ily by the uprisings in and . On 15 Feb - primar- Revolution”triggered February was “17 The The NT than less nothing building anentirelynewState. to amounts challenge ditional ad- the the , in of But renegotiated. being rules are game the and power of balance domestic the both elsewhere, as region: the of countries er facing Libya are more fundamental than in most oth- challenges The them. control to unable and ground de- the on events shaping largely forces local the are from tached they legitimacy: of crisis a facing are government its and (NTC) Council Transitional National The emerge. to yet have forces and tions coali- nationwide Broader, levels. national and local cities, tribes and militias are vying for influence at the 2012, June for scheduled Assembly, General a to elections towards moves Libya As collapse. State’s emergence of local power centres in the wake of the the was revolution Libyan the of aspect defining A of thetransitionalauthorities. those and be- institutions executive regime’s the continuity tween no almost is there States, bouring the . Contrary to developments in neigh- down of the Libyan regime is unique in the context of claim to representing the State. The complete break laid successfully that emerge leadership rebel a and split apparatus state the saw region the in country other No course. singular a took revolution Libyan Among the Arab Spring’s diverse developments, the Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin German InstituteforInternationaland Associate, MiddleEastand Africa Division Wolfram Lacher of LocalPower Centres The Libyan Revolution andtheRise Mediterranean Politics |Maghreb C andtheRevolutionaryForces - only briefly occupied top positions (such asNTC (such positions top occupied briefly only prisonment, and technocrats and reformers who had former Gaddafi confidants who had seen exile or im- officers, military senior and aides Gaddafi close ed includ- former The homogenous. means any by was longstanding and camp neither But opposition. exiled the of members officials regime senior former resentatives abroad, the clearest divide ran between the NTC, its Executive Office and its diplomatic rep- united only were by their goal to topple the ground regime. Within the on revolution the the led and that forces leadership political the outset, the From the headofaninitiallyunorganiseduprising. at itself placed and defectors regime of coalition a comprising leadership elitist NTC,an the With March. early in in NTC the of ment ing. The second key development was the establish- erupt- protests the of weeks two within war civil of tutions. As a result, the country found itself in a state and family tribal loyalties, local, as well as the weakness of of state insti- strength the in lay velopment de- this for reason The defected. units army whole and themselves, armed Civilians people. of dreds hun- killed had forces regime once irrelevant came be- they had, have may protesters demands initial Whatever cities. and families their protect to revolt more the forces, the joined security leaders tribal and military political, quickly the by killed were ers protest- more The protests. the to response violent regime’s the was first The revolution. a into calate Two developments were decisive for the revolt to es- in thenorth-west. rest also spread to the capital and other cities un- and the days, Within demise. regime’s the for called fire on buildings government set Mountains) da and Darna (Green Mountains) and Zintan (Nafusa massacre. The same day, youth in the towns of Bay- prison 1996 a of victims the for justice demanded Benghazi in protesters of group small a 2011, ruary

167 Med.2012 Panorama 168 Med.2012 Panorama rvdd ite upr, n ol bltdy re to tried belatedly only and support, influence, little less provided even had NTC the Mountains, sa ated entirely independently. In and the Nafu- oper- others while Ministries, Interior and Defence units. armySome brigades were loosely tied defected to the NTC’s the of structures command the to opments. In the east, the brigades refused to submit devel- these control to failed completely NTC The ra ofmilitias,withvaryingdegreessuccess. military councils emerged to coordinate this pletho- local evolved, conflict the As Bayda. and Darnah had a strong local base in the north-eastern cities of and 1990s the during regime the against surgency which had led an in- Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), Libyan defunct the to close people from recruited were front eastern the on fought that brigades eral Sev- cities. and tribes own their with foremost and first lay brigades these of loyalties The cities. their protect to was the outside formed that brigades most of goal initial The civilians. recruited among mainly were brigades revolutionary the officers, army defected or businessmen notables, tribal by Led emerged. groups different of dozens Benghazi, and Misrata In cities. or tribes individual ber of revolutionary brigades formed on the basis of num- growing a Misrata, and Mountains Nafusa the Oases,eastern the Cyrenaica, the In forces. tionary revolu- local supporting and coordinating in effort less much investing while recognition, ternational in- obtaining on focused successfully) (and largely NTC The ground. the on struggle revolutionary the leading be- forces the and leadership emerged elitist this tween however, rift, significant most The in August2011. of fall Tripoli the until Office Executive the its NTCand in the overrepresented from strongly Libyans were north-east divides, social all Across ga. NTCas such Gho- rule, Hafiz Abdel vice-chairman Gaddafi’s throughout Libya in remained had who – lawyers and professors university – elite cated edu- the of representatives as well as Tarhouni), Ali Minister Finance and Oil as (such backgrounds prominent less from opposition exiled the of bers mem- former by joined were They 2011). (Lacher, the monarchy, but were marginalised under Gaddafi bourgeois families who played a leading role under cluded many representatives of the in- aristocratic and They NTC. the in group main other the nated domi- opposition exiled the of members Long-time ecutive Office,MahmoudJibril). Ex- its of head the or Jalil Abdul Mustafa chairman local revolutionary forces coordinating andsupporting investing much lesseffortin international recognition, while successfully) focusedonobtaining The NTClargely(and many previously prominent players. Like Prime Min- Prime Like players. prominent previously many of departure the saw 2011 mid-November in gling, The transitional government formed, after much wran- and itsExecutiveOffice. NTC the Tarhounion Ali or Jibril Mahmoud as such figures liberal or officials regime former of role the criticised harshly Sallabi Ali cleric influential the and leaders Militia again. working economy and tration apparatus, the NTC failed to quickly get the adminis- state collapsed a over taken having and structures, control adequate of absence the in assets Libyan frozen of release the for press to reluctant funds, of Short legitimacy. of crisis a entered NTC the tober, and the proclamation of Libya’s liberation on Walid,23 Oc- Bani and in remnants regime’s the of After the fall of Tripoli in late August 2011, the defeat after theRegime’sCollapse The NT and cities. rivalries between armed groups from different tribes tionary base and the political leadership, as well as revolu- the between tensions centres, power local of theemergence transition: Libyan the define to continue that dynamics the to rise gave regime the against tribes and cities individual of struggle The of arevolutionarybrigade. members by assassinated murky, apparently was Younes remain details the Although 2011. July in army Younes,Fattah defected Abdel General Staff, of the units’Chief of murder the by highlighted first was revolution the leading forces military the received leader), over control NTC’sof The loss . from backing LIFG Abdel former (a as Belhadj such Hakim leaders militia individual as well as Mountains, Nafusa the and Misrata in brigades local relations: foreign separate established even establish Local closer actors relations (ICG, 2011). C’s WeaknessandGrowingRivalries ieso, ot ee pnaeu icdns trig- incidents spontaneous were most dimension, political a had clashes these of some While thority. au- its impose to inability NTC’s the demonstrated capital the a in clashes kept Repeated Misrata presence. strong and Zintan from militias Belhadj, by headed Council TripoliMilitary the to addition In 2011. August late since other each with competing been had cities other and capital the from militias military weight to exert influence. In Tripoli, dozens of In addition, local actors were increasingly using their their cities. to (NOC) Corporation Oil National the of parts and ministries important of relocation the for lobbying Local power brokers in Benghazi and Misrata began government. transitional the in marginalisation leged al- their against protested cities and tribes Several ence soon after Tripoli had fallen (Haimzadeh, 2011). influ- political greater demanding began Zintan and individual cities or tribes. Militia leaders from Misrata of proponents were actors main the which in after, coalition together. Power struggles intensified there- heterogeneous their held had that goal the attained forces revolutionary the regime, the of fall the With major cities. ilar spontaneous initiatives for local elections in other the target of popular resentment. This triggered sim- become had council local the after 2012, February in held were elections local Misrata, In appointed. NTC,the like which, of self- most were councils, cal lo- the of some include to widened also resentment popular of targets The unaccountable. and opaque targeting the NTC and its government as ineffective, cities, other and Tripoli Benghazi, in erupted tests government’s use of public funds. In December, pro- transitional the of grew Suspicion military. and civil both forces, revolutionary the and NTC the tween be- gap the close Yet,to failed developments these and townswereadequatelyrepresented. regions all that ensure to sought that formula a on councils to name representatives for the NTC based significantly broadened its membership, asking local NTCthe 2011, December and August between ver, as military heavyweights during the civil war. Moreo- their emerged which Misrata, in and Zintan of struggle towns home the in role leading a played had respectively.Both Ministers Interior and Defence as Aal Abdel Fawzi and al-Juwali Osama of pointments power centres and brigades was reflected in the ap- back local of influence political the though, Significantly, ground. prominent a without technocrats were ministers new most al-Kib, Rahim Abdel ister - rniin eetos o Gnrl seby r to are Assembly General a to elections transition, of August 2011, which lays out the timetable for the Declaration Constitutional NTC’s the to According Political Forces Outlook: LocalPowerCentres andNational conflicts thattheNTC wasunabletocontain. new for groundwork the laid had war civil the sum, In their of forces. revolutionary by captured been had members many apparatus, security Gaddafi’s nated domi- had tribes Tripoli.both and Since Misrata from sacked during their capture by revolutionary brigades ran- and destroyed severely been had cities whose – Gaddadfa and mainly – Walid Bani and Resentment also grew among the inhabitants of Sirte a keyroleintheformerregime’ssecurityapparatus. played had that constituencies tribal involved conflict as “Gaddafi loyalists,” which often occurred when the adversaries their label to party one by attempts was feature common Another justice. transitional vancing were conflicts therefore directly related to the these NTC’s slowness in ad- of Many community. another of members disarm or at- arrest to group one by tempts were conflicts such for triggers common most and the tribal establishment in . Among the brigade revolutionary a between and , in militias and Tobu between , and Asabea between Zintan, and Mashashiya between militias, Zawiya and Warshefana between including re- gions, in several erupted fighting heavy 2012, March and 2011 November Between actors. local armed between developed conflicts Tripoli,serious Outside opaque andunaccountable government asineffective, cities, targetingtheNTCandits in Benghazi, Tripoli andother In December, protestserupted nesty International,2012). (Am - killings and disappearances torture, of cases to leading atrocities, wartime in participated having in the capital to search for people they suspected of tias from Zintan and Misrata also used their presence mili- However, brigades. revolutionary among ness hot-headed- and indiscipline by essentially gered

169 Med.2012 Panorama 170 Med.2012 Panorama in Priiat a a ofrne n egai in Benghazi council regional a establish to decided 2012 March in conference a at Participants tion. trac- gain to unlikely are system, political federal a initiatives for autonomy in Libya’s north-east, and for that means centres power local of dominance The constitution-making process, inordertocementtheirpower. the in allocation budget and governance of model decentralised a through push to seek also could coherent actors Local leadership. a central than rather interests local competing of coalition fractious loose, a under proceed to set cam- electoral is transition The politics. post-election and paigning both in strongly will feature interests therefore tribal and Local lists. party national through assembly the enter will remainder the while constituencies, local of basis the on elected be to are representatives 200 Assembly’s General the of toral law adopted in early military February 2012, three-fifths elec- their the to According transform power. political into to weight actors local for nities The transitional process could also provide opportu- needed. their militias, in order to exert political influence when vidual players in local power centres – could maintain indi- or – tribes or cities some met, been have tions condi- these once even But office. taken has ment govern- legitimate fully a and security provide can institutions national before weapons their in hand to government Many revolutionary brigades refuse (Hüsken, 2012). central the to power their acquired relinquish newly to reluctant be will and transition local actors will continue to play a key role during the ing transitional justice. There is much to suggest that advanc- and apparatus, security and army new a of brigades and other armed groups, the establishment the disarmament and demobilisation of revolutionary ity to tackle the acute challenges facing the country: of position weakness, raising serious a questions about their abil- in are government its and NTC The has beenadoptedbyreferendum. constitution the after months seven held be to are elections New 2012. March in adopted timeframe amended an to according constitution, draft a duce pro- to months four have will which committee, ent constitu- a and government provisional a appoint to is assembly The 2012. June 23 by i.e. liberation, of take place within eight months of Libya’s declaration H H L I A Bibliography into anothercivilwar. descending from Libya prevent to likely are level cal lo- the in rooted mobilisation of patterns and terests In- coalitions. national or regional form to attempted not have conflicts local to parties Tothe tions. date, struggles from widening into larger-scale confronta- power and conflicts prevents also centres power In the meantime, however, the predominance of local stituency fornationalmovements. con - important an represent could who brigades, revolutionary of members young predominantly the frustrating up end quickly could elites tribal local of challenge local actors’ power. The backroom politics less is likely than newly emerging national political forces government to central weak The begun. just the However, transformation of Libya’s political landscape March. has only early in party a co-founded to well-defined parties; the Libyan potential greatest into develop to yet have forces, national the as emerge have which currents, only beginning to organise. Even the various Islamist are forces political nationwide 2012, March of As succeeding. of chance little has therefore initiative autonomy The council. new the recognise to refused whom of all parties, local political and leaders tribal including militias, councils, north-east, the in actors key from autonomously. Cyrenaica However, the conference triggered a major backlash the govern would that nternational acher mnesty üsken aimzadeh 2011. ye?” No. 4,p.140-154,2011. Revolution.”Libyan New Libya.London:AI,2012. Brussels: ICG,2011. Qadhafi . After Challenges Security Together. Vol. 53,No.1,p.26-31,2012. Libya.” of Cyrenaica the in Revolution , Wolfram. “Families, Tribes and Cities in the in TribesCities Wolfram.“Families, and , Toa. Tia Pltcl utr ad the and Culture Political “Tribal Thomas. ,

, No. 12, p. 9-10, p. 12, No. Diplomatique, Monde Le I nternational , Patrick. “Qui a gagné la guerre en Lib- en guerre la gagné a “Qui Patrick. ,

C risis G . roup , Vol. 18, Vol.Policy , East Middle Militias Threaten Hopes for Hopes Threaten Militias (ICG). (ICG). odn Libya Holding Orient,