Family Firms, Minority Investor Protection, and Firm Performance
Family Firms, Minority Investor Protection, and Firm Performance Pascal Gantenbeina • Christophe Volontéa,b January 2020 Abstract Minority investor protection becomes especially important within the corporate governance framework in the presence of controlling shareholders. In this study, we investigate the relationship between family ownership and four elements related to minority investor protection in Switzerland, namely dual class structures, voting rights restrictions, opting-out/up clauses from the duty to make a takeover offer, and board independence. Using a sample of 2,035 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015, our results indicate that dual class family firms are negatively correlated with firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. In those firms, minority investors typically have substantially fewer voting rights compared to the economic ownership. Furthermore, dual class family firms significantly differ in their investment decisions. In contrast, the other elements connected to minority investor protection, such as voting rights restrictions, opting-out/up clauses, and board independence, have no significant effect on firm performance and investment decisions. The results suggest that family control obtained by dual class equity structures may influence corporate decisions that harm co-shareholders and firm value. As a result, such structures may be abolished and replaced by shareholder democracy. Keywords: Corporate governance, family firms, minority investor protection, board independence, Tobin’s Q a University of Basel,
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