Mediterranean Politics | Maghreb The Libyan Revolution and the Rise of Local Power Centres Wolfram Lacher ruary 2011, a small group of protesters in Benghazi Associate, Middle East and Africa Division demanded justice for the victims of a 1996 prison German Institute for International and massacre. The same day, youth in the towns of Bay- Panorama Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin da and Darna (Green Mountains) and Zintan (Nafusa Mountains) set government buildings on fire and called for the regime’s demise. Within days, the un- Among the Arab Spring’s diverse developments, the rest also spread to the capital Tripoli and other cities Libyan revolution took a singular course. No other in the north-west. 2012 country in the region saw the state apparatus split Two developments were decisive for the revolt to es- Med. and a rebel leadership emerge that successfully laid calate into a revolution. The first was the regime’s claim to representing the State. The complete break- violent response to the protests. The more protest- down of the Libyan regime is unique in the context of ers were killed by the security forces, the more the Arab Spring. Contrary to developments in neigh- quickly political, military and tribal leaders joined the bouring States, there is almost no continuity be- revolt to protect their families and cities. Whatever tween the regime’s executive institutions and those initial demands protesters may have had, they be- 167 of the transitional authorities. came irrelevant once regime forces had killed hun- A defining aspect of the Libyan revolution was the dreds of people. Civilians armed themselves, and emergence of local power centres in the wake of the whole army units defected. The reason for this de- State’s collapse. As Libya moves towards elections velopment lay in the strength of local, family and to a General Assembly, scheduled for June 2012, tribal loyalties, as well as the weakness of state insti- cities, tribes and militias are vying for influence at the tutions. As a result, the country found itself in a state local and national levels. Broader, nationwide coali- of civil war within two weeks of the protests erupt- tions and forces have yet to emerge. The National ing. The second key development was the establish- Transitional Council (NTC) and its government are ment of the NTC in Benghazi in early March. With facing a crisis of legitimacy: they are largely de- the NTC, an elitist leadership comprising a coalition tached from the local forces shaping events on the of regime defectors and dissidents placed itself at ground and unable to control them. The challenges the head of an initially unorganised uprising. facing Libya are more fundamental than in most oth- From the outset, the political leadership and the er countries of the region: as elsewhere, both the forces that led the revolution on the ground were domestic balance of power and the rules of the united only by their goal to topple the regime. Within game are being renegotiated. But in Libya, the ad- the NTC, its Executive Office and its diplomatic rep- ditional challenge amounts to nothing less than resentatives abroad, the clearest divide ran between building an entirely new State. former senior regime officials and longstanding members of the exiled opposition. But neither camp was by any means homogenous. The former includ- the ntC and the revolutionary Forces ed close Gaddafi aides and senior military officers, former Gaddafi confidants who had seen exile or im- The “17 February Revolution” was triggered primar- prisonment, and technocrats and reformers who had ily by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. On 15 Feb- only briefly occupied top positions (such as NTC chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil or the head of its Ex- establish closer relations (ICG, 2011). Local actors ecutive Office, Mahmoud Jibril). even established separate foreign relations: local Long-time members of the exiled opposition domi- brigades in Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains, as nated the other main group in the NTC. They in- well as individual militia leaders such as Abdel cluded many representatives of the aristocratic and Hakim Belhadj (a former LIFG leader), received bourgeois families who played a leading role under backing from Qatar. The NTC’s loss of control over the monarchy, but were marginalised under Gaddafi the military forces leading the revolution was first (Lacher, 2011). They were joined by former mem- highlighted by the murder of the defected army bers of the exiled opposition from less prominent units’ Chief of Staff, General Abdel Fattah Younes, backgrounds (such as Oil and Finance Minister Ali in July 2011. Although the details remain murky, Tarhouni), as well as representatives of the edu- Younes was apparently assassinated by members cated elite – university professors and lawyers – of a revolutionary brigade. who had remained in Libya throughout Gaddafi’s rule, such as NTC vice-chairman Abdel Hafiz Gho- Panorama ga. Across all social divides, Libyans from the The NTC largely (and north-east were strongly overrepresented in the successfully) focused on obtaining NTC and its Executive Office until the fall of Tripoli international recognition, while in August 2011. The most significant rift, however, emerged be- investing much less effort in 2012 tween this elitist leadership and the forces leading coordinating and supporting the revolutionary struggle on the ground. The NTC Med. local revolutionary forces largely (and successfully) focused on obtaining in- ternational recognition, while investing much less effort in coordinating and supporting local revolu- The struggle of individual cities and tribes against tionary forces. In the Cyrenaica, the eastern Oases, the regime gave rise to the dynamics that continue the Nafusa Mountains and Misrata, a growing num- to define the Libyan transition: the emergence of 168 ber of revolutionary brigades formed on the basis of local power centres, tensions between the revolu- individual tribes or cities. In Misrata and Benghazi, tionary base and the political leadership, as well as dozens of different groups emerged. Led by tribal rivalries between armed groups from different tribes notables, businessmen or defected army officers, and cities. the revolutionary brigades were mainly recruited among civilians. The initial goal of most brigades that formed outside the Cyrenaica was to protect the ntC’s Weakness and Growing rivalries their cities. The loyalties of these brigades lay first after the regime’s Collapse and foremost with their own tribes and cities. Sev- eral brigades that fought on the eastern front were After the fall of Tripoli in late August 2011, the defeat recruited from people close to the defunct Libyan of the regime’s remnants in Sirte and Bani Walid, Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which had led an in- and the proclamation of Libya’s liberation on 23 Oc- surgency against the regime during the 1990s and tober, the NTC entered a crisis of legitimacy. Short had a strong local base in the north-eastern cities of of funds, reluctant to press for the release of frozen Darnah and Bayda. As the conflict evolved, local Libyan assets in the absence of adequate control military councils emerged to coordinate this pletho- structures, and having taken over a collapsed state ra of militias, with varying degrees of success. apparatus, the NTC failed to quickly get the adminis- The NTC completely failed to control these devel- tration and economy working again. Militia leaders opments. In the east, the brigades refused to submit and the influential cleric Ali Sallabi harshly criticised to the command structures of the defected army the role of former regime officials or liberal figures units. Some brigades were loosely tied to the NTC’s such as Mahmoud Jibril or Ali Tarhouni on the NTC Defence and Interior Ministries, while others oper- and its Executive Office. ated entirely independently. In Misrata and the Nafu- The transitional government formed, after much wran- sa Mountains, the NTC had even less influence, gling, in mid-November 2011 saw the departure of provided little support, and only belatedly tried to many previously prominent players. Like Prime Min- ister Abdel Rahim al-Kib, most new ministers were gered essentially by indiscipline and hot-headed- technocrats without a prominent political back- ness among revolutionary brigades. However, mili- ground. Significantly, though, the influence of local tias from Zintan and Misrata also used their presence power centres and brigades was reflected in the ap- in the capital to search for people they suspected of pointments of Osama al-Juwali and Fawzi Abdel Aal having participated in wartime atrocities, leading to as Defence and Interior Ministers respectively. Both cases of torture, disappearances and killings (Am- had played a leading role in the struggle in their nesty International, 2012). home towns of Zintan and Misrata, which emerged as military heavyweights during the civil war. Moreo- ver, between August and December 2011, the NTC In December, protests erupted significantly broadened its membership, asking local in Benghazi, Tripoli and other councils to name representatives for the NTC based cities, targeting the NTC and its on a formula that sought to ensure that all regions and towns were adequately represented. government as ineffective, Yet, these developments failed to close the gap be- opaque and unaccountable Panorama tween the NTC and the revolutionary forces, both civil and military. Suspicion grew of the transitional government’s use of public funds. In December, pro- Outside Tripoli, serious conflicts developed between tests erupted in Benghazi, Tripoli and other cities, armed local actors. Between November 2011 and targeting the NTC and its government as ineffective, March 2012, heavy fighting erupted in several re- 2012 opaque and unaccountable. The targets of popular gions, including between Warshefana and Zawiya Med. resentment also widened to include some of the lo- militias, between Mashashiya and Zintan, between cal councils, most of which, like the NTC, were self- Asabea and Gharyan, between Tobu and Zuwayya appointed.