Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 7, Issue 12 December 2016 THIS MONTH: RED DIAMOND “BEST OF 2016” ISSUE! INSIDE THIS ISSUE by TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration Pathankot Attack .................. 2 Sustainable Readiness ........ 6 TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Skylark UAV ........................ 13 Integration (ACE-TI) produces Russian Criminals .............. 17 the Red Diamond monthly Antilanding Operations ...... 21 newsletter as one of several Hizballah .............................. 26 operational environment (OE), Russian EW ......................... 30 threat, and opposing force UK Use of DATE .................. 32 (OPFOR) resources for US Army Al Shabaab Hotel Targets .. 35 training, professional education, and leader development. This Militias in Ukraine, Pt 2 ...... 41 December issue is a selection of Modeling Threats ................ 50 articles published during 2016 Pakistan TTR ....................... 55 that showcase current, real- DJI-Phantom ....................... 60 world threats and how they can JRTC Rotation 16-09 .......... 64 be represented or replicated in Egypt and ISIL ..................... 70 Army learning venues across the range of live, virtual, constructive and gaming Defense of Kunduz ............. 77 (LVCG) simulations. Articles included in this issue range from real-world threats Threat 2025+ ........................ 80 (Egypt and ISIL) to doctrinal OPFOR (Modeling Threats), from tactics (Defense of ACE-TI POCs ....................... 85 Kunduz) to equipment (Skylark UAV), and from concept (Sustainable Readiness) to application (JRTC Rotation 16-09). OEE Red Diamond published by TRADOC G-2 OEE To be added to the Red Diamond e-distribution list, contact: ACE Threats Integration Mrs. Nicole Bier (DAC) Send suggestions to: TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration ATTN: Red Diamond [email protected] Jon H. Moilanen (DAC), Operations, G-2 ACE-TI Red Diamond Disclaimer and Laura Deatrick (CGI CTR), The Red Diamond newsletter presents professional information but the views expressed Editor, G-2 ACE-TI herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they reference. The Red Diamond staff reserves the right to edit material. Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the US Army for information contained therein. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED by H. David Pendleton, TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (CGI Ctr) TRADOC G-2 ACE-Threats Integration will soon release its latest Threat Action Report (TAR) on the 2 January 2016 Jaish- e-Mohammed (JeM) attack on the Pathankot Airbase in northwest India. This TAR validates the ability of a small unit to tie up a much larger number of personnel for several days, even after the elimination of all of the militants. The TAR also shows sophisticated threat actor planning, which included two cells initiating their mission despite the lack of direct communication between the groups. Lastly, the TAR demonstrates the likelihood that JeM made a concurrent assault in a different country hundreds of miles away, indicating a high level of coordination between the various action elements within their organization. In the early morning hours of 2 January 2016, four JeM members penetrated the perimeter of the Pathankot Airbase in Punjab state in northwestern India. Their intent was to divert the attention of base security personnel so another team of two militants could approach the runway in an attempt to destroy any fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft located on the tarmac. This pair of militants had been hiding out on the airbase for almost 48 hours, waiting to commence its mission. Due to the four- man team leaving behind its walkie-talkie, which caused a lack of direct communication during the mission that prevented better coordination between the two cells, the two-man team initiated its mission at a pre- planned time. Four-Man Team The loss of the walkie-talkie was not the first snag in the militants’ plans. On Wednesday, 30 December 2015, a JeM handler dropped the four attackers off at the Pakistani border near the Indian village of Bamiyal, Pathankot district, Punjab state. The team infiltrated over the border on the night of 31 December 2015 at almost the exact same location that another militant team had used in order to conduct an attack on a Pathankot police station the previous July. The team had arranged for a taxi to meet it, and used its own GPS device to take the back roads to the intended destination. The cabbie became suspicious, however, of his passengers’ possible nefarious intentions and purposely crashed his taxi into a tree, making the vehicle inoperable for future travel. For his efforts to thwart the attack, the militants executed their driver in a field adjacent to the crash site. Without transportation, the four militants flagged down and, using the small-arms weapons they carried, carjacked a vehicle containing three men returning home from a party. The carjackers, after initially blindfolding and securing the vehicle’s occupants, released two of the three men and kept one man as a hostage until he later escaped. The four-man cell then continued on toward its target. Unluckily for the militants, one of the released men, Salwinder Singh, was actually an unarmed Gurdaspur district police superintendent in civilian clothes. When the carjackers realized there was an inoperable blue police beacon mounted on their stolen vehicle, they returned to where they had released the two men but could not find them. The militants, however, decided to proceed with their mission despite the possible compromise. The superintendent and his friend walked over an hour to reach the closest police station, where Singh called his supervisor. Due to his subordinate’s spotty performance record, the supervisor refused to believe that the carjacking was Red Diamond Page 2 December 2016 terrorist-related. This conclusion came in spite of previous Indian security bulletins to the police in the border states warning them to be on the lookout for up to 15 militants that may have crossed into India from Pakistan. Singh’s supervisor just told him to go to work like normal. Even when Singh’s vehicle was found less than one-half mile from the Pathankot Airbase, the Indian security agencies failed to connect the carjacking with a potential terrorist act until just before the attack began. Due to previous intelligence received indicating a possible militant attack along the border, the Indian military directed that all mission-capable aircraft be flown out of Pathankot Airbase by midnight on 1 January 2016. The Indian government also dispatched 50 National Security Guard (NSG) commandos from New Delhi to Pathankot district to look for the suspected militants. Over the next couple of days, the number of “Black Cats”—the nickname for the NSG commandos— increased steadily in the Pathankot area. The exact target of the militants on the first day of the New Year was still unknown, but this would become apparent less than 24 hours later. After midnight on 1 January 2016, one member of the four-man team climbed a eucalyptus tree to reach the top of the Pathankot Airbase perimeter wall and cut the barbed wire on top. The team then used a nylon rope to help the others scale the wall. After crossing the wall, the team made three phone calls—two to its handlers and one personal call to an attacker’s mother—to let her know that he was on a suicide mission. While there was no closed-circuit television on the base, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a camera observed the intruders crossing the fence. An Indian Air Force Garud (commando) Quick Reaction Team (QRT) quickly intercepted the militants and a firefight broke out, during which one of the QRT members was wounded. With its mission compromised, the four-man militant cell fled east in the direction of the runway, passing a couple of buildings on the way. Figure 1. Pathankot attack, April 2016 Red Diamond Page 3 December 2016 Figure 2. Action sequence of Pathankot attack, April 2016 The four-man militant team entered one of these buildings, which served as a Defense Security Corps (DSC) dining facility, where the cooks were just beginning to prepare breakfast. One of the DSC jawans (lower-ranking enlisted soldiers) thought something was amiss when a group of men wearing army fatigues suddenly appeared, and the jawan confronted the group. The militants attempted to escape, but the jawan chased down one of the intruders, took the intruder’s weapon away from him, and killed the militant. The three remaining intruders then shot and killed the jawan. The other cooks, however, were able to call security, who arrived quickly. The security personnel cornered the three remaining militants and killed them. Two-Man Team The team of two militants, despite having no communication with the four-man group, set out to destroy any non- operational aircraft still located on the tarmac and attempted to stealthily make its way to the runway. Due to the arrival of a large number of security personnel involved in eliminating the other four-man cell, the militants could never get closer than 700 meters from the runway. Eventually the two remaining attackers took refuge for over 12 hours in an unoccupied barracks, sleeping and eating, while they contemplated their next move. Due to the belief that only four militants had penetrated the airbase perimeter, the Indian security personnel thought all the attackers were dead; government officials even announced publically that the attack on Pathankot Airbase was over. To be on the safe side, security personnel systematically began to clear the other buildings on post, beginning with the most vital facilities. After hiding all day, the two remaining militants decided to ambush some security personnel as they walked by the barracks on Saturday night, 2 January 2016.