CEU eTD Collection METHODS In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in ANTI-REVOLUTION OF Department of Political Science Political of Department Central European University European Central THE Supervisor: AntonPelinka Supervisor: Mikheil Kechaqmadze Budapest, Hungary Political Science Political Submitted to Submitted POST-SOVIET 2007 By STRATEGY REGIMES AND CEU eTD Collection democratic values further intodemocratic valuesfurtherpost-Soviet the region. see of if expansion the to want they measures, of these existence becomethe awareof should be used in as future the well. The main messageconveyed is- the democracy forces promotion electoral in revolutions post-Sovietthe region for the last years- These 2005-2007. measures will in preventing part a significant played measures anti-revolutionary that is adopted conclusion The explored andcategorized. Their useduring elections the inAzerbaijan andBelarusareexamined. are tools anti-revolutionary and‘hard’ power of ‘Soft’ forms andcharacteristics The nature, in Kazakhstan, of Russia Belarus, framework Azerbaijan, time 2003-2006. the and Uzbekistan strategy methods designedand andimplemented by regimesthe offivecountries- post-Soviet anti-revolutionary Ianalyze measures. and strategy anti-revolutionary specific implement design regimes for promptingto them and post-Soviet the actedas“‘wake-up call’ revolutions electoral is that my departure The pointargument of revolution. - electoral to their authority haveIn this Iexploretothenew thesis regimes post-Soviet responded howthe type of challenge ABSTRACT i CEU eTD Collection experience. sharing their time, turning process the of writing the a intothesis memorable and enjoyable I also extendmy mygratitude to friends and colleagues atCEUfor givingme and support andadvice. comments valuable for their Thomas Rooney process of writing the thesis.I would like to thankmyI supervisor forthoughtfully alsome guiding throughout challengingthe owe much gratitude to VitaliI First,want tothankmy family forby standing me andand offering their support encouragement. Silitski, Lincoln Mitchell support people. impossible of the wouldseveral without been The completion thesis have this of and ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii CEU eTD Collection BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 75 CONCLUSION...... 71 HPE ...... 38 CHAPTER 3 ...... 20 CHAPTER 2 ...... 6 CHAPTER 1 ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... ii ABSTRACT...... i CONTENTS OF TABLE ..Aebia 05...... 52 3.5. Azerbaijan 2005 3.4. Russia...... 49 3.3. Kazakhstan...... 46 3.2. Uzbekistan...... 45 3. 1. Post-Soviet Regimes’ Response toElectoral Revolutions- Anti-Revolutionary Measures 2.3. Mechanisms of ...... 31 Electoral Revolution 2.2. Causes of Electoral Revolution...... 25 2.1. Electoral Revolution...... 20 1.2. The Typology of the Regimes in Azerbaijan,Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia 1. Types of ...... 6 Political Regimes 3.6. Belarus ...... 61 Elections 2006 ...... 38 ...... 15 3.5.4. The Developments The Post-Election 3.5.4. Independent 3.5.3.Election MonitoringOrganizations 3.5.2. YouthOrganizations 3.5.1. PoliticalOpposition 3.6.3. The Developments The Post-Election 3.6.3. 3.6.2. CivilSociety 3.6.1. ThePolitical Opposition ...... 65 ...... 54 ...... 56 ...... 63 ...... 60 ...... 69 iii ...... 59 CEU eTD Collection Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. Over?,”; Chavusaw, “Revolution and anti-revolution in the post-Soviet space,”;Wilson, 6 5 12, (2005).no.1 Allen and Carl Gershman, “The Assault on Democracy Assistance,” on Democracy Assault “The Gershman, Carl and Allen 4 db.stanford.edu/pubs/21152/Silitski_No_66.pdf. Authoritarianism in Formerthe Soviet(the Union Case of Belarus),” CDDRL Working Papers (2006), http://iis- 3 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2005-11-25-chavusaw-en.html. Chavusaw,“Revolution andanti-revolutionin post-Sovietthe space,” http://ukraineanalysis.wordpress.com/2007/03/09/after-the-orange-revolution-an-article-by-andrew-wilson/Contemporary ;YuriUkrainian Studies University of Cambridge, UK, in (23February 2007), Lecture Stasiuk Annual 5th Russia,” and Ukraine in Democracy of Post-Soviet Nature The Revolution: Orange Ivan Krastev, “Democracy’s “Doubles,” ofBelarus,” Case The Democracy: “Preempting Silitski, 2 the post-Soviet regimes to the sweeping wave of electoral revolutions which in less than fiveless electoral sweeping whichin than regimes wave of tothe post-Sovietrevolutions the can asaprotective of conceived response strategy Emergence of regimes’ anti-revolutionary the measures. diverse anti-revolutionary and innovative implementing and developing of in terms leaders the representing Kazakhstan and measures hasbeen observedinmost of post-Sovietthe countries- among them Russia, Belarus focus onpreventingsharp anti-revolutionary of Existence revolution. an occurrence electoral Growing number of scholars 1 “ learning“ authoritarian measures electoral Such havebeen revolution. referred as”preemptive authoritarianism” phenomenon- political a new against directed measures implementing and strategy a specific INTRODUCTION Silitski, “Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus,”; Silitski, “Is the Age of Post-Soviet Electoral Revolutions Andrew Wilson, Larry Diamond, “Authoritarian learning: lessons From the Colored Revolutions,” Silitki, “Is the Age of Post-Soviet Electoral Revolutions Over?,”; Vitali Silitski, “Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Vitali Silitski, “Is the Age of Post-Soviet Electoral Revolutions Over?,” Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World 4 and represent a combination of “ hard” and “soft” power tools 2 observe that the post-Soviet regimes are in the process of forming of in process the are regimes post-Soviet the that observe Journal of Democracy 6 Though it post-Soviet authoritarians time to the recognize threatposed by electoral revolutions, they finally have and are fully prepared fully are and have finally they revolutions, electoral by Journal of Democracy 1 17, No. 2(2006): 36–50; Andrew Wilson, “After the Journal of Democracy Foreign Affairs Eurozine Democracy at Large at Democracy (2006), 16, no. 4 (2005): 83-97; (Yale University Press, 2005). Brown Journal of World Affairs 85, 2 no. (2006): 55–68; Vitali Virtual Politics: Faking 17, no. 2(2006): 36–50; to pre-empt the next one next the pre-empt to 1 (2005),8–10. ( Vitali Silitski) Michael 5 with a 3 and 1 CEU eTD Collection http://www.rferl.org. 10 Communism Herd, “Colorful Revolutions and CIS:the ‘Manufactured’ Versus ‘Managed” Democracy?,’P 9 8 Postcommunist World,” 7 evident question, which can be posed,is “why not?” (Kyrgyzstan March 2005)in andelectoral period yearsthe of expectations, post-Soviet sincethelastthree revolution- - no electoral revolution inevitable, andnearly that”. already everyone understands has taken place.state many in are signsRussiarevolution suggestingthat“there (Motherland Party) is to that With this regard,seemed absent which provokedthe the Member of Russia’smost Parliament Mikhail Delyagin Even immunity of most powerfulthe country- Russia-against“orange post-Soviet virus percent ready, andin itis Kazakhstan 30 percentready”. think the ‘Orange inRevolution’ Moldova is 80 about percent ready; in Kyrgyzstan itis 40 county whichpost-Soviethadcalculated chanceof ahigher ‘hosting’revolution, electoral international backing for change.Sergei Markov, aleading Russian analyst,even political determined of opposition, groups withpopulation discontented regimes’the performance and be looked realistic. seemed There revolution’ for all to and enthusiastic preconditions this: next‘color of and aprobability Azerbaijan inKazakhstan, Belarus, upcoming elections enemy,ferocious be andshould combated atany which defeated with means. In2004-2006, most the to theira mortal authority, as threat revolutions electoral perceived The regimes Akaev- hasbeen and as referred wave“the fourth of democratization” years down broughta number leaders- of post-Communistthe Milosevic, Kuchma, Shevardnadze, Andrei Vladimirov, “ Revoliutsiia na eksport (Revolution for Export)” for (Revolution eksport na “ Revoliutsiia Vladimirov, Andrei Sergei Markov quoted in Charu Singh, “A Quiet Cold War,” inthe Transitions Noncooperative Dictatorship- and of Democracy Wave Fourth “The McFaul, Michael RFE/RL Newsline, “Party’s Chief Ideology ofWarns “Inevitable” Russian Revolution,” June 14, 2005, 52, 2 no. (2005): 3-18 World Politics . 54, no. 2(2002): 212–244. 2 Frontline 8 22, no. 03 (2005). 10 Itogi, Yet, despite all all calculations despite these Yet, December7, 2004, quoted in Graeme 7 roblems of Post- ” ” 9 I CEU eTD Collection and Uzbekistan- of and period the of Uzbekistan- of 2003-2006. I specifically focus on parliamentary the in elections Kazakhstan, Russia countries-five from I use Azerbaijan, Belarus, empirical the data post-Soviet regimes. measures of post-Soviet the anti-revolutionary of existence the regarding myhypothesis of correctness the on proof essential when they and have beenused? revolutionary What ofthepost-Sovietregimes? natureandforms?How measures aretheir major my in toprove I answerthree In this questions- argument order research successor. ‘hand-picked’ tothe ofpower transition insuresmooth to hopes regime for upcoming parliamentary and presidential in elections Russia 2007-2008in which Russianthe measures areactively being Anti-revolutionary fraudulentfor “tightening used elections. screws” of against the andregimes’suppressing theopposition’s electoral ‘victory’ protesting attempts in elections Azerbaijan measures2005. In these incountries these effective proved sealing the canbemethods elections during presidential inBelarus2006andparliamentary the observed these Theuseof mechanisms. power and of acombination ‘soft’ ‘hard’ ‘antidote’- revolutionary mechanisms of electoral revolutions andfinally came upwith productthe of labor-their anti- study causes used the resources servicesto the andof intelligence thinkand tanks the Ukrainian andKyrgyz colleagues. They employed ‘brightest the minds’ they had attheir disposal, Serbian,Georgian, their of experience ‘unfortunate’ the regimes studied, andanalyzed post-Soviet anti-revolutionary measures specific strategyandimplement revolutions actedas ‘wake-up call’forthepost-Soviet regimes,prompting them todesigna that argument an develop I revolution. electoral phenomenon- political emerging to My is answer an research attempt to by the post-Sovietregimes’question this response analyzing I consider answering that questions these thoroughly provides 3 . I maintain that the leaders of what are theanti- electoral CEU eTD Collection Soviet electoral revolutions. It analyzes the anti-revolutionary measures of measures Uzbekistan, anti-revolutionary analyzes the It revolutions. electoral Soviet post- the to response regimes’ post-Soviet the on elaborates three Chapter phenomena. different are usedinterchangeably revolution sometimes causes andmechanisms of which electoral though revolutions in Georgia 2003,Ukraine 2003, and Kyrgyzstandistinguishes 2005. It between the also studies the mechanisms andmethods used by revolutionary forces during electoral ‘closed authoritarian’ politicaldefines systems. Chapter two the causes of electoral revolution. It or Sovietregion authoritarian’ views post- the them as‘competitive and study either under regimes in typology of oneelaborates the on political Chapter andquestions. argument research The research is divided into introduction, threechapters and conclusion. Introduction sets main on topic.the of published works lack I am in and thesis covering that the processes of the fact of because of recentness the mostly and literature mainofficial The anddocumentation. source informationof isdata This Internet. is information I gathering andmainly data use the secondary academic legislativesources- acts, For Iresorttoqualitativemethods. of In thistype research descriptive/explanatory countries. of region’s the measures revolutionary Asian authoritarian anditsregime anti-revolutionary picture strategy a of provides anti-the good 2007-2006 and actively to anti-revolutionary resorts measures; 3) Uzbekistan is a typical Central 2) the Russia’s regimefor isgearing the up crucial parliamentary and presidential in elections in of elections period the wereactively in which theanti-revolutionary 2003-2006 measures used; held Kazakhstan Belarus, Azerbaijan, 1) reasons: three for Uzbekistan- and Russia Kazakhstan, Belarus, countries-Azerbaijan, post-Soviet five on with elaborating research I delimitthe measures. anti-revolutionary of factthe the of existence 2005andAzerbaijan presidential in elections inBelarus 2006 as electionsthese clearly portray 4 CEU eTD Collection developments in developments inpost-Soviet region future. the the shaping factor important be an will and region in the unfolding process political on the impact havehad of a day is they aconsiderable demand measures as the these already on anti-revolutionary strategy measuresand in post-Sovietthe region. Iconsider study that of In researchthis fill I strive to gapon academic considerable the which knowledge currently exists in on 2006. Conclusion elaborates researchthe findings. during the parliamentary elections in in Azerbaijan 2005 and presidentialthe elections in Belarus Kazakhstan andRussia.conducts It analysesthorough on useof the anti-revolutionary measures 5 CEU eTD Collection 16 no. 23(2000):103-122. 15 14 13 of Belarus, Moldova,Russia, and Ukraine”, Cases The Wave: Fourth the in Competitiveness Regime of Sources the and Building State “Authoritarian Way, A. World” Postcommunist the in Transitions Noncooperative Dictatorship- and of Democracy Wave Fourth “The McFaul Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research”, with “Democracy Levitsky, Steven and Collier David 2005); Governance, Democratic for Division SIDA, democracy” Reflections onan Emerging Trend, Democracy no. 2(2002):21-35; Andreas Schedler, “Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation”, 1999); Larry Diamond, “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Hybrid about Thinking Democracy: Without “Elections Diamond, Larry 1999); 12 “the gray zone” - vaguedefinitions develophas factledscholars sometimes diverse, to democratic This regimes. and authoritarian both of elements combine regimes post-Soviet the that showed Observations regimes. authoritarian as beconsidered they should or regimes democratic of category in the located be should regimes these whether exactly determine to inability an been has 11 regimes. of post-Soviet definition exact an elaborating haveformidable task- on laboring been the scientists forAlready adecadenumberof political the thesis-Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. regimes and offer the typology Ielaborate on hybrid regimes. the andauthoritarian of democratic characteristics the describe of the regimes of those post-SovietIn this I chapter review thedefinition of used in literature and political regimes academic countries which1. TypesofPolitical Regimes I discuss in 1 CHAPTER Wilson, Andreas Schedler, “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections,” of Democratization Game Nested “The Schedler, Andreas Paul Brooker, Paul Thomas Carothers, “The End of Transition Paradigm,” of Transition End “The Carothers, Thomas Larry Diamond, Cicero, ; Michael McFaul, “Transitions from Postcommunism ,” On Duties Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World 13, no. 2(2002): 36-50; Olle Törnquist, 16 Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics ; “competitive authoritarianism” ; “competitive Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 4. 13 ; “ disguised dictatorship”disguised in Supporting Political Party Systems – Experiences andChallenges with a definition, so that everyone understands what the subject of discussion is discussion of subject the what understands everyone sothat a definition, with World Politics Every piece of rational instruction upon any matterought to begin Repoliticisation of Democracy in Developing Countries: Journal of Democracy 6 57, no.2( 2005):231–261. 14 17; World Politics ;“electoral authoritarianism” ;“electoral Journal of Democracy , (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 12 “semi-authoritarianism” The major problem that scholars faced scholars that majorproblem The . International Political Science Review 49, no.3 (1997): 430-451; Michael, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002). 13, no. 1 (2002): 5-21. 16, no. 3(2005):5–19; Lucan Journal of Democracy 18 Journalof 15 ; “delegative (Stockholm ; “virtual (Cicero ) , 13, 11 : CEU eTD Collection Collapse. Sovietology, theDeath of Communism and the New Russia ( 22 21 no. 2(1999): 183–205. 20 insightful an cast and trap above-mentioned the avoid to enables regimes political post-Soviet of of an existence of democracy in such countries where they do notexist. An actor-based definition bemedia considered cannot asproof of democracy. an will Such approach be naïve recognition and regular elections mere of aparliament, existence that is truth It established the democracy. façade of a providing by wrongly ofthe nature regime thetrue ‘masking’ pitfall of into the By following actor oriented definition of political regimes, it is possible to avoid danger of falling by rules. set these limits set Actors environment. rulesthe of gameandthe the functionpolitical processes the within ‘behind-the-stage’ makingplacedecisions. Decision takes process innon-transparent, mechanisms and anda state of making/performing aresubjugatedtothe actors’interests decision- fundamental the arenot institutions regimes, Unlike democratic actors. implemented by andmeasures decisions aredeveloped and authoritarian strategies, regimes, and semi-authoritarian the for characteristic are which systems, such In bodies. implementing system, in The most optimal defineway post-Sovietto regimes the canbe viewing them as apolitical which political of regimes. types authoritarian and democratic actors, rule” “electocratic not institutions, represent the major decision making and 19 Endowment forInternational Peace, 2003). 18 (2002): 51-65. 17 democracy” Richard Sakwa, Fareed Zakaria Fareed William Case, “Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change,” Regime for Pressures the Withstanding Malaysia: in “Semi-Democracy Case, William Guillermo O'Donnell, “ Delegative Democracy,” “ Delegative O'Donnell, Guillermo Marina Ottaway, Authoritarianism,” of Competitive Rise “The A. Way, Lucan and Levitsky Steven 19 , “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs ; Russian Political Evolution: a Structural Approach, Democracy Challenged. TheRise ofSemi- Authoritarianism “semi-democracy” 23 ; “hybrid regimes” “hybrid ; 20; “illiberal democracy” “illiberal 24 - which attempt to merge the characteristics of both of characteristics the merge to which attempt - Journalof Democracy 7 London, NewLondon, York: Pinter, 1998), 181-201. 76, no 6 (1997): 22-43. in M. Cox (Ed.) 5, no.1 (1994): 55-69. 21 ; “authoritarian democracy” ; “authoritarian (Washington D.C Carnegie Journal of Democracy Rethinking the Soviet Pacific Affairs 13, no. 2 66, 22 ; CEU eTD Collection About Uncertain Democracies 27 26 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),18 25 24 Encyclopedia of Elections ( 23 game” political the of rules by well-defined the is characterized “regimethat statement Schmitter’s time informat. whichstay In O’ Donnel’s over resilient and characteristics, this and regard, Calvert’s definition underlines significance ofviewing the regimes as possessors of specific in governments which remainspower essentiallyin handsthe of samethe social group.” regimes Calvert’s definition of a regime“the nameusuallya government sequencegiven to or of methods,‘pick-up successor’ makesme into toincorporate definition the of post-Sovietthe group inpower region, post-Sovietthe is that manipulated and achievedthrough the elections sequence general withinthe of of same uninterrupted of transition political power pattern the state” the by of rulers the coordinated actors, military power and economic, ideological, of dominant alliance as“an political regimes refer to Hence,I of affairs. real state the view into differ cruciallyin the types two systems, which andauthoritarian democratic includes both term that umbrella on the isan regimes of political concept the Thus, leaders arechosen. national,how executive determine degree to which that andprocedures rules arethe political that” regimes InthisDahl states regard, procedure. the rules electoral and election system the to regime political of links characteristics the fact This regimes. allow forin contestation elections formingof of the nature regimesthe political shaping the and processes unfolding withinthe role crucial the with deals regime political the of aspect important additional and participation in Peter, Calvert ed., Calvert Peter, Michael Mann, Terry LynnKarl, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Diamond, 27 allows to consider the regimes as systems of autonomous institutional arrangements. An Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation The Sources of Social Power Electoralism: Why Elections Are Not Democracy, The Process of Political Succession Congressional Quarterly Books, 2000). (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 4. , vol. II, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions The Rise ofClasses and Nation States.1760-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1987), 18. 8 In Richard Rose, ed., The International 26 25 . Also . CEU eTD Collection 28 authoritarian as Linz defines regimes regimes. of political type each of definition offers aclear literature existing them. The between which makes democratic draw itnecessary authoritarian, a semi-authoritarian, linedistinctto regimes- of types several comprises region Soviet post- entity. The homogenous politically Existing nature of post-Sovietregimes callsfor avoiding considering the post-Sovietregion as public, competitive, andfreefair thedeepening and democracy process, of will elusive”. remain a through consistently occurs leaders national of selection acountry’s Until elections. fair and democracy. As Howard and Roessler argue “at the same time, democracy cannotbe less than free of a state evaluating in elections of factor the underestimating or overestimating avoiding electoralism” of “fallacy isitavoid aspects important fallinginto Inthis of crucial systems. to other regard, political the elections- there ishigh narrowing risk of thespaceof observations andnotice failing to some arrangements- political the of element important, though single, a on focusing by However, organization. of elections’ thepattern type with regime’s the connecting validly of continuously have fell shortof requirementsthe for competitivethe andfair proves elections, the of a government”. selection Ideologies and Party Systems 32 31 30 29 Journal of Political Science Howard and Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes”, of democracy”. attributes important Howard and Roessler, “ Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes”, 2-3. Regimes”, Authoritarian Competitive in Outcomes Electoral “ Liberalizing Roessler, and Howard Karl, Robert Dahl, Robert Juan J. Linz, J. Juan 3. Ibid., quite predictable ones predictable quite actually limits but ill-defined within formally poweror exercises group a small occasionally leader a which in and development, their in points some at except mobilization, political normentalities, intensive extensive without ideology,guiding distinctive butwith and pluralism, elaborate without not political responsible, limited, systemswith political Electoralism: Why Elections Are Not Democracy. An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition 50, no. 2(2006). (Helsinki: Westermarck Society,255. 1964), 29 . 32 by “focusing on the significance of elections at the expense of other of expense the at elections of significance the on “focusing by 28 The history of elections held under the post-Soviet regimes, that 30 Nevertheless, there is a need to keep afine in balance is there a need to Nevertheless, (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1971), in Marc Morje´ inMarc 1971), Press, University Haven:Yale (New 9 , in Erik Allard and Yrjo Littunen, ed., Cleavages, American 31 CEU eTD Collection Europe and Latin America, 38 37 Oklahoma Press, 1991). 36 Europe and Latin America 35 34 76. 33 of aspects with different regimes democratic liberal and democratic of electoral elements which merge the aspoliticalsystems regimes of canbe Hybrid nature such represented regimes. existingin acountry under study itcalls for viewing based on above-mentionedthe ambiguous in Thetask of atypecountry).political regime exactly differ of representation each defining (degrees of theelementsin ofandare represented regimes which democratic authoritarian As it has already been noted, most post-Soviet regimes fall within the category of hybrid regimes, elections" is “democracy is which democracy to aselectoral referred in asystem system, which parties lose democracy state. According toSchmitter and Karl democratic regimes can be referred a for meetnot requirements the do be asthey regimes could considered democratic, post-Soviet concerns the mobilization. canbe political However, extensive/intensive raised whether which mostly as considered totalitarian- because of a lack of ideology dominant and non-existent It is noteworthy that according to this definition none of the post-Soviet regimes could be formulation of democracy viewed in the works of Przeworski forcompetitive struggle thepeople’s vote”. arriving atpolitical in decisions which individuals acquire power the to decide by means of a Schumpeter addsa new requirementwhen he considers democracy to be “an instrumentused for Przeworski, Dahl, Samuel Huntington, Adam Przeworski, Joseph, Schumpeter, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry L. Karl, “What Democracy is ... and is not,” accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competitionthrough and cooperation of their elected representatives indirectly acting citizens, by realm public the in actions their for accountable as a modern political democracy.. a system of governance in which rules are held Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition. 38 Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern are among the principal of democracy definitions used in literature. the Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern The Third Wave: Democratization in the late 20th Century Capitalism, Socialism und Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 10. 34 10 These two definitions of democracy, plus the (New York: Harper& Brothers, 1947), 269. . 33 35 Journal of Democracy , Huntington (Norman, OK: University of 36 , andDahl 2,no.3(1991), 37 , in , CEU eTD Collection 40 39 to a chance the opposition victory deprive and secure their electoral means to unfair and coercive butwhich elections, fall of as short democratic standards, governmentparty the leadersand use held asregularly regimes of democratic characteristics such possess study under regimes post-Soviet The regimes. political of existing arrangements systemic particular the account regimes.Soviet Scholars usually offer amore focused specificdefinition, which intotakes The term hybriditself regime is and broad ambiguous and fails depicta to nature true of post- the and values/beliefs, which usually marks a full democracy. It is characterized as institutional arrangements with of a full set is characterized liberal democracy On hand, other the suffrage” multiparty arefilled executivechief offices regular, competitive, through with universal elections refers toelectoral democracy in Diamondfactor. version of elections representwhich the majordemocracy, democratic the is there ‘abridged’ distinction between an important Electoral them. democracy represents still fall electoral into category both liberal and regimes, the of Though democratic democracy fraudulentandviews, manipulated and electoral processes, institutions. weak democratic government’s the to opposition and expression free for right the exercising for opportunities restricted candidates, of the victory foropposition theelectoral limited chances authoritarianism- 41 Diamond. Diamond, “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regime,” 25. ibid., 10-11. applied fairly, consistently, and predictably across equivalent cases, irrespective of the of class, status, orpower of those subject to the irrespective rules. cases, equivalent across predictably and consistently, are fairly, rules legal applied which in law” of “rule a through only secured be can turn, in Freedom pluralism, and elections. periodic beyond representation, and articulation of processes ongoing group and freedoms, sothatcontending valuesinterests individual and may expressed be andcompete for through as well as pluralism civic and political for provisions extensive 40 Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation 40 as “…a civilian, constitutional system in which the legislative and legislative the inwhich system constitutional civilian, “…a as 11 , 8. 41 39 CEU eTD Collection Hybrid Regimes in the PostColdWar Era. 43 42 authorities use for promoting their political interests. As Levitski and Way argue, more the tools that than they are nothing arepresent, for countries democratic are characterized leaders Though arrested. in competitivethe authoritarian countries theinstitutions which usually get are harassed stolen. arebanned andsupporters andvotes In someparties cases,opposition media Their position inhindered, opposition the isregularly competition. access of to political unprivileged isthe authoritarianism competitive characterizes which dimension important An because of its particularity- as they unlike the entirely authoritarian regimes coined term the authoritarian- as competitive to arereferred regimes Such political succeed. challenge to the authorities. The response of the authorities to the challenge has been arapid been has challenge tothe authorities the of response The authorities. tothe challenge with dissatisfaction regime’s the manages and performance mobilization supporters’ the topose aserious through population’s the on capitalizing in succeeds opposition competition, political culminates in the overthrow of regime.the Evenfunctioning within limitedthe opportunities for time and buildsover which tensions, be to domestic tovulnerable tend Such regimes the fixed solution major the to problem leaders- the of which is tosecure their graspon power. the be a to prove not does regimes of the post-Soviet nature thesemi-authoritarian even However, Steven Levitsky and Lucan 3. A.Regimes,” Way. (2002) Authoritarian in Competitive Outcomes Electoral “Liberalizing Roessler, and Howard unfair a by handicapped highly uneven-and are sometimes dangerous-playing forces field. Competition is thus realbut opposition inthat authoritarian are they but power; for seriously contest to them use parties opposition façade: a merely not are institutions democratic that the regime cannot be labeled democratic. Such regimes are competitive, in that field andabuseofmediaresourcesskewtheplaying so state violations, civil liberties fraud, which in but power, gaining of means primary the as viewed widely are institutions democratic in formal which regimes civilian regimes are authoritarian competitive electoralnot process is completely the and rigged fraudulent either. fair,” and “free not certainly while words, other In power. in in those of result defeat could the that upset electoral an at chance a have does opposition the long, are odds generally allow for aminimal ofgenuine level meaning competition, that, although the . 43 Unpublished bookmanuscript, 5. Competitive Authoritarianism: The Emergence and Dynamics of 12 42 CEU eTD Collection 45 44 democracy.They headedtoward clearly nor neither dictatorial "are countries these that show democracy”. into are not transition in 'transitional' makers that“many persist calling thatpolicy andaidstates practitioners countries Carothers regimes. autonomous independent, as them regarding for call and regimes transitional democracy. This iswhy some scholarsargueagainst considering the post-Soviet regimes as of Sovietthe Union regimes donotshow signsthese thatthey have moved oraremoving towards collapse the yearsafter Fifteen democratization. against their resistance characteristic: particular The nature of the post-Soviet semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes display another interventions. external their opponents. If such collapse,regimes is this mostly resulted by a bloody uprising, coup or regimes aremore capable andinclined tosuppress populations’andthe eradicating discontent and existnot any aharsh gets regimecriticismthe towards Closed authoritarian response. electionsthe serve asstamping expendinglife-span free tools of a media government, the does developments. In closed authoritarian the regimes opposition isin either exileunderground, or and processes political with distinct nature political of different are regimes they characteristics, similar sharesome regimes authoritarian closed and authoritarian competitive Though state”. tothe critical and organizations associations autonomous competitive elections, dominantsevere restrictions state and ongovernment, individual steadily moving down pathofbecomingthe closed authoritarian, portray and an” existence of civil which and ispolitical not are closedregion; several of either are or authoritarian post-Soviet regimes the ‘authoritarization’ accountable rights, and throughabsence ofelections to citizens, lack of Robert Dahl, Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002) 9. 1 (2002) no. 13, of Democracy Journal Paradigm,” Transition of the End “The Carothers, Thomas Democracy and its critics (New Haven: Yale University Press,1989), 22. 45 But the facts and the dynamics of political developments political of dynamics the and facts the But 13 44 CEU eTD Collection Twenty Years?, ” Wave: Democratization in the late 20th Century Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes 50 49 Polyarchy”, (1989) 612-621; Dahl, 48 47 46 leading scholars likeBollen and Jackman, Dahl,Coppedge and Reinicke realm; a state into in post-Soviet the of and autocracy insightful democracy understanding provides an It one. most optimal beconsidered the can approach political regime agraded of complex systems and events typical to be withconducted useof the an which succeedsin an approach into entangledpenetrating web for thehave regimes region. Soviet post- of nature the on studies that Inshows complexity terms above-mentioned The of evaluating a typology of the entails”. free competition risks that political the to exposing themselves without of democracy appearance andmaintained maintaincarefully determined alternative systems… to the constructed zone". apolitical gray have entered mechanisms and principles that are either present (albeit imperfectly) or absent (albeit absent or imperfectly) (albeit present either are that principles and mechanisms by constitutive characterized wholes is,bounded aresystems, that systems is thatpolitical is “what continuism, approach missedby argue that, dichotomous completely or this degreeism, complexis toofor andthis- factremains this evidentdespite the fact thatproponents of a region the regimes- post-Soviet for workingwith the mosttool optimal the be considered cannot understanding democracy by and autocracy- supported Sartori, Geddes Huntington, Linz, Consequently, with approached rounded,ready-made numbers. adichotomous approach to matter of is“democracy degree” alwaysa Giovanni Sartori, Kenneth Bollen and Robert Jackman, “Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies,” Ottaway. ibid., 9. Bollen and Jackman, “Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies”, 618. 47 DemocracyChallenged. The Riseof Semi- Authoritariansim Studies in Comparative and International Development Annual Review of Political Science The Theory of Democracy Revisited Democracy of Theory The Democracy andIts Critics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.2000); Huntington, 46 Ottaway also support this position and argues that “they are . Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Democratization about Do WeKnow “What Geddes, Barbara . ; Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke, “A Scale of “A Scale Reinicke, Wolfgang and Coppedge ; Michael 49 2 (1999):115–44. isandita issue not of which can beconveniently (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House. 1987); Juan J. Linz, 14 25, no.1 (1990):51-72. , 7. American Sociological Review 48 have that claimed The Third 54 50 , CEU eTD Collection 51 authoritarian regimes. asconsolidated identified are regimes 7 points 6 to From regimes. authoritarian semi-consolidated of category the into fall 6 points above regimes From 5points. 5 to located are regimes Autocratic electoral democracies. between between 1and4.The regimes located regimes3 and areclustered 4generally represent most and Democratic democratic scale, regimes. represents 7least where 1 House Freedom democracy andscores regime types- hybrid fall regimes within 4and5on a typical seven-point judicial framework and independence; and table the corruption, provides a linking between local media; governance; national governance; democratic independent civil democratic society; process; change electoral incategories: of seven progress the countries byevaluating democratic political regimes in data cancountries post-SovietFreedom House the on be to identify an effective tool type of the the region. The Freedom House and Russia analyzes 1.2. TheTypologyof ofthe Regimes inAzerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan the level of democracy in the of countries. these presidents the of list the give Ialso actors political major the with regimes political associates which regimes and Kazakhstan Uzbekistan, definition actor-based considering Russia.Also the of political Belarus, in Azerbaijan, cover thesis- the I political regimes post-Soviet those typology of the Based onthe above-mentioned definition politicalof regimes in nextsub-chapterthe Iprovide hybrid regimes and studying them using dichotomousapproach can be a“flawed” practice. when on the hand,other approach adichotomous does not allowfor differentiating post-Soviet imperfectly). Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited 51 A graded approach A grasps a graded approach true complexity nature of of regimes,post-Soviet , 184. 15 52 CEU eTD Collection Politics Program, Campbell and law Public Saweyer paper, Affairsworkshop Institute, “research MaxwellRevolutions, Color Schoolthe Beyond of SyracuseDemocratization: University, and Protests Electoral http://www.freedomhouse.hu/nitransit/2006/methodology.pdf; Katya Kalandadze and Mitchell A. Orenstein, also showsall that of countrieshavethese been of trend undergoing ‘authoritarization’ in 2004- A Table The judiciary. and legislature controlled and weak leader; its and government executive omnipotent media; controlled and suppressed society; civil non-existent or weak regime; ruling which elections, authoritarian manipulated merelyregimes: toexpandserve alife-span of the can What for from Tableinferred be the Aisshare typical that countries the characteristics these 53 52 Source: Russia Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Belarus Azerbaijan Russia Table A:Democracy Score Indexof Azerbaijan, Belarus,Uzbekistan Kazakhstan, and regimes. authoritarian consolidated of category the to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Belarus, regimes; authoritarian Azerbaijan belong tothe group of that semi-consolidated evaluates and Russia Uzbekistan Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, regimes of the typology above-mentioned the to According and Russia fall into the category of authoritarian regimes. The Freedom House Freedom House. Freedom Bollen and Jackman, “Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies”, 612. Country Data compiled from Freedom House publication- 53 Nations Nations in Transit 2006 Methodology 5,25 N/A 6,25 6,54 5,63 Score Rankings Score Democracy 2004 5,61 6.43 6,29 6,64 5,86 Democracy Score Democracy Rankings 2005 Nations in Transit 2003-2006 . 16 5,75 6.82 6,39 6,71 5,93 Democracy Score Democracy Rankings 2006 . http://www.freedomhouse.org/ Present Present Present Present Present “Authoritarization’ Trend CEU eTD Collection http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/SLAPP/Papers/SLAPP%2006-07/Kalandadze.pdf. thesis. in on I elaborate the countries that post-Soviet of those lists presidents the TheTableB processes. represent principal who the defineactors decision making the and path process the of political theenormouspossess power and stay in for alongtheir office period of time. presidents The in category the leaders countries, Thesewhich the belong“super-presidential’ of to countries still beidentified. has what degree, to to regimes,however the of authoritarization of authoritarian the nature strengthens regime.I argue the to thesemeasuresthat have contributed and thesituation directly democracy with affects NGOs- suppressing the media,controlling opposition, harassingthe nature of measures- the these of that contend state democracy, I the of deterioration and measures anti-revolutionary the between connection direct the identify attempts of protesting against fraudulentthe elections. While Inmy study I donotseek to andsuppress atthecrucial victory ensureelections authorities’ the to measures authoritarian presidential 2008.Theseelections countries havein had(or case of undertake Russia have) to in elections Belarus 2006andin case of Russia the 2007andelections parliamentary upcoming elections in Kazakhstan 2005, parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan 2005, parliamentary crucial elections the during implemented Russia and Kazakhstan Belarus, Azerbaijan, of which regimes the measures took place anti-revolutionary between connection is a there that (ormaintain I noted, be can willregion post-Soviet take) in these countries2006. Whilein this asperiod an explanation – presidential of a this factor a general tendency of ‘authoritarization’ of the 17 CEU eTD Collection himself is insuring focusing on asmooth transition of power to his ‘hand-picked’ successor’. successors of previousthe With presidents. regard toPutin itcan also benoted currently that he ‘hand-picked’ the as power to came both they however standards), region’s post-Soviet the for andPutin in Aliyev been have necessarily long for office 8-4yearsrespectively the a period (not This has been by the achieved politicalsuppressing opposition and conducting fraud. theelection respectively. years 13-16-16 for office in the been have Karimov- and Nazarbaev Lukashenko, them- Threeof rule. longevity presidents’ these on of picture gives aclear The Table2also unions. resource of trade human the activelyto resorts Lukashenko andFair areUnitedcase of Russia Russia. parties Putin there in Party and Social Justice Party; Democratic National Revival Democratic Party; Uzbekistan Democratic National Self-Sacrifice Party; Democratic People's Uzbekistan Party; Democratic inpartiesgovernmental andgroups- case ofKarimov partiesthese areUzbekistan Liberal pro- the control and run Presidents these of all in reality, However, parties. political the The Table 2 shows that only two Presidents- Aliyev and Nazarbayev- are officially affiliated with Table 2: Source: Kazakhstan Belarus Azerbaijan Russia Uzbekistan Data complied from the Central Intelligence Agency Presidents of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia Country Nazarbayev Nursultan Lukashenko Alexander Ilham Aliyev Vladimir Putin Vladimir Islom Karimov President Nur-Otan affiliation No formal party affiliation No formal party affiliation No formal party New Azerbaijan Political Party 18 World World Fact Book Party . www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ October 2003 December 1991 July 1994 December 1999 December 1991 Time in Office in Time ( since) ( CEU eTD Collection the post-Soviet electoral revolutions. electoral post-Soviet the usedduring mechanisms and elaborate electoral on revolutionary revolutions I In thechapter next Ukraine 2004,and Kyrgyzstan revolutionary 2005 the succeededforces in victory. the reaching political phenomenon-topplerevolution- electoral the Incase regimes. to 2003, Georgia of from which increasingforces revolutionary attack the use thetechniquesandmeasuresof new the The above-mentioned longevity post-Sovietthe of regimes in lastthe years has come under an 19 CEU eTD Collection 54 of power, uprising, andriots”. alongthrough manifestations with ofviolenceother and such resistancemovements, seizuresas [revolution fundamental is] states violence.change accomplished that” Gurr sociopolitical For a long time, revolutions. a electoral conventional, success tothe post-Soviet the of mechanisms which contributed explain revolutionary the well-established Alsocauses. from using empirical the in revolutions the UkraineandKyrgyzstan I data Georgia, focusIn this I chapter two of on definingelectoral itstasks- and describingrevolution concept definition2.1. Electoral Revolution of revolution 2 CHAPTER associated it with for decades. These revolutions together with the collapse of Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the decision deprived the communist regimes the crucial support they enjoyed from Sovietthe Union decision thenot tosupport communists’ regimessuppress to the opposition movements. This has been the Soviet Union’s PresidentGermany 1989) which finally succeeded inbringing down these The regimes. factor significant Gorbachev’s refusal mass-demonstrations andthe negotiations-(Czechoslovakia,round-table Hungary, Poland, to follow ‘Brezhnev’s Doctrine’ pressure exerted on regimesthe a by forces combination through revolutionary the of peaceful and The major peaceful of has post-Communists characteristic these been revolutions hugethe revolutions. peaceful newpolitical lastphenomenon- of emergence thedecades sawthe However, Cuba 1959werecase-book examplesin of revolutions, peopleviolent numerous which perished. Tud Gurr, Tud Why Men Rebel Men Why (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 4. 54 The revolutionsin FranceRussia 1789, China 1917, and 1949, 20 CEU eTD Collection Union Wheatley Jonathan, Authoritarianism and Struggle for Democracy in Serbia and Belarus the Age of Post-Soviet Electoral Revolutions Over?”; Vitali Silitski, Vitali Silitski, “Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus,” Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia,” Europe and Black Sea admitted admitted “inthat seeking tolearn lessons from democraticthese breakthroughs,itis important to region, post-Soviet leadingthe on scholar Michael a tobeMcFaul, extremely proved difficult. the definition ofrevolutions, which make this phenomenon uniquepolitical from others; and b)conceptualizing electoral revolutiona) among these elections) fraudulent the (besides andcharacteristics factors those identifying two-fold: is revolution electoral of definition basedexact an developing with onproblem major those factors and characteristics. This task has European Review Internationalof Affairs 55 vague. still is phenomenon political new this of concept the and done being from far still definition, exact its developing on working been have scholars of number recently a which based on revolutions, electoral four successful of experience the despite However, elections. markingthe majorterm theirandagainst fraudulent people’s characteristic- manipulated protests and These Akaev (2004) revolutions (2005). arecommonly toaselectoral revolutions, referred themselves Milosevic stripped of power- Kuchma/ (2000),Shevardnadze (2003), Yanukovich resultmassive of organized protests by four opposition the post-communistleaders found in continued The successful 21 of walk the revolutions peaceful UnionSoviet and Eastern the Europe. SovietUnion marked the final days of communistthe regime whichfor decades dominated in the David Reichardt, “Democracy PromotionSlovakia: in AnImport or an Export Business (Ashgate Publishing Co, 2005). Georgia from national awakening to Rose Revolution; delayed transition in the former Soviet Studies 4, no. 1 (2004): 107-118; BieberFlorian,“The Serbian Opposition andCivil Society: 18(2002): 5-20 International Journal ofPolitics, Culture and Society ; 21 Ognjen Pribicevic, “Serbia After Milosevic,” After “Serbia Pribicevic, Ognjen Journal of Democracy . Unpublished book manuscript (2005); The Long Road from Tyranny: Post-Communist st century as well, when as a 16, no. 4(2005);Silitsky, “Is ,” Perspectives: Central Perspectives: ,” 17 (2003):73-90; the work is work the Southeast 55 The CEU eTD Collection Perspectives on the Fourth Wave”, www.utoronto.ca/jacyk/Kuzio_ComparativeRevolutions.pdf. 58 Democracy 57 56 Georgia and Ukraine”. revolutions. andfive of electoral tools listfour characteristics Valerie Sharon Volchik Bunce and is scholarsaswell. works of example, in other observed the For causesof revolution the electoral islong”. list conditions the that necessary of realize of electoral revolution. addingcase, andfactors’ ‘confounding complexity represent processof the to defining aconcept electoral revolution (which marks its individuality) from ‘side’ factors, which vary from case to of elements essential the distinguishing allows also approach This distinctiveness. exclusive its scholars todistinguish electoral as a revolution ‘stand-by-itself’ political and outlinephenomenon itsproperties different marking from typesother of Useof revolutions. this approach enables which an elements andidentifyingelectoral core and are uniqueto revolution the characteristics scholars are approach: most By by So whatnow, electoral them define revolutions? an essentialist dominant in some revolutions than in others. more havebeen factors anddifferent replicas exact others’ represent each not does revolutions geographically regions. different Thepath of revolutionary of variousdevelopments electoral in countries very different can placein revolutions politically/economically/mentally take electoral demonstrate revolutions electoral the of and analyses asthe is different situation real The conditions. favorable extremely under only place take which phenomenon) political areuniquerevolutions (because events of combination of so many explainingfactors one Taras Kuzio, “Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-Communist Countries: Comparative Countries: Post-Communist Five in Revolutions and Breakthroughs “Democratic Kuzio, Taras Revolutions”, Electoral and Conditions “Favorable Wolchik L. Sharon and J. Bunce Valerie McFaul, “Transitions from Postcommunism”, 17. 17, no.4 (2006). 57 Kuzio lists ten factors which resulted in revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, 58 However, there exists a danger of erroneously thinking that electoral that thinking erroneously of danger exists a there However, 22 56 The same trend of developing a long list of Journal of CEU eTD Collection Revolutions inPost-Communist Eurasia”, 59 by government’sthe downfall.elections,in Fraudulent which governmentthe various through followed by against government opposition, organized the the andthepeople’s elections protest 2005, which byfundamental fraudulentare characterized andmanipulated two elements: 2000 and Ukraine 2004,aswell as the parliamentary elections in Georgia 2003and Kyrgyzstan of Hence Idefine presidential usingthe in examples the revolutions elections electoral Serbia impossible. if not issmall, future foreseeable in the countries, fair,freechanging in through government the elections and competitive most post-Soviet the to gain electoral inconducted a freemanner competitive and whichinfactexcluded apossibility the of opposition victory. inAzerbaijan(parliamentary elections 2005 andin presidential 2006)werenotelections Belarus Overall, inthethesis Icover b) elections via the elections; government the over victory the opposition’s it can be nature of politicalthe regimes existing in under thecountries not show apossibility study do of stated with semi-authoritarian reasons: a)the because of victory two of electoral examples above-mentioned much certainty against Iparticularly organizeprotests the government. thefrom post-election usingthe refrain that itsas a defeat of to need result the which acceptance excludes of elections, government’s the prospect use mechanismsof ofmass after protests elections.the be Thishas to explained by the of revolutions. aselectoral areconsidered occasionally – campaignsopposition of of political andprocess the unification conducting get-out-the-vote they elements share the of – electoral revolution organizing mobilization civic through elections in Slovakia 1998and Croatia, presidential inelection Mexico 2000)which, because (parliamentary government the over of victory opposition the excludeelectoral cases of the For delimiting the scope of my research, when elaborating on the concept of electoral revolution I Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon Wolchik “Bringing Down Dictators: American Democracy Promotion and Electoral and Promotion Democracy American Dictators: Down “Bringing Wolchik Sharon and J. Bunce Valerie 23 59 However, they lack one major feature - feature major lack one they However, CEU eTD Collection Journal of Democracy 60 http://sitemaker.umich.edu/comparative.speaker.series/files/bunce_american_democracy_promotion.pdf. itisdemonstrators, evident the people that arethe engine, whichstarts revolutionthe and it drives the of number large the explain can which reasons of nature the of Nevertheless opposition. organizingmass-protests, and level pre-election mobilizationof of populationthe by the population’sfactors: dissatisfaction with governments,the opposition’s popularity, traditions of by other be explained can demonstrations inthe participants of number high The protests. in the observed a relationship between the level of election fraud and the number of people participating hasnotbeen there However, in demonstrations. opposition’s the participate more people the has more countries populous been thatthe the Thegeneral are of tendency smaller scale. widespread, bringing hundreds together of of thousand people, andin some countries, the protests opposition andAlso, population.in some countries againstpeoples’ protests fraud election are Though there is always fraud election an countries reaches scaleandin extensive some itis countries notthatwidespread. considerable election vary country;from in fraud to thelevel country protests some andpeoples’ electoral However, of fraud and feeling of ‘stolenbox”. elections’ among enforce outcome maybethe through election people ballotthe the deniedto to enough powerful the and government the A opposition emerginginalike: social movement wake the of a stolen an potential enormous for triggering stolenmass arecriticalprotest, elections forjunctures the have they “because that observe Kuntz and Thompson regard, this In elections. the after protests powerful into elections,mechanismsof turns before and the accelerated which started gradually mobilization, of The process social period. post-election the and phases: pre-election the into two received numberthe of by votes dividing actas watersheds political the opposition, the processes rigging), steals thevictory ‘reduces” from most (in manipulations cases,vote or opposition the Mark Thompson and Philipp Kuntz,” Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October,” Serbian ofthe Case The Elections: Stolen Kuntz,” Philipp and Thompson Mark 60 15, no.4 (2004), 16. 24 CEU eTD Collection Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003,Ukraine 2004,and Kyrgyzstan 2005”, European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. University of Toronto (2005): 3-4; Cory Welt, 61 elections result ofthe peoples’ non-violentprotests organized bythe opposition against fraudulent is peoples’Thedefinition against government. I the protest the offer The definition I am usingin research this is based on elements: these fraudulenttwo elections and revolution. electoral till the successful end. This is the reason I emphasize the peoples’ role in the definition of the success of electoral success the revolutions of electoral in region post-Soviet the has been to focus more on defining specificcauses which to contributed The general tendency workingamong identifying scholars on the causes of electoral revolutions 2.2. Causes ofElectoral Revolution region. in post-Soviet the revolution electoral on causesof the Ielaborate sub-chapter thenext In by causes. various created the situation uses toachievemethods peaceful objective its byusingtoits advantage the pre-revolutionary groups which do not resort to using physical the violence in an effort todismantle the regime, but seek to change the existingThe opposition’s is definition broadand represents a political and group party, individual which regime. I delimit is ‘stolen for directed. the elections’ government orchestrating people’s angertowards which the the definition of Thegovernment. majorthe focus is also placed onthe opposition, which is thechannel through opposition the of change in the results eventually which to population, the of thosemobilization election post- and political fall of the government, as it is not the focus of my study. I delimit myself with the pre-election Michael, McFaul, Michael, . I deliberately do not expand the definition to cover the political developments after the “The Second Wave of Democratic Breakthroughs in the Post-Communist World: Comparing 61 , than to examine the causes of examine, causesof arevolutionary creating the to than 25 Danyliw/Jacyk Working Papers fall of the governmentfall ofthe asa Georgia: Causes of the , Center for , Center CEU eTD Collection Georgia 2003,Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan and 2005”, 3- 63 http://en.rian.ru/world/20050421/39717750.html consequences”. ensuing the all with tension social to heightened leads market tothe economy command and administrative the from transition protracted the believe experts The grounds. economic and social objective have territory post-Soviet on revolutions “color that argues which Market” the to Transition Long “the report the peculiar nature of the regime - unpopular with authoritarian leanings, but weak and tolerant of “a) electoral revolutions): post-Soviet can toother factors be generalized (these Revolutions Rose military, police.” and forces, intelligence tens of thousands of demonstrators to protest electoral fraud,and (7)divisions among the mobilizing of capable opposition apolitical (6) vote, falsified the about citizens inform to media independent enough falsified, (5) were results thattheelections perception quickly the create regime; (2) anunpopularincumbent; (3) aunited and organized opposition; (4) anability to of revolutions: electoral parts necessary which are conditions, several causes, which though occurrenceare not diametrically of a revolution.combination different, Each scholar still varystudying making happen. revolution the it Nevertheless,to would also bean exaggeration a to think that of to similarsome electoralin played it a role extent.or cause a single of significance the exactly identify to impossible be McFaul revolutionswould It several defines others. than contributors develops important more been have causes them of some however, revolution; electoral his list of of electoralthe in of has beenpresent eachof each case which several comprises causes, It revolution. electoral revolutionsAnalyses of arethe post-Soviet crucially electoral popularity government,the of butnot majorthe for reason electoral revolutions. important revolution cause for reducing the important tobe an have been show considered factors social-economical tense forthat therean is not a single major cause of 62 4. Rose Revolution and Lessons for Democracy Assistance situation within contextthe of existing social-economical in environment those countries. McFaul, “The Second Wave of Democratic Breakthroughs in the Post-Communist World: Comparing Serbia 2000, Serbia Comparing World: Post-Communist the in Breakthroughs Democratic of Wave Second “The McFaul, There were few studies to link causes of color revolutions to economic reasons- i.e. reasons- economic to revolutions of color causes link to studies few were There 63 Welt also defines several elements, which led to the 4 (Washington, DC. Management System International, 2005), 26 FBK Consulting “( 1) a semi-autocratic 1) complied a 62 The CEU eTD Collection media, and the security forces reluctant to use violence demonstrators”. the touse against forcesmedia, reluctant security andthe independent more a opposition, organized better a as such former inthe factors of combination morelikely succeed to in hybrid in than authoritarian more closed a favorable regimes due to electoral In regard,Kalandadzeare this revolution. andOrenstein “electoral protests explain that of causes and regimes political of nature the between link firm is a there and coincidence mere with ita is not that countries maintain Scholars Kyrgyzstan. and Ukraine Georgia, the regimes: in semi-authoritarian place took revolution electoral post-Soviet Every revolutions. electoral feature of unique is mostof regime the nature semi-authoritarian three causes, Among these nature strong of regime; semi-authoritarian unpopularthe opposition. characteristics- government; similar several list they that shows assessments above-mentioned the of Elaboration 65 64 its success. for conditions favorable create for opposition, which uses limitedthe opportunities itpossesses toexpandits support base and tools. suchregimes However, donotsucceed in down completely shutting space operational the democracy and control the political processes through ‘soft power’ (occasionally ‘hard power’) hybrid façade tocreate the of arecompelled regimes nature, of particularity their political andforces passivity security the e)the of via and its international United other and diplomatic assistanceefforts, pressures; States programs political change was possible; d) external democracy promotion efforts, particularly those of the by matched examples offraud; c) the persuadefollowersegregious opposition’s ability that to b) scenario the peculiarof procedure; democraticdemocratic electoral checks-and-balances Kalandadze and Orenstein, “Electoral Protests and Democratization: Beyond the Color Revolutions”, 8-9 Revolutions”, Color the Beyond Democratization: and Protests “Electoral Orenstein, and Kalandadze Welt, Georgia: Causes of the Rose Revolution and Lessons for Democracy Assistance . “ 64 27 , 4 , 65 of Because . CEU eTD Collection 67 66 which atthe elections, parties go tothe governmental means fewervotes that performance cause of regime.dismantling the high The of number unsatisfied people with government’s the opposition an additional valuableconduct tool to the mobilization and the unite people around the yearin last office”. direction,from up year51 percentthe before. Kuchma’s duringapproval ratings plummeted his were saying as thatthecountry inrespondents goingpercent of 2001 asearly was wrong the polls less putMilosevic’s at popularity by than 30 percent summerof the 2000. In Georgia, 82 incumbent”. “an of factor unpopular critical mass of people a isfor of existing there alsoaneed revolution Inthe caseof in electoral general. revolution unsatisfied with of a from causes the very different not are terms instructural revolution electoral The causesof the governments’ performance. revolutions. electoral McFaul refers to it theregime. Suchscenarios have unfolded inall which post-Communist countries have experienced through use the of various non-violentpressure mechanisms succeeds in dismantlingthe the geta elections sharp reaction from opposition,the whichmobilizes themasses of people and fraudulent The fraud. election to orchestrating resort have to they bellow) discussed reasons hope inthey towinfairfreemanner tovarious (due cannot and conducted a competitive elections needauthoritarian regimes tohold ona elections regular basisfor(re)-gaining legitimacy. Butas closed authoritarian regimes, which depend on othermechanisms for having ‘legitimacy’, semi- unlike take similartrend: furtherthe areformedmajor the developments and actors strengthened, opposition the with are together which media- and three society civil an emerging for allow regimes Hybrid major contributing factors to a success of electoral revolution. After these ibid., 8. McFaul, “Transitions from Postcommunism”, 8. 67 Understandingpeoplenot most that support governmentgives dothe the 66 He uses empirical data to prove his argument “In Serbia, “In prove hisargument to data He usesempirical 28 CEU eTD Collection Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, and Kyrgyzstan 2005” doubtful doubtful non-existent. Baseof their or gradually diminished political the support until loyalty bodies astheir was to them law-enforcement the on rely leaderscould regimes level. The from sided governmentthe the with opposition. defection The both on took individual and group revolutions. With evidentthe progress of revolutionary developments, more and more defectors’ for electoral situation atypical revolutions- finalof the seen stages at which wereclearly rule of Shevardnadze, Kuchma and Akaev were vulnerable to defections andinternal frictions, The factor. this of significance the proves revolutions electoral post-Soviet the of experience The guns”. with the division among the actors of power-with its semi-authoritarian nature, ‘visible lack of regime strength’ can be conveniently explained McFaul refers to it as “splits among the guys with 69 68 strength”. regime of regimethe with “[its] unusual tolerance for “motionsthe of democracy” anda visible lack of change. This use isachieved through of factors. Weltother combines factor the of unpopularity of agents active become citizens in which movement protest dynamic the into transformed isexistence of not people to prerequisite unsatisfied be revolutions.the should Dissatisfaction But fall itshouldbe starts mere noted that apart. of mechanisms civil other disobedience and demonstrations widespread the with faced regimes when the its stages, final at especially High number of discontentedvital tool of ‘people’s power’ to seek the regimes’ demise. peoples’ anger andbringingmore people tothe streetdemonstrations, giving the opposition the citizens raising the asacatalyst fraud.This acts wider tothe election to resort is government compels the the significant factor for the successful revolution, McFaul, “ Welt, 69 Georgia: Causes of the Rose Revolution and Lessons for The Second Wave of Democratic Breakthroughs in thePost-Communist World: Comparing Serbia 2000, 68 Indeed, if the regime’s tolerance for ‘motions of democracy’ can be explained , 16. 29 Democracy Assistance, 2. Assistance, Democracy CEU eTD Collection people”. crushuse force to not andthe did showedrestraint ruling asbecausethe regimes methods, “modern nonviolentrevolutions tookplace not so much because the people adoptednonviolent that claim the with in contrast comes assumption His movement. opposition wide-ranging such and fact incapablenumber underlines regimes’ of the suppress demonstrators the that were to 71 70 leaders public leaders personal the opposition “couldthat showedtothe stand narrow above acted in than itunison when wasdivided and fragmented. Thelack ofvisible friction among the negotiations inclined People with government. the support weremore to opposition the itwhen election social expose mobilization, fraud,manage election the demonstrations, the and conduct opposition in caseof post-Sovietthe electoral conduct wasbetter positionedrevolutions pre- to frontunited –is a third factor appearscrucialthat for democraticbreakthrough”. efforts of a united opposition. McFaul maintains that is coordinated number the The mobilization only of through possible a high of demonstrators the opposition movement, if only they would possess means to do so. suppressing to hesitate to resort not would regimes as semi-authoritarian the be correct, cannot million of cannot”. one of A canbethousand ten with aggressively.protest dispersed tear the ancien regime. Smaller, less organized crowds would have tempted state officials to actgoodwill guys the moreof with guns, was key the removingfactor violentsuppression as an foroption influence on the regime oppose massthe demonstrations. In this regard,according toMcFaul, crucial the tool of exerting is the high number wereleftincumbents only a smallwith whichof die-hardgroup supporters, effectively not could of demonstrators “the size of the crowds, not the Akbar Ganji, “The Struggle Against Sultanism”, Journal of Democracy 16, no.4 (2005), 48. ibid., 17-18. 71 However, based on existing empirical data it can be stated that that the latter claim 70 This assumption directly links the success of a revolution with the 30 “ a united opposition theperception – or of a gas and armored cars. A crowd 72 United CEU eTD Collection on the Fourth Wave”, 15 73 Georgia 2003,Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan and 2005”, 8. 72 an platform”. election around and unite interests organizations, youth youth organizations, independentorganizations, monitoring election organizations, united and non-profit international as such factors unrelated sight first At phenomenon. political distinctive itthat is sucha which make thisof internalrevolutions factors combination external electoral and is stated can be The definitely only thing that revolution. successof tothe electoral contribution level exact liesformat difficulty isdefiningthe of their the and internal. and However, external categories- two into divided conveniently be can region, post-Soviet in the revolutions electoral The revolutionary mechanisms, which played an active role in bringing down regimesthe during 2.3. Mechanisms of Electoral Revolution region. mechanisms, which haverevolutionary during been in electoral revolutions used post-Sovietthe the on elaborates sub-chapter next The forces. revolutionary the by used mechanisms are which revolutionarythe situation develops. In revolutionarythe of process vitalthe importance Soviet region. However, only causesdonotmakethe revolutions.built They foundation the upon inthe post- revolutions tothesuccessof electoral have contributed causes The abovementioned in leaders spoke voice.one opposition the moment crucial in every But Kyrgyzstan. in lower and Ukraine and Georgia in high was communicate with. can Nevertheless,they the levelopposition the of opposition’s from unityactors variedmajor from the country to identify country- to for example, community it international Kuzio.“Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-Communist Countries: Comparative Perspectives McFaul, Second “The Wave of Democratic Breakthroughs in thePost-Communist World: Comparing Serbia 2000, . 31 73 Existence of united opposition helped the CEU eTD Collection monitoring organizations. According toWelt,monitoring in organizations. case the of Rosethe Revolutionin Georgia “U.S. democracy in wasinstrumental increasing theworldwide, election capacity of independent involvement.government’s Forexample, United States, the driven byits agenda of expanding government and opposition. The empirical data could be used to portray the pattern of the foreign the between mediators elections; andacting as results fraudulent the of the denouncing governmental The organizations;typical pattern of their activities included: providing funding forlocal and international non- revolutionary processes and preferred toact the through international non-profitorganizations. exerting the with associated directly being avoided cases many pressurein them- among active most were on the regimes actorness) asthesingle inmostacting cases latter Union and(the European the United States to hold fairinvolvementtheir in revolutionary the weredifferent.processes The foreign governments – the and free elections;organizations and international non-profit organizations. Understandably, level the and format of inter-governmental /international governments countries’ foreign categories: two into fall region post-Soviet in the outcomes revolutionary the influenced which factors external general, In will benecessary provideempirical answerto this acomplete to data issue. The additional electoral revolution. thesuccessof an contributed factors external the what extent to is farfrom clear it matter still factors external fact that despite evident the that state merely occurrence of In a revolution regularly order inappear. to avoid this engaging debate, Iwill The claims of overestimating as well as of underestimating the significance of external factors for revolutions. electoral on mechanisms external of influence exact the on existing opinions different by seen clearly is mechanisms revolutionary of impact the explaining of complexity The explain. succeeded in down bringing semi-authoritarianthe Thisregimes. iseasy phenomenon not to 32 CEU eTD Collection process and offered valuable assistance whenever itwas most needed. National-Democratic whenever assistance and valuable process offered organizations werein positionbetter in tochangingresponding of realities revolutionary the independent-election monitoring organizations. As they directlyworked in field,the these actingmediators between establishing as opposition groups, different the andsupporting the opposition groups with socialthe mobilization tools, training the opposition activists and often local non-governmental training theorganizations, representatives ofmedia, equippingthe The area of wasmuch their wide:providing to expertise neededassistance the financial-technical categories- camefundedinto or two individual governments through the benefactors. also field, inthe work actual the doing were which organizations, profit non international The regime the between of opposition- and the example 2004. Ukraine free alsoas mediators acted an importance of elections.dignitaries The andfair conducting messageof regimes the and tothe brought before elections the Ukraine and Georgia visited the dignitaries Foreign well. as basis individual on acted community International level. international of andlack rightnessadditional of regimeassurance of the theirthe support of cause on international community immediatelywould become known to generalthe givingpublic, them the of position the on news The fraud. election of accusations the to weight significant Georgia, Ukraine andKyrgyzstan was importantan supporting tool for opposition,the adding The foreign firmgovernments’ position on refusing recognize to thefraudulentelections in during RoseRevolution. the 74 NGOs” monitoring election local of cultivation the and implementation, and training tabulation] voting election funding wassubstantial assistance listincluded for voter and reform, [parallel PVT Welt, Georgia: Causes of the Rose Revolution and Lessons for Democracy Assistance 74 The existence of The existence of such andtheirorganizations proved findings to beacrucial factor 33 , 7. CEU eTD Collection by youth the organizations included: printing and distributing informational materials, organizing andinspiring elders to express openly their discontent against the regime. The mechanisms used were mostly carried out youthmobilizing at cause around the aimed of dismantling regime the allowed reachingamuch for Therevolutionary thatthese measures audience. organizations wider it flexiblycases, represented network connected of regional which organizations and central Inmany horizontal to structure. The youth werearrangedaccording organizational organizations regimes,the for could many beascary factor people. dismantling at aimed demonstration the in personally engaging of idea the in politics, interested particularly important factor in post-Sovietthe regimes, where although population is generally political widespread in Georgian the youth apathy among public and particular”. This was Kandelaki, most As vocal regimes. of critics werethe the youth The organizations regimewas the possible. representingyoung people from all of walks life,pursue managed to peoplethe a that change of among (Kyrgyzstan) were active most the of participants revolutions.the Theseorganizations, organizations. The members of The organizations. Pora community. international wider the to message its gets opposition the with them on a regular basis. They served as the important communication channels than andforeign of beactors, official structures the the governments engagedin could throughactivities with local the with in working flexible more were they that was organizations such of strength The were among most the active actingpost-Soviet duringrevolutions. the international organizations Institute of International Affairs, International andRepublican Institute Open Society Institute is a representative of another important mechanism of electoral revolutions- youth revolutions- mechanism of important electoral of another isa representative Kmara leader says leadersays “ Otpor Kmara (Enough (Serbia), 34 Kmara ) played animportant role in combating (Georgia), Pora (Ukraine), KelKel CEU eTD Collection Fair Elections and DemocracyHuman Rights; b) local election(Georgia), monitoring organizations- for example, International the Society forCommittee Organization for Security and Co-Operation inOffice Europe/ of Democratic Institutions and of Ukrainian Votes organizations- andinter-governmental for Electoral Systems- Foundation International Affairs, (Ukraine). These for International Institute Democratic National for example, organizations- non-profit represented organizations International organizations. local and international a) categories: two into which monitoring in The election fall organizations worked Ukraine andKyrgyzstan Georgia, opposition was able to intensify his demands for the resignation of the presidents. the figures these with Backed elections. the stole regimes the how public the to showing cases and scaleof election fraud. The information they provided wasinvaluable in of terms the data on documented of the sources independent the They were electoral revolutions. Soviet done byindependent monitoring election organizations. They played in acrucial part post- the In inthis regard, processthe of exposing theelection fraud, particularly was work significant by fraud orchestrated exposedtheelection regime. the andtogether organizations have in with local Theyouth been non-governmental organizations contact regular disobedience. each Georgia and Ukrainetraveled countriesto to others’ offer trainings on toolsthe of civil with each otherand sharedtheir expertise. The youth activists knowledge and from Serbia, was funded by The youth Open-Society Institute. the regular contact established organizations which necessary funds forprovided setting upandrunning organization forthe example,- theyouthFunding for organizations came international thethrough non-profitorganizations processes. revolutionary protest rallies and demonstrations and recruiting young people tobecome involved in the 35 Kmara CEU eTD Collection and independent election monitoring organizations. The next chapter analyses these anti- these analyses chapter next The organizations. monitoring election independent and strikes against revolutionary the mechanisms- youth such as organization, political opposition launched have The pre-emptive measures. implementand the particularly strategy revolutionary revolutions. Thecomprehended the needpreempt to threatand this develop specific anti- by their electoral posed scaleof the rules realizedthe regimes to threat gradually The post-Soviet regime. any(semi)-authoritarian bring almost potential down to causes, hasagreat matched formidable which possess with power the situation byspecific resulted revolutionary monitoringshowed and that external youth mechanisms, organizations election organizations electoral revolutions post-Soviet The revolution. successof the electoral contributing to gradually in unison, acted they as effective most were mechanisms revolutionary above-mentioned The monitoring organizations. information on manipulations election the by andindependentproduced impartial election by against fraudhad regime election the the protests unless documented the they orchestrated developments. The opposition could not hope to influence a high number of people to join the election monitoring organizations enjoyed aunique influence position to therevolutionary Because they informationpossessed documented trustworthy, fraudon election independent or non-profit donor organizations. governments foreign sources, inter-governmental the through either came funding organizations’ be thewhole either could geographical one region country.activities or organization’s The area The of the organizations. international local non-profit of and representatives dignitaries, foreign issues, election on theexperts represented observers organizations’ The lists. voter’s compiling polls, exit missions, observation election term long and short mechanism- various organizations wereactively in engaged of every combiningphase monitoringelection through 36 CEU eTD Collection Uzbekistan Uzbekistan and Russia in of framework time the 2003-2006. in Kazakhstan, Belarus, andimplemented measures Azerbaijan, revolutionary designed 37 CEU eTD Collection region. Blank even “Moscow entertainedhope that claims the of having Abashidze succeed leaving Russia’s sphere ofinfluence. Russia relied on pro- Russian leader of Georgia’s Adjara’s worst the his agenda,represented finally case scenariofor Russia- Georgia’s pro-Western clear favordid prospect not the Shevardnadze, of victory the ledof opposition the by with Saakashvili, political turmoil in is Georgia an interesting phenomenon to explore. Though in general Russia the to Russia’s response countries.regard, this post-Soviet In it other a possibility repeating of in first attemptof regionelectoral be post-Sovietrevolution the crucial inwould of terms testing The developments in Georgia immediately attracted the attention of the post-Soviet regimes.resignation. The Shevardnadze’s President for calling cities, Georgian other several election manipulations the opposition started to organize in widespread protests Tbilisi and fraud.Responding tothe widespreadmarred election by whichwere elections, parliamentary the The RoseRevolutionit is(as unfolded commonly backgroundto) the referred on of The firstelectoral inrevolution post-Sovietthe region placetook in Georgia in 2003. November measures. anti-revolutionary of 2006 toportray post-Soviet the general the characteristics focus on parliamentary the elections in Azerbaijan 2005and the presidential elections in Belarus Azerbaijan, Belarus,Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russiain periodthe I of 2003-2006. specially of by regimes the implemented measures on anti-revolutionary elaborate the I In this chapter Measures 3. 1. Post-Soviet Regimes’ Response to Electoral Revolutions- Anti-Revolutionary 3 CHAPTER 38 CEU eTD Collection http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112403.shtml. 78 http://www.puritans.net/news/caucasus050704.htm. Georgia’s “Rose Revolution”: a made-in-America cop. 75 leaders as a result electoral of revolutions (Milosevic, Shevardnadze, Abashidze) Igor Ivanov was either.” interests Georgia’s pressure, asnot being in and with accordance democratic principles, Idonot think this isin influence or through law oron street, the the outside all taken decisions regard “we [Russia] that stated in He electoral general. revolutions Revolution and Rose the towards negative attitude However, despite his role in negotiating Shevardnadze’s resignation, Ivanov never hid his down,Shevardnadze tostep proposal,prevailed on Ivanov soas to avoid civil warfare” thatwouldcompromise inleave When leaders Shevardnadze rejected thispower. opposition the Georgia, Russianforeign minister, Ivanov Igor inarrived Tbilisi “in an attempt tobroker a On November 22, the same day when the opposition behappensindifferent"Russia towhat there”. reporters that Georgia, "cannot telling stormed the buildingLoshchinin of the Valery Parliament Minister Foreign Deputy 15 November On processes. political in the involvement of announcedfeltfor moreactivea need Russian government the Shevardnadze” “Georgia cause without the of that “MoscowHowever, with signsthe of oppositionthe gaining grounds inmobilizing the Georgians around may try to forShevardnadze”. its support of as acondition a succession mediate between Shevardnadze inmid-term or when he wouldleft have office in 2005 oreven of engineering such the opposing factions in 77 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/11/mil-031115-28e6c27b.htm. 76 http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1947. Barry Grey and Vladimir Volkov, Newswire, VOA News Report, November 15, 2003, Stephen Blank, “Georgia’s Revolution: Russia’s SourGrapes”, Eurasia Insight “ Daunting Challenges Await Georgia’s New leaders”. November 24, 2003. 24, November leaders”. New Georgia’s Await Challenges Daunting 78 It is interesting that for his role in mediating resignation of the of resignation mediating in role his for that interesting is It “ Oil intrigue and US Realpolitik heighten tensions in the Caucasus Puritan News Weekly. 39 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst 75 May 7, 2004. , 76 77 CEU eTD Collection 82 2003, http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2003/480309.shtml. 81 80 http://www.cdi.org/russia/Johnson/8205-10.cfm. 83 http://www.hindu.com/2003/12/31/stories/2003123101161000.htm. 79 on had discussion alengthy issue atthismeeting.participants The was notthe document discussed of the text meeting,the the after organized press-conference the it at became asknown However, of the Georgian Opposition as "categorically unacceptable toall democratic states." denouncing issuedmethods the as thechairman CISCouncil Heads of State the astatement of of acting revolution, of aresultelectoral to collapse beless thanaswould year next in whose regime region the as a but only not whole." Georgia have destabilized "couldevents unconstitutional mannerin which Georgianthe leadership wasdeposed, and emphasized thethat adocument Ivanov.meeting,At adopted which participants including the Igor the of Leonid bythesenior CIScountries, President, Kuchma representatives and wasattended discussKiev, to Ukraine, in developments the Themeetingby Georgia. was called Ukrainian the Just three days leaders theRoseRevolution,inafter aspecial the post-Soviet meeting organized regimes. from post-Soviet aresponse the immediately triggered in Georgia The RoseRevolution leader Ivanov seeing Igor across thresholdthe his of presidential palace knowshis time isup dubbed as “The Angel Political of Death” Ibid. Almond. Mark Almond, “Igor Ivanov and the Russian Retreat to Moscow”, to Retreat Russian the and Ivanov “Igor Almond, Mark Vladimir Radyuhin. Roman Woronowycz, “CIS diplomats meet in Kyiv to discuss crisis in Georgia”, Ukraine Weekly, November 30, Igor Ivanov and the Russian Retreat toMoscow. Ivanov did not explain what specific actions had been agreed upon. agreed been had actions specific what explain not did Ivanov again on Ivanov. "Notthe only the matter of Georgia's situation, buthow not to let thishappen territory“This was one of the questions we addressed," explained Russian Foreignmember-states. Minister CIS other in repeated not is and develop not does of scenario Georgian the CIS. discussionThat addressed the methodsneeded I to be decidedly. developed to make so and thatsure anotherthink quickly so place took Shevardnadze, of Mr. ouster their we addressedHow the "velvet revolution," asthe victors in the civilGeorgian unrest have described the issue successfully". Mr. U.S. eyes Russian turf . Available at 79 . Almond once even joked “any that, post-communist 40 Johnson’s Russia’s List, 83 May 12, 2004 81 Leonid Kuchma, 82 “ criticized the criticized . ”. 80 CEU eTD Collection 85 Demokratizatsiya (June 2006), 17, www6.miami.edu/maia/ISAS05/papers/Russia-Belarus_Thomas_Ambrosio.pdf. 84 Viktor and Prime-Minister Yushchenko then Viktor former werethe elections Prime-Minister the marred 1stand the the2nd election of rounds presidential main inUkraine.of The competitors demonstrations massive intimidation against the voter corruption, andfraud electoral which inrevolution post-Sovietthe region. The revolutionplacetook onthe background of the The Orange in Revolution in Ukraine November- December 2004marked the second peaceful regimes. Russia’s and Ukraine’s Ukraine in powerof 2004 showedthe oppositionthe movementcouldbeat joint the effort of proved tobesuccessfulsupport in in revolutionary forces. the combating The developments regimes against electoral Soviet directed name receivedthe revolutions “Holly Alliance”. significance of and outlinedelectoral revolutions the response to them. post- the union This of meetingits and agenda showed that leaders tocomprehend post-Sovietthe started the special the factorganizing of The revolution. of electoral threat the to response collective This meeting can be considered tobethefirstattemptby regimes post-Soviet the toshape a likely a color that revolution would spreadtoRussia itself”. “according to reasoning,this by authoritarianism inperpetuating makesBelarus, Putin itless from itself an of revolution in elector occurrence Russia. In Ambrosioregard this argues that incountries itprotects forces post-Soviet by other that revolutionary considered the combating against itand aimed atlimiting Russiasphere of influence in post-sovietregion. the also Russia aredirected revolutions asit that electoral perceives rolein the plays adominant process this information, exchangeassistance, intelligence andconduct jointpropaganda campaigns. Russia technical-informational offer activities, anti-revolutionary their coordinate to been has goal major Ibid., 17. Thomas Ambrosio, “Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations: Insulating Minsk from a Color Revolution” 41 85 However,not always Russia’s 84 The , CEU eTD Collection http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101041206-832225-1,00.html. Ukraine's policy of seeking membershipin ”. NATO’ end he would ‘that promised Yanukovych elections, the before just Putin, Vladimir president was evident, propel Ukraine back into Russia’s area ofinfluence. The loyalty Yanukovych towardsRussiaof as he constantlyRussia’s in position realm, post-Soviet on otherthe when hand victory Yanukovych’s would reiterated victory meanwould loss influence a total UkraineRussia’s on of weakeningof andsubsequent it. unfoldingprocesses in Ukraine was Russia particularly significant. considered Yushchenko’s that For in the involvement example, Russia’s attention. state’s post-Soviet other without left been have not could at “personalIt is understandable that developmentsthe in such an important post-Sovietcountry as Ukraine meeting withmargin. runoff 2ndthe of round of electionsthe onDecember 26,atwhich wonYushchenko with a clear startgovernment negotiating to oppositionsthe with and they adeal reached on organizing the thousands took of demonstrators to thestreets of Kiev. forcedThe widespread protests the formerTymoshenko, Yushchenko’s the Primesupported Minister, demand. of Hundreds Ukrainian andforeign monitors of massive frauddemanded an annulment of results.the Yulia Yanukovych was ahead that showed Commission Election Central by the announced results The 22. November 87 November11,2004, http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/11/10/ukraine.shtml. 86 Yanukovych’s bidfor presidency - during the pre-election Putin visitedcampaign, Ukrainetwice received of vote). the 39.87% Yushchenko heldround on October 31 did not determine the winner (Yanukovych received 39.32%and enjoyedlatter Yanukovych. The support the of incumbentthe Leonidpresident Kuchma. The 1st Paul Quinn-Judge Yuriand Zarakhovich, “The Orange Revolution”, Moscow News , “OppositionCandidate Wins First Round of Ukraine Presidential Election — Official Result”, .87 accusationsYushchenkoby However,widespreadbacked bythe 86 42 on held was elections the of round 2ndThe 88 supported strongly Understatedly,Putin Time. November28, 2004 . Russian CEU eTD Collection http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/election-2004-r.htm. 89 http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/xhtml/articles/3196.html. 88 intohowever Though they pro-governmental and were clearly the divided opposition the groups. werenotwith Most candidates officiallyelections. affiliated any parliamentary political party; On February 27 and March132005 Kyrgyzstan held first the and second the rounds of region.Soviet in in developments inKyrgyzstan 2005werethethirdconsecutive electoral revolution the post- region. The Asia Central even elsewhere,in and country authoritarian could berepeated the in the region. It provedstateexaggeration that the Orangefor markedto Revolution later the turning developments point that a model of electoralfor presidency. the This loss echoed all over thepost-Soviet region itandbe wouldnot an revolution wasNevertheless, all proved this support futile in bringing victory to Yanukovych and he lost hisnot bid confined to one particular oppositionin they orange which of asthe“puppets” were portrayed West. the andachievements againstthe aswelldesigning qualities, positive campaigns propaganda were instrumental in designing informationthe campaigns for Yanukovych which underlined his Pavlovski andSergei were actively Markov assisting Yanukovych’selection campaign. They campaigns designedbythem. propaganda ledof by Thegroup Russia technologists the Gleb and (spindoctors) of by political technologists influenced factor the Russian were considerably Ukraine several times and designed Yanukovych’s election campaign. The elections in Ukraine Yanukovych’s campaign biggest financial toYanukovych itcontributor allegedly- million spent300 on US Dollars congratulated Yanukovychand with hisactively ‘election” as the President campaigned of Ukraine. Russia wasfor also the Yanukovych; Putin was the first (and only) state leader, who Sreeram Chaulia. “Democratisation, NGOs and "colour revolutions". Global Security.Org , “ Russia & the 2004 Presidential Election”, . 89 A delegation of the leading Russian political technologists visited technologists political leading Russian of A the delegation 43 OpenDemocracy. CEU eTD Collection and political opposition. out againstmeasures werecarried The majororganizations non-governmental anti-revolutionary revolutions. electoral post-Soviet in the role active an played which mechanisms revolutionary the major The on measures. been has focus reducing taken examples of anti-revolutionary case-book are andKazakhstan Uzbekistan of experience regard, In this the existence. new totheir threat Theregimesmeasuresrepeat it. felt that had immediate the in tobetaken to neutralizeorder this inrevolution neighboringthe Kyrgyzstan would inspire domestic the attemptopposition to to The Tulipwas particularlyfor theCentral Revolution warning feltAsian regimes which that the resorted tomore andKuchma. violencegovernment than Shevardnadze protests firstand remainedduring fragmented the whole period of revolution.the The wave revolutionary of started strongly united not was opposition The casualties. casesof the the were andthere violence more in the regionsinvolved ititdifferent- was tosome extent However, electoral revolutions. previous post-Soviet and at as the it thesamecharacteristics bore Asia.In general, Central in post-Soviet the revolution later stagesThe Tulip moved Revolution (as tothe eventsthe in KyrgyzstancapitalJuly leader opposition 2005 the Kurmanbek Bakiev the landslideenjoyed victory. are commonly city.called) was the country.the On April 2 Akaev firstresignedAkayev’s from his position and in the presidentialelectoral elections held on buildingsgovernment’s in Bishkek on March 24 and theAskar President Akayev’s flightfrom the demonstrationsstage to andstarted results election to acceptthe refused inadministration, shortcomings election The backedopposition by all OSCEelectionthe monitoring findings mission of a numerous over the countrymost sits. received that candidates pro-governmental the which finalthe of results electionsthe wereneverpartial announced, basedon mediaresults announced culminated with the takeover of the central 44 CEU eTD Collection sources “the move appears to be a pre-emptive strike by the government to try and defeat a totry beand defeat by strike apre-emptive government the to “themovesources appears Sunshine in Coalition Uzbekistan, wasarrestedonfinancial chares. According opposition the example,movement.Sanjar For 23,2005, October on opposition head Umarov, moderate of the revolutionary the of leaders potential become might who leaders opposition the arresting on by regimesthe orchestrated alternative againstthe focus particular The was political paid groups. ongoing repressions decadeof account the intoachieve taken to thehardtask was not The regime measuresfinally took also against domestic the political eradicating It opposition. processes. thedomestic on organizations in fact government Uzbekistan’s reduced to zero impact international non-profitthe of the activities of the Winrock ereclosed; forwithdraw;and War Board Institute the forced Exchange to PeaceReporting and International Institute Research of International the offices the out; ordered Agency was Refugee United Nations the for Agricultural power of regime’s campaign: suppression the the operations of were suspended; DevelopmentHouse Freedom banned. The 90 Institute” Society Open reregister the refusal to subsequent andtheGovernment's obstacles Bureaucratic affected. develop andrule democratic to principles working of lawIn particular, organizations havebeen organizationscontrol inan to effort their and prevent activities a similarinscenario Uzbekistan. assistance technical international for requirements monitoring and registration new implemented limitation of their activities or closure of their offices. According to USAID Report “Uzbekistan considerable resulted on them attacks which awaveof direct The regime unleashed activities. organizations’ non-governmental international the suppressing on focused has Uzbekistan 3.2. Uzbekistan USAID Budget- Uzbekistan 90 There is a long listinternational of organizations which experienced the , 2006, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/uz.html. 45 CEU eTD Collection http://www.mosnews.com/news/2005/08/25/kazakhpresident.shtml. 92 http://www.sunshineuzbekistan.org/wordpress/archives/135. 91 poured andthrough books their hampered their activities, andacontroversial bill tolimitthe of international NGOs in Almaty,including the Red Cross, were visited by inspectors,tax who The regime alsocarried thestepagainst out non-profit “ international organizations the a range it movement opposition before can growing U.S.-backed rise tochallengeregime the 3.3. Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan. would bethere revolution nopeaceful electoral community that international opposition and message domestic tothe clear the deliberately sent regime wasready to goextreme any todiscourage The regimeof revolution.the attempts who were protesting againstmainly social problems. This brutal use of force was to show that the Andijan of city the in protestors un-armed of hundreds death to shot forces Government Uzbek The culmination campaign of came on regime’sMay the anti-revolutionary when13, 2005, the heAfterward 13years was for sentenced in prison. ex-Soviet state state were toorichstage that a sweptUkraine ex-Soviet likethose revolution to and Georgia” country. ThepresidentNazarbayev emphasized thiswhile argument stating“that people inhis impossibility revolution inthe of mostpopular Kazakhstan is an prosperity economic of the that prove to given reasons various the Among situations. different in totally place took revolutionsthese that inKazakhstan claiming possibility the revolution electoral repudiated of regime through persuading information the aimingcampaigns any people at the that tochangeattempts the Before presidential the elections in2005,the Kazakh regimemuch paid attention on conducting electoral revolution were doomed for a failure. The officials constantly STRATFOR- Uzbekistan: Quashing Signs of a Revolution?” October26, 2005, Moscow News , “Kazakhstan too Richfor aRevolution- President”, 46 October 25, 2005. 25, October ” 92 91 . CEU eTD Collection forces and reduce the revolutionary mechanisms. Ban on activities of international Ban non international of mechanisms. profitforceson activities andreducethe revolutionary measures. The regimes power anti-revolutionary ‘hard’and Uzbekand both- actively the ‘soft’ Kazakhregimes used were taking preemptive shows that It information. totheabove-mentioned regard bemadewith can conclusions Several strikes to neutralize the potentialsecuring goals. their revolutionary revolutionary mechanisms usedduring the electoral revolutions andintroduced them for the regimes the that andshows analyzed in forcesrevolutions electoral the revolutionary 95 bloody/#more-18. http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/kazakhstan_NIT_2006.pdf. 94 http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/hillf/20051031_kazakhstan.pdf. 93 Kazakh by hear top aconcert to Astana hall capital inthe newa shiny sports at gathered shirts and week thebefore presidential “moreelection 4,000people than in identical yellow baseball caps a held rally final At the introduced. were elements ideological process in this that significant demonstrations, regime the carried out stepsthe for mobilizingits supporters. In this regard,it is and elections prior the after month to 94 crowdthe control weapons machineand guns, aswell receiving trainingin putting down rallies. for demonstrations. There werereports dispellingthe conductingof preparations police ordering for countering wastaken The focus The regimeon prepared rallies. opposition the also processes. political domestic in the involvement community’s 2005.” operations offoreign NGOs in Kazakhstan was putbefore parliamentthe in spring and summer Freedom House. Freedom “ Fiona Hill, “Wither Kazakhstan?“, “Wither Hill, Fiona In April 2005, the Parliament of Kazakhstan adopted In April Parliamenta lawthe of bannedforKazakhstan 2005, adopted one which rallies The election trail gets a bit blood”, 93 pop groups” The regime’s message was clear- that they would not tolerate the international the not tolerate they would that clear- message was The regime’s Nations Nations in Transition 2006, Kazakhstan . 96 is It noteworthy that these tactics closely resembles ones used by the used ones resembles closely tactics these that noteworthy National Interest http://kazakhstan.blogsome.com/2005/11/25/the-election-trail-gets-a-bit- . 95 . October31, 2005. Besides theplans tosuppress opposition the 47 , CEU eTD Collection 97 for the post-Soviet regimes. of importance factor the of in Russian information strategies political developingtechnologists made by rulerwhothe neverbeen generous in particular apraisegiving underlines the 96 ‘Iam guests, in yourconfident unbiased and objective evaluation of issues”. the is Uzbekistan currently attack," an"information Uzbekunder the strongman told his Russian that “noting evident became visit the of goal the Karimov President the with meeting the On massacre. Andijan the after months several Uzbekistan visited also technologists political Russian The 2005,Kazakhstan 2006. Azerbaijan to themelections- the regimesduring whichresorted republics” well ex-Soviet as in other been working since Ukraine’s ‘orange revolution’ tostymie any popular revoltin Russia itself, as who by “have used weredeveloped electoral by regimes the the revolutions technologists these Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.According to political analysts the tactics of mimicking the tactics of A special comment should be made with regard againstchance tono regimes. the forces protest massive toorganize stood revolutionary the role of Russian the circumstances such under fact, In political disbanded. cruelly or banned either were rallies technologists in domestic and international non governmental organizations were suppressed andbanned; the with the ideasindoctrinated were harassed; people the or arrested leaderswereeither opposition The regime. of the opposition’s revolutionary forces wereso weakened that they couldmountany not serious challenge to the by wellbefore theactual strikes preemptive of so day elections, that time potential the viciousnesswere few among many measures. The anti-revolutionary specific undertake goal was to and weaknessorganizations; arrest and harassment of the members of the opposition; informationand campaigns- the regimes’ strength; the Ibid. Gulf Times , “Peoplebandwagon power grindsto Kazakhstan”halt in 97 . These tactics afterwards were disseminated among weredisseminated the . These afterwards tactics 48 , Monday 5, 2006. 98 This comment This CEU eTD Collection radical opposition groups.” “the goal of program this is understandable tome, and itconsists of keepingyouth from joining that stated Belkovskii Stanislav analyst political the Policy, Youth Russia’s the explaining when youth. recruit this In regard weakeningto The regimecapacity opposition’s also aimed atthe rallies. instrumental in organizing pro-governmental the organizations and dispersing the opposition organizations has been toassemble the well-organized youth groups of people whowould be participated and where the main message conveyed was to express their support for Russia’s express and theirsupport wasto participated main messageconveyed wherethe 100 happenwill not here.’” variant see theUkrainian whom that ‘Westto the “he wants to according http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/58BA252F-9639-421C-8E91-4A4C5FC0EB05.html. Together); 99 from RFE/RL. 98 wereestablished- several these youth.youth purpose For organizations The Russia’s regime paidmuch attention on recruiting andmobilizing the pro-governmental ideology. controllinginternational and domestic nonprofitorganizations and developing anti-revolutionary measures. Themajor focus has been youth establishingtaken on organizations, pro-governmental technologists is just one part (though important) of the Russia’s regime’s anti-revolutionary useof the these itself. However, in Russia measures anti-revolutionary outthe carrying and developing in the engaged actively were technologists political Russian the Understandably, 3.4. Russia Julia A. Corvin, “Taking Youth Policy to the Next level”, Radio Daniel Kimmage, “ These organizations rallies held numerous inwhich tensof the thousands activistsof Nashi November26, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp112606.shtml. Russia (Ours); /Uzbekistan: Bringing Political Systems ‘Closer Together 99 Mestnye made The same was leaderNashi by comment of the Yakemenko (Locals). 49 The idea behind establishing theseyouth Free Europe/ Radio Liberty ”. Idushie Vmeste EurasiaNet Partner Post . November 11, 2005, 11, . November (Walking CEU eTD Collection http://www.workers.org/2006/world/ngos-0216. 102 101 http 100 NGOs was useof the propaganda campaignwhichportrayed NGOsas spies workingand puppets it reasonsenough violation considered majorof Another democratic standards. tool to combat revolution.” down on NGOs mightthat use foreign funding topromote an upheaval like Ukraine's Orange clamp government the help should “legislation sponsors, bill's the of one was who Ostrovsky financing ofnongovernmental organizations.” the for conditions transparent create and countries foreign by life political internal Russia’s political This objectives. situation is Thisunacceptable. law is designed prevent to interference in they become an instrumentit not, “WhetherWith want stated law or regardtothis organizations that Putin these government. in the foreign organizations and hands groups which receive funding from outside Russia register with the of foreignlaw requires new The that of NGOs. andactivities financing registration, on restrictions the states that use NGOs andinternational NGOs. In themJanuary 2006, the PutinPresident singed alaw which imposed to achieve The steps regime’s unleashed NGOscanbedividedgroups-their against two against into domestic the own organizations. non-governmental against aimed also was targets other among which plan revolutionary they showed that were not only by established Kremlin,the but they were apart of a bigger anti- governmentthe atfirst tried todistance itself from these organizations thefurther developments sell out Russia to theWest” to They elections. are preparing society before the our membersMestnye, “are the his of political against whowanttodividecharlatans organization regime and contempt against the democratic opposition. According to Sergei Fateev,leader of the Sara Flounders Ibid. Anna Arutunyan, “Pro-Kremlin YouthGroup: Orange Revolution, Go Home!”, ://www.mosnews.com/commentary/2005/05/16/nashirally.shtml. 103 This bill received much criticism from the international community which with which community international the from criticism much received bill This , “ 450,000 NGOs inRussia. U.S Finances opposition,” 102 50 According to the Member of Russian Alexei Russian of Member the to According Workers World Workers Moscow News , February 6, 2006. . May 16, 2005, . 101 Though CEU eTD Collection 3AC4D549A134.html. Liberty. 106 sofia.org/uploaded/1163753090__od161106.pdf. 105 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-05/13/content_2954292.htm. 104 103 foreign friends can and will try to repeat them”. not be limited to2007-08[when Russia holds parliamentary and presidential elections]. Our Serbia in listthe “orange” of victims –“why not itdo in a fifth? I think that these will attempts off agenda,the since if they managed to pull it off in four countries” -- the reference includes intake” Ashe (hisreference Russia toelectoral “Irevolutions). stated can'tsay that thisis issue regime” pressure from below andinternational from pressure thatdestroyedabove theLeonid Kuchma immediately considered was response as“Moscow’s dangerous to the combination of populist of understanding democracy) totheKremlin’s (according Russia’s way democracy of outlines which doctrine This example. book case a represents Surkov Vladislav Administration Democracy’ which was devolved inFebruary 2006by Deputy Head of Presidential the of ‘Sovereign concept In the this regard Russia’s population. basis to ideological alterative attemptedThe regime todevelop anti-revolutionary in also the ideology to offer an order governmentthe by financing the opposition through non-governmental organizations”. topple to in Belarus revolution" "velvet so-called a plotting were services intelligence “foreign wasstatementpropaganda made by Federal Russian Security Service headNikolai Patrushev against Russia’s and Russia’s allies national interests. For example, a typical case of such Daniel Kimmage, “Kazakhstan: 'Sovereign Democracy' In Almaty and Moscow,” and In Almaty Democracy' 'Sovereign “Kazakhstan: Kimmage, Daniel Russian-style”. democracy’, “‘Sovereign Krastev, Ivan Ibid. China View July 10, 2006. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/7/6129BE69-8044-4EAD-A401- 105 Surkov himself did not conceal that the focus of the doctrine was combating “a soft “a combating was doctrine the of focus the that conceal not did himself Surkov , “Moscow accuses foreign spies of funding ‘revolution’ in Belarus”, in ‘revolution’ of funding spies foreign accuses “Moscow , 51 106 OpenDemocracy , November, 26, 2006. http://www.cls- May 12, 2005, RadioFree Europe/ Radio 104 CEU eTD Collection demanding that Azerbaijan hold free andfair The elections. Council of ParliamentaryEurope based elections, ontheexperienceUnderstandably, of international the was 2003 community the of crisis years”. past ten rights human gravest its experiencing is Azerbaijan post-election “the Watch, Rights and Asia Central Rachel Europe of acting Division of director Human the to executive Denber, According by criticisms community. received harsh international massive crackdown the election 107 to the Aliev received resultsofficial Ilham percent 76.8 votes. of yearsplace two thefraudulent after and violent presidential in inelections 2003, which according Azerbaijan Party,the Front andParty Party. Ittook the Equality Popular Azerbaijan Democratic rulingwere the bloc opposition and the of consisting NewAzerbaijan Azadliq(Freedom) Party contenders main The 2005. 6, November on held were in Azerbaijan elections Parliamentary 3.5. Azerbaijan 2005 andBelarusregimes. ofAzerbaijan measures anti-revolutionary the Ielaborate the forces.on victory over In sub-chapter this succeeded instampingopposition their elections in Azerbaijan 2006 and the presidential elections in Belarus in 2006- which regimesthe parliamentary elections- post-Soviet two of experience the using from benefits also regime The Russia’s measures). of anti-revolutionary can by success bethe fact that explained partially (the in Russia revolution electoral of chance slimmest is only there is that now position dominant revolution and insure a smoothexplains the enormous amount of transitionwork carried out by the regime in order to avoid electoral of powerSurkov’s reference elections tothe their 2007-2008 proves vital importanceKremlin tothe and from Putin to his successor. In general, the http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2004/06.pdf. Heidi Sobergren, “Azerbaijan: Presidential Elections October 2003,” 108 52 NORDEM Report06/2004, 107 These results and post- These results the CEU eTD Collection 112 N°40 Baku/Brussels, 21 November2005. 111 http://www.eurasianet.org/azerbaijan/news/turkey_20051104.html 110 October2005. 109 January 23, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/23/azerba6992.htm. 108 report“ OSCE/ODIHR whichsupporters allowdid not for organizing competitive the campaigning. andmembers and intimidation of arrests party opposition characterized with widespread interested really was government the goal only the that showed developments pre-election the community, in to achievedespite However, all demandsforthese organizing fairthe elections issuedby international the was holding to would stage beinternational areheld].” andorderly [if strengthened elections transparent power by any position the on Azerbaijan’s manner. in andan transparent orderly areconducted if elections the means. Thebe much will stronger elections”Azerbaijan adhere principles of competitive to the government elections elections". democratic organize campaign opportunity for Azerbaijani the toshowauthorities that they have the political will and ability to was Ensemble adopteda resolution in which itdescribed theupcoming elections as “crucial leaders “If there are massive falsifications, we will call on fight, within wewill tobounds people call on the massivethe “If leaders falsifications, are there possibility of organizing anelectoral Accordingrevolution. Ali to Kerimli, of one Azadliq’s the message about to spreadthe started opposition the wasbecoming evident, elections the through government the changing of impossibility the when circumstances, such Under on markedhad election effectthe process". a negative and has and byexecutive authorities candidates address redressseriousviolations to or authorities PACE Mevlut Katik, “ Human Rights Watch, OSCE/ODIHR International CrisisGroup , "Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan Offer anOpportunity that Should Not Be Missed", Strasbourg, 13 Interim Report No. 3, op. cit., 3, quoted in Azerbaijan's 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity. Turkey Encourages aFree-and-Fair Vote in Azerbaijan “Azerbaijan: Government Launches post-Election Crackdown,” Human Right News. Right Human Crackdown,” post-Election Launches Government “Azerbaijan: " , “Azerbaijan’s 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity,” Policy Briefing, Europe Briefing the continuing failure of election commissions and the prosecuting the and commissions election of failure continuing the 109 Azerbaijan the on called also ally, closest its Turkey, 53 112 ”. EurasiaNet, April11, 2005, 111 Also according to 110 CEU eTD Collection 115 http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1103/p06s01-wosc.html. 114 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article586365.ece. 113 constitution,” the of government. to decided pursue theactive campaigningbloc all country the over notand do hide the theirintentions tochange the tool tactical major its As exile). in latter (the Guliyev Rasul Chairman DPA and Gambar Isa Chairman Musavat Kerimli, Ali Chairman PFPA were leaders alliance's The (Freedom). bloc Azadliq to form electoral managedthe Party- Democratic Party andAzerbaijan thefirstFor timemain three opposition theparties- Azerbaijan Party, Front Popular Equality the 3.5.1. Political Opposition opposition youth parties; organizations; and independent election monitoring organizations. eliminatingfactors which three the crucialplayed role intheprevious post-Soviet revolutions: at weredirected anti-revolutionarymeasures Its of revolutions. any organizing electoral attempts underestimated”. be not should events these of impact psychological The win. can you end, the to fight ifis people revolutions afterthe in whichshowed place Georgia, that Ukraineyoutaking and “this election that stated, leaders, of opposition the one Ali Kerimli, revolutions. electoral Soviet power mechanisms. power useof for and‘soft” weresecuredthrough the failure. Thesegoals ‘hard’ was doomed revolution any rallies to theopposition’s anddemonstrate to organize that supporters attempt electoral regardto with the partiesopposition weretosuppress theopposition’s capacity of organizing the Yigal Schleifer, “In Azerbaijan ‘a Neck-Tie Revolt”, Neck-Tie ‘a “In Azerbaijan Schleifer, Yigal Jeremy Page, “West balks at backing revolutionas elections loom in oil-rich state”, EurasiaNet. 115 Azerbaijan Elections 2005, Party Profiles. http://www.eurasianet.org/azerbaijan/parties/index.html. The governmentalso hadits towardsthe own plans majoropposition. Its goals 114 However, governmentwas ready suppressing take a challengeon the of to 113 The Azeri inspired wasopposition by success of the previousthe post- CSMonitor 54 , November 3, 2005, 3, November , Times, November4, 2005. CEU eTD Collection arrested 26 arrested people, mostly of members Guliyev’s party chargeson of a coup attempt. The official was arrested in Ukraine. On the same he request day, government’s Azerbaijan the to asaccording Azerbaijan, comeallowed to to was not the officers of Azerbaijan National Azeri on charges, leadercorruption soughtbythe police DPA, Rasul of the 17, October Guliyev, Security Ministry The regime measures leadership alsocarried On againstthe out of movement. opposition the in society". unacceptable a democratic bordering on cruelty,outright displayed by forcespolice whilebreaking uppublic rallies…is developments in Azerbaijan by stating that “thedisproportionate violence and brutality, October, 2005, quoted in Azerbaijan's 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity. International Crisis Group. 118 were threatened, and made to withdraw [from madeand the race]”. [from towithdraw were threatened, [and] wehadrally arrested about200ofsupporters attempt, hundredsbeaten.our Candidates 117 116 days. several for besurenot oftheirHundreds safety.werearrested, of for period, shortoften people occasionally for a prerequisite largesuccessful demonstrations- electoral could demonstrators The revolution. mechanism-revolutionary people’s power. The opposition could hopeto not organize long and fundamental the of one eradicating was regime the rallies, the dispelling or authorization depriving the opposition an opportunity to organize the demonstrations either bydenying holdBaku. By in downtown the rallies to Azadlig wasdenied authorization occasions when to the demonstrations in organize locations. This was central inthe fourobserved separate and arrest the opposition activists. The common practice was denyto the opposition authorization Major “hard” power mechanisms were the use of physical force to dispel the opposition rallies Insight Rovshan Ismayilov, “Azerbaijan’s Campaign Ends, AttentionNow Focusing onPost-Election Period,” Azerbaijan's 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity,13. PACE, "Parliamentary Elections in AzerbaijanOffer an Opportunity that should not be missed," Strasbourg, 13 , October 4, 2005 116 According to Ali Kerimli, a leader of the opposition Azadlig bloc, “At every Azadlig“At bloc, leader Ali of the a opposition to Kerimli,According , http://www.eurasianet.org/azerbaijan/news/campaignend_20051104.html. 118 55 117 PACEhad tothese torespond Eurasia CEU eTD Collection after organizingafter ahunger secured strike that return the of its one members,of Namiq Ferziyev, to members organization’s variedfrom 2500 1500 people.to to According Party of Azerbaijan. Front Popular (Waves), 121 120 2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav101705b.shtml. wereformed: youth elections several the Before organizations 3.5.2. Youth Organizations demonstrations. in the participating from goal 119 an similar inlongin Azerbaijan has end ago,” to come tothose protests Ukraine of street “Theera Aliyev stated that ThePresident base significant. wasnot support opposition’s hand the not possible inAzerbaijan, asthe governmentenjoyed the widespread support, when on the other a revolution that constantlywas reiterated andsupporters party representatives The government an into anarchy”. country plunge the conducting portraying PRcampaigns as “traitors” who opposition the and would “provocateurs” were Internet an radio TVschannels, controlled government The omnipotence. regimes’ ideaof with people the andindoctrinating revolution conceptof electoral “demonizing” the powermechanisms ‘soft’ Such opposition, the were typical cases of actions aimedatdiscrediting and suchaprovocation. prevented authorities process the thenews oppositionwasplanning tocirculate election stared todisruptthe thatthe that sources Katik, “Turkey Encourages a Free-and-Fair Vote in Azerbaijan”. Ibid. Rovshan Ismayilov, “Opposition-Government Battle overResponse to Guliyev,” of of wassuch announcements toshatter people’s in trust oppositionthe and people discourage Yeni Fikr (New Thinking), 120 Yox! (No!). 56 Yeni Fikir Yeni Fikir 119 122 was associated with the opposition the with associated was Yeni Fikir activists, the number of the Megam Eurasia Insight received much publicity (It IsTime), , October 17, October , Dalga 121 The CEU eTD Collection 125 September20, 2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092005.shtml. 124 123 http://www.eurasianet.org/azerbaijan/news/youth_20051103.html. term for his role in a supposed coup plot. Tagiyev, Ramin organizing anti-government protests with aim the of overthrowing the government. The same day, Poland by sponsored Nuri National Institute, the Democratic instructionsallegedly on received Azerbaijani According government. tothe while sources, official attending atraining in session Nuri was detainedfor 48hours chargeson ofconspiring toorganize acoupagainst the agents Armenian as identified men two with office disseminated video that depicted Bashirli signing areceiptfor $2,000 and drinking cognac with financial backing from Armenian special services. The Azerbaijani Prosecutor-General’s Parliamentary Elections”, 122 because of the were carriedout thearrests that AliKerimli stated Party Front Chairman leader of a Bashirli, strikeblow”. decided andtherefore apreemptive to movement, leaders in the Azadlig opposition bloc said that "Authorities were aware of the power of the youth first. In this regard,The regime dangertheyouth comprehended the that organizations posed to its ruleand attacked Fuad Mustafayev, deputy well. as chiefrallies protest mass the in organizing of the Popular Frontand distributing and pamphlets brochures. Theyouth Party,organizations could havebeen instrumental and one of the become actively in engaged every aspect of upcomingthe –campaigning, elections monitoring, with affiliation his of because from reportedly been hadthere, expelled earlier who University, Pedagogical Azerbaijan Ibid. Khadija Ismayilova, “Youth Activists in Azerbaijan Say they are Being Targeted by Government,” Ibid. Mina Muradova and RufatAbbasov, “YouthGroups in Azerbaijan EncounterDifficulties during Run-up to Yeni Fikir Yeni Fikir Eurasianet, Azerbaijan Elections 2005 Yeni Fikir. another deputy chairperson, was sentenced to a three-month prison , was arrested on charges of plotting a coup attempt in Azerbaijan attempt acoup chargesplotting of on , wasarrested Inspired with this Inspired with success thesethis youth organizations planned to 125 . Commenting on these arrests, leader of Popular leader the of arrests, these Commenting on 124 57 On September 12, . November3, 2005. 123 Yeni Fikir Ruslan 2005 3, AugustOn Deputy Deputy Chairperson EurasiaNet, CEU eTD Collection to become such as significant force as as significant such to become election The youth and developments. post-elections in organizations Azerbaijan never managed influence pre- to the youth significantlyorganizations’ capacities the undermined counterparts foreign well of morecooperation attempts the with as thwarting experienced establishing waveof leadersUnderstandably,of the arrests members andyouth the of as the the organizations Without Borders. Reporters watchdog for Mass of for Kyiv-basedthe Media, theinternational Institute representation Ukraine's observers- among them were a senior leader among them of were asenior observers- Ukraine. Yevtushenko, a leader of organizations and the Ukrainian youth organization- The regimelaunched also aimed attacks the atdisrupting cooperation the localbetween the youth youth groups’ activism,forcing them focusto mainly on their own survival.” hamper significantly to been has actions recent government’s the of effect The 2005. throughout has increased youth of persecution “thegroups authorities' these the against organizations struggle istoisolate them”. Human Rights Watch condemned the regime’s oppressive policy the stop people young these make to way only the that think [authorities] "They Azerbaijan. deteriorate after stolen elections. 128 November9, 2005. 127 126 fear of authorities’ Ibid. Taras Kuzio,“Azerbaijani-Ukrainian relations deteriorate stolenafter elections,” Ukrayinska Pravda 127 Azerbaijan also deported also Azerbaijan http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2005/470505.shtml. , November 8. 2005. obkom.net.ua, quoted in Kuzio. in quoted obkom.net.ua, 2005. 8. , November Yeni Fikir’s Pora, increasing popularity and their desire to reduceyouth activism in was arrested at Baku airport. Two days after he was deported days Two at hewasdeported after to Bakuairport. was arrested 128 Otpor, Kmara andPora. Pora activists who traveled to Azerbaijan as election 58 Pora, Yevhen Zolotariov, and Serhii Taran, head andSerhii Taran, YevhenZolotariov, Pora. On Sergei On September 15,2005, Azerbaijani-Ukrainian relations Eurasia Daily Monitor, 126 CEU eTD Collection 130 October26, 2005, http://www.today.az/news/politics/20974.html. 129 elections. the amandate wasnotgranted toobserve Affairs for International Institute National the Democratic visit example, For deprivingAzerbaijan. to observe observersan opportunity orthe elections the to regardtoforeign organizationsWith resorted Azeri the to refusing accreditation government both- domestic and foreign election monitoring organizations. of activities hindering the wereaimed against efforts The organizations. these against directed werealso of Azeri regime the methods anti-revolutionary the role. Consequently, significant election monitoring organizations which election the fraudexposed played an extremely independent findingsthe the As the experienceshowed,of previousrevolutions the electoral of 3.5.3. Independent Election Monitoring Organizations international donors. Only on 25 on Only donors. international organization conduct to monitoring,the asthemajor funding sources of for them were the theelections.monitor This imposed by limitation regimethe wasinfactbanning any domestic allowed werenot to morefundinginternational than from of 30 percent sources received their these which domestic the organizations according Election Code, the to that, problem facedwas organizations major The organizations. monitoring election domestic active most the among The Election Monitoring Center, For the Sake of Civil Society, and Law and Development- were domestic organizations. 130 a visa- reportedly for her criticizing the government’s conduct of 2003 the presidential election. Ismayilov, “Azerbaijan’s Campaign Ends, Attention Now Focusing on Post-Election Period”. Azerbaijan monitoring majorelection However, the brunt unleashedof independent against on attack was Today 129 Irina Lasota, head of the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, wasrefused Europe, in headfor Democracy Institute Eastern of the Irina Lasota, , “National Democratic Institute probably will be again deprived of observing elections”, th of after of October 2005,thecontinuous demandfrom PACE, the 59 CEU eTD Collection Reforms Party, Umid Party, United Popular Front Party, Great Creation Party, Social Prosperityalliance, Civil SolidarityParty, and Civiland Ana Vatan Parties eachwon two seats; the oppositionLiberal Party, Democratictripartite bloc Azadlig (Freedom) received only eight seats. The opposition Yeni Sisayet (YeS – New Policy) 134 Insight 133 http://www.postchronicle.net/newsboard/index.cgi?frames=n;read=6232. 132 131 limitation. this did Commission andVenice OSCE/ODHIR, the AliyevPresident sing decreewhich the lifted mount election observation efforts that citizens can trust and tarnishes their accomplishments in accomplishments doingtheir so”. tarnishes and trust can citizens that efforts observation election mount for CSOs to difficultmakes it society organization]- CSOs[civil asnonpartisan same status the monitoring organizations. AsMaharramov argues “Theexistence of such groups-which claim The electionby election was marked Independent” “pseudo- factof the of establishing various adequatelyenough prepare time for to theelection monitoring. governmental governmental party was not strong. oppositions’ againstprotests the elections results which granted absolutethe majority the to the that accidental not is it regime, the by the out carried strikes preemptive these all With 3.5.4. ThePost-Election Developments pall. was toproduce which results the would with compete those of USAIDexitindependent funded Mitofsky International use ofvarious exitandpolls. The opposition claimed that sponsors the of the two companies- Saar Poll- were the representativeswere aimed atconfusing publicwith the real the same The situation. was attempted goal through of the Azeri by findings by purposefully different issued organizations regime.the orchestrated The these regime and the aim According to the official results, the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan party (YAP) received 58 seats out of the 121.The of the out seats 58 received (YAP) party Azerbaijan Yeni the ruling results, official the to According International Crisis Group, “Azerbaijan’s 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity”. Sarvat Maharramo, “Azerbaijan Ready for Election”, September 27, 2005, 27, September Election”, for Ready “Azerbaijan Maharramo, Sarvat Khadija Ismaylova, “ Azerbaijan: 133 , October, 5,2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav100505.shtml. 132 The high numberof election monitoring organizations was confusing,often 131 But with just two weeks before the elections the organizations did not have not did organizations the elections the before weeks two just with But Debate Over exit Polls Threatens Confidence in Election Results,” Election in Confidence Threatens Polls exit Over Debate 134 lacked capacity The wasdisorganizedthe and opposition 60 Eurasia CEU eTD Collection to promptto us tocall intoquestion outcomethe ofthe elections”. The Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Lavrov stated that “They [violations] were notso serious as important country rich in themovement of a strategically with relations in interested were notUSA and‘spoiling’ EU the oil. Russia was also prompt the Ukraine. Apparently, or as in inAzerbaijan Georgia developments the strongly to that react in offering support for the Azeri regime. 138 http://www.eurasianet.org/azerbaijan/news/leadership_20051117.html. elections.” parliament of completion successful “"the with Aliyev President Azerbaijan the congratulated ralliesfuture wasdeniedbytheBakucity government. downtown Baku on November 26was brutally suppressed by policethe and authorizationthe for whichgovernment didnot bring any for results them. The attempt toorganize arallyin 137 136 http://www.eurasianet.org/azerbaijan/news/opposition_20051116.html. 135 government party supporters) comprise the remainder of the 121 final results. Unity Party eachsecured one seat in parliament. Independents without formal party affiliation (but in fact the to mountwidespreadmovement. protest Forces of Forces Belarus); Sergei DemocraticGaidukevich (Liberal Party of Belarus); Alaksandarand (United Democratic AlexanderMilinkievic candidates: three fraudulent, wasrunningagainst for presidency a as result of 2004 referendum by considered internationalthe community as presidential elections. In these elections, Lukashenko, who was permitted to run for the third term sinceOn byAleksandra ruled March 19,2006Belarus, 1994,held Lukashenko presidentthe 3.6. Belarus Elections 2006 changein Azerbaijan. regime end the to marked the of attempt international Azeribacking, the attemptkeep not opposition did to organizing rallies. the This Ibid. Sergei Blagov, “Russia Backs Azerbaijani Leadership in Poll Controversy,” Ibid. Choices,” Tactical Important Faces Opposition “Azerbaijani Ismayilov, Rovshan 138 . Without andmass organize. strongcapacity theconsiderable protest the the to 135 61 with negotiations the in engaged became It 136 The international community did not did community international The 137 EurasiaNet Putin The Russian President EurasiaNet, , November17, 2005, CEU eTD Collection measures represent interesting phenomena to explore. to interesting phenomena represent measures the wide front. They were aimed against a response to theelections manipulations during presidential the the haveelections been carried at political opposition and civil society. as atpreventingrevolution electoral regime the aiming Belarusian of measures the revolutionary Both of these 141 2006. 140 http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/breaking_news/12801069.htm. 139 LukashenkoBelarus “brought policythe preemptionof to perfection. potentialthe forcesrevolutionary had been taken before elections.the As Silitski,mentions under in combating measuresmajor the However, opposition. force the use against the to threatening The afterdevelopments theelections showed thatLukashenkoexaggeratingwas not in that threatened revolution, the of mentioning any of suspicious particularly revolution in Belarus. of electoral the seearepetition desire to their neverconcealed theopposition that account into for factor the regime,especially taking irritating regime,wasaconsiderable of critic the a vocal also Kazulin, of that with coupled campaigning active His officials. EU as well as leaders national with countries andmetnegative of regime.the sides European Healso visited several Georgia andUkraine. Hewastraveling in extensively regionsthe of country the exposingand the in of experience of the electoral campaigning revolutions leaders previous the the resembled bewas considered to majorincumbentthe Lukashenko. contender Hisstyle against the of Milinkievic candidates, opposition the Among Party). Social Democratic Kazulin (Belarusian Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case ofBelarus Case The Democracy: Preempting Silitski, Dictator,” Ex-Soviet last Europe’s down “Bringing Lee Myers, Steven Belarus,” in Elections “The News, Mercuri hours. that we theseknow instigating are acts. who those and it doing Embassies actually are what who of those necks the ofwring certain they states should Any beareattempt to destabilizeaware the situation will be metof with drastic action.this.up We will Theyto. should know They will be thrown out of here within 24 140 139 Lukashenko, who after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was Ukraine in Revolution Orange the after who Lukashenko, , 62 84. New York Times Magazine 141 Indeed, the anti- the Indeed, . February 26, CEU eTD Collection Silitski, “Pre-emptive Democracy- Learning from Defeat”, 95. 145 193. Defeat”, from “Learning 144 143 142 buildings inbe only located office the to party offices the whichrequired that Code Housing years. two for imprisoned were Movement, Front Young leaderthe the of Seviarynec, Paval and Party, Social Democratic the of Chairman opposition-Statkievich, Mikalaj measures againstthe addition preemptive regime carried out by regime. the orchestrated be to believed Hanchar), Viktar Committee Election Central the of Chairman former the Yury and formerZacharanka Interior (theof Minister opponents of regime’s the disappearance Often his weremoremovement. methods for unscrupulous- than example, mysterious the The whole period of Lukashenko’s rule has been marred byhis suppression of oppositionthe 3.6.1. ThePolitical Opposition of the border”. had south and occurred such asthosethat situations avoid commandstructure, the systems, unity the Head of thewith oppositionthe demonstrations. TheProsecutor-General Sheiman Viktar as was appointed Presidentialmeeting for fired was Eryn Leanid chief KGB example, for officials; ranking high the among Administrationpeacetime”. with a clearthe mandatepresident was enhancedsuppress the demonstration with amendments the to thePolice Law,whichgranted “to consolidate to ‘flexibility’ bodies. police’s The law-enforcement Belarusian for norm the the action of a right the power “to make arbitrary decisions on the use of firearms by police in David Marples, “Belarus: The Return of Sheiman,” Return The “Belarus: Marples, David Ibid, 94. Ibid., 88. Charter-97 News Service 144 purges loyalty wasachievedby bodies The conducting law-enforcement the of 145 The opposition was attacked from another front as well; in early 2005 the new the 2005 in early well; as front another from attacked was opposition The ,”Interior troops Will Fulfill Any Tyrant’s Order,” February 1, 2005, quoted in Silitski. 142 inLukashenko’s presidential 2006 With election the upcoming 143 Eurasia Daily Monitor The harassment of the opposition activists became activists opposition of the The harassment 63 , 1- 8 December2004, quoted in CEU eTD Collection complex nature shows how seriously and profoundly the regime prepared for these elections. and innovative Their demonstrations. opposition’s revolution- electoral the of mechanism cornerstone the combating at aimed which measures anti-revolutionary innovative were These 23. was intensification of and Silitski states: propaganda information the dissemination. period. Summit’s andagenda; itwould shorten mainthe opposition candidate’s Milinkevich’s campaign Belarus; itwould not coincide with G8 the Summitin Russia taking Belarus the issue out of the mean which elections representativesparliamentary wouldnotbeablewould the that travel to to Ukraine’s itthe with coincide would candidates; of presidential nomination the forprocess the factors explaining move: this it would create problems toopposition with collecting signatures of moving March assaulted date elections from by the liststhe several 2006. Silitski June to was presidential forelections the organizecampaign asuccessful to capacity The opposition organizational capacity. 149 148 147 146 revolution. electoral of successful prerequisite weather in March hinder organization wouldlengthyof demonstrations, amajorprotest in resulted hundred closure of the party offices, three Silitski, Ibid., 142. Ibid,. 142. Silitski, “Belarus: Learning from Defeat”, 140. 147 “ cold The weather. the is concerning factors one in these remarkable ismostWhat combat the efforts of the opposition. of the efforts the combat regime the change in and Belarus giving organize officialsto the advance instructions onhow to efforts the unmasking manuals even and reports analytical special population the official take on the revolutions. Security forces began publishing documentaries, propaganda broadcasts, andreports, newspaper articles explain to the countless shared who media, state the in intensified propaganda Orange Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union (the Case ofBelarus)”, Case (the Union Soviet Former in the Authoritarianism Preemptive Deterred: Contagion 149 148 64 Another innovative anti-revolutionary measure anti-revolutionary innovative Another 146 impedingconsiderably opposition’s the CEU eTD Collection amendments to the Criminal Code according to which participation in activities of de-registered of in activities participation which to according Code Criminal the to amendments liquidatedwere close forced or down.InNovemberto adopted government 2005,the From more2005 2003 through than a hundredthe of most active NGOscritical authoritiesthe of A was strong particularly launchedattack against domestic the non-governmental organizations. ”. penalcode’ 289of the under Article as terrorists ‘considered on election day alland warnedthat individuals whojoined election wouldday protests be government the of overthrow violent a preparing was opposition the elections of guise the “under that stated that Minister and Interior the Chief headof KGB,the the Prosecutor the conference, a jointOn press harsher. March 16at werebecoming statements official approaching the http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2006/06/19393_en.pdf. 153 153 151 150 revolutions). electoral of definition (Lukashenko’s banditry” of “acts affairs” in internal “meddling to calledrevolution velvet NGOs forthrough 50million dollars”. deputy that“certain chief implementforcessecurity Belarus' argued wantservice, a so-of to was toportray pattern NGOs these foreign with Veger, linked Viktor as closely services. security them A in most the negativeway.portrayed NGOswhich andinternational domestic regular propaganda campaignsrole againstthe conduct wasassigned to measures the significant whichresource involved‘soft’ both and mechanisms. ‘hard’ power Among ‘soft “power schemean this vital elaborate to revolutionary suppressing of Lukashenko’s resorted regime another The governmentattacked majorforce: opponent and civil potential revolutionary society. 3.6.2. Civil Society Ibid. OSCE/ODIHR Freedom House Ibid., 5. Ibid., Election Observation Mission Report on Presidential Elections inBelarus 2006, , “Reporton Belarus 2006”, //www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/WoW/2006/Belarus2006.pdf.http: 151 of Belarus by the international community in order to conduct to in order community international the by Belarus of 65 153 150 made was The usual reference 152 With the date of elections of date the With CEU eTD Collection forces attempting a Yugoslavia-style coup and portraying the Western election monitors aspart election monitors and Western coup the aYugoslavia-style forces portraying attempting Cooperation in (OSCE) inEurope Belarus of representing headquarters the of the opposition and for Security mission Organization of the permanent the towards accusation regime’s the was of case typical One work. observers’ foreign the obstructing or them against campaigns election monitoring aswell. included organizations activities conducting These propaganda were considered tobeacrime.were considered was banned by courtthe in April 2005; conducting of public opinion surveysa without license independent polling agencyin critical pastthe the against official election and referenda result, election”. the uprising after inarrested February 2006 on charges of“organizingfraudulentexit polls and planning aviolent were ‘Partnership’ monitoring election of largest leaders the key Four observers. international domestic and was -against two-fold attack this regard,the In organizations. observation election independent force- revolutionary thecrucial The Belarus neutralized also regime regime took noregime took chance inneutralizing NGOs: 157 http://web.amnesty.org/appeals/index/blr-011106-wwa-eng. 156 155 154 NGOs by up to yearsthree in prison. Silitski, “ContagionDeterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union(the Case of Belarus), 25. Amnesty International, “ Silitski, ”Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union(the Case of Belarus)”, Ibid., 5. 24. international situation in the republic of Belarus or its poweror bodies. military, social, economic, on political, data falseful deliberately with organization international or foreign state, offoreign ‘provision for in prison years ‘Discreditation of the Republic of establishes Belarus’ punishmentof up to two Belarus’ of became punishable by up to five security years. And the external new ‘the article to detriment in actions take to community international to organization of mass disordersArticle may be punished by up to three years in jail.293 Calls was amended so that teaching or other training of persons for Belarus: Election Monitors Imprisoned 156 Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies, the 157 Lukashenko’s regime carried out measuresinternational against Lukashenko’s carried regime out 154 Further elaboration on these amendments shows that the that shows amendments these on elaboration Further 66 ”, November2006, 155 CEU eTD Collection retrenchment in the post-Soviet space,” 161 CIS Observers Vladimir Rushailo”, March 20, 2006. 160 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12095. 159 158 Aleksanderincumbent Lukashenko. of opponents to pertained allegations, andthese of all candidates of nomination of process violations that CIS account. The intoonly observers elections taken these if thestancesurprising towards organization this of of the Belarusian presidential election of 2006 found were in the members of a Scandinavian unofficial election observers group March 15,eight on for example, country; the from expelledBelarus or to entrance were refused elections’ the over dirt ‘spreading of campaign international an of pressure” external of despite elections the unprecedented commitments democratic Belarus’ international and and election complied code election theballot mission,campaign with the observation CISelection including the majority observers, of “in of opinion the the overwhelming statement was no fraudelection during the elections- the Ministry issuedBelarusian Foreign Affairs the expressed during election the monitoring process” Lukashenko, buton contrarythe forpraised “an unbiased approach and pointview the was of that (CIS)States Election Monitoringwas not Organization-only spared of any criticism from Independent of Commonwealth the organization- monitoring election another hand other the On airport. of OSCE election monitoringmission were refused an entry and from deported Minsk’s aegis the under theelections observe to in Belarus who arrived Georgian Parliament of Members Rick Fawn, “Battle over the box: international election observation missions, political competition and Official web-page of the President of Belarus, “Alexander Lukashenko Meets with the Head of the Mission of the “ Civil Georgia,” Georgia Belarus Elections: Dictating Democracy?”, http 159 162 . Slams ‘Dictatorial’ Regime in Belarus,” March 17, 2006, International Affairs 161 Thisfactwas propagandized by show to regime the there ://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/pdf/Belarus%20Elections.pdf. http://www.president.gov.by/en/press20681.html#doc. 67 82, 6 (2006),no. 12. 160 . Thisbeshould considered not fact 158 Silba . The electoral observers electoral . The were expelled, eight expelled, were CEU eTD Collection http://www.data.minsk.by/belarusnews/082005/120.html 166 http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2006/02/14/vlast visiting Belarus were arrested and deported andarrested deported visiting wereof out Belarus country.the youth activists between youth and Foreign international Belarusian the community. contacts of 165 12. space”, post-Soviet the 164 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp040205.shtml. The regime wasparticularly brutal youth against the organization Special mention beshould madewith the regime’s regard to youth suppression of organizations. which is fraud.mechanism-directly therevolutionary against aimed election the exposing 163 162 regimes. the favor always findings whose from countries –China,authoritarian who Iran- regularly monitor post-Sovietelectionsthe and roleIts be shouldin viewed same the lineas international practiceof observers the recruiting by CIS Election Monitors serve as alternative informationindependent international and domestic monitoring election organizations. The findings produced proving the ‘fairness’ of the elections. considered tobe aprotective shield setupby post-Sovietthe regimes against criticisms the of Minister andNational Thisshould beHead VladimirSecurity organization Council Rushailo. meetingheads ofstates 2002. in October a CIS at adopted States, Independent of Commonwealth of the States Member inthe Freedoms and Rights, Electoral Elections, of Democratic by Standards establishedon the Convention the Belarus 2005, Uzbekistan 2005)reiterating nothere electionthe that fraud. Thisorganization was defenderconstant ofthepost-Sovietregimes theelections during (examplesof Kyrgyzstan 2005; been a has Organization (CIS)Election Monitoring States of Independent The Commonwealth Fawn, “Battle overthe box: international electionobservation missions, political competition and retrenchment in Roman Kupchinsky, “CIS-Monitoring the ElectionMonitors,” Ibid., 13 Charter 97 Zubr “Two Georgians Arrested inBelarus”, Arrested “Two Georgians activists took place took activists a regular on basis. , “ Regime Fears Youth Resistance”, August 20,2005, February 14, 2006. 164 163 These mechanisms hold anti-revolutionary nature anti-revolutionary hold mechanisms These 165 68 It has headedbeen by Thetried obstruct establishing regime also to Eurasia Insight. Zubr April 2, 2005. April (Bison). 166 former Russian Interior Russian former O h te hand, other the On The mass arrests CEU eTD Collection 170 http://www.tvr.by/eng/vybor2006.asp?id=9&date=23.03.2006%2013:00:00#9 169 Belarus”, in conditions 168 http://charter97.org/eng/news/2006/10/20/praca 167 of votes. received 83% Lukashenko results official elections the to According 3.6.3. ThePost-Election Developments Lukashenko. of Committee Youth Organizations exit conducted 84.2% poll votes which granted of to andin for wereengagingexample,activities- pro-governmental at theelections, Belarusian the activities” Belarusian society has received as such huge state youth support sphere, organizations of Belarusian “otherOrganizations.AsCommittee Youth Lukashenko spherestated of Union, Youth Belarusian Pioneerand the Organization Belarusian Republican the Republican lending Lukashenko’s regime was support aconsiderable to thepro-governmental organizations- any the means. However, wasnotopposition’s futile,struggle itlearned as useful the lesson Lukashenko’s regime againstdemonstrated its brutality and determination to stay in power by includinghundreds leaders werejailed. opposition the people, of whoafterwards arresting rallies opposition the dispersed forcefully police the 25 24- March On demonstrations. continue opposition’s hand,the regimemeanstosuppress every was to the using determined mobilize forces’ capacity revolutionary largenumber of to was weakened. people Onthe other the measures anti-revolutionary asaresultconducted of the nighnumbers, reached the fraudulentand started to organize thedemonstrations. However, the opposition’s rallies never backed with ofinternational declaredtheelections monitoring findings organizations the election Belarusian Review Belarus TV, Presidential Elections- 2006: InformationMaterials. March23, 2006, Charter 97, “Gallup/Baltic Surveys announces impossibility of independent and reliable exit polls under present Charter97, “Only Trusted People to Work withYouth”, October20, 2006, 167 168 support Lukashenko’s “appreciated’ organizations youth these Understandably, , March.2005,, http://www.belreview.cz/articles/3002.html March 20, 2003, http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2006/03/20/gallup 69 169 The opposition 170 CEU eTD Collection Belarusian regime. Belarusian which many hope will in crucial prove securing successin nextthe struggles with currentthe 70 CEU eTD Collection power power measures. ‘Hard’ power measures include- training, mobilizing and usingpolice; army, majorsome andcan characteristics beinto conveniently groups: divided two ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ share all they is different, extent some to regime each of measures anti-revolutionary Though 3. measures. revolutionary measures corresponding to situationthe in individual andcountry coordinate their anti- develop anti-revolutionary strategy. Thefocus was two-fold: develop specific anti-revolutionary and revolution electoral of the concept in tocomprehend the the measuresorder to take started 2. Immediately thefirst in revolution post-Sovietafter regimes Georgia post-Soviet 2003,the against them. immune is regime political post-Soviet undemocratic the of none that means This environments. electoral revolution can take geographically, politically and mentally different regions and that proves revolutions electoral post-Soviet of the Experience favorable conditions. most the not unique1. Electoral do represent revolutions political place which only phenomena take under Ukraine andKyrgyzstan. Myfindings show that: revolutionary forces andmechanismsusedelectoral the during revolutions inGeorgia, post-Soviet major againstthe directed measures regimes’ the anti-revolutionary tolocate Particularly I sought parliamentary elections inAzerbaijan 2005and presidential the elections in Belarus 2006. andin Uzbekistan- periodthe of paying2003-2006, aspecificelections- on focus two the Kazakhstan, Russia countries- Belarus, of Azerbaijan, post-Soviet such measuresIanalyzed five and themeasures. In strategy search of carry out existence respective specific anti-revolutionary develop regimes the prompting them post-Sovietregionfor a“wake-upto Soviet the call’ acted in post- my the prove electoral has of the been revolutions that The main objective to research CONCLUSION 71 CEU eTD Collection emptive strikes against them. The analyses of three post-Soviet regimes-Azerbaijan, Belarus, and andmonitoringyouth organizations specific,organizations) and pre- carried out pin-pointed election such (non-profitmechanisms organizations, electoral revolutions- as revolutionary findingsregimes post-SovietThe research showthatthe of on focused studying practical aspects have been established and trained. in forces whichwill campaign actively become anti-revolutionary engaged the anti-revolutionary and have mechanisms revolutionary been already carried out the againstthe strikes preemptive of power atupcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia in 2007/2008. The transition smooth regime’s the securing usedfor areactively measures The anti-revolutionary 5. tactics. arranged anti-revolutionary designed and regimes use through ‘people’s of were suppressed-power’ mostly use through pre- the of toconfront the attempts forces’ revolutionary The victory. sealedtheir‘electoral successfully revolutionary weakened the forces through the anti-revolutionary measures and pre-emptive, electoral in revolutions countries- Azerbaijan two 2005 andBelarus 2006.The regimes’ 4. Use of anti-revolutionary the measures has hadreducing on effect probability of of occurrence non-governmental organizations. revolution’ activitiesofinternational banningthe local curbing non-governmental organizations, criminal andcodes amendingtheexisting aimed atreducing ones aprobability of electoral election-monitoringorganizations; new adopting establishing ‘pseudo-independent’ election and youth pro-governmental organizations; forming pro-governmental civil organizations; for developing establishing measures; of revolution; anti-revolutionary use political technologists corrupting aimedof anotion figures of at electoral and publicuse of political discourse/rhetoric political opponents; publickilling crashing the protestors; protests; powermeasures‘soft’ include: intelligence services against revolutionary forces; the surpassing jailing the demonstrators; the 72 CEU eTD Collection from from inThisscholars isindeed future. the task an important accountintotaking almost that political whichleavesahope these that attention an phenomena they receive would adequate of large recentness with extentthe To can this bemeasures. explained anti-revolutionary Soviet post- knowledgeisthe on gapinacademic there that aconsiderable The research showed also is necessary. factors presence of happenrevolutionary several strong to revolution electoral of electoral revolution,Presently itis define impossible to exactly a combination of factorsbut determinewhich the success at least with considerable monitoringelection capacity influence,– werepresent. external opposition,domestic significant certainty it strong can suchfactor- leastthree at that shows Kyrgyzstan) and Ukraine (Georgia, revolutions be stated that in order electoral for post-Soviet of experience the The revolutions. electoral successof the precondition which factors needseveral the of concern of findings existence significant The particularly isrevolution made. mechanisms whichmightbe used bythe and opposition civil if society an attempt of electoral and The regimesmeasures. and directly purposefully those tools revolutionary attack anditcarefullypurging, random but thewell-planned reveals analyzed, anddevisedplot of anti- notand theirHowever, of society.does suppression havenature pattern civil ofindiscriminate opposition the for space’ ‘operation closing the regimesaregradually the that shows The research action. of strategy own their designing againstthem,while steps planned knowledge regimes’ the on hand,This, onother mightgiveadvantage forces revolutionary significant the of possessing measures which be pattern by of regimes.anti-revolutionary would post-Soviet conducted other identify the findings canbegeneralizedand usedto These measures sharesimilar characteristics. in that measures prove againstthese revolutionary general these measures directed Russia) 73 CEU eTD Collection democratic forces will be will forces in democratic doing so. measures. The future developments anti-revolutionary these to responding achallenge on upon take forces to democratic for the in the post-Soviet itNow beusedfuture. in time will againthe they existence, forces regimes’ andprolongingthe regimes revolutionary the suppressing willin be successful to proved they as show and tried, been have they howexist; successfully the regimes isamatter of of reality; post-Soviet they measures the anti-revolutionary -the region democracy be inThe message topromote striving conveyed forces can to the post-Soviet the come. years to for processes anti-revolutionary region experience is these going to certainly post-Soviet the 74 CEU eTD Collection http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/xhtml/articles/3196.html revolutions". and NGOs "colour “Democratisation, Chaulia, Sreeram. AffairsPacific Regime for Change.” thePressures Withstanding in Malaysia: “Semi-Democracy Case, William. Peter.ed. 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