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A Report on Post Election Violence ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM A Report on Post Election Violence A report compiled by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisations Forum 7 August 2000 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum: A Report on Post Election Violence The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (also known as the “Human Rights Forum”) has been in existence since January 1998. Nine non-governmental organisations working in the field of human rights came together to provide legal and psycho-social assistance to the victims of the Food Riots of January 1998. The Human Rights Forum has now expanded its objectives to assist victims of organised violence, using the following definition: “organised violence” means the interhuman infliction of significant avoidable pain and suffering by an organised group according to a declared or implied strategy and/or system of ideas and attitudes. It comprises any violent action which is unacceptable by general human standards, and relates to the victimsʼ mental and physical wellbeing. The Human Rights Forum operates a Legal Unit and a Research and Documentation Unit. Member organisations of the Human Forum are: The Amani Trust The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace The Legal Resources Foundation Transparency International (Zimbabwe) The University of Zimbabwe Legal Aid Clinic Zimbabwe Association for Crime Prevention and the Rehabilitation of the Offender Zimbabwe Human Rights Association Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association The Human Rights Forum can be contacted through any member organisation or the following personnel: The Chairperson, c/o P O Box 5465, Harare – cell phone #091 233 712 The Co-ordinator, c/o P O Box CY 1393, Causeway – cell phone # 091 337 699 The Project Lawyer, c/o P O Box 5465, Harare – cell phone #091 238 070 Email: [email protected] Website: www.hrforumzim.com All earlier reports can be found on the website. 2 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum: A Report on Post Election Violence There was widespread violence in the pre-election period. Most of this violence was directed at candidates and supporters of political parties in opposition to Zanu (PF), and against commercial farmers and workers on commercial farms. Regrettably violence against these persons has continued after the parliamentary elections on 24-25 June. In the cities and towns the army has been harassing and assaulting people in high density areas. There continue to be violent attacks and death threats against members and supporters of the MDC. People are still fleeing some rural areas to escape the violence. Commercial farmers and their workers continue to be attacked and threatened. This report documents the post-election violence that has taken place. Part 1 Violence by army and police personnel against civilians in towns Immediately following the announcement of the results of the general election, army personnel were deployed with police details. There had been a few incidents of post-election violence in the cities and towns, and the reason given for the deployment of the police and army was to prevent further outbreaks of such violence. However, as time went on there were numerous reports of people being beaten up who were not engaging in any acts of violence. This has led to a perception that the heavy-handed tactics being employed by army personnel are aimed more to do with punishing people in the towns for having voted for the MDC than they have to do with the maintenance of law and order. Even The Herald which would have been expected to have supported this clampdown, has strongly criticised the way in which these operations are being carried out. Additionally in its editorial comment on 24 July, it correctly points out that soldiers are not trained to use minimum force, and soldiers therefore make bad policemen. It also points out that it has generally been peaceful in all residential areas apart from a handful of incidents in the first day or two after the election results were announced, although it says that the strong patrols by the police and army helped to achieve this result. It suggests that army personnel should no longer be used for patrolling, but should simply be held in reserve to be called in by the police if necessary. The last time the army was deployed in support of the police was during the food riots that occurred in January 1998. In the quelling of these riots and in the aftermath of the riots there were numerous incidents in which the army used excessive and sometimes fatal force. This is documented in the Human Rights Forum entitled A Consolidated Report on the Foods Riots 19 – 29 January 1998. The Human Rights Forum has assisted a number of the victims and their relatives to bring legal actions against the responsible authorities. Some of the claimants have received compensation as a result of these actions, and a number of the cases are still pending. The excesses of army personnel during these operations are documented in various newspaper reports. The most important articles are reproduced below. Police arrest 12 for post-election violence — Daily News 30 July Police announced yesterday they had arrested 12 people for post-election violence in Harare and Kwekwe on Wednesday. They accused political parties they did not name of refusing to accept the outcome of last weekend’s election, despite public pronouncements suggesting they had done so. Wayne Bvudzijena, the police spokesman, said the leaders of political parties would be held accountable for the actions of their members. He could not say the action that would be taken against the political leaders. Five people were arrested in Kwekwe after a car, believed to been used in the Zanu (PF) election campaign was burnt. Bvudzijena said he understood the car was used in the election campaign of the 3 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum: A Report on Post Election Violence Zanu (PF) candidate for Kwekwe Central. Bvudzijena could neither confirm or deny the car belonged to Mnangagwa, who lost to Blessing Chebundo of the MDC. Bvudzijena said the police had tightened security in Kwekwe, Harare and Chitungwiza following post-election disturbances. He said the police had information people wanted to provoke the police. He would not give details but warned that such people would be dealt with ruthlessly. He said a number of parties had not genuinely accepted the outcome of last week’s election. “We are aware that certain people, while they may be preaching the acceptance of the outcome of the election are, by their actions, acting otherwise and fomenting violence,” he said. He said the police were appealing to the political leaders to warn their members against violence. He also accused some political commentators of fanning violence through their comments in the media. Bvudzijena said members of political parties should heed the warning by Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, last Tuesday, that violence would not be tolerated. However, the police have not acted on crimes by war veterans on invaded commercial farms. Police insist farmers were not reporting the crimes. Army units will not be withdrawn from ‘flashpoints’ — The Herald 13 June Police will not withdraw army units from identified “flashpoints” in Harare despite widespread condemnation of perceived strong-arm tactics by the troops. There has been a public outcry over alleged high-handedness by the army units deployed in most high-density suburbs, especially Mabvuku, Mbare, Budiriro, Glen Noral, Dzivarasekwa and Chitungwiza. Several people have reported receiving severe beatings from the joint army and police units patrolling high density areas. There are many reports of troops ordering the closure of beerhalls and nighclubs. Police spokesman Chief Superintendent Wayne Bvudzijena said the joint operation would remain for as long as it was necessary. In a statement later Chief Superintendent Wayne Bvudzijena said that the public’s claims of army brutality had not been substantiated. He also called on people who claimed to have been beaten by patrols to report to the police and not the army since the police were in total command of the operation. Chief Superintendent Wayne Bvudzijena said that as far as he knew the officers deployed to the suburbs were under instructions not to harass anyone but to suppress lawlessness. Soldiers have been accused of imposing “marshal law” over wide swathes of Harare and other parts of the country, beating up revellers at beerhalls and people found in groups. Chief Superintendent Wayne Bvudzijena said that the police were sure that the calling off of the operation would result in a resurgence of post-election political violence. About 30 people were arrested in the three days immediately after the elections after sporadic incidents in several suburbs. A tour around the Harare suburbs of Mbare, Glen Norah and Budiriro revealed that the reports of the army’s activities had residents living in fear. “We were seated having our drinks and listening to the juke box when they stormed in and demanded that we all stand up and show them respect,” said one man who witnessed a raid on Friday night. “When we did as they had asked they picked out two people and said that they wanted to show us what they could do to misguided people. They began beating the two up with rifle butts of their rifles. It was very, very, very sad.” In Glen Norah beer drinkers start streaming out of nightclubs or beerhalls just after dusk for fear of stumbling into the patrols. Last week, soldiers chased revellers out of some nightspots. This happened on Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday at around 8 pm. Afternoon raids have also become common. The national human rights watchdog, ZimRights, has condemned the attacks, with its chairman saying “political violence should not be substituted with army or police violence.” Army, police unleash new wave of terror — Daily News 3 July 2000 The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) have allegedly teamed up to unleash a post-election terror campaign that has left several people injured in some suburbs of Harare.
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