Company Voluntary Arrangements: Evaluating Success and Failure May 2018 Professor Peter Walton, University of Wolverhampton Chris Umfreville, Aston University Dr Lézelle Jacobs, University of Wolverhampton Commissioned by R3, the insolvency and restructuring trade body, and sponsored by ICAEW This report would not have been possible without the support and guidance of: Allison Broad, Nick Cosgrove, Giles Frampton, John Kelly Bob Pinder, Andrew Tate, The Insolvency Service Company Voluntary Arrangements: Evaluating Success and Failure About R3 R3 is the trade association for the UK’s insolvency, restructuring, advisory, and turnaround professionals. We represent insolvency practitioners, lawyers, turnaround and restructuring experts, students, and others in the profession. The insolvency, restructuring and turnaround profession is a vital part of the UK economy. The profession rescues businesses and jobs, creates the confidence to trade and lend by returning money fairly to creditors after insolvencies, investigates and disrupts fraud, and helps indebted individuals get back on their feet. The UK is an international centre for insolvency and restructuring work and our insolvency and restructuring framework is rated as one of the best in the world by the World Bank. R3 supports the profession in making sure that this remains the case. R3 raises awareness of the key issues facing the UK insolvency and restructuring profession and framework among the public, government, policymakers, media, and the wider business community. This work includes highlighting both policy issues for the profession and challenges facing business and personal finances. 2 Company Voluntary Arrangements: Evaluating Success and Failure Executive Summary • The biggest strength of a CVA is its flexibility. • Assessing the success or failure of CVAs is not straightforward and depends on a number of variables. • Early termination of a CVA is not necessarily indicative of the CVA having failed. • An analysis of the 552 CVAs commenced in 2013 involving companies in England and Wales showed: ► 18.5% were fully implemented; ► 16.5% were ongoing at the survey date; ► 65% were terminated without achieving their intended aims; ► 7% were terminated within the first 2 quarters; ► 24% were terminated between 4 and 6 quarters after commencement. • 514 or 93% of companies entering CVA were small or micro companies: ► 8 or 1.6% of small companies used the Sch. A1 moratorium; ► 7 or 1.4% of small companies first entered administration. • 38 or 7% of companies entering CVA were non-small companies, of which four first entered administration. • CVAs with the benefit of a moratorium were terminated in only 20% of cases. • 79 Insolvency Practitioner firms took one appointment with a further 25 taking two. • Four insolvency practitioner firms acted in over 20 cases. • The following issues with CVAs are noted: ► There are situations where CVAs have been implemented but terminated quickly; ► Some CVAs return very little to creditors over their lifetime; either because contribution payments are repeatedly missed or because contributions are only sufficient to cover the costs of the process; ► The ‘real’ length of CVAs is often much shorter than its expected duration as a result of missed contributions; ► There is often a significant gap between the expected level of dividends and the actual dividends; ► There is not always a contingency plan for the costs of a subsequent winding up in the event the CVA terminates. • Dividends to unsecured creditors were rare in CVAs which terminated within 6 quarters of commencement. • Often directors do not implement necessary changes or fail to identify and tackle fully the problems identified in the CVA. • HMRC is seen as the most engaged creditor and the one most likely to vote against a CVA whether for policy or commercial reasons. • Different stakeholders have differing views of how effective CVAs are and how their interests might best be protected. • The UK is slipping in the World Bank rankings and lessons may be learnt from the World Bank principles and other international insolvencydevelopments. 3 Company Voluntary Arrangements: Evaluating Success and Failure Main Recommendations • CVAs should last no longer than 3 years without good reason. • Directors’ duties should be articulated moreclearly and fully to include a requirement to address financial distress early. • The roles and duties of nominees and supervisorsshould be articulated more clearly and fully in a revised SIP. • Public sector creditors should have to explain their decision fully if they refuse to support a CVA proposal. • A new form of pre-insolvency moratorium should be introduced. • Standard terms and conditions, at least for small company CVAs, should be made available and when adopted, certain classes of creditors should have to explain fully if they refuse to support the CVA. • There could be consideration of whether the insolvency practitioner fee system used in other insolvency procedures should be adopted in CVAs. • Documentation filed at Companies House in relationto CVAs should be more informative so as to improve transparency and encourage confidence. 4 Company Voluntary Arrangements: Evaluating Success and Failure 1. Purpose of the Research The purpose of this report is to consider the reasons for the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of company voluntary arrangements (“CVAs”) and to investigate the outcomes where CVAs fail. The frequency of CVAs is reasonably low when compared with alternative corporate Insolvency Act 1986 procedures1 and it has been commented that CVAs have a high failure rate.2 The research project aims to identify ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ CVAs and by doing so, identify key characteristics which will in turn allow practical guidance to be provided to insolvency practitioners (“IPs”) and also inform policy recommendations to Government. We are conscious that the project is being carried out a time when national and international bodies are con- sidering how best business rescue can be encouraged. In May 2016 the UK Government launched A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A consultation on options for reform. The consultation put forward four key proposals to encourage rescue of viable businesses including the introduction of a pre-insolvency restructuring moratorium; the protection of essential supplier contracts during restructuring; the ability to bind and cram down secured creditors in a restructuring; and the introduction of new options for rescue financing. Clearly, some or all of these matters may be factors which impact upon whether or not a CVA is deemed feasible in the first place, and subsequently, whether the CVA reaches a successful conclusion. Sim- ilar to the UK Government proposals, are those found in the draft EU Directive on preventive procedures3 from November 2016.4 In addition to conducting empirical research concentrating on CVAs in England and Wales, we have also considered national and international developments and consultations including some comparative analysis. The findings from the empirical research build on those from the last comprehensive research on this issue by Sandra Frisby and Adrian Walters published in March 2011.5 That research was based on cases commenced in 2006 and is therefore relatively old and takes no account of any developments in law and practice since then. Evidence of current practice is required in order to identify the circumstances in which CVAs are used, are suc- cessful or unsuccessful and to identify factors which are favourable or unfavourable to CVA success. As part of this process it is important to take account of the views of the main stakeholders interested in CVAs. The views of insolvency practitioners, lawyers, landlords, secured and unsecured creditors6 have been canvassed and their respective positions and opinions have fed into our assessment of how CVAs operate currently and how that operation might be improved. It is reasonably clear that although pre-packaged administration existed in 2006, pre-packs are more commonly encountered (as an alternative to CVAs) in 2018 than they were in 2006. It is now possible to identify companies which have entered a pre-pack and to consider the reasons those in control of those companies expressed for preferring a pre-pack over a CVA. The research also considers the reasons given by IPs for preferring a pre-pack over a possible CVA. 1. There were 17,243 total company insolvencies in 2017 in England and Wales of which only 292 were CVAs. 2. A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A consultation on options for reform found at: www.gov.uk/government/ consultations/a-review-of-the-corporate-insolvency-framework (hereafter referred to as the “the Consultation”) identified that in 2014 there were 563 CVAs, of which 388 failed, equating to a failure rate of 60%. 3. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU (2016/0359(COD)) (hereafter referred to as the “Draft Directive”). 4. In addition, the European Law Institute in its July 2017 Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law report looks at similar issues Found at: http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/Instrument_INSOLVENCY.pdf. 5. S. Frisby and A. Walters Preliminary Report to the UK Insolvency Service into Outcomes in Company Voluntary Arrangements,