Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity
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Common to body and soul: philosophical approaches to explaining living behaviour in Greco-Roman antiquity Edited by R. A. H. King Walter de Gruyter ¢ Berlin ¢ New York 2006 Acknowledgments This collection of essays owes its inception to a symposium held in Munich 8-10th September 2003, whose purpose was to bring together scholars working in the ¯eld to discuss some aspects of the philosophy of mind in antiquity that may conveniently be subsumed under the rubric \common to body and soul". All but one of the papers presented here were read, in earlier versions, at the symposium, Thomas Johansen's piece being the exception. None of them has appeared in its present form in print before. The editor has translated Pierre-Marie Morel's and Thomas Buchheim's papers into English. Many people and institutions were instrumental in making the sympo- sium possible; the editor would like to express his gratitude to the follow- ing. The Fritz Thyssen Stiftung gave very generous ¯nancial support to the symposium. The Gesellschaft fÄurantike Philosophie also supported the undertaking. Ursula Steiner was most helpful in making the three days at Kardinal Wendel Haus, where the symposium was held, very en- joyable. Thomas Brunotte was of great assistance both at the symposium itself, and also in preparing the book for publication. He is responsible for the camera ready copy and the indexes to the volume. Its publication has been subsidised by Lehrstuhl III (Thomas Buchheim), Philosophie Department, LMU Munich. Sabine Vogt, who also took part in the sym- posium, has been exemplary as editor at de Gruyter. Finally, the volume's editor would like to thank most warmly all participants in the symposium for their participation, and all contributors to this collection for their contributions. R. A. H. King / Munich, September 2005 Contents Introduction (R. A. H. King) . 1 Parmenides on Thinking (Edward Hussey) . .13 Parmenides on the Place of Mind (Roman Dilcher) . 31 Life Beyond the Stars: Aristotle, Plato and Empedocles (Denis O'Brien) . 49 Plato's phaulon skemma: On the Multifariousness of the Human Soul (Thomas Buchheim) . 103 \Common to Soul and Body" in the Parva Naturalia (Pierre-Marie Morel) . .121 What's New in the De Sensu? The Place of the De Sensu in Aristotle's Psychology (Thomas K. Johansen) . .140 Common to Body and Soul: Peripatetic Approaches After Aristotle (Robert W. Sharples) . 165 Interaction of Body and Soul: What the Hellenistic Philosophers Saw and Aristotle Avoided (Christof Rapp) . 187 Psychophysical Holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism (Christopher Gill) . 209 Body and Soul in Galen (R. J. Hankinson) . .232 Contributors . 259 Index locorum ......................................................261 General Index . 275 Introduction¤ R. A. H. King Greco-Roman antiquity provides a wide variety of models of the relations between body and soul, and some of the most notable are associated with the phrase \common to body and soul". This phrase is a commonplace of ancient philosophical psychology, that is the doctrines and investigations of the soul (psych^e), both human and in general. Versions of the phrase occur in Plato, Aristotle, and ¯nally in Plotinus. Epicureans, Stoics and Galen were intimately concerned with problems connected conceptually, if not linguistically, with things common to body and soul. The ten papers collected here present a snapshot of current research by workers in the ¯eld. No attempt has been made at a systematic coverage, for this would require not merely more of a history of philosophical psychology than is at present agreed on, but also more connections between ancient and modern thought than may safely be taken for granted. For example, substantial dualism cannot be understood independently of the doctrine of substance in question. As will be seen, alternative points of view are presented in the collection, and this introduction will not attempt a ¯nal adjudication. I begin with a brief sketch of the options discussed, and then present them in a little more detail. Soul (psych^e) is, roughly, what distinguishes living things from other things. The importance of things common to body and soul lies in the fact that neither in philosophical nor everyday encounters are we usually faced with soul on its own. Body-soul couples, what they do and what they undergo, are much more in evidence. To see that this is so, we have only to consider the fundamental explananda of psychology { movement, including action, and cognition, more especially perception. This is not to suggest that there is no point in distinguishing between body and soul { all of the thinkers considered here do so in a variety of ways. Both what may be common to soul varies, as does what it means to be common to body and soul. The subjects which may be common are states, generally speaking, or more speci¯cally functions. The whole life of the embodied substance may be involved. In contrast, it is in fact remarkably ¤ Many thanks to Thomas Buchheim for his comments on an earlier version. 2 R. A. H. King di±cult to present mental activity in the absence of body { as becomes clear from the two papers which discuss such theories. Roman Dilcher's view of Parmenides on thinking presents a transcendent intellect, whereas Denis O'Brien's account discusses an early layer in Aristotle's thought displaying bodiless gods living beyond the world. One approach to the varieties of partnership between body and soul envisaged by di®erent theorists is through styles of explanation. From a modern perspective, causal interaction is the most obvious way in which things may be common to body and soul { here represented in antiquity by materialist theories of the soul. They di®er from modern versions in that both aspects of the interaction only occur in the interacting whole. Body and soul are not considered as separable substances, but as aspects of a whole. Hellenistic philosophers are important representatives of this line of thought, as shown by Christof Rapp and Christopher Gill. Weaker ver- sions of body soul partnership include co-variation as in Edward Hussey's presentation of Parmenides. A second group of theories insists on teleological explanation for living things. Here, an important idea is that body is an instrument of the soul. Such a teleological relation is to be found in the theories of both Aristotle and Plato. In Plato, there are those things which can only be striven for by body-soul composites, such as the good life. Such striving only makes sense when there are active tendencies of the soul, which include bodily aspects, which can be ordered in the right way. For Aristotle the body is the organ of the soul, and so related to it as to a good or end. In both Plato and Aristotle, this insistence on teleology leaves room for much work interpreting what their positions actually imply for states and actions common to body and soul. In Parmenides either thought and perception are explained by the mixture of the body (Edward Hussey) or thought transcends body and so has nothing in common with it (Roman Dilcher). The ¯rst option cor- responds to the view that Presocratics subscribe to a naijve materialism, which holds that all there is, is in some way material; this is also the view of Love and Soul to be found in Empedocles (Denis O'Brien). For Plato the function of soul is to organise body, and corporeal life, in accordance with the idea of the good; and so it is neither form nor body (Thomas Buchheim). This is the purpose of his division of the soul into three active tendencies. Galen adopts this theory, but quite reasonably concludes that empirical investigation cannot establish if the soul is body or immaterial, although it can discover the soul's locations and the material transmission of its powers (R. J. Hankinson). Introduction 3 Aristotle uses the rubric \common to body and soul" to describe a particular department of his psychology, but quite how this department is to be distinguished is not clear. Indeed he considers the option that all a®ections of the soul fall under it, using emotion as an example for something inseparably both psychic and corporeal (Christof Rapp). One option for distinguishing things common to body and soul from other psychic phenomena, is that in particular the physiological aspects come to the fore { the functional organisation of body, whose changes perform psychic activities (Pierre-Marie Morel). Or else while excluding merely thought, the concentration is on the concrete activities which distinguish the kinds of living things (Thomas Johansen). These subtleties are re- flected in the range of stances adopted by Aristotle's successors, which range from hylomorphism to materialism (Robert Sharples). Both Stoics and Epicureans lay great weight on the fact that if soul and body are to interact causally, then the former must be a body as well. But this principle leaves a variety of ways open for the co-a®ectability of body and soul to be understood (Christof Rapp). In this way vital activities are performed by matter only when contained in the whole living thing. In both cases this kind of explanation naturalises the soul, putting it in the context both of human life as we are familiar with it, and of the cosmos as a whole (Christopher Gill). The phrase \common to body and soul"1 refers to a central group of problems in ancient philosophical psychology, including not merely inter- action between soul and body, but parallelism and teleological or func- tional relations. Furthermore it marks the point where philosophy and more empirically minded approaches meet, including both those of Aris- totle in Parva Naturalia and of medical writers.