October 2018 Forecast.Indd
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October 2018 Monthly Forecast 1 Overview Overview 1 In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10 3 Status Update since our In October, Bolivia assumes the presidency of they are being used for migrant smuggling or September Forecast the Council. Early in the month a Council visit- human trafficking. ing mission to the DRC is planned, focused on Additionally, in accordance with the 60-day 4 Democratic Republic of the Congo the upcoming elections. Following the return of reporting cycle, Yemen may be added to the pro- the Council delegation, there will be a briefing to gramme of work. 6 Libya the Council by the trip co-leads (Bolivia, Equato- Other African issues include: 7 Counter-Terrorism rial Guinea and France). Special Representative • Mali, on the activities of MINUSMA; 8 Syria of the Secretary-General Leila Zerrougui is also • the CAR, on the activities of MINUSCA; 10 UNDOF (Golan Heights) scheduled to brief on the activities of the UN mis- • Sudan (Darfur), on the activities of UNAMID 11 Sudan/South Sudan sion in the DRC. and the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee; Bolivia has chosen to hold a meeting on the • Western Sahara on the activities of MINURSO 13 Western Sahara role of natural resources as a root cause of conflict. and the adoption of a resolution renewing the 14 Israel/Palestine There will also be two open debates: one on wom- mission’s mandate; and 15 Mali en, peace and security, focused on the empow- • Sudan/South Sudan, on the activities of 16 Colombia erment of women in political processes; and the UNISFA and an adoption scheduled to renew regular quarterly open debate on Israel/Palestine. the joint border verification monitoring mech- 17 Sudan Other Middle East issues include: anism in Abyei. 19 Central African • Golan Heights, on the activities of UNDOF; There will be a briefing from Special Repre- Republic • Lebanon, on the latest report on the imple- sentative Jean Arnault on the Secretary-General’s 20 Lebanon mentation of resolution 1559 (2004), which 90-day report on the UN Verification Mission in 22 Women, Peace and called for the disarmament of all militias and Colombia. Security the extension of government control over all A briefing is also expected on the report on the 23 Cyprus Lebanese territory; and Secretary-General’s good offices in Cyprus and 24 Yemen • Syria, the monthly briefings on political and the outcome of UN consultant Jane Holl Lute’s humanitarian developments and on the use of consultations on the negotiation process. chemical weapons. Other issues this month include the annual The Council is scheduled to adopt a resolution briefing to the Council of the ICJ President and a renewing the authorisation for member states to joint briefing by the chairs of the Council’s coun- inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of ter-terrorism related committees. Libya when reasonable grounds exist to suspect In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10 27 September 2018 This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. In October, the five incoming members of the For many years, the diverse nature of the For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council—Belgium, the Dominican E10 members has made coordination and joint Security Council actions please subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” Republic, Germany, Indonesia and South Afri- action difficult. However, driven by dissatisfac- series at whatsinblue.org or follow ca—will begin attending meetings of the Council, tion with being sidelined on key Council deci- @SCRtweets on Twitter. both formal and informal, as well as meetings of sions and a shared desire to improve the effec- the subsidiary bodies. Starting on 1 January 2019, tiveness of the Council, especially in the face of these five members will make up the E10 together P5 paralysis caused by sharp differences, elected with Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, members have begun acting as a more cohe- Peru and Poland. sive group. The E10 now meet monthly at both Security Council Report Monthly Forecast October 2018 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10 permanent representative and political coor- In 2013-14, Australia and Luxembourg extended the JIM’s mandate for one month dinator level. These meetings have allowed (joined by Jordan in 2014) paved the way while requesting the UN Secretary-General, the E10 to discuss the working methods of by drafting decisions on the humanitar- in coordination with the OPCW, to submit the Council, particularly around the issues ian aspects of the Syria conflict. Ever since, proposals to the Council for a new struc- of penholders and chairs of subsidiary bod- elected members have been the recognised ture and methodology for the JIM. Follow- ies. The elected members chair all the sub- co-penholders on Syrian humanitarian ing the Russian veto of the Japanese draft, sidiary bodies, with the P5 deciding on the issues and have found ways of navigating the Italy in its role as Council president circu- distribution of responsibilities. This year divisions of the permanent members on the lated a draft letter to the Secretary-General the E10 have pushed for a greater role and Syria issue to achieve outcomes on cross-line requesting that the JIM’s organisational more equitable distribution in the allocation and cross-border humanitarian access and administrative arrangements be main- of chairs of subsidiary bodies. These regu- The increasingly divisive P5 dynamics, tained until 31 December 2017, pending lar E10 meetings also provide a forum for particularly over Syria, have been a partic- a final decision on the renewal of its man- discussion of issues of substance, and an ular catalyst for E10 action. In April 2017, date. Soon thereafter, Sweden and Uruguay opportunity to garner support from fellow following the chemical weapons attack on circulated a draft resolution to extend the E10 members for potential new initiatives. Khan Shaykhun, the P3 and Russia both JIM’s mandate for a year with the aim of The E10 have had several meetings with the produced separate draft resolutions, which reaching a compromise among the com- Secretary-General, most recently in mid- were then negotiated among the P5. Frus- peting perspectives in the Council. Russia September together with the incoming five trated at not being consulted in the negotia- opposed both initiatives, which led to the elected members. tion process, the E10 in an unusual move demise of the JIM, but the energy and dyna- The incoming members enter the Coun- produced a draft text that represented a mism shown by these Council members in cil at a moment when the opportunity for compromise among the positions of the the last stretch of the negotiations on a file elected members to make their mark on the permanent members. The existence of this traditionally monopolised by permanent work of the Council appears greater than it alternative E10 draft that might have been members was notable. has been for many years. In the early 1990s, acceptable to the majority of members Even when there is agreement on a Syr- after the end of the Cold War and lasting for apparently made it more difficult for the P3 ia-related issue, implementation of these about a decade, elected members frequent- and Russia to proceed with a vote on draft Council decisions is often difficult. In Feb- ly took initiatives on important issues and resolutions that would almost certainly not ruary, the Council unanimously adopted contributed policy options on a full range of have been adopted, either because of likely resolution 2401, which demanded a ces- matters. However, starting in the mid-2000s, vetoes or not having the requisite nine votes. sation of hostilities in Syria. Sweden and the space shrank for such contributions However, US air strikes that evening on the Kuwait, the current co-leads on humani- from elected members, particularly with the Sha’yrat airbase outside Homs derailed the tarian issues, engaged in intense bilateral emergence of a more rigid “penholder” sys- attempt by the E10 to bridge the divide negotiations with Russia and were able to tem. Today, the P3—France, the UK, and among permanent members. The P3 then incorporate enough of its concerns for there the US—are penholders on the majority of circulated a draft resolution, largely based to be rare Council unity on a Syria-related situations on the Council’s agenda. on their previous text, although incorporat- outcome. However, the Syrian government The P3, with their institutional memory ing one element from the E10 draft. That did not abide by the resolution, and there and well-resourced missions, are arguably in draft was vetoed by Russia. was no de-escalation of the violence. a strong position to hold the pen on substan- In November 2017, elected members The humanitarian crisis in Yemen, for tive issues in the Council. Being a penholder played an active role in trying to keep alive which the UK is the penholder, is another goes beyond drafting and negotiating texts, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) situation where the elected members have however. It also means calling meetings and of the Organisation for the Prohibition pushed for greater Council attention and organising visiting missions,and can work of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the more balanced outcomes. Coordination against inclusive Council processes. The UN, which had been set up to determine by some elected members on this issue penholder practice has often led the per- responsibility for the use of chemical weap- emerged late last year as a result of what manent members first to discuss and seek ons in Syria. Renewing the JIM mandate were perceived as unbalanced Council draft agreement among themselves on a draft text was always going to be difficult, as the P5 products on Yemen.