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sallux ECPM FOUNDATION WHAT FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE: ONE SIZE FITS ALL? Angelo Delsen & Christiaan Meinen A reflection on the European Commission’s plans and a proposal for an alternative approach sallux 2 ECPM FOUNDATION TOWARDS A RELATIONAL EUROPE In June 2017 the European Commission (EC) launched its ‘Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence’. It sketches a European security context characterized by military, economic and energy related threats to our east, next to vulnerable and ungoverned spaces of conflict to our south. This article is an initial response to the findings of the reflection paper and the wider federalist plans we see often these days. The European Union (EU) currently has a principle in place which is called: subsidiar- ity1. All measures, agreements and working plans should be seen from this perspective. In this light Defence matters fall under the ultimate political authority of the sovereign state(s). Only states can have a standing army, so the issue of all European Defence matters immediately touch the very nature of EU member states and the EU itself. lems the EU states have to deal with (2017). First of all, the European states have according to the EC neglected their defence budgets. On the contrary, the EC sees that competing pow- ers have increased their military spending’s. Secondly, many of the threats faced by Europe do not respect national borders, as greater con- nectivity is blurring the boundaries between internal and external security. To further ex- plain the claim that European military spend- ing is neglected, the EC writes that European capabilities lag behind others, while there are differences in member states’ contributions in European defence. According to the EC there is also the problem that because defence markets are highly fragmented there is a lack of inter- “A common de-nationalised army would, and could, operability between European military systems no longer owe obedience to a national authority, ei- and the money is spend inefficient. In a con- ther as a whole nor in respect of the units of which nected world European member states are too it is composed. It would have sworn loyalty to the small to deliver hard power on their own (EC, Community. The Community alone would have 2017). Where continental-sized powers, like the power over it. If any of its units were to follow the US, Russia or China, are better equipped than orders of a national Government, they would be re- medium sized states. In contrast to this, the EC garded as deserters or rebels. If, therefore, such an also identifies certain strengths. The EU uses an army is set up, the only valid orders will have to approach with a blend of soft and hard pow- come from an authority recognised by all the par- er. It uses security and defence instruments ticipating States”. Robert Schuman (19512) alongside diplomacy, sanctions, development cooperation and trade aimed at preventing REFLECTION PAPER ON THE FUTURE OF conflict (2017). Where soft power alone may not EUROPEAN DEFENCE be enough, the EU’s integrated approach lies The EC identifies two important security prob- at the heart of sustainable security. To counter sallux TOWARDS A RELATIONAL EUROPE ECPM FOUNDATION 3 the problems European states face, concerning able to protect its key strategic activities from exter- their security, the EC describes three different nal takeovers.’’ ‘European Defence Scenario’s’: the Security and Defence Cooperation scenario, the Shared Se- EU SINGLE DEFENCE MARKET curity and Defence scenario and the Common One of the most comprehensive policies pro- Defence and Security scenario. posed by the paper is the creation of a single The Security and Defence Cooperation scenar- EU defence market. The EC claims without io is the least integrated scenario, where the adequate substantiation3 that at least 30 billion Common Defence and security scenario is the euros are spent inefficiently because there is a most integrated scenario of the three. If we take lack of interoperability. The EC believes that this into account, the used arguments in the paper is caused due to the fragmentation of the EU it is clear that the EC has a preference for the defence market. Common Defence and Security scenario. The We believe that a single market could only be Security and Defence Cooperation scenario has effective if there will be a level playing field -be according to the reflection some advantages in tween producers. The problem here is that all comparison to the present-day situation, but states have shown to secure their national (often mainly disadvantages. The Shared Security and industrial and thus domestic political) interest Defence scenario is a mix of both positive and before the ‘European’ interest. The strongest negative arguments according to the reflec- European states all have highly protected Mil- tion paper, where the Common Defence and itary Industrial Complexes4 (MICs) and are not Security scenario is presented as a solution for willing to buy ‘foreign’ platforms. Even states all shortcomings of present European defence like France and Germany, who seem to be pro- policies. It is therefore that we will mainly focus found advocates of EU military integration5, are on the policies proposed in the more ambitious in practice protecting their own industrial-, for- Common Security and Defence scenario: eign affairs- and security interests6. ‘’This most ambitious scenario foresees the progres- sive framing of a common Union defence policy, ECONOMIES OF SCALE leading to common defence based on Article 42 of To strengthen the strategy of creating a com- the EU Treaty which allows a group of like-mind- mon European defence market the EC resorts to ed Member States to take European defence to the the argument for ‘economies of scale’. We agree next level. Under this scenario, EU countries would with the EU that economies of scale could have undertake greater commitments to each other’s se- a significant impact on the price of military sys- curity, making Europe’s protection a shared respon- tems. It would therefore be most economical if sibility of the EU and NATO. The EU would be able all European militaries would use the same sys- to run high-end security and defence operations, tems. Only when Europe as a whole decides to underpinned by a certain level of integration of use the same military hardware we could speak Member States’ defence forces. The EU would sup- about ‘economies of scale’. What is important to port joint defence programmes with the European realize is that this approach does not leave room Defence Fund, as well as set up a dedicated Europe- for differences between European users. To keep an Defence Research Agency. This would also foster in line with the ECs findings about interopera- the creation of a genuine European defence market, bility, standardized platforms should be kept up- sallux 4 ECPM FOUNDATION TOWARDS A RELATIONAL EUROPE to-date and on the same level throughout the answers to these assumptions and report on it. EU. This is mainly because different variants7 of The question we should ask ourselves which the same product will lead to different support interests are more important: the interests of lines and logistics. big MIC (and their shareholders) or the reason of existence of armed forces in the first place: LOSS OF SOVEREIGNTY defending the (sovereign countries on the) Eu- A single European market and procurement ropean continent and its people?9 would mean that each state will need to buy the same systems. Which means that each state OPERATIONAL RISKS should be aware that, besides acquisition, they Besides the mentioned economic and sovereign- also should commit to collective costly up- ty risks we see a more practical risk the EU mem- grades. This should in itself not be a problem ber states should consider: operational risks. – but we believe that this only can be performed Where the EC sees diversity as a negative issue if it will be forced to all member states by a new we see it as a principle which works in practice. supranational authority8. This authority will then Each hardware system normally has advantages decide what platforms to equip the Europe- and disadvantages. Non-is completely the same an forces with and how, and when to upgrade or equal. Creating a one-size-fits-all approach them. In our opinion this could be problematic creates limitations in options and capabilities. An for the EC plans, as states are normally reluctant example of limiting the numbers in the “Euro- to give away their key political decision powers. pean Defence” toolbox is when aircraft are tem- States will only decide to do this, when it will porarily taken out of service because there are a benefit their own MIC. The Common Defence number of consecutive crashes10 11. A situation and Security scenario as stated by the EC study like this would leave Europe extremely vulnerable could be viable only if states decide on acquiring to irregularities, a luxury the proposed EU de- the cheapest (acquisition plus operation) and fence policy does not have. also the best available technical solutions. This can only be done by means of a neutral evalu- SMALL TO MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES ation of alternatives, within a real level playing AND SMALL STATES field. We see both in the USA and EU member Maybe the biggest problem we see with the EC states that this isn’t happening now, and it isn’t plans12 are the consequences for smaller Euro- very likely to happen in the (near) future. It’s this pean producers. These often highly advanced lack of neutral evaluation and ‘protectionism’ of and skilled ‘Small to Medium Sized Enterprises’ mainly the larger industrials which in our opin- (SMEs) lack the marketing and global reach of ion leads to the 30 Billion spending inefficien- big European companies but often deliver ad- cies as mentioned by the EC.

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