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Nuevo Escenario De Confrontación, El CENTRO SUPERIOR DE ESTUDIOS DE LA DEFENSA NACIONAL MONOGRAFÍAS del 126 CESEDEN EL CIBERESPACIO. NUEVO ESCENARIO DE CONFRONTACIÓN Febrero, 2012 CATÁLOGO GENERAL DE PUBLICACIONES OFICIALES http://publicacionesoficiales.boe.es/ Edita: MINISTERIO SECRETARÍA DE DEFENSA GENERAL TÉCNICA NIPO: 083-12-024-7 (edición en papel) NIPO: 083-12-025-2 (edición en línea) NIPO: 083-12-023-1 (libro-e) ISBN papel: 978-84-9781-723-3 ISBN libro-e : 978-84-9781-724-0 Depósito Legal: M-12287-2012 Imprime: Imprenta del Ministerio de Defensa Tirada: 500 ejemplares Fecha de edición: marzo, 2012 En esta edición se ha utilizado papel libre de cloro obtenido a partir de bosques gestionados de forma sostenible certificada. Las opiniones emitidas en esta publicación son de exclusiva responsabilidad de los autores de la misma. EL CIBERESPACIO. NUEVO ESCENARIO DE CONFRONTACIÓN SUMARIO Página INTRODUCCIÓN .............................................................................. 9 Por José Ramón Casar Corredera Capítulo primero LA CIBERSEGURIDAD Y LA CIBERDEFENSA ................................ 35 Por Luis Feliu Ortega Capítulo segundo ESTRATEGIAS INTERNACIONALES PARA EL CIBERESPACIO ..... 71 Por Carlos Enríquez González Capítulo tercero LA EVALUACIÓN DEL CONFLICTO HACIA UN NUEVO ESCENA- RIO BÉLICO ................................................................................. 117 Por Javier López de Turiso y Sánchez Capítulo cuarto EL CIBERESPACIO COMO ESCENARIO DEL CONFLICTO. IDEN- TIFICACIÓN DE LAS AMENAZAS ................................................ 167 Por Ángel Gómez de Ágreda — 7 — Página Capítulo quinto CAPACIDADES PARA LA DEFENSA EN EL CIBERESPACIO ......... 205 Por Óscar Pastor Acosta Capítulo sexto TECNOLOGÍAS PARA LA DEFENSA EN EL CIBERESPACIO ......... 253 Por Manuel Pérez Cortés COMPOSICIÓN DEL GRUPO DE TRABAJO ................................... 307 ÍNDICE .............................................................................................. 309 — 8 — INTRODUCCIÓN INTRODUCCIÓN Por JOSÉ RAMÓN CASAR CORREDERA «Ne Sero Veniam Depugto Proelio» («Que no llegue tarde, con la batalla ya acabada») PLAUTO, Menaechmi El ciberespacio, nuevo Global Common junto con los tradicionales terres­ tre, marítimo, aéreo y espacial, está siendo objeto común de reflexión y publicación por parte de estudiosos y numerosas agencias e instituciones públicas y privadas nacionales e internacionales, incluyendo la Organiza­ ción del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), Unión Europea, Organización para la Seguridad y Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), etc. El ciberespacio se anticipa o se vislumbra, desde la perspectiva que interesa a esta Mono- grafía, como un escenario de conflicto mayor, en el que las actuales esca­ ramuzas, mayoritariamente aún de baja intensidad, pudieran evolucionar a enfrentamientos de mayores dimensiones, que posiblemente combinados con otras actuaciones de fuerza, quizás en otros Commons, constituyan una verdadera guerra, la que ha dado en llamarse ciberguerra. Esta Monografía se orienta principalmente hacia aspectos relacionados con la ciberdefensa considerada como una cuestión básicamente militar, en el sentido de que se interesa por facetas que involucran a institu­ ciones, organizaciones o profesiones militares, en todo o en parte. No considera sin embargo, al menos explícita y detalladamente, otros aspec­ tos también importantes para el ciudadano, como el robo de datos per­ sonales, el ciberdelito económico, etc., y otros, seguramente de interés — 11 — nacional general, como el ciberespionaje industrial o el uso malicioso de otras herramientas «corrientes» de Internet, como redes sociales, blogs o simples portales web (o medios de comunicación on-line) para hacer apología extremista o sembrar dudas de confianza o reputación de una economía, una nación, una empresa, etc. Los ejemplos recientes (diarios) de ataques premeditados en Internet con notable impacto mediático (por ejemplo, los muy recientes casos de los grupos Anonymous o Lulzsec), aunque con pocas consecuencias realmente graves (conocidas, al menos de momento), parecen poner de manifiesto que, en muchos casos, el impacto mediático y la alarma social no son siempre proporcionales al grado de la amenaza real. Es literal­ mente imposible hacer una historia detallada, día a día, de la cantidad de sucesos de ataques (de baja intensidad, diríamos), consistentes en robos de datos, denegaciones de servicio, publicación dolosa de informacio­ nes estrictamente personales, etc. que se han sucedido en los últimos (muchos) meses: Sony, Honda, Citigroup, Paypal, Apple, The Sun, Face­ book, el Fondo Monetario Internacional, el Senado de Estados Unidos, la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) norteamericana, El Pentágono, Inteco, Movistar, y un larguísimo etcétera, que ocuparía varios párrafos, han sido víctimas de ataques a través de Internet. Al margen de conse­ cuencias prácticas que no se han producido, es indiscutible que estos ataques, sean de hacktivismo simple o de otra dimensión, son capaces de generar una sensación de indeseables inseguridad y desconcierto tanto en los ciudadanos como en las economías. El ciberespionaje comercial e industrial es también un elemento de preo­ cupación general, principalmente en Occidente, en relación a algunas grandes potencias. En el año 2010 salieron a la opinión pública varias campañas, aparentemente originadas en algún lugar de China. Quizás dos de las más conocida son la operación Aurora, dirigida a diversas empresas con sede en California de los sectores de la Tecnología de la Información y las Comunicaciones (TIC) y Química y la Shadow Network, aparentemente dirigida a comprometer determinados intereses de la In­ dia. El ataque a Lockheed Martin y a otros contratistas de Defensa de Es­ tados Unidos, a través de determinados dispositivos de Rivest Sharmia and Adleman, es otro ejemplo, de entre tantos, de intentos de intrusión interesada en sistemas de proveedores críticos para la defensa o la eco­ nomía de una nación. El 4 de noviembre de 2011 se conocía en la prensa española uno de los informes oficiales de inteligencia de Estados Unidos — 12 — (referido al periodo 2009­2011), que acusaba a China y Rusia de robar (o intentarlo) secretos comerciales. El informe, no obstante, reconoce la dificultad de determinar exactamente quién está detrás de estos ataques cibernéticos (por cierto, una de las dificultades recurrentemente aludidas en varios capítulos de esta Monografía). Se puede tener la tentación de intentar restar seriedad práctica a estos intentos, logrados o malogrados, de robo de datos (yo mismo la tengo), pero hay otros indicios y noticias que no pueden dejarnos tranquilos. Podríamos mencionar varios, sin duda; pero, para esta Introducción he retenido dos, basados en dos noticias recientes: la primera, conocida hace unos días, aunque referida a hechos sucedidos en los años 2007 y 2008, descubre que un informe del Congreso de Estados Unidos expone los indicios que hacen sospechar que desde China se tuvo acceso a dos satélites gestionados por la Administración Nacional de Aeronáutica de Estados Unidos (NASA). Se supone que el acceso tuvo lugar a través de un centro de control terrestre de la NASA en Noruega. Sin consecuencia práctica, el suce­ so ilustra que es posible imaginar capacidades de intrusión en misiones de alto valor estratégico. La segunda noticia es de ayer (escribo estas líneas el 20 de noviembre de 2011) y refiere un ciberataque contra una infraestructura industrial civil de Estados Unidos, en concreto, un servicio de distribución de aguas en Illinois. El incidente habría tenido lugar el 8 de noviembre; los atacantes habrían usado unas claves robadas de una empresa que desarrolla software para los Sistemas de Control SCADA, para acceder remotamente e inutilizar una (o varias) bombas de agua. No se sabe a día de hoy acerca de las intenciones del atacante, en su caso, y modo de actuación, pero el incidente demuestra la posibilidad de intervenir remota y maliciosamente en las infraestructuras críticas de un país. Se trazó el ordenador de origen del ataque en Rusia, pero esto, en el ciberespacio, no se puede constituir en prueba alguna de autoría real. Es en este contexto de intrusiones, ataques y provocaciones de menor o mayor envergadura, que se vienen sucediendo cotidianamente, en el que hay que entender la creciente preocupación intelectual, pero también la actualidad del tema en las agendas políticas y de trabajo de los organis­ mos competentes. El Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN), im­ pulsando ésta que es una de sus líneas de reflexión prioritarias en la ac­ — 13 — tualidad, ha querido contribuir en el debate sobre el estado actual y es­ trategias de actuación para la defensa de los intereses de los individuos en el ciberespacio, formando un grupo de trabajo sobre el ciberespacio como nuevo escenario de conflicto, que me ha cabido el privilegio de coordinar. Se suma así a otras iniciativas concurrentes o complementa­ rias, algunas extremadamente valiosas, como la que recoge el Cuaderno de Estrategia, número 149 del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, febrero de 2011, dedicada también a la ciberseguridad. El grupo de trabajo ha estado formado por Luis Feliu Ortega, Carlos En­ ríquez González, Javier López de Turiso y Sánchez, Óscar Pastor Acos­ ta, Manuel Pérez Cortés, Ángel Gómez de Ágreda (que ha ejercido de secretario­coordinador con una eficacia imposible de imitar y sin cuyo concurso este trabajo no se hubiera terminado ni en tiempo ni en forma) y por mí mismo. Hemos dado
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