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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 34 / PCEMI N°34 MDS RESEARCH PROJECT / PROJET DE RESCHERCHE MED JOINT SPECIAL AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE INTEGRATION – – A MODEL FOR ALL NATIONS – By / par Maj P. N. Feuerherm This paper was written by a student La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College in stagiaire du Collège des Forces fulfilment of one of the requirements of the canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions which the author alone contient donc des faits et des opinions que considered appropriate and correct for the seul l'auteur considère appropriés et subject. It does not necessarily reflect the convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas policy or the opinion of any agency, nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion including the Government of Canada and d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le the Canadian Department of National gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de Defence. This paper may not be released, la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est quoted or copied except with the express défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de permission of the author and the reproduire cette étude sans la permission Department of National Defence. expresse de l’auteur et du ministère de la Défense national. ii CONTENTS Table of Contents ii List of Figures iv List of Tables v List of Acronyms vi Abstract viii Introduction 1 Chapters 1. Background Section 1 – The Crisis 5 Section 2 – Force Composition and Rationale for Selection 10 Section 3 – Key Events 13 2. Intervention Section 1 – Details of Involved Elements 16 Section 2 – Assault Plan and Roles of the Assault Force 19 Section 3 – Execution 21 3. Interplay Section 1 – Selection Process 25 Section 2 – Operational Design 28 Section 3 – Allied SOF and SF Structures 33 Sub-Section 3.1 – United Kingdom 34 Sub-Section 3.2 – United States 37 Sub-Section 3.3 – Australia 40 iii Sub-Section 3.4 – Canada 42 4. Allied Comparison Section 1 – Methodology 47 Section 2 – United Kingdom (UK) 48 Section 3 – United States (US) 53 Section 4 – Australia (AUS) 61 Section 5 – Canada (CA) 66 5. Lessons Learned 68 Section 1 – Command and Control 69 Section 2 – Intelligence 71 Section 3 – Interoperability 73 Section 4 – Operational Planning 75 Section 5 – Concluding Remarks 78 Appendix 1 – Map of Sierra Leone (including major objectives) 80 Appendix 2 – Layout of Air Insertion and Extraction Methodology 81 Bibliography 82 iv List of Figures Figure 1: Operation BARRAS C2 Structure 30 Figure 2: Special Operations Forces Subordinate Joint Force Command and Control 32 Figure 3: Map of Sierra Leone (including Major Objectives) 80 Figure 4: Layout of Air Insertion and Extraction Methodology 81 v List of Tables Table 1 – ABCA Unit Comparisons 34 vi List of Acronyms 160th SOAR 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States) 1st SFOD-D 1st Special Forces Operations Detachment – Delta 4 RAR 4th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment 427 SOAS 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron ABCA American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Standardization Program ADF Australian Defence Force AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone) CANSOFCOM Canadian Special Operations Forces Command C2 Command and Control CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirement CIA Central Intelligence Agency CO Commanding Officer COBR Cabinet Office Briefing Room CSOR Canadian Special Operations Regiment CT Counter-terrorism DA Direct Action DIA Defence Intelligence Agency DSF Director Special Forces (United Kingdom) ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community Of West African States HALO High Altitude Low Opening HUMINT Human Intelligence IMATT International Military Advisory and Training Team INTERFET International Force East Timor JCMOTF Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander JFPOTF Joint Force Psychological Operations Task Force JFSOCC Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander JSFAW Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force JTF 2 Joint Task Force 2 LSL Landing Support Logistics LO Liaison Officer OC Officer Commanding OP Observation Post OPCOM Operational Command OSS Office of Strategic Services PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters (United Kingdom) RAF Royal Air Force RFA Royal Fleet Auxiliary RN Royal Navy vii RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) SAS Special Air Service SASR Special Air Service Regiment SBS Special Boat Service SCUBA Self-contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus SF Special Forces (primarily a U.S. term) SFAS Special Forces Assessment and Selection SFSG Special Forces Support Group (United Kingdom) SLA Sierra Leone Army SOCCE Special Operations Command and Control Element SOE Special Operations Executive SOF Special Operations Forces SR Special Reconnaissance TAG Tactical Assault Group TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures UKSF United Kingdom Special Forces UN United Nations UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor USS United States Ship USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command viii ABSTRACT Force integration exists in various forms and has been a function of military operations for many years. Whether considered at the joint services level, including elements from a combination of Land, Air, Sea and Special Operations forces or at the combined international and Allied levels, the concept is far from new. How is it then, that when one views integration between Special Operations and what have historically been conventional forces, a greater challenge seems to materialize? The secrecy which notably surrounds operations in which Special Operations Forces are involved is one obvious aspect however in today’s asymmetric threat environment a more holistic view must exist in order to maximize domestic and international force capabilities to meet the ever evolving situation. Nations have integrated these forces over recent years with varying rates of success. This paper will evaluate the effectiveness of special and historic conventional force integration using the British hostage rescue Operation BARRAS as a template (a map of Sierra Leone including major objectives can be found at Appendix 1). The successful resolution to the hostage crisis by this joint force reinforced the mindset that this form of integration is viable for future operations. By analyzing essential building blocks, a comparison to ABCA nations established the applicability in similar circumstances. The comparative analysis of past operations identify several critical integration shortcomings however, these too can be overcome. The lessons highlighted during the analysis show the necessity of a more formal C2 structure, supportive intelligence, interoperability and coordinated operational planning. Based on this examination Operation BARRAS provides an appropriate template for force integration. 1 “They produced disproportionate effects relative to the small numbers of deployed troops.”1 INTRODUCTION The above statement appears within the Commander’s Foreword of the soon to be published Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) key stone document, CANSOFCOM 2008 and provides insight into the employment of forces commonly referred to as Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the Canadian context. While the concept of SOF may not be particularly new, their employment in the complex environment of today’s conflicts has seen a dramatic increase both independently and in a joint environment. Many operations in recent history have seen actions by various military elements including SOF and conventional forces conducted in parallel each with distinct missions although and limited if any mutual support. Some, such as the British hostage-rescue in Sierra Leone at the turn of the millennium – Operation BARRAS, have had noticeable force integration and interplay in order to achieve the mission. This integration allowed for the maximization of strengths indigenous to each particular force element with a minimization of impact on any one in particular. Operation BARRAS combined capabilities found in forces primarily from the British Army’s 22 Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment and 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (1 Para), the Royal Navy’s Special Boat Service (SBS), and 7 Squadron Royal Air Force