WHO AM I?: THE IDENTITY CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST P R Kumaraswamy*

More than democratic deficit, most countries of the Middle East suffer from the fundamental problem over their national identity. More than three-quarters of a century after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire from which most of them emerged, these states have been unable to define, project, and maintain a national identity that is both inclusive and representative. None of the countries of the Middle East is homogeneous; they consist of numerous ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic minorities. Yet they have not succeeded in evolving a national identity that reflects their heterogeneity. Countries of the Middle East are internally diverse and , hence, a narrow exclusive national identity could not be imposed from above.

Speaking at the meeting of the Foreign Middle East is homogeneous; they consist Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council of numerous ethnic, religious, cultural, and (GCC) in September 2005, Sheikh linguistic minorities. Yet they have not Mohammed bin Mubarak al-Khalifa of succeeded in evolving a national identity Bahrain urged the need for safeguarding that reflects their heterogeneity. Iraq's "-Islamic identity so that Iraq The problem is universal. Whether they can remain an active member of the Arab are democracies ( and Turkey), and Islamic environment. " 1 Coming from evolving democracies (Iraq and Palestinian an organization that in the past led the anti- areas), republican regimes (Egypt, , Iraqi and anti-Saddam sentiments in the and Algeria), quasi-liberal monarchies region, it exhibited a basic concern over ( and Bahrain), or Islamic regimes possible fragmentation of Iraq and its (Iran), the region suffers from the inability ramifications for its Arab neighbors. Yet to recognize, integrate, and reflect its ethno- the statement also brought to focus the cultural diversity. Without exception, all the fundamental problem facing the Middle Middle Eastern states have tried to impose East, name ly identity. an identity from above. Whether Contrary to the conventional wisdom ideological, religious, dynastical, or power- about democratic deficit, most countries of centric, these attempts have invariably the Middle East suffer from the failed and have often resulted in schism and fundamental problem over their national sectarian tensions. identity. More than three-quarters of a The region as a whole has been unable century after the disintegration of the to address, let alone resolve , the core issue Ottoman Empire from whom most of them of national identity. While borrowing the emerged, these states have been unable to European (though gradually weakening) define, project, and maintain a national model of territory-based national identity, identity that is both inclusive and the Middle Eastern countries have been representative. None of the countries of the unable to build a "nation. " In other parts of

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P R Kumaraswamy the world, nations, both old and new, have They often had boundaries defined by become states; the process has been colonial powers, formal title and a ruling reversed in the Middle East where states are dynasty, support and patronage from the still in search of a nation. Instead they have former rulers, diverse population, but no tried numerous others means to circumvent cohesive national identity. With notable the problem of national identity. exceptions like Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria , most lacked, or hence ha d to invent , their IMPERIAL-COLONIAL LEGACY historical roots. Much of the identity problem facing the How did they resolve the problem of region ca n be traced back to imperialism national identity? Some tried to resolve this and colonialism. The dismemberment of the through religion, the most dominant and Ottoman Empire and the formation of new easily identifiable individual identity. states in the region were anything but smooth. States were carved out with little RELIGIOUS IDENTITY concern over people, geography, or history. With the exception of Turkey, all the The states, which emerged from the ruins of countries of the Middle East have opted for the Ottoman Empire, were neither a religion-centric identity. In some cases, homogeneous nor cohesive. They not only this coincided with state formation and in had artificial boundaries, but they also others, religion gradually replaced others as lacked any sense of internal cohesion. the pre-eminent national identity. If the Driven by imperial legacy of the British Turkish decision to present itself as a and French, the two imperia l powers that secular state was the choice and outcome of were active in the region, different the destruction of the Ottoman Empire , ethnic /national groups were clubbed others have sought to buttress their identity together into one state or the same national through religion. While Islam is the group was divided among different states. If dominant identity of most Arab states and the formation of , supposed to be a Iran, Israel defines itself as a Jewish state. homeland for the Maronite Christians Even though Lebanon is not an Islamic exemplifies the former, the plight of Kurds state, its society is a mirror image of the scattered in Iran, Iraq, Syria , and Turkey sectarian tension among various religious symbolizes the latter. Even the modern groups. boundaries of ancient states like Iran This emphasis on religion became more contain a large portion of the religious other. apparent when some ruling dynasties tried In places like Iraq and Jordan, lea ders of to justify their claims to their supposed the new state were brought in from the membership to the Qureshi tribe to which outside, tailored to suit colonial interests Prophet Mohammed belonged. The ruling and commitments. Likewise, most states in Hashemite dynasty in Jordan for example, the Persian Gulf were handed over to those traces its lineage to the days of the Prophet who could protect and safeguard imperial and sought to claim both religious and interests in the post-withdrawal phase. temporal loyalty of their subjects. 2 The Each of the new states were confronted Hashemites had been thrown out of their with the problem of defining their national role as custodians of Mecca by the Saudis. identity. This was problematic because For a while, however, they found a new most of them were never a nation before. source of religious and political legitimacy

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Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East by ruling over east Jerusalem. Their control jurisprudence is based on the Islamic of the Islamic holy sites in the city until the Sharia. June war of 1967 was even seen as a minor The case of Iran is even more peculiar. compensation for the losses suffered by the Under the constitution, "Twelever Ja'fari Hashemites at the hands of Saud. At one School" is the official religion of the time, King Abdallah-I even aspired to Islamic republic. This narrow Shi'a-Islamic declare east Jerusalem as the capital of identity excludes a large portion of its Jordan but was dissuaded by the British. population, including the Arabs, Turkmen, For this reason, Jordan never gave up its Assyrians, and Kurds --who are all Sunnis-- aspirations to gain a foothold in Jerusalem. as well as others both non-Persian--like the According to the Israel-Jordan of 1994, Azeris-- and non-Muslim--like the Jordan enjoys a "special status " over the Armenians and Bahais. In other words, a Islamic religious places in Jerusalem. This vast majority of the Iranians would have came against the backdrop of the difficulties in identifying with the current Declaration of Principles of 1993 and the regime that represents Shi'a Islam. impending installation of the Palestinian Likewise, efforts by the Islamists of the National Authority (PNA), thereby north to impose the Islamic Sharia upon the underscoring the importance of Jerusalem Christians and animist s living in the south to the Hashemites. resulted in a prolonged civil war in Sudan. Likewise, Saudi Arabia also thrives on The election of Kurdish leader Jalal al- its strong links to Islam. While the House of Talabani as President of Iraq, therefore, is Saud does not have a pedigree to the both a novelty and revolution in the Middle Qureshi tribe, it seeks political mileage over East. In all other states, senior positions are the presence of the two holiest places in denied to the religious "other. " In some Islam, Mecca and Medina. Indeed, cases, the prohibition is explicit and in following domestic opposition from Islamic others, the exclusion is circumspect. groups, the Saudi monarch changed his Monarchies, the most prominent system of official title to "Custodian of the Two Holy governance, rest on dynastical succession, Places. " and this excludes almost the entire Even nominally secular regimes are also population--including the religious other-- not immune from the drive for a religion- from being rulers of the country. The centric identity. Following the Arab defeat constitutions of Iran and Syr ia , for example, in the June 1967 war and the gradual explicitly state that only a Muslim can be radicalization of the Middle East, even the head of state. these states have also come under the Since the countries of the region are not influence of the Islamic undercurrents. exclusively Islamic, such overarching With the result, religion--mostly Islam-- influence of Islam in the public domain plays an all-pervasive role in the public as deprives the non-Muslim minorities of any well as private domain in the Middle East. role or say in the formation of national In most Middle Eastern states, Islam is identity. In Egypt , for example, the Coptic recognized as the official religion and the identity pre-dates the introduction of Islam

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P R Kumaraswamy but portraying them as a distinct minority Jewish-Arab conflict inside the state gets people into trouble with the authorities. pertains to the need to evolve a territorial- Many of the problems facing noted national rather than ethno-national identity Egyptian socialist Saad Eddin Ibrahim for Israel. Such an identity cannot be emanates from his desire to recognize the exclusively Jewish but would also have to plights of the minorities in his country. His include and reflect its Arab citizens who attempts to highlight the predicament facing constitute about a fifth of its population. At the Copts were viewed with suspicion the same time, however, given the intensity because , as veteran journalist Muhammed of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, any Heikel put it forcefully, the Copts are not a resolution of the identity question in Israel distinct group but merely "a part of Egypt's or the dilution of the Jewish exclusive unbreakable fabric." 3 The Copts who national identity, is neither realistic nor symbolized the Egyptian identity long advisable. before the arrival of Arabism and Islam to Moreover, the demographic reality the land of the Pharaohs have been prevented even the hardened supporters of systematically marginalized from the the settlement movement from advocating national identity. 4 the Israeli annexation of the occupied Israel is also not immune from the territories. To retain its democratic religious winds blowing across the Middle credentials Israel would have to follow the East. Despite its democratic model, it is still erstwhile Jordanian model and grant unable to reconcile with the inherent citizenship to the Palestinian residents of contradiction between its Jewish and the and . This would democratic identities. On one level, mean Israel ceasing to be a Jewish State but Zionism transformed the Jewish nation automatically becoming a bi-national one . scattered in four corners of the world into a In short, because all the states contain a state in the historic land of Israel. The large segment of the religious "other," any choice of erstwhile Palestine as the location religion-centric identity is both exclusive of the Jewish national home was both a and incomplete. Thus, one can go to the historic and religious choice. In spite of its extent of arguing that most of the internal accomplishments , however, both during the tensions and conflicts in many countries are pre-state yishuv period and since 1948, it due to their inability to accommodate the was unable to come to terms completely religious other. with its non-Jewish population. Israel Zangwell's slogan of "People without a land, DYNASTIC IDENTITY going to a land without people " was far too Monarchy still remains the most powerful and blinding. dominant form of governance in the Middle Since its establishment, Israel has been East. Out of the 25 states in the region, as unable to resolve its identity dilemma. many as eight follow monarchy. At the time While the Arab citizens enjoy equal of their independence from colonial rule, a political, social, and religious rights, they few more also had monarchs who were are unable to identify with the explicitly eventually overthrown through a revolution Jewish symbols of the state , such as the flag, or a coup. In most cases, ruling family has national anthem, holidays , and other become both the symbol and representative cultural motifs. The prime focus of the of the state. Given the longevity of the

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Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East rulers, most states witnessed very few to constitute the majority in Jordan. The successions and little new leadership. For Hashemite kingdom tended to view any example , since its founding in 1932, Saudi suggestions of a Palestinian majority in Arabia ha s had only six rulers.5 Jordan as an attempt to undermine the Not only does dynastic succession Jordanian state and its stability. More so, a exclude the non-Muslims in these countries, powerful segment of the Israeli right ha s but also exclude s a vast majority of the argued that Jordan is a Palestinian state but population. In some cases, the ruling family without a Palestinian head of state.8 does not reflect the majority community. Yet the gerrymandering of parliamentary The al-Khalifah family, which rules constituencies clearly favors the Bedouins , Bahrain, for example , is Sunni while the who form the backbone of the ruling ma jority population is Shi'a. One finds monarchy, rather than the , who similar situations in other countries as well. live in the refugee camps. According to one The orthodox Wahhabi Islam that provides Jordanian observer: legitimacy and religious sanctity to the ruling dynasty in Saudi Arabia rejects There are 45 electoral heterodox Islamic sects--including the districts. Districting is Shi'a--as non-Muslims. The Shi'a who considered unfair because constitute over ten percent of the Saudi there is a lack of balance population continue to be marginalized between population and the from the Saudi national identity. 6 numbers of seats per district. According to Annual Report on The division of districts is International Religious Freedom published claimed to guarantee by the US State Department, "Members of representation for the 'less the Shi'a minority continued to face fortunate areas' and to political and economic discrimination … prevent the capital, Amman, The Government continued sporadically to from taking the ma jority of enforce other restrictions on the Shi'a seats, but is seen as fanning community, such as banning Shi'a books the spirit of tribal and excluding Shi'a perspectives from the competition and extensive religious media and broadcast strengthening the concept of programming."7 the 'services deputy' who The Hashemites face a different concentrates on his or her dilemma in Jordan. There is an ongoing electoral district. Districting conflict between the original inhabitants of is also seen as intended to and the Palestinians who reduce the representation of became its citizens in the wake of the areas he avily populated by Hashemite annexation of the West Bank Jordanians of Palestinian captured during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. origin.9 Despite the official position to the contrary, the Jordanians of Palestinian origin appear According to another :

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P R Kumaraswamy

the wider population of these countries. Some defend the division into electoral districts on the EXPANSIONIST IDENTITY ground that it guarantees Certain nations sought to circumvent the representation of 'less identity question by following in the fortunate areas', safeguards footsteps of the imperial powers, opting for the share of some areas in regional expansion, and coveting their economic development, or smaller and less powerful neighbors. When prevents the capital and their national identity remained unclear, surrounding towns from they sought to expand their territorial limits taking the majority of seats, and thereby hoped to present themselves as but it is clear that politics is the leaders of the . Jordan also behind the motives for ironically began this process. Backed by the arguing for a reduction of then most powerful and well-organized the representation of areas Arab Legion, King Abdallah-I toyed with heavily populated by the idea of a greater Jordan. His annexation Jordanians of Palestinian of the West Bank was merely a first step in origin…. Amending the law his grandiose plan that would have included to create a more equitable parts of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Likewise, distribution of districts might in the 1950s when King Hussein was facing produce a huge increase in domestic threats to his regime, Baghdad, the representation of then ruled by King Faysal-II , was hoping Jordanians of Palestinian that Iraq could take over Jordan and other origin, which might in time Arab countries. threaten the identity of the Some countries found it difficult to Jordanian state.10 accept the existence or emergence of new states on territory that had once been In short, any meaningful representation ruled as part of a unit with their own lands. for the Jordanian-Palestinians in the Syria, for example, never reconciled itself Hashemite Kingdom would have to wait for with the French decision to carve out the resolution of the overall Arab-Israeli Lebanon as an independent country and to conflict. demonstrate this opposition never opened The oil rich Arab countries in the an embassy in Beirut. Its official Persian Gulf face a different kind of representative in Lebanon is often referred problem. In most countries, the native to as "governor " rather than ambassador. population constitutes only a minority and This diplomatic situation, however, did not labor migrants constitute the bulk of the inhibit Syria from maintaining a large population. In United Arab Emirates, for military presence in Lebanon until 2005. example, Arab and non-Arab expatriates Similarly, on the eve of the British make up more than three quarters of the departure from the Persian Gulf in 1971, country's population. the Shah resurrected Iran's historic claims Under such circumstances, national over Bahrain. Likewise, Saddam Hussein's identity merely means the dynasty that rules desire to claim Kuwait to be the 19th the state rather than it being a reflection of province of Iraq resulted in the US-led

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Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East military offensive in 1991. Even after the consequences upon the identity question. war and the eventual expulsion of its forces, Expansion of the territorial limits does not Baghdad periodically referred to its historic resolve the identity crisis and in some cases, rights over Kuwait. It was only the it only exasperated the problem. downfall of Saddam Hussein in the summer of 2003 and formation of an elected TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITY provision government that eventually led to If individual expansion was not always Iraq giving up its erstwhile claims over successful, some sought the transnational Kuwait. route to the identity crisis. Confronted with For long, Egypt and Libya had designs national identity, ideas of pan-Arabism and over their weaker neighbors, Sudan and pan-Islamism offered some hopes. By Chad respectively. Turkey's control of aspiring for a transnational identity, they Cyprus is also an indication of this sought to circumvent and even resolve the expansionist trend prevalent in the Middle immediate problem of national identity. East. This path, however, was troubled from the The Israel-Palestinian conflict has also very beginning. been influenced by the desire for hegemony. Arab states went into unchartered waters. An influential segment of the Israeli right is The supra-nationalism of Europe today is opposed to any territorial compromise with the culmination of a process whereby states the Palestinians. For its part, Hamas and its that have fully realized their individual radical supporters seek the destruction of national identities have opted to voluntarily the state of Israel and aspire for a surrender that identity and to seek a Palestinian state "within the 1948" common European ide ntity. For centuries boundaries. Both positions merely block Britain, France, and Germany fought any meaningful Israeli-Palestinian bitterly to retain their individual national reconciliation. Above all, any territorial identities before emerging as the advocates expansion of Israel would merely of an all-encompassing European identity. accentuate the identity debate and further In the Middle East however, the pan- erode Israel's Jewish identity. Arab and pan-Islamic identities were a In short, democratic, monarchical or substitute for individual national identities. revolutionary, states of the Middle East Unable to transform states into nations, they have sought expansion as a means of opted for trans-state regional identities. circumventing the identity debate and often They sought to overcome the difficulties of used Arabism as their national identity. evolving a territory-based national identity Despite the best of their efforts, by focusing on the common cultural and expansionism never proved to be successful. religions background. The inclusive Even those who had temporary gains (Syria Arab/Islamic identity thus came into in Lebanon, Israel and Jordan vis-à-vis the conflict with the exclusive territory-based West Bank, Turkey vis -à-vis Cyprus, and identity and national interests. Morocco vis-à-vis the western Sahara), Tension thus became inevitable. Inter- eventually could not escape from the Arab and inter-Islamic differences became

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P R Kumaraswamy far more serious than the conflict with the which have yet to fulfill their territorial outside world. The Arab attitude toward aspiration, poses a different kind of Egypt following the Camp David problem. Colonial interests worked against agreement sums up this dilemma. Egypt the Kurds and deprived them of their self- was isolated and expelled from the League determination and statehood. Scattered in because it pursued a narrow "national Turkey, Iraq, Syria , and Iran, they lack a interest " and abandoned the larger "Arab centrifugal power base. Turkey, despite the interest." accommodating tradition of the Ottoman Egypt's attitude toward the Arab League Empire, has been ext remely slow in coming can also be seen as an indication of its to terms with its Kurdish population. For desire to be the leader of the Arab world. long, it not only denied the very existence Indeed the League is the only regional of the Kurds , but also wanted "Mountain organization in the world where the formal Turks " to assimilate into the modern leadership remains with a single country. Turkish nation. Even the newly found Since its founding in 1945, the post of freedom among the Iraqi Kurds would not secretary general of the League was always resolve the situation of Kurds living in the held by an Egyptian. 11 neighboring countries. Ankara's vehement At times, even the expansionist desires opposition to Kurdish autonomy in post- of individual rulers are also presented as an Saddam Iraq underscores its apprehensions effort to bring about Arab unity. The about similar demands from Turkish Kurds. transnational Ba'ath socialist model also did Palestinians, despite their universal not resolve this problem; both Iraq and endorsement, also suffer from an identity Syria swore by the same ideology but crisis, though of a different nature. pursued different paths. Currently the Palestinians live under four Pan-Islamic drive presented a different distinct types of political arrangements: kind of problem. Theologically, Islam does not rec ognize territorially defined nation · Citizens of Israel states. It treats the believers-- Muslims in · Residents of the areas under the this case--as one people, transcending all control of the PNA other barriers, divisions, and frontiers. · Citizens of Jor dan Under these circumstances, the traditional · Refugees residing in Jordan and European model of nation-states merely other Arab countries undermine s the unity of the ummah. This theological dichotomy did not inhibit Saudi So long as the Palestinians lack Arabia from promoting its interests both sovereignty, their dispersal under different inside and outside the region through its political arrangements would be a source of support for various pan-Islamic movements. strength. They would be able to influence The formation of the Organization of the and exercise pressures upon the countries Islamic Conference in 1969 was a clear where they reside. The formation of a manifestation of this trend. sovereign state would place a stark choice before the Palestinians who reside outside STATELESS IDENTITY the territorial limits of the Palestinian state. The situation of Kurds and Palestinians, Statehood would pose a number of two prominent Middle Eastern groups threats to the Palestinian identity. One,

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Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East unrestricted flow of refugees into Israel King Abdallah in 1999 to abandon Jordan's would bring about its destruction. Hence, erstwhile support for Hamas, close down its Israel is unlikely to accept the Palestinian office , and expel its leaders was a clear right of return to their erstwhile homes in signal. 14 Jordan does not wish to be mandate Palestine. This in practice would entangled with the Palestinians, especially mean that refugees would have to be when the final status negotiations confront accommodated within the future Palestinian sensitive issues such as refugees, borders , state. Given its limited "economic etc. absorptive capacity," 12 a Palestinian state Three, the emergence of Hamas as a would not be able to accommodate all the serious challenge and a potential alternative refugees who might wish to return. In such to Fatah and the PLO poses a different kind a situation, a large number of Palestinians, of challenge to the Palestinian national even if financially compensated, would identity. The secular Palestinian have to be accommodated either within nationalism represented by Yasir Arafat and those states where they have been residing his colleagues faces the threat of being or in mutually agreed third states. replaced by Islamic radicalism represented With the sole exception of Jordan, none by Hamas. The hitherto Muslim -Christian of the Arab states has bestowed citizenship unity exhibited by the secular nationalists rights upon the Palestinians who lived in will undergo a metamorphosis following them for decades. Even if the Arab states the January 2006 victory of Hamas in the were to be induced to modify this stand, the Palestinian elections. Places like Bethlehem problem is far from over. The presence of and Nazareth that were traditionally Palestinian refugees significantly associated with Christ are losing their contributed to the Christian-Muslim Christian character and demographically tensions in Lebanon and eventually have become predominantly Muslim. triggered a protracted civil war in that Thus, if both individual efforts and country. Moreover, the role played by the transnational approaches have failed to Palestinian leadership in Jordan (1970) and resolve the identity issue in the Middle East, Kuwait (1990-91) would be extremely what could be the alternative? unnerving for many Arab regimes to accept Palestinians as full citizens. It would PROGNOSIS/CONCLUSION require more than a formal apology from Countries of the Middle East are the Palestinian leadership to overcome internally diverse and hence a narrow mistrust and past bitterness. exclusive national identity could not be Two, Palestinian statehood is also imposed from above. If experiences in raising concerns in Israel and Jordan over Lebanon or post-Saddam Iraq were an irredentist claims of the Palestinians and the indication, confessional arrangement or possible demand for a greater Palestine that other forms of proportional representation would encompass the Israeli Arabs and would only intensify the internal tensions Jordanian-Palestinians with the future and conflicts. Proportional representation, Palestinian state. 13 The determination of

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P R Kumaraswamy for example, did not prevent the marginalization of the Israeli Arabs. Ami Ayalon, "Egypt’s Coptic Pandora’s Each state would have to evolve an Box", in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor identity that is neither parochial nor (eds.), Minorities and the State in the Arab confessional, but rather a territorial identity World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, that recognizes and encompasses their 1999), pp.63-67. individual distinctness and variations. Each 4 Indeed, President Gamal Abdul Nasser, state would have to recognize the need for the secular Arab nationalist, initiated some and eventually evolve an inclusive identity. of the anti-Coptic measures. In many or most cases, such an identity, 5 They are Abdul Aziz (1932-53) and his given the mix of populations, would not be sons Saud (1953-64), Faisal (1964-75), exclusively "Arab" or "Islamic" but would Khalid (1975-82), Fahd (1982-2005) , and require lots of local variations and Abdallah (2005-present). The situation is flexibility. The Middle East faces a stark not differe nt in other countries. Bahrain ha s choice: accommodate or fragment. had three rulers since 1971; Jordan has had At the same time, the problem of four kings since 1946; Kuwait has had four national identity is universal in the Middle emirs since 1950; Morocco has had three East and only individual countries can kings since 1957; Oman has had two resolve this problem. Outside interference, sultans since 1932; Qatar has had three even a well-intended one , would merely be emirs since 1971; and the UAE has had a repeat of the colonial legacy. So long as four presidents since 1971. this fundamental issue ha s not been 6 Shi’a groups, however , claim that they resolved, any reforms in the system of constitute as much as 25 percent of the governance, including a democratic model, Saudi population. Madawi al-Rasheed, would be insufficient to mitigate the "The Shi’a of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in problems facing the Middle East. Research of Cultural A uthenticity." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, * P R Kumaraswamy teaches Israeli politics No.1 (May 1998), p.132. See also, The at the Centre for West Asian and African Economist , June 17, 2002. Studies, School of International Studies, 7 International Religious Freedom Report Jawaharlal Nehru, New Delhi, India. 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/3550 7.htm, accessed on July 3, 2005. NOTES 8 See, for example , Raphael Israeli, “Is Jordan Palestine?” in Efraim Karsh and P R 1 Khaleej Times, September 7, 2005. Kumaraswamy (eds.), Israel, Hashemites 2 The Hashemite Kingdom still emphasizes and the Palestinians: The Fateful Triangle importance of this lineage. To see the (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp.49-66. Hashemite family tree, visit: 9 Zaid Majed, “Introduction and Executive http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/tree - Summary,” Building Democracy in Jordan: english.html, accessed on June 6, 2005. Women’s Political Participation, Political 3 Karim al-Gawhary, "Copts in the Party Life and Democratic Elections ‘Egyptian Fabric’," Middle East Report, (Stockholm, International Institute for Vol.26, No.3 (July-September 1996), p.21. Democracy and Electoral Assistance

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Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East

(IDEA), 2005), p.19. 10 Suleiman Sweiss, “Electoral Systems in Jordan”, in Building Democracy in Jordan: Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life and Democratic Elections (Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2005), p.115. 11 However, between 1979 and 1990 Chedi Klibi of Tunisia held the position, as Egypt was suspended from the League following its signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel. 12 This expression was first used by the Zionist leadership to justify that the yishuv could absorb more Jewish immigrants. 13 For a more in-depth discussion see, Hillel Frisch, “Ethnicity, Territorial Integrity and Regional order: Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1997), pp. 257- 70. 14 P R Kumaraswamy, “The Jordan-Hamas Divorce,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 8 (August-September 2001), www.meib.org/articles/0108_me1.htm.

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