the failure of Ayub's economic policy. Pakis- tan welcomed Kosygin's offer of Soviet development aid and trade, but the President was warned by his foreign policy experts, including me, "to be cautious of involvement in the Soviet Union's more far-reaching economic proposals with political overtones." Kosygin pushed ahead, pressuring Yahya to accept his proposal for a conference of Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union at the Deputy Foreign Minister level "to discuss the question of transit trade." He added that "Iran and Turkey could also be brought into this arrangement [the conference of deputy ministers]." Yahya, a simple man and a novice in diplomatic dialogues with a major power, accepted Kosygin's conference proposal in the belief that this acceptance did not represent a commitment to join the proposed grouping; the Soviet Pre- mier got the impression that Pakistan had endorsed his economic proposals.

When the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan began to remind him of his previous intention to send representatives to the deputy foreign ministers' conference, the President tried to avoid the issue. On July 10, 1969, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, calling the Soviet plan of "little economic advantage," said that Pakistan would not join an "alliance opposed to China."22 Analyzing Pakistan's turn away from the Kosygin plan, the Indian newspaper Hin- dustan Times on May 23, 1969, mentioned Pakistan's concern that a system of cooperation which includes a "giant-like Soviet Union" might work to the disadvantage of the Asian countries. It was, however, the suspicion that Moscow was forming a political league against China that was the main factor in Pakistan's refusal. Kosygin himself had firmly planted this suspicion. "China is not interested in peace in this region," the Premier told Yahya during their talks on the proposed group, "while the Soviet Union wants peace and stability in the region." The Pakistanis found it as hard to agree with this assessment as they did to believe what Kosygin said to Yahya next. During their meeting in Peking in fall 1964, said Kosygin, 181

Mao told him that "China should be given a free hand in Asian affairs while the Soviet Union should have a free hand in Europe." Kosygin claimed that the Soviet Union could not agree and that this refusal caused "friction between the Soviet Union and China." Kosygin also levelled charges concerning "China's involvement in East Pakistan." Yahya replied, "there is no such evidence." In fact, Pakistan was more worried about direct Indian and indirect Soviet involvement in East Pakistan.

New Delhi and Kabul received Kosygin's proposals more favorably. This was evident from the joint communique issued after Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Afghanistan in June 1969 and from an Indo-Soviet agreement signed in March 1970. Under this agreement India agreed to finance a road from Kandahar in Afghanistan (linked by road to the Soviet border) to the Iranian border, there to join an Iranian-built road to the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas. The Soviet Union would thus obtain an outlet, much needed since the closing of the Suez Canal, for its trade to South and Southeast Asia-the route would pass through Af- ghanistan and Iran but bypass Pakistan. In July 1970 the Soviet Union also completed another sector of highway in Afghanistan, a highway that ultimately will lead from the Soviet Union to modern roads reaching down to Pakistan; the Soviets may hope to use this route, in preference to the sea route via Vladivostok, for the delivery of naval stores to their growing Indian Ocean fleet.

REFERENCES

I. New Times, January 19,1965. 2. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 3. See Ayub's speech on Sept. 23 in Dawn, Sept. 24, 1965. 4. "Soviet Press Comment" Central Asian Review, no. 4, 1965, pp. 372-373. 5. /bid. 6. Pravda, Sept. IS, 1965. 7. See Chapter 9. 8. See chapters. 9. The Times (London), Sept. 7, 1965. 10. See Chapter 9. 11. See New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, The Times (London), and The Guardian (London), January 1966. 12. See Choudhury, op. cit., pp. 216-222. 13. See the statement of F. Jinnah (the founder's sister and Ayub's opponent in the 1964 presidential election) in Dawn, Jan. 12, 1966. 14. See the text of the declaration in Dawn and Pravda, Jan. II, 1966. • I S. The Soviet news agency :Tass made the denial, reported in Dawn and Pravda, Feb. 4, 1969. 16. Based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 17. Pravda, Aug. 4, 1966. 18. "Tashkent Conference," Central Asian Review, no. 3, 1966, pp. 274-278. 19. The Soviet reaction was reported in The Statesman, Oct. 20, 1967; Pravda, Oct. 25, 1967. 20. Except where otherwise indicated, the following account of Ayub's Moscow visit and Kosygin's return visit is based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 21. See Chapter 5. 22. Oehlert, op. cit. 23. The Statesman, July 10, 1968. 24. /bid. 25. See Chapter 6 26. Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based on my research and personal interview's in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 27. Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), July 11, 1969.

182 READING 15

(Excerpts from 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis', by S. M. Burke, Karachi, Oxford UniversiW Press 1975).

Reproduced with Permission

he gradual shift in Soviet policy from one of complete support of India to one of neutrality in Indo—Pakistani disputes, which had been perceptible to insiders for some- T time, became manifest to all during the Kutch war. Reflecting the view of 'Soviet official circles', Tass, in a statement circulated on 8 May, expressed the hope that India and Pakistan would settle the Kutch dispute by peaceful means 'with consideration for the interests of both sides'.'

When the Consortium meeting was postponed, the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan declared that 'some concrete proposals' were being discussed between Moscow and Rawal- pindi for economic and other assistance to Pakistan.2 On 20 August the Soviet Union made a Rs. 1.5 crore loan to Pakistan for the purchase of machinery for airport construction.

In the meantime the situation in Kashmir was becoming increasingly dangerous because of the escalating Indian military offensive across the ceasefire line. Pravda wrote: We would like that Soviet—Pakistani relations like our traditional friendship with India, be a stabilizing factor in Asia and facilitate a normalization of the relations between Pakistan and India/3

On 4 September Kosygin wrote to Shastri and Ayub, expressing concern at the military conflict in an area directly adjacent to the borders of the Soviet Union', and offered the good offices of the Soviet Union towards a peaceful settlement of Indo— Pakistani differences!' When India crossed the international frontier, Kosygin, for the first time, was more critical of one party than the other. He took exception to India's action and asked New Delhi to order ceasefire and withdraw Indian forces behind the ceasefire line in Kashmir and the international frontier elsewhere.' The Soviet Union no doubt believed that, if China entered the war on the side of Pakistan, the USA would join India. Apart from the unpredictable. consequences of a major war on Soviet borders, such a development would have brought Pakis- tan under the complete domination of China and India under that of the USA, undermining Soviet influence in both the major South Asian countries.

• On 17 September Kosygin renewed his offer to mediate between India and Pakistan in more specific terms. He invited the two Governments to confer on Soviet territory, at Tash- kent 'for instance', and added that he too could 'take part in this meeting', if desired by both sides.6 Ayub replied that, for such a meeting to be successful, the ground would first have to be prepared, and suggested that this be done in the Security Council in which the Soviet Union was a 'most influential and important member' .7 Shastri said the Soviet proposal could be considered only after the cessation of military activities and the creation of a calmer

183 atmosphere.8 To convince Pakistanis of Russia's impartiality, the Soviet Embassy in Karachi issued a press commentary on 12 November which stated: 'Attempts are made at times to claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly not objective and is inclined to support one side at the expense of the other. Such opinions are far from the reality/9

In the meantime it was becoming increasingly clear that, with the acceptance of the ceasefire by the parties and the withdrawal of the Chinese ultimatum, the Security Council had lost its sense of urgency to strive for a solution of the Kashmir dispute. The Russians, however, were still pressing India and Pakistan to confer at Tashkent. Dmitry Polyansky, a member of the Presidium of the CPSV Central Committee, said in Moscow, 'It is the sincere desire of the Soviet Union that the dangerous conflict between India and Pakistan should be completely extinguished.' I°

Seeing the Soviet offer of mediation as the only possible chance fora Kashmir settle- • ment, Pakistan now showed greater eagerness to avail herself of the Soviet invitation than India, who wished the status quo to remain undisturbed. Foreign Minister Bhutto announced Pakistan's affirmative response on 11 November." Shastri dragged his feet for sometime and consented to meet Ayub only after the latter had agreed to discuss the 'total relationship' between India and Pakistan.' A Soviet Government communique formally announced on 8 December that Shastri and Ayub would meet at Tashkent on 4 January 1966.

The Tashkent conference lasted from 4 to 10 January. Premier Kosygin earned the praise of both sides for his untiring efforts to get Ayub and Shastri to subscribe to a joint 'De- claration'.13 As neither party wished to resume hostilities, the declaration was in the nature of a face-saving compromise, capable of being interpreted in different ways. In concrete terms its main achievement was the agreement between the parties to withdraw, not later than 25 February 1966, 'all armed personnel' to the positions held before 5 August 1964. A date in early August had to he chosen as the fixed point if Indian forces were to be evicted from all the territory they had seized in their offensive into Azad Kashmir during that month. August 5 was a convenient date because the parties were agreed that infiltration from Azad Kashmir into Indian—held Kashmir had begun on that day. In accepting it as the guidepost for withdrawal of forces, neither side gave up its basic contentions. Each held to its own position on the question of who the infiltrators were and why they had crossed the ceasefire line.

Neither party at Tashkent obtained what it had earlier declared to be its essential conditions for withdrawal behind the original boundaries. The Pakistanis did not get a self- executing machinery for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. They had to be content with the pale assurances that both sides 'will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to bei.11 countries', and that both sides had 'recognized the need to set up joint Pakistani—Indian bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken'. The Indians had to vacate all the territory in Azad Kashmir without obtaining any clear guarantee that there would be no repetition of armed infiltration from Azad Kashmir. 'The issue of the infiltrators to which Mr. Sahstri and India attached great importance,' commented an Indian columnist, 'practically faded out of the Tashkent discussion.' 14 Other Indian demands that were also rejected by Pakistan were: (a) that the Declaration should contain a clause to dissuade Pakistan from having relations • with third countries of a nature that might injure the vital interests of India: this was obviously meant to circumscribe Pakistan's friendly relations with China;15 (b) the freezing of the ceasefire line as the permanent border; (c) a no-war pact, without a definite arrangement for the settlement of disputes. I 6

1 84 c I.

The Indians claimed that the parties' reaffirmation, in the Declaration, of 'their obli- gation under the 1UN1 Charter, not to have recourse to force', amounted to a no—war declaration. Bhutto quoted Article 51 of the Charter that 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' and argued that nothing in the Charter p'recluded Pakistan's right to assist Kashmiris, who are victims of Indian aggression.17 According to the Indians, the agreement in the declaration not to interfere in the 'internal affairs of each other' barred Pakistan from interference with India's possession of Kashmir. Pakistanis replied that a disputed territory cannot be regarded as the internal affair of one of the claimants.

Of the three participants in the discussions at Tashkent, the Soviet Union was the only one to emerge with unqualified satisfaction. The Times had observed that the Soviet Union was trying to open a lock that has no key'I8 Soviet success in getting Pakistan and India to talk on neutral ground, and agree to a statement, was a feat no other country had performed before. It greatly raised the prestige of the Soviet Union in the Afro—Asian arena where she was competing for influence with China. Soviet diplomacy, long successfully excluded from the subcontinent by the British presence there, had made a dramatic breakthrough and proved itself a major factor in the power politics of South Asia. Finally, Russia, hitherto often labelled a potential aggressor by the West, was able dramatically to project herself as a peacemaker at a time when the US was escalating the war in Vietnam.

China did not relish the sight of the Soviet Union playing such an influential role in South Asian affairs. She must have felt, also that the Soviet Union was trying to wean Pakis- tan away from the close relationship China had so assiduously built up with her. The Ren Min Ribao alleged that the Declaration was 'a product of joint US—Soviet plotting' and that the objective of the Soviet Union had been 'to weaken the united struggle against imperialism in Asia and Africa'.I9 A resolution of the Afro—Asian Writers' Conference at Peking, in June 1966, stated that the 'notorious' Tashkent Conference had been 'designed, under the fraudu- lent screen of "peaceful" settlement of Indci— Pakistani disputes, to get Pakistan to join with India for "joint defence against China":20

(For further study see Reading 18 of this Block)

REFERENCES

I. Asian Recorder, 1965, p. 6464. 2. Dawn, 30 July 1965. 3. Ibid., 25 Aug. 1965. 4. Pakistan Horizon, 4th Quarter 1965. 5. Hindu Weekly, 20 Sept. 1965. 6. Pakistan Horizon, 4th Quarter 1965. 7. Dawn, 26 Sept. 1965. 8. Observer, 26 Sept. 1965. • 9. Dawn, 14 Nov. 1965, quoted in Pgkistatillorizon, 4th Quarter 1965. 10. Soviet News, 9 Nov..I965. I I. Hindu Weekly, 15 Nov. 1965.

i 85 12. Hindu Weekly, 29 Nov. 1965. 13. For text of the Tashkent Declaration see Asian Recorder, 1966, p. 6896. 14. K. Rangaswami in Hindu Weekly, 24 Jan. 1966. Shastri had said that India would not withdraw from Haji Fir even lithe whole world went against her. K. C. Saxena, Pakistan, Her Relations with India, 1947-1966, p. 265. IS. I Dawn, 21 Jan. 1966. 16. -Ibid., 30 Jan. 1966; see also Hindu Weekly, 24 Jan. 1966. 17. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 15 March 1966, p.504. IS. The Times, 3 Jan. 1966. 19. Quoted in Dawn, 16 Feb. 1966. 20. Peking Review, 1 April 1966, quoted by B. S. Gupta in 'A Maoisi Line for India', The China Quarterly, Jan.-March 1966, p.9.

186 READING 16

(Excerpts from 'India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Major Power: A Politics of Divided Subconti- nent,' by G. W Choudhly, New York, The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission. he idea of such regional grouping was not new when, in early 1969, Kosygin suggested in Kabul that a cooperative organization be established by Pakistan, Af- Tghanistan, India, Iran, and the Soviet Union. The Afghan Foreign Minister put forth a similar proposal in 1966, and the United States endorsed the idea for the subcontinent in 1967 when it resumed economic aid to Pakistan and India.' Pakistan itself was an exponent of regional cooperation, taking the initiative for collaboration and development among Iran, Turkey, and itself. But Kosygin's plan only appeared innocuous: it was intended to consolidate the Soviet position and to contain the Chinese in South Asia. Moreover, Pakistan had always maintained that meaningful economic cooperation was not possible when political relations among the potential partners were strained—as were its own with Afghanistan and India. During his second Pakistani visit within thirteen months in May 1969, Kosygin met at length with Yahya Khan, who had assumed the presidency on March 25, and urged him to accept the regional grouping proposa1.2 Kosygin shrewdly stressed only the economic aspects. He said that in the past the Pakistani government, aided by the capitalist countries, had engaged in "vain efforts" to eliminate the nation's widespread poverty—in this context he apparently sought to please Yahya by referring to the failure of Ayub's economic policy. Pakis- tan welcomed Kosygin's offer of Soviet development aid and trade, but the President was warned by his foreign policy experts, including me, "to be cautious of involvement in the Soviet Union's more far-reaching economic proposals with political overtones." Kosygin pushed ahead, pressuring Yahya to accept his proposal for a conference of Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union at the Deputy Foreign Minister level "to discuss the question of transit trade." He added that "Iran and Turkey could also be brought into this arrangement [the conference of deputy ministers]." Yahya, a simple man and a novice in diplomatic dialogues with a Major power, accepted Kosygin's conference proposal in the belief that this acceptance did not represent a commitment to join the proposed grouping; the Soviet Pre- mier got the impression that Pakistan had endorsed his economic proposals.

In the meantime, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the military intelligence pointed out to Yahya the grave implications of a,Soviet-built political grouping on China's south-west flank. Such publications as Dawn and the Pakistan Times also lambasted the idea of Pakistan's joining the Soviet-sponsored economic community, and Yahya finally realized his mistake.

187 When the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan began to remind him of his previous intention to send representatives to the deputy foreign ministers' conference, the President tried to avoid the issue. On July 10, 1969, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, calling the Soviet plan of "little economic advantage," said that Pakistan would not join an "alliance opposed to China."3 Analyzing Pakistan's turn away from the Kosygin plan, the Indian newspaper Hin- dustan Times on May 23, 1969, mentioned Pakistan's concern that a system of cooperation which includes a "giant-like Soviet Union" might work to the disadvantage of the Asian countries. It was, however, the suspicion that Moscow was forming a political league against China that was the main factor in Pakistan's refusal. Kosygin himself had firmly planted this suspicion. "China is not interested in peace in this region," the Premier told Yahya during their talks on the proposed group, "while the Soviet Union wants peace and stability in the region." The Pakistanis found it as hard to agree with this assessment as they did to believe what Kosygin said to Yahya next. During their meeting in Peking in fall 1964, said Kosygin, Mao told him that "China should be given a free hand in Asian affairs while the Soviet Union should have p free hand in Europe." Kosygin claimed that the Soviet Union could not agree and that this refusal caused "friction between the Soviet Union and China." Kosygin also levelled charges concerning "China's involvement in East Pakistan." Yahya replied, "there is no such evidence." In fact, Pakistan was more worried about direct Indian and indirect Soviet involvement in East Pakistan. New Delhi and Kabul received Kosygin's proposals more favorably. This was evident from the joint communique issued after Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Afghanistan in June 1969 and from an Indo—Soviet agreement signed in March 1970. Under this agreement India agreed to finance a road from Kandahar in Afghanistan (linked by road to the Soviet border) to the Iranian border, there to join an Iranian-built road to the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas. The Soviet Union would thus obtain an outlet, much needed since the closing of the Suez Canal, for its trade to South and Southeast Asia—the route would pass through Af- ghanistan and Iran but bypass Pakistan. In July 1970 the Soviet Union also completed another sector of highway in Afghanistan, a highway that ultimately will lead from the Soviet Union to modern roads reaching down to Pakistan; the Soviets may hope to use this route, in preference to the sea route via Vladivostok, for the delivery of naval stores to their growing Indian Ocean fleet. One of the ironies of the feud with China is that it led the Soviets to the very "Dul- lesism"— the propagation of military pacts — that it had damned for more than fifteen years. The proposed Soviet collective security system in Asia was introduced to the world by First Secretary Brezhnev in his speech to the international meeting of the Communist parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969.4 A few days before, lzvesba gave some details of the proposed security plan, which was described as a defensive measure to safeguard the independence of Asian countries against "imperialist aggression and newo-colonialism."6 That its real aim was to restrict Chinese influence becomes clear from an analysis of the Soviet envoys' and leaders' diplomatic dialogues with the Pakistanis, the Indians, and others. In fact, as I told Yahya after carefully reading the minutes of his July 1969 talks with the Soviet Ambassador, the plan called for nothing but "the Russian version of SEATO."6 Following a Moscow conference of Soviet envoys, the Ambassador to Pakistan called on Yahya as well as the Pakistan Foreign Secretary to try to sell the Brezhnev scheme. He described the proposed plan in lofty terms, stressing such features as "non-interference in internal affairs of signatory countries" and "economic, cultural and scientific cooperation". The Ambassador pointed out to the Foreign Secretary "the inadequacy of economic collaboration" under SEATO and CENTO in contrast to the more worthwhile collaboration under the Soviet plan.

188 But upon being question about security aspects of the plan, the Soviet Ambassador had to reveal its main purpose, which had to do, not with economic cooperation, but with China. The specifics of the proposed security agreement also made this plan. For example, the signatories would not enter into any alliance, formal or informal, with a third country that might be hostile to any member countries, nor should they "make any commitment inconsistent with the proposed Asian Security Plan". The anti-China slant was also indicated by the fact that Brezhnev announced the plan only three months after the most serious armed conflict todate on Sino-Soviet borders; the chances of a full-scale Soviet attack on China could not be ruled out, and there was speculation, not entirely baseless, that the Soviet might strike at the Chinese nuclear installations. Moreover, lithe proposed security plan could be used against a nation that Pakistan considered a friend, it apparently could not be used against Pakistan's true enemy. Yahya wanted to know what help, if any, the Brezhnev plan would offer "in case of an aggression committed by one member country against another" — such as would be the case in a repetition of the 1965 Indo- Pakistani war. The answer was as evasive as it was rhetorical: "The Asian Security Plan will put an end to such regional conflicts which the Imperialist countries like USA and expansionist ones like China encouraged".

Pakistan were practically unanimous in opposing the Brezhnev plan. The army made it clear to the policy makers that it would not allow them to respond favourably (although they were not inclined to do so anyway), and the press also scorned the plan.' Nur Khan, to assure Peking that Pakistan would never be a party to any direct or indirect anti- China move, ecnomic, political, or military. "Pakistan shall not succumb to Soviet pressure," Nur Khan told Premier Chou En-lai during extensive talks on July 13 and 14.

Reaction to the proposed Asian collective security system was not much more encouraging elsewhere. On a September 1969 Moscow visit to discuss the plan, Indian Foreign Minister Singh first commented rather favorably: "India welcomes the proposal... the essence of the Soviet Plan is the development of cooperation among the Asian countries for the purpose of strengthening peace".9 But in view of India's traditional opposition to any form of military pact, Singh had to modify his position after he returned to New Delhi. Enthusiasm for the plan in other Asian countries was no greater than that for Dulles's Manila Pact (SEATO) in the mid-1950s.

The Soviets continued to extol the proposed security system's virtues and advantages to Asian countries—just as they denounced any form of alliance to which "the imperialists belong" —but without much apparent -effect. The Soviet press launched a major campaign in December 1969, when the third ministerial meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) took place in Malaysia. On December 15 Moscow Radio proposed that a new regional grouping be formed with the assistance and participation of the Soviet Union as a "state with territory both in Europe and Asia." The Soviet claim that it was not merely a European power was first advanced, as we have seen, in 1964 by India in the attempt to include the U.S.S.R. in the Second Afro—Asian Conference, and since the Tashkent Conference the Soviet Union had been working particularly hard to establish its Asian credentials. During his visit to Pyongyang in the summer of 1970 Brezhnev claimed that Spviet ideas on European security were gaining approval and support from European publics and governments; "in the opinion of the Soviet Government," he said, similar ideas would also prove "quite acceptable" for the Asian continent.9 But the Asian countries approached about the Soviet collective security system remained unimpressed.

President Yahya Khan scheduled a five-day visit to Moscow beginning June 22, 1969, and both the Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan and the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow

189 indicated that the Kremlin leaders would give top priority to the Asian security system in the dialogues. I was among those advisers in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Economic Affairs who prepared the President for the trip; having joined his Cabinet in Oc- tober 1969, I was in active consultation with Yahya in his final planning sessions before heading for Moscow. Since joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1967,1 had consistently warned both President Ayub Khan and President Yahya Khan of the Soviet designs in South Asia:! harbored no illusion about Soviet "friendship" for Pakistan.

During Yahya's lengthy talks with Kremlin leaders, Pakistan was assured of larger Soviet economic aid for the fourth five-year plan (1970-1975). Soviet assistance was promised for several industrial projects, including a million—ton steel—melting plant in Karachi.

But when Yahya raised the question of continued arms shipments to Pakistan, the Kremlin leaders demurred. Kosygin told Yahya, "You cannot expect Soviet arms while you are unwilling to endorse our Asian SecuritySystem." He added that the system would be the best guarantee for her [Pakistan's] territorial integrity," pointing ominously to an "explosive situation in East Pakistan," "dangers of foreign involvement there," and "China's role." Yahya and his government disagreed. "China," said the President, "is sincerely interested in Pakis- tan,s territorial integrity and sovereignty." Yahya, who by this time was acquainted with the technique of dealing with Soviet blackmail and blandishment, ended the dialogue with a polite but firm rejection of the Brezhnev and Kosygin proposals.

The Russians also sought to establish a radio relay communication centre near the site of the former American Badabar base. While innocuous in theroy, the proposal was revealed upon closer scrutiny as another clever Soviet device to make Pakistan sacrifice much more than it could hope to gain. As Communications Minister of the Yahya Cabinet, I examined the Soviet proposal and warned Yahya on the eve of his visit to the U.S.S.R. In a note to the President, I referred to the proposal as nothing but a "Russian version of the Badabar base" and worse; while it was easy to give notice to a Western country such as the United States to close a base, I said, "once you are in the Russian parlour, you are there forever."

Pakistan's rejection of the various proposals put forth by the U.S.S.R. as the "price" of military supplies doomed the era of better understanding and warmer relations between Moscow and Islamabad. In addition to their unwillingness to conform to Soviet plans and proposals, the Pakistanis annoyed the Soviet Union by providing links between Washington and Peking; their middleman's role was begun at the request of President Nixon during his twenty-two-hour visit to Pakistan in August 1969, and it culminated in the secret trip of Henry Kissinger to Peking via Rawalpindi in July 1971. The Soviet attitude toward Pakistan waxed harder and harder. On February 7, 1970, even before Yahya's June visit, New Times wrote a highly unfavourably article on Pakistan, thus reversing the attitude of the Soviet press, which had stopped its hostile comments on Pakistan after 1965.

Thus the Soviets were frowning at Pakistan when the Bangladesh crisis began in 1971. The relationship between this soured attitude and the prompt Soviet support for the Bangladesh movement was more than casual.

(For further study see Readings 13 and 14 of Block 3-4, Volume I)

What dividends can the Kremlin extract from Mrs. Gandhi for its support in the 1971 crisis? After the war, the Prime Minister was reported to have said, "We are unable to display 190 gratitude in any tangible sense for anything. '9 Yet the fact remains that India is securely knotted to the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets remain friends in what has become a rather unfriendly world. Partly as a result of its 1971 victory, India's diplomatic options today are not as wide as they were in the heyday of Nehru's nonalignment in the 1950s. Not only India's relations with the United States and China but even its image in the Third World soured as a result of the war—as demonstrated by the emerging nations' repudiation of India at the UN General Assembly in De- cember 1971.'1 Moreover, India and the Soviet Union share such common objectives as containment of China and prevention of Pakistani-rearming. (This rearming might be achieved 4 through the help of China, Iran, and others, perhaps including the United States—though Nixon told Bhutto in October 1973 that the United States would not supply weapons,I2 there is fear in New Delhi that Iran's vast acquisitions of U.S. arms might have a spillover effect for Pakistan.' 3 Similarly, New Delhi quivers over the proposed plan for the oil-producing gulf states to finance the manufacture of French Mirage aircraft plants located in Pakistan. 14) A final reason for powerful Soviet leverage in New Delhi, of course, is the load of weapons supplied the Indian Army; after, as before the war, security and Moscow's contribution to it are paramount considerations.

With its long traditions of opposition to any form of military pact, India faces a dilemma in Brezhnev's plan for Asian collective security. As pointed out earlier, Brezhnev deliberately kept his plan vague for sometime, but he and other Kremlin officials never missed an opportunity to harp on its virtues in their dialogues with Asian leaders. The Soviets tried to pass off the 1971 treaty of friendship, as well as the India—Bangladesh treaty of 1972, as preliminary steps toward the establishment of an Asian collective security system.15 Eventually they changed tactics, announcing publicly details of the plan. Among the principles that, ac - cording to Brezhnev, "collective security in Asia must, in our view, be based on" were renun- ciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for the sovereignty and inviolability of borders, non-interference in national affairs, and economic and other cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.16 The U.S.S.R. 's change in tactics probably resulted from the disappointing results of early attempts to win Asia over to the idea. Not only did Pakistan turn down Brezhnev, but Indian Foreign Minister Singh having initially expressed interest in Brezhnev's proposal, soon declared that India did not believe in the notion of big powers as the guardian of security for India or its neighbours.

As part of the new public campaign pushing the proposed pact, a Radio Peace and Progress commentary on March 23, 1972, suggested that both Bangladesh and Pakistan should enter into agreements with the Soviet Union on the model of the Indo—Soviet treaty of 1971. Principles embodied in the Indo— Soviet treaty, the commentator claimed , were applicable to "any other people of the Asian Continent who want to live independently and freely." ' 7 Brezhnev, shrewd enough to emphasize that in Asia the security system would not be of "military blocs," good-neighbourly cooperation by all interested states," claimed in his March 20, 1972, foreign policy speech to the Soviet Trade Union Congress that interest in his proposal was growing. Soviet press commentators repeatedly made the same claim,' 8 despite the fact that most Asian governments balked at joining the Russian-sponsored scheme because, if for no other reason, they did not care to be sucked into the Sino—Soviet spat. Kosygin commended the plan during the Moscow welcome for the Afghan Prime Minister on March 16, 1972, and the Premier's speech was broadcast in eleven Asian languages as well as English. Visits to Moscow in October by Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and the Shah of Iran gave the Soviets new opportunities to press their case.

191 In the face of the Soviets mid-1972 propaganda offensive, Asian governments remained unconvinced, and the Kremlin switches tactics again, this time reverting to non- governmental channels. They spread the Brezhnev plan gospel at a series of conferences, such as the Afro—Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) executive committee meeting in Aden in February 1973, the "peace" conventions in India and Nepal, and the Afro—Asian Women's Conference in Ulan Bator. A leading role in this new campaign was played by the World Peace Council (WPC), which held the Conference on Asian Security and Cooperation in Dacca May 23-26, 1973, this was a preliminary to the World Congress of Peace Forces, held in Moscow in October 1973, at which Brezhnev again spoke on his favourite idea for Asia.°

Meanwhile the Soviets were also "expanding economic ties in the name of establishing the 'material basis' of collective security."20 Hoping that friendship treaties with developing countries might contribute to the construction of a wider network under its aegis, the U.S.S.R. in 1972-19737-in an apparent attempt to revive Kosygin's 1969 trade and transit plan—began to stress the importance of greater economic cooperation as the basis for regional security. Moscow Radio told Asia on September 30, 1972, that the three subcontinent countries, as well as Afghanistan and Nepal, were interested in "setting [in motion] regional cooperation with Soviet participation"—a contention that, at least insofar as Pakistan was concerned, was erroneous. On October 2, 1972, Moscow Radio lauded the Soviet Union's economic relations with India, Afghanistan, and Iraq "as an example to other Asian countries." The Soviets' technique was to stress first, through these radio commentaries and other media, "innocuous economic cooperation" and then to reveal their primary desire for the security plan.

India, in particular, has been subject to the Soviets' economic inducements with security pact implications. The Soviet Union and India signed an agreement on September 19, 1972, to set up a Commission "on economic, scientific and technical cooperation," pre - sumably in accordance with article 6 of the 1971 friendship treaty. With the agreement stipulating that each country will take into account the needs of the other's economy when formulating national plans, one of the Commission's tasks is to supervise the implementation and operation ofjoint ventures.21 In September 1972, when Planning Minister D. P. Dhar visited the U.S.S.R. to secure assistance for India's fifth five-year plan, due to start in 1974, the pro-Moscow Indian newspaper Patriot even recommended that India be linked with the Soviet bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Mrs. Gandhi rejected the idea. But how well India fends off increasing Soviet pressure for 'economic cooperation' and then for security system membership—is to be watched carefully. The South Asia Triangle will shake if the Soviets manage to induce India and, through India, Bangladesh to endorse their economic and military moves in South and Southeast Asia.

In response to Iran's U.S.-aided arms buildup—and the possible implications of that buildup for Pakistan—Indian Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram dashed to Moscow on a ten clay visit beginning July?, 1973, with a long shopping list of Soviet weapons.22 Indian defense policy makers, engaged in formulating a security plan for the next five years, had modified their earlier calculations as the Shah of Iran pledged to "protect the territorial integrity" of "New" Pakistan. New Delhi thought Washington had helped prompt that pledge. "In India's eyes," noted The Guardian on July 9, 1973, "American objectives are much wider and in dude—apart from building up an anti-Soviet bulwark....—a considered policy to build up a counterpoise to India, now that Pakistan can no longer play this role." Iran is constructing at Chah Bahar, on the Markan coast barely 50 miles from the Pakistani border, a naval and air base bigger than any other it has built in this region. Since Indian naval superiority in the 192 Arabian Sea played a decisive role during the 1971 fighting, Indian admirals ate worried at the prospect of a modern Iranian fleet coming to Pakistan's aid in any future 14Øo—Pakistan war.28

The arming of Iran, principally by the United States, is resulting in additional leverage for the Kremlin because of the alarms it sounds in New Delhi. India is still militarily superior to Iran and Pakistan combined, and it would be native to think that the Shah will open his new arsenal to Pakistan for any military adventure against India. Yet the Indians have always been most sensitive to the slightest bulging of Pakistan's military potentialities, and Bhutto recent boast have not reassured them. In mid-1973 Bhutto told a Western correspondent that the fall of Dacca was the beginning of the fall of India" and that "because they beat us once they cannot beat us always."24 The Prime Minister's tone was "very different from [that ofl the man who signed the Simla agreement with Mrs. Gandhi a year ago"—a difference, as The Economist pointed out, that may be explained partly by Bhutto's volatile per- sonality; but Bhutto unquestionably has.been reinforced in his new mood "by the thought of all these Iranian fighter-bombers at his rear."25

Hence, despite India's growing dependence on Moscow for military help, Jagjivan Ram scurried to Moscow for more help that could only yield more dependence. "Although most Indians regard India as an autonomous center of powers and Indo—Soviet alliance as a coalition of two co-equals," Bhabani Sen Gupta candidly observed, "the fact remains that much of the recent accretion to India's influence is the result of the powerful support it received from the U.S.S.R."28 That a weakening of that support would cripple India is also a fact, and the Kremlin leaders are well aware of it.

Soviet fortunes in South Asia have waxed in intimate relation to Indo—Soviet ties. Departing from its initial period of indifference and hostility toward the subcontinent, the Soviet Union reexamined bourgeois nationalists movements and, by the mid- 1950s, began courting New Delhi. The relationship became increasingly close as Moscow sided with India during the 1962 war with China and the 1965 and 1971 Pakistani wars, as it delivered huge arms orders, and as it concluded the 1971 treaty of friendship. Now the Soviets were pushing for open alliance.

Between the time of the announcement on October 3, 1973, and Brezhnev's visit to India the following month, hardly a day elapsed without the Soviet papers describing the In- dians' anticipation of this "occurrence of tremendous importance," this "major, historic milestone"; "India hails Brezhnev's visit with its whole heart," claimed Moscow's press media.27 One of Brezhnev's main objectives in going to India was to counteract Chinese efforts to discredit the U.S.S.R. among nonaligned nations; Moscow fretted when Middle East elder statesman President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia echoed Peking's condemnation of "superpower hegemony." Peking's denial of great power status and its claim to champion "small and medium" countries unsettled Kremlin leaders, as did its support of the proposal put forward by Sri Lanka, Iran, and others for a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean; the proposal, according to china, furthered the "struggle against domination by some big powers and their efforts to create zones of influence."28 In addition, Soviet propagandists pointed to alleged Chinese inspiration for Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's call, made at a Tokyo press conference on May 11, 1973, for the formation of an international naval task force to counter growing Soviet influence.29

If India no longer spoke with "the global voice" as in the heyday of Nehru, it remained "in the great game of Sino—Soviet rivalry a very substantial piece on the board."3`) Thus

193

Brezhnev journeyed to India to squeeze out maximum political support and to check up on reports that New Delhi might begin to explore possibilities for improved relations with China-Moscow, of course, would regard such exploration as an unfriendly act.'

In regard to the Asian collective security plan, observers expected Brezhnev to carry with him to India one of two contrasting strategies. One was to drop the poorly received security plan altogether, inaugurating in its place a "peace offensive" in which India would be given the leading role. India would be praised as a stable and strong "bastion of anti-imperialism and peace," and its treaty of friendship with the U.S.S.R., augmented by additional fruitful aid and trade agreements, would serve as an • example for others to follow; Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and even Pakistan would be among potential signatories to friendship treaties along the lines of the Indian treaty of 1971.32 The other strategy that observers thought Brezhnev might pursue in India entailed not scrapping the collective sec- dray plan, but furthering it. The Soviet chief would pressure India to endorse his plan and thus not only cement the Soviet-Indian relationship bdt also render less likely Sino-Indian detente.

REFERENCES

1. See Chapter 6. 2. Except where otherwise indicated, this section is bised on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1967-1971. 3. Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), July 11 , 1969. 4. Pravda, June 8, 1969. 5. See V. V..Matveyev, "A Filled Vacuum," lzvestia, May 29, 1969. 6. Except where otherwise indicated, the remainder of this section is based on my research and personal interviews in Pakistan, 1969-1971. 7. See Pakistan Times and other Pakistani newspapers, June-July, 1969. 8. Pravda, Sept. 21, 1969. 9. /bid, Aug. 16, 1970. 10. New York Times, Feb. 17, 1972. 1 I. Rajan. "Bangladesh and After," op. cit. 12. New York Times and Washington Post, Sept. 19-21,1973. • 13. See the report of the Indian Economic and Scientific Research Foundation on National Security in Overseas IIin- duslan Times, Jan. 25, 1973. 14. Based on my research at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and at Columbia University's Research Insti- tute on Communist Affairs, 1971-1974. IS. See "Soviet-Indian Treaty in Action," New Times, no. 39, 1971, pp. 10-11. 16. Pravda, Mar. 21, 1972. 17. Donaldson, op. cit. p. 6. 18. See, for example, Tess, Oct. 20, 1972. 19. Based on my research at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs 1971-1974. 20. Donaldson, op. cit., p.27. 21. The Statesman, Sept. 20, 1972. 22. Daily Telegraph, July 9, 1973. 23. The Guardian, July 9, 1973. 24. The Economist, July 14,1973. 25. /bid. 26. Sen Gupta, "New Balance of Power," op. cit. 27. See The Times (London), Nov. 23, 1973. 28. See the Chinese Foreign Minister's speech in Tehran, June 16, 1973, in Dawn, June 17, 1973. 29. Pravda, May 13, 1973. , 30. See The Times (London), editorial, Nov. 26, 1973. 3!. See The Times (London), Nov. 23, 1973. 32. See The Observer, Nov. 28, 1973.

194 READING 17

(Excerpts from the article, Pak—Soviet Relations 1947-1987: An Appraisal by Syed Rifaat sain, 'Unpublished Paper', Department of International Relations; Quaid-i-Azarn University, Is- lamabad, 1987).

Reproduced with Permission

he reported Soviet official warning to Islamabad in June 1986' against its nuclear ambition is symptomatic of the deep deterioration which has occurred in the bilateral re- Tlations of the two countries in recent years. Admittedly, Pak—Soviet relations have never been very friendl9.2 At best they have been correct. Yet, they have never shown so vividly the kind of animadversion of Moscow concerning Pakistan's foreign policy attitudes as they are today. That Moscow should publicly forbid Islamabad from pursuing its nuclear option — matter of vital national security importance to Pakistan — indicates that all is not well and there is something fundamentally wrong in Pak—Soviet relations. The causes of this deep-running malaise are numerous. From the Soviet viewpoint, Islamabad's strategic relationship with Washington and Beijing, declared enemies of Moscow; its unwillingness to help Kremlin close its "bleeding wound" in Afghanistan; and its Islamic vocation are the primary causes of the animosity between the two countries. The former Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Smirnov, in his valedictory speeches in 1984 had mentioned three major Soviet grie• vances against Islamabad. these, in his words, were: "increase in Pakistan's involvement in the events in Afghanistan's, discrimination against the Soviet Embassy and other missions, and anti-Soviet propaganda in Pakistan."' In PakiStan's view, Moscow is a superpower which is hell bent on imposing its diktat over its immediate smaller neighbors. Moreover, Moscow supports Pakistan's chief adversary India and was directly responsible for Pakis- tan's dismemberment in 1971. In Moscow's continued occupation of Afghanistan, Is- lamabad sees an impending mortal threat to its own security. If Pakistan has assumed the mantle of a frontline state, Islamabad argues, then it was an externally imposed condition created by Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Islamabad also feels that Moscow has been totally insensitive to Pakistan's security needs and compulsions emanating from its difficult geo-strategic location and its multi-dimensional conflicts with its immediately neighbours especially India.

Given these conflicting perceptions of interests, roles and outlooks of the two countries it is not overly surprising that Islamabad and Moscow have had a troubled co-existence. The emergence of Pakistan's nuclear programme4 as a bone of contenion between the two countries will further aggravate their already tense relations. One may ask here are the two countries bound to remain on a collision course or is there any way the gulf in their divergent perceptions can be bridged? An answer to this all important question will inevitably involve judgements about Moscows's past and present policies towards Pakistan. The opinion in Pakistan is divided on this question. One can discern two diametrically opposed trends of thinking. These may be described as alarmists5 and rationalist6 schools of thought. One sen- tence description of the alarmist thesis is that "the Soviets are coming." Alarmists place great

195 emphasis on the ideological character of the Soviet state and argue that Marxism—Leninism is the major driving force of Soviet foreign policy. Since Pakistan is a Muslim state, it is argued, its very existence close to the Soviet borders esp. to Soviet Central Asia which has a large Muslim population is a threat to Moscow. In view of Moscow's professed atheism and Islamabad's unswerving commitment to Islamic principles, the argument goes, the twin shall never meet as friends.'

Another version of this alarmist thinking is the socalled "geotrategic" hypothesis' which looks upon contemporary Soviet policies towards Pakistan as essentially a continua . tion of the old Czarist tradition of southward push stemming from a Russian historic sense of geographic claustrophobia. Soviet military move into Afghanistan in 1979 and its subsequent intransigence to withdraw from that country has lent great credence and authentic- ity to this version of alarmist thinking. Alarmist view in both of its versions rules out the possibility of genuine amity between Moscow and Islamabad in view of their opposed philosophical outlooks and geo-political compulsions. Opposed to the alarmist thinking, the reigning orthodoxy, are views of the rationalists, a minority confined mainly to the intellectual elite of Pakistan which is sometimes hypercritical of Islamabad's strategic tilt towards Washington. Rationalists discount the pre-eminence given to ideological considerations or geo-political "push" forces as significant causative factors of Moscow's orientation towards Pakistan. Instead, they point to the historical emergence first of Islamabad—Washington, then Islamabad—Beijing axes and negative perception of these by Moscow as most important factors vitiating the development of friendly relations between the two countries. Rationalist argument sees the difficulties in Pak—Soviet relations as basically problems of statecraft and diplomatic alignment. The implication of their argument is that if Pakistan becomes a genuinely non-aligned country with a policy of splendid isolation from the triangular con flictual politics of Russia, America and China, then conditions for the possibility of genuine friendship between Moscow and Islamabad will indeed emerge.

Its minority status notwithstanding, the history of Pak—Soviet relations lends strong empirical support to the rationalist view. Constraints of space do not allow a detailed description of the factual history of Moscow's policies towards Pakistan. Nevertheless, a brief account of these is in order to make the point that by and large Moscow's foreign policy towards Pakistan has been one of flexibility, restraint and caution if not one of total understanding. So to begin at the beginning. The momentous event of Pakistan's birth went almost unnoticed in the Soviet Union. The only comment made by Stalin was not very flatter- ing. He is reported to have remarked "how primitive it was to create a state on the basis of religion."9 In spite of this attitude of benign neglect bordering on hostility soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1948, Moscow was the first Communist country to send an invitation to the Prime Minister Liaqat All Khan for a state visit. 1° For some hitherto unexplained mysterious reasons, Liaqat Ali never went to Mos- cow. Instead he ended up in Washington at a time when the cold war between Moscow and Washington was in full cry. This diplomatic snub, however, did not hamper the exchange of trade, cultural and medical missions between the two countries. In 1950 when the War between South and North Korea broke out Pakistan endorsed12 the UN sponsored, American backed military action against North Korea, a friend and military ally of Moscow. Pak—Soviet relations took a negative turn when in 1951 Prime Minister Liaquat directly implicated Mos- cow and the miniscule Communist Party of Pakistan in the famous Pindi Conspiracy case against his government:3 Following this both the countries imposed restrictions on the movement of each other's diplomatic personnel in their respective countries.' 4 It is significant to note that despite these negative developments in their bilateral relations, Moscow adopted a policy of strict neutrality vis-a-vis the Kashmir Issue between India and Pakistan.

196 This was reflected in Moscow's non-participation in the UN Security Council discussion of the Frank Graham Report in 1951.15 Nor did Moscow publicly endorse Afghan Irredentist claims against Pakistan on the so called Pakhtoonistan issue.' The historic shift in Mos- cow's attitudes of neutrality on these two cruCial issues of Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan came about only in 1955. And this happened after Pakistan became the most allied ally of the US, Moscow's arch enemy. Pakistan became a bona fide member of the Anglo-american backed anti-Soviet military alliances of SEATO and Baghdad Pact in 1955 and 1954, respectively. What worried Moscow the most at the time was the US potential use of its military bases in Pakistan for a nuclear strike against the Soviet heartland. As John Foster Dulles used the apocalyptic language of massive retaliation against the Soviets, Moscow grew increasingly hostile towards the American military presence in Pakistan. The inevitable result was a shift in its posture of neutrality on both the Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan issues. During his visit to India in December 1955 along with Nikita S. Khrushchev, Premier, Bulganin denounced the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO as aggressive military alliances. Speaking at Sringar on 10 De- cember, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union viewed with deep concern the establishment of military bases in Pakistan and regarded Kashmir as "one of the States of Republic of India which has been decided by the people of Kashmir."7 One week later, at a dinner in Kabul, Marshal Bulganin declared: "We sympathize with Afghanistan's policy on the Pakhtunistan issue." 8 Thus Soviet denunciations of Pakistan's membership in SEATO and Baghdad Pact went hand in hand with its support for India on the Kashmir Issue and for Kabul on the Pakhtoonistan question. Yet, and this is indeed truly remarkable, these Soviet pronouncements were not one of unmitigated hostility towards Pakistan. On the occasion of birthday celebrations of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali JInnah at the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow in 1956 A. I. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, declared: "Pacts or no Pacts, the Soviet Union wants cordial relations with Pakis- tan."19 In February 1956, the Soviet Union offered Pakistan to share technical knowledge on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.2° During the same year Moscow hinted at its willingness to construct a steel mill in Pakistan as it had done in India.

PART TWO

The tensions in Pak—Soviet relations caused by Pakistan's membership in anti- Soviet military alliances were aggravated after the military coup d' etat in Pakistan in October 1958. Ayub Khan's ostentatious endorsement of the American doctrine of containment could have hardly pleased Moscow.21 In Ayub Khan's proposal to India for a joint Pakis- tan—Indian mutual defence agreement22 as a bulwark against a breakthrough from the north, (i.e. from the USSR and China) towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, Moscow saw the revival of the old British power game directed against it. When the Ayub regime entered into negotiations with the United States with a view to concluding a bilateral military pact, Moscow expressed its alarm over this development. Pravda warned Pakistan that it was "playing with fire"?' Denouncing the move for the conclusion of a bilateral military agree ment between the United States and Pakistan, the Soviet Defense Ministry paper, the RH) STAR stated that the establishment of American bases in areas proximate to the Soviet fron tiers constituted a grave threat to the security of the Soviet UMon."24 It warned that "the Soviet Union had all the modern weapons needed to destroy the aggressor's bases wherever they may be."25 Pak—Soviet relations touched an all-time low after the famous "U-2" inci- clent.26 Reacting sharply to the fact that the American U-2 plane had flown from the US military base located in Peshawar, Pakistan, Premier Khruschev bluntly told Pakistani diplomats at a Czech Embassy function in May 1960: "If you continue to let the Americans fly from your - air bases into Russia, then we will not only shoot the US planes, but will have to aim our rockets at your bases as well."22 Four days later the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, sum

197 moned the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow and handed him a protest note and warned that "if similar provocation were repeated, the Soviet Union had the necessary means to render harmless bases providing such facilities."' The U-2 incident, besides bringing Pak—Soviet relations to a breaking point also marked the turning of the tide of their mutual hostility. Pakistan realized the dangers to its physical security inherent in its strategic alignment with the US and began to adopt a more even-handed policy towards Moscow. The "Friends Not Masters"29 thinking of Ayub was welcomed by Moscow. Barely three months after the U-2 incident, the Government of Pakistan announced that it had in principle accepted an offer from the Soviet Government to help in exploiting Pakistan's mineral resources, particularly oi1.30 Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zulfiqar All Bhutto visited Moscow in January 1965 for high-level talks with the Soviet leaders on the future of Pak—Soviet relations. Commenting on Bhutto's visit, Moscow Radio stated: "We are sure that as a result of this visit, the first visit of the Pakistani Foreign Minister to the USSR, the spheres of our cooperation will expand and this visit would be of great importance in strengthening the relations between the two countries."31 Bhutto's visit was followed by President Ayub Khan's eight- day State visit to the Soviet Union in April 1965 — the first ever by a Pakistani Head of State. Premier Kosygin described Ayub's visit as a "momentous event in the history of Soviet—Pakistan relations."32 The Soviet Press hailed the joint communique issued at the end of the visit as indicative of the "dawn of a new era in Pakistan—Soviet relations."33 In Ayub's own judgement the visit was a success as it involved the "general recognition on both sides that the meeting might prove to be a turning point in our relations and that there were tremendous possibilities of cooperation..."34 And the visit did indeed turn out to be a turning point. This was immediately reflected in Moscow's posture of neutrality towards the lndo—Pakistan "mini war" over the Rann of Kutch in April-May 1965. In its statement on May 8, 1965, the Soviet news agency TASS called upon both India and Pakistan not to weaken each other and expressed the hope that "India and Pakistan will solve their differences through direct negotiations...."." Similarly, at the conclusion of Indian Prime Minister La! Bahadur Shastri's visit to the Soviet Union on May 19, 1965, the Indo—Soviet joint communique significantly omitted specific references to Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch, two issues of vital political importance to the Indian Prime Minister. Again at the time of the outbreak of Indo—Soviet joint communique significantly omitted specific references to Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch, two issues of vital political importance to the Indian Prime Minister. Again at the time of the outbreak of Indo—Pakistan War in September 1965, Moscow gave a forceful demonstration of its new approach of balanced relations with both India and Pakis- tan. Throughout the period of war Moscow maintained a policy of strict neutrality on the issues that had triggered this war. On September 4, 1965 the Soviet Union took an unprecedented diplomatic initiative when Premier Kosygin called upon both India and Pakistan to cease military operations immediately and offered Soviet good offices for mediation in their conflict. This Soviet offer to mediate was repeated on September 7 and 11.36 After some initial hesitation Pakistan accepted the Soviet offer on November 25, 1965.32 In early 1966 the Soviet Premier Kosygin successfully acted as an "honest-broker" between India and Pak is tan. His efforts.resulted into the signing of the famous Tashkent Declaration on January 10 1966 between India and Pakistan. Tashkent Declaration was favourable to Pakistan in the sense that it implicitly recognized Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue as a disputed territory." After Tashkent, Pak—Soviet relations continued to register improvement. The high- point was reached in 1968 when Moscow agreed to supply arms to Pakistan which included MIG jets, IL-28 bombers, tanks, and guns.39 The Soviet decision to finance a $200 million steel mill in Karachi gave a further boost to this warming trend. In the first half of 1969 the Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Grechkov officially visited Pakistan as head of a high powered military delegation. During this visit he reportedly said that "Pakistan should be strengthened against its enemies."46 During the same visit, the deputy chief of staff of the

198 Soviet Navy, Vice-Admiral N. I. Smirnov, stated at an official dinner a strong Pakistani navy "would be a powerful precondition for peace in this part of the Indian Ocean Littoral."4I This trend towards cordial relations was, however, arrested as a result of two major developments. One, Moscow's enunciation of an Asian Collective Security Plan announced in the aftermath of Sino— Soviet border clashes in 1969 and Pakistan's flat refusal to endorse it due to its overt anti-Chinese overtones.42 Two, Pakistan's role as a go-between in President Nixon's historic "opening" to China in 1971.43 Due to Sino—American rapprochment, perceived by Moscow as a "ganging up" of both against it, Moscow turned, once again, towards India as its ally to redress the changed balance of power in Asia. The result was the 20 Year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with India signed in August 1971.44 The Soviet military, diplomatic, political and moral support to India in its 1971 War with Pakistan, which led to the emergence of Bangladesh, has often been taken as a proof of Soviet implacable hostility towards Pakistan and its desire to destabilize Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the Soviet help to India under the Friendship Treaty played a pivotal role in letting New Delhi succeed in dismembering Pakistan. There is also no gainsaying the fact that Moscow intended to punish Pakistan for its failure to endorse Brezhnev's Asian Security Plan and for its role as a bridge between China and America. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made that Soviet support to India in its war against Pakistan was qualified and that Moscow in fact may have played an important role in saving West Pakistan from the Indian military vengeance. After the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan, following the military action in March 1971, Soviet Presi- dent Podgorny wrote a letter to President Yahya Khan on April 2,1971.45 In this letter the Soviet President, after expressing his concern over the alleged gross violations of human rights in East Pakistan, urged Yahya to seek a political solution of the problem in East Pakis- tan. President Yahya in a strongly worded response not only denied that there had been any violations of human rights in East Pakistan but also told Moscow not to interfere in Pakis- tan's internal affairs." After the signing of the Indo—Soviet Peace Treaty in August 1971, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Sultan Mohammad Khan arrived in Moscow on September 4. Khan held talks with Gromyko and Firyubin. Khan returned to Pakistan reporting that the Soviets supported peace on the subcontinent, the unity and integrity of Pakistan.47 The most clear indication of Moscow's reluctance to give India a carte blanche in its dealings with Pakistan came at the time of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's visit to Moscow at the end of September, 1971.48 She held long hours of talks with the Soviet triumvirate — Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny — and the Soviet leaders are reported to have been "tireless in trying to persuade Mrs. Gandhi out of any intention to intervene in East Pakistan militarily."49 The statement issued at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit said that the "Soviet side reaffirmed its position" as set forth in Podgorny's letter of April 2."5° This meant a Soviet commitment to a political rather than military approach to the crisis in East Pakistan and thus the avoidance of an armed conflict between India and Pakistan. Again at the end of Premier Kosygin's visit to Algeria in Oc- tober, 1971 Kosygin signed a joint communique which called for "respect for the national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan."5' Ironically, this is perhaps the only reference to Pakistan's territorial integrity during the whole fateful year of 1971. Not even the Chinese were prepared to underwrite Pakistan's "territorial integrity" in the face of the India determination to amputate and decimate it as a national state. The Indians were furious over this Soviet position. On October 13, the TIMES OF INDIA editorialized:

"The joint statement.., enhances the doubts that have been increasingly felt recently about Moscow's attitude to the Bangladesh struggle and its repercussions on relations between India and Pakistan. The doubts persisted after Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow and the joint statement that was signed on that occasion, even though its language gave rise to hopes in India that Moscow was moving nearer New Delhi's standpoint. But there hopes have now been belied ... it provides further evidence that far from promoting the prospects of an independent Bangladesh, the Indo—Soviet treaty is intended, at least by Moscow, to function as a break."52

199 0 In apparent reaction to the Soviet—Algerian joint communique, Mrs. Gandhi proclaimed on October 14, 1971 that "India saw independence as the only way out of the crisis in East Ben- gal." As the war between India and Pakistan approached Moscow continued stressing the need for a political settlement.64 On December 4, 1971, when the Security Council of the UN convened to consider the situation of armed clashes between India and Pakistan, Moscow introduced a draft resolution for consideration which made no mention of secession and the independence of Bangladesh. The resolution called for "a political settlement in East Pakis- tan which would inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities." It "called upon the Govern- ment of Pakistan to take measures to cease all acts of violence by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan which led to a deterioration of the situation."' Chinese veto killed the resolution and with it the chances of any negotiated political settlement of the crisis and war in East Pakistan. It is also important to note that the Soviet Press did not use the expression "Bangladesh" until December 10-12, 1971.56 On the other hand India had recognized Bangladesh as an independent state as early December, 6, 1971. The Soviet behaviour during the course of Indo—Pak War of 1971 is also curious, to say the least. There is considerable circumstantial evidence to suggest that Moscow restrained Mrs. Gandhi from implementing her planning "to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir and.to elirranate Pakis- tan's armor and air force capabilities."67

On December 11, 1971, the-Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Voronstov reportedly told Henry Kissinger that Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov had been sent to New Delhi to "arrange for a satisfactory outcome and to urge Indiartrestramt."58 This assurance by the Soviet Ambassador was given presumably in response to Kissinger's warning to Mos- cow that "they had until noon on December 12 or we would proceed unilaterally."69 Kuznet- sov had arrived in New Delhi on December 12 and remained there for four days. On De- cember 12, the day Kuznetsov arrived in New Delhi, Voronstov called on Kissinger again to assure him that "India had no aggressive designs in the West."6° Evidently, it was this Soviet pressure on India for restraint in West Pakistan which made both Indian Ambassador L. K. Jha in Washington and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh give public assurances to Washington that India would not destroy West Pakistan. OnOn December 14, two days before the fall of Dacca, Voronstov brought a formal note from the Soviet government to Kissinger reporting firm assurances by the Indian leadership that India has no plans of seizing West Pakistan." President Nixon records in his memoirs: "Voronstov said that the Soviets were prepared un- conditionally to guarantee that there would be no Indian attack on West Pakistan or on Kashmir."62 Following these assurances of the Soviet leadership to Washington, Mrs. Gan- dhi in her letter to President Nixon on December 15, 1971, one day before the fall of Dacca, stated "we do not want any territory of West Pakistan. We want lasting peace with Pakis- tan."63 Later on December 26, 1971 in an interview President Nixon admitted that Soviet restraint had helped in bringing about the "cease fire that stopped what would inevitably have been the conquest of West Pakistan."64 Even Kissinger, who claims full credit for saving West Pakistan from Indian Military clutches admits in his memoirs that the issue ofIndian restraint could not have been tackled without Soviet help. He notes: "There is no doubt in my mind that it was a reluctant decision by India resulting from Soviet pressure, which in turn grew out of American insistence, including the fleet movement and the willingness to risk the summit."66 In an interesting analysis of the American role in the1ndo—Pakistan War of 1911, a distinguished American historian, Garthoff, in his recent book "detents and confrontation"' suggests that it was not the Soviet Union which obstructed the proceedings of the cease-lire between India and Pakistan. Rather it was Henry Kissinger himself. He notes that when on December 10, the Pakistani commander in East Pakistan offered a cease-fire, Kissinger was "disconcerted" as such an eventuality ran counter to the logic of Kissinger's triangular diplo macy. Garthoff says "So the United States persuaded Pakistan not to offer the cease-tire.""/ So much for the much vaunted American "tilt" towards Pakistan. 01 ^ 200 PART THREE

In the years following the tragedy of East Pakistan, Pak—Soviet relations haltingly moved towards a rapprochement. President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972. This visit was important as it took place against the immediate backdrop of the East Pakistan debacle which had left Pakistan defeated, divided and humiliated. India held 94,000 Pakistanis as prisoners of war and controlled large chunks of its territory. Bhutto was aware that without Moscow's help he could neither get his territory nor his people back from India. To make things worse, Bhutto's long-standing and vehement opposition to the Tashkent Ag- reement which Kosygin had helped sign between India and Pakistan in 1966, was a matter of public record.68 Only too recently Bhutto in his famous speech before the UN Security Coun- dl on December 13, 1971 had characterized Tashkent a sell out favouring the Indians "so much so that their Prime Minister had died ofjubilation."89 Under these conditions one could hardly expect Bhutto's visit to be a pleasant one. And it was not. Bhutto was accorded a cool welcome in Moscow. Kosygin asked him to make a "realistic assessment" of the situation in South Asia — apparently a nod in the direction of recognizing Bangladesh — and observed that Moscow will not so easily forget or forgive the past. Then with brutal frankness he told Bhutto: "If history were to be repeated, we would take the same stand because we are convinced that it is the correct one."7° Predictively, Bhutto failed to secure any promise of help from Moscow concerning the release of Pakistani POWs from India. However, this visit did result in an increase in the scope of economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. Moscow offered to construct a one million-ton-capacity steel mill near Karachi and agreed to provide 435 million in credits for the project:7' It further conveyed its willingness to help in the laying of a high-voltage electric transmission line and the establishment of a powerful radio station.72 Bhutto visited Moscow again in October 1974. By this time he had signed Simla Accord with India, normalizing the relations between the two countries and had also pulled Pakistan out of SEATO. These moves seemed to have been duly appreciated in Moscow as was evident from the cordial welcome accorded to Bhutto. Premier Kosygin described Bhutto's visit as a new "major step" in the direction of the strengthening of good- neighbourly relations between the two countries and expressed the hope that "an advance to a higher level" would be made "in all fields" of Pakistani—Soviet cooperation.73 The joint communique issued at the end of Bhutto's visit significantly omitted any reference to issues such as Pakhtoonistan and Bangladesh. while Moscow did not endorse Bhutto's proposal for a nuclear-free South Asia, it did urge Afghanistan and Pakistan to settle their disputes by negotiations on the basis of the principles of peaceful-coexistence. The call for a negotiated settlement of diputes between Islamabad and Kabul was significant. It was issued at a time when a major tribal revolt had broken out in the province of Baluchistan74 and the relations between Kabul and Islamabad were very tense after Sardar Daud's return to power in Af- ghanistan in July 1973. Daud was an avowed champion of the cause of Pakhtoonistan and Bhutto had accused Daud's government for its hand in the uprising in Baluchistan:is That Moscow should urge both Islamabad and Kabul to seek a negotiated settlement of the problems was, in political terms, a concession to Pakistan as it reflected a more neutral stance of Moscow towards the Pakhtoonistan issue.

The imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan in July 1977 and Bhutto's arrest seemingly did not adversely reflect on the developing amity between Moscow and Islamabad. On the thirtieth anniversary of Pakistan's independence in 1977, President Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin sent messages to Pakistan wishing peace and progress.76 Articles appearing in Pravda commended Pakistan's withdrawal from the SEATO and the improvement in its relations with its neighbours. However, strains began to reappear in Pak—Soviet relations following the Soviet backed communist putsch in Kabul in April 1978. As a consequence of this

201 development, Pakistan felt exposed from the north77 and began supporting the insurgents fighting against the communist regime of Taraki in Kabul. On March 19, 1979, Pravda accused Pakistan along with China and others for their "reactionary machinations against the democratic Afghanistan." A high level delegation led by Mahmood Haroon, Minister of In- terior visited Moscow in 1979 to allay Moscow's apprehension regarding Islamabad's alleged complicity in the counter-revolutionary activities against Soviet—backed communist regime in Kabul.78 Moscow remained unconvinced.79 The Soviet military action in Afghanis- tan in December 1979 involving 100,000 Soviet troops marked the beginning of a "cold war" between Islamabad and Moscow. In the Soviet move into Afghanistan Islamabad saw the elimination of a valuable strategic buffer and the possible Soviet military drift towards its own borders. From Pakistan's security view-point it was a nightmarish situation as the Red Army stood perilously close to the Khyber Pass, a traditional gateway of the invaders of the subcontinent. In order to mitigate Islamabad's threat perception resulting from its move into Afghanistan, Moscow offered to guarantee the inviolability of the Durand Line. This offer was made through India in March-April 1980, presumably during Mr. Swaran Singh's trip to Islamabad as a special envoy. The Soviet proposition was rejected by Islamabad as it involved India and Iran as co-guarantors of the inviolability of the Durand Line. Pakistan's security compulsions forced it to embrace Washington once again. Moscow grew hostile towards this "second honeymoon" between Washington and Islamabad. On the eve of Presi- dent Zia's visit to Washington in December 1982 Izvestia, in a long article accused Pakistan of conducting "an undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" and noted that its "arms build-up exceeds its defense needs" and that its "efforts to create a nuclear weapon cannot fail to alarm it neighbors." Izvestia warned Pakistan that its use "as a blind tool of American imperialist policy in the region is not only fraught with serious consequences for peace in the South and Southwest Asia, but also harbors a threat to the security of the people of Pakistan themselves." Moscow has also accused Pakistan for its lack of sincerity in seeking a negotiatied settlement of the Afghan issue through Geneva parleys. Besides pursuing a strategy of verbal threats Moscow has also put indirect military pressure on Pakis- tan to change its pro-Washington tilt as evidenced by the frequency and intensity of the cross-border raids, air violations and artillery barrages. Over the Matani incident in April 1985, in which several Russian soldiers got killed, Moscow reacted angrily and described the incident as "an act of war against the Soviet Union." Gorbachev himself warned President Zia of the dire consequences if Islamabad continues its present Afghan policy. Thus in the wake of the Soviet military move into Afghanistan in December 1979 the focal point of discord between Moscow and Islamabad became Pakistan's—Afghan policy and its security links with Washington. Moscow's animadversion of Pakistan's foreign policy has been all- encompassing It has accused Islamabad for its alleged help to Afghan insurgents in the form of sanctuaries, training camps and as conduit for the supply of arms from outside. It has ex- coriated Islamabad as a "lackey" of American imperialism in the region. It has denounced Pakistan's nuclear programme as a "threat to world Peace". It has taken an exception to the opening of the Khunjerab pass in the Karakorams to civilian traffic. And it has openly complained about the alleged discrimination against its diplomatic personnel in Pakistan. As of today the range of issues on which Pak—Soviet perceptions diverge and conflict is indeed very long. Needless to say that most of Moscow's grievances against Islamabad are outlan- dish to say the least. Perhaps the single most important cause of the tensions between the two countries both in the historical and contemporary contexts has been Soviet negative perception of Islamabad's policy of strategic alignment with Washington. It follows then that as long as this condition of alignment obtains Pak—Soviet relations are bound to remain troubled. We must realize that we are important but small country with a difficult geostrategic environment. We are perhaps better off pursuing a policy of enlightened isolation which takes as its point of departure the supremacy of Pakistan's own national self-interest.

202

REFERENCES

1. The Muslim, July 16,1986, p.1. 2. For an excellent historical analysis of Pak-Soviet relations see Reghunath Ram. Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan. (New Delhi: S. Chand &Company, Ltd, 1983); Recent discussion are Mehrunnisa Ali, "Soviet-Pakistan Ties Since The Afghanistan Crisis," Asian Survey, (September, 1983), pp. 1025-1041; Rasul. BRais, "Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union, "In Leo Rose, Noor A Hussain (eds.) U.S. - Pakistan Relations. (Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley, University of California, 1985), pp. 128-139; William E. Griffith," The USSR and Pakistan," Problems of Communism (Jan-Feb, 1982), pp. 38-44. 3. The Muslim, November 19,1984, p.1. 4 Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Moscow's Warning to Pakistan: What does It mean?' The Muslim, August 3, 1986, p. 4; Also my article, "Moscow and Pakistan's nuclear option," The Muslim, November 19, 1984, p4. 5. For an Alarmist statement see Tahir Amin. Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World (Is - lamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982). 6. See for example, Sajjad Nyder, "Pakistan's Afghan Predicament: Towards Neutrality-Ill," The Muslim, February 8, 1984. 7. In mid-fifties a group of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs had observed "There are important divergences of outlook between Pakistan, with its Islamic background, and the Soviet Union, with a background of Marxism which is atheistic." Pakistan Horizon (March, 1956), p46. These divergences in their world-views were emphasized in order to explain why Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was unable to visit Moscow in 1950. 8. Geostrategic version of the alarmist argument derives its empirical strength from the Moltov-Ribbenthrop Ag- reement of October 1940. This agreement proclaimed that "the area South of Batum and Baku extending in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the centre of aspirations of the Soviet Union." R. J. Sontag and),).Beddia (eds) Nazi Soviet Documents 1939-41 (Washington) D. C:. 1948), pp. 251-7. With regard to the particular Soviet claim to a sphere of influence in the 'General Direction of the Persian Gulf' it should be noted that the proposal for such a sphere of influence did not originate from the USSR. Rather it was made by Germany. Moreover, the German proposal lacked in good faith as it was made at a time when Hitler was actively engaged in preparing the invasion of the Soviet Union. Later on when Hitler and Stalin failed to agree on their respective spheres of the influence in Eastern Europe Moltov-Ribbenthrop understanding also fell through. For a convinc- ing rebuttal of Soviet aims in the Indian Ocean with reference to Moltov-Ribbenthrop Agreement of 1940 see Geoffrey Jukes, 'The Indian Ocean"Adelphi Paper, No. 87 1972 (London: The Inst. for Strategy. in Soviet Naval Policy, p. 2. For an official Pakistani formulation of this geostrategic hypothesis see Mohammad Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan- American Alliance: Stresses and Strains," Foreign Affairs (January 1964); 9. Quoted in Raghunathop. cit., p. 8. 10. 164 p. 14. I. Scholarly opinion is divided over the question why Liaquat never availed himself of the opportunity to visit Mos- cow. K. Sarwar Hasan argues that "it was the realization of economic dependence upon the U. S. that prompted Liaquat Ali Khan to postpone, in effect abandon, his projected visit to the Soviet Union and go to the United States instead." K. Sarwar Hasan Khan, "The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan", Pakistan Horizon (De- cember, 1951), p. 186. Raghunath Ram attributes Liaquat's decision not to go to Moscow to a lurking Pakistani suspicion of future Soviet intentions. Since the Soviet Union had "sanctioned and anti-capitalist strategy in 1948 against the countries of the South and South East Asia including Pakistan" and this "further intensified the Pakis- tani fear of the Soviet intentions." Raghunath Ram, op. cit; p. 15. F: M. Innes, a former Indian Civil Servant and an advigbr to Pakistan Central Commercial Committee in early 1950s, suggests that Liaquat Ali Khan wangled the invitation from the Soviet Union in order to counter the invitation of President Truman to Nehru in May 1949 to visit the U. S. F. M. trines, "The Political Outlook in Pakistan' Pacific Affairs (October, 1953), pp. 251-7. G. W. Choudhry blames the Pakistani bureaucracy for sabotaging Liaquat's prospective visit to Moscow. G. W Choudhury, India, Pakistan Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics ofa Divided Subcontinent. (New York: Free Press, 1975). 12. At a Press Conference in London in July 1950 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan reportedly said: "Pakistan would give any help within its means in support of the American action in Korea." Quoted in Raghunath Ram, op. cit,. p. 18- 13. Liaquat Ali Khan told the Parliament on March 21,1951 that the conspirators had planned to invite advisory rills • sion from a "certain foreign country" to set up a communist state. Dawn, March 22, 1951. 14. Raghunath Ram, op. cit; p.53. IS. /bid; p. 60. 16. ;bid; p. 69. 17. New Times, No. 52 (Supplement) December 22, 1955, p. 26. 18. 1zvestia, December 30, 1955. 19. Dawn, March 30, 1956. 20. Raghunath Ram, op, cit; p. 76.

203 21. In 1951, when Ayub Khan was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, he had suggested a pro-Western policy to his political superiors. A Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed on May 19, 1954 between Pakistan and the U.S.A. see George). Lerski, The Foreign Policy of Ayub Khan"Asian Affairs (March-April 1974), pp. 255-274. 22. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, A Political Autobiography (Lahore: Oxford University Press), pp. 126-129). 23. Pravda, November 22, 1958. 24. Red Star, November 23, 1958. 25. /bid. 26. The U-2 flights from Pakistan provided extremely important information about Soviet military affairs. Accord- ing to William;, Barnds, "the communication facility at Peshawar enabled the U.S to learn much about Soviet missile developments. The atomic detection stations supplied useful if less critical information about Soviet and perhaps Chinese nuclear tests." William.). Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 252. 27. lzvestia, May 10, 1960. 28. lzvestia, May 14, 1960. 29. Title of Ayub Khan's autobiography. 30. Pravda, August 10, 1960. 31. Pravda as reported in Dawn January 26, 1965. 32. Pravda, April 4, 1965. 33. Pravda, April 11, 1965. ' 34. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, op. cit; p. 168-169. 35. Pravda, May 9, 1965. 36. Pravda, September 12, 1965. 37. Tahir Amin, 'The Tashkent Declaration-A Case Study-Third Party's Role in Resolution of the Conflict" Islamabad Papers (March 1980) (Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 38. 38. Tashkent Declaration signed on January 10, 1966 stated: "the interests of the people of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuation of tensions between the two countries. It against this background that Jammu • and Kashmir was discussed and each of the sides set forth its respective position." Text in Tahir Amin Ibid. 39. Robert C. Horn. Soviet-Indian influence relationship: Issues and Influence. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p.31. 40. /bid; p. 41. /bid. 42. G. W. Choudhuty, op. cit; p. • 43. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Mass:. Little Brown, 1979), p. 914, 848-849. Kissinger notes that he and Nixon were "profoundly grateful" for Pakistan's role in helping arrange U.S. contacts with China. 44. Articles 8,9 and 10 were significant in the Treaty. The Treaty prevented both parties from joining a military alliance which was directed against any of them. It also provided for possible military and diplomatic assistance to each other in case one of them is engaged in war. An important function of the Treaty was to deter any Chinese or American intervention in the subcontinent. See Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet Treary and the Emerging Asian& - lance ofPowerAsian Survey (June 1972), pp. 463-474. Text of the Treaty is given in Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXIV . No. 4 (1973), pp. 163-166. 45. Note from President Podgorny to President Yahya Khan dated April 2, 1971, Pakistan Horizon, 2nd Quarter (1971), pp. 149-150. 46. Note from President Yahya Khan to President Podgomy dated April 5, 1971, !bid; p, 151. 47. Robert C. Horn, op. cit; p.67. 48. Ibid. 49. p. 67. 50. /bid. 5 I . New Times, No. 42, October 1971, pp, 36-38. 52. Times of India October 13,1971. 53. Robert C. Horn, op. cit; p.69. 54. K. D. Kapur, Soviet Strategy in South Asia: Perspectives on Soviet Policies Towards the Indian Subcontinent and Afghanistan. (New Delhi: Young Asia Publication, 1983), p. 167. 55. Quoted in, "The War Commission and the surrender - A StaffStudy, Outlook (Karachi), Vol. 3 No. 8 May25, 1974, p.9. 56. K. D. Kapur, op. cit; p.206. 57. New York Times, January IS, 1972. 58. Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: Amerkan-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. (Washington D. C:, The Brooking Institution, 1985), p.272. • 59. Ibid. 60. Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p.909

204

61. Raymond L. Garthoff, op. cit., p. 266 and K.D. Kapur, op. cit., p. 213. 62. Richard Nixon, The Memories of Richard Nixon (Gosset and Dunlap, 1978), p.530. 63, K. D. Kapur, op. cit, p.213. 64. Ibid. 65. Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p.9!3. 66. Raymond L Garthoff, op. cit., 67. Ibid; p. 271. 68. Addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on March 9, 1969 Bhutto had claimed that he "had fought tooth and •nail against the Tashkent Declaration". Quoted in Tahir Amin, The Tashkent Declaration, op. cit., p. 69 footnote 36. 69. The Times (London), December 14, 1971. 70. Quoted in D. Shah Khan, "Pakistan and Balkanization", Tempo (Karachi) No. 6 Only/August, 1975), p.6. . < 71. K. D. Kapur, op. cit., p.224. 72. [bid; p. 235. • 73. !bid; p. 236. 74. Sleig Harrison. In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism And Soviet Temptations (New York: Carnegie En- dowments for International Peace, 1981). 75. K. D. Kapur, op. cit., p. 296. 76. Ibid; p. 24. 77. Mehrunnisa All, op. cit., p. 1026. 78. A Petrov, "Provocations Continue", Pravda, June I, 1979. 79. Pran Chopra, "Rejection of Indian Offer—I" Times ofIndia, December 12, 1985 and "Pakistan's Afghan Crisis-II-Fear of Indo—Iranian Friendship" Times of India, December 13, 1985.

205 $

206 READING 18

(Excerpts from Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis', by S. M. Burke, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission.

hen it was rumoured that the United States might supply military aid to Pakistan, the Afghan Embassy in Delhi issued a statement that such assistance would Wstrengthen Pakistan as a 'colonial' power over the 'freedom-seeking people of Pakhtunistan'. I Afghanistan reacted sharply to the Pakistani announcement, in March 1955, that the various parts of the western wing of Pakistan would be amalgamated into one ad ministrative unit under the name of West Pakistan. It was alleged that this would further erase the separate identity of the Pakhtuns in Pakistan.

A reconciliation was temporarily effected by the good offices of some Muslim countries and diplomatic ties were resumed, but the situation again deteriorated in October when West Pakistan was officially inaugurated. Afghanistan's Grand National Assembly, the Loi firga, traditionally convened at times of national emergency, met at Kabul in the middle of November and passed a resolution declaring that Afghanistan did not recognize the 'Pakhtunistan' territories as a part of Pakistan and demanding that Afghanistan's defences be strengthened by all possible means.2

At this delicate juncture Russia, having a score of her own to settle with Pakistan for her openly pro-Western policy, took a hand in the game. In December 1955 Premier Nikola Bulganin visited Kabul, accompanied by Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and declared, 'We sympathize with Afghanistan's policy on the Pushtunistan issue.'3

207 The Soviet Union also exploited the situation to increase Afghanistan's dependence on Soviet assistance. During their visit Bulganin and Khrushchev offered a credit of $100 million for economic development. In 1957 an additional credit of $15 million was provided for oil exploration. In 1959 the Soviet Union agreed to build the Kushk-Kandahar road and the Shindand military airfield at a total cost of $85 million. By the end of 1960 the total of Soviet assistance, including military aid, was estimated to be $300 million, and about 1,600 Soviet civil and military technicians were believed to be in Afghanistan.

Some improvement in Pakistan—Afghan relations resulted from an exchange of visits, starting with President Iskander Mirza's visit to Kabul in August 1956, followed by visits to each other's country, in the course of the next two years, by Premier Daud and Suhrawardy and King Zahir Shah. During this period an Air Agreement and a Transit Trade Agreement were made, and a direct radio-telephone link was established.

In October 1958 Ayub Khan assumed power in Pakistan. He desired good relations with Afghanistan but, himself a Pakhtun and heading a Pakhtun-dominated administration,4 he could not understand the Afghan grievance that Pakhtuns in Pakistan were an oppressed people. A few weeks after a visit to Rawalpindi, in January 1960, Foreign Minister Naim said at Kabul that Pakistan had refused to discuss the 'Pakhtunistan' issue and complained that Ayub Khan's regime was even more adamant against the 'Pakhtunistan' demand than Pres- ident Mirza, who desired 'to find some sort of solution'.6 Not long afterwards Khrushchev, now Premier of the USSR, again travelled through Kabul. A joint communique, marking his talks with the Afghan leaders, asserted that a solution of the 'Pakhtunistan' problem should be reached by implementing the United Nations Charter 'Principle of self-determination'.6

In the meantime, besides a vilifying propaganda offensive against Pakistan/ posters and handbills were distributed in the tribal area inciting the tribesmen to rise against the Government of Pakistan.8 Towards the end of September 1960, a lashkar estimated to be 15,000 strong penetrated into Pakistani territory near Bajaur but was repulsed with heavy losses.

On account of harassment by Afghan Intelligence officials, shopkeepers, landlords of houses, and others, it became virtually impossible for Pakistani personnel attached to the Consulates in Afghanistan to discharge their duties. Accordingly, Pakistan informed Af- ghanistan on 22 August 1961 that the Pakistani Consulates at Jalalabad and Kandahar would be closed down, and demanded that the Afghan Consulates and Trade Agencies in Peshawar and Quetta be also closed. Afghanistan retaliated by severing diplomatic relations with Pakistan and closing the border.

This phase of Pakistani—Afghan relations, the most unfortunate of all, ended in March 1963 with the resignation of Premier Daud, a cousin of King Zahir Shah, who had ruled Afghanistan with an iron hand for nearly ten years and made the demand for 'Pakhtunistan' one of the main planks of his policy. With him also went his brother, Foreign Minister Naim. •

Relations with the Soviet Union

Even before Pakistan signed up with the West, the Soviet Union had suspected that she would let her territory be used as a spring-board for attacks on the USSR. After Pakistan had subscribed to the Western security system, this suspicion became almost a conviction Protest notes, warning Pakistan of the dire consequences of allowing military bases En be

208 constructed in Pakistan, were regularly addressed to the Pakistani Government, and were as regularly rejected as being without foundation. Pakistan's participation in SEATO and CENTO was also criticized as collaboration in the intended Western aggression against Rus- sia and China. As retribution for Pakistan's unfriendly acts, the Soviet leadership openly supported India's claim to Kashmir and Afghanistan's demand for 'Pakhtunistan'.

At the same time, however, the door was never shut to reconciliation. It was clearly stated that, if Pakistan mended her ways, the Soviet Union would be prepared to beam on her as beneficently as she did on neutral India.

According to New Times the immediate purpose of the Turco—Pakistani alliance was to convert Pakistan into an American military base.9 A Soviet note, protesting against US military aid to Pakistan, accused her of placing military bases at the disposal of the United States and of placing the Pakistani Army under a foreign command by accepting foreign ad- v isers. ° A Soviet Foreign Office statement published in Pravda on 15 September said SEATO was 'directed against the security interests of Asia and the Far East and, at the same time, against the freedom and national independence of the Asian peoples. An article in New Times alleged that the Baghdad Pact constituted a threat not only to the Soviet Union 'but to all the peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa, and especially to those defending their national independence and opposing colonialism"

In the meantime the Soviet Union had been going all out to win India's favour.. By 1954 Russia had sufficiently recovered from the ravages of the Second World War to embark upon a programme of economic assistance to less developed countries. Among the earliest beneficiaries of the new policy were Afghanistan and India. In February 1955 the Soviet Union undertook to build for India a modern iron and steel mill at Bhilai. In June Nehru was invited to Russia on a two-week visit and accorded an unprecedented welcome. He said he had found 'a passion for peace' everywhere he had gone and was so deeply moved that when taking leave of his hosts he told them that he was leaving a part of his heart behind.

Of even 'greater significance was the three-week return visit in November-De- cember of the same year of Premier Bulganin and First Secretary Khrushchev. Huge crowds greeted them wherever they went with chants of 'Hindi—Russi Bhai Bhai' (Indians and Rus- sians are brothers), and 'Hindi—Russi Ek Hai' (Indians and Russians are one). Besides calling India and the Soviet Union 'allies' in the struggle for world peace,12 and promising all the help India needed to make her industrially strong,13 the Soviet leaders gave emphatic support to the political questions nearest India's heart. The Russians 'were grieved that the imperialist forces succeeded in dividing India into two parts." Portugal in Goa was like a tick which fastens itself to a healthy body.16 At Srinagar Khrushchev noted that Kashmir was 'nearest of all to the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union' and said it was a pleasure to visit the State 'because it is the birthplace of your esteemed Premier Mr. Nehru.' he also declared that the fact that Kashmir was one of the states of the Republic of India had been decided by the people of Kashmir. 16

In their Joint Declaration the Soviet Union visitors and Prime Minister Nehru condemned the formation of military alliances, alleging that they had extended the area of the cold war and increased tension. '7 At the airport parting Nehru said, 'It appears that on this occasion a part of our heart has been separated from us'. Khrushchev, not to be outdone, replied, 'lam also leaving a small part of my heart behind to the people of India.'18Later he told the Supreme Soviet, 'As a beloved brother is welcomed in a loving family of the peoples of India.' On the way home Bulganin and Khrushchev stayed at Kabul for four days and there belaboured Pakistan further by siding with Afghanistan on the 'Pakhtunistan' issue.

209 Other moments of tension between Pakistan and the USSR followed when the Soviet Union accused Pakistan of supporting the 'colonizing proposals' of the Western powers of the future of the Suez Canal; when Pakistan strongly criticized the Russian invasion of Hungary; when, in February 1957, Russia cast her first veto in the Security Council proceedings on Kashmir to bar a resolution stating that the use of a temporary United Nations Force to facilitate demilitarization deserved consideration; when Pakistan signed the bilateral De- fence Agreement with the US in March 1959; when, in the autumn of 1959, President Ayub Khan referred to the possibility of a concerted Russian—Chinese drive towards the Indian Ocean in five years as part of their plan for Communist world domination; and when the American U-2 spy plane, having taken off from Peshawar, was brought down in Russia in May 1960.

In his address to the Supreme Soviet in August 1953, Premier Malenkov said Russia placed great value on good relations with both India and Pakistan.I9 Khrushchev, in his speech at Srinagar on 10 December 1956, while condemning partition as the old trick of 'divide and rule', was careful to add, But the establishment of two separate states — India and Pakistan — is a decided issue, and I have not stated my opinion on this score so frankly in order that the question might be re-examined in any quarter.' He castigated Pakistani foreign policy, but stated at the same time that the Soviet Union 'should very much like' to have friendly relations with Pakistan, 'and it is not our fault that such relations have so far not developed. But we shall persistently strive to improve these relations in the interest of peace.2" When reporting on the South Asian tour to the Supreme Soviet, Bulganin declared that the Soviet Union would like to have no less friendly relations with Pakistan than she had with India, Burma, and Afghanistan, and also that the Soviet Union would continue to endeavour to improve her relations with Pakistan?'

These gestures were followed by Bulganin's written replies to a Pakistani editor's questions, in the course of which the former said the Soviet Union could share her knowledge of the peaceful applications of atomic energy with Pakistan and that there were real possibilities for an expansion of trade based on an exchange of Soviet industrial and agricultural machinery for Pakistani agricultural and livestock products.22 While attending the Na- tional Day reception at the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul on 23 March 1956, Foreign Minister Molotov told the Pakistani Charge d'Affaires that the Soviet Union was ready to build a steel mill for Pakistan like the one she was constructing in India.23

First Deputy Soviet Premier Anastas Mikoyan led a formidable forty-man delegation to Karachi in March 1956 participate in the ceremonies inaugurating Pakistan as a republic under her newly framed constitution, and made a strong bid for Pakistani goodwill. He offered aid without strings, and stated that Premier Bulganin and Khrushchev were always ready to come to Pakistan and were waiting only for an invitation.24 In a somewhat involved statement on Kashmir he conceded that the issue was a 'very important question' for Pakis- tan. He said that Bulganin and Khrushchev had expressed their views in India after assessing public opinion but significantly observed, in the same breath, 'It is not for us to decide finally the question of Kashmir. It should be decided by the people of Kashmir.25 Mikoyan also invited the Pakistani Parliament to send a delegation to visit the Soviet Union.

210 A trade pact was signed in Karachi between Pakistan and a visiting Soviet delegation in June 1956, resulting in transactions worth Rs. 20 million during 1957.26 The leader of the delegation said that his side would have been glad to discuss the question o f assistance in oil-boring, drilling, or refining but that Pakistan had not raised such a question.22

Mikoyan's offer of aid had been immediately turned down. A Pakistani Government official had declared publicly, 'Nobody wants aid from them and that is our policy'." His invitation to a parliamentary delegation to visit Russia, however, was accepted in August 1956. M.A. Khuro, leader of the delegation, revealed to Dawn's London correspondent after the tour that the delegation had been assured by Bulganin and Khrushchev, in a two-hour discussion on Soviet—Pakistani relations, that the USSR was anxious to cultivate close relations with Pakistan. Khuro gained the irripression that the Russians had not yet said their last word on Kashmir, and thought it would be wrong to infer from Khrushchev's statement in Srinagar that the USSR had, on this issue, finally ranged herself on the side of lnida."

By 1958, the Pakistani-U.S. alliance having come under strain,30 there was a noticeable softening of the Pakistani attitude towards the Soviet Union. The hurling in space of Sputnik 1 by the Russians on 4 October 1957, moreover, had been read as a clear sign everywhere that the USSR was on the threshold of an impressive technical and economic breakthrough. The New York Times noted that the speeches of the head of the visiting Rus- sian parliamentary delegation, offering aid 'without strings, were prominently displayed on the front page of Pakistani newspapers and were winning the acclaim of the man in the street.31 Dawn reported that Pakistan's foreign policy was under re-examination and that one of the suggestions was to improve relations with the Soviet Union in the cultural and economic fields.32 The newspaper also observed editorially that it was 'a far-fetched idea' that the Soviet Union or China posed any physical threat to Pakistan, but that if war came Pakistan was sure to be attacked, perhapS with nuclear weapons, 'not because we are a prize in ourselves but because we appear to Soviet eyes as having taken sides militarily with the enemies of the Soviet Union'.33

The growing uncertainty in foreign policy, however, was halted in October 1958 when Ayub Khan took up the reins of power. As one of the chief architects of friendship with America, he tried to mend that deteriorating alliance. There was no move for some time towards an easier relationship with the Soviet Union. But after Pakistani —U.S. relations resumed their uneven course, the Soviet Embassy in Pakistan again broached the subject of petroleum exploration. This time the U-2 incident killed the negotiations before any noticeable progress could be registered. When excitement had subsided, Ayub gave the signal for a fresh start by saying, in June 1960, that he saw no reason why Pakistan could not 'do business' with the Soviet Union.34Talks were thereafter resumed and ultimately resulted in the Pakistan—Soviet Agreement of 4 March 1961. Pakistan was granted a loan of $30 million and promised technical assistance and equipment for exploration for oil. Though the negotiations were accompanied by numerous Pakistani official statements that the proposed arrangement did not signify any change in her foreign policy, the successful conclusion of such an important agreement was not without significance. The ice was broken.

REFERENCES

I . New York Times, 23 Dec. 1953. 2. Asian Recorder, 1955,P. 521. 3. N. A Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma, and Afghanistan, P. 202. 4. Two of Ayub's Cabinet Ministers (General Azam and F.M. Khan) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army (General Musa) were Pakhtuns.

211

5. Dawn, 29 Feb. 1960. 6. Ibid., 6 March 1960. 7. For exampl e, Radio Kabul said on 21 Nov. 1959: 'The dictatorial military regime in Pakistanis turning Pakhtunis- tan into hell and rubble: The Bajaur Incident, and undated Government of Pakistan booklet, p.8. 8. One of the posters in Pushtu, distributed by the Afghans in Sept. 1960, read: 'Call Pakhtunistani brethren!... Your sacred land... today is being trampled under the dirty feet of Pakistani imperialism.... Pakhtun warriors! rise up... and oust the aggressive Pakistani authorities from your land.' Ibid., p. 14. 9. New Times, No. 9, 1954, p. 18. 10. Dawn, 5 May 1954. . New Times, No. 50, 1955, p. 19. • 12. NA. Bulganin and N.S.Khrushehev, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma, and Afghanistan, p. 13. 13. Ibid., p.52. 14. Ibid., p. 111. IS. Ibid., p.96. 16. Ibid., pp. 107, 112. Though Nehru's ancestors came fromKashmir, he had not been born there. He was born at Al - lahabad in India. 17. Ibid., p.304. 1.'3, M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs, 054-56, p. 324. 19. New York Times, 9 Aug. 1953. 20. NA. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma, and Afghanistan, pp. Iii, 114. 21. /bid., p.249. 22. New York Times, 7 Feb. 1956. 23. Ibid., 24 March 1956. 24. Ibid., 25,27 March 1956. 25. Dawn, 26 March 1956. 76. Ibid., 28 June 1956 and 7 Nov. 1958. 27 29 June 1958. 28. New York limes, 27 March 1956. 29. Dawn, Aug. 1956. • 3u. see 0. 12. 31. New York Times, 31 Jan. 1958. 32. Dawn, 30 march 1958. 33. Ibid., 31 March 1958.

34 New York Times, 27 June 1960.

Reading 19 (See Reading 17)

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