October 2018

Monthly Forecast

1 Overview Overview 1 In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10 3 Status Update since our In October, Bolivia assumes the presidency of they are being used for migrant smuggling or September Forecast the Council. Early in the month a Council visit- human trafficking. ing mission to the DRC is planned, focused on Additionally, in accordance with the 60-day 4 Democratic Republic of the Congo the upcoming elections. Following the return of reporting cycle, Yemen may be added to the pro- the Council delegation, there will be a briefing to gramme of work. 6 Libya the Council by the trip co-leads (Bolivia, Equato- Other African issues include: 7 Counter-Terrorism rial Guinea and France). Special Representative • Mali, on the activities of MINUSMA; 8 of the Secretary-General Leila Zerrougui is also • the CAR, on the activities of MINUSCA; 10 UNDOF () scheduled to brief on the activities of the UN mis- • Sudan (Darfur), on the activities of UNAMID 11 Sudan/South Sudan sion in the DRC. and the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee; Bolivia has chosen to hold a meeting on the • Western Sahara on the activities of MINURSO 13 Western Sahara role of natural resources as a root cause of conflict. and the adoption of a resolution renewing the 14 /Palestine There will also be two open debates: one on wom- mission’s mandate; and 15 Mali en, peace and security, focused on the empow- • Sudan/South Sudan, on the activities of 16 Colombia erment of women in political processes; and the UNISFA and an adoption scheduled to renew regular quarterly open debate on Israel/Palestine. the joint border verification monitoring mech- 17 Sudan Other Middle East issues include: anism in Abyei. 19 Central African • Golan Heights, on the activities of UNDOF; There will be a briefing from Special Repre- Republic • , on the latest report on the imple- sentative Jean Arnault on the Secretary-General’s 20 Lebanon mentation of resolution 1559 (2004), which 90-day report on the UN Verification Mission in 22 Women, Peace and called for the disarmament of all militias and Colombia. Security the extension of government control over all A briefing is also expected on the report on the 23 Cyprus Lebanese territory; and Secretary-General’s good offices in Cyprus and 24 Yemen • Syria, the monthly briefings on political and the outcome of UN consultant Jane Holl Lute’s humanitarian developments and on the use of consultations on the negotiation process. chemical weapons. Other issues this month include the annual The Council is scheduled to adopt a resolution briefing to the Council of the ICJ President and a renewing the authorisation for member states to joint briefing by the chairs of the Council’s coun- inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of ter-terrorism related committees. Libya when reasonable grounds exist to suspect

In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10

27 September 2018 This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. In October, the five incoming members of the For many years, the diverse nature of the For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council—Belgium, the Dominican E10 members has made coordination and joint Security Council actions please subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” Republic, Germany, Indonesia and South Afri- action difficult. However, driven by dissatisfac- series at whatsinblue.org or follow ca—will begin attending meetings of the Council, tion with being sidelined on key Council deci- @SCRtweets on Twitter. both formal and informal, as well as meetings of sions and a shared desire to improve the effec- the subsidiary bodies. Starting on 1 January 2019, tiveness of the Council, especially in the face of these five members will make up the E10 together P5 paralysis caused by sharp differences, elected with Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, members have begun acting as a more cohe- Peru and Poland. sive group. The E10 now meet monthly at both

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10 permanent representative and political coor- In 2013-14, Australia and Luxembourg extended the JIM’s mandate for one month dinator level. These meetings have allowed (joined by in 2014) paved the way while requesting the UN Secretary-General, the E10 to discuss the working methods of by drafting decisions on the humanitar- in coordination with the OPCW, to submit the Council, particularly around the issues ian aspects of the Syria conflict. Ever since, proposals to the Council for a new struc- of penholders and chairs of subsidiary bod- elected members have been the recognised ture and methodology for the JIM. Follow- ies. The elected members chair all the sub- co-penholders on Syrian humanitarian ing the Russian veto of the Japanese draft, sidiary bodies, with the P5 deciding on the issues and have found ways of navigating the Italy in its role as Council president circu- distribution of responsibilities. This year divisions of the permanent members on the lated a draft letter to the Secretary-General the E10 have pushed for a greater role and Syria issue to achieve outcomes on cross-line requesting that the JIM’s organisational more equitable distribution in the allocation and cross-border humanitarian access and administrative arrangements be main- of chairs of subsidiary bodies. These regu- The increasingly divisive P5 dynamics, tained until 31 December 2017, pending lar E10 meetings also provide a forum for particularly over Syria, have been a partic- a final decision on the renewal of its man- discussion of issues of substance, and an ular catalyst for E10 action. In April 2017, date. Soon thereafter, Sweden and Uruguay opportunity to garner support from fellow following the chemical weapons attack on circulated a draft resolution to extend the E10 members for potential new initiatives. Khan Shaykhun, the P3 and Russia both JIM’s mandate for a year with the aim of The E10 have had several meetings with the produced separate draft resolutions, which reaching a compromise among the com- Secretary-General, most recently in mid- were then negotiated among the P5. Frus- peting perspectives in the Council. Russia September together with the incoming five trated at not being consulted in the negotia- opposed both initiatives, which led to the elected members. tion process, the E10 in an unusual move demise of the JIM, but the energy and dyna- The incoming members enter the Coun- produced a draft text that represented a mism shown by these Council members in cil at a moment when the opportunity for compromise among the positions of the the last stretch of the negotiations on a file elected members to make their mark on the permanent members. The existence of this traditionally monopolised by permanent work of the Council appears greater than it alternative E10 draft that might have been members was notable. has been for many years. In the early 1990s, acceptable to the majority of members Even when there is agreement on a Syr- after the end of the Cold War and lasting for apparently made it more difficult for the P3 ia-related issue, implementation of these about a decade, elected members frequent- and Russia to proceed with a vote on draft Council decisions is often difficult. In Feb- ly took initiatives on important issues and resolutions that would almost certainly not ruary, the Council unanimously adopted contributed policy options on a full range of have been adopted, either because of likely resolution 2401, which demanded a ces- matters. However, starting in the mid-2000s, vetoes or not having the requisite nine votes. sation of hostilities in Syria. Sweden and the space shrank for such contributions However, US air strikes that evening on the Kuwait, the current co-leads on humani- from elected members, particularly with the Sha’yrat airbase outside Homs derailed the tarian issues, engaged in intense bilateral emergence of a more rigid “penholder” sys- attempt by the E10 to bridge the divide negotiations with Russia and were able to tem. Today, the P3—France, the UK, and among permanent members. The P3 then incorporate enough of its concerns for there the US—are penholders on the majority of circulated a draft resolution, largely based to be rare Council unity on a Syria-related situations on the Council’s agenda. on their previous text, although incorporat- outcome. However, the Syrian government The P3, with their institutional memory ing one element from the E10 draft. That did not abide by the resolution, and there and well-resourced missions, are arguably in draft was vetoed by Russia. was no de-escalation of the violence. a strong position to hold the pen on substan- In November 2017, elected members The humanitarian crisis in Yemen, for tive issues in the Council. Being a penholder played an active role in trying to keep alive which the UK is the penholder, is another goes beyond drafting and negotiating texts, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) situation where the elected members have however. It also means calling meetings and of the Organisation for the Prohibition pushed for greater Council attention and organising visiting missions,and can work of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the more balanced outcomes. Coordination against inclusive Council processes. The UN, which had been set up to determine by some elected members on this issue penholder practice has often led the per- responsibility for the use of chemical weap- emerged late last year as a result of what manent members first to discuss and seek ons in Syria. Renewing the JIM mandate were perceived as unbalanced Council draft agreement among themselves on a draft text was always going to be difficult, as the P5 products on Yemen. This year, a group of before sharing it with the rest of the Council, held divergent views on how well it had per- Council members—Bolivia, the Nether- making it difficult for elected members to formed its job. Competing draft resolutions lands, Peru, Poland and Sweden—have provide substantive inputs at an early stage from the US and Russia failed to be adopt- coordinated regularly and taken joint posi- in the negotiations. ed—the US draft due to a veto, the Russian tions on the humanitarian dimensions of In recent years, frustration over being draft lacking enough votes—on 16 Novem- the conflict. In particular, members of this sidelined and concerns at a lack of effec- ber, one day ahead of the end of the JIM’s group were united on what they regarded as tiveness on major Council decisions have mandate. Several elected members then a more comprehensive text during the nego- spurred elected members to find creative offered options to keep the JIM functioning. tiations on a presidential statement on the ways of playing a role on key agenda issues. Japan circulated a draft text that would have humanitarian situation in Yemen adopted in

2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10

March this year. discussed in the Council. In December 2016, well as the power of the veto, elected mem- There are other examples of elected Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal and Ven- bers, through strategic alliances and greater members with very different foreign poli- ezuela worked together for the adoption of cooperation as the E10, are able to influ- cy priorities coming together on issues of a resolution on Israeli settlements after the ence the work of the Council. The incom- shared interest. In May 2016, five elected original sponsor, , had withdrawn the ing elected members are in a strong position members (Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, draft under heavy political pressure. to continue this move from the sidelines to Spain and Uruguay) initiated a resolution The actions of elected members in the working more closely with the P5 in core on the protection of health care in armed last few years have shown that, although the areas related to the maintenance of interna- conflict, an issue which is now regularly P5 have the advantages of permanence as tional peace and security.

Status Update since our September Forecast

Programme of Work two Russian nationals for the attempted mur- Youth Representative of Afghanistan to the On 4 September, the Council discussed the der of Sergei Skripal and his daughter and UN for 2018. “unofficial calendar of events” for September for the possession of the nerve agent Nov- in the open chamber after members were ichok. Russia denied the allegations that it Somalia unable to reach agreement on the provision- was involved in the incident in Salisbury and On 11 September, the Somali national secu- al programme of work for the month, given blamed the UK for refusing any cooperation rity advisor briefed the 751/1907 Somalia disagreement over whether to include Nica- with Russia in the investigation. and Eritrea Sanctions Committee on weap- ragua on the programme (S/PV.8339). Fol- ons management in Somalia. On 13 Sep- lowing the meeting on Nicaragua on 5 Sep- Corruption and Conflict tember, Special Representative and head tember, the Council adopted the provisional On 10 September, the Council held a briefing of UNSOM Michael Keating briefed (S/ programme of work. on corruption and conflict under the agenda PV.8352) the Council on the latest UNSOM item “Maintenance of International Peace report (S/2018/800). Head of AMISOM Nicaragua and Security” (S/PV.8346). UN Secretary- Francisco Madeira and Executive Director On 5 September, the Council held a briefing General António Guterres and John Prender- of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and on the situation in Nicaragua (S/PV.8340). gast, Founding Director of the Enough Proj- the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) Gonzalo Koncke, the Chief of Staff of the ect and Co-Founder of The Sentry, briefed. Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka also briefed. On Secretary General of the Organization of 20 September, Council members issued a American States, and Felix Maradiaga, a civ- Venezuela press statement welcoming the Agreement on il society representative, briefed the Council. On 10 September, Council members held Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Coop- an open Arria-formula meeting proposed eration signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia on 16 Haiti by the US and entitled “Venezuela as a Case September (SC/13516). They also welcomed On 6 September, Assistant Secretary-Gener- Study of Corruption, Peace, and Security”. the meeting between the presidents of Dji- al for Peacekeeping Operations Bintou Keita Mercedes de Freitas, the Executive Direc- bouti and Eritrea on 17 September in Jeddah. briefed the Council (S/PV.8342) on the most tor of the Venezuela chapter of Transparency recent Secretary-General’s report on MINU- International, and Marshall Billingslea, the Peacekeeping JUSTH (S/2018/795). Keita described the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing in On 12 September, the Council held a debate progress towards 11 benchmarks for the the US Department of the Treasury, briefed on peacekeeping reform (S/PV.8349). The transition to a non-peacekeeping UN pres- Council members. Council was briefed by Under-Secretary- ence in the country. Council members also General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean- noted that the violent July protests in Haiti Afghanistan Pierre Lacroix and Sarah Blakemore, Chief demonstrated the volatility of the socio-eco- On 11 September, Council members issued Executive of the NGO Keeping Children nomic situation. a press statement condemning the 5 Septem- Safe. On 21 September, the Council unani- ber terrorist attack in Kabul claimed by ISIL mously adopted resolution 2436 on peace- Nerve Gas Attack and the 11 September attack in Nangarhar keeping performance (S/PV.8360). On 6 September, the Council held an emer- (SC/13498). On 17 September, the Council gency session on the investigation of the Salis- held the quarterly debate on UNAMA (S/ DPRK (North Korea) bury nerve agent attack (S/PV.8343). UK PV.8354). Briefings were provided by the On 17 September, the Council held an open Ambassador Karen Pierce presented the lat- Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen- briefing on the implementation of sanctions est information on the investigation. She also eral and head of UNAMA, Tadamichi Yama- on the DPRK (S/PV.8353). The US request- said that the UK had brought charges against moto, and Ramiz Bakhtiar, the newly-elected ed the meeting to address issues related to

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 3 Status Update since our September Forecast the midterm report of the Panel of Experts. Lacroix on the Secretary-General’s 90-day protection of civilians work during the past Under‑Secretary‑General for Political Affairs report (S/2018/831). Lacroix reported that 20 years, as 2019 will mark the 20th anni- Rosemary DiCarlo briefed on recent efforts the international community must send a versary of protection of civilians becoming a to denuclearise the Korean peninsula.. Dur- strong message to the parties in conflict that Council agenda item. ing the meeting, the US accused Russia of with the new peace agreement signed, there pressuring the panel to modify its report, is no longer any justification for continued Iran which described sanctions violations by some clashes. Special Envoy for Sudan and South On 24 September, Council members issued Russian actors, and called on the panel to Sudan Nicholas Haysom and the Intergov- a press statement condemning the terror- publish its original report. Russia dismissed ernmental Authority on Development Spe- ist attack that took place in southwest Iran the allegations and said that the US inter- cial Envoy for South Sudan Ismail Wais also on 22 September during a military parade, fered in the panel’s work by preventing the briefed. A civil society representative based in which resulted in the death of 24 people, circulation of the latest version of the report South Sudan briefed via video teleconference. including children, and the injury of 60 oth- to the wider UN membership. On 27 Sep- ers (SC/13523). tember, the Council held a ministerial-level Protection of Civilians meeting on efforts to denuclearise the DPRK. On 21 September, the Council adopted a Non-Proliferation US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo briefed presidential statement on the protection of On 26 September, the Council held a summit- on the ongoing diplomatic engagement and civilians (S/PRST/2018/18) in which it “rec- level meeting on countering the proliferation stressed the importance of maintaining pres- ognises the contribution of the updated Aide of weapons of mass destruction, chaired by US sure on the DPRK until it takes concrete Memoire”, which is attached as an annex President Donald Trump (S/PV.8362). Coun- steps towards denuclearisation. to the statement (S/PV.8339). The presi- cil members discussed a wide range of non- dential statement further requests that the proliferation issues during the meeting. The South Sudan next report of the Secretary-General on the Iran nuclear agreement and efforts to denu- On 18 September, the Council was briefed protection of civilians be submitted by 15 clearise the Korean peninsula dominated the (S/PV.8356) by Under-Secretary-General May 2019, and that this report summarise discussions. for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre achievements and challenges to the UN’s

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action term (under the country’s constitution) its presidential candidate. Kabila’s decision not In October, the Council is planning a visiting ended in December 2016, remains in office. to run was broadly welcomed internationally, mission to the Democratic Republic of the According to an agreement reached between including by Canada, Switzerland, the US, the Congo (DRC). Bolivia, France and Equato- Kabila and the opposition on 31 Decem- AU, the EU and MONUSCO, according to rial Guinea will co-lead the mission. ber 2016, elections were to be held by the the latest Secretary-General’s progress report Also in October, the Council expects to end of 2017, and Kabila was not to run for on the electoral process of 28 August. Sha- be briefed, most likely by the Special Repre- a third term or initiate amendments to the dary is said to be a Kabila loyalist and is on sentative and head of the UN Organization constitution. Citing logistical difficulties, the the EU sanctions list for being “responsible Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUS- Independent National Electoral Commission for the recent arrests of activists and opposi- CO), Leila Zerrougui, on the Secretary-Gen- (CENI) eventually published a new electoral tion members, as well as the disproportionate eral’s latest report on MONUSCO. calendar for combined presidential, legisla- use of force since his appointment, such as the MONUSCO’s mandate expires on 31 tive and provincial elections to take place on violent crackdown on members of the Bundu March 2019. 23 December 2018. The political tensions dia Kongo (BDK) movement in Kongo Cen- were exacerbated by Kabila’s failure to reveal tral, the repression in Kinshasa over January- Key Recent Developments his own intentions for a long time. February 2017 and the disproportionate use The electoral process in the DRC contin- On 8 August, the last day to submit presi- of force and violent repression in Kasai prov- ues to be a major concern for the Council, dential candidates, Kabila’s party nominated inces”, according to the EU listing information. despite recent positive developments. Presi- former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Former Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, dent Joseph Kabila, whose second and final the Interior Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary as whose conviction by the ICC for war crimes

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DRC Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2424 (29 June 2018) renewed the DRC sanctions regime until 1 July 2019 and the mandate of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee until 1 August 2019. S/RES/2409 (27 March 2018) renewed MONUSCO’s mandate until 31 March 2019. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2018/786 (24 August 2018) was a report on the electoral process in the DRC. S/2018/655 (2 July 2018) was a report on MONUSCO. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8346 (10 September 2018) was a briefing on corruption and conflict in which the Director of the Enough Project and Co-Founder of The Sentry John Prendergast briefed the Council.S/PV.8331 (27 August 2018) was a briefing on political developments in the DRC via video teleconference by MONUSCO head Leila Zerrougui; President of the Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo Monseigneur Marcel Utembi; and spokesperson for Rien Sans Les Femmes Solange Lwashiga Furaha. Sanctions Committee Document SC/13500 (12 September 2018) was a press release on the 31 August meeting of the Sanctions Committee with the Group of Experts. SC/13458 (17 August 2018) was a press release on the open meeting for member states held by the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee on 27 July.

4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Democratic Republic of the Congo

and crimes against humanity was overturned been responsible for killing more than 800 of the Congolese national police, according to on appeal on 8 June, also registered as a presi- civilians in Beni territory, North Kivu, since the report. A proliferation of militias and armed dential candidate. The CENI declared him October 2014. On 22 September, 18 people, groups also contributed to the increase in abuses of human rights and international humanitarian ineligible, however, on the grounds that the including 14 civilians and four Congolese law, notably in North Kivu. A significant increase ICC had found him guilty of witness tam- soldiers, were killed in an attack attributed was also reported in violations of the civil and pering. The Constitutional Court confirmed to the ADF in Beni, North Kivu. The ADF political rights of political opponents, journalists CENI’s decision on 19 September. Opposi- is also believed to be responsible for the and civil society activists, including human rights tion parties rejected this decision and the dis- deadly attack on Tanzanian peacekeepers on defenders throughout the country related to elec- tions scheduled for December 2018. At press qualification of five other candidates (out of 7 December 2017, in which 15 peacekeep- time, the HRC was expected to vote on 28 Sep- 25), arguing that it was politically motivated, ers were killed, 53 were wounded, and one tember on a resolution on technical assistance an accusation the government has denied. remains missing. and capacity-building in the field of human rights On 13 August, Council members issued In a briefing on corruption and conflict in the DRC. a press statement welcoming the registration on 10 September, Director of the Enough of the candidates for the presidential and Project and Co-Founder of The Sentry John Key Issues and Options legislative elections and Kabila’s “respect for Prendergast said that the DRC exemplifies The primary political issue for the Council in his commitment to abide by the Congolese the nexus between corruption and mass the upcoming period is that the elections take Constitution and the provisions of the 31 atrocities. He noted that security forces and place as scheduled and that they are free and December 2016 political agreement”. Coun- rebel groups use extreme violence against fair. The visiting mission will be an opportu- cil members also reiterated the importance of civilians and forced labour for the exploi- nity to meet with key stakeholders and reit- creating the necessary electoral conditions of tation of natural resources in order to fund erate the Council’s previous messages, call- transparency, credibility and inclusivity. their activities. ing on the DRC to take action to guarantee The President of the National Episcopal Conflict in North Kivu has complicated that the electoral calendar is observed and Conference of Congo, Monseigneur Marcel efforts to eradicate Ebola in the DRC. After that elections are inclusive and held in a safe Utembi, briefed the Council on 27 August. the World Health Organization (WHO) environment conducive to participation in The spokesperson for Rien Sans Les Femmes declared the 2018 Ebola outbreak in the the political process by all. (a local organisation promoting women’s par- DRC over on 24 July, a new outbreak erupted Council members may also press the ticipation in the electoral process), Solange in North Kivu in August. According to the DRC government to take all necessary mea- Lwashiga Furaha, and Zerrougui were the WHO, by 23 September there had been 119 sures to ensure a peaceful transition of pow- other two briefers. confirmed and 31 probable cases of Ebola, er. The Council may reiterate its call on all In his report on the electoral process, the resulting in 100 deaths. stakeholders to refrain from violence and to Secretary-General noted with concern con- remain committed to the electoral process as tinued incidents of repression and intimida- Sanctions-Related Developments the only way forward. The visit will also give tion of political activists and human rights The DRC Sanctions Committee held a formal Council members the opportunity to assess open meeting for member states on 27 July on defenders and other restrictions on the politi- the status of logistical preparations and offer the final report of the Group of Experts assist- cal space. The report called upon the authori- ing the committee. The coordinator of the group MONUSCO’s assistance to CENI. ties to lift the general ban on public demon- presented the report, followed by comments by The Council may choose to issue a pres- strations and uphold the rights of Congolese the representatives of the DRC, Burundi, Tanzania idential or press statement to reinforce the citizens to freedom of expression and peace- and Uganda. positions taken during the visit. On 31 August, the Group of Experts present- ful assembly. (The Council had called on the Additionally, the Council can utilise the ed its programme of work for the next year. DRC to lift the ban in resolution 2409.) The sanctions regime by amending the listing cri- report further noted that recent public state- teria to include acts that hinder a free and ments by government officials and CENI Human Rights-Related Developments fair electoral process and sanction actors who have indicated that the CENI intends to hold During its 39th session, the Human Rights Coun- undermine the electoral process. the elections without MONUSCO’s support. cil (HRC) held an enhanced interactive dialogue on 25 September on the report of the High Com- The eastern DRC continues to be missioner for Human Rights on the human rights Council and Wider Dynamics plagued by the activities of rebel groups, situation and the activities of the UN Joint Human All Council members remain concerned with a disastrous effect on the population. Rights Office in the DRC, covering June 2017 to about the ongoing political crisis and the dire According to UNHCR, there were 782,363 May (A/HRC/39/42). The report noted a dete- security situation. There is consensus about Congolese refugees in neighbouring coun- rioration of the human rights situation across the the imperative of holding elections on 23 country with an overall increase of almost 20 per- tries on 31 July, mostly originating from the cent in the number of human rights violations and December without further delays. North and South Kivu regions, where there abuses documented by the Joint Human Rights The Council has visited the DRC 13 times, are many active rebel groups and militias, Office, compared to the previous reporting peri- first in 2000 and most recently in Novem- such as the Islamist Ugandan Allied Demo- od. More than 63 percent of the violations were ber 2016. Since early 2018, there seems to cratic Forces (ADF). Human rights groups committed by state officials, primarily members have been agreement among members to visit of the DRC armed forces (FARDC) and officers say that the ADF and other militias have the DRC during the electoral process. The

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Democratic Republic of the Congo visit was to have taken place in August, but elections and confidence-building measures Council members during their visit. Ques- disagreement over precise dates led mem- between the government and the opposition. tions remain for some Council members, bers to agree to postpone it. It seems that Council members generally take a posi- however, as to the influence Kabila may exert in order to focus on political developments, tive view of Kabila’s decision not to run for a on key stakeholders in the run-up to and fol- the Council will only visit Kinshasa. During third term. Given their varying perspectives lowing the elections. the visit, Council members are keen to main- on the nature of the political situation in the France is the penholder on the DRC, tain a united front by focusing on matters of DRC, his decision also removes what could and Kuwait chairs the DRC Sanctions consensus, such as the importance of timely have been a bone of contention between Committee.

Libya

Expected Council Action smuggling of migrants and trafficking in per- intercepted at sea. According to estimates In October, the Council is expected to renew sons via the notes that by the EU military operation in the South- the authorisation for member states to the humanitarian and human rights situa- ern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast tion of refugees and migrants remains dire, MED operation SOPHIA) about 29,785 of Libya that they have reasonable grounds to with the prospect of worsening. The number persons were rescued by various vessels suspect are being used for migrant smuggling of people held in detention is increasing due in the central Mediterranean Sea between or human trafficking. to a higher number of interceptions at sea October 2017 and 31 July 2018, which con- The mandate of the UN Support Mission and the growing closure of the Mediterra- stitutes a substantial reduction from the in Libya (UNSMIL) expires on 15 Septem- nean Sea. corresponding previous reporting period ber 2019, and the mandate of the Panel of At a 5 September briefing on the latest from 2016 to 2017. Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions developments in Libya, Special Representa- The security situation in Libya remains Committee expires on 15 November. tive and head of UNSMIL Ghassan Salamé highly volatile, aggravating the precarious said that “abuse and exploitation abound situation of migrants and refugees. During Key Recent Developments within prisons and detention centres”, add- recent heavy clashes between armed groups On 13 September, the Council adopted ing that UNSMIL continues to have great in Tripoli, UNHCR had to relocate people resolution 2434, renewing the mandate of difficulty accessing those locations. Human from detention centres that came under fire. UNSMIL until 15 September 2019 without rights abuses in Libya, countries of destina- With the support of UNSMIL, a ceasefire altering the core of its mandate. tion, and at sea include trafficking, arbitrary agreement was reached on 4 September. A According to UNHCR, the number detention, torture, forced labour and sexual Ceasefire Consolidation Agreement was of arrivals by sea to Italy via the Central abuse. In the report, the Secretary-General signed on 9 September. On 10 September, Mediterranean route between January and welcomes support to Libya to combat the the headquarters of the National Oil Coop- July 2018 was 18,500, representing a sharp smuggling of migrants and trafficking in eration was attacked, and on 11 September, decline in comparison to 95,200 in the persons but stresses that such support and Matiga airport in Tripoli was attacked. At same timeframe in 2017. The proportion of all actors involved, including the Libyan press time, the ceasefire agreement contin- deaths increased, however: 1,095 persons coast guard and navy, need to comply with ued to be violated. died on this journey between January and human rights obligations. The report also At press time, the UN’s 2018 humanitar- July, representing approximately one in 18 calls upon states to refrain from handing ian response plan for Libya of $312.7 million people trying to reach Italy, in contrast to over individuals to state or non-state actors was funded at 23.5 percent, with $239.2 mil- 2,276 between January and July in 2017, if there is a known risk that they will face lion outstanding. representing roughly one in 42 people. The human rights violations by those actors. latest report of the Secretary-General on the Furthermore, it also calls upon states not Sanctions-Related Developments implementation of resolution 2380 on the to return to Libya third-country nationals On 11 September, the 1970 Libya Sanctions Com- mittee designated Ibrahim Jadhran, who led

UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2434 (13 September 2018) extended UNSMIL’s mandate until 15 September 2019. S/RES/2420 (11 June 2018) renewed the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya bound to or from the country that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. S/RES/2380 (5 October 2017) renewed the authorisation for member states to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking.S/RES/2362 (29 June 2017) renewed the mandate of the panel and the measures regarding attempts to illicitly export oil from Libya until 15 November 2018. S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions (assets freeze and travel ban), and established a sanctions committee. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2018/11 (6 June 2018) welcomed the momentum generated by the international conference on Libya in Paris. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2018/807 (31 August 2018) was on migrants and traf- ficking of persons on the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya and inspection and seizure of vessels off the coast of Libya.S/2018/780 (24 August 2018) was on UNSMIL. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8341 (5 September 2018) was a briefing by the Special Representative and head of UNSMIL, Ghassan Salamé, and Ambassador Olof Skoog (Sweden), chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. S/PV.8250 (9 May 2018) was the semi-annual briefing by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on recent developments concerning cases in Libya. Security Council Press Statement SC/13490 (6 September 2018) condemned the violence in Tripoli and welcomed the result of the mediation reached on 4 September by UNSMIL. Sanctions Committee Documents SC/13497 (11 September 2018) was a press release regarding the adding of one individual to the sanctions list. S/2018/812 (5 September 2018) was the Panel of Experts’ final report.

6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Libya

attacks in the oil crescent in June, for sanctions in the Human Rights Council received an oral agreements. Key actors involved in the fight- the form of a travel ban and asset freeze. update from the High Commissioner for Human ing could be considered for designation by the Rights on 26 September and held an interactive sanctions committee for targeted sanctions. Human Rights-Related Developments dialogue on Libya. In a statement on 4 September, a spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights Council Dynamics expressed concern over the outbreak of violence Key Issues and Options Members are aware that international coop- in Tripoli that began on 26 August, in which at The key issue for the Council in October is eration to combat the smuggling of migrants least 21 civilians were killed, including two women to adopt a resolution renewing the authori- and trafficking in persons needs to be and two children, with a further 16 injured. Accord- sation for member states to inspect vessels strengthened. The last two years have seen ing to the statement, the parties to the conflict have been firing indiscriminately and using weap- on the high seas off the coast of Libya when few changes to the authorisation, which made ons with wide-area effects—including rockets, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the negotiations less contentious. In case the tank shells and artillery—in densely populated these are being used for migrant smuggling penholder will opt for that approach again, residential areas. The spokesperson called on or human trafficking. this may also be the case this year. all parties to put an end to indiscriminate attacks Regarding the violence in Tripoli, the The UK is the penholder on Libya, and and to take all feasible precautions to spare civil- ians and civilian objects. During its 39th session, Council could issue a press statement urg- Sweden chairs the 1970 Libya Sanctions ing the parties to adhere to the ceasefire Committee.

Counter-Terrorism

Expected Council Action 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and their countries of origin or third countries, In October, the Council is scheduled to Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee including assaults on public spaces and receive its annual briefing from the chairs The Council has adopted two important civilian targets, present an immediate threat of its counter-terrorism-related commit- resolutions concerning ISIL and Al-Qaida to member states. In aiming to address tees, Ambassador Sacha Sergio Llorenty over the last year. The Council unanimous- this threat, it called on states to assess and Solíz (Bolivia), chair of the 1540 Commit- ly adopted resolution 2368 on 20 July 2017, investigate suspected individuals whom they tee, which focuses on the non-proliferation renewing and updating the 1267/1989/2253 have reasonable grounds to believe are ter- of weapons of mass destruction; Ambassador sanctions regime. The updates are intended rorists, including suspected FTFs and their Kairat Umarov (Kazakhstan), chair of the to reflect the current and evolving threat pre- accompanying spouses, children and other 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in and the sented by Al-Qaida and ISIL. The resolution family members. Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanc- also provides updates concerning the Office After the position of the Ombudsperson tions Committee; and Ambassador Gustavo of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da’esh) had been vacant since 7 August 2017, Daniel Meza-Cuadra Velásquez (Peru), chair of the and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, includ- Kipfer Fasciati (Switzerland) was appointed 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). ing communications among the Ombudsper- on 24 May. Solíz will also address the joint activities of all son, the sanctions committee and petitioners. The 1267/1989/2253 sanctions list, which three committees. In accordance with the resolution, the com- was last updated on 29 August, currently mittee adopted revised guidelines on 5 Sep- contains the names of 263 individuals and Key Recent Developments tember to facilitate the conduct of its own 82 entities. The joint briefing was initially scheduled to work and provide useful guidance to member take place in May, a year after the previous states in their efforts to implement the rel- 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee joint briefing of 11 May 2017, but was post- evant Security Council resolutions, including On 21 December 2017, the Council adopted poned at the request of Bolivia, as Solíz also resolution 2368. resolution 2395, renewing the mandate of briefed the Council separately on 12 April on The Council adopted resolution 2396 on the Counter-Terrorism Committee Execu- the work of his committee. foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and return- tive Directorate (CTED) as a special political ees on 21 December 2017. The resolution mission until 31 December 2021. The resolu- acknowledged that returning and relocat- tion addressed CTED’s functions within the ing FTFs who participated in attacks in wider UN system, including the relationship

UN DOCUMENTS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2396 (21 December 2017) addressed the threat of foreign terrorist fighters. S/RES/2395 (21 December 2017) renewed the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) until 31 December 2021. S/RES/2368 (20 July 2017) renewed and updated the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Through an annex to the resolution, eight individuals or organisations were added to the sanctions list. Secretary-General’s Report S/2018/770 (16 August 2018) was the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL to international peace and security. Security Council Letters S/2018/514 (24 May 2018) concerned the appointment of Daniel Kipfer Fasciati as Ombudsperson for the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. S/2018/340 (12 April 2018) was the 17th programme of work of the 1540 Committee. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8330 (23 August 2018) was a briefing by Under-Secretary-General Vladimir Voronkov, the head of the UNOCT; Michèle Coninsx, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate; and Joana Cook, senior research fellow with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s College London. S/PV.8230 (12 April 2018) was the annual briefing by the chair of the 1540 Committee. Sanctions Committee Documents SC/13504 (13 September 2018) was a press release on the revised guidelines of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 7 Counter-Terrorism between CTED and the UN Office of Coun- programme included plans by the committee related issues, including updating the Al-Qai- ter-Terrorism (UNOCT). It provided a com- to hold deliberations on enforcing applicable da and ISIL sanctions regime and the man- prehensive text regarding CTED’s full man- laws on prohibiting non-state actors from date of CTED and addressing FTFs, return- date, which now encompasses cross-cutting acquiring chemical and biological weapons, ees and others. issues such as FTFs and countering violent in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolu- The importance of counter-terrorism extremism. It stressed that assessing the tion 1540. Solíz emphasised that achieving efforts enjoys overall unanimity among implementation of resolution 1373 and other universal reporting on the implementation Council members, notwithstanding diver- relevant counter-terrorism resolutions is the of resolution 1540 remains one of the com- gences over the politicisation of the issue in core function of CTED. mittee’s main priorities. He said that 180 out the Middle East. However, frictions on some On 9 April, Council members held an of 193 member states have submitted their issues remain, such as divergences between Arria-formula meeting on Peru’s initiative, national reports. During the April meeting, Russia and other member states that led titled “Enhancing synergies between the several Council members expressed concern to delays in the appointment of the ISIL United Nations and regional and subregional over the increasing use of chemical weapons (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Commit- organisations to address the nexus between in the recent period. tee Ombudsperson. terrorism and transnational organised crime”. That some differences remain among Among the briefers were CTED Executive Key Issues Council members in their approach towards Director Michèle Coninsx; the executive A key issue for the committees is to ensure counter-terrorism was also evident during director of the UN Office on Drugs and that they are able to address the widening the negotiations over resolutions 2395 and Crime, Under-Secretary-General Yury Fedo- scope of the threats and various facets of the 2396. For example, several states, mainly the tov; and Under-Secretary-General Vladimir Council’s counter-terrorism agenda within western ones, took the view with respect to Voronkov, the head of UNOCT. their respective mandates. FTFs and returnees that states need to dis- On 23 August, Voronkov briefed the A particular issue for the 1267/1989/2253 tinguish between FTFs and their families in Council on the seventh report of the Sec- Committee is to continue to strengthen mem- their screening process rather than automati- retary-General on the threat posed by ISIL. ber states’ compliance with the sanctions cally assume that the families are complicit. Also briefing were Coninsx and Joana Cook, regime. Furthermore, they wanted the resolution senior research fellow with the International A key issue for the 1540 Committee is the to call on states to develop comprehensive Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and follow-up on national implementation and prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration Political Violence at King’s College London. reporting to the committee. strategies to determine the most appropriate solution for FTFs and their families. Howev- 1540 Committee Council Dynamics er, Russia took the view that FTFs should be On 12 April, Solíz briefed the Council on In the past, most counter-terrorism-related held criminally liable and that family mem- the committee’s activities and its priorities discussions were held in the Council’s sub- bers travelling with FTFs are complicit and for the upcoming period as laid out in the sidiary organs, but over the last two years the should, therefore, be held accountable. programme of work covering the period from Council has discussed and adopted decisions 1 February 2018 to 31 January 2019. The on various aspects of counter-terrorism and

Syria

Expected Council Action Syria and its allies and its potentially disas- Despite constituting a de-escalation zone In October, the Council expects to receive the trous humanitarian consequences. The UN agreed to in 2017, Idlib has been targeted by monthly Syria briefings on the humanitarian has repeatedly warned of the possibility of Russian and Syrian airstrikes. The presence situation, political developments, and the use a humanitarian emergency on a scale not in Idlib of around 10,000 fighters of Hay’at of chemical weapons. yet seen in the Syrian conflict in case of an Tahrir al-Sham (a Council-designated ter- escalation of military activity in and around rorist group) continues to be used to justify Key Recent Developments Idlib. The area hosts 1.4 million civilians dis- military operations, as has been the case in September was marked by the looming placed by the conflict and a total of 2.9 mil- other parts of Syria. offensive in the governorate of Idlib by lion people, including one million children. On 7 September, OCHA’s Director of

UN DOCUMENTS ON SYRIA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2401 (24 February 2018) demanded that all parties cease hostilities in Syria. S/RES/2393 (19 December 2017) renewed the authorisation for cross-border and cross-line aid delivery. S/RES/2254 (18 December 2015) was on a political solution to the Syrian crisis. S/RES/2118 (27 September 2013) was on chemical weapons. Secretary-General’s Report S/2018/845 (14 September 2018) was the monthly report on the humanitarian situation. Security Council Letters S/2018/828 (10 September 2018) conveyed a joint statement by the Astana guarantors after a 7 September high-level meeting in . S/2018/804 (28 August 2018) was an OPCW report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8355 (18 September 2018) was a briefing by Lowcock and de Mistura. S/PV.8347 (11 September 2018) was a briefing requested by Russia on the Astana process. S/PV.8345 (7 September 2018) was a briefing on Idlib by de Mistura and Ging. S/PV.8344 (6 September 2018) was a briefing by Nakamitsu.

8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Syria

Operations and Advocacy John Ging and a solution for Idlib. During the meeting, in and report back to the Council by 31 October. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura which Iran and also briefed the Coun- When discussing Idlib, Lowcock has briefed the Council on the situation in Idlib. cil for the first time on this issue under rule 37 repeatedly emphasised the vital role that That afternoon, the five EU members of the of the provisional rules of procedure, differ- Council-authorised cross-border deliveries of Council (France, the Netherlands, Poland, ences among the Astana guarantors regarding humanitarian aid continue to play in alleviat- Sweden and the UK) co-hosted an Arria- how to deal with Idlib became apparent. ing the suffering of civilians. Humanitarian formula meeting on “Syrian Voices on Pre- On 17 September, Russian President access continues to be restricted for the UN venting a Deathtrap in Idlib”. At the meet- Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep and its partners despite the fact that swaths ing, which was webcast, several participants Tayyip Erdoğan announced the establishment of territory are increasingly under the control emphasised the role that civil society can play of a demilitarised zone 15 to 20 kilometres of the government and that it should be possi- in fighting terrorism and promoting the sepa- wide in Idlib along the contact line between ble to deliver aid through regular - ration of forces in Idlib. the armed opposition and government troops. based humanitarian programmes. Ahead of the meeting, several configura- Council-designated terrorist groups are to be The High Representative for Disarma- tions of Council members issued joint state- withdrawn from the area and by 10 October, ment Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, briefed the ments in an attempt to avert the negative heavy military equipment is to be removed Council on 6 September. Although the two humanitarian impact of a major military from the area. Turkish mobile patrol groups remaining chemical weapons production operation in Idlib. The E10 (the ten elected and Russian military police units are expect- facilities have been destroyed, the Organisa- members of the Council) met on 4 Septem- ed to monitor the zone. The agreement also tion for the Prohibition of Chemical Weap- ber to discuss developments in Idlib. Poland, provides for the restoration of transit along ons (OPCW) continues to regard the initial in its capacity as the monthly coordinator the -Latakia and Aleppo-Hama routes declaration submitted by the Syrian govern- of the E10, read a statement at the Securi- before the end of 2018. ment to the OPCW in 2013 as incomplete. ty Council media stakeout expressing their On 18 September, Secretary-General In October, the OPCW Director-General deep concern about a humanitarian catas- António Guterres welcomed the agreement is expected to submit a progress report to trophe in the event of a full-scale military and called on all parties in Syria to cooper- the organisation’s Executive Council on operation in Idlib province. The statement ate in its implementation and ensure safe and arrangements to identify the perpetrators of reiterated the urgent appeal of the Secretary- unimpeded humanitarian access in all areas the use of chemical weapons in Syria in line General to the government of Syria and all through the most direct routes. At a Council with the decision taken on 27 June by the parties to exercise restraint and to prioritise meeting that same day, Lowcock, who also Conference of States Parties to the Chemical the protection of civilians. On 6 September, welcomed the agreement, wondered: “Is this Weapons Convention. eight current, past and future Council mem- merely a stay of execution? Or is it the begin- Regional tensions between Israel and bers that belong to the EU expressed sup- ning of a reprieve, the first tiny glint of light Syria continue. On 17 September Syria’s port for the urgent diplomatic efforts under- at the end of the very darkest tunnel?” React- air defences downed a Russian surveillance taken by Turkey and the UN and called on ing to the agreement, most Council members plane killing 15 people on board. According the Astana guarantors—in particular Russia considered it a positive step, but many had to Syria’s state-owned media, air defences and Iran—to uphold the ceasefire and de- questions regarding the conditions for the sep- were activated in response to Israeli airstrikes escalation arrangements they had previously aration of forces, the mechanisms to enforce in the Syrian province of Latakia. agreed, including protecting civilians as a the agreement, and the situation of civilians matter of priority. beyond the zone and in the near future. Human Rights-Related Developments On 10 September, Under-Secretary-Gen- The Special Envoy’s efforts to facilitate the During its 39th session, the Human Rights Coun- cil (HRC) held an interactive dialogue on 17 Sep- eral for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock establishment of the constitutional committee tember with the Independent International Com- told reporters that “there need to be ways of continue to face challenges. The committee is mission of Inquiry on Syria and considered the dealing with this problem that don’t turn expected to be formed by 150 people (one- commission’s report, which was based on investi- the next few months in Idlib into the worst third each from the government, the opposi- gations conducted from 16 January to 10 July (A/ humanitarian catastrophe with the biggest tion, and civil society). At the 18 September HRC/39/65). The reporting period was marked by “continued proliferation of warring parties, loss of life in the 21st century”. According briefing, de Mistura told the Council that the increased militarization and unprecedented lev- to OCHA, between 1 and 12 September, a names of 50 civil society members that he els of internal displacement” of more than one sharp increase in hostilities and fears of fur- had proposed have been significantly chal- million civilians. The report deals with the battles ther escalation led to the displacement of over lenged by Astana guarantors. Furthermore, that led to mass displacement and their impact 38,300 people in northwest Syria. and while issues such as chairing and voting on civilians, and sets out applicable internationally accepted principles that have not been observed Russia requested a Council meeting on 12 have been canvassed with the Astana guar- in relation to forced displacement and internally September to brief on a 7 September high- antors, much remains unresolved regarding displaced persons. The HRC also considered the level meeting convened by the guarantors of rules of procedure for the committee. At the report of the special rapporteur on the negative the Astana process—which include Turkey as meeting, several Council members encour- impact of unilateral coercive measures on the well as Iran and Russia—in Tehran. Speak- aged de Mistura to proceed to convene a first enjoyment of human rights, Idriss Jazairy, on his ers highlighted efforts to cooperate and find session of the committee as soon as possible mission to Syria in May (A/HRC/39/54/Add.2).

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 9 Syria

The report concludes that the application of accu- could hold informal, unscripted and forward- Syria through its scheduled monthly brief- mulating unilateral coercive measures is making it looking discussions at the ambassadorial level ings. The increased attention in September “unnecessarily difficult” for Syrians to enjoy basic to seek ways to increase pressure on the par- might not have generated concrete Council human rights and to receive humanitarian aid. At press time, the HRC was expected to vote on 28 ties to the conflict and strive for a political outcomes, but it has contributed to raising September on a resolution on the human rights settlement that is both realistic and accept- the visibility of the stakes in Idlib. Although situation in Syria. able to all. consultations could have provided for more Since it was established in August 2011, action-oriented discussions on sensitive mat- the Human Rights Council’s Independent ters, no Council member formally requested Key Issues and Options International Commission of Inquiry on consultations on Syria in September. Given the crucial role of actors such as Rus- Syria has briefed Council members in an A new element has been the participa- sia, Turkey and Iran on both the political Arria-formula meeting seven times, most tion in Council meetings of Iran and Turkey, and humanitarian fronts, Council members recently on 21 April 2017. Council mem- Astana guarantors that do not have a seat on could seek an informal interactive dialogue bers could hold a meeting to be briefed by the Council. In early 2017, several Council with them in order to have a more action- the commission. members tried to organise an informal inter- oriented discussion and to ascertain whether active dialogue with the Astana guarantors, the Council can support the establishment of Council and Wider Dynamics but this was resisted given the strong divi- the demilitarised zone in Idlib. In September alone, the Council held five sions among the guarantors. Previous efforts Some Council members question whether meetings on Syria, the most since April and by Council members to receive their brief- any efforts on the political process are like- mainly focusing on the situation in Idlib. ings, whether formally or informally, had ly to yield results, given the Syrian govern- Over the last six months as the government not been successful since the Astana process ment’s emphasis on regaining and consolidat- has consolidated the territory under its con- started gaining traction. ing control of territory. However, within the trol (taking over Dara’a and in the Kuwait and Sweden are the penholders on window of opportunity created by the tem- southwest and lifting the sieges of Foah and humanitarian issues in Syria. porary reprieve in Idlib, Council members Kafraya), the Council has mostly discussed

UNDOF (Golan Heights)

Expected Council Action was also included, recalling resolution 2242 tents for IDPs on 13 July. Following the In October, the Department of Peacekeep- and its aspiration to increase the number of recapture of that part of Syria by the SAAF, ing Operations (DPKO) will brief Council women in military and police contingents of the IDPs started to leave. At press time, no members in consultations on the most recent UN peacekeeping operations. tents were left. The Quneitra crossing point report of the Secretary-General on the UN Lieutenant General Paolo Serra is lead- remains closed, as it has been since 2014, Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). ing a team conducting an independent review making it impossible for UNDOF to provide No formal outcome is expected. of UNDOF. The results of the review are for humanitarian crossings. The mandate of UNDOF expires on 31 expected later this year. The Secretary-General’s 11 June report, December. On 24 July, UNDOF received information covering the period from 23 February to 23 from the Syrian authorities that Israel had May, said that the ceasefire between Israel Key Recent Developments shot down a Syrian aircraft flying in Syrian and Syria was being maintained, notwith- On 29 June, the Council unanimously airspace. At the same time, UNDOF received standing the volatile environment due to adopted resolution 2426, renewing UND- a report from the (IDF) the conflict in Syria. However, violations of OF’s mandate without changes for another that they had intercepted a Syrian fighter jet the Disengagement of Forces Agreement of six months, in line with usual practice. Lan- with a missile, stating that the jet had entered 1974 occurred. Those included the Syrian guage was added in the preambular section, two kilometres into Israeli airspace. armed forces and non-state armed opposi- recalling a request to the Secretary-General Following an offensive in mid-July by the tion groups exchanging heavy weapons fire in to ensure that data related to the effective- Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAAF) and their the areas of separation and limitation on the ness of peacekeeping operations, including allies in the south-western part of the coun- Bravo (Syrian) side. Armed groups—includ- peacekeeping performance data, is used to try to regain areas held by rebels, the number ing terrorist groups listed by the Council such improve analytics and the evaluation of mis- of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the as Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly the Nus- sion operations, based on clear and well- “area of separation” increased sharply. UND- rah Front) and the Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army, identified benchmarks. Language related OF was not able to determine the number which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State to the Women, Peace and Security agenda of IDPs but estimated that there were 2,590 of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—continued to

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS Security Council Resolution S/RES/2426 (29 June 2018) renewed the mandate of UNDOF until 31 December 2018. Secretary-General’s Report S/2018/550 (11 June 2018) was a report on UNDOF.

10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 UNDOF (Golan Heights) exchange fire in the UNDOF area of opera- mechanised infantry company of UND- technologies. Press elements were issued in tions. UNDOF reported incidents in which OF has conducted more than 30 protected March as an outcome of the consultations IDF soldiers fired into the area of separation patrols during the reporting period. Other referring to those aspects; this may again be (where no military forces other than those of developments include the relocation of the a possibility. The Council is generally rather UNDOF are allowed) and across the cease- office of the force commander and the Irish restricted in its options—how UNDOF oper- fire line. Every day, UNDOF personnel force reserve company of UNDOF to Camp ates is subject solely to the Disengagement observed crossings by unidentified individu- Faouar. Phase three will include the reoccu- of Forces Agreement of 1974 that ended the als from the Bravo to the Alpha (Israeli) side. pation of a number of observation posts. . On that side, 200 incidents of deployment DPKO has continued to engage with both of unauthorised military equipment in the the Syrian and Israeli governments seeking Council and Wider Dynamics area of separation were reported. UNDOF the deployment of appropriate technologies There is general agreement within the Coun- has protested the violations and called upon for UNDOF, which it considers a priority. cil that UNDOF’s mandate, including its liai- both sides to exercise restraint, in line with its Regarding a “sense and warn” system, the son functions, contributes to stability in the mandate to observe violations, report them, IDF has informally indicated it would not region, given the absence of a peace agree- and interact with both sides. object to its deployment. Syrian authorities ment between Israel and Syria. The mission’s UNDOF continues to make progress oppose it, however. observation role has been limited since its towards a limited return to operations on September 2014 relocation to the Alpha side Mount Hermon and at Camp Faouar on Key Issues and Options because of the extremely unstable operating the Bravo side in accordance with a phased The Syrian government is increasingly tak- environment. Israel and Syria value UND- UNDOF plan. Phase one was completed on ing control of areas of the country formerly OF’s presence and want to see the mission 14 November 2016 with the re-establishment held by different armed actors. A changing return to the Bravo side. Council members of the UNDOF presence at Camp Faouar. environment may have implications for the continue to support the eventual complete Phase two involved the resumption of lim- ability of UNDOF to implement its mandate. return, mindful of the fact that this would ited patrolling of the northern and central Ongoing issues for the Council are the require a favourable security environment, parts of the area of separation in February numerous violations of the ceasefire and which is also crucial for maintaining the con- 2018 over a period foreseen to last six to eight UNDOF’s ability to implement its mandate, fidence of troop-contributing countries. months, although the timeline is subject to including the full return of UNDOF to the Russia and the US are the co-penholders conditions on the ground. The Nepalese Bravo side and the deployment of appropriate on UNDOF.

Sudan/South Sudan

Expected Council Action Key Recent Developments the final such extension, unless the Council In October, the Council expects to receive The security situation in Abyei, the disputed decided to continue the mission’s support a briefing in consultations on the Secretary- territory along the Sudan/South Sudan bor- for the JBVMM based on the parties’ dem- General’s report on the implementation of der, remains relatively stable but unpredict- onstrating measurable progress on border the mandate of the UN Interim Security able, in the absence of significant progress on demarcation in line with six specific mea- Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Resolution 2416 establishing temporary arrangements for its sures set out in the resolution. Among other requested that this report be submitted by administration and security, pending resolu- things, these measures included: maintain- 15 October. The Council is also expected to tion of its final status. Humanitarian needs ing clearance for all UNISFA air and ground decide by 15 October whether to adopt a res- remain substantial and are exacerbated by patrols; finalising agreement on four JBVMM olution extending the mission’s support for intercommunal tensions and a lack of basic team sites; convening at least two meetings of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring public services. In this context, UNISFA the Joint Political and Security Mechanism Mechanism (JBVMM), established in 2011 continues to carry out its mandate, includ- (JPSM); withdrawing from the Safe Demilita- to conduct monitoring and verification activi- ing ongoing facilitation of peaceful migration rized Border Zone (SDBZ); making progress ties along the Sudan-South Sudan border, as throughout Abyei, conflict prevention and in establishing specific border crossing cor- set out in resolution 2412. deterrence, and mediation. ridors (and opening two new ones) between The mandate of UNISFA expires on 15 On 23 April, the Council unanimously Sudan and South Sudan; and resuming bor- November. The mission’s support for the adopted resolution 2412, extending UNIS- der demarcation discussions. JBVMM expires on 15 October. FA’s support for the JBVMM until 15 Octo- On 15 May, the Council adopted resolu- ber. The resolution stated that this would be tion 2416, which renewed the mandate of

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2416 (15 May 2018) extended UNISFA’s mandate until 15 November and reduced the authorised troop ceiling of the mission from 4,791 to 4,500. S/RES/2412 (23 April 2018) extended UNISFA’s support for the JBVMM until 15 October. Secretary-General’s Report S/2018/293 (3 April 2018) was on the situation in Abyei. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8357 (20 September 2018) was a briefing on Sudan/South Sudan.Security Council Letter S/2018/778 (20 August 2018) was from the Secretary-General, transmitting recommendations about the reconfiguration of UNISFA’s mandate.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Sudan/South Sudan

UNISFA until 15 November and requested Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeep- for example, this would entail an expansion the Secretary-General to provide detailed ing Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix and of the mission’s current activities with regard recommendations for the reconfiguration of Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan to the JBVMM to include protection for AU UNISFA. The Secretary-General’s recom- Nicholas Haysom briefed the Council on Border Programme staff engaged in demar- mendations were submitted to the Council UNISFA on 20 September. The briefing was cating the border. Another option is to retain in a 20 August letter. held in the open chamber, departing from the the mission’s support for a shorter period as The letter recommended changes to the usual practice of receiving these briefings in a means of putting pressure on the parties mission’s military component, including consultations. In keeping with the Secretary- to intensify efforts to fully implement the transferring troops to the JBVMM to make it General’s 20 August letter, Lacroix called for JBVMM and also to reach a political solution. fully operational based on the reduced need changes to UNISFA’s mission concept within A further option is for the Council to take no for a large UNISFA military presence within the current ceiling of uniformed personnel. action to extend the mission’s support for the the Abyei Area and the assessment that the He maintained that the JBVMM “remains a JBVMM, which would result in a decrease in JBVMM remains vital in contributing to pre- vital part of the framework that regulates the UNISFA’s troop levels on 15 October from venting conflict between the two countries. relationship between the two countries.” Lac- 4,500 to 3,959 as set out in resolution 2416. The full deployment of the JBVMM is of roix also reiterated the Secretary-General’s An additional key issue for the Council to “paramount importance”, according to the recommendation to establish two further sec- consider is the appropriateness of UNISFA’s Secretary-General’s letter. tor headquarters and team sites within the current mandate in relation to its strategic On 14 September, Council members Safe Demilitarised Border Zone, with troops priorities and the situation on the ground received a confidential note from the Secre- to be transferred from Abyei, in order to pro- ahead of the mandate renewal in November. tary-General, requested in resolution 2412, vide more substantive attention to the border This assessment could be informed by the on progress by the parties on the six specific region as a part of the JBVMM. He further 20 August recommendations of the Secre- measures set out in that resolution. The note noted the recommendation of the Secretary- tary-General and the Secretary-General’s reportedly said that standing clearance for General that UNISFA concentrate those mil- October report. UNISFA air and ground patrols in the Safe itary personnel remaining within the Abyei Demilitarized Border Zone, one of the six Area along the area’s borders to help prevent Council Dynamics specified measures, has been continued by incursions by armed groups (namely, rebel Over the past several years, the US has repeat- Sudan and South Sudan, but that little prog- groups from Sudan and South Sudan). edly expressed its concern that UNISFA was ress has made with regard to other measures, Haysom said that the resolution of the persisting longer than had been intended and that the parties had postponed JPSM final status of Abyei “above all else…would for an interim force, and that Sudan and meetings in recent months. allow for the timely exit by UNISFA from South Sudan were taking advantage of the The Secretary-General’s report on the Abyei.” He noted that internal problems in relative stability that UNISFA provides to implementation of UNISFA’s mandate, both Sudan and South Sudan had hindered delay attempts to resolve the status of Abyei which the Council requested be submitted negotiations on this issue in recent years. and related border-security issues. At the 20 by 15 October in resolution 2416, is expected However, Haysom said that there is hope September Council meeting, US Deputy to include reporting on: that both countries will now engage substan- Permanent Representative Jonathan Cohen • the movement of weapons into Abyei and tively in talks on the status of Abyei, noting questioned whether all of UNISFA’s tasks the presence, destruction and confiscation that the reduced tensions between Sudan “remain appropriate and necessary.” Regard- of weapons within Abyei; and South Sudan as a result of Khartoum’s ing the JBVMM, he said that the US would • steps that have been taken by the Secre- mediation efforts in the South Sudan conflict not “support indefinitely a mechanism that tary-General to develop an integrated per- had created a more conducive environment remains underutilized and is not making formance-policy framework and to apply for negotiations. progress in resolving the political issues that it to UNISFA; are at the root of UNISFA’s JBVMM support • results of human rights monitoring as Key Issues and Options mandate.” In contrast, Ethiopia and several requested, including information, analy- A key issue for the Council is whether to other Council members are of the view that sis, and data on violations and abuses of maintain UNISFA’s support for the JBVMM suspending support for the JBVMM would human rights; and through its monitoring and verification tasks undermine its effectiveness, and that the par- • steps the parties have taken towards along the border. An option is to continue ties have taken sufficient steps towards estab- implementing the June 2011 Agree- the mission’s support in recognition of recent lishing the JBVMM to merit retaining sup- ment on Temporary Arrangements for efforts made by the parties towards making it port. This difference in perspective is likely the Administration and Security of Abyei fully operational, namely the standing clear- to feature in discussions ahead of deciding Area (e.g., the establishment of the Abyei ance for UNISFA ground and air patrols. whether to extend support for the JBVMM Area Administration and an Abyei police Continued support could also include some in October. service) and towards achieving a political or all of the 20 August recommendations of The US is the penholder on Abyei. resolution to the status of Abyei. the Secretary-General related to the JBVMM;

12 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Western Sahara

Expected Council Action a general framework as a basis for subse- from the Polisario said that it stood ready to The Council will receive a briefing in consul- quent negotiations, rather than going into resume direct negotiations immediately, with- tations on Western Sahara in October. The substantive issues. out preconditions and in good faith under the Special Representative and head of the UN Since MINURSO’s renewal in April, an auspices of the Personal Envoy. Mission for the Referendum in Western Saha- independent review of the mission was con- Another issue will be members’ consider- ra (MINURSO), Colin Stewart, is expected ducted. The findings of the review, which ation of the recommendations that the Sec- to brief. Also during October, the Council have not been made public but are to be inte- retary-General is likely to propose to make is expected to renew the mandate of MIN- grated into the Secretary-General’s report MINURSO more efficient, based on the URSO, which expires on 31 October. on MINURSO, apparently determined that independent review. Other issues may include MINURSO plays a conflict-prevention role, an update to the Council’s request in resolu- Key Recent Developments providing a strong guarantee against a renew- tion 2414 to “interview” the parties “to better When the Council renewed the mandate of al in fighting in this part of the Sahel. If the understand” the tensions that have occurred MINURSO in April, it opted for a six-month mission were removed and fighting resumed, in recent years ahead of the mandate renewal renewal instead of the regular one-year responding to the resulting situation could be pertaining to Guerguerat and, also this year, extension. The US, which is the penholder much costlier than MINURSO’s annual $53 to Bir Lahlou. Also likely to be discussed is on Western Sahara, pushed for the short- million budget. The review reportedly also Stewart’s inability since his appointment in er extension to pressure Morocco and the noted that the mission has been operating in December 2017 as Special Representative Polisario Front to resume negotiations that the same way for the past 27 years and pro- to meet with the Polisario leadership, which are meant to obtain a mutually acceptable posed modernising it with new technologies, has requested that the meeting take place in political solution that would provide for the which would be more efficient for monitoring Western Sahara as opposed to the practice of self-determination of the people of Western the cessation of hostilities and would provide meeting in Tindouf. Sahara. The last round of formal negotiations financial savings. The Council may renew the mandate occurred ten years ago. During its explana- In other developments, the AU Assem- of MINURSO for an additional six months, tion of vote at the resolution’s adoption, the bly agreed at its 31st summit in Nouakchott, expressing support for the Personal Envoy’s US warned that the further extension of the Mauritania in July, to support a solution to plans to resume political negotiations, and peacekeeping operation in October would Western Sahara through the UN process, as reiterating its calls upon the parties to engage depend on progress in the political process, opposed to its previous position calling for in negotiations without preconditions and in saying that it expected to see the resump- joint AU-UN efforts. It appealed to the par- good faith. tion of “real and substantive talks”. The then ties “to urgently resume negotiations without US political coordinator Amy Tachco added, pre-conditions and in good faith under the Council Dynamics “Should that fail, we will then need to take auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN, Council members want to see progress a hard look at our work and our responsi- whose Security Council is seized of the mat- towards the resumption of negotiations, and bilities when the Mission again comes up for ter”. It also decided that a troika compris- during the last consultations most members renewal in six months”. ing the outgoing, current and incoming AU expressed support for the Personal Envoy’s From 23 June to 1 July, the Secretary- chairpersons, together with the AU Com- efforts. This included the US, which has General’s Personal Envoy for Western Saha- missioner, should be its main mechanism for driven the recent pressure being exerted by ra, Horst Köhler, who is responsible for supporting UN-led efforts and considering the Council on the parties to return to nego- facilitating negotiations, visited the region the issue. tiations. US National Security Advisor John to push for the resumption of negotiations. Bolton, who served as an assistant in the Köhler visited Algiers, Nouakchott, Rabou- Key Issues and Options 1990s to former Personal Envoy James Baker, ni and Rabat before spending three days in A key issue is progress in the political process is said to have played an important role in the Western Sahara, where he held meetings in towards resuming negotiations, without which decision to have a six-month renewal in April. Laayoune, Smara and Dakhla with local the US has suggested that it may not sup- Personal Envoy Köhler met with Bolton in authorities, civil society organisations, and port MINURSO’s renewal. The process has Washington, D.C. the day before Council the business community. stalled over the last decade because the parties’ consultations in August. On 8 August, Köhler briefed Council respective proposals for the basis of a politi- Permanent member France staunchly members in consultations on his visit and cal solution as outlined in 2007 are mutually supports Moroccan positions. Ethiopia is the on his plans to advance the political process. exclusive. An important step will be the par- only current African member that recognises Köhler said that he intended to invite the ties’ responses to the invitation to participate an independent Sahrawi Arab Democratic parties and neighbouring countries Algeria in the upcoming talks, which, according to Republic, as proclaimed by the Polisario in and Mauritania to direct talks that he would Köhler’s envisioned timeline that he outlined 1976. Last April’s mandate renewal vote saw seek to organise in late November or early when he briefed Council members, should China, Ethiopia and Russia abstain on reso- December. These talks, Köhler apparently be provided during October before MINUR- lution 2414, maintaining that the penholder explained, would allow the parties to discuss SO’s expiration. A 1 June letter to the Council was not adequately consultative during the

UN DOCUMENTS ON WESTERN SAHARA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2414 (27 April 2018) extended MINURSO’s mandate for six months. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8246 (27 April 2018) was the renewal of MINURSO, including Council members’ explanations of votes.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 13 Western Sahara

negotiation process. Members are likely to expected to recommend for MINURSO. among the Group of Friends, comprising have differences over the efficiency propos- The US is the penholder on Western France, Russia, the UK, and the US, joined als that the Secretary-General’s report is Sahara, and resolutions are initially discussed by Spain, the former colonial power.

Middle East (Israel/Palestine)

Expected Council Action forces along the fence separating Gaza from Mitigation Program”. In October, the Security Council will hold its Israel, according to OCHA and the Gaza On 20 September, Mladenov briefed the quarterly open debate under the agenda item Ministry of Health. One Israeli has also been Council during the monthly meeting on the “the situation in the Middle East, including killed in these clashes. Israel has accused Middle East (Israel/Palestine). This consti- the Palestinian question”, which will focus on Hamas, which it considers a terrorist group, tuted the quarterly report on the implemen- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Special Coor- of directing the protests along the fence. tation of resolution 2334, which demands dinator for the Middle East Peace Process On 16 September, an Israeli settler was an end to settlement activity and calls for Nickolay Mladenov is expected to brief, most stabbed and killed by a Palestinian youth the prevention of violence against civilians, likely via video teleconference from Jerusalem. near the Kfar Etzion settlement on the West including acts of terror. Mladenov said that in No outcome is anticipated. Bank. The youth was shot and wounded by the preceding quarter no steps had been tak- the victim. en by Israel to cease settlement activity, which Key Recent Developments On 10 September, US State Department he described as a violation of international On 4 September, Israel’s High Court of Jus- Spokesperson Heather Nauert issued a press law and a hindrance to peace. He expressed tice rejected a petition to prevent the demoli- statement announcing that the US was clos- concern about the continuing deterioration tion of Khan al-Amar, a Bedouin village of ing the PLO office in Washington, D.C., given of the political, humanitarian, and security 180 people in the . In a tweet the that the PLO had “not taken steps to advance situation in Gaza. He also described the con- following day, Mladenov noted that the “UN the start of direct and meaningful negotia- tinuing violence along the fence separating has called on Israel to cease demolition of tions with Israel” and had “condemned a US Gaza and Israel. While criticising Hamas and Palestinian property and efforts to relocate peace plan they have not yet seen and refused other groups for firing rockets into Israel, he Bedouin communities in the West Bank”. to engage with the U.S. government with expressed concern at the continued use of The Palestine Liberation Organization respect to peace efforts and otherwise.” The live fire by Israel. (PLO) filed a claim with the ICC on 11 Sep- press statement further noted that the deci- tember calling for an investigation of Israel’s sion was also “consistent with Administration Key Issues and Options activities with regard to Khan al-Amar. Saeb and Congressional concerns with Palestinian The key underlying issue is what role the Erekat, a senior PLO official, said that the attempts to prompt an investigation of Israel Council can play in mitigating the heightened petition focused on “war crimes in Khan by the International Criminal Court.” tensions between Israel and the , al-Amar”, including “forcible displacement, This move takes place in the midst of signifi- reflected by the violence along the Gaza bor- ethnic cleansing and the destruction of civil- cant US aid cuts to services for Palestinians. On der fence, the exchange of fire between Gaza ian property”. 31 August, the US announced that it would cut and Israel, the continued settlement activity, Violent encounters have continued along all funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency the planned demolition of Khan al-Ahmar, the Gaza border fence with Israel. On 14 for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). As its larg- and the unhelpful rhetoric from the parties. September, approximately 13,000 Palestin- est donor, the US had directed approximately The two failed draft resolutions on Israel/Pal- ians demonstrated in multiple spots near $350 million per year to the agency. Also in estine tabled on 1 June—the vetoed Kuwaiti the fence. Israeli forces said protesters threw late August, the US slashed approximately draft and the US draft which received only one explosives and rocks at them. According to $200 million in bilateral aid to the Palestinian affirmative vote (from the US itself)—reflect the Gaza Ministry of Health, three Pales- Authority. On 7 September, the US declared this long-standing gridlock. Since these doc- tinians were shot and killed by Israeli forces that it was redirecting $20 million allocated for uments, as well as several failed press state- during the protests. On 18 September, it was hospitals in East Jerusalem to other preroga- ments on this issue in recent months, were reported that two more Palestinians had been tives. Also in early September, the US Admin- proposed by either Kuwait or the US—which shot and killed by the Israeli military during istration halted $10 million in funds expected hold strongly contrasting views on Israel/Pal- protests near the in Gaza. to support Palestinian-Israeli cultural exchang- estine—one possible option is for other mem- Since 30 March, over 180 Palestinians es as part of the US Agency for International bers to take the lead in drafting outcomes, per- have died in violent encounters with Israeli Development’s “Conflict Management and haps contributing to a perception that initial

UN DOCUMENTS ON ISRAEL/PALESTINE Security Council Resolution S/RES/2334 (23 December 2016) condemned Israeli settlements and was adopted with 14 votes in favour and a US abstention. Secretary-General’s Report S/2018/614 (18 June 2018) was on the implementation of resolution 2334. Security Council Letter S/2018/454 (14 May 2018) was submitted by ten Council members—Bolivia, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru and Sweden—and requested that quarterly reports on the implementation of resolution 2334 be in writing. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8358 (20 September 2018) was a briefing by Mladenov on the implementation of resolution 2334. S/PV.8329 (22 August 2018) was on the situation in the Middle East. S/PV.8289 (19 June 2018) was a briefing by Mladenov on the implementation of resolution 2334.

14 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Middle East (Israel/Palestine) versions of drafts may serve as a more bal- this regard, the Council could consider pur- funding for UNRWA. In contrast, several oth- anced, objective basis for negotiation. suing a presidential statement that provides er members have questioned whether Isra- Another key issue is the humanitarian cri- political support for international efforts to el has used disproportionate force in Gaza, sis in Gaza and the impact it could have in foster this reconciliation. view Jerusalem’s final status as a matter to exacerbating the political and security situ- be negotiated by the parties, and emphasised ation in the occupied Palestinian territories Council Dynamics that UNRWA’s work is critical to efforts to and Israel. Given recent US cuts in aid to There is a stark and growing contrast between maintaining stability in Gaza and elsewhere. a variety of institutions serving the Pales- the views of the US and other members on At the 20 September briefing, sever- tinian population, Council members could this issue. Although the US has tradition- al members—Bolivia, Equatorial Guinea, use the public briefing as an opportunity to ally demonstrated strong support for Israel, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, and Sweden— commend those who have enhanced their its policies have become increasingly partial reiterated their desire to receive written support for humanitarian and development toward the interests of the current govern- reports in advance of the quarterly briefing projects supporting Palestinians and to ment in Jerusalem. In this regard, the US on the implementation of resolution 2334. advocate for enhanced financial support for has placed the blame for the violence along With the exception of the written report pro- such programs. the Gaza fence in recent months entirely on duced in June—which was a focus of a public A further key issue is the importance of Hamas, moved its embassy to Jerusalem in briefing—these reports have only been con- promoting intra-Palestinian reconciliation. In May, and, as noted above, has withdrawn its veyed orally.

Mali

Expected Council Action together to promote sustainable peace and the rule of law, and implementation of the In October, the Council expects to receive a to tackle the security and development chal- key provisions of the agreement. Partici- briefing from the Under-Secretary-General lenges facing the country. Keïta was sworn in pants at a high-level meeting on the margins for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Pierre on 22 September. of the general debate of the General Assem- Lacroix, on the situation in Mali, followed by Council members are growing increas- bly invited the government of Mali and the consultations. ingly frustrated with the limited implemen- UN to finalise the pact for peace at the next The mandate of the UN Multidimension- tation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and session of the Comité de Suivi de l’Accord, al Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali Reconciliation in Mali. More than three years the main follow-up mechanism to the agree- (MINUSMA) ends on 30 June 2019. The since its signing, important provisions related ment, in October. sanctions regime ends on 31 August 2019, to institutional measures, security arrange- As a way of continuing to put pressure on and the mandate of the Panel of Experts ments and development for the northern the parties to deliver on their commitments expires on 30 September 2019. regions remain unaddressed. Although the on the agreement, the Council renewed the parties have reiterated their commitment to sanctions regime on Mali and the mandate of Key Recent Developments its implementation by agreeing to a timeta- the Panel of Experts through the unanimous Mali held a presidential election on 29 July, ble in January and a more detailed roadmap adoption of resolution 2432 on 30 August. with a runoff on 12 August between the in March, some members have questioned The final report of the panel included a con- incumbent President Ibrahim Boubacar Keï- whether there is sufficient political will to fidential annex proposing the designation ta and opposition leader Soumaïla Cissé. Keï- advance this process. of three individuals belonging to non-state ta was re-elected with 67 percent of the vote. The Council renewed MINUSMA’s armed groups, but no action has been taken The elections took place amidst considerable mandate for one year on 28 June. Resolution on this recommendation. security challenges and with Cissé assert- 2423, which was adopted unanimously, did The security situation in the north and ing that they were tainted by fraud. How- not significantly modify the mission’s man- centre of Mali continues to be critical. On ever, the EU and AU observation missions date, but it did exert pressure on the parties 9 August, the 1267/1989/2253 Al-Qai- accepted the results, which were upheld by to implement the 2015 agreement. The res- da/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant the Constitutional Court on 20 August. On olution requested the Secretary-General to (ISIL) Sanctions Committee added to its 24 August, Council members issued a press take appropriate steps to swiftly conclude a list Adnan Abou Walid al-Sahraoui, leader statement welcoming the publication of the “Pact for Peace” between the government of of Al-Mourabitoun, a Council-designat- final results of the presidential elections and Mali and the UN. This pact is to be based on ed group active in Mali that pledged alle- calling upon all Malians to unite and work agreed benchmarks related to governance, giance to ISIL. At press time, at least 104

UN DOCUMENTS ON MALI Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2432 (30 August 2018) renewed the targeted sanctions regime on Mali and the mandate of the Panel of Experts. S/RES/2423 (28 June 2018) renewed MINUSMA’s mandate for one year. S/RES/2391 (8 December 2017) outlined the ways in which MINUSMA is expected to support the G5 Sahel joint force and described how the UN will be reimbursed for its assistance. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8288 (14 June 2018) was a briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix on the situation in Mali. Security Council Press Statement SC/13464 (24 August 2018) welcomed the publication of the final results of the presidential elections in Mali. Sanctions Committee Document S/2018/581 (8 August 2018) was the final report of the Panel of Experts.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 15 Mali peacekeepers have been killed as a result Key Issues and Options the UK and the US have expressed support of malicious acts since the establishment of Council members have raised the tone for identifying those obstructing, delaying MINUSMA five years ago. Inter-commu- of their frustration with the lack of imple- or threatening the implementation of the nal violence among ethnic groups persists, mentation of the agreement, calling on the peace agreement, with a view to imposing and terrorist groups often take advantage of parties to take “unprecedented steps”. Res- targeted sanctions. Russia stated in April that these tensions to increase recruitment and olution 2423 expressed the Council’s inten- the direct use of sanctions should be a mea- legitimacy in their communities. tion, in the absence of significant progress sure of last resort and that rushing to impose The G5 Sahel Joint Force has had limited in implementing the agreement, to request restrictions will hinder the entire settlement impact so far in addressing instability in Mali the Secretary-General to provide options process. It is unclear whether there would and its border areas. On 29 June, its head- for significant changes to MINUSMA after be consensus to sanction any individual or quarters in Sévaré suffered a complex terror- June 2019. Council members, who have not entity. ist attack in which at least six people died. In held consultations on Mali since April, could As part of the Secretariat’s initiative to early July, the military leadership of the mis- discuss how they can support the political review systematically long-standing missions, sion was replaced as a result of the attack. process bilaterally and multilaterally. They a strategic review of MINUSMA was con- could hold a frank and unscripted discus- cluded in April. The review—led by Ellen Human Rights-Related Developments sion to garner support around a common Margrethe Løj, a former Special Represen- The independent expert on human rights in Mali, political strategy and reach out to the par- tative in Liberia and South Sudan—was not Alioune Tine, undertook his first mission to the ties to encourage progress. To do so, the Sec- shared directly with the Council, although country from 24 to 29 June. In a 4 July state- ment, Tine expressed alarm over the continuing retariat, the mission leadership and Algeria, some of its recommendations were conveyed deterioration of the security, human rights and which chairs the Comité de Suivi de l’Accord, in a Secretary-General’s report. In the review humanitarian situation in the centre of the coun- could be invited to participate in an informal process, it became apparent that the Secre- try, as well as in the region of Ménaka. He called interactive dialogue. tariat continues to experience pressure from on authorities in Mali to carry out prompt, detailed Despite the widespread concerns about member states regarding the outcome of and independent investigations into an “alarm- ing” increase in human rights violations following the slow pace of implementing the peace these reviews. On 21 September, the Coun- accounts of several attacks by community mili- agreement, no individuals or entities have cil adopted resolution 2436, requesting the tias, often with the participation of armed groups, been sanctioned under the 2374 Mali Secretary-General to ensure that pertinent resulting in deaths, injuries, the destruction or sanctions regime. Council members could findings of future reviews be shared with the burning of property, and people being forced to consider a set of listings that target, in a Council and with relevant member states, as leave their homes. Tine will submit a report to the Human Rights Council at its 40th session in balanced way, all the parties to the agree- appropriate, alongside the Secretary-Gener- March 2019. In a 17 July statement, a spokesper- ment that are hindering its implementation, al’s integrated analysis, strategic assessment son for the High Commissioner for Human Rights while preserving the parties’ engagement in and frank advice. expressed concern about a surge in intercommu- the process. France is the penholder on Mali. The nal violence in the Mopti region of central Mali, chair of the 2374 Mali Sanctions Commit- leading to widespread displacement of the civilian population that is already vulnerable because of a Council and Wider Dynamics tee is Sweden. lack of protection and basic social services. Regarding sanctions, France, the Netherlands,

Colombia

Expected Council Action Key Recent Developments 6.3.3. Sections 3.2 and 3.4 focus on politi- In October, the Council will receive a briefing On 13 September, the Security Council cal, economic and social reincorporation of from Special Representative Jean Arnault on adopted resolution 2435 renewing the man- the members of the guerrilla group Fuerzas the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on the date of the verification mission until 25 Sep- Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejér- UN Verification Mission in Colombia. Con- tember 2019. The mission will continue to cito del Pueblo (FARC-EP); personal and sultations are expected to follow the briefing. verify the implementation of sections 3.2 and collective security guarantees; and compre- The mandate of the verification mission 3.4 of the November 2016 Final Agreement hensive programmes on security and protec- expires on 25 September 2019. for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable tion measures for communities and organisa- and Lasting Peace, as called for in its section tions in conflict-affected areas.

UN DOCUMENTS ON COLOMBIA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2435 (13 September 2018) renewed the mandate of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia. S/RES/2381 (5 October 2017) authorised the UN Verification Mission in Colombia to participate in and coordinate the work of the monitoring and verification mechanism for the temporary ceasefire between the government of Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional. Security Council Letter S/2018/801 (30 August 2018) was a letter by President Iván Duque conveying a joint request for the extension of the mission’s mandate by the government of Colombia and the FARC. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8351 (13 September 2018) was the meeting at which resolution 2435 was unanimously adopted. S/PV.8319 (26 July 2018) was a briefing by Arnault on the Secretary-General’s latest report on Colombia. Colombian Vice President Óscar Naranjo also participated in the meeting.

16 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Colombia

By a letter dated 30 August, Colombi- former guerrilla members. Although the finance a strategy for reintegrating former an President Iván Duque conveyed a joint motivation for this decision remains unclear, FARC-EP members into society and to pro- request for mandate extension by the gov- the mission stressed that the decisions by the vide safety and security in areas previously ernment of Colombia and the Fuerza Alter- six leaders were a breach of their obligations occupied by the FARC-EP remain criti- nativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC), under the agreement to actively contribute cal issues in the successful implementation the political party successor to the FARC- to ensuring the success of the reincorpora- of the agreement. Council members could EP. Duque, who took office on 7 August, has tion process. encourage dialogue between representatives repeatedly expressed his commitment not to Meanwhile, FARC-EP dissident groups of the government and the FARC, including terminate the peace agreement but to pro- pose a growing security challenge and have through the reactivation of the commission pose “corrections”. The new administration a destabilising impact on rural communities. for follow-up, impulse and verification of the aims to modify provisions related to the tran- Human rights defenders and social leaders implementation of the agreement (CSIVI) to sitional justice mechanisms and how to deal continue to be targeted, with 121 killed in address the trust deficit and discuss how the with the cultivation of coca. 2017, according to the Office of the High commitments made in the agreement are to One of the divisive issues in the imple- Commissioner for Human Rights. be carried out in this new phase. mentation of the agreement is the work of During a visit to New York on 23 August, The current political context may mean the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), the Foreign Minister Carlos Holmes Trujillo a significant change in the role the two suc- justice component of the transitional justice expressed support for the UN’s increased cessive UN missions have played since the system. Centro Democrático, the political engagement in addressing the regional government of Colombia requested the party of President Duque, had proposed impact of the humanitarian situation in Ven- Council’s involvement in January 2016. The amendments in the final stages of the legisla- ezuela. An estimated 1.6 million people have present mission, with the Council’s close tive consideration of the SJP statute in June, fled Venezuela since 2015, and an addition- attention and support, could be in a position including limiting the role of the SJP in evalu- al 1.8 million are expected to leave this year, to use its leverage to sustain key provisions ating extradition requests and barring human according to UNHCR. Colombia, which has of the agreement at a moment of uncertainty rights attorneys from serving as SJP magis- also traditionally been a destination country in order to reassure Colombians about the trates, but the Constitutional Court rejected for Venezuelan immigrants, now hosts almost irreversibility of the process. these changes on 16 August. The Court also one million Venezuelan citizens. On 19 Sep- reaffirmed that those former guerrilla mem- tember, UNHCR and the International Council Dynamics bers found responsible for crimes by the SJP Organization for Migration announced the Council members are unified in their support and who have cooperated fully with the tri- appointment of Eduardo Stein as a Joint Spe- for the peace process in Colombia. This was bunal can participate in politics, including cial Representative for Venezuelan refugees reflected in the negotiations on the renewal holding office. and migrants in the region. of the mission’s mandate, when no Council An erosion of confidence about the future member proposed changes to the language in among the rank and file, the mid-level com- Key Issues and Options the resolution. Several members have viewed manders and the leadership of the FARC is An important issue is ensuring that the peace engagement in Colombia as a rare bright spot having a negative impact on the implemen- agreement is implemented in its entire- for the Council as it struggles to play an effec- tation of the agreement. In a statement on 6 ty under the new administration. Council tive role in several other conflict situations. September, the UN mission announced that members could organise a visiting mission to However, some members have expressed six leaders of the FARC had abandoned the Colombia to convey its unanimous support concerns about the future of the agreement territories in the country’s southeast where for the agreement. under the new administration. they had relocated with approximately 1,500 The government’s ability to develop and The UK is the penholder on Colombia.

Sudan (Darfur)

Expected Council Action Joanna Wronecka (Poland), chair of the 1591 Key Recent Developments In October, the Security Council will be Sudan Sanctions Committee, is expected On 13 July, the Council unanimously adopt- briefed on the Secretary-General’s 90-day to provide the quarterly briefing to Council ed resolution 2429, extending UNAMID’s report on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in members on the committee’s work. The man- mandate until 30 June 2019. The resolu- Darfur (UNAMID), as requested in reso- date of UNAMID expires on 30 June 2019. tion welcomed the improved security condi- lution 2429. Also in October, Ambassador tions in Darfur but expressed concern over

UN DOCUMENTS ON DARFUR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2429 (13 July 2018) renewed UNAMID’s mandate until 30 June 2019. S/RES/2425 (29 June 2018) was a technical rollover of UNAMID’s mandate until 13 July. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2018/612 (13 June 2018) was an update report covering 16 April to 10 June. S/2018/530 (1 June 2018) was the joint special report of the UN Secretary-General and the AU Commission Chairperson on the strategic review of UNAMID. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8290 (20 June 2018) was a semi-annual briefing by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.S/PV.8287 (14 June 2018) was the 90-day briefing by the chair of the Sudan Sanctions Committee.S/PV.8283 (11 June 2018) was a briefing on UNAMID.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 17 Sudan (Darfur)

ongoing clashes and restricted humanitarian should be monitored. Council members said. In Darfur particularly, land occupation and access in the Jebel Marra area, noting that expect to receive this report in October ahead violence targeting IDPs, including sexual violence inter-communal conflicts remain one of the of the briefing. against displaced girls and women, continue to hinder their return to their areas of origin. At press main sources of violence in Darfur. It also As in previous years, UNAMID’s man- time, the HRC was expected to adopt a resolu- welcomed significant reductions in the num- date continues to prioritise the protection tion on 28 September on technical assistance ber of internally displaced persons (IDPs) but of civilians, the facilitation of humanitar- and capacity-building to improve human rights in noted that approximately two million people ian access, mediation between the govern- Sudan, renewing the mandate of the independent remain displaced in Darfur, with the majority ment and armed groups, and intercommu- expert for another year. in need of humanitarian assistance. nal mediation. Nevertheless, resolution 2429 Given the improved security situation slightly revised the priorities. With regard to Key Issues and Options in Darfur overall, resolution 2429 decided the protection of civilians, for example, new A key issue that Council members will want to reduce the troop ceiling from 8,735 to language has been added calling for “moni- to follow closely is the effect of further troop 4,050 military personnel over the course of toring and reporting on human rights, sexual reductions on the security situation as well the mandate renewal period. The authorised and gender-based violence and grave viola- as the effect of the mission’s revised priori- police personnel ceiling was maintained at tions against children”. The priority relat- ties, including on human rights reporting 2,500. The resolution incorporated several ed to intercommunal mediation has been and intercommunal mediation efforts. An aspects of the 1 June joint special report of the expanded to include a focus on mediation option would be to rely on the benchmarks UN Secretary-General and the AU Commis- with regard to “other local conflict that could set out in the Secretary-General’s upcom- sion Chairperson on the strategic review of undermine the security situation”. ing report, which is also expected to include UNAMID. It requested UNAMID to focus The last Council briefing on the issue how progress on these benchmarks should on both peacekeeping and long-term solu- was by Under-Secretary-General for Peace- be monitored. tions to conflict drivers in Darfur with a view keeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix on A longstanding issue is how the Council towards the exit of the mission on 30 June 11 June. On 20 June, ICC Prosecutor Fatou can seek to address the root causes of the 2020, provided there is no significant change Bensouda provided the semi-annual briefing conflict and to promote intercommunal rec- in the security situation in Darfur and that on the ICC’s work with regard to Darfur— onciliation. An option would be to request key indicators are fulfilled. (These indicators a situation the Council referred to the ICC Jeremiah Mamabolo, the Joint Special Rep- pertain to security sector reform, the rule of more than 13 years ago—again urging the resentative and head of UNAMID, to present law, durable solutions for displaced host com- Council to play a more active role in support- the Council with options in this regard. munities, human rights and the immediate ing the arrest and transfer of those suspected Another longstanding issue is how to sup- delivery of services for IDPs.) In the context of “multiple crimes against humanity and war port efforts to break the ongoing impasse in of the mission’s drawdown, the resolution crimes” in Darfur. the negotiations between the government and underscored the need “to keep the situation Darfuri rebel movements over implementa- in all areas of Darfur under review” and “to Sanctions-Related Developments tion of the Doha Document for Peace in maintain the flexibility within UNAMID to On 13 June, Ambassador Wronecka briefed the Darfur, adopted in 2011. One option is to 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, in her capacity respond to developments throughout Darfur invite Thabo Mbeki, chair of the AU High- as chair, on her April visit to Sudan. The follow- as the situation requires”. It supported the ing day she provided the chair’s quarterly brief- Level Implementation Panel, to address the joint special report’s call for consolidation of ing to the Council. On 17 August, the committee Council on his efforts. Mbeki last briefed the a whole-of-system approach in Darfur, and was briefed on the interim report of the Panel of Council in an informal interactive dialogue the establishment of joint UNAMID-UN Experts (the interim report, unlike the final report, on 12 January 2017. Another option is for the is not made public). Country Team offices in the capitals of the Council to consider imposing, or threatening states of Darfur “except for where Mission to impose, additional targeted sanctions on sites would remain”. It also requests strength- Human Rights-Related Developments those parties who continue to refuse to par- ened integration among UNAMID, the UN During its 39th session, the Human Rights ticipate in the negotiations. Council (HRC) held an interactive dialogue on Country Team, and other UN entities operat- 26 September with the independent expert on ing in Darfur. human rights in Sudan, Aristide Nononsi, and Council Dynamics Resolution 2429 requested the Secretary- considered his report covering September 2017 Council members continue to differ in their General and the Chairperson of the African to June (A/HRC/39/71). The report expressed assessment of the situation in Darfur. Some Commission to conduct a strategic review of concern that the Sudanese government had still members seem to view more guarded recog- not implemented a significant number of recom- UNAMID by 1 May 2019. It extended the nition of progress as appropriate while others mendations contained in previous reports of the Secretary-General’s regular cycle of report- independent expert. Those displaced within Dar- are generally more positive in their assessment, ing to the Council from 60 to 90 days and fur face many challenges in IDP camps, including as reflected during the July negotiations on requested that the Secretary General’s ini- lack of adequate food, safe drinking water and resolution 2429 renewing UNAMID’s man- tial 90-day report include a detailed, clearly adequate health care, causing them to remain date. China, Ethiopia, Russia and others were heavily dependent on the services and support of benchmarked exit strategy for UNAMID as comfortable with the pace and scope of the UNAMID and humanitarian agencies, the report well as how progress on these benchmarks reduction recommended in the joint special

18 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Sudan (Darfur) report, but some members maintained that it others indicated that such a timeline should opposition from some members, the resolu- was too severe. As a compromise, the recom- not be absolute but should be conditioned on tion instead took note of this recommenda- mended troop reduction was accepted, but success in addressing the drivers of conflict in tion, rather than welcoming it. It did, how- the police ceiling was maintained at 2,500 Darfur. As a result, language was added on ever, request the Sudanese government “to instead of being reduced to 1,870 person- the fulfilment of certain indicators and that engage in discussions with the OHCHR as nel. A related source of disagreement was the Secretary-General’s upcoming report regards the establishment and activities” of how to characterise the timeframe for the should include related benchmarks. such an office. mission’s withdrawal. While some members Another issue of some controversy was that The UK is the penholder on Darfur; emphasised that the mission should withdraw earlier drafts of the resolution welcomed the Poland chairs the 1591 Sudan Sanctions by June 2020, as recommended in the joint joint special report’s recommendation that Committee. special report, France, the US, the UK and OHCHR open an office in Sudan. Following

Central African Republic

Expected Council Action representatives of the 14 armed groups persists. MINUSCA announced that it is In October, Special Representative and head that signed on to this process at the end of investigating reports that nine people were of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Sta- August. On 30 August, the armed groups taken from the country’s largest IDP camp, bilization Mission in the Central African signed a document of demands to form the PK3, in Bria on 6 September and killed dur- Republic (MINUSCA) Parfait Onanga-Any- basis for continued negotiations. Media ing violent clashes between anti-Balaka and anga, is expected to brief on the latest devel- reports indicate that a previous demand for an ex-Seleka faction, the Popular Front for opments in the country and the most recent blanket amnesty for all rebels, rejected by the Rebirth of the CAR (FPRC). MINUS- MINUSCA report, due on 15 October. the government, was eventually not included CA also called for calm after IDPs threw MINUSCA’s mandate expires on 15 in the document. two grenades in the camp while protesting November 2018. In parallel, Russia brokered a meeting in the violence. The Chair of the 2127 Central African Khartoum between the anti-Balaka militia After eight people were killed in May in Republic (CAR) Sanctions Committee, led by Maxime Mokom and the ex-Seleka fighting between MINUSCA and anoth- Ambassador Kacou Houadja Léon Adom led by Noureddine Adam. On 29 August, the er ex-Seleka faction, the Union for Peace (Côte d’Ivoire), is scheduled to undertake two groups issued a declaration of commit- (UPC), the security situation in Bambari— a visiting mission to the country from 2 to ment towards peace in the CAR through the located in the centre of the country, where 5 October. establishment of the “Central African Forum” MINUSCA has a significant presence—has as a framework for communication. The CAR been relatively calm. Armed groups remain Key Recent Developments government, which did not participate in this in control of parts of the city, however, and The security situation in the CAR is dire. meeting, took note of the declaration. Russia violent crime remains rampant. Self-proclaimed self-defence groups, loosely has also been training and arming the CAR Armed groups continue to target humani- connected to some members of the anti-Bal- security forces and has notified the CAR tarian workers and MINUSCA peacekeep- aka movement, have continued to operate Sanctions Committee, as required by resolu- ers. On 23 August, a Burundian peacekeep- in south-eastern CAR, targeting Muslims. tion 2399. er was killed in an attack on a MINUSCA Ex-Seleka factions, which are largely Mus- In addition to national reconciliation convoy in Basse-Kotto prefecture. Council lim, continue to establish illegal parallel efforts, MINUSCA is supporting govern- members issued a press statement condemn- administration and taxation structures in ment-led local peace and reconciliation ini- ing the attack the following day. Additionally, areas under their control, preying on the tiatives, inclusive of armed groups and civil OCHA reported that between January and population. The government, led by Presi- society, which have been assisting in reducing August, 274 incidents affecting humanitarian dent Faustin-Archange Touadéra, has mini- violence, building trust between communities, organisations were recorded across the coun- mal control outside Bangui. facilitating the return of internally displaced try, endangering staff and hindering humani- The African Initiative for Peace and people (IDPs), and local disarmament pro- tarian assistance. More than half of the pop- Reconciliation in the CAR, led by the AU, cesses in some areas. ulation—2.5 million people—is in need of convened a meeting of the government and Despite these developments, violence humanitarian assistance, and according to

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE CAR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2399 (30 January 2018) renewed the CAR sanctions regime until 31 January 2019 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 28 February 2019. S/RES/2387 (15 November 2017) renewed the mandate of MINUSCA until 15 November 2018. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2018/14 (13 July 2018) expressed the Council’s concern over the continuing violence perpetrated by armed groups in the CAR and reaffirmed its support for the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR. Security Council Letters S/2018/846 (13 September 2018) was from Sudan regarding the Khartoum meeting between armed groups from the CAR. S/2018/463 (15 May 2018) was on MINUSCA support for the CAR security forces. Security Council Press Statement SC/13465 (24 August 2018) condemned a 23 August attack by armed elements on a MINUSCA convoy in Basse-Kotto prefecture, killing one Burundian peacekeeper. Sanctions Committee Documents SC/13456 (14 August 2018) was a press release on the 20 July briefing by the Panel of Experts assisting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee on the panel’s midterm report. S/2018/729 (23 July 2018) was the midterm report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 19 Central African Republic

UNHCR there were 687,398 IDPs and over in areas under their control. might also be an effective incentive for armed 582,000 refugees in neighbouring countries The committee met with the representatives groups to commit to reconciliation. as of 17 May. of neighbouring countries on 7 September to dis- As signalled in the 13 July presidential cuss the implementation of sanctions. In accordance with resolution 2387, the statement, as part of its efforts, the Council Secretary-General submitted recommenda- could mandate MINUSCA to provide lim- tions to the Council on 16 May regarding Human Rights-Related Developments ited operational and logistical support to the possible support for the redeployment of the During its 39th session, the Human Rights Coun- CAR security forces, as recommended by the cil held an interactive dialogue on 27 September CAR security forces. He recommended that Secretary-General in his May report. with the independent expert on human rights in the Council authorise MINUSCA to provide the CAR, Marie-Thérèse Keita Bocoum, and con- limited operational and logistical support to sidered her report covering July 2017 to June (A/ Council and Wider Dynamics the CAR security forces trained by the EU HRC/39/70). The reporting period, during which The deteriorating security situation, with its Military Training Mission for a period of 12 Bocoum made two visits to the CAR, was marked intercommunal undertones, slow reconcilia- by “constant human rights violations and abuses months, under certain conditions, includ- tion efforts, and the government’s inability to linked to continuing attacks by various armed ing that the security forces were vetted and groups in the south-west of the country in 2017, project law outside of Bangui and Bambari, would uphold the principles of accountability and in Bangui and the centre of the country in has been a continuing matter of concern for and the rule of law. The Secretary-General 2018”, the report said. Most of the abuses were the Council. stressed that without this support, the abil- attributable to anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka armed The issue of support for the CAR secu- factions and criminal gangs which continued to tar- ity of the CAR to restore peace and establish rity forces has been a sticking-point for get civilians, humanitarian workers and UN peace- state authority would be undermined. In a keepers, but also homes, public buildings, hospitals Council members, as security sector reform, 13 July presidential statement, the Council and places of worship, worsening the humanitarian including the vetting of personnel, has gone expressed its intent to review the Secretary- situation and restricting access to economic and slowly. In light of this, Council members General’s recommendations. The statement social rights, as detailed in the report. disagreed during negotiations over resolu- also expressed its concern over the continu- tion 2387 about whether MINUSCA should ing violence perpetrated by armed groups in Issues and Options be assisting the authorities by working with the CAR and reaffirmed its support for the The continued fighting between rebels, personnel who have been linked to human African Initiative for Peace and Reconcilia- attacks against civilians along sectarian lines, rights violations while faced with the reality tion in the CAR. and the targeting of MINUSCA personnel that MINUSCA is unable to be present in and other UN and humanitarian personnel large parts of the CAR without the deploy- Sanctions-Related Developments is of serious concern to the Council. In addi- ment of these forces. In addition, while the The 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee met on 20 tion, slow reconciliation efforts have yet to US is pushing for austerity and efficiency in July to discuss the midterm report of the Panel change the situation on the ground or assist peacekeeping, some Council members ques- of Experts assisting the committee. The report noted that the ongoing redeployment of the CAR in expanding state authority beyond Bangui. tion MINUSCA’s ability to expand its tasks military and the joint operations of MINUSCA and In an effort to curb violence, the Council when it is already overstretched and expe- the national security forces—mainly the failed could consider acting through the 2127 CAR riencing difficulties in fulfilling its mandate. attempt on 7-8 April to dismantle armed ele- Sanctions Committee, listing those with These differences of approach also surfaced ments in PK5, a Muslim enclave in Bangui—have links to recent attacks on civilians, including during the negotiations over the 13 July contributed to the hardening of the positions of ex-Séléka elements, in particular the FPRC. Its individuals who have incited ethnic or reli- presidential statement. leaders continued their attempts to reunify the gious violence. A credible threat of sanctions France is the penholder on the CAR. Séléka and consolidate parallel administrations

Lebanon

Expected Council Action territory. This briefing, usually conducted Key Recent Developments In October, Council members will receive by the Special Coordinator for Lebanon or Five months after parliamentary elections, the semi-annual briefing on the latest report an official from the Department of Political Lebanon has yet to form a government. In on the implementation of resolution 1559. Affairs, has always been held in consultations. late May, Lebanese President Adopted in 2004, resolution 1559 called for The mandate of the UN Interim Force designated Saad Hariri as the prime min- the disarmament of all militias and the exten- in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August ister in charge of forming the government. sion of government control over all Lebanese 2019. Hariri’s task has been complicated by a

UN DOCUMENTS ON LEBANON Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2433 (30 August 2018) renewed the mandate of UNFIL for another year. S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) expanded UNIFIL by 15,000 troops and expanded its mandate. S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non- Lebanese militias, extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory, and free and fair presidential elections. Secretary-General’s Report S/2018/703 (13 July 2018) was the report on the implementation of resolution 1701. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8338 (30 August 2018) was the vote on resolution 2433.

20 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Lebanon lack of agreement among the major political plan to increase its naval capabilities with the between and Israel. blocks on their share of cabinet posts in the aim of reducing UNIFIL’s Maritime Task- On the political front, the Council will new government. force and transitioning its responsibilities to continue to follow closely the developments According to media reports from early the Lebanese Navy. related to the formation of the new govern- September, Lebanon’s Speaker of the Parlia- Newly appointed head of UNIFIL and ment in Lebanon. Council members are ment, Nabih Berri, warned that the economic force commander Major General Stefano Del aware that a protracted period of political situation in Lebanon is serious, while Presi- Col chaired his first tripartite meeting on 6 instability in Lebanon could have implica- dent Aoun said that such concerns are exag- September. Del Col met with senior officials tions for the security situation in the country gerated. Aoun acknowledged that there are from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and and the wider region. difficulties facing the Lebanese economy but the Israel Defense Forces to discuss the situ- Lebanon’s burden in hosting close to said that the country is working to address ation along the Blue Line, the border demar- one million refugees from Syria is also of them. Lebanon is under pressure from the cation between Israel and Lebanon. He com- deep concern, and in that regard, the Coun- International Monetary Fund to make fiscal mended both parties for their efforts to ease cil could request a briefing by UNHCR on adjustments to address its public debt. Initiat- tensions and preserve stability. how member states can enhance services ing any reforms in this regard would require On 21 September, the Special Tribunal for to refugees. a functioning government. Lebanon completed closing arguments in the In a televised address to his supporters case involving four individuals charged with Council Dynamics on 20 September, Hezbollah leader Has- conspiracy to commit a terrorist act, which The Council continues to demonstrate unity san Nasrallah announced that the group has resulted in the assassination of former prime in its support of Lebanon’s sovereignty, ter- acquired precision-guided missiles despite minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. The accused ritorial integrity and security and its efforts to Israel’s efforts to prevent this. According to remain at large, and the trial in The Hague is insulate itself from the damaging effect of the some estimates, Hezbollah currently has being held in absentia. Saad Hariri was pres- Syrian conflict. The Council has also recog- more than 100,000 missiles that could tar- ent on the first day of the closing arguments nised the decisive role of the LAF in respond- get Israel. Nasrallah reiterated that Hezbollah and later told the media that he is confident ing to security challenges. fighters would remain in Syria as long as they that those who killed his father would be held The members are divided, however, in are needed by the Syrian government. to account. their view of the security dynamics in the On 30 August, the Council adopted reso- region and the role of the mission. This was lution 2433, which extended UNIFIL’s man- Key Issues and Options particularly evident during the mandate date for a further year. While negotiations on There are several interrelated issues for the renewal negotiations both last year and this the resolution were not as contentious as last Council, notably the weaponry that Hezbol- year. The US has continued to emphasise year, diverging views among Council mem- lah and other non-state actors possess and the threat posed by Iran, Hezbollah, and the bers on the mission’s role were evident. In the the flow of arms through Syria to Hezbollah, proliferation of weapons in southern Leba- past, the US has publicly criticised UNIFIL which directly hinder the ability of the Leb- non, and has promoted a more active role for for overlooking the alleged upsurge in Hez- anese government to exercise full authority UNIFIL in confronting these threats. On the bollah’s activity and increased flow of weap- over its territory. The ongoing crisis in Syria, mission’s configuration, the US has strong- ons into southern Lebanon and demanded with Hezbollah’s involvement on the side of ly advocated for the reduction of UNIFIL’s that UNIFIL assume a more visible presence the Syrian government, has contributed to Maritime Task force, leading towards eventu- in the area. The resolution stressed the need this flow of arms. These circumstances pose al termination. Most other members, howev- to improve management of UNIFIL civil- a threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty and stabil- er, share the view that the mission’s mandate ian resources with the goal of improving the ity and contravene its obligations under reso- and tasks should remain unchanged. These effectiveness of the mission, and requested lutions 1559 and 1701, the latter of which members are cautious of drastic changes in the Secretary-General to provide his rec- called for a cessation of hostilities between the mission’s mandate and their impact on ommendations on the issue by the end of Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. The situation the fragile calm that has been maintained in the year. While the mandate of the mission also generates concerns about tensions along southern Lebanon for the past ten years. remained unchanged, the resolution called the Israel-Lebanon border, with the con- on the government of Lebanon to develop a tinuing threat of a resumption of hostilities

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 21 Women, Peace and Security

Expected Council Action women’s participation at their centre. During requests the Secretary-General and troop- In October, the Security Council will hold the meeting, Mohammed and Diop shared contributing countries to seek to increase its annual open debate on women, peace and information and impressions with regard the number of women in UNIFIL, and security and the Secretary-General’s annual to women’s leadership in the prevention of to ensure the meaningful participation of report on the issue. conflicts and their inclusion in processes women in all aspects of its operations. It also Bolivia, as president of the Council in addressing environmental, humanitarian and requests UNIFIL to take gender consider- October, is expected to circulate a concept development challenges. This was the second ations fully into account as a cross-cutting note ahead of the debate. The debate, which briefing of its kind, following-up on a brief- issue throughout its mandate as well as to may be held at high level, is expected to focus ing after a joint UN-AU trip to the Demo- assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring on the empowerment of women in peace cratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria in the full and effective participation, involve- processes. The Secretary-General is expected August 2017. ment and representation of women at all lev- to brief. No formal outcome is expected at After a briefing on the Lake Chad Basin els of decision-making and to enhance its this point. region in March, the Department of Politi- reporting to the Council on this issue. cal Affairs issued a confidential note to Resolution 2414 of 27 April, renew- Key Recent Developments Council members addressing the gender ing the mandate of the UN Mission Since the adoption of resolution 1325 on 31 dimension of the threat posed by the terror for the Referendum in Western Sahara October 2000, the Council has focused regu- group Boko Haram. This was the first time (MINURSO),similarly asked the Secretary- larly on the issue of women, peace and secu- a communication of this type focused on General to increase the number of women in rity. Resolution 1325 recognised that conflict the gender dimension of any conflict, and is MINURSO, as did resolution 2430 renew- has a differential impact on women and that consistent with the provisions of resolution ing the mandate of the UN Interim Force in addressing the needs, views and participation 2242, which called for the inclusion of the Cyprus (UNFICYP) on 26 July. There were of half of society would provide a positive women, peace and security agenda in efforts also more references than in previous years to peace dividend. It emphasised the protection to counter terrorism and violent extremism. women’s participation and empowerment in of women, their meaningful participation in The note provides information on how Boko this year’s resolution 2405 of 8 March renew- peace and security processes, and the need Haram uses gender-based inequalities and ing the mandate of the UN Assistance Mis- for an increased role of women in preventing gender stereotypes for their operations: for sion in Afghanistan (UNAMA). and resolving conflict. The seven resolutions example, by deploying a greater proportion adopted since then established a broad spec- of female suicide bombers than other insur- Key Issues and Options trum of norms on women, peace and security. gent groups, as women tend to face weaker An important issue is to continue integrating The most recent Council resolution on this security checks. women, peace and security issues in relevant thematic issue, resolution 2242, adopted on Relevant developments this year regard- country-specific and regional issues on the 13 October 2015, included practical actions ing mandates of peace operations include the Council’s agenda, as recent mandate renewals for the improved implementation of the 21 September adoption of resolution 2436 have done and which members may wish to agenda, including by convening an Informal on peacekeeping performance. The resolu- highlight. Other examples of progress include Expert Group (IEG). tion, which reiterated a request from resolu- the mainstreaming of language in Council Thus far in 2018, the IEG has held meet- tion 2242 to the Secretary-General to present products and reporting by the Secretary- ings on Mali and the Sahel, Iraq, Democratic a revised strategy to double the number of General, an increasing number of female civil Republic of the Congo, the Lake Chad Basin, women in military and police contingents of society briefers and female leaders in Council Afghanistan, the Central African Republic UN peacekeeping operations by 2020, set a meetings, and sexual and gender-based vio- and Yemen. deadline of March 2019 for this strategy to be lence as a designation criterion in sanctions The Council held a briefing on 10 July submitted to the Council. regimes. Members may also stress that there on “Women, Peace and Security in the Sahel Recent resolutions renewing peacekeep- is scope for further progress, of the integration Region”, chaired by Swedish Foreign Minis- ing mandates also reflect increasing aware- of women, peace and security issues in efforts ter Margot Wallström. UN Deputy Secretary- ness of the importance of mainstreaming to prevent and counter terrorism and violent General Amina Mohammed and AU Special women, peace and security issues. Resolu- extremism; in non-proliferation, disarmament Envoy on Women, Peace and Security Bineta tion 2433 adopted on 30 August, renew- and arms control; and women’s political par- Diop briefed. Wallström had joined the Chad ing the mandate of the UN Interim Force ticipation in all levels of governance. They and Niger legs of a joint UN-AU trip, led in Lebanon (UNIFIL), recalls the request may wish to present good practices regard- by Mohammed and Diop, that focused on in resolution 2242 for a strategy to dou- ing their national action plans on women, peace, security and development issues, with ble female personnel in peacekeeping. It peace and security and their bilateral foreign

UN DOCUMENTS ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY Security Council Resolution S/RES/2242 (13 October 2015) addressed women’s roles in countering violent extremism and terrorism, improved the Council’s working methods in relation to women, peace and security, and took up gender recommendations made by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the Global Study on the implementation of resolution 1325. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2017/861 (16 October 2017) was the annual report on women, peace and secu- rity. S/2018/250 (23 March 2018) was the annual report on conflict-related sexual violence.Security Council Letters S/2018/688 (11 July 2018) was the summary of the 5 June meeting on Mali and the Sahel held by the IEG. S/2018/475 (17 May 2018) was the summary of the 29 March meeting on Iraq held by the IEG. S/2018/362 (16 April 2018) was the summary of the 28 February meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo held by the IEG. S/2018/188 (23 February 2018) was the summary of the 30 January meeting on the Lake Chad Basin held by the IEG. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8306 (10 July 2018) was a briefing on “Women, Peace and Security in the Sahel Region”, chaired by Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström. S/PV.8234 (16 April 2018) was an open debate on conflict-related sexual violence.S/PV.8079 (27 October 2017) was the annual open debate on women, peace and security.

22 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Women, Peace and Security assistance support to organisations working renewals and sanctions, as well as other the- decisions on women, peace and security, Chi- towards women’s participation in peacebuild- matic areas. na and Russia have routinely criticised new ing in countries affected by conflict. language as an expansion of the women, The upcoming annual report of the Sec- Council Dynamics peace and security agenda or perceived it as retary-General is expected to provide an The co-chairs of the IEG, Peru and Swe- infringing on state sovereignty or encroach- update on gender parity within the organisa- den, have been working to integrate women’s ing upon competencies of other parts of the tion; members will be able to assess progress issues as peace and security issues as an inte- UN system. and use the information from the Secretary- gral part of the Council’s country-specific The UK is the penholder on women, General’s report and the open debate to feed work, rather than primarily as a free-standing peace and security issues; Peru and Sweden into their thinking about country-specific thematic issue. are the co-chairs of the IEG. situations in the context of mission mandate During past negotiations of Council

Cyprus

Expected Council Action Speaking to the media on 16 September, the next mandate renewal. In October, the Council expects to receive a Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan So far, the Council has been wary of initi- report on the Secretary-General’s good offic- said that Turkey would increase rather than ating discussions about the specifics of man- es in Cyprus and the outcome of UN con- decrease the number of troops stationed in date changes or prospects for downsizing the sultant Jane Holl Lute’s consultations on the northern Cyprus. Addressing the issue of mission, fearing a negative impact on the situ- negotiation process. Cyprus’s unification, he said that the matter ation on the ground and on the political pro- would have been solved if the Greek Cypri- cess. Council members could, however, be Key Recent Developments ots had supported the plan of then-Secre- more open to these discussions during the In July, the Council adopted resolution 2430, tary-General Kofi Annan. In separate ref- next mandate renewal in January 2019, espe- which extended the mandate of the UN Peace- erendums on the Annan plan in April 2004, cially if the current stalemate in unification keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for Turkish Cypriots voted for it while Greek talks persists. another six months. Notwithstanding the lack Cypriots rejected it. of progress in unification talks for over a year, During the high-level week of the UN Council Dynamics the Council did not initiate any changes in the General Assembly, the Secretary-General As is the case with other issues of low intensity mission’s mandate or size. The resolution wel- met separately with Greek Cypriot leader on the Council’s agenda, only a few members comed the appointment of Lute as UN consul- Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot with particular interest in the conflict follow tant and called on all sides to use this oppor- leader Mustafa Akinci. Secretary-General the situation in Cyprus closely. Among these tunity to engage in constructive consultations. used this opportunity to discuss with both are France, Russia, and the UK. The UK is The Secretary-General appointed Lute leaders the prospects for resumption of uni- also one of the guarantor powers under the earlier in July as a UN consultant charged fication talks. 1960 Treaty of Guarantee on the indepen- with consulting the parties and seeking their dence, territorial integrity and security of reflections on the negotiation process. So far, Key Issues and Options Cyprus. Over the past several years, the US Lute has held meetings with the Greek and At the moment, the Council’s main concern has become more engaged in efforts to find a Turkish Cypriot leaders separately and with about Cyprus is the lack of progress in the political solution as the island started to gain the representatives of the guarantor powers— unification talks and what role, if any, the importance because of its offshore hydrocar- Greece, Turkey and the UK. At press time Council should play to stimulate the process. bon resources and its strategic location in there was no substantial information on the In the absence of a political solution or tangi- relation to the fight against terrorism in the outcome of her talks with the parties. Neither ble progress in talks, an issue for the Council Middle East. The current US administration Lute nor the Secretary-General addressed is whether to consider significant changes to has been particularly focused on increasing the media on the ongoing process of consul- the mission’s mandate and examine downsiz- the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeep- tations. As requested by resolution 2430, the ing options. ing operations while emphasising that such Secretary-General will submit a report to the Council members are interested in receiv- missions need to support political solutions. Council on the outcome of Lute’s consulta- ing more information on the prospects for a The Council has been unified in its sup- tions by 15 October. This report will form political settlement of the Cyprus issue. The port for the political process, which could the basis for the Council’s deliberation on the outcome of Lute’s consultations will play an lead towards final settlement of the Cyprus Cyprus issue in October. important role in guiding discussion during question. There are some differences,

UN DOCUMENTS ON CYPRUS Security Council Resolution S/RES/2430 (26 July 2018) renewed UNFICYP’s mandate until 31 January 2019. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2018/610 (14 June 2018) was on progress towards a settlement in Cyprus. S/2017/1008 (28 November 2017) was on the strategic review of the UN mission in Cyprus. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8317 (26 July 2018) was the vote on resolution 2430.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 23 Cyprus

however, over the acceptable timeline for the be Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned for the however, were not included in the final text of reunification talks. Some members seem to outcome to be effective. the resolution. In the absence of progress on be frustrated by the duration of the politi- During the negotiations of the last man- the political front, it is likely that the US posi- cal process and share the view that it can- date renewal resolution, the US seemed to tion will gain more support from other mem- not be open-ended, and that the Council have proposed adding to the draft specific ref- bers who have so far been cautious on this could stimulate the negotiations by putting erences to timed benchmarks for an exit strat- issue. Russia is likely to continue to oppose pressure on both sides. However, Russia has egy tied to the political process as well as a any drastic changes to the mission’s mandate strongly opposed any attempt to exert pres- request for a comprehensive strategic review and troop numbers. sure on both sides and seek to affect negotia- of the mission that would have evaluated The UK is the penholder on Cyprus. tions, as it maintains that the process must every aspect of UNFICYP. These suggestions,

Yemen

Expected Council Action 2017 by the Human Rights Council (HRC), freedom of expression, including the coali- In October, the Special Envoy for Yemen, published its findings (A/HRC/39/43). The tion’s ban on international media traveling on Martin Griffiths, is expected to brief the experts affirm that individuals from both UN humanitarian flights to Sana’a, Houthi Council. A representative of OCHA is also sides, including Saudi Arabia and the United arrests of journalists and of the Bahai minor- likely to brief. Arab Emirates (UAE), might have committed ity, and intimidation by both sides of their war crimes. The report says that coalition air- perceived critics. The report details sexual Key Recent Developments strikes—which have repeatedly hit residential violence and rape by Yemeni government and The Saudi Arabia-led coalition, fighting in areas, markets, funerals, weddings, detention Security Belt forces (a southern paramilitary support of the Yemeni government against the facilities, civilian boats and medical facilities, force supported by the UAE) and Emirati Houthi rebel group, came under increased and have caused the majority of documented personnel against migrants and internally dis- scrutiny for its conduct of the war during civilian casualties—may have been conduct- placed and vulnerable persons. The experts’ August, while in September, UN efforts to ed in violation of the principles of distinction, findings echo those of a Human Rights Watch bring the government and Houthis together proportionality and precaution. The report report, also issued in August, about the JIAT, for the first time in two years faltered. also says that there are reasonable grounds raising serious concerns over its indepen- On 9 August, a coalition airstrike hit a to believe that coalition restrictions on com- dence and the quality of its findings. The school bus in Saada, killing at least 40 chil- mercial shipping violate the proportionality Group of Experts submitted a confidential dren. The next day, Council members dis- rule of international humanitarian law, hav- list of individuals who may be responsible for cussed the attack in consultations. Through ing caused extreme suffering for millions of international crimes to the OHCHR. press elements, members called for a credible civilians and being unjustified by any possible On the political front, Griffiths organ- and transparent investigation. Initially, the military advantage. The experts note that no ised consultations between the government coalition defended the strike, but on 1 Sep- searches of shipments to Houthi-controlled and Houthis that were planned to start on 6 tember, the Joint Incidents Assessment Team ports had uncovered any weapons. According September in Geneva. The Houthis did not (JIAT), an investigative body set up by the to the report, the ban on commercial flights attend, however, after demanding last minute coalition, said the strike was conducted based to Sana’a constitutes a violation of interna- changes to the travel arrangements for their on intelligence that Houthi leaders were in tional humanitarian law protections for the delegation, that following several days of dis- the bus but that delays had led to striking sick and wounded. Violations by the Houthis cussion could not be resolved. Griffiths held the bus with children on board. A coalition and their allies for indiscriminate attacks talks with the Yemeni government delegation statement on 6 September said that the JIAT and access restrictions in Taiz are also cov- that focused on confidence-building mea- would also assess a 23 August air strike on a ered, though the experts, who could not visit sures, including the release of prisoners, the vehicle in which 27 civilians fleeing fighting in the city, say further investigations into these re-opening of Sana’a airport, economic issues Hodeidah governorate, including 22 children, issues are required. and a wide range of humanitarian issues, such were killed. The report further covers widespread arbi- as opening up humanitarian access routes. At On 28 August, the Group of Indepen- trary detention, enforced disappearances, ill- an 8 September press conference, Griffiths dent Eminent International and Regional treatment, torture and the use of child sol- said that he would travel to Muscat and Experts on Yemen, established in September diers. It describes restrictions on the right to Sana’a to consult with the Houthi leadership

UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2216 (14 April 2015) demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all seized areas and relinquish all seized arms and established a targeted arms embargo. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2018/5 (15 March 2018) called for the full and sustained opening of Yemen’s ports, including Hodeidah and Saleef, and for increased access to Sana’a airport. Security Council Letter S/2018/847 (14 September 2018) was from the UAE about military operations around Hodeidah. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8361 (21 September 2018) was a briefing on Yemen.S/PV.8348 (11 September 2018) was a briefing on Yemen.S/PV.8323 (2 August 2018) was a briefing on Yemen.Security Council Press Statement SC/13484 (5 September 2018) welcomed the upcoming Geneva consultations. Human Rights Council Document A/HRC/39/43 (17 August 2018) was the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen.

24 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Yemen

about what had been discussed with the gov- Experts on Yemen. At press time, the HRC was humanitarian and commercial imports and ernment delegation. expected to adopt a resolution on human rights, their distribution. The Council may further On 11 September, Griffiths briefed the technical assistance and capacity-building in endorse a UN plan from June to place Hodei- Yemen on 28 September. It was unclear whether Council in a public meeting followed by con- the group of eminent experts’ mandate would be dah port under UN supervision, and could sultations after which members issued press renewed. recall that sanctions can be applied against elements expressing regret that the Houthis individuals or entities, according to resolu- had not attended the Geneva meeting and tions 2140 and 2216, for violating interna- urging all sides to get behind the process that Key Issues and Options tional humanitarian law and human rights the Special Envoy is leading. Griffiths vis- The Special Envoy’s efforts to resume a polit- law, or obstructing the delivery of humanitar- ited Muscat from 12 to 13 September and ical process and ways that the Council could ian assistance. Sana’a from 16 to 17 September. According support this remains a key issue. During The Council may also consider holding a to his office, he held “constructive” discus- the 11 September briefing, most members briefing with the group of eminent experts on sions about resuming consultations and con- expressed regret over the Houthi absence at the human rights situation in Yemen. fidence-building measures. Geneva but avoided speaking critically of the Following the unsuccessful Geneva meet- Houthis. They reiterated their strong sup- Council and Wider Dynamics ing, the coalition intensified military opera- port for Griffiths and encouraged the sides to Council members support the efforts of tions around Hodeidah, the port city through engage constructively with the Special Envoy. the Special Envoy, and share strong con- which 70 percent of Yemen’s imported food, Griffiths has also been seeking to engage cerns about the consequences of an attack fuel and medicine requirements enter the other Yemeni actors, including groups in the on Hodeidah and the larger humanitarian country. The coalition publicly signalled its south where there is a secessionist movement, crisis, which are reasons that the Council is plans to re-launch an offensive—paused since while he pursues consultations with the two often described as united on Yemen. At the June—against the city. A 14 September let- principal parties. same time, Saudi Arabia and the UAE exert ter from the UAE to the Council reiterated Aspects of Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, a great deal of influence on the Council’s con- that “the liberation of Hodeida[h] is critical in which 8.4 million people are at risk of sideration of Yemen through the alliances and to re-engaging the Houthis in peace talks”. famine, include access for critical supplies strategic relations they maintain with Council Most of the fighting so far has been over the and aid, the parties’ compliance with inter- members. This has led to differences among main road linking Hodeidah with Sana’a and national humanitarian law, the protection of members over how to respond to different other population centres in the central high- civilians and the deteriorating economy. An aspects of the war, and caused some mem- lands, effectively closing the eastern route out immediate concern is the situation around bers to be cautious in the positions they take. of the city. Hodeidah, which could see heavy civilian Kuwait is part of the coalition and champi- The economic situation worsened as the casualties in a battle for the city and a sig- ons coalition positions. A group of five elect- Yemeni rial fell sharply in value, prompting nificant worsening of the humanitarian situ- ed members—Bolivia, the Netherlands, Peru, widespread protests in southern Yemen in ation if its port can no longer function as Poland and Sweden—often takes a joint posi- September. Yemen’s main entry point for food and other tion highlighting humanitarian dimensions. Under-Secretary-General for Humani- humanitarian assistance. For example, following the 9 August airstrike tarian Affairs Mark Lowcock briefed the In the 11 September press elements, on the school bus, Peru requested the Coun- Council on the escalation around Hodeidah Council members asked that Griffiths keep cil session on this incident, on behalf of this and the worsening economic situation on 21 them updated on his efforts. Council mem- group, and the group also proposed the 21 September. He warned that Yemen may be bers may continue to affirm their support for September meeting with Lowcock. Russia, “approaching a tipping point, beyond which the Special Envoy, and encourage the parties and members of this group, have called for it will be impossible to prevent massive loss and those with influence on them to engage ending offensive operations around Hodei- of life as a result of widespread famine across constructively with him. dah. The P3 have focused on the need to pro- the country”, and described already existing On Hodeidah, the Council is likely to tect infrastructure and access for humanitar- “pocket-like conditions of famine”. monitor developments, which include the ian and commercial goods. prospect of an offensive on the city and also Due to Saudi objections to any new resolu- Human Rights-Related Developments concerns about the possible imposition of tion on Yemen since the adoption of resolution During its 39th session, the HRC held an inter- a siege. It could adopt a presidential state- 2216 in April 2015, the Council approach has active dialogue on 25 and 26 September on the ment calling for a de-escalation or cessation been to take decisions through presidential report on Yemen by the High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings, conclu- of hostilities and for the parties to ensure that statements, most recently in March. sions and recommendations of the Group of all roads and ports, including Hodeidah and The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Peru Independent Eminent International and Regional nearby Saleef, remain open and functional for chairs the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 25 26 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 27 Security Council Report Staff

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28 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018