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Powering AI and Automotive Applications with the MIPI Camera Interface Agenda
Hyoung-Bae Choi Synopsys Powering AI and Automotive Applications with the MIPI Camera Interface Agenda Adoption of MIPI CSI-2℠ Image sensors beyond mobile AI and automotive examples CSI-2 interface overview Meeting reliability requirements of automotive applications Supporting artificial intelligence (AI) applications Summary © 2018 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 2 MIPI Specifications in New Applications Automotive, IoT / Wearables, Virtual / Augmented Reality © 2018 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 3 Industrial & Surveillance Applications Using MIPI CSI-2 Image Sensors © 2018 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 4 Example of MIPI in an Automotive Application MIPI CSI-2 Image Sensors & DSI Display MIPI CSI-2 Image Sensors Front Camera Module Vbat Power Supply Front Camera Left Camera MIPI DSI Right Display Module Camera Display Proprietary, LVDS or Right Camera MPU Left Ethernet Switch Module Camera CAN Interface Rear Camera Module Flash LVDS or Rear Camera DRAM Memory Ethernet Link Other Camera Module Other Camera Module © 2018 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 5 Safety-Critical ADAS Applications Require ISO 26262 Functional Safety Compliance and ASIL Certification Electronics failure can have hazardous impact Emergency braking Pedestrian detection Collision avoidance ≠ © 2018 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 6 MIPI Specs for Automotive Applications Infotainment Vehicle Networks & V2X • Real time video & data network • Gateways • Navigation • Telematics • Audio/Video • V2V • Entertainment • V2I • Security Driver Information Driver Assistance • Parking assist • Instrument clusters • Lane departure warning -
OCP DC-SCM Specification
Datacenter Secure Control Module Specification Authors: Priya Raghu, Senior Hardware Engineer, Microsoft Mark A. Shaw, Principal Hardware Engineering Manager, Microsoft Prakash Chauhan, Server Architect, Google Siamak Tavallaei, Chief Systems Architect, Google Mike Branch, Server Architect, Google Mason Possing, Hardware Engineer, Microsoft Open Compute Project • DC-SCM Specification Revision History Version Date Notes 0.8 Nov 9th 2020 Initial public review. 0.95 Dec 2nd 2020 Feedback Implemented Removed ESPI_CS1_N and replaced with RSVD3, Table 22:SPARE[0:1] desc, 1.0 March 11th Fig 22: Updated to initiator/Responder, Table 27: I3C pull-up updated to 2021 STBY/MAIN, Sec 6: Platform interop wording edit, Sec 2.2.3- Typo( FFF> HFF), Fig 3,4,5,6 updated, Table 3 updated http://opencompute.org ii Open Compute Project • DC-SCM Specification Contributions to this Specification are made under the terms and conditions set forth in Open Web Foundation Contributor License Agreement (“OWF CLA 1.0”) (“Contribution License”) by: Microsoft Corporation, Google LLC Usage of this Specification is governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the Open Web Foundation Final Specification Agreement (“OWFa 1.0”). Note: The following clarifications, which distinguish technology licensed in the Contribution License and/or Specification License from those technologies merely referenced (but not licensed), were accepted by the Incubation Committee of the OCP: INTELLIGENT PLATFORM MANAGEMENT INTERFACE (IPMI) I2C TRADEMARK OF PHILLIPS SEMICONDUCTOR I3C TRADEMARK OF MIPI ALLIANCE, INC USB TRADEMARK OF USB IMPLEMENTORS FORUM, INC PCIE TRADEMARK OF PCI-SIG ESPI TRADEMARK OF INTEL CORP NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING LICENSES, THIS SPECIFICATION IS PROVIDED BY OCP "AS IS" AND OCP EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTIES (EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR OTHERWISE), INCLUDING IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, NON-INFRINGEMENT, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR TITLE, RELATED TO THE SPECIFICATION. -
ASD-Covert-Foreign-Money.Pdf
overt C Foreign Covert Money Financial loopholes exploited by AUGUST 2020 authoritarians to fund political interference in democracies AUTHORS: Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley © 2020 The Alliance for Securing Democracy Please direct inquiries to The Alliance for Securing Democracy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1700 18th Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/covert-foreign-money/. The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the authors alone. Cover and map design: Kenny Nguyen Formatting design: Rachael Worthington Alliance for Securing Democracy The Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD), a bipartisan initiative housed at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, develops comprehensive strategies to deter, defend against, and raise the costs on authoritarian efforts to undermine and interfere in democratic institutions. ASD brings together experts on disinformation, malign finance, emerging technologies, elections integrity, economic coercion, and cybersecurity, as well as regional experts, to collaborate across traditional stovepipes and develop cross-cutting frame- works. Authors Josh Rudolph Fellow for Malign Finance Thomas Morley Research Assistant Contents Executive Summary �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1 Introduction and Methodology �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� -
Gautam Barua, Director IIT Guwahati • 2011
Speakers of IC3‐2008 to IC3‐2014 Inaugural Talk • 2012: Gautam Barua, Director IIT Guwahati • 2011: Narendra Ahuja, University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign, USA (Fellow of ACM, Fellow of the IEEE, Fellow of AAAS) • 2010: Dhanendra Kumar, IAS, Chairman Competition Commission of India • 2009: K.R. Srivathsan, Pro Vice‐Chancellor of IGNOU • 2008: Vineet Nayyar, CEO HCL Technologies Limited Keynote Speakers • 2014 o Martin Henson , Professor, University of Essex, UK o Tirumale K Ramesh, Professor, Amrita University, India o Albert Y. Zomaya, Professor, University of Sydney, Australia o H. J. Siegel, Professor, Colorado State University,USA o Azzedine Boukerche, Professor, University of Ottawa o Krithi Ramamritham, Professor,IIT Bombay o Prem Kalra, Professor,IIT Delhi • 2013 o Zvi Galil, Dean of College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology o Dinesh Manocha, Phi Delta Theta/Matthew Mason Distinguished ,Professor of Computer Science at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill o Yves Robert from LIP, ENS Lyon, France, IEEE Fellow o Laxmi Narayan Bhuyan, Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California, Riverside o R. Govindarajan, IISc Banglore o Srikanth Sundararajan IIT Bhubaneshwar o Rajat Moona, C‐DAC, Pune • 2012 o H. T. Kung, William H. Gates, Harvard University o Nageswara S. V. Rao, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, USA (Fellow of IEEE) o Chandrajit Bajaj, University of Texas at Austin (Fellow of the AAAS, ACM) o Alok Choudhary, John G. Searle , Northwestern University, USA (Fellow of IEEE, ACM and AAAS) o Ishwar Parulkar, Cisco Systems, Bangalore, India o Ramesh Hariharan, Strand Life Sciences, Bangalore, India o Sunil D. -
Microcontroller Serial Interfaces
Microcontroller Serial Interfaces Dr. Francesco Conti [email protected] Microcontroller System Architecture Each MCU (micro-controller unit) is characterized by: • Microprocessor • 8,16,32 bit architecture • Usually “simple” in-order microarchitecture, no FPU Example: STM32F101 MCU Microcontroller System Architecture Each MCU (micro-controller unit) is characterized by: • Microprocessor • 8,16,32 bit architecture • Usually “simple” in-order microarchitecture, no FPU • Memory • RAM (from 512B to 256kB) • FLASH (from 512B to 1MB) Example: STM32F101 MCU Microcontroller System Architecture Each MCU (micro-controller unit) is characterized by: • Microprocessor • 8,16,32 bit architecture • Usually “simple” in-order microarchitecture, no FPU • Memory • RAM (from 512B to 256kB) • FLASH (from 512B to 1MB) • Peripherals • DMA • Timer • Interfaces • Digital Interfaces • Analog Timer DMAs Example: STM32F101 MCU Microcontroller System Architecture Each MCU (micro-controller unit) is characterized by: • Microprocessor • 8,16,32 bit architecture • Usually “simple” in-order microarchitecture, no FPU • Memory • RAM (from 512B to 256kB) • FLASH (from 512B to 1MB) • Peripherals • DMA • Timer • Interfaces • Digital • Analog • Interconnect Example: STM32F101 MCU • AHB system bus (ARM-based MCUs) • APB peripheral bus (ARM-based MCUs) Microcontroller System Architecture Each MCU (micro-controller unit) is characterized by: • Microprocessor • 8,16,32 bit architecture • Usually “simple” in-order microarchitecture, no FPU • Memory • RAM (from 512B to 256kB) • FLASH -
Server Base Manageability Requirements 1.0 Platform Design Document Non-Confidential
Arm® Server Base Manageability Requirements 1.0 Platform Design Document Non-confidential Copyright © 2020 Arm Limited or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Document number: DEN0069B Server Base Manageability Requirements Server Base Manageability Requirements Copyright © 2020 Arm Limited or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Release inormation The Change History table lists the changes made to this document. Table 1-1 Change history Date Issue Confidentiality Change 30 January 2020 A Non-Confidential Initial release, SBMR 1.0 15 June 2020 B Non-Confidential License LES-PRE-21585 Page 2 of 45 Copyright © 2020 Arm Limited or its affiliates. All rights reserved. DEN0069B 1.0 Server Base Manageability Requirements Arm Non-Confidential Document Licence (“Licence”) This Licence is a legal agreement between you and Arm Limited (“Arm”) for the use of the document accompanying this Licence (“Document”). Arm is only willing to license the Document to you on condition that you agree to the terms of this Licence. By using or copying the Document you indicate that you agree to be bound by the terms of this Licence. If you do not agree to the terms of this Licence, Arm is unwilling to license this Document to you and you may not use or copy the Document. “Subsidiary” means any company the majority of whose voting shares is now or hereafter owner or controlled, directly or indirectly, by you. A company shall be a Subsidiary only for the period during which such control exists. This Document is NON-CONFIDENTIAL and any use by you and your Subsidiaries (“Licensee”) is subject to the terms of this Licence between you and Arm. -
Distance Education Certification Standards
Distance Education Certification Standards Association of Real Estate License Law Officials 11650 Olio Road, Suite 1000 #360, Fishers, IN 46037 Copyright 2020 Table of Contents PREFACE ................................................................................................................................... 1 Background to the Standards .................................................................................................... 1 The Standards Task Force Founding Members.................................................................................................................. 2 2013 -‐ 2014 Revision Taskforce Members .......................................................................................................................... 2 IDECC and New Industries ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 WHY STANDARDS? ................................................................................................................. 4 What is Distance Learning Education? ............................................................................................................................. 4 Standards, Amid Change .......................................................................................................................................................... 5 Curricula, Courses, and Distance Delivery ...................................................................................................................... -
Cyber Dissuasion
N° 03/2012 recherches & documents mars 2012 Cyber Dissuasion Bruno gruselle Maître de recherche à la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Bruno tertrais Maître de recherche à la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique alain esterle Chercheur associé à la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique w w w . frstrategie . o r g CYBER DISSUASION RECHERCHES & DOCUMENTS N ° 03/2012 Édité et diffusé par la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 4 bis rue des Pâtures – 75016 PARIS ISSN : 1966-5156 ISBN : 978-2-911101-68-7 EAN : 9782911101687 WWW.FRSTRATEGIE.ORG 4 B I S RUE DES P ÂTURES 75 016 P ARIS TÉL. 01 43 13 77 77 FAX 0 1 43 13 77 78 SIRET 394 095 533 00045 TVA FR74 394 095 533 CODE APE 7220Z FONDATION RECONNUE D'UTILITÉ PUBLIQUE – DÉCRET DU 26 FÉVRIER 1993 SOMMAIRE INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 5 LES VULNERABILITES DE L’ESPACE NUMERIQUE ET LES RISQUES ASSOCIES SONT DEJA IMPORTANTS ET DEVRAIENT S ’AGGRAVER A L ’HORIZON 2020 ................................................... 9 Il est nécessaire d’établir le degré de gravité des risques numériques, les vulnérabilités exploitables et les perspectives de leur développement ................. 9 Les menaces pesant sur l’espace numérique ont d’ores et déjà des conséquences de sécurité importantes ...........................................................10 Les acteurs malveillants de l’espace numérique sont nombreux et leurs motivations appartiennent à des ensembles diversifiés ........................................14 -
Name: Prof. João Manuel Ribeiro Da Silva Tavares Date of Birth: February 12, 1969 Passport Nº: P209475 - PRT
João Manuel R. S. Tavares Curriculum Vitae Name: Prof. João Manuel Ribeiro da Silva Tavares Date of Birth: February 12, 1969 Passport nº: P209475 - PRT Address: Faculdade de Engenharia da Universidade do Porto Departamento de Engenharia Mecânica Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, s/n 4200 - 465 PORTO PORTUGAL Phone: +351 22 508 1487 / +351 22 041 3472 Fax: +351 22 508 1445 Email: [email protected] url: www.fe.up.pt/~tavares Education: Habilitation: Mechanical Engineering, University of Porto – Portugal, 2015 PhD: Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Porto – Portugal, 2001 (Computational Vision) MSc: Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Porto – Portugal, 1995 (Industrial informatics) BSc (5 years): Mechanical Engineering, University of Porto – Portugal, 1992 Actual Position: Associate Professor (with Habilitation) at the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto, Department of Mechanical Engineering, since December 2011. (www.fe.up.pt) Areas of Research: § Biomedical Engineering; § Biomechanics; § Computational Vision, Image processing and analysis, Medical imaging; § Computer Graphics, Scientific Visualization; 1 João Manuel R. S. Tavares Curriculum Vitae § Modelling and Simulation; § Product development. Research IDs: § Thomson Reuters: www.researcherid.com/rid/M-5305-2013 § Scopus: www.scopus.com/authid/detail.url?authorId=36538110300 § Orcid: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7603-6526 § ResearchGate: www.researchgate.net/profile/Joao_Tavares2 § Google Scholar: http://scholar.google.pt/citations?user=urdxG3EAAAAJ&hl=en § publons: http://publons.com/a/1170011 Supervisor Projects: Master Thesis Finished: 1. Development of a new nasal irrigation device Ana Rita Gonçalves Salvador Supervisor: João Manuel R. S. Tavares Integrated Master in Mechanical Engineering, University of Porto, 1st semester of 2017/2018, submitted in January 2018, public defense on 16 February 2018 2. -
The University and the Future
Contents PRESENTATION 1 THE UNIVERSITY THE YEAR AT A AND THE FUTURE GLANCE 2 ACADEMIC YEAR 2010-2011 SUMMARY OF THE UOC ANNUAL REPORT THE UOC IN FIGURES 8 THE UOC IN THE WORLD 16 RESEARCH, TRANSFER AND INNOVATION 18 EDUCATION AND QUALITY 20 FINANCIAL REPORT 22 THE UOC ONLINE 24 portada okENG.indd 1 09/02/12 11:04 “OVER THE LAST ACADEMIC YEAR WE HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE UOC IS EVEN MORE OPEN AND ACCESSIBLE, FLEXIBLE AND ADAPTABLE TO SOCIETY’S NEEDS, AND MOBILE, MULTILINGUAL AND MULTI-FORMAT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE LIFESTYLES OF OUR STUDENTS.” Imma Tubella, President of the UOC rectora.uoc.edu THE UNIVERSITY AND THE FUTURE Recently, I have had the opportunity to For this reason, over the last academic present the UOC’s educational and gov- year we have made every effort to ensure ernance model at international university that the UOC is even more open and ac- forums in such diverse corners of the world cessible, fl exible and adaptable to society’s as Washington, Paris, Singapore, Qatar and needs, and mobile, multilingual and multi- Kenya to widely differing audiences from the format in order to be able to respond to the academic, scientifi c, business and govern- lifestyles of our students. ment sectors. On each occasion, I felt great pride on hearing how speakers – both those This commitment means we have to who already knew about us and those who reinvent ourselves constantly and steer our only just had – saw the UOC as a point of organisation so as to bravely navigate the reference for their online universities. -
The Question of State Sponsored Cyber Terrorism and Espionage Student Officer
st th The Hague International Model United Nations Qatar 2020 | 21 – 24 of January 2020 Forum: The Security Council Issue: The Question of State sponsored cyber terrorism and espionage Student Officer: Sebastian Santoni Position: President Introduction On the 27th of April 2007, Estonia experienced the first of a series of cyber attacks which would go on to shape laws, policies, and attitudes within and outside its borders. The country was bombarded by thousands of independent actors, resulting in the complete loss of most internet services for three weeks. The Estonian parliament, banks and media were all targeted in the midst of political disagreements with Russia. Although not the first incident of cyber terrorism, this was definitely one of the most destructive, managing to make an entire country go offline. In response, the world’s first ever regulations concerning actions in cyberspace were drafted, hoping to prevent such incidents from occurring in the future. However, incidents of cyber terrorism and espionage continued and remain a major threat to international security. Not only can they create mistrust and paranoia between nations, but also paralyse the organizations and resources core to their economic, social and political stability. This is especially true when such acts are initiated by countries and their related bodies, placing the world’s most sophisticated technology in the wrong hands. As members of the United Nations, it is the responsibility of countries to use their resources, voices and cooperation to strengthen international cyber security and work towards a world where state-sponsored cyber terrorism and espionage are void. Organizations such as the Kaspersky Lab and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence have made strides toward combating the issue, although they are restricted by an acute lack of relevant treaties and laws. -
UM Distance Education Handbook For
Faculty Distance Education Handbook 2020-2022 1 https://www.montevallo.edu/academics/distance-education-um/ Table of Contents UM Distance Education .......................................................................................................................................................... 4 Definitions................................................................................................................................................................ 4 Technical Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................... 5 University Commitment ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 Provision of Faculty Training and Support ................................................................................................ 6 Faculty Commitment ............................................................................................................................................................... 7 Distance Education Policies .............................................................................................................................. 8 Communication of Distance Education Requirements.......................................................................... 9 Best Instructional Practices for Distance Education Courses ......................................................... 10 Student