A Primer on Second Lien Term Loan Financings by Neil Cummings and Kirk A
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What a Creditor Needs to Know About Liquidating an Insolvent BVI Company
What a creditor needs to know about liquidating GUIDE an insolvent BVI company Last reviewed: October 2020 Contents Introduction 3 When is a company insolvent? 3 What is a statutory demand? 3 Written request for payment 3 Is it essential to serve a statutory demand? 3 What must a statutory demand say? 3 Setting aside a statutory demand 4 How may a company be put into liquidation? 4 Qualifying resolution 4 Appointment 4 Liquidator's powers 4 Court order 5 Who may apply? 5 Application 5 Debt should be undisputed 5 When does a company's liquidation start? 5 What are the consequences of a company being put into liquidation? 5 Assets do not vest in liquidator 5 Automatic consequences 5 Restriction on execution and attachment 6 Public documents 6 Other consequences 6 Effect on contracts 6 How do creditors claim in a company's liquidation? 7 Making a claim 7 Currency 7 Contingent debts 7 Interest 7 Admitting or rejecting claims 7 What is a creditors' committee? 7 Establishing the committee 7 2021934/79051506/1 BVI | CAYMAN ISLANDS | GUERNSEY | HONG KONG | JERSEY | LONDON mourant.com Functions 7 Powers 8 What is the order of distribution of the company's assets? 8 Pari passu principle 8 Excluded assets 8 Order of application 8 How are secured creditors affected by a company's liquidation? 8 General position 8 Liquidator challenge 8 Claiming in the liquidation 8 Who are preferential creditors? 9 Preferential creditors 9 Priority 9 What are the claims of current and past shareholders? 9 Do shareholders have to contribute towards the company's debts? -
UK (England and Wales)
Restructuring and Insolvency 2006/07 Country Q&A UK (England and Wales) UK (England and Wales) Lyndon Norley, Partha Kar and Graham Lane, Kirkland and Ellis International LLP www.practicallaw.com/2-202-0910 SECURITY AND PRIORITIES ■ Floating charge. A floating charge can be taken over a variety of assets (both existing and future), which fluctuate from 1. What are the most common forms of security taken in rela- day to day. It is usually taken over a debtor's whole business tion to immovable and movable property? Are any specific and undertaking. formalities required for the creation of security by compa- nies? Unlike a fixed charge, a floating charge does not attach to a particular asset, but rather "floats" above one or more assets. During this time, the debtor is free to sell or dispose of the Immovable property assets without the creditor's consent. However, if a default specified in the charge document occurs, the floating charge The most common types of security for immovable property are: will "crystallise" into a fixed charge, which attaches to and encumbers specific assets. ■ Mortgage. A legal mortgage is the main form of security interest over real property. It historically involved legal title If a floating charge over all or substantially all of a com- to a debtor's property being transferred to the creditor as pany's assets has been created before 15 September 2003, security for a claim. The debtor retained possession of the it can be enforced by appointing an administrative receiver. property, but only recovered legal ownership when it repaid On default, the administrative receiver takes control of the the secured debt in full. -
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1979 Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors Anthony T. Kronman Thomas H. Jackson Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Anthony T. Kronman & Thomas H. Jackson, "Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors," 88 Yale Law Journal 1143 (1979). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors* Thomas H. Jacksont and Anthony T. Kronmant One of the principal advantages of a secured transaction is the protection it provides against the claims of competing creditors. A creditor asserting a security interest in his debtor's property is likely to find himself in competition with a wide assortment of other claimants. For example, his security interest may be challenged by another creditor with a consensual security interest, by a creditor with a judgment or execution lien, by a creditor claiming a right to the collateral under some general statutory entitlement such as a repair- man's lien, by a seller to or a buyer from the debtor, or by the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. To a considerable extent, the value of a security interest depends upon the degree to which it insulates the secured party from the claims of the debtor's other creditors.1 Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code contains detailed rules for resolving conflicts between secured creditors and various third parties-rules that tell the secured party what he must do in order to prevent his security interest from being overridden by a competing claimant, or, conversely, what a competitor must do in order to cir- cumvent an existing security interest in the debtor's property. -
Bankrupt Subsidiaries: the Challenges to the Parent of Legal Separation
ERENSFRIEDMAN&MAYERFELD GALLEYSFINAL 1/27/2009 10:25:46 AM BANKRUPT SUBSIDIARIES: THE CHALLENGES TO THE PARENT OF LEGAL SEPARATION ∗ Brad B. Erens ∗∗ Scott J. Friedman ∗∗∗ Kelly M. Mayerfeld The financial distress of a subsidiary can be a difficult event for its parent company. When the subsidiary faces the prospect of a bankruptcy filing, the parent likely will need to address many more issues than simply its lost investment in the subsidiary. Unpaid creditors of the subsidiary instinctively may look to the parent as a target to recover on their claims under any number of legal theories, including piercing the corporate veil, breach of fiduciary duty, and deepening insolvency. The parent also may find that it has exposure to the subsidiary’s creditors under various state and federal statutes, or under contracts among the parties. In addition, untangling the affairs of the parent and subsidiary, if the latter is going to reorganize under chapter 11 and be owned by its creditors, can be difficult. All of these issues may, in fact, lead to financial challenges for the parent itself. Parent companies thus are well advised to consider their potential exposure to a subsidiary’s creditors not only once the subsidiary actually faces financial distress, but well in advance as a matter of prudent corporate planning. If a subsidiary ultimately is forced to file for chapter 11, however, the bankruptcy laws do provide unique procedures to resolve any existing or potential litigation between the parent and the subsidiary’s creditors and to permit the parent to obtain a clean break from the subsidiary’s financial problems. -
Dealing with Secured Lenders1
CHAPTER TWO Dealing with Secured Lenders1 David Hillman2 Mark Shinderman3 Aaron Wernick4 With investors continuing to pursue higher yields, the market for secured debt has experienced a resurgence since the depth of the fi nancial crisis of 2008. For borrowers, the lenders’ willingness to make these loans has translated to increased liquidity and access to capital for numerous purposes, including (i) providing working capital and funding for general corporate purposes; (ii) funding an acquisition-related transaction or a recapitalization of a company’s balance sheet; or (iii) refi nancing a borrower’s existing debt. The increased debt loads may lead to fi nancial distress when a borrower’s business sags, at which point management will typically turn to its secured lenders to begin negotiations on the restructuring of the business’s debt. Consequently, the secured lenders usually take the most active role in monitoring the credit and responding to problems when they fi rst arise. Secured loans come in many different forms and are offered from a range of different investors. The common feature for secured debt is the existence of a lien on all or a portion of the borrower’s assets. Following is a brief overview of the common types of secured lending: Asset-Based Loans. The traditional loan market consisted of an asset based lender (traditionally a bank or commercial fi nancing institution) providing revolving loans, term loans, and letters of credit secured by a fi rst priority lien on accounts receivable, inventory, equipment, and 1. Special thanks to Douglas R. Urquhart and Roshelle Nagar of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP for their contributions to earlier editions of this chapter. -
Restructuring Risk in Credit Default Swaps: an Empirical Analysis∗
Restructuring Risk in Credit Default Swaps: An Empirical Analysis∗ Antje Berndt† Robert A. Jarrow‡ ChoongOh Kang§ Current Version: November 18, 2005 Preliminary and Incomplete Abstract This paper estimates the price for bearing exposure to restructuring risk in the U.S. corporate bond market during 2000-2005, based on the relationship between quotes for default swap (CDS) contracts that include restructuring as a covered default event and contracts that do not. We find that on average the premium for exposure to restructuring risk amounts to 6% to 8% of the value of protection against non-restructuring default events. The increase in the restructuring premium in response to an increase in rates on default swaps that do not include restructuring as a covered event is higher for high-yield CDS and lower for investment-grade firms, and depends on firm-specific balance-sheet and macroeconomic variables. We observe that firms that offer a distressed exchange often experience a steep decline in their distance to default prior to the completion of the exchange. As an application, we propose a reduced-form arbitrage-free pricing model for default swaps, allowing for a potential jump in the risk-neutral non-restructuring default intensity if debt restructuring occurs. ∗We thank Lombard Risk for Default Swap data. We are grateful to Jean Helwege, Yongmiao Hong, Philip Protter and Roberto Perli for useful comments. †Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University. ‡Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University. §Department of Economics, Cornell University. 1 Introduction This paper estimates the price for bearing exposure to restructuring risk in the U.S. -
Corporate Restructuring
Corporate Restructuring guidance Navigate restructuring challenges and risk with experience that runs deep People. Partnership. Performance. How we deliver Vast professional expertise Our smart teams comprise industry experts —financial advisors, attorneys, and claims agent professionals who have worked at Big Four accounting firms, the largest international law firms and in government agencies. We are personally accountable for exceptional results. 200+ years of combined experience faster Substantive, relevant, technological superiority Epiq’s powerful and intuitive technology tools reduce the burdens of the restructuring process. Our highly secure, geographically dispersed data centers exceed industry standards. Expect intuitive, dependable, relevant and secure technology at your disposal at all stages of your case largest chapter11 turnarounds in history Platinum standard in solicitation and balloting Epiq is the industry leader in helping solve restructuring challenges—no Epiq has built the industry’s most experienced, sought-after balloting team, especially when public securities are involved. We’ve outperformed in hundreds of matters and we continue to matter how complex—with clarity, confidence and speed. Our hallmark develop customized, cutting-edge procedures to reduce case time and execution cost. is innovative technology with superior consulting and administrative support, customized to your needs. Strategic communications Our strategic communications team is expert in creating plans critical to managing employee, customer, -
Partially Secured Creditors: Their Rights and Remedies Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act John C
Louisiana Law Review Volume 37 | Number 5 Summer 1977 Partially Secured Creditors: Their Rights and Remedies Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act John C. Anderson Repository Citation John C. Anderson, Partially Secured Creditors: Their Rights and Remedies Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 37 La. L. Rev. (1977) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol37/iss5/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PARTIALLY SECURED CREDITORS: THEIR RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER CHAPTER XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT John C. Anderson* Discussions of the rights of secured creditors under the Bankruptcy Act are conspicuous by their absence.' Ironically, the Act speaks the least about those creditors receiving the most.2 In bankruptcy liquidation cases under Chapters I-VII of the Bankruptcy Act, secured claims are entitled to the highest priority, being paid in preference to all other claims and 3 administrative expenses when the security for such claims is liquidated. Since most bankrupt estates are heavily encumbered by mortgages and liens, nearly all of the assets of the estates, after being liquidated, are paid toward secured claims. Accordingly, after the payment of secured debts, administrative expenses and then priority claims, there is usually little or nothing left to pay dividends to unsecured creditors. While there is a paucity of discussion about secured creditors in liquidation proceedings, similar discussions of the rights and remedies of secured creditors in arrangements under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act are virtually nonexistent.4 Once again, secured creditors are integral par- * Member, Baton Rouge Bar. -
Overview of the Fdic As Conservator Or Receiver
September 26, 2008 OVERVIEW OF THE FDIC AS CONSERVATOR OR RECEIVER This memorandum is an overview of the receivership and conservatorship authority of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”). In view of the many and complex specific issues that may arise in this context, this memorandum is necessarily an overview, but it does give particular reference to counterparty issues that might arise in the case of a relatively large complex bank such as a significant regional bank and outlines elements of the FDIC framework which differ from a corporate bankruptcy. This memorandum has three parts: (1) background on the legal framework governing FDIC resolutions, highlighting changes and developments since the 1990s; (2) an outline of six distinctive aspects of the FDIC approach with comparison to the bankruptcy law provisions; and (3) a final section illustrating issues and uncertainties in the FDIC resolutions process through a more detailed review of two examples – treatment of loan securitizations and participations, and standby letters of credit.1 Relevant additional materials include: the pertinent provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance (the "FDI") Act2 and FDIC rules3, statements of policy4 and advisory opinions;5 the FDIC Resolution Handbook6 which reflects the FDIC's high level description of the receivership process, including a contrast with the bankruptcy framework; recent speeches of FDIC Chairman 1 While not exhaustive, these discussions are meant to be exemplary of the kind of analysis that is appropriate in analyzing any transaction with a bank counterparty. 2 Esp. Section 11 et seq., http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/1000- 1200.html#1000sec.11 3 Esp. -
Subordinated Debt As Bank Capital: a Proposal for Regulatory Reform
Subordinated debt as bank capital: A proposal for regulatory reform Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall Introduction and summary probability that a greater reliance on market discipline Last year, a Federal Reserve Study Group, in which will cause a temporary market disruption. Addition- we participated, examined the use of subordinated ally, history shows that introducing reforms during debt as a tool for disciplining bank risk taking. The relatively tranquil times is preferable to being forced 2 study was completed prior to the passage of the 1999 to act during a crisis. U.S. Financial Services Modernization Act and the Perhaps the most important reason that now may results are reported in Kwast et al. (1999). The report be a good time to consider greater reliance on subor- provides a broad survey of the academic literature on dinated debt is that international efforts to reform subordinated debt and of prevailing practices within existing capital standards are highlighting the weak- the current market for subordinated debt issued by nesses of the alternatives. In 1988, the Basel Committee banking organizations. Although the report discusses on Banking Supervision published the International a number of the issues to be considered in developing Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital a policy proposal, providing an explicit proposal was Standards, which established international agreement 3 not the purpose of the report. Instead, it concludes on minimum risk-based capital adequacy ratios. The with a call for additional research into a number of paper, often referred to as the Basel Capital Accord, related topics. relied on very rough measures of a banks credit risk In this article, we present a proposal for the use exposure, however, and banks have increasingly en- of subordinated debt in bank capital regulation. -
Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring That Works 1
Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring that Works 1 Martin Guzman2 and Joseph E. Stiglitz3 Abstract Recent controversies surrounding sovereign debt restructurings show the weaknesses of the current market-based system in achieving efficient and fair solutions to sovereign debt crises. This article reviews the existing problems and proposes solutions. It argues that improvements in the language of contracts, although beneficial, cannot provide a comprehensive, efficient, and equitable solution to the problems faced in restructurings—but there are improvements within the contractual approach that should be implemented. Ultimately, the contractual approach must be complemented by a multinational legal framework that facilitates restructurings based on principles of efficiency and equity. Given the current geopolitical constraints, in the short-run we advocate the implementation of a “soft law” approach, built on the recognition of the limitations of the private contractual approach and on a set of principles – most importantly, the restoration of sovereign immunity – over which there may be consensus. We suggest that in a context of political economy tensions it should be impossible for a government to sign away the sovereign immunity either for itself or successor governments. The framework could be implemented through the United Nations, or it could prompt the creation of a new institution. Keywords: Sovereign Debt Crises, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Debt Contracts, International Lending 1 We are indebted to Sebastian -
The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: a Reply, 80 Va
Fordham Law School FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History Faculty Scholarship 1994 The nsecU ured Creditor's Bargain: A Reply Susan Block-Lieb Fordham University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Susan Block-Lieb, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain: A Reply, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1989 (1994) Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/740 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE UNSECURED CREDITOR'S BARGAIN: A REPLY Susan Block-Lieb* INTRODUCTION U UNLIKE Law and Economics scholars who view secured lend- ing as a consensual relationship benefiting not only debtors and their secured parties but also the debtors' unsecured creditors, Lynn LoPucki describes secured transactions as a subsidy because they benefit debtors and their secured creditors at the expense of unsecured creditors. He believes security "is an institution in need of basic reform" because it "tends to misallocate resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a bargain to which many, if not most, of them have given no meaningful consent."' He divides these unsecured creditors into two groups: involuntary creditors, and