³Privatisation, Employment and Employees´ Nikiforos Manolas
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&RQIHUHQFHRQ ³3ULYDWLVDWLRQ(PSOR\PHQWDQG(PSOR\HHV´ 1LNLIRURV0DQRODV (FRQRPLVW 0LQLVWU\RI(FRQRP\DQG)LQDQFH *UHHFH 5HJXODWRU\ 5HIRUPV 6WUXFWXUDO &KDQJHV DQG 3ULYDWLVDWLRQ LQ *UHHFH GXULQJ V 3DSHU VXEPLWWHG EXW QRW SUHVHQWHG ± 2FWREHU $WDN|\ ,VWDQEXO 7XUNH\ 5HJXODWRU\5HIRUPV6WUXFWXUDO&KDQJHVDQG3ULYDWLVDWLRQLQ*UHHFHGXULQJV ,%DFNJURXQG During 90s, for the fist time in post-war history, Greek strategies for economic development shifted markedly reliance on market forces rather than on state-managed growth. In the pre-1974 period Greece’s state-led development strategy based on import substitution and credit allocation produced strong growth (7% with manufacturing on the average at 11.4% annually), combined with low inflation (4%) and small balance of payments deficits (2.1% of GDP) until 1974. From 1974 until 1995 the economy showed a completely different picture. GDP annual growth rate averaged 2%, manufacturing growth slowed to almost zero, annual inflation averaged 18%, and the average external deficit, as a share of GDP, doubled. This performance was much worse than that of its neighbors and the other countries of the European Union (EU). The economic slowdown can be attributed almost completely to two major factors, namely the decline in the share of total investments in GDP, and the decline in the productivity of new investments. In an environment which had led to a downward spiral in economic performance, ultimately resulting in crisis (of slowing growth) and many large private firms that had grown rapidly in the favorable pre-1974 environment became “problematic” (these companies had huge debts to state banks which led to the de-facto nationalization of them, were not allowed to close due to a policy of preserving jobs, while a new corporation was building up in 1983, the so-called “,QGXVWU\ 5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ &RUSRUDWLRQB,52”, to manage the take-over of ailing private corporations by the public sector) Structural reforms as we will develop them, in detail, in the next paragraph, started timidly in the early 90s with important changes to financial and labor market regulations, some product market liberalization, and initial steps in state reforms. Initially were stimulated by the need to comply with EU regulations and EMU criteria, but have accelerated after 1994, and currently form one of the new government’s important policy objectives for the next period. Experience in other countries has shown that broad regulatory and structural reforms, along with supportive macroeconomic and labor market policies can provide an appropriate framework for stipulating both supply and demand. 2 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD. This happen and with Greece, which the macroeconomic fundamentals over the last decade achieved, comfortably, the five Maastricht criteria for membership to 11-member Euro-zone area (EMU), at GRD/EUR of 340.75, by the target date of January 1, 2001. Entry to Euro-zone area marked an important milestone in Greece’s efforts for greater stability and improves growth prospects. As illustrated in the following table 1, Greek economy during 90s grew wit a numerical average GDP growth rate 2.7% surpassing the E.U average (2%) Activity is being led by high rates of investment, higher than the E.U average public and private sector investment finance to a large extent by the E.U Structural Funds. Fiscal disciplines had as a result the fiscal deficits, as a percentage of GDP, to decrease by 13,8% units (the deficit has been reduced from 13,6% of GDP in 1993 to a level of 0,2% in 2001). The general government deficit to GDP ratio is forecast to decline further in subsequent years falling well as much as 0.5% of GDP annually. The inflation rate (CPI) has been brought down from near 14,4% to around 3,0% in 2001 and was reduced by almost 11% units (14,4% in 1993 and 3,0% in Dec.2001). 3 Table 1. 0DLQ(FRQRPLF,QGLFDWRUV*UHHFH(XURODQG2(&' à à à à à à à à Ià Ià *'3ÃJURZWK È\HDU à 0,2 2,2 2,0 2,4 3,5 3,1 3,4 4,1 4,0 4,4 -*5((&(à -0,8 2,4 2,4 1,4 2,1 2,8 2,5 3,4 2,3 2,1 -(XURODQGB$YHUDJH 0,0 2,4 2,7 1,9 2,6 2,7 2,1 3,4 2,0 2,1 -OECDEurope Average ,QIODWLRQ È\HDU à -*5((&(à 14,4 10,9 9,3 8,5 5,4 4,5 2,1 2,9 3,1 3,5 3,9 3,1 2,9 2,4 1,8 1,3 1,2 2,3 2,1 1,5 -(XURODQGB$YHUDJH 6,2 8,3 5,7 6,0 5,8 3,9 3,9 3,7 4,4 3,1 -OECDEurope Average ,QYHVWPHQWV È\HDU à *5((&(à -3,5 -2,8 4,2 8,4 7,8 11,8 7,3 8,1 9,0 9,5 - -7,5 2,0 2,5 1,6 2,5 5,1 5,2 4,7 3,3 2,6 (XURODQGÃ$YHUDJH -4,8 1,7 3,2 2,7 4,0 5,6 4,1 4,9 2,3 3,0 OECDEurope Average 4*HQ¶O*RY¶Wà )LQ¶Oà 'HILFLW (%GDP) 13,8 10,0 10,2 7,4 4,0 2,5 1,8 0,9 0,0 0,7 Ãà -*5((&(à 5,9 5,4 5,3 4,4 2,6 2,2 1,3 0,1 1,0 1,2 (XURODQGÃ$YHUDJH 6,3 5,6 5,3 4,2 2,3 1,6 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,6 OECDEurope Averageà 5**3XEOLFà 'HEWà È*'3 111,6 109,3 108,7 111,3 108,3 105,5 104,6 102,7 103,0 102,2 -*5((&(à 70,2 72,7 76,3 77,5 76,9 75,2 74,4 72,1 69,9 68,4 -(XURODQGB$YHUDJH 66,6 68,9 71,9 72,7 71,8 69,8 68,6 66,2 63,8 62,4 OECDEurope Average 7. 8QHPSO5DWH È Ã 9,7 9,6 10,0 10,3 10,2 11,2 12,0 11,3 10,8 10,0 *5((&(à - 10,9 11,7 11,4 11,6 11,7 10,9 10,0 9,0 8,6 8,6 (XURODQG$YHUDJH 10,4 10,7 10,3 10,4 10,1 9,3 8,5 7,7 7,3 7,3 OECDEurope Average :DJH*URZWK È\HDU à -*5((&(à 8,7 11,7 14,7 10,6 10,2 9,3 4,9 4,3 4,5 5,0 3,2 2,9 3,7 3,2 2,9 2,4 2,4 2,1 2,4 2,4 (XURODQG$YHUDJH 3,2 3,0 3,6 3,2 3,1 2,9 2,8 2,6 2,9 2,8 -OECDEurope Average ,QGXVWULDOÃ3URGXFWLRQà ÃÃÃÃÃà È\HDU à -*5((&(à -2,9 1,1 2,1 1,2 1,0 4,3 0,6 5,4 4,3 4,0 (XURODQG$YHUDJH -4,3 5,2 3,4 0,1 4,1 4,4 1,9 4,8 1,5 1,6 -OECDEurope Averageà -3,0 5,5 3,3 0,4 3,6 3,6 1,6 4,3 1,5 1,4 Ã&RPSHWLWLYHQHVVà D5HODWLYHà 8QLWà /DERXUà &RVWVÃà à Ãà -*5((&(à 87 93 100 102 106 101 104 98 98 98 (XURODQG$YHUDJH 101 99 100 102 99 100 100 95 97 100 -OECDEurope Averageà 101 99 100 102 103 107 106 103 104 106 à 7HQà <HDUà %RQGà <LHOGV È Ã 4 4à Ãà -*5((&(à 7,8 6,2 à 5,5 5,3 (XURODQG$YHUDJH 4,6 4,9 5,4 4,8 4,8 -OECDEurope Average 4,4 4,7 5,1 4,6 4,6 &XUUHQW %DODQFH *'3 -0,8 -0,1 -2,5 -5,7 -4,1 -3,2 -4,2 -7,1 -6,5 -6,2 Ãà -*5((&(à 0,5 0,3 0,8 1,2 1,7 1,1 0,5 0,1 0,2 0,6 (XURODQG$YHUDJH 0,4 0,5 0,9 1,2 1,7 1,0 0,4 0,1 0,1 0,5 -OECDEurope Average 6RXUFHÃ+6%&Ã(XURSHDQÃ(FRQRPLFVÃ4ÃÃ2(&'Ã(FRQRPLFÃ2XWORRNÃ1RÃ-XQHÃà 4 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD. Interest rates on the long-term government bonds (i. e interest rate on bonds with 10 year to maturity) have also declined considerably, and it brought the average rate in March of 2000, in the level of 6.2 % which was below the reference value 7.2%. The debt ratio to GDP following a sufficiently declining trend (the relative small reduction of debt ratio is mainly due to the assumption of public corporation’s debt by the central government in the context of restructuring), although still is over the Maastricht criterion, which is 60% to GDP. It should be noted that the downward trend in the debt ratio is set to strengthen in the following years due to considerable privatisation proceeds as WKH WDEOH in the statistical annex indicates. As to the stability of the exchange rate criterion, the smooth participation of the drachma in the ERM and the improving economic fundamentals put Greece in a strong position to satisfy this criterion It has to be noted that the relatively high growth rates of the last several years allowed the improvement of the wage earners disposable income almost by 1,5% per year on the average for the period 1993-1998.