The Effects of Adverse Weather Conditions on Transport

House of Commons Transport Committee

The effects of adverse weather conditions on transport

Fourth Report of Session 2008–09

Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 20 May 2009

HC 328 Published on 29 May 2009 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00

The Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated public bodies.

Current membership Mrs Louise Ellman MP (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chairman) Mr David Clelland MP (Labour, Tyne Bridge) Mr Philip Hollobone MP (Conservative, Kettering) Mr John Leech MP (Liberal Democrat, Manchester, Withington) Mr Eric Martlew MP (Labour, Carlisle) Mark Pritchard MP (Conservative, The Wrekin) Ms Angela C Smith MP (Labour, Sheffield, Hillsborough) Sir Peter Soulsby MP (Labour, Leicester South) Graham Stringer MP (Labour, Manchester Blackley) Mr David Wilshire MP (Conservative, Spelthorne) Sammy Wilson MP (Democratic Unionist, East Antrim)

Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/transcom.

Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Annette Toft (Clerk), Jyoti Chandola (Second Clerk), David Davies (Committee Specialist), Marek Kubala (Inquiry Manager), Alison Mara (Senior Committee Assistant), Jacqueline Cooksey (Committee Assistant), Stewart McIlvenna (Committee Support Assistant) and Hannah Pearce (Media Officer).

Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is [email protected].

Contents

Report Page

1 Introduction 3

2 The events on 1–2 February 2009 3 The extent of travel disruption 3 Planning and preparation 4 Winter Maintenance 5 Salt stocks 5 Communication and co-ordination 6 The Highways Agency 6 Local authorities 6 Priority routes 8 London 8 Communication and Co-ordination 8 Priorities for gritting 9 Cancellation of bus service 9 Role of the Mayor of London 11 Scrutiny of the Mayor 12

3 Conclusion 13

Conclusions and recommendations 15

Formal Minutes 17

Witnesses 18

List of written evidence 18

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 19

1 Introduction

1. The beginning of 2009 saw a period of cold weather which, by recent standards, is exceptional for the UK. Snowfall and freezing temperatures caused disruption to travel, particularly in early February. The snowfall on 1 and 2 February was reportedly the heaviest since 1991.1 Heavy snowfall in London and the South East during the early hours of 2 February had a drastic impact on transport in the capital. Although services were slowly restored during the day, London had no bus service for most of the morning of the 2 February. Overground trains and London Underground services were also affected by delays and cancellations. Disruption to services also affected other areas of the country and continued for several days.

2. In response to the severe disruption caused by the snow in London, the London Assembly Transport Committee produced a report, Slipping Up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, posing a series of questions, to which Transport for London (TfL) responded on 27 April 2009. On 12 March the Secretary of State for Transport gave a written statement to the House on the response to the severe weather. The Secretary of State highlighted the problems caused by the heavy snowfall. He announced that the UK Roads Liaison Group (UKRLG), a partnership of Central Government, devolved administrations, trunk road authorities and local authorities, would review the events of the beginning of February and make recommendations for improvements by July 2009.

3. We felt that the seriousness of the disruption caused by snow in early February particularly, but not exclusively, in the capital, warranted an inquiry by this Committee to look at the problems at a national level and to report earlier than the summer deadline of the UKRLG review. We wanted to look at why public transport had been disrupted and whether this disruption was handled better or worse by different authorities, whether planning and preparation by local authorities and the Highways Agency was sufficient, and whether co-ordination between the bodies involved in responding to the heavy snow was adequate. We heard from local government representatives, the Mayor of London, the Transport Commissioner for London, a representative from operators, the chair of the London Assembly Transport Committee and the Minister of State for Transport, Paul Clark MP. 2 The events on 1–2 February 2009

The extent of travel disruption 4. Although media coverage during the first week of February suggested that there was serious, wide-spread disruption throughout England, our witnesses challenged this view. David Sparks of the Local Government Association told BBC Radio 4 that a more proportionate reaction was needed.2 Matthew Lugg of the CSS3 told us that “There was

1 Councils justify their response to record snowfalls, Public Finance, 6 February 2009 2 8 February 2009, BBC Radio 4, Today programme 3 Formerly known as the County Surveyors’ Society

some disruption but I think in many authorities that was minimised by the service that was provided.”4 Talking about the UK as a whole, Councillor David Sparks of the Local Government Association told the Committee that there had not been “an unprecedented closure of public transport throughout the country”.5 Valerie Shawcross, Chair of the London Assembly Transport Committee challenged the suggestion that London had been more seriously affected by the snow than other parts of the country, as did Peter Hendy, the Transport Commissioner for London. He gave the example of Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire as areas where it had been impossible to run a bus service following the heavy snowfall.6

5. While some transport services were maintained, there is no doubt that the snowfall, particularly over London and South East England, was heavier than had been predicted by the Met Office. Our witnesses all agreed that the key factor in any disruption was the unforeseen severity of the snowfall. Even advanced and repeated salting could have had little chance of keeping roads clear when faced with snow fall of up to 24cm in south London.7 The report from the London Assembly Committee accepts “the fact of the salting/gritting regime being simply overwhelmed by the speed and weight of the snow and the fact that London was universally covered”.8

Planning and preparation 6. The first warning of the possibility of snow during the first week of February came on 21 January. Although no formal forecast was issued at that stage, between 21 and 28 January the Met Office alerted key contacts, such as the Cabinet Office, Network Rail and the Highways Agency, to the potential for snow. Met Office Public Weather Service Advisors began to contact the emergency services. On Thursday 29 January a Met Office National Severe Weather Warning Service Advisory Notice was issued for heavy snow, suggesting a 40–60% risk of disruption for eastern counties of England, valid for Monday 2 February. This was extended to cover other areas of the UK on Friday 30 January. An Early Warning for heavy snow with over 60% likelihood of disruption was issued on Saturday 31 January, suggesting snowfall of 10–20cm. A warning of extreme weather was issued for London and counties to the south for Monday 2 February. This type of warning is rare.

7. Evidence submitted to the London Assembly by the East London Bus Group states that all bus operators have major incident and emergency plans to deal with a variety of events, including severe weather conditions.9 For local authorities and London boroughs, winter maintenance plans include details of priority roads for gritting. Winter maintenance plans also include details of relevant policies and service agreements.

4 Q5 5 Q25 6 Q252l 7 Q141 8 Q147 9 Slipping up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, London Assembly Transport Committee p 34

Winter Maintenance 8. Local authorities, the Highways Agency and Transport for London as well as bus and train operators all have plans in place to deal with winter weather such as snow and ice. Winter maintenance plans include arrangements for precautionary salting and removing snow and ice which has already formed. The plans also identify which roads and routes have priority status for snow and ice prevention and clearance.

9. The most common winter maintenance approach is salting or gritting, used either to prevent ice forming or to melt snow and ice which has already formed.10 Where snow cannot be removed with salt or grit it may be possible to use snow clearing equipment, such as snow shovels or snow ploughs, to clear roads. Nigel Barrett of the East London Bus Group told us that some gritters can be fitted with a plough to enable them to function as snow ploughs.11 However, Peter Hendy, the Transport Commissioner for London, cautioned that it was very difficult to use snow ploughs in built-up, urban areas due to the risk of causing damage to parked vehicles.12

10. As part of this inquiry we asked witnesses about resources for winter maintenance. We heard, repeatedly, that to invest in heavy clearing equipment such as snow ploughs would be a poor use of public money due to the infrequency of the occasions when they would be required. Matthew Lugg of, CSS, the County Surveyors’ Society told us that:

It [the snow on 1 and 2 February] was a one in 20 year event. We could gear up resources for that sort of event, but is that the most cost-effective way of dealing with it in terms of the service we deliver? Although businesses may pay a lot, local taxpayers would pay an awful lot in terms of what we would have to deliver to deal with such a severe winter. […] We have to consider what is appropriate in this country for what we have in a normal winter.13

Salt stocks 11. One of the main problems during the period of heavy snow in February was the dwindling supply of salt held by local authorities. We heard that local authorities had placed their usual orders for salt before the winter. Matthew Lugg of the County Surveyors’ Society told us that a lot of the salt stock had been used before Christmas due to very cold weather causing more frost and ice than normal and when local authorities ordered more stock, the suppliers “could not respond and deliver”.14 Being unable to replenish salt stocks used in late 2008 combined with the heavy snow fall at the beginning of February led some local authorities to believe they could run out of salt.15

10 While salting aims to melt snow or ice, gritting involves the use of another, non-soluable, material mixed with the salt in order to provide additional grip for vehicles on the road while the salt takes effect. 11 Q158 12 Q214 13 Q15 14 Q52 15 ibid

12. Following the heavy snowfall in early February, salt was imported from Italy, Spain, Germany and Tunisia. There were reports that supplies of salt were so low in some areas of the country that in Gloucestershire the council had resorted to using table salt to try to keep roads clear.16 However, we heard from a number of witnesses that no local authority ran out of salt and that one of the areas where there was successful co-operation was salt sharing between areas. Paul Clark told us that:

No local authority ran out of salt supplies and, indeed, as a response to the situation and dealing with it we [...] developed [...] a Salt Cell which deliberately monitored and brought information in from across the country as to supplies of salt that were out there, how long that was going to last, what mutual aid was required and, indeed, the Highways Agency helped in that way as well.17

Communication and co-ordination 13. A lack of co-ordination between boroughs themselves and between boroughs and TfL was one of the areas criticised in the London Assembly report as having hampered efforts to clear roads. Written evidence to that inquiry from the London Boroughs of Haringey, Enfield and Harrow all highlighted a lack of co-ordination between boroughs themselves and between boroughs and TfL.18 The evidence we heard suggests that this was a problem shared by the rest of the country. The transport network is maintained by a number of different bodies. These bodies were all affected by ice and snowfall but the areas of responsibility between these organisations were not always clear, and in some cases, this hampered efforts to restore the transport network.

The Highways Agency 14. The Highways Agency is responsible for the strategic road network, around 5% of roads, and the footways alongside them. While there was little criticism directed specifically at the Highways Agency, Councillor Sparks, representing the Local Government Association, suggested that, along with other organisations, they needed to improve the way they shared information during periods of disruptive weather. He suggested that, as well as focusing on strategic rail and road routes, the partnership between the Highways Agency and local authorities should support local authorities in tackling local problems, which could have a major impact despite only affecting a small area.19

Local authorities 15. Most of our witnesses were supportive of the actions taken by local authorities.20 Councillor Sparks told us that “I do not know what many of those local authorities could

16 Severe storms will bring gales and more snowfall, The Independent, 9 February 2009 17 Q102 18 Slipping up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, London Assembly Transport Committee, pg 10 19 Q101 20 Q44

have done that they did not do.”21 Although unwilling to discuss variation between local authorities in terms of good and bad performances, witnesses did accept that there was variation in the way local authorities responded and suggested that this was positive. Mr Low, from the Transport Advisory Group Transportation Committee, said that conditions affecting local authorities could vary and that local authorities’ winter service plans were designed carefully..22

16. One area where our witnesses did suggest the response of local authorities could be improved was in the way they worked with other organisations to deal with adverse weather conditions. One particular area of concern was the apparent lack of co-ordination between local authorities and bus operators. Councillor Sparks told us that it had become very difficult for local authorities to ensure that public transport ran in adverse weather conditions because “the structure of the bus industry is fragmented and the nature of the rail industry is fragmented and we just do not have an adequate public transport system to deal with adverse weather conditions.”23

17. Although we accept that the current regulatory framework may make it difficult for local authorities to take an active role in operational decisions, there is still scope for local authorities to participate pro-actively in the co-ordination of operators in planning and preparing emergency plans as well as during transport disruption. Nigel Barratt of the East London Bus Group told us that:

When you talked to the local authorities, as we did during the course of Monday and said, ‘Please can you send people down to clear the front of our depots?’ they said, ‘We are concentrating on the trunk roads and we will get to you as a secondary issue when and if we can.’ That was the biggest problem that we had on Monday.24

Local authorities clearly have to determine their priorities based on local needs, but there appears to be a widespread failure to prioritise the restoration of public transport services. In particular, there seemed to be little thought given to clearing access routes from bus depots and garages to the road network. Councillor Sparks suggested that there was a wider problem with the way public transport was viewed and the lack of priority given to public transport in national policy.25

18. We do not suggest that local authorities alone are guilty of failing to prioritise public transport. However, the needs of public transport operators must be incorporated into winter maintenance plans. It is also important that public transport operators work with local authorities effectively and engage fully with winter maintenance planning. Any response to seriously disruptive short-term weather, such as heavy snowfall, should take into account the needs of public transport operators. It should ensure that public transport receives the priority it deserves and that disruptions to public transport services are minimised. As part of their winter maintenance and emergency planning, all local

21 Q13 22 Q7 23 Q78 24 Q 158 25 Q16

authorities should discuss with bus and train operators in their area what action is necessary to help minimise disruption to public transport services in the event of snowfall and include such action in their plans.

Priority routes 19. One suggestion for dealing with exceptionally severe weather conditions was to focus efforts on keeping a network of strategic roads within an area open. The Minister suggested that, although winter maintenance plans may contain details of the routes to be salted, in exceptional circumstances, such as those of 1 and 2 February, it may be necessary to focus efforts on a smaller number of key roads and access to routes to depots and garages.26

20. This idea was not welcomed by all our witnesses. There was concern that concentrating snow clearance on certain roads would increase the time taken to restore the transport network as a whole and would not help road users as few car or bus journeys take place only on main roads. We accept that, in general, the focus of winter maintenance should be on keeping all transport services up and running. In cases of very severe weather lasting several days, however, there may be some benefit in concentrating initial efforts on the clearance of key roads, thereby allowing at least a small number of partial public transport services to run.

London 21. On 1 and 2 February, very heavy snowfall over London and the South East meant that roads in the capital were covered by over 20cm of snow. During the morning rush hour on 2 February, no buses were running and there were disruptions on the Underground. Southern and South Eastern train services into London were also badly affected. The snow had a crippling effect on parts of the transport network in London, and the disruption for commuters and cost for business had an impact not just in London but in the country as a whole. However, we do recognise that some services coped well. Overground rail services arriving from the north into London ran, as did the Docklands Light Railway. On Monday 2 February, services ran on over 80% of the Underground network, albeit service patterns were modified.

Communication and Co-ordination 22. The London Assembly Transport Committee have criticised disputes between TfL and boroughs and a lack of effective co-ordination. They have called for command centres to be set up to take a lead in planning and recovery in the event of severe weather. Valerie Shawcross told us that “had there been better co-ordination, particularly between TfL and the London boroughs, we might have recovered the situation earlier than was done.”27 TfL’s response to the London Assembly inquiry said that the first contact between TfL and the London Local Authority Coordination Centre was at 5pm on Monday 2 February.28

26 Q106 27 Q147 28 Slipping up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, London Assembly Transport Committee, pg 26

23. Evidence provided to that inquiry by London boroughs was critical of the lack of communication from TfL, but also accepted that boroughs themselves did not work effectively with their neighbours which hampered efforts to clear roads. Martin Low of the Transport Advisory Group Transportation Committee nonetheless told us that there were examples of good co-ordination. He said that:

There was a lot of mutual aid. […] if there is a particular problem, then we respond. Peter Hendy called me early in the morning. There were problems with Westbourne Park Bus Garage; we deployed extra crews out there to go back over the areas which had previously been salted at 11.30 the previous morning. The important thing is good information, working together and I think local government demonstrated that extremely well, certainly in London and across most of the rest of the country.29

Priorities for gritting 24. One area of co-ordination that was singled out for criticism by the London Assembly was the identification of key roads and areas for gritting. The London Assembly inquiry heard that one reason for the disruption to bus services was that some access roads for bus depots were not cleared at an early stage. Their report also questioned whether “limited resources in terms of gritting could have been targeted towards particular routes that serve hospitals to ensure they recommence first once the weather improves.”30 Written evidence from the London Ambulance Service notes that when local authorities were asked to help clear driveways to enable emergency vehicles to leave ambulance stations, their response was that the ambulance stations and driveways were private land and not the responsibility of the local authority.31 Martin Low of the Transport Advisory Group, however, told us that Westminster City Council included salting for the ramps at St Mary’s Hospital as a key area for gritting in their winter maintenance plans.32 There is conflicting evidence about the priority given by local authorities to ensuring that areas like ambulance station driveways and hospital ramps, which are essential for the emergency services, are cleared. Every local authority response to severe weather should assign a very high priority to this duty.

Cancellation of bus service 25. The closure of the London bus network was undoubtedly the most significant disruption to public transport and the one which affected the largest number of people. TfL state that:

At 12.10 am [on Monday morning] the London Buses Network Duty Manager, in conjunction with the On Call Manager, decided to instruct the remaining bus services on completion of the current trip (so passengers could complete their journey) to return out of service to the garage as soon as practical because the roads were becoming impassable, the high risk of an increasing number of bus accidents,

29 Q18 30 Slipping up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, London Assembly Transport Committee, pg17 31 Slipping up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, London Assembly Transport Committee, pg 41 32 Q42

to allow gritting lorries unimpeded access to the road network, to ensure the bus service could re-start as soon as road conditions allowed and to ensure buses were not abandoned at the roadside.33

26. They go on to say that, between 4am and 5am on the Monday morning, bus operators assessed road conditions and found that it was not possible to operate bus services. While CentreComm co-ordinated the information from bus operators it was left to operators to decide when to resume services. TfL state that “There was no general instruction not to operate the day service”.34 Some bus services resumed by 11.00am on Monday and the Minister, Paul Clark MP, told us that by 4.30pm 100 out of the 700 routes were up and running.35

27. Peter Hendy made clear to the Committee that the decision not to run bus services was taken at an operational level. He said that:

…we did not stop the night bus service. When it came to the morning, CentreComm sent a message at 04:56 – I get all these – and it said, “All operators who are able to run a service safely in their local areas, please contact CentreComm with the routes and details.” […] That message […] was the right message. It did not say, “Do not run the bus service”. It said, “If you can run the bus service safely tell us what you can do”, and they could not, and I would not have countermanded that instruction either because I am not in a position to do so. When it became apparent that we could not run anything, and also in the knowledge that the Underground was running […] the Docklands Light Railway was running, I sent the Mayor a text just after six o’clock in the morning, and then […] I rang him up, and I think those were all the right things to do.36

28. The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, was also keen to stress that the decision on whether or not to run bus services had been an operational one. While he was informed of the decision made, he was not going to over-rule the operational decisions made by staff on the ground. He told us that:

Even if it had been my job or my responsibility to countermand the decision of CentreComm to send those buses home, there having been, as I say, 30 accidents involving buses and many more calls to the emergency centre […] I do not think I would have taken that decision.37

29. One issue raised by Valerie Shawcross, Chair of the London Assembly Transport Committee, was the possibility of certain key routes being prioritised to allow a skeleton bus service to run. Peter Hendy told us that this would not be practical as buses, even those running mainly on strategic roads, would use other roads for part of their journey. He said that:

33 Slipping up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, London Assembly Transport Committee, pg 24 34 Slipping up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, London Assembly Transport Committee, Pg 25 35 Q95 36 Q204 37 Q194

We do not ask people to keep particularly strategic routes clear […] you might imagine that the number 36 [bus] uses the Camberwell New Road and it is a strategic road, and, indeed, it does, but it also has to turn around in the back streets of Queen’s Park. If we curtailed it at Marble Arch, it would have to use the back streets around Marble Arch. At Peckham and New Cross it goes around the back streets. To run a bus service you have to have the whole route from one end to the other or the piece you have decided to run sufficiently clear to operate it safely.38

30. While we accept Mr Hendy’s view that there are practical difficulties in having priority roads for snow clearing and then running special bus services on these roads we believe there is room for improvement in the way TfL approaches gritting. On 2 February, some bus services began running before noon whilst others did not resume service at all that day. This suggests that some routes are easier to restore after heavy snow fall than others. Advance planning and work to identify these routes may mean that in future public transport services can be restored more quickly. We recommend that TfL and bus operators work together to identify which routes are likely to be least affected by heavy snow and whether, in exceptional circumstances, focusing on these routes would allow at least some service to be maintained or restored quickly following snowfall.

31. We welcome the London Assembly Transport Committee report, Slipping Up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, which examined the disruption caused to transport in the capital in some detail. It covers many of the issues raised above and posed a number of questions for TfL and the London Resilience Authority Panel. TfL responded to this report on 27 April. The response highlights a number of changes which will improve the handling of severe weather conditions. These include a clear trigger for a multi-agency partnership meeting to be convened and a commitment to raise awareness of Operation Ringmain, the protocol for incidents which do not fit the definition of ‘major incidents’. The response also states that resilience planning will now include a single point of contact to improve co-ordination and it will be made clear where the responsibility for clearing access routes for buses and ambulances lies.39 We welcome the London Assembly Transport Committee report, Slipping Up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, and the response from TfL.

Role of the Mayor of London 32. The London Assembly Committee said in their report that although the decision over whether to run bus services was an operational matter rather than a policy matter, the Mayor’s role as Chairman of Transport for London meant he should challenge senior officers over their decisions. The London Assembly report draws attention to “the question of the point at which TfL decided to inform the Mayor about the situation.”40 Martin Low of the Transport Advisory Group suggested that “the Mayor of London could play a useful

38 Q195 39 Slipping Up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, TfL response, 27 April 40 Slipping up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, London Assembly Transport Committee, pg 14

role working in partnership with London local authorities to make sure that the winter service plans, the salt stocks and the supply chain are adequate to meet London's needs.”41

33. Despite some criticism of the co-ordination between TfL, operators and boroughs, the Mayor made clear that he did not see this as a problem and that he had no intention of taking the lead in promoting early communication if a similar situation arose in future. He told us that even if, for example, senior figures had talked over the weekend of 31 January and 1 February to co-ordinate their response to the predicted snow he did “not think it would have made the slightest difference to the difficulties we encountered”.42

34. The Committee does not, as the Mayor seemed to imply, consider that more meetings before the snow fell would have been a panacea for the problems London faced on 1 and 2 February. Nor do we suggest that operational decisions after snow falls should be overruled by the Mayor. However, given that we heard evidence to suggest that co-ordination between organisations was one of the areas which could be improved in future, it is necessary to examine this area. It is also an area where guidance and strategic leadership could, quite properly, be provided by the Mayor. We hope that, upon reflection, the Mayor will acknowledge that the transport situation in the capital on 1 and 2 February was unsatisfactory. While many of the factors leading to the transport disruption were unavoidable, more active strategic leadership and preparation could have given more confidence and may have enabled more public transport services to be restored more quickly.

Scrutiny of the Mayor 35. The key roles of the Mayor are to provide strategic direction and guidance for the work of his officials. The London Assembly in turn provides democratic checks and balances on the way the Mayor executes this function. Where matters are of national significance, the scrutiny offered by the Assembly is complemented by scrutiny by Parliament. It is not unreasonable to expect that the Mayor seeks to develop a constructive relationship with Assembly and Parliamentary committees. Valerie Shawcross, Chairman of the London Assembly Transport Committee told us that her committee did not take evidence from the Mayor as part of their inquiry into the adverse weather. She said that:

We did contact the Mayor’s Office and the Mayor was not available. He was launching the East London Line that day. The Mayor’s practice is to come to the plenary session of the London Assembly and to limit his attendance at committees.43

36. The Mayor was also reluctant to appear before this committee. When he did appear he told us that he was:

…dealing with a London Assembly that is very jealous of its prerogatives, a fledgling body that wants to safeguard its right to be the primary crucible in which the Mayor can be tested, and in my view quite rightly.44

41 Q57 42 Q228 43 Q155 44 Q207

37. We are disappointed at the Mayor’s apparent disregard for scrutiny work. It is the function, indeed the duty of the London Assembly Transport Committee to scrutinise the performance of TfL and the Mayor’s transport strategy for London. Furthermore, because of London’s position as the capital, circumstances there sometimes affect the nation as a whole disproportionately. In such circumstances, Parliament has a role in examining what could have been done better. We approached this task in a constructive frame of mind. We hope that the Mayor of London will reconsider his strategy in relation to scrutiny, and we urge him to adopt a more open and constructive approach. The lack of leadership manifested in his reaction to the disruption of public transport is disappointing. 3 Conclusion

38. The Minister, Paul Clark MP, acknowledged that “there are substantial lessons to be learned” following the heavy snow and transport disruption at the beginning of February.45 This is a sentiment echoed by Councillor Sparks of the LGA. We agree that the travel disruption at the beginning of February was unsatisfactory. While the unusual and unexpectedly heavy snow fall meant that some disruption was inevitable, it is vital that all those involved ensure that winter maintenance plans and crisis responses are reconsidered so as to minimise future disruptions. While we have not heard any evidence to suggest that the response of any one organisation or agency was seriously lacking, neither are we satisfied that there was any body which could not learn from the events of early February to improve their responses to adverse weather conditions or other events that are likely to cause serious transport problems.

39. As announced in the written statement from the Secretary of State on 12 March 2009, the UK Roads Liaison group, comprising of central government, devolved administrations, trunk road authorities and local authorities has been asked to “consider what steps could be adopted by local highway authorities, trunk road authorities, producers of the salt and others stakeholders to ensure the effective treatment of England’s road networks” and to report by the summer.46 We look forward to the report of the UK Road Liaison Group. Following this report, we recommend that the Secretary of State issue clear guidelines about the planning and preparation for adverse weather so as to minimise travel disruption.

40. Although the heavy snow caused serious problems for some commuters, it may also have allowed bodies responsible for emergency planning for the transport network to identify and remedy areas of weakness in their plans. Nigel Barrett told us that the East London Bus Group:

…have this major incident procedure within our company. It does not just deal with adverse weather, but everything from riots, to demonstrations, to pandemic flu. We test it regularly, and we tested it for real on that particular day. We have learned lessons from it and we have added sections to our own plans.47

45 Q92 46 Q80 47 Q185

We urge any local authorities or agencies that have not already done so to look at their response to the heavy snow. Everyone involved needs to examine any weaknesses or potential improvements to emergency plans that may have emerged from the events on 1–2 February.

41. No witness suggested to us that a significant increase in the money available for winter maintenance would be particularly beneficial or that major investment in additional equipment could be justified. Given competing demands on public money it is important to ensure that spending by the Government and local authorities produces real benefits. There are ways in which the response to heavy snow and its impact on traffic can be improved. However, these are to do with planning and co-ordination, not increased spending. Our witnesses were very clear that extra money, increased salt stocks or more snow ploughs are not the solution to dealing with snow and ice on UK roads.

42. During the course of this inquiry we found that three key elements required for a successful response to severe weather were mentioned repeatedly. The relationship between all the bodies involved in ensuring that the road network and public transport systems can operate is one of these key elements. It is also important that emergency recovery plans and winter maintenance plans give a clear indication of what the priorities for salting and gritting should be and that these priorities have been agreed with public transport operators and the emergency services. The final element to a successful response to severe weather is the presence of good leadership. Co-ordination, prioritisation and visible leadership are vital to the success and speed of recovery following severe weather.

Conclusions and recommendations

List of Recommendations 1. As part of their winter maintenance and emergency planning, all local authorities should discuss with bus and train operators in their area what action is necessary to help minimise disruption to public transport services in the event of snowfall and include such action in their plans. (Paragraph 18)

2. We accept that, in general, the focus of winter maintenance should be on keeping all transport services up and running. In cases of very severe weather lasting several days, however, there may be some benefit in concentrating initial efforts on the clearance of key roads, thereby allowing at least a small number of partial public transport services to run. (Paragraph 20)

3. There is conflicting evidence about the priority given by local authorities to ensuring that areas like ambulance station driveways and hospital ramps, which are essential for the emergency services, are cleared. Every local authority response to severe weather should assign a very high priority to this duty. (Paragraph 24)

4. We recommend that TfL and bus operators work together to identify which routes are likely to be least affected by heavy snow and whether, in exceptional circumstances, focusing on these routes would allow at least some service to be maintained or restored quickly following snowfall. (Paragraph 30)

5. We welcome the London Assembly Transport Committee report, Slipping Up?: Impact of the extreme weather on London transport, and the response from TfL. (Paragraph 31)

6. We hope that, upon reflection, the Mayor will acknowledge that the transport situation in the capital on 1 and 2 February was unsatisfactory. While many of the factors leading to the transport disruption were unavoidable, more active strategic leadership and preparation could have given more confidence and may have enabled more public transport services to be restored more quickly. (Paragraph 34)

7. We are disappointed at the Mayor’s apparent disregard for scrutiny work. (Paragraph 37)

8. We hope that the Mayor of London will reconsider his strategy in relation to scrutiny, and we urge him to adopt a more open and constructive approach. The lack of leadership manifested in his reaction to the disruption of public transport is disappointing. (Paragraph 37)

9. We look forward to the report of the UK Road Liaison Group. Following this report, we recommend that the Secretary of State issue clear guidelines about the planning and preparation for adverse weather so as to minimise travel disruption. (Paragraph 39)

10. We urge any local authorities or agencies that have not already done so to look at their response to the heavy snow. Everyone involved needs to examine any

weaknesses or potential improvements to emergency plans that may have emerged from the events on 1–2 February. (Paragraph 40)

11. There are ways in which the response to heavy snow and its impact on traffic can be improved. However, these are to do with planning and co-ordination, not increased spending. Our witnesses were very clear that extra money, increased salt stocks or more snow ploughs are not the solution to dealing with snow and ice on UK roads. (Paragraph 41)

12. Co-ordination, prioritisation and visible leadership are vital to the success and speed of recovery following severe weather. (Paragraph 42)

Formal Minutes

Wednesday 20 May 2009

Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair

Mr David Clelland Ms Angela C. Smith Mr John Leech Sir Peter Soulsby Mr Eric Martlew Graham Stringer Mark Pritchard

Draft Report (The effects of adverse weather conditions on transport), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 42 read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of standing Order No. 134.

Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 17 June at 2.30 pm.

Witnesses

Wednesday 11 March 2009 Page

Mr Matthew Lugg, Director of Highways, Transportation and Waste Ev 1 Management, County Surveyors’ Society (CSS); Councillor David Sparks, Chair, Transport and Regeneration Board, Local Government Association; and Mr Martin Low, Director of Transportation, Technical Adviser’s Group (TAG)

Paul Clark MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State; Mr Gary Backler, Ev 10 Director Rail Service Delivery, Department for Transport, and Mr Derek Turner, Network Operations Director, Highways Agency

Thursday 2 April 2009

Ms Valerie Shawcross, Chair, London Assembly Transport Committee, and Ev 21 Mr Nigel Barrett, Chief Executive Officer, East London Bus Group

Mr Boris Johnson, Mayor of London, and Mr Peter Hendy, Transport Ev 27 Commissioner, Transport for London

List of written evidence

1 Department for Transport Ev 38 2 Dome UK Ltd Ev 38 3 Met Office Ev 38 4 Transport for London Ev 40

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

Session 2008–09 First Report Work of the Committee in 2007–08 HC 211 Second Report School Travel HC 351 Third Report Appointment of the Chair of the Office of Rail HC 433 Regulation Fourth Report Effects of Adverse Weather Conditions on Travel HC 328 First Special Report Ending the Scandal of Complacency: Road Safety HC 136 beyond 2010: Government Response to the Committee’s Eleventh Report of Session 2007–08 Second Special Ending the Scandal of Complacency: Road Safety HC 422 Report beyond 2010: Further Government Response to the Committee’s Eleventh Report of Session 2007–08 Third Special Report School Travel: Government Response to the HC 561 Committee’s Second Report of Session 2008-09

Session 2007–08 First Report Galileo: Recent Developments HC 53 Second Report The London Underground and the Public-Private HC 45 Partnership Agreements Third Report Work of the Committee in 2007 HC 248 Fourth Report The future of BAA HC 119 Fifth Report Ticketing and Concessionary Travel on Public HC 84 Transport Sixth Report The Blue Badge Scheme HC 475 Seventh Report Department for Transport Annual Report 2007 HC 313 Eighth Report Freight Transport HC 249 Ninth Report The Draft Marine Navigation Bill HC 709 Tenth Report Delivering a sustainable railway: a 30-year strategy HC 219 for the railways? Eleventh Report Ending the Scandal of Complacency: Road Safety HC 460 beyond 2010 Twelfth Report The opening of Heathrow Terminal 5 HC 543 First Special Report Galileo: Recent Developments: Government HC 283 Response to the Committee’s First Report of Session 2007–08 Second Special The London Underground and the Public–Private HC 461 Report Partnership Agreements: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2007–08 Third Special Report The future of BAA: Government Response to the HC 569 Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2007–08

Fourth Special Ticketing and Concessionary Travel on Public HC 708 Report Transport: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2007–08 Fifth Special Report Department for Transport Annual Report 2007: HC 1102 Government Response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2007–08 Sixth Special Report Freight Transport: Government Response to the HC 1103 Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2007–08 Seventh Special The Draft Marine Navigation Bill: Government HC 1104 Report Response to the Committee’s Ninth Report of Session 2007–08 Eighth Special Delivering a sustainable railway: a 30-year strategy HC 1105 Report for the railways?: Government Response to the Committee’s Tenth Report of Session 2007–08 Ninth Special Report The Blue Badge Scheme: Government and HC 1106 Westminster City Council Responses to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2007–08

Session 2006–07 First Report Work of the Committee in 2005–06 HC 226 Second Report The Ports Industry in England and Wales HC 6I-I & 61-II Third Report Transport for the London 2012 Olympic and HC 199 Paralympic Games: The Draft Transport Plan Fourth Report Department for Transport Annual Report 2006 HC 95 Fifth Report The Government’s Motorcycling Strategy HC 264 Sixth Report The new National Boatmasters’ Licence HC 320-I & 320-II Seventh Report Novice Drivers HC 355-I & 355-II Eighth Report Passengers’ Experiences of Air Travel HC 435-I & 435-II Ninth Report The draft Local Transport Bill and the Transport HC 692-I & 692-II Innovation Fund First Special Report Passenger Rail Franchising: Government Response HC 265 to the Committee’s Fourteenth Report of Session 2005–06 Second Special Roads Policing and Technology: Getting the right HC 290 Report balance: Government Response to the Committee’s Tenth Report of Session 2005–06 Third Special Report Bus services across the UK: Government Response HC 298 to the Committee’s Eleventh Report of Session 2005–06 Fourth Special Local Transport Planning and Funding: HC 334 Report Government Response to the Committee’s Twelfth Report of Session 2005–06 Fifth Special Report The work of the Civil Aviation Authority: HC 371 Government Response to the Committee’s Thirteenth Report of Session 2005–06 Sixth Special Report Transport for the London 2012 Olympic and HC 484 Paralympic Games: The Draft Transport Plan: Olympic Delivery Authority Response to the Committee’s Third Report of Session 2006–07

Seventh Special Department for Transport Annual Report 2006: HC 485 Report Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2006–07 Eighth Special The Government’s Motorcycling Strategy: HC 698 Report Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2006–07 Ninth Special Report The Ports Industry in England and Wales: HC 954 Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2006–07

Session 2005–06 First Report UK Transport Security – preliminary report HC 637 Second Report Financial Protection for Air Travellers: Second HC 636 Report Abandoning Effective Protection Third Report Going for Gold: Transport for London’s 2012 HC 588 Olympic Games Fourth Report Departmental Annual Report 2005 HC 684 Fifth Report Future of the British Transport Police HC 1070 Sixth Report How fair are the fares? Train fares and ticketing HC 700 Seventh Report Parking Policy and Enforcement HC 748 Eighth Report Piracy HC 1026 Ninth Report The work of the Department for Transport's HC 907 Executive Agencies – DVO Group and the Highways Agency Tenth Report Roads Policing and Technology: Getting the HC 975 balance right Eleventh Report Bus Services across the UK HC 1317 Twelfth Report Local Transport Planning and Funding HC 1120 Thirteenth Report The work of the Civil Aviation Authority HC 809 Fourteenth Report Passenger Rail Franchising HC 1354 First Special Report The Performance of the London Underground: HC 431 Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2004–05 Second Special The Departmental Annual Report 2004: HC 432 Report Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2004–05 Third Special Report Integrated Transport: the future of light rail and HC 526 modern trams in the UK: Government Response to the Committee’s Tenth Report of session 2004–05 Fourth Special Search and Rescue: Government Response to the HC 586 Report Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2004–05 Fifth Special Report Rural Railways: Government Response to the HC 587 Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2004–05 Sixth Special Report Tonnage Tax: Government Response to the HC 611 Committee’s Second Report of Session 2004–05 Seventh Special Financial Protection for Air Travellers: Government HC 639 Report and Civil Aviation Authority Responses to the Committee’s Fifteenth Report of Session 2003–04

Eighth Special European Community Competence and Transport: HC 976 Report Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2004–05 Ninth Special Report Financial Protection for Air Travellers: Abandoning HC 996 Effective Protection: Government and Civil Aviation Authority Responses to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2005–06 Tenth Special Report Going for Gold: Transport for London’s 2012 HC 1152 Olympic Games: Government Response to the committee’s Third Report of Session 2005–06 Eleventh Special Departmental Annual Report 2005: Government HC 1517 Report Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2005–06 Twelfth Special Future of the British Transport Police: Government HC 1639 Report Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2005–06 Thirteenth Special How fair are the fares? Train fares and ticketing: HC 1640 Report Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2005–06 Fourteenth Special Parking Policy and Enforcement: Government HC 1641 Report Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2005–06 Fifteenth Special The Work of the Department for Transport's HC 1615 Report Agencies – Driver and Vehicle Operator Group and the Highways Agency: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2005–06 Sixteenth Special Piracy: Government Response to the Committee's HC 1690 Report Eighth Report of Session 2005–06

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Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 1 Oral evidence

Taken before the Transport Committee on Wednesday 11 March 2009

Members present Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair

Mr John Leech Ms Angela C. Smith Mr Eric Martlew Sir Peter Soulsby Mark Pritchard Graham Stringer

Witnesses: Mr Matthew Lugg, Director of Highways, Transportation and Waste Management, County Surveyors’ Society (CSS), Councillor David Sparks, Chair, Transport and Regeneration Board, Local Government Association and Mr Martin Low, Director of Transportation, Technical Adviser’s Group (TAG), Junior Vice-President and Member of Transportation Committee, gave evidence.

Chairman: Good afternoon, gentlemen, and Q4 Chairman: Do you think that more could have welcome to our meeting. Do members have any been done to stop the disruption by snow, looking interests to declare? back at it now? Mr Martlew: GMB Union and Unite; I am a Mr Low: The biggest problem was a huge amount of member of both. snow falling after the roads had been salted. Until Graham Stringer: Member of Unite. you have heavy traYcking over that or you remove that layer of snow, there are going to be some Q1 Chairman: I am a member of Unite. I would like consequences. They could not have been foreseen to ask the witnesses to identify themselves, please. because of the unusual circumstances that we all Councillor Sparks: I am David Sparks. I chair the faced. LGA Regeneration and Transport Board and I am a councillor in Dudley. Mr Lugg: My name is Mathew Lugg. I am Director Q5 Chairman: But, with hindsight, what do you of Highways and Transportation for Leicestershire think could have been done or done better to help County Council but I also chair the CSS Engineering you to deal with it? Committee, and our members represent about 75% Mr Lugg: Can I just challenge your assumption that of the English highway network. there was widespread disruption? There was some Mr Low: I am Martin Low, Director of disruption but I think in many authorities that was Transportation at Westminster City Council, but I minimised by the service that was provided. am here to represent the Technical Advisers’ Group. Certainly in Devon there was a particular incident when 220 people had to be rescued from a road, but Q2 Chairman: At the beginning of February, bad in general most of the highway network was kept weather was forecast. Bad weather came, yet we had passable with care. I think the local authorities wide scale disruption. Why did that happen when it generally did a good job in very diYcult was generally known that the adverse weather was circumstances. going to come? Would anybody like to tell me why Councillor Sparks: I think with hindsight, because it we had such a problem? was such a major event, what we need to do, and this Councillor Sparks: The fundamental reason why we is why we welcome your inquiry and we would hope had the problem was because the weather that we there would be a further inquiry, is to have a look at had was extreme; it was the worst weather that we that event and see what lessons can be learnt. Clearly had had in 18 years, and that caused the disruption. we can learn lessons. Quite frankly, we need to do so As far as we are concerned, we did as much as we in relation to dealing with extreme weather in this possibly could as local authorities and, at the end of country. the day, we continued to grit the roads throughout that period. Q6 Chairman: Was there a problem of lack of Q3 Chairman: Should the weather have been seen as funding for winter maintenance? part of emergency needs, for it to have been put in Mr Lugg: I would argue not. I think local authorities the category of an emergency? Do you think the did have adequate resources. We have, as Martin emergency planning could have been better? Low says, good plans in place and arrangements. We Mr Low: No. Each of the highway authorities has a have good kit and good contractors. The problem winter service plan and salting of the roads in almost that we got into—and you may come on to this—is every local authority in the country started well about the salt supply. In general, I think the ahead, many hours ahead, of any snow falling on equipment and resources we had were adequate. The the highway. problems we got into were around the salt supply. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:31 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Ev 2 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low

Q7 Mr Leech: Mr Low, you said this could not have come from Europe because of the experience they been foreseen but is it not more the case of this very have had there. That was in Westminster’s streets poor weather is only going to happen every few in 2002. years, and therefore it is not really seen as a priority to be prepared for these sorts of situations? Q11 Mark Pritchard: I have to say that I am Mr Low: No. I think local government has planned staggered by your responses thus far. I think there is over many years the types of equipment it uses. I give a great deal of diVerence between what you have said you just one example, the PowerFlex machines that and the reality, certainly in my experience and the were used to distribute salt on the footways so that experience of my constituents in the Midlands. If Y there is an even, e cient coverage of the footways: you look at countries like Sweden and Norway, they those same vehicles are used on a daily basis to have the right equipment, clearly they have more undertake routine street cleaning and cleansing of snow and more often, but nevertheless lessons the footway areas, and we deploy that equipment; should have been learnt from previous large indeed, many other local authorities do as well. It is snowfalls that we have had in this country. I important to realise that local government has been wondered whether you had any response to the planning on a regular basis, looking at its winter accusation that your response as local authorities service plans, adapting those plans. You also have to was too little and too late, whether at the right or remember that the conditions, even within one local wrong time. authority, can vary immensely. We are very careful Mr Low: A lot depends on who are the judges of about the way we develop those winter service plans good performance. I regard our residents as being to respond, and that is why so many local authorities that and the South East Bayswater Residents’ were out salting in advance of the first snowflake Association have proudly said, “Westminster falling on the highway. Council copes well”. I am sure that is replicated across the country. There will be isolated instances, Q8 Mr Leech: My personal experience of my flat in and of course there will because weather conditions Battersea is that there was no sign of any salt at all vary; they vary even within the 8.5 square miles of on the route from the bus stop to my flat. Is that not the City of Westminster where there is a massive V something that you can relate to that perhaps did di erence in temperature from the north of the City actually happen in London? that is two degrees colder than the south of the City, V V Mr Low: I cannot comment on every street in where there are di erent conditions, di erent V London, but in terms of the way in which local weather fronts, which a ect the way in which the authorities approached the situation, a tradition winter service plans which are produced by the local approach in a winter service plan is to get in and pre- authority adapt and prioritise the areas to be treated. treat the streets, footways and carriageways, before The quality of the weather forecasting is often good, the snow falls. Once the snow starts to fall, then you but we all know that the weather forecasters do not go on to prioritisation in terms of the way in which always get it right. In this case, there was not an issue salt is deployed and laid. Wandsworth is probably an about the quality of the weather forecasting; it was example of one of two London boroughs that have quite simply that we had a huge amount of snow in the largest salt supplies in the whole of London. a very short period of time. They could go on laying salt as often as they needed without any worry about running out. So in Q12 Chairman: We are trying to get a general picture Wandsworth’s case, I am surprised to hear that, but of what happened and what can be done. we can certainly make some enquiries on a point of Councillor Sparks: Can I comment on the general detail and assist the committee in a written response. picture and indeed for the whole of the country on behalf of the LGA? The fact of the matter is that throughout the country in the majority of cases the Q9 Mr Leech: I am surprised to hear what you have roads that are normally gritted were gritted. They said, given my personal experience of Battersea were gritted according to the schedule. They were Bridge Road, for instance, where there did not see to gritted according to the weather conditions. There is be any sign of any salting at all. a myth in this country that every street should be Mr Low: Perhaps I should also explain that it treated. It is impossible to treat every street. We have depends when you were looking. If you were looking to treat it according to a strategy. I do not know on the street before the first snowflake fell, you may whether you heard me but the second point that I have seen some salt. If you were looking after six said right at the very beginning that we have had a inches of snow fell in an hour, it is possible that you major event and there are lessons to be learnt. We as would not have seen the salt because it was overlaid local authorities will learn those lessons. with snow. Q13 Mark Pritchard: If I may intervene, the fact is Q10 Chairman: It is about timing? that I do not think anybody on this committee is Mr Low: It is about timing and about adapting to suggesting, I think it is an Aunt Sally, that every the weather changes. Every local authority has a street should be gritted. What we do expect and what very good winter service plan. We share good the public that we represent expects is that major practice amongst local government. We have done roads at least will be gritted, and perhaps gritted so for many years. We do not just look within the more than just once because it is pretty obvious, UK; we look abroad. The machine I spoke about has whatever the weather forecast, however accurate or Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:31 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 3

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low not, a lot of snow was coming, as we were told over Mr Lugg: No, I am not saying that. I am saying that many days. Then after that snow came, we knew if regularly we had more severe winters, we would other snow was coming. Perhaps the message from have to review what is appropriate to deal with that. today is that we can grit a lot of roads but we can Councillor Sparks: I think a valid point is being only grit them once, and perhaps we have the wrong made about public transport that needs to be type of snow. examined. We have not got it right in this country at Councillor Sparks: No, there is no way I am going to the moment in terms of the priority that is given to make a comment like that. The fact of the matter is, public transport in extreme weather and we need to and I repeat it, that the majority of the major roads have an inquiry into what should be the real strategic were gritted as per those schedules. It might every objectives as to what should be gritted and what well have been the case that there were problems should be treated and what should be a priority. with some roads; that is often not because of gritting Public transport does not get the priority that it but because of the working schedules and so on or needs. the gritters getting out. People worked 24 hours out Chairman: I am sure that is one of the issues that we of seven, and I do not know what many of those shall be giving some thought to. local authorities could have done that they did not do. Q17 Graham Stringer: Whilst this was the heaviest snowfall for 18 years, there have probably been since Q14 Mark Pritchard: Mr Low, you held up one the Second World War six or seven snowfalls of this booklet from one small area of our islands. I could magnitude. Why then was this the first time London hold up a booklet from the CBI or the Federation of was closed? Small Businesses or a variety of other business Mr Low: I think the critical factor on the first day voices, employers in this country that lost hundreds was that there was no heavy rail running at all. A of millions of pounds because of the inability of their significant proportion of commuters come into workforce to get to work, either under their own central London by heavy rail and in the early stages steam or by public transport. Is that a success? there were no buses operating. The only options Mr Low: No, I do not think it is a success but you people had were either use of a private car or walking have touched on a very important point that any or making use of things like the river bus that was inquiry into this particular issue needs to look at the still running. whole of the public transport network, with a focus on heavy rail and underground as well as the bus Q18 Graham Stringer: I am aware of what network. Certainly on the busier roads, many of the happened. I am asking why. roads were passable and useable but there were Mr Low: I cannot answer for the rail operators. I instances where that did not take place. We accept cannot answer for Transport for London. What I that. can answer for are the highway authorities, and a lot of work was done. There was a lot of mutual aid. The Q15 Mark Pritchard: Which cost hundreds of mutual aid has been worked up over the years, so millions of pounds to UK plc, to British business? that if there is a particular problem, then we respond. Mr Lugg: With respect, I think we have to take a Peter Hendy called me early in the morning. There proportionate view of what happened in this country were problems with Westbourne Park Bus Garage; this winter. It was a one in 20 year event. We could we deployed extra crews out there to go back over gear up resources for that sort of event, but is that the areas which had previously been salted at 11.30 the most cost-eVective way of dealing with it in terms the previous morning. The important thing is good information, working together and I think local of the service we deliver? Although businesses may government demonstrated that extremely well, pay a lot, local taxpayers would pay an awful lot in certainly in London and across most of the rest of terms of what we would have to deliver to deal with the country. The mutual aid works very well in so far such a severe winter. Can I just pick up on another as if there is a need not only for salt, if there was a point you have raised about severe weather in other shortage of salt, but for special equipment, we go in parts of the world? I think you have to bear in mind, and we did. We went into Camden. We oVered to go and pictures we saw of Moscow, Canada and into Lambeth to get things moving where they had a Scandinavian countries, that their winters are totally shortage of equipment. diVerent to ours and they experience the sort of weather we had on one day for about three months, so the regime is totally diVerent. We have to consider Q19 Graham Stringer: Are you saying that the bus what is appropriate in this country for what we have depots in London all had accessible roads to and in a normal winter. from them? Mr Low: I am not saying that. Q16 Mark Pritchard: Is the logic of that argument that you are saying that if we had more snow, we Q20 Graham Stringer: My experience in London would be better at it, which seems a slightly perverse that morning was that a lot of the roads were not argument given that clearly we did not have as much gritted in Westminster and pavements certainly were snow as the countries you mention and clearly we not salted and gritted. 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Ev 4 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low depots where buses were kept were accessible for Q24 Chairman: Is the LGA conducting any inquiry? buses driving in and out, and were the roads, in your Councillor Sparks: No, but we would like to be opinion, fit to drive a bus on? involved in a national inquiry into this. Mr Low: Certainly many parts of Westminster’s network were fit. I would disagree with you about Q25 Graham Stringer: We can agree that we should the salting. I have GPS-plotted information on the know. As the LGA, can you tell us why when we did gritting routes because all the gritters we deploy have not have unprecedented snow, we had an GPS tracking on them and we can prove to the unprecedented closure of public transport? Can you committee how much of our network, footway and give us any insight into why that happened? carriageway, was treated. The critical issue and why Councillor Sparks: We did not have an you might not have seen it is that a lot of that gritting unprecedented closure of public transport operation was going on with individuals working throughout the country. hard throughout the night preparing before the snow fell and after it fell. The huge amount of snow that fell on top of the grit might have meant that when Q26 Graham Stringer: I am talking about London you walked some of the streets in the City of specifically. Westminster you did not see the grit beneath it. Councillor Sparks: I cannot comment on the individual circumstances in London. I do not have the information. Q21 Graham Stringer: What percentage of roads Graham Stringer: If you do not have the going to and from bus depots were fit for buses to information, you do not have it. drive on? In your opinion, were the roads of greater London fit for buses to drive on generally? Q27 Mr Martlew: Mr Lugg, you said earlier that the Mr Low: Parts of the network were and parts were response was patchy throughout the country; some not; probably about 30%. authorities did it very well and some did not do it so well. We always suVer from this. Because London is Q22 Graham Stringer: Do you say that 30% were fit the capital and there was a problem in London, did to drive on? that give a distorted view of what had happened Mr Low: Yes, on the basis of the heavy snowfall and throughout the country? the basis that until you get some traYc on it, you do Mr Lugg: I think you may have misheard me. What not get back the benefit of the salt that is already I said was that the conditions varied across the down there. What happened in those circumstances, country. I did not say that some authorities did it as part of an established winter service plan, was that well and some not so well. The conditions in Devon the City Council, in common with any other and Dorset were very severe and the fact is that roads highway authorities across the country, deployed were closed because of the volume of snow and resources. They deploy resources not only from the therefore the problems were more severe. I do not provider who is set up to do the salting of the streets think was a reflection that Devon or Dorset— but also from other providers—parks contractors, highways contractors in Westminster’s case because Q28 Mr Martlew: I thought you were saying that we use a cleansing contractor for our salting Devon and Cornwall were doing it very well and operation. They were all deployed to supplement the implying that perhaps London had not done it so work, and Westminster streets were cleared very well. Can I come back to my own experience and the rapidly as a consequence of that combined action. issues? I walked in my constituency that morning and there was probably about four to six inches of snow. The buses were running. I went to the station Q23 Graham Stringer: You may not know the and caught the heavy rail, and I came down to answer to this question but on previous occasions of London. I got oV the train with lots of other people heavy snowfall in ’91, ’68–69 and other years, what and it was chaotic. There was no more snow in percentages of the roads were then fit for buses to London than there had been in Carlisle. There were drive on? no buses. The pavements at that point were covered. Mr Low: I cannot give you that answer this I accept it may have snowed on top of the grit. I am afternoon. We would be happy to provide the not saying the roads were not gritted. Let us go back committee with that information. to the decision on the buses. I think you said, Mr Councillor Sparks: I think that this is an extremely Low, that 30% of the roads were fit in the early valid point, not just in terms of the fact that there morning to drive buses on and as the day went on I was a major problem in London but also because we presume here was more. Are you really saying that have had situations like this before throughout the the blanket decision not to send any buses out was country. I think that what we need to do in an the wrong decision? inquiry is to have a look at when we have had other Mr Low: No, I think that that decision rightly really bad comparable events and compare what the should be taken by the bus operator in conjunction structure of public transport was and how things with Transport for London. I know from the were organised then and how they are organised personal contact that I had with the Transport now. Quite frankly, in this country we need to have Commissioner, Peter Hendy, that his team were very a situation where the cities and public transport does closely focused on whether or not buses should be not literally finish when you have adverse weather. allowed to be taken out. In the case of the City of Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:31 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 5

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low

Westminster, he was satisﬁed that we had done all Q37 Mr Martlew: I think the important thing you that we reasonably could and we responded to the said, Mr Low, is that at least 30% of the roads were extra help that he requested. serviceable. Mr Low: That is my estimate. Q29 Mr Martlew: You have just told us that you thought that 30% of the roads were ﬁt for the buses Q38 Mr Martlew: That was at the very beginning to go on and yet no buses went out? and you presume that it got better as the time went Mr Low: That is a decision for Transport for on? London Mr Low: Correct.

Q30 Mr Martlew: Are you saying that was the right Q39 Mr Martlew: And yet there were no buses at decision? all running? Mr Low: I am not qualiﬁed to comment on that; Mr Low: Incorrect: buses were starting to run on the Peter Hendy is. roads during the ﬁrst day after about 11.00 am.

Q31 Mr Martlew: Perhaps the Mayor would be the Q40 Mr Martlew: Let me finish. No buses at all went best qualified; would you agree with that? out because an order went out not to send them out Mr Low: No, I think the operational command rests first thing. Is that correct? with Peter Hendy; he is the right person. Mr Low: In the early stages, it was. By late morning, buses were running on some of London’s roads. Q32 Mr Martlew: Why in my constituency that had the same amount of snow were the buses running Q41 Mr Martlew: No buses went out and yet you say and here in London they were not? The fact that the that 30% of the roads were fit for buses. buses were not running meant in some cases that the Mr Low: Yes. other transport systems were not working and people could not get to work. Q42 Mark Pritchard: Mr Low, you cannot speak for Mr Low: There was no commuting heavy rail; Transport for London and I accept that, but in your South-Eastern operated no services at all from Kent experience would you say that part of the problem of and the south-east. some of the buses not running in London, whether in the morning or afternoon, whether it be 30% or Q33 Mr Martlew: They were coming in on the main 100% of open roads, is in part, if not mostly, due to line from the north? the fact that there may have been a concern about Mr Low: Yes, but they were not coming in from the people either arriving at work safely or returning south and the east. home safely? Obviously Transport for London has to be concerned about its staV who clearly need to arrive and depart from work in a safe manner. Q34 Mr Martlew: People do commute from places Mr Low: Correct, and that applies to other road like Rugby, and some of them were coming in. users, but again local government works very closely Mr Low: I do not disagree with any of that. with Transport for London. We gritted a bus station in Victoria, which is normally TfL’s responsibility. Q35 Mr Martlew: So heavy rail was not brought to They needed assistance; it was given immediately. a standstill? The response was there. The important point is that Mr Low: In terms of the comments made about the local government through the winter service plans CBI, for those businesses that were relying on has looked very carefully. They plan for the areas passengers coming in on the heavy rail from south- which are important. They look at the key routes, east London, Kent and south-west London, there and the key routes are not necessarily always the were no rail services running on those lines, and most strategic traYc routes; they include routes to and of those people therefore would not even have come from hospitals. For example, St Mary’s Hospital at in to central London. Paddington has ramps; Westminster’s provider was in there salting those ramps. They are not part of the Q36 Chairman: Do you think any consideration was highway network but they are an important part of given to people coming in from the north where the network of getting people to a hospital. That is a heavy rail was operating? demonstration of the way in which the winter service Mr Low: When it comes down to the bus network plans worked very well. We do all the salting of the and the tube network, you have got to ask Transport royal parks, as another example. I do not want this for London; you have got to ask Peter Hendy that to be a Westminster focus. I believe local question. He is the right person to give you the government responded magnificently to the events. operational advice and guidance. What I do know is There were incidents, and I accept that, and we have that Transport for London in terms of the London said we want to learn from that. We value the Underground network relies upon private hire to inquiry. bring their drivers in every morning prior to public transport and the tube network starting. There may Q43 Mark Pritchard: Mr Lugg, you mentioned have been some implications there, but I am not earlier the local authorities. Do you believe all of going to second guess it. That is a point for him, not them did particularly well? I think that is what you for us. said. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:31 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Ev 6 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low

Mr Lugg: My general view is from the information Councillor Sparks: I am not aware of any local I have received from my members that we coped very authority that underperformed in the sense that they well in very diYcult circumstances. I think the point did not do as well as they were able to do, but I am has been made that we have to give credit to many of obviously aware that not every local authority was the operators that went out in very diYcult able to perform in the same way as others. Therefore, conditions to keep roads safe and passable. The issue as we always do after anything like this, we need to that concerned me and one I think that will be an have to look at what was the best practice. issue for an inquiry is the salt supply. Q48 Mark Pritchard: Can you give me an example? Q44 Mark Pritchard: We are going to come on to Perhaps you can try to help us? that. I have a couple of quick supplementaries. Councillor Sparks: I cannot give any example. If I Would you say that local authorities did equally could, I would, believe me. well? Mr Lugg: I would not single out any authority that Q49 Chairman: In fact we are looking at the reasons had not done well. I think in general we all for the problems. responded well. The point is that we have clear plans Councillor Sparks: One thing that Graham Stringer and responsibilities. There is a litigation issue for us. brought out earlier on needs to be focused on, and It is not that we do things for that reason but it is very you are focusing on London. There is a real problem important that we follow our plans and do what we in this country now in terms of how adverse weather say and keep our promises and communicate well to aVects conurbations and big cities. We really do need the public and that there is clarity about what we did. to have a look at this because we have a situation where literally millions of people are at risk of being Q45 Mark Pritchard: You say the local authorities isolated if they embark on a journey in the early did well. By definition, they cannot for geographical morning and then there is an adverse snowfall in the and road network reasons possibly all have done afternoon; some of these cities seize up. This is equally well. Some could have done or should have unsatisfactory from a national point of view. We done or did do better than others. What I am trying need to get it sorted. to get at are which local authorities in your view under-performed and could have done better? Q50 Mr Leech: Councillor Sparks, as a councillor, I Mr Lugg: I think the point is that there were diVerent am sure you will be well aware of the diVerent circumstances across the country. In general, this constraints on how we spend money. Is it fair to say was a national problem but certainly in the that perhaps councils do not see spending on this Midlands we had periods of very severe weather and area as a priority because these situations only come in the West Country and the south. Through those every now and again? periods, every local authority did a good job with the Councillor Sparks: No, that is definitely not the case, resources and equipment they had. I would not and I have personal experience of this in my own single out any authority to say that it did not. local authority. We had a major financial shortfall one year: we actually looked at cutting back on Q46 Mark Pritchard: Would anybody else like to winter gritting and we were not able to do it because comment on that. Some of us are rather puzzled that of the priority that had been given to individual there is not a single local authority that roads. It is an extremely sensitive issue. When you underperformed? are talking about the amounts of money that are tied Councillor Sparks: I think it is very important that up in salt supplies, it is not the amount of money that local government applies to the question of winter is the problem but the fact that the salt deteriorates. gritting, for want of a better expression, the same We all know there are unlimited quantities of salt, in rigorous analysis as it does to any other function that eVect, beneath the ground. The problem is one of is performed by a local authority. At any given time, getting the supply to the point of delivery. That is a you will get a variation in performance. I personally problem. cannot identify particular local authorities that underperformed but I know not every local Q51 Mr Leech: I was not suggesting that local authority performed to the same extent in relation to authorities would cut back on their normal winter this particular problem. Therefore, we need to have maintenance but perhaps because these extreme a look at what happened and find out where we weather conditions only happen once every 15 or 20 can improve. years, they are not actually prepared for those extreme weather conditions, unlike other countries. Q47 Mark Pritchard: Councillor Sparks, I am rather Councillor Sparks: There are two points on this. puzzled. There is a slight inconsistency in your First, wearing another hat in terms of the budgets, answer there because the second part of your answer this is not an element that figures prominently when suggested that there were those that you are fixing your council budget because the underperformed, and yet you are not prepared to amount of money is not a big factor in comparison identify any of them. This is a public committee. I to other issues. The second point about whether we think it is incumbent upon us all to be as open as we should prepare for a one in 18 year event, quite possibly can. Which local authorities are you aware frankly, we should not prepare for a one in 18 year of that could have done better? It is not a damning event because that would be a misallocation of statement? resources when there is enough salt in the country at Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:31 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 7

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low any one time, provided it is delivered to the point Q56 Mr Martlew: Is it not right that that the gritting where it is needed. That is the problem; it is a of roads should be a London-based issue and not left problem of production and delivery. to the various boroughs? Most people go through one, two or three boroughs if they are travelling, but if one of borough does not have the salt, then it does Q52 Chairman: Why were there such low salt stocks not matter if the other two do have salt. Is it not when bad weather had been predicted for this year? really a matter that the London Authority, the Is there any explanation for that? Mayor’s OYce, should have control of the gritting Mr Lugg: The salt stocks of my members in the of all the streets in London? counties generally were similar to other years. The Mr Low: I do not think that would be appropriate. salt stocks at the beginning of the season were what It is important that there is a review of the winter we would normally buy in for a normal winter. The service plans, a review of the prioritisation of those problem that occurred was that we had a very busy plans if that issue touches upon the bus routes going time pre-Christmas; we used a lot of that supply. through several boroughs being adversely aVected When we went to the suppliers for replenishment, because three of the four boroughs cover that part of they could not respond and deliver, and then we got the route and the fourth borough does not. The into a scenario where a number of authorities Y important point is to look at the stock that is entered into a very di cult situation where they were available to be used by that local authority. For likely to run out of salt. As it happens, nobody did example, Westminster had 1,500 tonnes of salt ready and we can talk a bit more about why that happened. to deploy on its streets. It had a further 1,000 tonnes In general, the salt stocks at the beginning of the as back-up. It did not have a shortage throughout season were at a level that we would normally buy in the whole of the incident. We did make salt available for a normal winter. to neighbouring boroughs that did have temporary shortfalls of salt. When the snow first fell, there was Q53 Chairman: Would you say that it is a problem no shortage; it was later on in the day that some for the suppliers not having stocks to meet the authorities that perhaps had deployed salt, as predictions? Matthew Lugg said, in the earlier parts of the winter, Mr Lugg: I think it is an issue for the whole supply needed extra help and support. Some of that support chain. I would rather not comment specifically. This came from the mutual aid which the Highways ought to be looked at in more detail as part of some Agency oVered to London boroughs through inquiry. We need to talk to the suppliers; we need to Transport for London. To give you some idea of the think about salt stocks, stock piles, and how that is amount that was needed to be oVered as mutual aid, handled. There is a number of issues that need to be it was 750 tonnes, half of Westminster’s total supply. investigated as a result of what happened. Q57 Mr Martlew: I think you are making my case for Q54 Mr Martlew: I think there are two issues on salt. me for local authorities. You say some of them did One is general and I presume that somewhere the not have the supplies and others did. Surely if there Government has a stockpile of food in case there is was overall control, then the issue would be dealt an emergency. Are we suggesting, and it seems like a with on a London basis and not by the various good idea, that the Government should have a boroughs. stockpile of salt for an emergency situation? I know Mr Low: I think boroughs know their patches it is not a cheap option because you cannot just leave extremely well and because of local variations in it piled up because it needs to be covered. Is there a climate conditions, you need to fine-tune the winter case for saying there should be a strategic stockpile service plan. You do not do it on a London-wide of salt for the sorts of emergencies that happen once basis; you customise it to each of the areas. You very 20 years? make sure that there is enough resilience in the Mr Lugg: I think there could be. We need to look at system. I think the Mayor of London could play a those options. Some authorities would welcome useful role working in partnership with the London regional stockpiles. It may be that the suppliers local authorities to make sure that the winter service could produce more and stockpile it; it could be that plans, the salt stocks and the supply chain are we need bigger salt barns. All these things need to be adequate to meet London’s needs as just one looked at quickly as part of an inquiry to come up example. with some very quick solutions so that we do not find Mr Martlew: We look forward to asking him that ourselves in this position for the next winter. question.

Q55 Mr Martlew: Mr Low, I think you made a Q58 Graham Stringer: Following on from that, can comment earlier that one of the local authorities in you clarify the demarcation lines in London for the London had very adequate supplies? responsibilities for clearing roads, pavements, cycle Mr Low: Two did: Ealing and Wandsworth. They routes and pathways, for instance? have massive areas of salt storage. We would Mr Low: Yes; 95% of London’s roads are the probably want to build on that from a regional point responsibility of the London local authorities; 5% of of view to make sure that if an individual local London roads are the responsibility of Transport for authority experienced problems, they could call London, which forms the Transport for London upon that supplier if it were necessary. Road Network, commonly known as the red routes. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:31 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Ev 8 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low

TfL is responsible for that network; the local clear the carriageways. That is a separate operation authorities are responsible for the rest of the to the other operation of the footways, which is dealt network. with in a combination of ways. There are grit bins around the local authority area and from those grit Q59 Graham Stringer: And that includes pavements bins gangs actually take the grit and then deploy it and cycle ways? along the footways. Inevitably, there will be a slower Mr Low: Yes, it does. That is why it is important to progression of grit on the footways where the share good practice. Certainly when I was going by gritting operation on the carriageway does not car through Lewisham along a red route, I saw the extend to cover the footways, and a lot depends Transport for London’s contractor distributing salt upon the presence of on-street parking whether or along the footways on the Sunday before the snow not you are able to grit the footways from the gritter fell, well in advance. They were using a ﬂat-bed lorry or whether you need the devices and the techniques and chucking the salt oV with a spade. I think we that we deploy on the footways themselves. I would need to look at best practice to see whether that is an say in terms of a lag, there is probably a day’s lag eYcient way of operating. Every highway authority, between footways and carriageways overall, as a whether it is Transport for London or a London rough assessment based upon the knowledge that I borough, needs to do that. I know Transport for have. London have been in discussions with Westminster. Maybe the committee was not but they were quite Q66 Graham Stringer: Councillor Sparks, are you impressed at the way in which we dealt with aware of whether or not there has been an increase footways. They want to use some of the techniques across the country in claims for negligence because that we have developed over many years and that of accidents that happened when people have fallen other local authorities are using in other parts of the over on the pavements or on the roadways? country and looking at best practice from Europe, Councillor Sparks: There has been an increase bringing that to the streets of London. We have overall as you go on from year to year but I am not already done that; we want to do more of that with aware of any particular increase as a result of this our colleagues. particular event.

Q60 Graham Stringer: You helpfully told us earlier Q67 Graham Stringer: Does anybody else on the that 30% of the roads were viable, usable, fit for panel know? purpose early in the morning. Can you inform the Mr Low: I am not aware of an increase either. committee how that figure improved during the day? Mr Low: Not with a degree of accuracy. I am giving an approximate figure. Q68 Graham Stringer: Are you aware of any increase in road accidents? Q61 Graham Stringer: I do not expect a figure to two Councillor Sparks: No. decimal points. Mr Low: It is too early to tell. Mr Low: I will ask my colleague who was deeply involved in that. Q69 Chairman: Is the answer “no” or are you saying— Q62 Chairman: I am sorry, no, that is not permitted. Mr Low: The answer would not be available yet Mr Low: Then I will make an estimate based on my because if someone has an accident, it takes three information. months to appear on the accident database. We do not believe there has been any increase. Q63 Chairman: We accept that you are giving an Mr Lugg: I am not aware, certainly in my authority, estimate in good faith. that there has been an increase in road deaths as a Mr Low: I would say that by the end of the day it was result of the severe winter. We know very quickly probably up to about 60%. when there have been road deaths in our network. We would be able to see that very quickly if there is Q64 Graham Stringer: And the next day it was 100%, that trend. on the Tuesday? Mr Low: In relation to the fatalities, no, there has Mr Low: If you take the carriageways, pretty not been an increase, but if you are talking about much, yes. general accidents, it is too early to tell because of the way in which the data appears on the accident Q65 Graham Stringer: Did the pavements follow database. It takes three months from the time the that or were they much further behind in being police report the incident to it getting on to the local cleared? I accept that fit for purpose is a diVerent authority database. In the case of London, that is definition for a pavement. Did the pavements through the Transport for London’s Road Safety roughly follow the same percentage of being cleared Unit. Certainly in any inquiry that information and being easy to walk on? could be gathered and it would be very accurate. Mr Low: There is a completely diVerent approach when you are distributing salt in a crowded urban Q70 Mr Leech: Is it not the case that one of the environment. In the case of every local authority I reasons why the bus companies sent their buses back suspect it is very similar. The grit or the salt is to the depot the night before was that there had been deployed through gritting lorries that go along and a number of accidents, in London that is? Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 9

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low

Mr Low: The night before there was no snow. Why under footway paving material quite safely. It is not would they do that? sharp; you will not cut your hands on it. We have not looked at the type. I think it is very unlikely we Q71 Mr Leech: I am sure in some of the evidence would want to spread glass on our streets as an certainly that I have read that at midnight, or alternative to salt. whatever time it was, the bus companies were sending buses back to the depot because there had Q74 Mr Martlew: In fact you have just said that been a number of accidents. ground glass is used? Mr Low: I was not aware of that. No snow fell in Mr Low: It used as a footway paving material; it is Westminster; it started falling at two in the morning. not used for gritting. Q72 Mr Martlew: Putting down salt does not do anything for your roads and it does not do anything Q75 Mr Martlew: It is used in adverse weather for the vegetation. Was any consideration given to conditions? these matters when you decided to use salt? Mr Low: No, ground glass is not used. Councillor Sparks: I am really pleased that you have Mr Lugg: Another issue about the environmental raised this question because it has not had anything consequences is corrosion to vehicles and our like the level of attention that it needs to have. The structures. Clearly, salt is a very corrosive product, Environment Board at the LGA has long since been so again we have been investing in new types of salt. concerned about the over-use of salt and the One of them is where it is mixed with molasses and environmental impact. It is particularly important in that neutralises some of the corrosive impact of salt any inquiry that we emphasise that we should also be and helps to deal with some of the problems that we looking at other methods of dealing with adverse are seeing in terms of corrosion. Again, this is weather. One of the problems that we have, again in another area of development where local authorities the big cities in particular, is the level of panic that are looking at products that are less environmental you now get because there is not the confidence in harmful, but also still give the right impact in terms the public transport systems to get people out of of the way that they deal with the ice. The other cities. It is very important to realise that in dealing benefit about mixing salt in solution is that it is a with adverse weather conditions in the future we more eYcient way of managing the service. There are should not just be relying on salt and gritting. eYciencies in using more environmentally beneficial Mr Lugg: I, too, think that is a good point you raise. products. The industry and local authorities have moved on a Mr Low: Another thing we are doing is with the lot. Winter maintenance gritting used to be quite an flushing machines that are used to clean the roads. agricultural-type process. There is now a lot more For probably two months in the year they are not sophistication in the process. Clearly, what we try to used when there are adverse weather conditions. We do is minimise the amount of salt we use for the best are working with the manufacturer of that eVect. We have new ways of spreading salt, whether equipment so that it can be used with a brine it is through pre-wet or a brine solution, that means solution for salting purposes. That is another good that we can put less salt on the road than we way of using equipment that is needed for other traditionally used to do. There has been a lot of highway purposes when we have extreme weather progress within local authorities to move to these conditions.. new ways of working. The other aspects are problems about the environmental consequences of how salt is stored. Again, many local authorities Q76 Chairman: Do you know of any councils that now have invested in covered barns, so the salt is have looked at inter-seasonal heat transfer properly managed and kept dry to avoid the strong technology—storing solar heat and using it? None of risk of leachate and salt getting into the water you are aware of that. In terms of disruption caused courses and polluting our rivers and streams. We by the snow in the first week of February, we are told have been working on that but clearly we need to that the cost of the disruption is between £1 billion continue that progress. and £3.5 billion. Does that figure strike a chord with you? Q73 Mr Martlew: In Greenwich they have been Mr Lugg: No. using ground glass. I do not think the operators are Councillor Sparks: I do not know what the exact too keen on that, to be honest. Are any substitutes figure is. The important point is that the level of being looked at other than salt to carry out this job? disruption that was caused is unacceptable in an Mr Low: One important point is that we do not add advanced society like we have, and we need to aggregate or grit to the salt unless the temperature reduce it. goes below 8o; it is not necessary to do so. We use just Mr Low: With more businesses and local authorities pure salt until the weather conditions change. Once getting their staV to do home working and remote they change and the salt has less of an eVect in terms oYce working, location working, those working at of its intended action to break down and melt the home—stuck at home perhaps in some cases because snow and ice, then you get into the need to have the heavy rail was not working—were still able to some traction and you start to add aggregate to the undertake work during the day because of the mix. In terms of the comment about glass, yes, we do techniques which local government and other use a lot of recycled glass as a substitute for sand businesses have been operating in recent years. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Ev 10 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Mr Matthew Lugg, Councillor David Sparks and Mr Martin Low

Q77 Chairman: Are there any general lessons that needs to do is to recognise that the only way to solve can be drawn from the experience in terms of what this is to have a partnership, as we have at the present government should be doing? We have concentrated moment, with the Highways Agency (the in our questions to you on local government; that is Government) and local authorities. There should be your expertise. Looking at what has happened—and an emphasis, first of all on the strategic rail network perhaps Councillor Sparks may have some ideas and the motorways and then, secondly,because local looking over the whole of local government—is authorities are linked with local communities and there anything that you think central government you are essentially talking about a very localised could have done to help local government? problem with micro-climate having a major impact, Councillor Sparks: I think central government needs local authorities themselves should also be part of to make a decision on the priority that is given to the overall strategy in dealing with the problem. As public transport and the amount of investment that a final point: no-one should say that they are is necessary in public transport to get it up to the satisfied with what happened. It was unsatisfactory, standard of our continental competitors. At the and we all need to learn lessons and get it sorted, moment, we give advice to people: do not use your quite frankly. car; use public transport. As an ordinary punter, I know that in reality in adverse weather conditions Q79 Ms Smith: I am sorry to have been late and I you are frequently better oV in your own car than on hope this question has not been covered. There is a V public transport because you do not cancel your view that the events that we su ered in February are own car. very rare nowadays in the United Kingdom and that the investment required to deal eVectively with them would not represent value for money. My question Q78 Chairman: Was there enough co-ordination, is: what is your view on that? To Councillor Sparks generally speaking, in clearing roads so that public in particular: do you think that taxpayers would transport could operate? We are aware of the welcome the additional council tax that would have problems on London but looking generally across to be paid to invest in the kind of equipment that the piece? would be necessary to produce the kind of response Councillor Sparks: Generally, yes, because the that perhaps we would all be looking for, situation, certainly in the big conurbations, is that particularly given that it would probably only be there are well-established strategies for dealing with used once every 10 or 20 years? adverse weather. There has been no change really Councillor Sparks: I do not think council taxpayers since the pre-1973 local government boundaries; will welcome any increase in council taxes, especially they have been inherited and inherited. Where there Quarry Bank or in Dudley. I know that for a fact. is a problem, going back to Graham Stringer’s The fundamental point, on your question, is that point, is that, for example using my own personal though this has been a one in 18 year event, I do not experience, when we had control of transport in the think we should necessarily assume it is going to be conurbations, we could ensure that the buses and the another 18 years before it happens again because we trains ran; we cannot now because, as you as a are having extremely violent variations in weather, committee know, the structure of the bus industry is probably as a result of changes in the climate. fragmented and the nature of the rail industry is Chairman: I suspend the committee. Thank you for fragmented and we just do not have an adequate coming and answering our questions. public transport system to deal with adverse weather The Committee suspended from conditions. The other thing that the Government 3.46 pm to 4.13 pm for a division in the House.

Witnesses: Paul Clark MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Mr Gary Backler, Director Rail Service Delivery, Department for Transport and Mr Derek Turner, Network Operations Director, Highways Agency, gave evidence.

Q80 Chairman: Thank you for coming. Mr Clark, I services, particularly in some areas, the hard work of understand that you would like to make a statement? many people ensured that the impact was less than it Paul Clark: Thank you, Chairman. I would like the otherwise would have been. So I genuinely want to opportunity to give a short statement, which may put on record our thanks to all those that did their help in terms of the deliberations of your committee. best. But we are not being complacent. The problems I do welcome the opportunity to discuss the impact that large proportions of the population faced in of adverse weather on the transport system. The getting to work and carrying out their daily business Government acknowledges that the country has are serious ones. While it would be unrealistic to put been facing diYcult challenges this winter, in place the sorts of measures common in countries experiencing the coldest winter for almost 20 years, such as Russia and Scandinavia, where they with particularly heavy snowfalls in early February experience snow and ice every year, the Government across large parts of the country. These conditions is keen to learn from the experiences of this winter so created challenges for all those who were delivering that we can be better prepared in the future. The services at the local and national level. These were Greater London Authority have already conducted exceptional circumstances and although there were a review of the lessons learnt from the London some signiﬁcant problems in delivering transport perspective. Individual local authorities and Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 11

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner transport operators will also be undertaking their public. Decisions were being taken then by 10 own reviews to consider what lessons they can o’clock by bus operators to withdraw bus services. identify. At a national level, I can announce to the That continued up until about 10.30 on the Monday committee that the Government will be examining morning when some services started to run, and the provision of salt for the treatment of our roads. indeed by 4 o’clock in the afternoon there were some Although no highway authority ran out, the heavy 100 out of 700 routes that did actually have buses demand for salt throughout the winter meant that operating. stocks ran very low. This has placed a spotlight on how it is supplied, how it is stockpiled and used. The Q83 Chairman: Did the Government issue any Secretary of State has therefore invited the UK guidance about how to deal with severe weather? Roads Liaison Group, a partnership of central Paul Clark: The documents that we issue to local government, devolved administrations, trunk road authorities include one called Well-maintained and local authorities, to review the lessons that can Highways—Code of Practice for Highway be learnt from the recent events. They will consider Maintenance: on Winter Service, section 13 covers what steps could be adopted by local highway guidance in terms of some of the provisions that authorities, trunk road authorities, producers of the should be provided. Indeed, all local authorities V salt and others stakeholders to ensure the e ective need to have in place seasonal programmes to deal treatment of England’s road networks. The with such events. They will vary depending on the Secretary of State is asking the liaison group to nature of the area concerned. In terms of the general report back by the summer, and we will present the information that we gave at the time, it was very conclusions to Parliament. By looking at what much to advise the public always to allow plenty of happened earlier this year, including both what went time for travelling, to check with their service right and what went wrong, this review will give us provider, and obviously to look at the weather an opportunity to improve the way that we manage forecast. That was the general guidance that was extreme cold winters. given over the days of falling snow.

Q81 Chairman: Thank you, Minister. Can you tell us Q84 Chairman: Was there any general guidance to a little more about the review, who you will be local authorities on how they should prepare for a questioning and how you will be gathering situation like the one that arose? information? Paul Clark: That is provided within the code of Paul Clark: We will be gathering information practice that is laid out for local authorities in terms through clearly written submissions as well as of being prepared and having a programme and their meetings and stakeholder engagement with, for strategic network of roads that they deem to be example, obviously colleagues from the Highways strategic within their own given areas. Obviously, Authority to cover the strategic road network, but they will have provisions in place for salting of the also through the Local Government Association, for highways for which they are responsible. Obviously, example, the operators of services within regions on Derek Turner and the Highways Agency are those roads, and obviously emergency services as responsible for the strategic road network within this well, and also the producers and suppliers of salt in country, which is another area, and there is general this country, primarily the Salt Union and Cleveland guidance in terms for example of the levels of salting Potash, who both did some sterling work during the that would be needed in certain weather conditions, period, but there are issues to be learnt. whether it is icy conditions or whether it is continuous snow conditions, and the sort of levels of Q82 Chairman: The general picture we have at the salting that would be required on those roads. moment is of diVering situations across the country but a major problem in London. Do you have any Q85 Mark Pritchard: These snow events come information about what went wrong in London? around about very two decades. What would your Paul Clark: In terms of the issues and the challenges advice be, Minister, to the travelling public in such that were faced within the capital with regard to circumstances—to travel by car or travel by public buses and so on, obviously these are matters that are transport? particularly governed by the Mayor of London and Paul Clark: In terms of the circumstances that we TfL. I think clearly it would be helpful if the faced, you are absolutely right that they are once in committee no doubt was able to question those in a 20 year cycle. I think all of us accept that they were authority there. Having said that, obviously a review exceptional conditions that happened. In terms of has been already partly undertaken. The London my advice, it was exactly what we gave, depending Resilience Board has been undertaking a review, as upon the mode of transport that people want to use: well of course as the GLA, and issues have been to check with their travel provider and to allow taken on board. My understanding, when we looked plenty of time to be able to carry that out. I am at this, particularly in terms of the bus side of conscious that some of the lessons that we need to operations within the capital, is that there were learn are in terms of the information platforms that issues in the run-up to midnight on the night of are out there to be able to help. Indeed, the Sunday, 1 February into Monday 2 when snow was Highways Agency and Network Rail, for example, falling. There had already been in the region of some and the train inquiries system had volumes of traYc 30 incidents involving buses, indeed one where a bus that have never been seen before; in fact, 16 or 17 slipped towards a bus stop, injuring a member of the times the levels that are normal, and indeed much Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Ev 12 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner higher than some of the worst incidents that have Q88 Mark Pritchard: I am grateful, but I asked Lord happened in the capital when we think back to the Adonis some weeks ago the same question and he days of the bombings. gave a not dissimilar reply that it would be based upon performance. We have heard from expert witnesses today that clearly there was not a good Q86 Mark Pritchard: A previous witness in the level of performance when we needed performance earlier session for the Local Government to come through for this snow event, certainly in the Association said to the committee that you are better South East at least. I am just asking you to reiterate, oV in your car because you do not cancel your own is it the policy of Her Majesty’s Government not to car. How do you respond to that, given that the reward failure and if it is the policy then I would messages, certainly from a lot of radio stations and hope that you, as one of the Transport Ministers, will weather reporters, was where possible actually to say you will not agree to such a bonus for travel by public transport, and much of that was rewarding failure. cancelled? Paul Clark: As you well know, there is the Network Paul Clark: The premise on that basis is that in terms Rail Board and Network Rail members whose total of the public transport systems, the people who were is 100 people who are from a stakeholders’ group in running public transport systems just cancelled them the rail industry who will make that final decision. for almost no good reason. That is not the case. Let me say we have put down very clearly our view, Indeed, travelling by car could well have been and it is recorded in the oYcial documents, as to our diYcult and in fact was diYcult for many because of position as to us saying to Network Rail members being able to get for example to the strategic network that clearly we would expect them to take into in a safe and secure manner. I will say that if you look account the general public’s position and the at the railway network, for example in terms of the experience that they might have received in terms of levels of trains that were running overall, the picture performance of Network Rail. was not the same across the whole country. Indeed, parliamentary colleagues here will know, and in fact maybe some of them here, that they were able to Q89 Mark Pritchard: Do you accept Network Rail travel in this country as normal before they got to has a public subsidy of over £3 billion a year and the London taxpayer clearly wants to know whether that subsidy is going into rail investment and infrastructure investment or going into the back pockets of Q87 Mark Pritchard: Can I just say that you are directors who clearly are not performing? absolute right; I managed to travel down from the Paul Clark: Absolutely, and thanks to this Midlands, and I think other colleagues from Government they are getting that investment that is northern parts travelled down as well. However, we desperately needed within our rail infrastructure to did hear from earlier witnesses that there was a real be able to make sure that punctuality and reliability, impact on the south-east’s rail network. Clearly a lot which are critical matters day in, day out to the of people—many of the drivers within public general public who are travelling, are now at record transport, the staV of public transport—will live in levels. As you are well aware, under our the south-east, so that would have had an impact requirements between now and 2014 we want to see clearly. This is relevant to this point. In the context that punctuality and reliability increase still further. of the Prime Minister himself saying that he wants to That will be done by giving money to Network Rail see an end to the bonus culture and the end of to actually invest in the infrastructure. rewarding failure, given that we have heard from witnesses today that the south-east ground to a halt and the rail network, is it right that Ian Coucher, the Q90 Mark Pritchard: I appreciate that, and thank Chief Executive of Network Rail, is due to receive a you, Chairman, for your patience, but apart from bonus of up to £600,000? when it snows, of course. Paul Clark: I think you have been listening to Paul Clark: Apart from when it snows, but we have various speculations. Let me first of all say that we just accepted that what happened on and around 2 are not responsible; it is a matter for Network Rail’s February were exceptional circumstances. If I say to members in terms of bonuses. I have put on the you that the Met OYce, who provided very good record, in fact indeed on Monday night in the debate indications in terms of there being a 60% on sustainable railways, and my noble friend and the predictability of snow, predicted that it would be in Minister for the Railways, Lord Adonis in the other the region of 5–10 cm, but in fact in south London place put on record very clearly, that whilst this is a there was 24 cm that fell in that relatively short space matter for Network Rail, we would hope that, in of time. That sort of magnitude is diVerent and we light of the current situation and recognising the have to recognise that. Let me say, one of the things need for performance, the members and the Board we have discussed with Network Rail is they have would consider very carefully the level of the been undertaking various streams of works since 26 bonuses that are awarded and recognise where the February when they met to look at issues that had general public are and what their experiences might arisen from the snow events and, indeed, today a have been of Network Rail’s performance. That is further meeting takes place to look at some of the the answer. issues identified and some of the lessons learnt from Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 13

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner that will be published in due course so that people Q93 Graham Stringer: That is a bit of a glib way of are aware that all of us are learning from the events answering if you do not mind me saying, Minister. of 2 February and thereafter. There are always lessons to be learned, but are you satisfied that all those buses were cancelled to the Q91 Graham Stringer: We are going to try and detriment of the travelling public in London? interview everybody, Minister, who has direct Paul Clark: Let me say that in the run-up to the responsibility: bus companies, Transport for midnight period there had certainly been accidents London, the Mayor, everybody involved in this. I which would cause concern as to what should be realise you do not have operational control, but happening. London put up the “closed for business” sign on 2 February and I do not get any sense from you that Q94 Graham Stringer: Can I interrupt? I do not like you are appalled and angry about this. It had not interrupting witnesses but it is a matter of fact that happened since the Second World War and there you said earlier there were 30 accidents before have probably been conditions as bad as this midnight. What is your source for that information perhaps five or six times since the Second World War because we heard earlier our previous witnesses did and London has not closed. Apart from having an not know of those accidents? inquiry, what is your attitude to that? Paul Clark: That is information that has been Paul Clark: Obviously with the initial things that brought together because of work that has been were coming out about the situation in London, the going on to try to bring together lessons learnt immediate reaction was “How could this be already and being done through the various happening?” I will say to you, of course, I channels that exist. understand the headline in terms of this being the worst situation and this had not happened since the Q95 Chairman: Do you know if that information Second World War, and so on, but the widespread came from Transport for London? blanket covering of such a volume of snow was Paul Clark: I will say I believe it did, but I will pretty exceptional and that does make a diVerence in confirm where it came from to you in writing. As far the sense that with damage on a given route, a as I am aware it is reliable information. Certainly by blockage on a given route, you could not go round midnight you had the night services taken oV.By and divert easily. Having said that, there are 10.30 on the Monday some services were running substantial lessons that should be learned by all and, indeed, by 4.30 100 out of the 700 routes were concerned in the running of the capital city and the up and running. It does raise concerns for me and transport here. My understanding is that there were you need to look at where bus depots were, for some serious information diYculties that led to there example. If you have strategic routes and, indeed, being stories that there were substantial shut-downs, elsewhere in the country where they did have as you put it of London being closed for business, snowfall there were provisions made whereby bus when, in fact, there were not. For example, the services operated on main corridors and they did not Underground was running 80% of its stations. There go into housing estates or out into rural areas but were only three lines that were aVected to a certain there were at least drop-oV points made available. I extent: the Jubilee Line, the Piccadilly and Circle think there are some serious questions that need to Lines, where there was a reduction in some of the be answered in terms of provision of particularly the service because of them being outside and various bus services within the capital city. Obviously I am things in that way, technicalities. I do say to you 80% interested in that as a Department for Transport of London Underground services were running. 77% Minister, as indeed will be my colleague, the hon of the Docklands Light Railway services were Member for Poplar and Canning Town, whose running. This was on 2 February. Indeed, on responsibility does cover London, but in terms of the London Overground some 60%. The buses was day-to-day stuV that is a matter that needs to be where there were diYculties. Part of the work that asked of the Mayor and TfL. the Transport Select Committee does is obviously welcomed by us within DfT to inform and help in Q96 Graham Stringer: I am certain we will do. I am terms of learning lessons. Certainly the London just trying to get a value judgment out of you. You Resilience Plan was in place but there must be issues V have given a detailed description to the Committee, to be taken up there in terms of how e ectively it and that is helpful, but surely you must be worked, particularly in terms of bus services. dissatisfied, critical, find it unsatisfactory that so many buses were cancelled? Q92 Graham Stringer: You said earlier that bus Paul Clark: I do find it interesting that all buses at services were not taken oV for no good reason. “That that time were cancelled, but without looking in is not the case” I think was your exact quote. We detail at where the buses were, in which depots and heard earlier this afternoon that in the morning 30% so on, and what were the problems, shouting outrage of the road networks were cleared and fit for buses, at this stage may not necessarily be the right way yet there were no buses running and certainly the forward. What is necessary and what I hope is being buses were running at low levels as the road network done is clearly to look at where there were strategic improved. Are you angry about that? Do you think roads within London, what were the links to those it was satisfactory? bus depots and why were we not able to get some Paul Clark: No. I think there are substantial lessons buses out. I accept that is a serious question that to be learned. needs answering. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Ev 14 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner

Graham Stringer: I note that point. Can I ask but I have no doubt there were communications that another question? The Daily Telegraph on 7 would have gone on between depots as to, “What is February carried a quote from the Secretary of State happening with you in your patch?” and decisions for Transport saying that motorists were partly to were taken. blame because they had not purchased snow chains for £50. Is that an accurate quote and do you agree Q100 Mr Martlew: Do you think TfL would have with the Secretary of State if it is an accurate quote? had any input into that? Paul Clark: My understanding is that TfL did not Q97 Chairman: Minister, who was it? give any direction to stop all the buses. I have to say Paul Clark: It was not an accurate quote. If I recall I do think that is a matter that needs to be raised correctly, that arose from a comment from Question directly with them. Time which, indeed, my right hon friend had been at on the Thursday night—as you know it is recorded Q101 Mr Martlew: Can we now come to the salt on the Thursday night—and what he was pointing situation? I think you are very fortunate to be sitting out was this was about getting it in scale and making here today and we did not run out of salt, although a judgment about how far do we go because there we nearly did. What responsibility does the had been this question about should we not have Government have to ensure that there is enough salt been prepared for the heaviest snowfall we had in 20 to keep this country going? years, we should have snowploughs here, grit here, Paul Clark: There are a number of requirements and all over the place everything should be running as I may ask Derek particularly on the side of the normal as of course it does, supposedly, in Highways Agency. There are two parts to this. There Scandinavia or Russia. That was deliberately why I is the Highways Agency that is responsible for the raised those two particular areas because day in, day strategic road network and there are requirements in V out they are faced with that but in a di erent way, terms of the volumes that they need to maintain at and we are not. It is a bit like saying to motorists, any given time, which is six days’ capability supply “You must always have in the back of your car snow on the basis that they need to grit the whole area. I chains, invest money in snow chains which you have will leave Derek to expand on that. There are to use in accordance with the regulations, so not requirements that are laid down. Local Authorities damaging roads at the wrong time, you have to use equally, as I have already indicated, need to have them on the right surface, and you have to invest plans in terms of dealing with winter weather and that cost just in case you might need them once in 20 those plans need to be in place, which include having years”. That was the source of that. Certainly the salt supplies as well. No local authority ran out of Secretary of State was not blaming motorists for not salt supplies and, indeed, as a response to the having snow chains. situation and dealing with it we used the Regional Resilience Teams but then developed that further in Q98 Mr Martlew: Can I just go back to the buses and terms of setting up a Salt Cell which deliberately perhaps we can move on. There is a variety of bus monitored and brought information in from across companies in the capital and yet not one of those the country as to supplies of salt that were out there, buses went out that morning. Who took the decision how long that was going to last, what mutual aid was to say no buses should go out? required and, indeed, the Highways Agency helped Paul Clark: My understanding is that there was no in that way as well. And what was at the pithead, I general instruction given that buses should not run. was going to say, in terms of the supplies that were That is what I am informed was the case, that there there at the two suppliers, where did that need to go. was no general instruction. It was because of reports Because of that work that was undertaken, and I that were clearly circulating during that night of visited the Salt Union a few weeks after the event, (a) Sunday 1 February with accidents being reported partly to say thank you to them, and to Cleveland that decisions were taken to remove bus services. I Potash who were the other main suppliers, for the understand that was the position in terms of there sterling work that they did around the clock to keep was no general requirement. things going, but (b) to say there are lessons to be learned for all of us, suppliers and those who have to Q99 Mr Martlew: You seem as though you do not maintain our roads. really believe that yourself, Minister, because I certainly do not believe that all these bus companies Q102 Mr Martlew: Are you indicating that we nearly individually came to a decision not to send any buses ran out of salt or are you saying there was never out even though they had been told 30% of the roads going to be a problem even if it had gone on for at that time were ﬁt for purpose. There must have another week? been some co-ordination on that. Paul Clark: We would always manage. There were Paul Clark: I can well imagine, and obviously if you situations whereby some local authorities had are running depots across the country, these are substantial amounts, thousands of tonnes of salt, people at the sharp end day in, day out, who had to which they did not need because, fortunate for them, make decisions and I would say to them as the weather did not hit them in that way, yet there individuals they are doing sterling jobs, and the bus were other parts of the country which clearly were drivers who were trying to get through and not get struggling and, indeed, needed our help and support stuck with passengers in areas that were clearly to make sure the supplies that were available from clogging up with snow. These were diYcult decisions the pithead were getting to the right places. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 15

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner

Obviously there were some local authorities that Q106 Ms Smith: Minister, that is not the question. were down to their last salt supplies in terms of days My question is about the majority of workers who of capability, and that was where it was so important live oV the major strategic routes and who needed to to be able to do the salt audit that happened with get there before they could start to think about literally twice a day reports coming in, being getting to work. That was the major problem. monitored with the Highways Agency, CLG, DfT Paul Clark: I do understand that. What I was going and the Cabinet Contingency Secretariat working on to say was obviously it was the degree of together to take that through with daily disruption that happened with the levels of snow teleconferences to work through the logistics of that we had. We had also had substantially cold making sure that the salt was at the right place at the levels before that that used salt supplies as well. For right time. example, we had had temperatures that had been down at minus five to minus 10 for some period before that as well which led to a greater salting Q103 Mr Martlew: That is very reassuring, Minister, process. I was going to say whilst you may well have but why are you having an inquiry? a plan that says, “These are the roads we want to Paul Clark: Because there are lessons to be learned. do”, which includes feeder roads and other roads For example, there are issues about having resilience that link to those to be able to give freedom as far in terms of delivery of salt supplies from the pithead. and wide as possible, the level of snow that falls may There were some issues in terms of being able to have mean because of the level of gritting and pre-gritting drivers available for a weekend, which was critical. that you have done you have to go to a second level Indeed, the Highways Agency got involved in that contingency plan which is literally strategic routes. I way. There are other issues about the amount of think those are some of the things that will come out stock that is held at any of those given areas and of the discussions that we are going to have. should we increase the stocks that are held, what Ms Smith: Minister, I press the point that surely this would that mean and how could we deal with that, is an opportunity for DfT to make the case to DCLG how do we logistically move it across the country in Y based on the evidence of February for looking again a far better and e cient way. There are a number of at the standard of gritting across local government issues to be raised and looked at in detail. as a whole and to look at the diVering performances of local government across the country comparing Q104 Ms Smith: Minister, you have mentioned that London, for instance, and how it coped with the the CLG and DfT were involved in co-ordinating snow with, say, Manchester or SheYeld. responses to the situation in February and there is an inquiry ongoing now. Of course, local government is Q107 Chairman: Will this be part of the inquiry, regularly measured for its performance by the Audit Minister? Commission and the eVectiveness and eYciency of Paul Clark: The standard of gritting and so on does its gritting of the road network is part of that depend on the amount that you can physically do in measurement. Will the inquiry look at whether or that given time depending on the levels of— not there needs to be a revision of the criteria used to measure the performance of local government in Q108 Ms Smith: Even so you should be able to terms of gritting the network and would the DfT compare, Minister. Surely it is possible to compare have a view on that? London with Manchester in the same period. Paul Clark: There might be, but what the review Paul Clark: One of the things I want to happen from needs to look at is whether, in fact, the salt and the lessons that are learned from this period is where gritting operation was there and all that goes with there has been good practice in terms of being able that in terms of keeping strategic routes open and is to keep particularly public transport running, for the salt there for local highway authorities as well as example, how was that done in certain areas but not the Highways Agency, is it there to meet the criteria, in other areas allowing for the fact that the weather which could obviously lead to then looking at it in was on a par. I cannot stress enough that the actual terms of audit indicators and so on. I understand severity of the weather is a critical player in whether what you are saying but I cannot prejudge what you are able to keep X number of roads open and I might come out of the review. do understand the frustration for people being able to even get to those core routes that were open. Q105 Ms Smith: I would have thought, Minister, Again, we have to have put this in perspective; this that the DfT would have had a view given that the was a once in 20-year operation that happened on common complaint of people trying to get to work this scale. or whatever during that particular week was that the Ms Smith: The point I am making is it is not about strategic network nationally and at local level, ie the the particular severity of the event, it is about the V major roads, in any city or town were gritted but responses of di erent local authorities to that event. often the problem was getting to those major roads. Do you think the DfT may well want to look at a Q109 Mark Pritchard: Just one final question from revision of the criteria in terms of performance? me, Minister. You are a fair-minded and reasonable Paul Clark: As I understand it, in terms of the road man and I just wondered whether you would like to network at a local regional level, whilst there will be comment on whether you felt the cancellation of contingency plans that may well see critical routes buses in London specifically was an operational and major feeder routes being part of that— matter or a political decision? Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

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11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner

Paul Clark: I would hate to have to answer. I am Q118 Graham Stringer: This is a comment which sorry that neither you nor I were able to use our you may wish to comment on. It is strange when you Oyster Cards on the buses, which I know we both cannot answer generalities about the number of have, because that is always how we use them. accidents, yet we hear about a calamitous period just before midnight on 1 February when there were 30 Q110 Mark Pritchard: We do. accidents. Something does not feel quite right about Paul Clark: As you will know, it only costs £1 if you these statistics. have an Oyster Card. Paul Clark: We are talking about a relatively small area and you are asking in terms of nationwide. Q111 Mark Pritchard: And £2 if you do not. Paul Clark: £2 if it is cash, absolutely right. I am Q119 Graham Stringer: I am talking about increases, pleased we now agree on that. Minister. That is a terrific spike. Paul Clark: Those statistics will come through in due Q112 Mark Pritchard: Was it an operational or course and will be published and should form part of political decision? our learning curve from the issues through the Paul Clark: In terms of the decisions that were taken review. by the men and women operating the bus depots and so on, I am sure they took it for operational reasons Q120 Graham Stringer: Are you aware, and you and for the safety of the travelling public in their might not be, of an increase in negligence claims view at that time. Whether that is where we should made to local authorities because of the snow and ice have been is another issue that needs to be discussed. over this period? Mark Pritchard: Thank you, Minister. Paul Clark: I have not monitored that in terms of that increase. CLG no doubt will monitor that. Q113 Graham Stringer: Can I just ask you a few quick questions on costs? To the Highways Agency: Q121 Mr Martlew: On the point about the 30 how much did this episode at the start of February accidents, or incidents perhaps would be a better cost? word— Mr Turner: It is diYcult for us to give a precise Paul Clark: Incidents, yes. answer because the services provided through 14 of our service providers are wrapped up in a lump sump Q122 Mr Martlew: —was anybody hurt in any of as part of the contracts. I have tried to extract that, these incidents? anticipating this kind of question, and I think we Paul Clark: I do not believe anyone was hurt. There spent about £33 million over the whole year on was certainly a passenger standing at a bus stop who winter service. was not hurt to a degree that it was a serious injury problem. Q114 Graham Stringer: How does that compare to previous years? Q123 Mr Martlew: So we cancelled all the buses in Mr Turner: There is a significant increase in terms of London as a result of the fact that we had had 30 the amount of salt we used. This year to date we have incidents in which there were no injuries to anybody. used somewhere in the region of 200,000 tonnes on Is that what you are saying to us, Minister? the strategic road network. In the last few years Paul Clark: I am saying that decisions were taken usage has been going at about 150,000 tonnes. An that led to all the buses stopping virtually as from extra 50,000 tonnes is not a huge sum of money midnight on 1–2 February. That was the outcome of, because salt is about £25 per tonne. I suspect, collective decisions that were taken by individuals across the network in a number of Q115 Graham Stringer: Are the rest of the costs diVerent companies. subsumed within your normal contracts? Mr Turner: Yes. Q124 Mr Martlew: I am a cynic, Minister, as you are well aware. I think perhaps the situation was the Q116 Graham Stringer: So eVectively there is very decision was taken to stop the buses and then they little extra cost? went back to find these 30 incidents. I suspect it Mr Turner: Yes. might have been that way around and, therefore, they had an excuse for not putting the buses out the Q117 Graham Stringer: Minister, we talked earlier next morning. about the source of your accident statistics. Do you Paul Clark: What we should recognise is that there have any information on the increase in accidents on is an issue that if you get buses out on routes and they a national level over this period in early February? end up getting stuck with people on them, is that a Paul Clark: I do not. bigger issue and bigger problem for the travelling Mr Turner: It would be premature to say in terms of public than not starting that journey at all, and that personal injury accidents. We are not aware of an was a fine line decision that had to be taken. That is increase in fatalities. The personal injury accidents why I am saying the operational decisions that were will take some time to come through the system, but being taken by individuals, no doubt in those depots anecdotally we are not aware of a sharp increase in and so on, were one of those decisions that had to be personal injury accidents. taken. If a political decision was taken without any Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 17

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner proper consideration of whether that was necessary in, day out. You are also dealing with compacted that would be another matter which would be snow, and this starts to get into the technicalities of unacceptable, as I say. compacted snow, melting snow and slush and so on that you and I would know. I will not get into the Q125 Mr Martlew: The reason I am going on about technical side but you are obviously talking about this quite a lot is that in my constituency, and I compacted snow. I have talked about using salt, travelled down that day on the West Coast Main because that is what we use here rather than grit. Line and it worked, there was a similar amount of Grit will invariably get used in countries where there snow there to what I found when I got into London, is compacted snow to provide extra grip and so on. yet the buses in the urban areas ran, nobody took the decision not to run them, and it worked. I am saying Q127 Ms Smith: They just drive on the compacted there was either panic or an exaggeration of the snow. dangers that stopped the buses in London. Paul Clark: And they will make the investment in the Paul Clark: I can certainly understand exactly what necessary provisions because it is day in, day out for the Hon Member is saying in terms of Carlisle. I do substantial periods of time. We have to get it on the not know how much snow was there but I can give right scale; hence we go back to the comment that you examples of systems operating, for example in was supposedly attributed to the Secretary of State Bristol, and allowing drop-oV points and so on, not totally out of context. We cannot expect drivers in running into housing estates or rural areas, yet when this country to have snow chains because it just you look into the topography of Bath being more would not be sensible. hilly, buses did not run there. No doubt a lot of factors go into the decision-making process as to Q128 Ms Smith: So that will all be part of the whether you run those services in diYcult weather. inquiry? Much happened in Oxford with Stage Coach and so Paul Clark: There are always lessons to be learned. on running on main routes but not going in. I do understand exactly the issues you are raising and the decision-making process that happened. Clearly Q129 Graham Stringer: Have your clever what I am saying to you is that it is an issue that has economists done an estimate of the cost of this to be raised with the Mayor and TfL specifically episode to the UK economy? about whether there was a political decision not to Paul Clark: Not in a detailed way. We issued a figure run buses. In terms of operationally, and this is the in the region of half a billion pounds as the cost information in terms of the 30 incidents, as I have which, to be quite honest, was to respond to some of indicated I will write to the Chairman to let you the wild figures that were circulating in the press as to know where that arose from. the costs involved. That did use some of the standard figures that I used for disruption in a given day Q126 Ms Smith: I concur with that particularly within London and the South East, for absenteeism, given that SheYeld is probably the hilliest city in for business that might have been totally lost, even Britain, certainly far hillier than London and making allowances for deferred business that might managed to keep most of its bus services running. I have been lost. That has been on the gross cost of want to ask whether or not the Department is going GDP rather than taking into account any benefits to look at the services provided in Scandinavian that may well have arisen in terms of less accidents countries, Finland for instance, as part of the inquiry and so on. in terms of throwing up a valid comparison. A lot has been said about Scandinavia, and was said in Q130 Chairman: We have a figure of between early February. I do know something about Finland £1 billion and £3.5 billion. Does that sound familiar and I am aware that every driver in Finland puts to you? snow tyres on as soon as the snow falls in November; Paul Clark: No, it does not sound familiar to me. I am aware that the driving standards required to be The figure that we used was half a billion pounds. We given a driving licence are much higher, that is why have not spent a great deal of time following they have got the best rally drivers in the world; through. finally, I would also argue it is not true that Finland never experiences problems, apparently when the Q131 Chairman: Has any work been carried out by snow starts falling and when it melts there are the Department to see if Interseasonal Heat Transfer significant problems. I hope the Department will technology would be eVective? look at the comparisons to be made with Mr Turner: Yes. Scandinavian countries and perhaps enlighten the general public and all of us as to what really happens in those countries. Q132 Chairman: Mr Turner, can you tell us a little Paul Clark: Yes. There are always lessons to be more? learned. It is an interesting point that you raise in Mr Turner: We have carried out a pilot on the use of terms of driving standards. I would say that, of that technology and it is being reviewed. It is course, undoubtedly the driving standards of bus expensive technology. There are other technologies drivers here are not as advanced in terms of coping which can be used and we do look at a whole range with severe weather conditions as they are in of other treatments to try and improve our winter Finland, for example, because they have them day service. My own view is the technology that you are Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Ev 18 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner talking about is unlikely to be economically viable and it normally would receive about half a million and deployable throughout the network, it is just too hits on an average month, but on Friday 6 February expensive. it received over 450,000 hits in that one day, so the information was being got out there and being used. Q133 Chairman: Have you learnt any lessons about We also operate the Highways Agency website and co-ordination between the Department, the on average it receives between 6,000 and 19,000 visits Highways Agency and local authorities? per day, but on 2 February it received over 216,000 Paul Clark: I think the co-ordination that went on visits, so the Agency is providing a great deal of between the various departments, but also using the information. Regional Resilience Teams and so on, worked fairly well. In terms of the reports that came in, the situation reports that were then used to monitor Q136 Chairman: Now tell me about equipment. exactly the situation1 to get a picture, that worked Mr Turner: I have available about 500 salt spreaders, reasonably well in terms of bringing that together. including a small number of snow blowers. We have Where I think further work needs to be done is in just let a contract to renew and upgrade the fleet and terms of the supplies that were out there, salt issues, that is in the process of delivering over four years a but there were undoubtedly big issues that aVected renewal of the fleet. I think the service provided with the information flows to the general public. the renewed fleet, and indeed halfway through the Certainly that was one of the issues that happened in renewal process, was reasonable. I think that terms of information being co-ordinated from a equipment performed extremely well. The other number of diVerent places within the road network thing that is available to us, or is becoming available but also within the rail network to get the right to us, is a new contract—a national vehicle recovery information out there to various key players, contract—so that we will have available control of obviously the travelling public, most importantly, heavy recovery vehicles to help jack-knifed lorries to but also to media outlets and so on to make sure that get back on to the road system. That contract was let the information was clear and concise as well. There in October and is gradually being rolled out across are a lot of lessons to be learned there. I do not know the country and we will be using lessons learned whether Gary wants to say anything from the from this incident to help the deployment of that railways’ point of view. contract. Mr Backler: There is a recognition that the industry can improve the availability of its information, both Q137 Chairman: Have we got an eVective national internally within the industry and, crucially, to the strategy for dealing with severe weather? It does not passengers. There is an established group looking at look as if we have when we saw what happened. passenger information for disrupted days and Paul Clark: Looking at the strategic road network, looking at specific improvements that can be made all those remained open with the exception of the there. A lot of capacity was provided and the levels A38 but that involved an accident, and there was the of demand on the day were, as the Minister said, well-documented issue to do with the Severn Bridge unprecedented. EVorts are being targeted at the crossing but I think anyone seeing the exceptional resilience of the systems and also the flows and shards of ice that were falling would understand why inputs to identify future improvements. that had to be closed for the safety of the public. There are issues at local level in terms of how that Q134 Chairman: Does that mean if the situation was V repeated we would not have the same level of comes together because that a ects people who want disruption on rail? to get to work and so on, how we can improve the Mr Backler: I think it would depend on the scale and position there working with local authority partners in particular the peakiness of demand from the and, indeed, Network Rail and the train operators. public. At the moment the systems in place are the There are some serious questions there that are being same systems that were there in February. I know looked at in terms of what lessons have been learnt that National Rail Enquiries are planning to already. That process started on 26 February. I have introduce a new system that will become active on 1 already said that the lessons learnt from that review April, so from 1 April there will be an improvement that is currently going on will be put in place, and in the information to the public and the working there is a further meeting of the National Taskforce group has got an ongoing programme of later on today which will start some of that work improvements that it is looking at. stream to see what else needs to be put in place. In terms of the priorities and contingencies and priority Q135 Chairman: What about heavy equipment held routes that Network Rail has, much of that did by the Highways Agency? Is the equipment suitable operate with the exception of Kent and Surrey that or are you going to make any changes in that? had severe problems. It was as much down to the Mr Turner: Before I answer could I just add to the volume falling on that third rail that caused the position on the strategic road network in terms of biggest problems. However, if you are the travelling the provision of information? We have two channels public and cannot get to work I accept the to provide information to the motoring public. frustration and anger that you feel. In the context TraYc England is an internet service that we operate that this was the heaviest load in some 18 years I think that should be borne in mind as well. There are 1 Note by witness: The monitoring focused on the transport lessons to be learned from all parts of the transport rather than non-transport sectors. sector. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 19

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner

Q138 Chairman: Mr Backler, would you agree that Eastern, for example, in terms of running a train, it was the scale of the snowfall in Kent and Surrey because there were trains running from my own that caused the problems on the rail there? Is there station down the line to Ramsgate, for example, but anything you could learn from the situation to stop they were not running up to London. There would that recurring? be an issue about a train running from Gillingham Mr Backler: As the Minister said, they are looking and then getting stuck at Meopham in the heart of at the lessons to be learned, but it was the scale and the Kent countryside and having to require the speed against the forecasts that caused the emergency services to come out and battle through problems in Kent, Sussex and Surrey. and get to them. Those were judgments that had to be made. I do think we have to put this in perspective Q139 Chairman: Do you have any complaints about in terms of the severity that we had and the blanket the forecasts that were given? Were they accurate? covering and the degree that we experienced in that Were they given quickly enough? period starting on 1–2 February. Mr Backler: I understand there were some very localised developments in the weather that meant Q142 Graham Stringer: You have not really there were particularly concentrated forms of snow answered the question. Certainly judgments have to in particular areas and the problem with the rail be made, but do you not think these businesses are route is you only need one of these exceptional falls much more risk averse partly because of the threat of at a particular location and it just blocks the entire litigation? route. It was incidents like that that happened. On Paul Clark: There is an issue generally in society that South Western, as an example of what was possible we have become very much one that looks for the and what worked, their key route strategy was to route to claim far more easily today than we did in keep open the long distance routes to Southampton 1962 or 1947. I certainly believe that is the case. In eVectively and they ran a service to Southampton on terms of running a business and so on, it is rightly so the Monday at the expense of the shorter distance that they should run their businesses safely, in this routes and that strategy worked. case for the travelling public, and not take undue risks. I say to you I think there were a number of Q140 Chairman: Are there any lesson that other factors that came together in terms of the incidents companies could learn from them? that were faced here, not just one of them, being too Mr Backler: Yes, and they are. They are all re- risk averse. examining their key route strategies in light of what happened and learning lessons from that. Q143 Mr Martlew: Just to follow up on that, and it Nonetheless, as the Minister said, the particular is a comment on society probably, which I accept I conditions of the snowfall and the timing of the am a part of, is it not a fact that you think people in snowfall on that day were exceptional and this country today are not prepared to make the contributed to the localised disruption. eVorts that they would have done in the 1960s or whenever, and if there is an option to take the day oV Q141 Graham Stringer: This is a recast of one of the they will? early questions. This snowfall was not nearly as bad Paul Clark: No, I do not believe that to be the case as the winters of 1962–63, 1947–48, probably not as at all. I know many people, indeed even within the V bad as 1968–69, not that I remember all those. It was transport sector, who made sterling e orts to get to similar to 1991. Is it not the case, Minister, that work on that day to be able to run many of the because we live in a more litigious society we are services that were out there and running. There were seeing rail and bus companies being risk averse and very well publicised areas where they were not the travelling public is suVering because of that? running, which we have looked at, but many people Paul Clark: Can I just say in relation to the Met actually travelled to work and got to work to keep OYce, I mentioned earlier on that they provide a businesses and some of the transport sector running service in terms of the National Severe Weather on that day. I would not want to say that people take Warning Service and the Public Weather Service. that easy option because I do not believe that they The Met OYce were very clear in terms of the ﬁve do. day advance part of the programme in terms of their weather warning that there was an issue in terms of Q144 Chairman: You told us about the inquiry you being able to know there was going to be heavy snow are undertaking, but at the moment what would you and, whilst there was an indication there would be say is the biggest single lesson you have learnt from 5–10 cm, it actually ended up being 24 cm in south what has happened? London which had a critical eVect. Having said all Paul Clark: There was the issue about information of that, certainly 1991 was a cold one but in terms of being accurate that was going out and the real strains levels of snow and the blanket covering it was not as that put upon systems. I know within the railway great. If we go back to some of the dates of 1947 and system having the critical routes for such an event 1962, I do believe that there were probably steam means changing timetables for that given day and trains around at that time which does make for a that information then being fed through to a whole slight diVerence in terms of operation. I do not think range of diVerent services that are needed. There are it is necessarily wrong that we should put passenger issues about capacity to be able to do that in an safety as paramount. There were issues and eVective and eYcient way in a number of systems. judgments that had to be made, no doubt by South Indeed, undoubtedly the websites and so on we have Processed: 22-05-2009 18:34:32 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG1

Ev 20 Transport Committee: Evidence

11 March 2009 Paul Clark MP, Mr Gary Backler and Mr Derek Turner talked about before for general public use did get weeks and months and being able to draw some through a lot of information because you can see the conclusions with all the partners that are involved in volumes involved and keeping that up-to-date and attempting to make sure that our transport network processed was a major issue. I would say that is one continues day in and day out. of the early ones but this is about taking a proper Chairman: Thank you very much for answering our look at the lessons to be learned over the next few questions. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [SO] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 21

Thursday 2 April 2009

Members present Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair

Mr David Clelland Mark Pritchard Mr John Leech Sir Peter Soulsby Mr Eric Martlew Graham Stringer

Witnesses: Ms Valerie Shawcross, Chair, London Assembly Transport Committee and Mr Nigel Barrett, Chief Executive OYcer, East London Bus Group, gave evidence.

Chairman: Good morning. Welcome to our meeting lunch time of the Monday, to make a public this morning. Could I ask Members if they have any announcement that the congestion charge would be interests to declare, please? cancelled for the day. Again, these are political Graham Stringer: Member of Unite. matters, but I would have thought that in a situation Mr Martlew: Member of Unite and EMB. where drivers were being advised not to go into Sir Peter Soulsby: Member of Unite. Central London that was not a particularly sensible decision and it did prompt me personally to suggest Q145 Chairman: Louise Ellman, Member of Unite. that the Mayor ought to be making refunds to Could I ask you to identify yourselves, please, for people who hold one-week bus passes, for example, our records? for the cancellation of the transport system during Ms Shawcross: I am Valerie Shawcross, Assembly the day. member. I am Chair of the London Assembly Transport Committee. Q147 Chairman: Why do you think the weather had Mr Barrett: Good morning. I am Nigel Barrett. I am such a disruptive eVect on traYc in London, on the Chief Executive of the East London Bus Group. public transport in particular, in a way that just did not happen anywhere else in the country? Q146 Chairman: Ms Shawcross, in the report that Ms Shawcross: I am not entirely sure it did not your committee conducted into what happened in happen elsewhere in the country. This report was London in February, in your foreword you say, cross-party and it was completely accepted cross- “Most importantly, the Mayor, as Chair of party. The committee did accept the fact of the Transport for London, should ensure in future that salting/gritting regime being simply overwhelmed by he is kept appropriately informed and engaged the speed and weight of the snow and the fact that before and during the crisis.” What problems did London was universally covered, but the critical you identify in relation to the Mayor’s role in what comment the report makes is that had there been happened? better co-ordination, particularly between TfL and Ms Shawcross: Thank you, Chairman. Good the London boroughs, we might have recovered the morning. The session that we carried out and the situation earlier than was done. evidence we took was intended principally for us to take an initial look to see if we needed to do further Q148 Chairman: Heavy snow had been predicted, work, and during that session I did particularly ask had it not? Surely something else could have been Peter Hendy at the time what role the Mayor had done. played before, during and after what I will call “the Ms Shawcross: The boroughs we spoke to, and we crisis”, although that is perhaps rather overstating have evidence from them, were all gritting, and they the situation, before the cancellation essentially of all had their priorities and there was active work the buses and some of the transport in London. The going on. Indeed, there were many people working response was essentially that the Mayor had not extremely hard the day before. I think the evidence been advised of the state of London’s transport until we received suggested that you have to grit at the after 6.00 am. Personally, coming from a local right time, but in fact you can still become government background, as I am sure many of you overwhelmed by weight of snow falling on top. do, I found that strange, because our experience is There was probably a moment when everything that as a politician with overview political would have ground to a halt. However, we were not responsibility, you would normally expect such a satisﬁed that the recovery had been as quick as it politician, be it a leader or a mayor, not necessarily could have been. to be making the decisions but in amongst it to ensure that things were being carried out as they Q149 Graham Stringer: I think you are being very should have been and that anything that could be kind to the Mayor really. There was ﬁve days’ notice done to improve or retrieve the situation was being of this. The Mayor is responsible. He has overall done. I personally found it quite strange that the strategic responsibility for transport. It is by far his Mayor had not been proactive in seeking out biggest responsibility. In your inquiry, were you information about what the situation was. As far as aware that he contacted the boroughs or the bus I am aware, the Mayor’s only proactive intervention companies in order to decide how to respond to this in the whole situation was sometime around the predicted snowfall? Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

Ev 22 Transport Committee: Evidence

2 April 2009 Ms Valerie Shawcross and Mr Nigel Barrett

Ms Shawcross: We were aware that Peter Hendy on Ms Shawcross: I think they could have recovered behalf of TfL had written around the boroughs, I more quickly but it is true to say that there were think in the autumn period—and the key issue really roads that were salted and gritted which the snow fell was access to and from the bus garages—suggesting on top of again, and they needed re-salting and that they should be doing everything they could to gritting. There was also a bus garage at New Cross ensure access. I think it is true to say that the Mayor which we were concerned about, which serves the seems not to have been actively involved. I think A2. Because of a short slipway not being gritted, perhaps I am being kind, Mr Stringer, because in fact those buses did not run. We made the the committee did not call the Mayor himself to its recommendation that TfL should look to try and initial questions, so there certainly are some more keep some strategic routes open. Had they been able questions that could be put to the Mayor directly. to serve buses along the A2 and along the main road from Camberwell, they would have served two of the Q150 Graham Stringer: I am right, am I not, that he major hospitals in London. We were concerned Y has overall strategic transport responsibly and, as about sta ng and access to the major hospitals. far as you are aware, in the ﬁve days when there was notice of this unusually high snowfall he did not Q153 Chairman: Was there not any planning looking contact either the bus companies or the boroughs. at strategic routes? Ms Shawcross: As far as we are aware the Mayor was Ms Shawcross: TfL has its standard plan for not proactive in planning for this incident at all. He delivering gritting and salting on the main roads but is the Chair of Transport for London, so he has a lay they seem not to have prioritised the major bus role as the Chair of Transport for London. Of course routes. We challenged Peter Hendy about this during the committee was also quite critical and did not do our session and we were not particularly happy with very much about it on the rail side, and TfL is not this response. It seemed to be that he wanted to get responsible for the rail system in London. But I think everything back up and running because we felt it is fair to say that the Mayor seems to have been there could have been earlier recovery on strategic almost entirely absent from the incident. routes.

Q151 Graham Stringer: Was it right to cancel all the Q154 Mr Martlew: You say you did not interview buses? In your report, you refer to a number of the Mayor. accidents between, I think, 6.00 and just after Ms Shawcross: No, we did not. midnight on the Sunday. On the basis of that evidence—and I would be grateful if you could Q155 Mr Martlew: Why? substantiate that evidence—was it right to cancel Ms Shawcross: We did contact the Mayor’s OYce every single bus in Greater London? and the Mayor was not available. He was launching Ms Shawcross: Our committee, again, is receiving the East London Line that day. The Mayor’s evidence that you can look at directly. We felt that it practice is to come to the plenary session of the Y would be very di cult to criticise TfL and the bus London Assembly and to limit his attendance at companies who were talking to each other for committees. We expect him to attend for the making cancellations where there were safety issues strategic session on the transport strategy this year. involved. People have said to me that there was not any problem when the snow fell in 2003. I live in a hilly part of London—I live over near Crystal Q156 Mr Martlew: You have our sympathy because Y Palace—and I can tell you that there was a problem we have had great di culty getting the Mayor to in 2003. Buses were abandoned all over the hills come to us. surrounding London. The buses had slipped and Ms Shawcross: Yes. He does not do detail, I would some of them were out of control. Given it was think. Sunday night and there were some safety concerns Mr Martlew: We will find that out later. raised, and certainly there were some areas of Chairman: Could you say that a little louder. London that were literally impassable, it was probably a sensible decision. But we were not the Q157 Mr Martlew: Mr Barrett, obviously in a people on the frontline making that decision. Our previous life you ran the buses in Cumbria. concern was that we did not recover quickly enough Mr Barrett: I did, yes. the following day. Q158 Mr Martlew: I travelled down from Cumbria Q152 Graham Stringer: You did not really answer that day and you would have been pleased to see that the point whether it was right to cancel all buses. the buses in Carlisle were left in a good state because Clearly there would be specific occasions where it they were running. The amount of snow that was in might not have been so. For instance, the Carlisle was exactly the same as the amount of snow Camberwell Road and the Walworth bus depots are in London and yet there were no buses running in on roads which it is Transport for London’s London. We keep on hearing about the issue of the responsibility to keep clear. They are on the main gritters. My understanding is you use gritters if it is roads. I cannot find any evidence that your going to be icy. There is no mention anywhere in any committee found that those roads were salted and of these reports, and we heard from a senior engineer gritted. I cannot see why buses should not have run at the last session, about snow ploughs. That is from those depots. Can you? normally how you would clear a road, is it not? Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 23

2 April 2009 Ms Valerie Shawcross and Mr Nigel Barrett

Mr Barrett: That is certainly the case. It would be the particular supervisor reached that decision, I am diVerence that I would describe between the afraid you would have to ask somebody from activities of the local authorities in Cumbria, where London Buses. I operated bus services, and those down in London. You have to remember that the issue in London is that we do not get as much snow as they do in Q162 Mr Martlew: You do not know whether he Cumbria and perhaps they do not have as many took advice from anyone senior at TfL or even the snow ploughs—although I do not know the number Mayor? I suspect the Mayor was well asleep by that there are. On regular occasions when I was in this time. Cumbria they went out with the gritters with the Mr Barrett: I am not sure, but I can tell you what snow ploughs on the front all the time and always happened both in my companies and in most other cleared the road. I have to say that our biggest operators. I was aware of the worsening conditions problem we faced on Sunday evening and from around about eight o’clock onwards. I had throughout the morning of Monday was that, whilst several calls from my general managers around my the gritters had been out—and we had seen them out area to tell me that the conditions were getting all night and they were very regular and there were worse, and at 10 o’clock at night we withdrew our lots of them—the issue was that the snow was services from the Orpington area and around the compacting. The volume of the snow made it southern part of London. As it was progressing exceptionally diYcult to move around, not only the further and further to worsening conditions, we were access in and out of our depots but on anything that already withdrawing services from sections of the was not a major trunk route. When you talked to the route long before the decision was made at local authorities, as we did during the course of CentreComm at 10 past midnight. Monday and said, “Please can you send people Mr Martlew: Thank you very much. down to clear the front of our depots?” they said, “We are concentrating on the trunk roads and we Q163 Sir Peter Soulsby: Could I follow up on the will get to you as a secondary issue when and if we questions about clearing the routes out of the depots can.” That was the biggest problem that we had on and ask you to give us a feel for just how big a job Monday. that is. Would it require a very signiﬁcant diversion of resources in future to make sure that is given the Q159 Mr Martlew: Can I come back to the issue of priority it would need? the gritters without snow ploughs. You are really Mr Barrett: I will answer that in respect of my own saying that in other parts of the country, perhaps company, but I expect it is similar for most where there is more snow, they have the foresight to companies. I have 10 diVerent locations, ﬁve of put snow ploughs on the front of the gritters. Do you which are immediately close to main roads and some think that would have made a diVerence here in that are further away. To give you an example: our London if the snow ploughs had been there as well? depot at Upton Park is near West Ham Football Mr Barrett: If some of the roads had been cleared, Ground but it is accessed by two residential roads, we may have had a better opportunity to get out one in and one out. They are very narrow and only sooner. When we did examine the routes that we have room for one bus and the cars that park along tried to run on—and my staV were out from four there. Neither of those roads were gritted at all until o’clock in the morning examining bus routes all late on Monday and we did not get any buses out of around the garages—the problem was the that garage until late in the afternoon on Monday. compacted snow. You just could not get a bus Our depot at Leyton, which is on the main road, had further than 100 yards down the road without it direct access to a road that had been gritted. All of going sideways. our buses are under cover and we were able to start running services from there at around about 11 Q160 Mr Martlew: On the night when the issue was o’clock in the morning. ordered from control to withdraw the buses, that control is operated by TfL, is it? Q164 Sir Peter Soulsby: In order to get the exits from Mr Barrett: It is operated by London Buses, which the depots cleared would require some diversion of obviously are part of TfL, and it is called resources, but in general would not be a major drain CentreComm. Every emergency radio call from any on gritting and clearing main roads. bus, no matter who the operator is, goes direct to Mr Barrett: That is my view. My depot that is CentreComm in an emergency.At the depots we also furthest from the main road is about three-quarters have contact with that same radio system to each of a mile from the A13, at West Ham, on an and every bus that we operate. industrial estate, with an incline at the last part before it reaches the A13. We did not get anything Q161 Mr Martlew: So there will be an individual out of that depot until six o’clock at night. controller who would have taken that decision to Sir Peter Soulsby: Thank you. That is very helpful. call all the buses in? Mr Barrett: There is a controller at CentreComm. I think there is more than one. They will relay Q165 Mr Leech: Given a decision was made that no information backwards and forwards to the buses should be running, what could be the possible operators, and the operators in turn will give them logic of encouraging people to drive in by cancelling information back. On that particular night, how that the congestion charge? 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Ev 24 Transport Committee: Evidence

2 April 2009 Ms Valerie Shawcross and Mr Nigel Barrett

Ms Shawcross: In my view there was no logic at all Ms Shawcross: Yes, there is a person who is the lead in that. I could not see why that decision was taken. chief oYcer. There is a duty rota, and on this When I asked Peter Hendy why that decision was occasion it was Chris DuYeld, who is the Chief taken, he did make it clear that it was the Mayor’s Executive of the City Corporation. I was dissatisfied policy initiative. That was his decision. I personally with some of the answers to the questions we put to do not think it was a sensible decision. I do not think him because there is not a clear system for triggering it was an equitable one either, because there were that co-ordination arrangement to come into force people who had paid for weekly or monthly bus unless there is a major incident declared. Some passes who did not get a discount for the day. We rather cosy chats were had but really they needed to thought that was a strange thing to do. Perhaps I have a decisive decision earlier on to get their co- could add something about this issue of which routes ordination arrangements up and running. They are might have run. The only advantage I could see to serviced and supported by the London Fire Brigade, the entire cancellation of the system—the only so there is a 24-hour system that is in place. That was advantage and it is a weak one—was that at least the not done. media knew what information to put out. Everybody at least knew that there was not a bus. Q169 Chairman: Did the Mayor take any interest in Had there been some partial running of services, we this particular area? would have needed much better information Ms Shawcross: As far as I could see, absolutely not. capacity available. We were very concerned as As the Deputy Chairman of the London Resilience, Assembly members that many of us received the Mayor would have been well placed to say, information that members of the public had tried to “What about getting some of our resilience co- contact TfL by phone or email or to look at the ordination arrangements up and running?” It website and it was rather overloaded and it was slow certainly would have been worthwhile practice and and there was not much information. Had there been would have helped. some earlier restoration, it would have needed a parallel amount of information to make that clear to people what they could and could not get. Q170 Mr Leech: Are you confident that if this happens again the co-ordination will be in place and the response will be quicker and the leadership will Q166 Mr Leech: Do you think lessons have been be better, or have we not really looked at that? learned? Have plans been put in place to make sure Ms Shawcross: Not at this stage, but when we get the that in the case of another very bad set of weather reports back from TfL, and London Resilience have conditions this would not happen again? also agreed to review their arrangements, we will be Ms Shawcross: I think we detect embarrassment in a better position to judge. amongst our colleagues in TfL. You can judge that Mr Barrett: I am not sure of what type of committee for yourself. Our committee asked the Transport for it was but there was clearly a co-ordinating arm that London Board to do its own review and come back came into operation during the latter half of to us as a London committee so we can see what they Monday. You have to remember that, whilst the have decided, but I think there has been some snow was not as bad on the Tuesday, we still had recognition that co-ordination could have been some snow and we still had bus stations and bus better. The local authority has admitted to us that stops that had fair layers of snow into them, and I they had been tardy, not in doing their on the ground have to say that the plan worked exceptionally well work in their own areas but in terms of getting their on Monday night as far as we are concerned. We own co-ordination arrangements up and running. have a similar gold, silver, bronze command Because this was something less than a major structure that we have, that we use for all types of incident, they had not triggered the Gold Command incidents. Our incident room at our head oYce was arrangements, so the opportunity for better co- in full operation yesterday to deal with diversions ordination, sharing the salt around, cross-checking that were going on around London, but on that what needed to be done where was not set up and particular Monday night, my general manager, who running until five o’clock on the Monday. was on duty throughout the night, was feeding information into CentreComm, who were then feeding it into this body, and we then had examples Q167 Chairman: Was anybody in charge of co- of local boroughs deviating from their normal line of ordination? gritting to come into the areas that we had identified Ms Shawcross: Exactly, that is the point. There is a outside of our garages at the end of routes. It was London Resilience System, whereby if there is a exceptionally successful and that helped us to return major incident declared then the local authorities services to normality on Tuesday. have their own Gold Commander. This fell short of Ms Shawcross: It could have worked sooner. a major incident but, nonetheless, we felt that you Mr Barrett: It could have. could have easily used those co-ordination Ms Shawcross: That is the point we are making. arrangements—it would have been good practice— a day earlier to try to ease things through. Q171 Mr Leech: Do you think the necessary resources are available to deal with this kind of Q168 Chairman: Was anybody specifically in charge incident? Or is it the case that because London is not of co-ordinating activities? expected to get this sort of adverse weather Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Ms Valerie Shawcross and Mr Nigel Barrett condition, apart from in very extreme circumstances, Mr Barrett: We took the decision that we needed to the resources that are required are not really being inspect all of the routes that we were going to put invested in adverse weather equipment. services onto. Whilst the immediate outside of our Ms Shawcross: I think there were choices to be made. depot may have been gritted and suitable for I think London did not do as well as it could have travelling on, our buses by their very nature do not done, given the resources it already has. TfL does stick to main trunk routes, they deviate into housing have 35 snow ploughs and all of the boroughs were estates, they go in bus only lanes, they go to bus actively gritting. I do not think we did as well as we stations. I think I mentioned earlier on that most of could have done, given what we have. I do not think my managers certainly left for work in the very early across the public sector there would be much will to hours of Monday morning. They were all on duty invest in much more heavy equipment than we have. and in place by five o’clock and from that time One of the boroughs, I think Hounslow, have said to onwards they were out looking at the routes and us, “Had we had our own snow plough it would have examining them until they could send vehicles out in been sitting there since 1991 with nothing doing to a safe manner. We had one or two false starts. We it,” so there are some choices and I do not think there sent some buses out from our Leyton garage, got will be the will to invest in much more heavy about three miles up the road, just before Clapton, equipment. We questioned TfL about the use of and met an incline that they could not get up. The snow chains, for example, and for a short-term diversion to get around that would have been to snowfall like this, one or two days, they would have come all the way back to the garage and go on a three just about got the chains on the buses before the or four mile diversion to get around that point. snow melted, so they did not feel that there was However, when we sent them out just after one much more we could have done, but we certainly felt o’clock at that particular garage, that particular that as a committee we could have done better with section of road had then had suYcient traYc what we already have. through it, was clear, and they were able to get through. We were constantly looking at the route Q172 Mr Clelland: Just listening to the responses, and constantly looking at where the buses could go. are you satisfied that there is enough clarity between We adjusted schedules, we curtailed bus routes back, the various parties, the London boroughs, the we did not run some that went wholly through London Assembly, the Mayor, TfL, as to who is residential areas. That is what took the time, responsibility for what in these circumstances? satisfying ourselves that it was safe to operate the Ms Shawcross: When people are doing what they are services. supposed to do, yes. I think there was a failure at the interface. I think TfL and the boroughs were not co- Q176 Graham Stringer: I understand that you had to ordinating soon enough, because there will always take precautions about not getting buses stuck. be some small, on the ground issues that need Having reviewed the matter, could you have done resolving. better? Could you have started some buses earlier on some routes? Mr Barrett: We were expecting heavy snow. We were Q173 Mr Clelland: I know we are talking about not expecting it as heavy as it was. We have already public transport here but was there any evidence, for said that we felt we could perhaps have got our instance, that emergency vehicles were disrupted control staV and our senior managers in earlier, or because of the snowfall? Were they able to get to perhaps on Sunday night rather than Monday emergencies? morning. I do not think it would have made a lot of Ms Shawcross: We had some information from the diVerence, because the snow was that bad at four London Ambulance Service. They found it quite o’clock in the morning that we could not get out of diYcult. They said they were having to park on main the garages. It was still snowing at eight o’clock and roads and then carry patients to and from. But of it did not really ease up at all until about 11 o’clock course I think all the emergency services had some in the eastern half of London, and then it started diYculty with staYng, and individual workers went snowing again at two o’clock in the afternoon. But to extraordinary lengths to get into work. I have that is why we constantly had to review it, and it was heard some extraordinary stories about people more to do with the conditions and the level of snow walking miles and miles and miles through the snow. rather than the people we had on the ground. We That, for us, was why the collapse of the transport certainly had suYcient staV at work. system was so significant. It did not matter for many people that they worked at home or they took their kids out, but there was a core of essential need in Q177 Graham Stringer: Can I go on to the question London that was ill-served that day, and that was Mr Clelland asked about the emergency services and our principle concern. essential services for that matter. Do you have any hard figures on how many people did not get into work, either by sector or generally? Did anybody Q174 Graham Stringer: Mr Barrett, you said your die, for instance, because they could not get to buses started running at 11.00 am. hospital or because emergency services could not Mr Barrett: That is correct. reach them? Ms Shawcross: No. Within the scope of the report we Q175 Graham Stringer: Why 11.00 am, why not two do not have that information, but, as I say, we did hours before? Why not five hours before? have contact with NHS and they did make Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Ms Valerie Shawcross and Mr Nigel Barrett comments—the evidence is published—that it was Mr Barrett: Yes, I took personal control at four diYcult. They had to cancel a lot of pre-planned o’clock on Monday morning. procedures but they did run an essential emergency service and they did run essential accident and Q183 Mr Martlew: So you were not asleep in bed emergency units. We certainly have no suggestion when all this was going on. that anybody has died because of this, but it was an Y Mr Barrett: I was between midnight and four extremely di cult situation. o’clock, but I was on the road at just after five o’clock. Q178 Graham Stringer: You mentioned that the congestion charge was cancelled, which was a benefit Q184 Mr Clelland: I have no doubt that lessons have to motorists who seemed to drive around the centre been learned from this and new and diVerent Y of London without any di culty. The Evening procedures might be put in place if it happened Standard carried an article on 9 February that ticket again, but what research has been done into the Y V V o ce sta and platform sta had a day’s pay likelihood of it happening again? Is this something stopped. Is that accurate? we should put down as being a one-oV, or is this Ms Shawcross: If that decision was rescinded, that is something we should put down to climate change something you will have to ask Peter Hendy about. that might become a regular occurrence? What sort I think that is a situation that was resolved. of forward research is being done in that particular Chairman: I recollect that that was rescinded. regard? Ms Shawcross: As far as I am aware, these are Q179 Mr Martlew: Coming back to whether this was incidents that happen about once every 20 years on a major incident or not, millions of people in average in London. They are less likely, I gather, London could not get to work and there is a cost because of climate change, but we did not take any probably of £1 million. It damaged the City’s specific advice from the Committee’s point of view. reputation, and it damaged the UK’s reputation Maybe it is the case in hindsight that most of the because the capital of it was paralysed. Why was it people in senior management in the transport system not a major incident? Why did the system not kick in in London were not in those positions 20 years ago, with gold command? the last time there was this kind of snowfall, so they Ms Shawcross: That is a good question. The London were not mentally prepared for what it would be like. Resilience Committee is supposed to cover not just issues of terrorism but natural incidents, floods, that Q185 Mr Clelland: Future planning will not be based kind of thing. I do not know why they did not declare on any necessary major changes because you do not this a major incident. However, whether you define expect that to happen any more regularly than it has it as a major incident or not, some of the mechanisms in the past, therefore the need for diVerent kinds of they operate could have been useful to us on this equipment and that sort of thing will be based on occasion, and I do not see why the organisations that that sort of judgment. have those procedures could not have deployed Ms Shawcross: The London Assembly Transport them. It would have been good. Committee has asked TfL to look in detail at what they could have done better and we expect them to Q180 Mr Martlew: Whose responsibility would it do that. We will get a report back from them, and if have been to say it is a major incident or it is not a we are not satisfied, we will see them again. We major incident? expect them to do some work on how they will Ms Shawcross: The London Resilience Committee handle it better next time. We certainly do. has the principal responsibility. It is chaired by the Mr Barrett: We have this major incident procedure Minister for London and is deputy chaired by the within our company. It does not just deal with Mayor, but by and large the Metropolitan Police are adverse weather, but everything from riots, to the lead agency for any major incidents in London, demonstrations, to pandemic flu. We test it regularly, so I am not exactly sure why that decision was taken. and we tested it for real on that particular day. We I suspect they just did not think about it, and I think have learned lessons from it and we have added there is probably an issue there about who decides sections to our own plans. I am sure that most of the and how is it triggered. Usually it is experience on the bus operators in London have done the same. It is a ground, the bus companies for example, where the living document that we keep up to date with the information comes from first. changes, to everything and not just the weather.

Q186 Mr Clelland: Although there might be Q181 Chairman: Has that issue been pursued? V Ms Shawcross: We have asked the London di erences in co-ordination and in organisation, in Resilience Committee to review this incident in terms of equipment you do not feel there is relation to their normal procedures. necessarily the need for investing in new equipment because it is not likely to happen very often anyway. Ms Shawcross: We would expect more preparation Q182 Mr Martlew: Mr Barrett, you are saying that next time, because, to some extent, the co-ordination your bus company classed it as a major incident and of the event is extremely important but it is you have a gold command structure and you used completely lost if you have not done any advance that. preparation planning. We would expect TfL and the Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Ms Valerie Shawcross and Mr Nigel Barrett boroughs working jointly to tighten their act in recovery on the underground. I think the dramatic terms of preparation next time there is a weather part of the event was really the complete 100% warning. cancellation of the bus system. V Q187 Graham Stringer: One of the things that it is Q189 Chairman: How e ective was the co- diYcult to understand is why Docklands Light ordination between local authorities? Railway could run and most of the tube could run, Ms Shawcross: That is the issue we were mentioning but part of the tube system or the road system did to you. The London Resilience Committee, the gold not run. Have you come to a conclusion as to why commander of the local authority, that structure is for basically similar public transport arrangements responsible for co-ordination amongst the councils as well as between the councils and the other that some worked and some did not? responsible authorities. Something like sharing Ms Shawcross: There were technical reasons, I resources around, sharing the grit round—and I believe. DLR did perform exceedingly well. Gold know there were some boroughs that got low faster stars to DLR. About 80% of the underground than others—is the kind of thing which that system was operating on a lesser service, on, I think, structure could well have done. As it happens, I about 50% of the service, and that was about think there were quite a lot of bilateral technical matters. arrangements, meaning that the head of Highways in one borough rang up his mate, the head of Q188 Graham Stringer: What does that mean? Highways in another borough, and they shared their Ms Shawcross: I believe it was about issues of the resources, but there could have been a more co- electricity supply and coverage of the track. For the ordinated arrangement earlier. rail system we understood that there were some Chairman: Thank you very much for coming and issues about the diVerent types of electriﬁcation answering our questions. It is very helpful to us in north and south of London, so there were some understanding what happened, what went wrong, technical issues there. But there was quite a fast and how things could be made better.

Witnesses: Mr Boris Johnson, Mayor of London and Mr Peter Hendy, Transport Commissioner, Transport for London, gave evidence.

Q190 Chairman: Good morning. Thank you for Mr Johnson: Thank you very much, Chairman, for coming to our select committee today. Could I ask inviting me to your Committee. I am going to ask you both to identify yourselves for our records, Peter Hendy, the Commissioner, to elucidate any please. points of detail that I am unable to help you with Mr Johnson: I am Boris Johnson, and I am the myself. I have to say that I think your Mayor of London. characterisation of events is quite wrong. It smacks Mr Hendy: Peter Hendy and I am the Commissioner to me of a certain amount of unnecessary party of Transport. political bias and I have to say that in all candour I do think that to say that London was exceptionally poorly performing by comparison with other cities Q191 Chairman: Thank you very much. We have in the United Kingdom is simply not true. If you Y asked you to come to our committee today because look at the di culties that other bus operators got we are extremely concerned about what happened into in other cities in the country,you will see that the on 2 February, when our capital city was virtually problems in general created by the snow were very shut down in a way that did not happen in any other considerable and were universal. You asked the sort city in the country. Business was very badly aVected, of scatter-shot opening question about my responsibilities as Mayor. I did not really detect and estimates of up to £1 billion lost have been put much sort of grit or point in your question but I will forward. The Health Service was aVected: thousands try to give you an account of what happened which of urgent appointments had to be cancelled. After may be of use to you. looking at the report that has been put together by the Greater London Authority and the report Slipping Up? and speaking to the chair of that Q192 Chairman: Mayor, let me stop you for a committee, it appears that you did not act in moment and let us have a little clarity here. The accordance with your responsibilities, not just as report to which I refer Slipping Up?— Mayor of London but as Chair of Transport for Mr Johnson: There is a question mark, by the way. London. What can you tell us about that? It appears that you did not look at a possible problem coming, Q193 Chairman: —is in fact a cross-party report and that you were not involved in what was happening, this is a cross-party committee. There is no issue of that you did not recognise that this was an being partisan. The issue is about what happened in emergency, and it has been said to us earlier this London, why it happened in that way, whether it morning that you “do not do detail”. What can you could it have been done better and what could tell us about your role and what, on reﬂection, could happen for the future. According to the report there you have done better? are major questions over your involvement. It is Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy suggested here that you were not involved in trying skiddier and more dangerous and more diYcult for to anticipate what should be done about a problem buses to get out on the streets. Even if it had been my that had been anticipated by the weather forecasters, job or my responsibility to countermand the decision and that you did not become involved in the of CentreComm to send those buses home, there implementation of actions to try to deal with the having been, as I say, 30 accidents involving buses situation until well into Monday when the problem and many more calls to the emergency centre—I was already there. I would like you to focus on that. think 142 calls and 150 extra calls which could not Mr Johnson: Let me have another go at answering be answered—I do not think I would have taken your non-question. First of all, may I point out that that decision. the report to which you refer, Slipping Up? has a question mark at the end of it and I would say that Q195 Chairman: Had any strategic routes been the answer is no. The people responsible for identified, routes that would enable public transport Transport for London, the people who are to continue for preparatory work to try to keep responsible for getting the buses out, getting the tube them open? working, or getting the Docklands Light Railway Mr Johnson: I will ask Peter to answer that question. going did an outstanding job. There are a great many Mr Hendy: The way that this works is that every myths that need to be laid to rest, Chairman, and one autumn I send a letter to every local authority in of them is that people did not turn up and the bus London asking them in the case of snow and ice and drivers did not show up for work. I think that is a bad weather to be mindful of the need to run a bus calumny upon the bus drivers concerned. The service and public services. It is a standard letter. It overwhelming majority of them did show up for is usually acknowledged by the boroughs and I know work, and I think what most people would concede that they take it into account in their gritting plans. is that the circumstances made it extremely diYcult Normally,with lesser snowfalls, both we who run 5% for them to get their buses out of the garages and out of the local network and the 33 local authorities who of the depots on to the roads of London. With the run the other 95% have adequate treatment best will in the world, you can try to impute to me all machinery to keep everything clear, residential sorts of powers and all sorts of failures but it is not roads, minor roads and the major roads. We do ask within my competence, much though I appreciate them to bear in mind bus routes. We do not ask the regard in which you hold the oYce of Mayor of people to keep particularly strategic routes clear, as London, to stop the biggest discharge of snow that it were, because as I think Nigel Barrett was saying we have had in the skies of this city for 20 years. The to you only a few minutes ago, you might imagine consequences of that were very, very severe for bus that the number 36 uses the Camberwell New Road drivers and I do not for one minute resile from or and it is a strategic road, and, indeed, it does, but it condemn the decision of the controller at also has to turn around in the back streets of Queen’s CentreComm, who at roughly 12 minutes past Park. If we curtailed it at Marble Arch, it would have midnight on Monday morning, or 13 minutes past to use the back streets around Marble Arch. At midnight if you prefer, took a decision to tell all the Peckham and New Cross it goes around the back night buses once they had finished their rounds to streets. To run a bus service you have to have the make their way home where they possibly could. whole route from one end to the other or the piece There were no fewer than 30 accidents in the run-up you have decided to run suYciently clear to operate to that decision, and I would ask you to consider and it safely. This was an unusual event. This was a I would ask your colleagues to consider how many heavier snowfall than we have seen for 20 years and accidents you would have liked to have seen before the consequence was that both our equipment and that decision was taken. If you say that there was not the local authorities equipment was all fully utilised enough grit put on the roads or there was not but could not put enough salt or grit down in the suYcient preparation—and that seemed to be the hours of darkness, and when it started snowing on gist of what you were trying to say, in, I thought, a Sunday evening, to allow anything to run in the notably partisan way—and we really ought to be morning. zeroing in on that— Mr Martlew: On a point of order, is the Mayor here Q196 Graham Stringer: The Meteorological OYce to answer questions? He knows the system as well as gave us five days’ notice of this snow. Can you tell us, we do. with your responsibilities for overall transport strategy in London, with that warning of five days, Q194 Chairman: Mr Martlew, we will ensure the what action you took? Mayor does answer the questions. Mr Johnson: As I have said, there was a very Mr Johnson: The Mayor is very, very happy to considerable programme of gritting which I guess answer your questions. I am in the process of began not on Sunday afternoon and not in the small answering the question. In so far as I could detect a hours of Monday morning but, as far as I know, in sort of grit of question in the Chairman’s opening the early hours of Sunday, before any snowflake had salvo, this is the answer: Huge eVorts and huge fallen on London. There was a very considerable preparations were made to grit the roads. What programme of gritting that went on. happened was that there was a very, very substantial volume of snow that fell on the streets of London. Q197 Graham Stringer: You are telling me what You then had a situation in which layers of snow gritting went on, but that was not the question I were compacted with layers of grit. It made it even asked. 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2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy took, with your overall responsibility for transport Q203 Mr Martlew: Answer the question. in Greater London, over the five days when we knew, Mr Johnson: The answer is that I did repose the whole country knew, there was going to be a complete confidence in my oYcials and in Transport heavy downfall of snow which was likely to cause for London to get the job done, and to the best of disruption. I would like to know what actions you their ability they did. I really think that in your took. attempts to criticise what happened you are in Mr Johnson: As Chair of Transport for London, I danger of criticising hundreds and hundreds of am happy to say that I had general oversight and I hardworking people. presided over, with my Commissioner for Transport, a massive programme of gritting. If you ask me whether I personally went around trying to repeal Q204 Graham Stringer: I am simply asking what each snowflake as it tried to settle over London, then you did. obviously I would have to give you a negative Mr Johnson: Let me, for the avoidance of doubt, say answer. You do ascribe phenomenal powers to me— this: even if some committee had been convened to quite rightly, I think, as I think it is high time that we consider what extra gritting might have been laid on thought about a revision of the powers—to have or whatever—I do not know quite what you have in authority over basic meteorology, but it is not within mind—it would not have made the slightest V my competence to get up into a helicopter and di erence. A huge programme of gritting was encourage the snow to stay away. What I think you conducted, a great deal of work was done, and I am need to focus on, if I may be so bold, Chairman— afraid there was too much snow for the gritting operation that was mounted. Q198 Chairman: Mayor, I think you know what we Mr Hendy: I am responsible for the operation of the are asking. transport network control led by Transport for Mr Johnson: —is whether or not the Committee London, and I do not think I or any of my thinks— predecessors in whatever form London Transport has ever taken, have routinely rung up the people to whom we are responsible and told them, “Look, Q199 Chairman: We are not asking for superhuman we’ve done everything we could.” What I do is to powers, we are asking what you did. notify the Mayor and other people when we are Mr Johnson: What I did was to repose complete Y unable to do what we are doing. To do otherwise, confidence in my o cials and in Transport for would produce a barrage of messages of every London, who did an extremely fine job. I do not conceivable sort in circumstances where, when I think it behoves you or your Committee to cast went to bed on Sunday evening, having checked aspersions on the preparations made by the myself quite carefully that gritting was taking place, boroughs or by a lot of hardworking people across that the boroughs were doing what we expected the London. boroughs to do, in the anticipation not that it might be all right but that everything we had done could Q200 Graham Stringer: I do not want to put words have been done at that point. I would be negligent if in your mouth—there have been a lot of those I had not done that. If the Mayor had asked me, that already—but can you tell us if you took any action is what I would have told him. We could not have between getting the notice of this snow and the snow done anything about it. When you get to real time, starting to fall late on Sunday? I do not want absurd the people who take some of these decisions in real answers about trying to repeal snowflakes. Did you time are the right people to take them. I was call people together? There has been some criticism responsible for the bus service on 7 July 2005 and the from the people who have already looked at this people who withdrew from Central London from the GLA— whatever subsequent mythology says, the network Mr Johnson: I do not think there have been. duty manager at CentreComm withdrew the bus Chairman: Would you let Mr Stringer put his service from Central London at about 10.30 on 7 question. July because it was the right thing to do. He told me but he did not ask me. That is absolutely correct, just Q201 Graham Stringer: —that there was poor co- as it was at 10 past midnight on Monday morning 2 ordination between boroughs. February. It is worth me telling you that there is Mr Johnson: Nonsense. another myth here which deserves to be taken apart, which is that we did not stop the day bus service. Q202 Graham Stringer: I would be grateful if you When it came to the morning, CentreComm sent a could tell us whether you made any attempts to message at 04:56—I get all these—and it said, “All engage emergency powers, to co-ordinate the action operators who are able to run a service safely in their of boroughs, to talk to the bus companies with your local areas, please contact CentreComm with the strategic role as the leader of transport in Greater routes and details.” There is a word that is not spelt London to ensure that we had the best possible right there, but at 04:56 in the morning, I am not outcome from this event? bothered. That message, to people like Nigel Barrett Mr Johnson: I know what you are trying to do and I and his bus garages, was the right message. It did not understand why you are trying to do it, and I respect say, “Do not run the bus service”. It said, “If you can the narrow partisan, political reasons why you are run the bus service safely tell us what you can do”, trying to do it. and they could not, and I would not have Chairman: Would you answer the question. countermanded that instruction either because I am Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy not in a position to do so. When it became apparent Q207 Chairman: Yes, Mayor, I do appreciate that, that we could not run anything, and also in the but could you answer the question? knowledge that the Underground was running Mr Johnson: With the greatest possible respect to substantially, it ran 80%, and the Docklands Light your august Committee, Mrs Ellman, I am dealing Railway was running, I sent the Mayor a text just with a London Assembly that is very jealous of its after six o’clock in the morning, and then, when I prerogatives, a fledgling body that wants to had put some clothes on, I rang him up, and I think safeguard its right to be the primary crucible in those were all the right things to do. I do not choose which the Mayor can be tested, and in my view quite to disturb any more people during the night than I rightly. I do want to answer your question, Mr have to, particularly when they are not able to do Clelland—I cannot remember what it was now— anything about what I am telling them. I told the about whether I had— Mayor, not in order to invite him to countermand the decisions that had been made, because he could Q208 Mr Clelland: Any lessons to learn. have told me anything he wanted but he would not Mr Johnson: —anything to learn. have been able to countermand them, because they were not mine; they were the decisions of people who Q209 Mr Clelland: What are they then? work for Nigel Barrett; they were down to licensed Mr Johnson: The very important lesson to learn is bus drivers who have a duty in their licences to look that when you have a severe meteorological event on after public safety, and they decided it was not safe a scale where you have disruption of this kind you to run and I would not countermand that. have always got to remember that the public will be getting information about what has happened of a Q205 Mr Clelland: It was not a question about kind that can be distorting and misleading, and it is whether it was safe to run; it was about why it was very important that you get the message out quickly not safe to run that we are trying to get to the bottom because a lie can go halfway round the world before of and why more was not done to ensure that it was the truth has got its boots on. The reality is, as I think safe to run. We understand the exceptional you were alluding to yourself, that there were very circumstances of the weather at the time but what we considerable safety risks involved in getting those are trying to do is establish whether things could buses on the road. It took a great deal of time to have been done better. extract the fundamental point, which was that there Mr Johnson: You are just trying to put the blame on had been 30 accidents in the run-up to that very a Tory Mayor; that is what you are trying to do. It is proper decision by the Controller of CentreComm, pathetic, is it not? and if I have a regret it is that it took, I think, at least 24 hours and a lot of harrumphing from distinguished people perhaps—I do not know; I Q206 Mr Clelland: Select committees bring all sorts cannot remember what you said, but there was a lot of people in front of them, from the Prime Minister of harrumphing about London coming to a down to secretaries of state and the Governor of the standstill before people realised quite what the safety Bank of England. The Mayor seems particularly issues were. That data about the danger posed by irritated that he has had to come along here today. I allowing 12-tonne buses onto the streets and that think he ought to have acted in a more responsible information about why it was necessary to make the way in the oYce that he holds. This Committee is decision, as the Controller of CentreComm did, trying to get to the bottom of what costs London a could have been got out more rapidly. lot of money and could have cost lives; there is no doubt about that at all, and therefore we have to try Q210 Mr Clelland: That is what other people were and ensure that we can find some way to correct doing. I was asking about your role, whether you feel things that might have gone wrong. Is the Mayor in your role you did everything necessary in facing telling us that everything he did was perfectly this particular emergency and would you do correct, that he has no lessons to learn and that if this anything diVerent next time? happens again he will act in exactly the same way as Mr Johnson: As I have tried to say to you, I think, he has this time? Is that what he is telling us? in the urgency of the day and during the diYculties Mr Hendy: It is an operational question. transport was encountering on Monday morning, in Mr Johnson: I am delighted to appear before this hindsight it would have been a good thing if I had Committee but I should just say to this Committee, had at my fingertips the kind of information about that you have distinguished colleagues in the the reasons why the CentreComm Controller took London Assembly who greatly resent it when I the decision he did. I think that would have been appear before you because they feel it is their job to helpful. I think what it would have done, to be scrutinise what I do. I am delighted by the totally clear, is that it would have stopped a story fascination these Manchester MPs are all showing in getting legs, because the story immediately became, what happened in London, and quite right too, but “London’s buses have been paralysed for no reason I put it to you, Mrs Ellman, that there are people in at all”, and that other cities around the world had City Hall who feel it is their job to scrutinise what I been able to cope, “Look at New York”, and look at do, and I think it was the learned and distinguished everything else. Parenthetically I should say that Assembly member Mr John Biggs who criticised me that is not true. If you look at other cities around the the day after for going to talk to the Home AVairs world, when they do have exceptional snowfalls of Select Committee. this kind they are equally paralysed. The lesson I Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy take away from it is the vital importance of very bus stops that you want to keep clear, and so in communicating fast with the public what has really consequence, although all our gritters have snow happened, because it was certainly open to people, ploughs, it is quite hard to use them. If you use them, who may have been mischievous or who may not depending on your part of London and how well you have been mischievous, to portray the paralysis of know it, places like the Western Avenue and the the buses as something that could have been solved Great West Road, that is absolutely ﬁne; nobody with a click of the ﬁngers. That simply was not the lives next to them. If you wanted to use them on case. Camberwell New Road you would get damage claims from about 400 people in half a mile because Q211 Mark Pritchard: Welcome, Mr Mayor. A you cannot just throw this stuV anywhere. It is really previous witness some weeks ago on this inquiry said not the answer. Many of the boroughs do not have a that the decision to remove the buses was an snow plough at all and I think I would support that operational, not a political, decision. Do you agree in the use of public expenditure. Frankly, if I got with that? more money to run the bus service generally or Mr Johnson: Yes, of course, Mr Pritchard. There maintain the strategic road network, I would spend were no politics involved in any of the decisions. it on lots of other things before I did that.

Q212 Mark Pritchard: Can I just also, for the record, Q215 Mark Pritchard: But are you saying that say I was not aware of the introductory remarks the central government should play its part in providing Chairman was going to make and, whilst we clearly the necessary capital resource, and indeed revenue, need to ensure that lessons are learned from the snow for snow ploughs for the boroughs or that boroughs event in London, I do not stand by the Chairman’s themselves should, within existing budgets, take that remarks with regard to your role or your lack of role decision? in the snow event. Mr Johnson: Mr Pritchard, I have to say that the Mr Johnson: I am obliged, Mr Pritchard. utility of getting central government to pay for snow Mark Pritchard: And I am not sure about the other ploughs, in spite of what we saw in February, is Conservative members that are not here today. pretty marginal. I really agree with Peter. I think if Mr Martlew: Both not here. you are going to spend that order of money you would be much better spending it on upgrading the Q213 Mark Pritchard: Yes, exactly, therefore they Tube and improving the bus service. cannot be spoken for in their absence. Mr Johnson: It is an event that took place some time Q216 Mark Pritchard: One of our previous witnesses ago; I would point that out. said that the rail network was pretty much unaVected, apart from the south east with a lot of the Q214 Mark Pritchard: Can I ask you, Mayor, what rail lines closed down. I just wondered whether that extra support you think central government could had had an impact on some of the employees give to your oYce for a future snow event, if it arriving at work, or indeed being able to go home to happens again, and what help they could have given their families, in a safe and timely manner. for the last snow event? Mr Hendy: I am not sure that that is right. The Mr Johnson: It is a fascinating question. Obviously, Underground ran at about 80%. There were three if there were inﬁnite funds for Transport for London parts of the Underground that did not run—the west then I suppose, and Peter might want to amplify this, end of the District Line, the Piccadilly Line between we could invest in snow ploughs and we could have Acton Town and Rayners Lane, and the Jubilee a thorough-going programme, and the upkeep of Line, which was not aVected by snow; it had one snow ploughs, by the way, which is the other issue. It broken down train and when Tube Lines got another is all very well buying things, but you have then got one behind it they both broke down, so that was a bit to maintain them. For the once in every two decades of a problem, but that is probably no worse than a event of this kind I suppose we could ask the normal day. As for London being virtually shut department to sock us the cost of some snow down, actually, the Tube carried about half its ploughs. I think they would be better oV supporting normal passengers and did rather well in the the programme that we are instituting to look at circumstances, bearing in mind the snow. The creating lighter, less eco-hostile, less noisy, more national railway network south of the Thames was a carbon-friendly buses for London and that is a disaster. There were no trains on South East Trains programme that is under way at the moment. at all and none reached London. On the Southern Indeed, the advantage of that is that a lighter bus is network no trains reached London. South West not so skiddy on packed snow. Trains did manage to run a long-distance service Mr Hendy: Maybe I can help you with the from Southampton but no London residents equipment. The gritters that Transport for London’s managed to get on South West apart from at contractors have for the strategic road network are Wimbledon and Clapham Junction, and that ﬁtted with snow ploughs. One of the problems in probably stopped between one and a half and two using them in London is using them is that there is million coming into the city, whose journeys, of virtually no part of the road network in the built-up course, were so long that you could not manage to area where you can reasonably deposit snow by the do them by any other means. If I tell you that the side of the road. You will damage people’s cars, you average journey length on a London bus is 3.5 will throw it on the pavements, you will clog up the kilometres then, whilst the withdrawal of the bus Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

Ev 32 Transport Committee: Evidence

2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy service is something that I am personally very upset well, would have been quite a significant about and indeed I apologise for, it at least allows the administrative task and would in our calculation possibility of people walking short distances or have cost more than the refunds were worth. finding some other way of going. If you withdraw South East trains, South Central or Southern and Q221 Mr Leech: Can I go back to gritting, briefly? I the shorter journeys of South West, then nobody understand TfL are responsible for all the red routes. who lives in the vast area of south east England can Mr Hendy: Yes. get to London at all, and they did not. Q222 Mr Leech: And the ramp up to New Cross bus Q217 Mark Pritchard: Mayor, is there now a depot should have been the responsibility of TfL to rapprochement between the Mayor’s oYce and the grit but it was not done. Has there been any bendy bus? investigation as to why this did not happen? Mr Johnson: Are we reconciled with the bendy bus? Mr Hendy: The access to bus garages is something No, not at all, because one of the incidents that took which came up and the second call I made on place, I believe I am right in saying, on Sunday Monday morning was to John O’Brien, who is the evening involved a bendy bus in the Strand. I think Chief Executive of London Councils, because it was that was one of the narrowest escapes that the public apparent that in some cases whether or not you had and the programme of phasing out the bendy could have driven anything like the whole route was bus will go on and you will start to see them not the first issue. The first issue was that they could vanishing from the streets this summer. not get out of the garages. In a number of cases we discovered that the access ways, because of the depth of snow, had either been insuYciently gritted or not Q218 Mr Leech: One of the decisions you said you gritted at all, and what we then did was to get them were responsible for was cancelling the congestion gritted. One of the lessons that we have learned is charge. Given that the roads were not safe enough that in a number of cases both we and the boroughs for buses was it a particularly sensible idea to either were not gritting them enough or in some encourage people to drive in? cases they got left out. What we have resolved to do Mr Johnson: If you remember, some people already in future is grit all of those access roads, whoever had driven in and it seemed to me a reasonable thing owns them, in snowfalls of this nature. It is quite to do, to reflect the diYculties they were facing, to hard to be critical because the entire stock of local cancel the congestion charge on that particular day. authority and our own gritters and salters was out all night and, as for the operational decisions that were Q219 Mr Leech: If that is the case surely it would taken in terms of which roads you should grit, they have been also reasonable to give a reduction to were concentrating on the main strategic roads to people on their bus passes who had not been able to allow general traYctorun. get on buses. Mr Johnson: I understand the point you are making, Q223 Mr Leech: I understand one of the success and we did look into that. The diYculty was, and I stories of the day was the Docklands Light Railway, think Peter may be able to amplify this, that the cost which I think ran pretty much fully. of doing that would have been many times the value Mr Hendy: Yes. of the refunds themselves, as far as I can remember, and that cost itself must inevitably fall upon London Q224 Mr Leech: And the reason, I understand, is fare payers. that it is newer and is technologically more advanced than other bits of the Tube that failed. Would it be Q220 Mr Leech: Just as cancelling the congestion fair to say, given the Mayor’s decision to cancel the charge does. extension out to Dagenham and also the cross-river Mr Hendy: Perhaps I should explain the position in tram, that in light of the success of the Docklands regard to bus passes. 40% of people who travel by Light Railway during bad weather conditions bus do not pay themselves or at all. Anybody under perhaps the Mayor ought to reconsider those 18 in London or over 60 has a freedom pass or decisions? travels free because they are a youth. Of the Mr Hendy: No. It is entirely diVerent. The remainder, there is a very small percentage who pay Docklands Light Railway is quite simple. On the cash, there are nearly 20% who travel by pay-as-you- Underground railway, if you go and look at the go who would not have paid, and it was a Monday track, the current is collected by a shoe that runs so the level of renewal of daily and weekly bus passes along the top of an electrified rail. That is how it was was markedly lower, as you would expect, because done in 1903 and that, regrettably, is the system we people were not able to use them, at least at the start have all inherited and it will be like that for a very of the day. We are then left with 15% or so of the long time, I suspect. The DLR was instituted in the passengers who might have wanted to use the pass early 1980s and it has a shoe that is sprung and were not able to do so, and, after looking at it, underneath and which hits the rail from underneath we did indeed, as the Mayor said, conclude that to so snow and ice do not aVect it. We would, of course, find those people in these circumstances and identify like to re-equip the Tube completely with a new sort whether or not they could have used the buses, of current collection but what I would most like to because the bus service did start about 10 or 11 do is update the Tube from the current state of many o’clock and by the end of the day was running quite of the assets which are life expired as they are. If you Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy get round to investment priorities, that is a much be accurate, I do not think it would have made the more pressing need than to continue work on slightest diVerence to the diYculties we encountered. schemes that were never funded in the ﬁrst place and There was a staggering quantity of snow. The snow in both cases I had to advise the Mayor that we fell upon grit that had been put there. Further layers probably should not proceed with them simply of grit were put on the snow. There was more snow. because, even if we acquired the powers, we certainly We created a lasagne of snow and grit, upon which— would not have the money to build the schemes before their expiration. Q229 Sir Peter Soulsby: If I can just draw you back Mr Johnson: Mrs Ellman, could I just say that I have to my question— only got another three minutes. Mr Johnson: —it was very dangerous to send buses Chairman: About 40 minutes. Sir Peter and Mr out. Martlew have questions. Q230 Sir Peter Soulsby: The fact is something very Q225 Sir Peter Soulsby: Can I take you back to some exceptional in view of weather conditions was of the earlier questioning about the role of the predicted for the capital and you have given us not a Mayor when extreme weather is predicted in the single example of anything at all that you did to capital city? We had, as I recall it, quite considerable prepare for it. warning that such extreme weather was predicted on Mr Johnson: I think that is absolute tripe. this occasion, that it was likely to be very disruptive. I think perhaps it was somewhat worse than was predicted but nonetheless it was predicted to be quite Q231 Chairman: I think Mr Martlew wants to severe. I just wonder what you believe is the Mayor’s come in. role when such extreme events are predicted in Mr Johnson: I am under the sad obligation that I drawing together and ensuring— have to leave. Mr Johnson: I have had this question before. Q232 Mr Martlew: Can I ask you a partisan Q226 Sir Peter Soulsby: I do not think you answered question? it before. Mr Johnson: No, because I am oV. Mr Johnson: I did answer it, at great length. Q233 Chairman: Mayor, that is unacceptable, to Q227 Sir Peter Soulsby: I am trying to tease it out walk out in the middle of a question. We agreed 40 from you— minutes. Would you please let Mr Martlew ask you Mr Johnson: No, you are just trying to (inaudible). a question? Mr Johnson: Mr Martlew can ask a partisan Q228 Sir Peter Soulsby: —to ﬁnd out your question. understanding of the role of the Mayor in ensuring Chairman: Mr Martlew is a member of the that our capital city is adequately prepared for such Committee. Mayor, just a moment. Could I ask you extreme events. just for one minute—I do understand that you have Mr Johnson: As I have said, and I will run all the a time limit and I have agreed with that. Mr Martlew, answers together, my job is to have the right people could you ask a quick question and the Mayor will doing the job and to make sure that we have a be able to respond? general view of whether their preparations are adequate. I believe that they were. I think a fantastic Q234 Mr Martlew: I understand that you are going amount of gritting, as I have said, was done. My to leave Mr Hendy to answer the hard questions primary job, there having been a major when you go, Mayor. The question is,— meteorological event of that kind, is to communicate Mr Johnson: Are you saying none of your colleagues with the public. What you are trying to get at is that has asked hard questions? I think that is an insult. I should perhaps have convened some committee to Chairman: Mr Martlew, would you ask your work out an extra special strategy of gritting or question, please? something like that in order to be prepared for the event that the snow turned out to be even worse than Q235 Mr Martlew: Before you went to bed did you was predicted. I think that is what you are saying. make any inquiries about what was happening that What I should have done was look at the forecasts night and at what time did you wake up and were and say, “Is it possible that the forecasts are informed that there was a major problem? underestimating the snow?. I suppose it is. Mr Johnson: As Peter has already said, I think he Therefore, what I am going to do is convene a sort contacted me shortly after six and I replied, I think, of gold command and get all the relevant authorities before seven o’clock in the morning. round and see what we can do to have yet more grit”. The point I want to make to this Committee, and it is very succinct and I am afraid it is probably the note I Q236 Mr Martlew: So you had not made any am going to end on, is that even if we had done what inquiries that night to see if there was an issue? you are trying to suggest we could have done or I Mr Johnson: I observed that it had started to snow. could have done and we had had some special meeting on Friday or Saturday or Sunday when Q237 Mr Martlew: But you never made any these predictions, which as it was, turned out not to inquiries? Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy

Mr Johnson: For heaven’s sake. Goodbye. slightly heavier and have modern braking systems which are a bit more sensitive, but it is inherently Q238 Chairman: Thank you, Mayor. Does anybody unsafe to drive a seven-, eight-, nine-, 10-, 11-, 12- wish to ask Mr Hendy some questions? I thank you tonne vehicle on compacted ice and not expect it for coming, Mayor. sooner or later to slide into the kerb. In fact, it has Mr Johnson: I am obliged to you. (Mr Johnson left happened to me as a driver. You can sit on the crown the meeting) of the road stationary, and if the camber is big enough the bus will just go into the kerb. Q239 Graham Stringer: One of the things that interests me, and I have not looked at every incident, Q242 Mr Martlew: There seems to be a is that there have been probably five or six occasions contradiction between yourself and Mr Barrett since the Second World War when there has been snow and ice and diYcult conditions comparable to about the use of snow ploughs. He was basically February of this year, and yet on those occasions, in saying, and, as I say, he used to run the buses in my the late 40s, early 60, late 60s, early 90s, buses have constituency which is an urban area, that you would continued to run. Is it because your predecessors— use snow ploughs, and you are saying that it would and I know there were diVerent structures in local create too much damage. Surely the damage would government then—were better than you at the job or only be created if the snow was left to such an extent is it because something has fundamentally changed that it was very high. The other point is, it is not that means that the buses did stop on this occasion really expensive, is it? The Mayor was indicating that when they did not stop previously? there would be massive expense to fix snow ploughs Mr Hendy: I am not sure that you are right because to the front of the gritters. That is not the case, is it? folk memory would have it that everything ran Mr Hendy: On the first issue, I think the diVerence in perfectly in 1947, in 1963, in 1991 and in 2003. We London is that there is nowhere to put this stuV.Of had a very heavy snowfall of these sorts of course it would be handy, and in fact the ploughs proportions in north west London in 2003 or 2003 were used to some extent over that night and in the and it paralysed north west London. It happened in early morning. The people who use snow ploughs the evening rush hour and by eight o’clock in the eVectively for road clearing are the Highways evening we were unable to run any bus service in the Agency. If you watch them on motorways it is quite areas that were aVected. Certainly, in 1963, and an easy thing to do. In urban areas all I can say is indeed in 1947, from what I can gather from the that you would have to be quite a brave public records, there were areas of London that did not get oYcial to just run snow ploughs down any road with a service for several weeks rather than days. a significant number of parked cars and expect people not to complain at the consequences, Q240 Graham Stringer: Bus services? particularly when the whole lot is mixed up with grit. Mr Hendy: Yes, bus services. We and the boroughs threw nearly 10,000 tonnes of grit and salt on the roads of London in about 36 Q241 Graham Stringer: I do not want to interrupt, hours. We managed to block the drains of most of and I think that is a very interesting and important the highways of London by Wednesday and point. Do you think you could provide the Thursday, and you have to be quite careful in those Committee with the evidence to support that? circumstances not to pelt people’s parked cars with Mr Hendy: Yes, indeed, I will do. I think what is a mixture of snow and grit in some circumstances diVerent in this circumstance is that it is very unusual where that they would object quite violently to the for the whole of Greater London to be covered by consequences. this level and depth of snow. Normally it is part of the city. Sunday is about the worst time you can get it because traYc is so light. If it happens during the Q243 Mr Martlew: The Committee will have to course of the day you have already got the passage come to a decision on whether you are right or Mr of heavy vehicles—and one of my managerial jobs, Barrett is right. Can I now come back to the 30 because I have been around, I am afraid, for quite a accidents? How many people were injured in those long time and I have experienced most of those accidents? events, with the exception of 1947, in running a bus Mr Hendy: Very few. company, like Nigel Barrett—has been to persuade people to stay out when it is like this when actually they might feel that they want to come in. You have Q244 Mr Martlew: We had evidence that nobody to do it carefully because you cannot countermand was injured before. Is that correct? people’s view about the safety, but it is easier to do Mr Hendy: I believe, from the records that we have, when the traYc is heavy. If you lay salt it is better if that there was one slight injury. I would not rely on it all gets mixed up together than if the snow just lies, your report about 30 accidents. Thirty bus-related and Sunday evening and early Monday morning is accidents in six hours is a very high number on a about the worst circumstance you can get. The sort Sunday evening, bearing in mind the number of of folk memory that said the bus service never vehicles out on the roads. Another 22 were reported. missed a beat in 1963 is completely inaccurate. There What I am much more interested in is that 142 were parts of London that had a great lack of service emergency calls with another 150 unable to be for days and days because modern vehicles are answered is an astonishingly high number. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

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2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy

Q245 Mr Martlew: Sorry, Mr Hendy, but the Mayor Q248 Mr Leech: If a similar amount of snow falls was making a great issue of these 30 accidents; that next winter will all the buses stop again, do you is what he was basing it on. What you are telling me think? is that there may have been one person slightly Mr Hendy: If it falls in such a way, and if the gritting injured. Secondly, when did you find out about these and salting fail to keep pace with the amount falling 30 accidents? Was it before the Controller called the from the sky, that is quite possible. There is nothing buses oV or was it somebody adding them up later? else that we could have done within the limits of the When did you find out? equipment available for the highway authorities in Mr Hendy: When I found out was when we asked London to do something better. It is possible that we about the reasons for the withdrawal at 00.10. The might get a few buses out of their garages a bit people who were collating that information were in sooner, as Nigel said. It is equally possible that if the same room as the person who made the decision they did get out they would sit by the side of the kerb at 00.10. What he was reflecting was not only the because they would need suYcient roads cleared to number of accidents, not only the number of non- run. I think if it became apparent that this was not a bus-related accidents, not only the number of 20-year event, that it was a one-year event or a five- emergency calls but the fact that individual year event or a 10-year event, clearly we would be operators and drivers had already started to go back culpable if we did not step up the winter weather to the garages because they felt it was unsafe to run. precautions in order to take note of them. For example, we in the boroughs as highway authorities Q246 Mr Martlew: My final point, which I would have done a lot more in recent years about flooding like to have asked the Mayor but he has disappeared, because torrential rain is becoming more common is, do you think that what happened that night and and we need to keep gullies and drains clearer now the following day was such a major incident that the than we did 20 years ago. If we had snowfalls of this major incidents procedure should have been in place severity on a regular basis we might well have to go for London? back and keep all the buses under cover as we did 40 Mr Hendy: That is an interesting issue. When you years ago, but that is about the prediction of long- get on to the lessons learned, it is correct what the term weather events and I think that one thing Committee heard, which is that the normal way the nobody disagrees with in these circumstances is that Resilience Structure comes into force in London is this was a very exceptional event. It was also that it is called by the police, and generally speaking exceptional in that it covered the whole of Greater that is as a result of a catastrophic incident or in the London. The only other thing I would like to say to anticipation that there will be enough disruption to you about that is that in those circumstances what is have one. I am not and have never been able to equally remarkable is that, with a very old and instigate the gold control arrangements, neither is technologically rather unadvanced Underground the Mayor, though, of course, I expect one could system, we did manage to keep it going and give have asked. The co-ordination of local authorities is quite a lot of London the ability to go about its done by the duty local authority chief executive, and normal business. I beg to correct something that you previously heard, because I think I am right in saying that the duty Q249 Mr Leech: You said earlier that one of the chief executive was the Chief Executive of Bexley, Y V di culties about getting buses on main routes was and when that came into e ect on Monday morning that ultimately they usually have to turn round on that was primarily to sort out the supplies of grit and minor roads and could end up getting stuck. Have salt which were being used at such a rate that if we you thought about putting in place plans to have had not had some sort of pan-London activity to emergency routes in those circumstances so that you redistribute it some boroughs would have run out. I can change the routes completely just to run along think one of the lessons is that it would have been main roads? possible to get the Resilience Structure up and Mr Hendy: Yes, I have, and I have completely running earlier but what I would say is that I do not discounted it. None of our users would understand think anybody should be beguiled into believing that it. If the message came out in the morning that we had that happened the result would have been much had re-planned the London bus network to take diVerent, because we and every local authority were account of the snow for one day with no notice, we using all of the equipment that we had to do the job would cause immense chaos for all the people who that needed to be done. use it. One of the reasons that people do use the bus service is that they understand where it goes and Q247 Mr Martlew: But do you believe in hindsight— what it does, and we have spent certainly the last 10 and hindsight is a wonderful thing—that a major to 15 years trying to make it more intelligible. If we incident should have been called? Is that what you re-numbered it and re-routed it for one day in 20 are saying? years we would get into serious trouble and it really Mr Hendy: No. What I am saying is that it could is not very practical. What we expect the operators have been that the Resilience arrangements could to do and what we expect the local authorities and have been put in earlier. More information about highways authorities and ourselves to do in that what was going on might have been shared. I do not respect is enable the network to run in the way in think it would have made much diVerence to the which people expect it to run, and the fact that it did results on the streets. not I was very upset about because I believe that we Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

Ev 36 Transport Committee: Evidence

2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy should be running public services properly and that were withdrawn or curtailed again on Friday”. I live London deserves that. However, I think to re-plan it (sometimes anyway when I am not up here) in Bath. all for one event in 20 years would frankly be mad. We had no buses in Bath for 48 hours. There was virtually no service in Bristol for the same period of Q250 Mr Leech: Do you think then that there is a time. When local authorities are faced with snowfalls case for saying, “We are just going to concentrate of this magnitude in southern England they do not V V our eVorts on getting transport working along this have the equipment to take this stu o the streets, road and along that road”, and just leave other and their experiences as highway authorities were areas? mirrored by the experiences of the London highway Mr Hendy: It is a real problem because, as you heard authorities on Sunday and Monday, 1 and 2 about the Ambulance Service, people want many February. things from the highway network. It is not any use to the Ambulance Service just to access the major Q253 Mr Martlew: My understanding is that Bristol roads, just as it is not any use for the bus service. was not as badly aVected as London, perhaps Bath What people want is to be able to get down their was, so there were not major cities up and down the residential streets, and I do not, frankly, feel country that were as badly aVected as London. The confident in asking the local authorities to bus system was paralysed, is that not correct? concentrate solely on bus routes because I think they Mr Hendy: All I am quoting you is the information have a number of other responsibilities to fulfil as I had about what happened in parts of the rest of the well. We as a traYc authority in respect of the red country. I do not spend all my time trying to find out route network could have concentrated all our what happens in other major cities. I think the gritters on bus routes. Had we done so neither the evidence that I have brought is suYcient at least to Western Avenue nor the A2 nor the Great West persuade me that other highway authorities in the Road would have been gritted because they are not south of England have the same sort of equipment significant bus routes. That would not have been the and their responses have produced the same sort of right thing to do. You have to take a balance about result in running bus services. it. What was really unusual, as Nigel Barrett said to you, was that if the snow had stopped at four or five o’clock in the morning the continuous gritting by us Q254 Mr Martlew: I am sorry; I was just asking you and the local authorities would have enabled the to defend what the Mayor had said. service to run, perhaps not normally but reasonably. Mr Hendy: I have given you the information that I It went on for hours and as fast as people gritted it have got. got covered up. That is a really unusual situation. Q255 Graham Stringer: In answer to a previous Q251 Graham Stringer: When we had some borough question you said, “We should not put too much engineers in they told us that you were only emphasis on the 30 accidents that happened before responsible for the red routes. The implication of midnight on the Sunday”. Is that because you think your answer to Mr Leech’s question was that you they were trivial or they were not properly recorded, were doing more gritting than just the red routes. because when we have asked previous witnesses we Mr Hendy: Then I have not made myself clear. We have not been able to find direct evidence of where are only responsible for the red routes but the 5% of those 30 accidents were? the strategic road network for which we are Mr Hendy: The reason I did not give you the responsible carries about 30% of the traYc, so if I evidence is that the evidence comes from London asked our own contractors only to concentrate on Buses CentreComm. I will produce you the evidence the bus routes which were on red routes I would have in case there is some reason why you think I as a left quite a lot of London’s strategic road network public oYcial should be lying or not telling the truth. completely uncovered. Graham Stringer: That clarifies it. Q256 Graham Stringer: No, no, I am just trying to get the evidence. Q252 Mr Martlew: Sorry to ask you—the Mayor Mr Hendy: If you ask the right people they will has left, of course. The Mayor in his opening provide it and I run London’s transport network. We statement said that London was no worse aVected are responsible for CentreComm. We can provide than other cities. We have no evidence of that. Which you with that. You must be careful not to put words other cities were as badly aVected as London? in my mouth as a public oYcial, but what I was Mr Hendy: I normally concentrate on south east actually asking you to do was consider all the England. On Monday, 2 February, let me quote for circumstances. None of the 30 bus accidents is you, “In Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire a few trivial. Whether or not they injure anybody they are Arriva and Centrebus vehicles ventured out in all potentially serious and I think to suggest that in Hertfordshire but soon were marooned on some way any of them might not be is grossly snowbound roads. South of London very little ran in depreciatory of the skill of public service vehicle Surrey, Sussex, Hampshire or west Kent on the drivers and the people who hold operators’ licences Monday. There were no country services at all in to run the services. What I am suggesting is that that Surrey and Sussex, and later in the week on is not the only reason that the service was Thursday there were virtually no buses in withdrawn, and in circumstances where my control Bedfordshire or Buckinghamshire and most buses staV are faced with 150 unanswered emergency calls Processed: 22-05-2009 18:35:43 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG2

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 37

2 April 2009 Mr Boris Johnson and Mr Peter Hendy from bus drivers, are faced with circumstances of a Mr Hendy: I have not quoted any of those incidents. signiﬁcantly larger number of accidents that they would expect to take place on a quiet Sunday Q258 Mr Martlew: But there were a lot of those, evening, are faced with bus operators and drivers were there? who no longer feel able to run the services Mr Hendy: There were quite a few, yes. For the themselves, then that one statistic is only part of an sender of the snowball it is a joke. For the recipient, answer about the management decision to call the particularly if it has got grit in it, as it probably has V night bus service in. if it is o the street, it could be a tragedy. We were not happy about that. That again is not the primary reason why the service was withdrawn. The service Q257 Mr Martlew: Just on that, I think we have was withdrawn because it could not operate. That is received some evidence that some of these incidents the reason. were to do with people throwing snow at the buses. Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr Hendy, for Is that the case? coming and answering all our questions. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:37:02 Page Layout: COENEW [SE] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG3

Ev 38 Transport Committee: Evidence Written evidence

Supplementary memorandum from Department for Transport (SNOW 01) Further to my appearance before the Transport Committee on 11 March on the impact of February’s adverse weather conditions on transport in the UK, I undertook to write to you to clarify the details of one of my answers. In my response to Question 82 I explained that in the run-up to midnight on the night of Sunday 1 February, there had been some 30 incidents involving buses in London. In Question 94, Graham Stringer asked for the source of this ﬁgure. This number came from Transport for London, and can be found in paragraph 3, page 7 of the recent London Assembly Transport Committee report entitled “Slipping Up? Impact of the extreme weather on London report”. March 2009

Memorandum from Dome UK Ltd (SNOW 02) 1. Director of Dome UK Ltd for 18 months. Dome UK have built 120 timber salt stores across the UK since 1992. Prior to this was Commercial Manager for Salt Union Ltd at the Winsford Mine for 12 years. Previously Speciality DeIcers Business Manager with BP Chemicals. In total 20 years experience in the UK winter maintenance industry. 2. During the prolonged cold spell and snowfall in February 2009 many Highway Authorities came within a day of stocking out of highway de-icing salt. Many fell back on the reserves and organisational skills of the National Highways Authorities, most cut gritting routes and runs to a minimum, others resorted to expensive scrap table salt or imported grades that could not be spread by their “gritters”. 3. In 2000 I was responsible for the implementation of a salt barn PFI scheme at Norfolk County Council. Norfolk have seven purpose built and strategically located Domes backed up by two strategic stocks and all salt usage is accurately monitored. It is my understanding that Norfolk were one of the few local authorities to maintain stock levels throughout the winter. 4. In our view the situation that arose in February could be avoided by the UK wide adoption of strategically located permanently covered salt stores, ideally used by one Authority as an operational depot, but funded and accessible to several local stakeholders. Sized to ensure a minimum of 14 days worse winter usage is available locally. Presently either through managed salt schemes or the reluctance of private contractors to tie up working capital many Authorities will stock out in three days of snow. 5. As a ﬁrst estimate we believe an additional 250,000 tonnes of salt should be held close to point of use and not at the mines. This would involve a capital cost of around £15 million in barns, £6.5 million in salt. Payback in terms of avoidance of accidents, business disruption, additional haulage costs and payment of 100% premiums for imported salt would be almost instant. Covered storage eliminates environmental concerns, keeps salt in prime condition over many years allowing it to be spread at half the rates needed for wet externally stored stock. 6. UK wide direction is required to co-ordinate and direct action. Winter maintenance is at the bottom of the spending priority list for most Authorities and funding is picked oV by other services once winter ends. We have already seen evidence of enquiries made to us in early February terminating “now the emergency is over”. 7. We would welcome the opportunity to contribute further to the committee’s investigation or to the UK Roads Board study. March 2009

Memorandum from the Met OYce (SNOW 03) Overview of the Meteorological Situation 1. The snow events during the ﬁrst week of February 2009 were associated with a pool of very cold air that became slow moving over the UK. The localised intensity of the snow was due in part to slow moving frontal systems but also linked to intense convection generated by the relatively warm seas around the UK (eg North Sea, English Channel). However, by contrast the same warm sources created borderline rain/snow situations at some lower lying locations where winds were onshore. In between the snow bearing systems, moderate to severe overnight frosts occurred. In general, this was the heaviest and most widespread snow event across the UK since February 1991. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:37:02 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG3

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Individual Events 2. Easterly winds became established over the weekend 31 January–1 February and eventually brought in some very cold air from the continent. Heavy snow showers developed over the North Sea which moved inland across east and southeast areas in particular later on Sunday 1 and Monday 2 February. These showers became organised into preferred clusters and bands and led to some locations to the south of London seeing level snow depths of around 30 cm. Even in central London, there was up to 10 cm of snow. 3. Heavy snow showers spread across much of UK during 2 February with a more general area of precipitation extending up the eastern side as a discrete low-pressure system and attendant fronts moved up from France. This brought further accumulations to higher ground of E/NE England and eastern Scotland but the snow turned to rain at lower levels. 4. During 3 February, further bands of sleet/snow revolved around the low-pressure system to aVect southern, central and western areas with localised disruption where these bands became slow moving. Further accumulations of up to 17 cm were reported in parts of Wales. Snow over Scotland was generally confined to higher ground with a respite in other areas. These bands died away on 4 February only to be replaced by another frontal system bringing sleet/snow across southern and later central areas. A further 5–10 cm of snow was widely reported by daybreak on 5 February with 20 cm locally in the Midlands. 5. The original low-pressure system had tracked to the southwest of the UK by this stage but became reinvigorated during 5 February as it began to move back towards southern areas. There were some heavy falls of snow over SW England (away from coastal fringes) overnight 5–6 February with reports of 55 cm over parts of Dartmoor. The snow eventually spread to other southern and central parts of England and SE Wales during Friday 6 February. 6. The weekend of 7–8 February provided a respite for many, although a front moving east later on the 8th brought a period of snow, particularly to some central and eastern parts of the UK. 7. A new low-pressure system then formed over the Atlantic and tracked along the English Channel during the 9th and 10th. The battle between milder air and the pre-existing colder air provided a mix of precipitation types, with a prolonged period of heavy rain across the southern half of the UK which gradually turned to snow before clearing. Some areas again saw significant snow accumulations—notably the Midlands. 8. Another respite from snowfall followed but with some very severe overnight frosts in places. 9. The final snow event occurred on Wednesday 11 February as milder Atlantic air began to push in against the residual cold air. This transition led to accumulations of snow across the eastern side of Scotland and NE/E England where 10 cm fell locally. Thereafter, milder air became more established and the occurrence of overnight frosts decreased markedly.

Met Office Forecasts,Warnings and Actions 10. 21–28 January—there were signals from a variety of sources for much colder weather to extend across the UK in early February but confidence in details on where snow would fall and how much was not suYciently high to issue any formal advance warnings. However, key customers (including the Cabinet OYce and their counterparts in the devolved administrations, the Highways Agency and Network Rail) were informed in terms of a “heads-up” and Public Weather Service (PWS) Advisors opened close contact channels with Emergency Responders. Media outlets were also used to communicate a consistent message. 11. Thursday 29 January—A Met OYce National Severe Weather Warning Service (NSWWS) advisory was issued for heavy snow, implying 40–60% risk of disruption, for eastern counties of England valid for Monday 2 February. This helped to raise awareness for Emergency Responders and the public via the Met OYce website, particularly with the increased risk coinciding with the start of the next working week. 12. Friday 30 January—The NSWWS advisory was extended to other parts of the UK covering both Monday 2 February and Tuesday 3 February. The Cabinet OYce was briefed that the risk of disruption would be likely to increase as the event approached, and that more specific detail could be perceived as higher resolution model data became available at those shorter lead times. 13. Saturday 31 January—An Early Warning for heavy snow, implying more than 60% risk of disruption, was issued for much of England and Wales for the period 0000–1800 Monday 2 February with 10–20cm of snow mentioned. This included high profile locations such as London and the commuter belt of SE England. Cabinet OYce and Emergency Responders were updated to aid with eVective mitigation planning. 14. Sunday 1 February—The Early Warning was updated and extended to include Tuesday 3 February. A warning of extreme weather (very heavy snow) was issued for London and counties to the south for Monday 2 February to focus on the expected greatest impact. This type of warning is only issued very rarely. Meanwhile, NSWWS advisories were issued to cover the risk of disruption from snow during the rest of the week (4–5 February). Further briefings were provided to the Cabinet OYce. 15. Monday 2 February—Shorter term Flash and Emergency Flash warnings were issued as updates to the earlier warnings. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:37:02 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG3

Ev 40 Transport Committee: Evidence

16. Tuesday 3 February onwards—Further updates via shorter term Flash warnings and longer term NSWWS advisories and/or Early Warnings were issued to highlight risk areas for further disruption. PWS Advisors worked closely with Operations Centre, Emergency Responders and local resilience forums. Extra graphical products were issued to the Cabinet OYce to supplement the NSWWS information on the web and these were used at COBR.

Background Information on PWS Advisors 17. The Met OYce is responsible—through its Public Weather Service (PWS)—for providing the National Severe Weather Warning Service (NSWWS) for the whole of the UK. 18. In response to the Civil Contingencies Act (2004), the Met OYce created a number of Public Weather Service Advisor posts to oVer support to the resilience community. The posts are centrally funded from existing funding lines as part of our PWS commitment. 19. There are currently ten PWS Advisors covering the UK with a range of experience covering weather forecasting, hydrology/ﬂood warning, weather impacts modelling and media broadcasting. Although each is the key point of contact for a speciﬁc geographic region, they work as a team and pool their joint expertise. 20. The PWS Advisors provide advice to resilience forums and Gold Commands on the current weather situation as well as on other weather parameters that may aVect recovery operations. May 2009

Supplementary memorandum from Transport for London (SNOW 04) I am writing further to my recent appearance with the Mayor of London before the Committee in connection with the above inquiry. I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to provide details of the number of calls made to Transport for London’s (TfL’s) bus control centre, CentreComm, during the evening of 1 February. This issue was covered in TfL’s written evidence to the London Assembly’s inquiry into this topic and published with its report, which was considered by your Committee; but, of course, you did not formally ask for written evidence for this inquiry. Had you done so, we would have been able to provide the additional details in advance of my oral evidence. This would have been in keeping with usual select committee practice to invite written memoranda at the start of an inquiry. I also enclose the joint TfL-London Resilience Local Authority Panel response to the London Assembly’s report Slipping Up?: Impact of extreme weather on London transport, which I trust will assist the Committee’s deliberations.

Historical Incidents of Heavy Snowfall and their Impact on the Transport Network During my oral evidence I explained that it was very unusual indeed that such heavy snow had fallen in such a short space of time across Greater London. There have, nevertheless, been previous incidents of heavy snowfall in London that had led to the loss of bus services. I mentioned the most recent example of disruption when very heavy snow fell during the evening of 30 January 2003, particularly in North West London. The area was badly aVected and bus services were progressively withdrawn as road conditions worsened, and gritting and salting failed to keep pace with snowfall. Looking further back, there was also disruption during 1947, 1961, 1963 and 1991.

1947 London was struck by a blizzard on 28 January. “Council workmen were unable to keep pace with the frequent bouts of snow and the tendency for road surfaces to freeze even during the middle of the day” which led to many roads being impassable for several days. As a consequence, London Transport (LT) bus services were withdrawn from numerous roads particularly those in Muswell Hill and between Shirley and Hayes; Coulsdon and Old Coulsdon; and Cockfosters and Potters Bar.1

1961 Snow fell on New Year’s Eve 1961, which was a Sunday. The eVect was less disruptive as it was a relatively quiet day. On Monday 1 January 1962, however, the roads received no attention from highway authorities and it was possible to operate bus services in only a few cases. The severe weather persisted on 2 and 3 January which aVected work on the conversation to bus operation of trolleybus routes in the Colindale, Stonebridge and Finchley areas.

1 Glazier, K (2000) Routes to Recovery: London Buses 1945–52, p 38. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:37:02 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG3

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1963 Heavy snow that had begun to fall at Christmas 1962 continued into the New Year. While most roads in what was the then Central operating area of LT remained passable, except for the hills, there was widespread disruption to LT bus services in the former Country area which covered parts of the Home Counties. In general, only the level stretches of main roads remained open with all hilly sections and minor roads blocked. The A11 was closed for some time between Epping and Harlow which left the new town without services as buses were not able to reach their routes. During early January, 38 bus and six Green Line coach routes were withdrawn, curtailed or diverted which left some communities cut oV for a period.2

1991 London was aVected by a spell of extremely cold weather, heavy snow and strong winds, which started on 7 February.The adverse weather lasted for more than a week and led to many road closures and accidents. Parts of the capital, particularly hilly areas, were completely cut oV from road traYc for some time.3

Incidents Reported to CentreComm on 1February 2009 Following the onset of heavy snowfall on 1 February, CentreComm received an increasing number of radio calls from bus drivers across all areas of London as conditions deteriorated. Between 6.30pm and 12.10am on 2 February, 30-bus related accidents due to snow and ice were reported to CentreComm with additional accidents reported to local bus garages instead. CentreComm also received reports of another 22 accidents not involving buses. There were 142 emergency calls logged by CentreComm during this period from bus drivers reporting increasingly diYcult driving conditions. There were also many instances where it was not possible to make contact with the bus driver due to the high volume of incoming calls. At one point, there were 150 calls from drivers requiring assistance held in the system. Such a high number is unprecedented. It was for this reason that night bus operations were suspended to avoid any further incidents. I would like to reiterate, however, that on 2 February, services were quickly and progressively restored during the morning as conditions improved. Buses began to leave garages from 10.30 am and by 6 pm 1,700 buses were in operation across London. I hope the information contained in this letter helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further assistance. Peter Hendy May 2009

APPENDIX A Summary of Bus Driver calls to CentreComm during the Evening of 1February 2009 Old call % a call that could not be answered immediately and, when it was, the bus was no longer able to respond.

Time Bus Description of call route 1740 320 Lots of snow in area 1743 Rail replacement bus—broken glass on board 1756 148 Lorry parked at location making a delivery 1812 48 Driver reporting a wheelbarrow at in road 1816 34 Accident at location las and mps on scene 1818 87 Info on DEF route 37 1820 B13 Road very slippery needs gritting 1829 422 Road needs gritting extremely slippery 1838 466 Roads are not gritted 1841 403 Road getting bad needs gritting as a matter of 1845 ELW Two x IC1 Youths shining lazer light at bus drivers 1851 157 Driver informing that it is snowing 1856 157 Road icy 1858 T130 Code Red info 1900 15 Road blocked E/B-aware 1904 Req info re closure 1906 474 Icy road 1907 7 Aware see earlier call

2 Stitson, L The story of 1963, London Bus Magazine, 67, Winter 1988–89, London Omnibus Traction Society, pp 12–51. 3 Leefe, D, Morgan, A and Wilson, T (1992) LRT route changes, London Bus Review of 1991, London Omnibus Traction Society, p 11. Processed: 22-05-2009 18:37:02 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG3

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Time Bus Description of call route 1907 B11 Roads in area not gritted 1908 216 Driver informing that there is snow everywhere 1909 113 Aware 1910 2 Enq re Oxford Street diversion 1911 103 Roads not gritted 1912 136 Youths throwing snowballs. advised. 1915 Diversion enq 1916 38 NOE Enquiry 1918 130 Heavy snow on road 1922 412 Buses unable to climb hill 1928 163 Youths throwing snow balls. driver advised 1931 464 Road closed. due to abandond cars. bus stuck. 1932 D7 Motor cyclist slipped oV bike—LAS already called 1934 60 Bus has slid down hill and is now stuck 1937 452 Roadworks barriers leaning into road 1944 403 Road very slippery 1948 381 Bus stuck on icy road 1949 188 Road slippery 1951 D7 Driver complaining road slippery 1952 381 Driver saying road slippery 1954 277 Garage has asked the bus to inform us 1957 410 Youths laying in the road 1959 D7 Security has closed road, driver advised 2003 286 Road very slippery 2006 X Bus stuck cleared on call 2013 484 Slippery road cars and buses sliding 2014 295 Route 74 stuck on slippery road, road blocked 2015 135 Driver stating that he cannot continue 2016 60 Bus is stuck in the snow 2018 74 Bus now moving. but road slippery 2018 211 Buses sliding all over the road 2021 188 Road unpassable due to snow 2021 37 Slippery road 2021 185 Many buses stuck 2023 414 Has to drive slowly as the road is slippery 2023 333 Snow balls being thrown 2024 262 Group of youths throwing snowballs at buses 2025 484 Buses stuck as road slippery 2026 262 Youths throwing snowballs 2028 135 Bus is on the stand and the road is too slippery 2029 Road closed due to buses stuck on ice 2030 63 Buses stuck on ice 2030 376 Youths throwing snowballs at buses 2032 174 Snowballs 2034 74 Road blocked 2034 12 Bus stuck on ice 2035 430 Icy roads—aware 2035 132 Bus unable to climb hill 2036 47 Road blocked—Ref 911 2038 C3 Icy road buses unable to proceed 2040 14 Driver states road slippery due to snow 2042 74 Road blocked due to road surface slippery 2042 403 Stuck on ice. Road blocked 2043 47 Icy—road too dangerous 2044 26 Kids throwing snowballs 2045 345 Bus stuck 2046 1 Heavy traYc due to ice 2047 20 Cars stuck under bridge 2048 63 Icy roads 2048 419 Driver states that garage have called police 2049 295 2050 391 Road is blocked—buses are moving very slowly 2050 391 RTE C3 Stuck. road iced over 2052 1 Two buses stuck on icy road Processed: 22-05-2009 18:37:02 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG3

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Time Bus Description of call route 2052 135 Bus stuck due to ice 2053 14 Bus stuck and has no gears 2055 162 Road blocked in both directions due to ice 2055 D8 Bus stuck—area icy aware 2056 168 Road blocked, ice 2056 14 traYc not moving—NFD possible RTC 2057 343 Driver states that road is full of ice 2059 63 Road blocked by two buses 2059 468 Road too icy to use 2102 C3 Now clear and moving 2102 68 Bus stuck on ice against kerb 2103 202 Ice and snow thrown 2106 54 Buses unable to continue 2107 151 Bus stuck, sliding down hill, cannot move 2107 68 Bus stuck in icy conditions—aware 2108 450 Stuck on hill unable to proceed—too icy 2112 269 Road impassable. ice 2112 168 Too icy—buses sliding towards parked cars 2114 200 Snow balls 2115 W8 Buses can not enter Pickets Lock due to ice 2118 119 Bus unable to continue up hill, road blocked 2120 14 Road iced over. buses stuck 2124 W15 Road icy 2124 47 Old call 2127 286 Snow balls 2127 Old call 2127 156 Old call 2128 68 Buses trapped due to ice—eight buses trapped 2129 428 Slip road onto B255 St Clements Way. icy 2132 14 12 Buses stuck in ice 2133 Old call 2137 198 Road blocked—unsure why 2138 74 Old call 2138 P4 Old call 139 211 Old call 2140 S1 Bus stuck in snow—cannot proceed 2140 444 Old call 2143 23 Icy roads. on RTE 2145 22 Stand was icy, she is on her way back 2146 211 LAS Enq Re 999 call—no Code Reds received 2147 343 Old call 2147 95 Old call 2147 190 Old call 2147 270 District Line closed 2148 63 Eight buses stuck for over 1 hour. mp updated 2148 12 At a standstill—icy road 2150 428 See Ref: 1033 2152 40 Bus parked across road 2152 339 Snow ball thrown at driver, driver not willing to 2155 167 Bus stuck on icy hill 2156 Road closed RTC—LFB on scene 2200 X26 Road icy buses stuck on hill 2202 188 Buses stuck sue to ice 2204 87 Snow balls thrown at PAX 2206 468 Stuck in the snow 2206 62 Snowballs throw at PAX 2209 496 Road icy, three RTAs on bottom of hill 2209 12 Driving stating that he is still stuck there 2211 363 Stuck in ice—aware 2212 P13 Bus is stuck 2218 36 Running late told to contact garage 2218 C3 Old call 2219 74 Road blocked due to ice 2220 430 Old call Processed: 22-05-2009 18:37:02 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG3

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Time Bus Description of call route 2220 74 Adverse road conditions running late 2221 P13 Old call 2223 220 Old call 2223 D8 Old call 2224 22 Driver unable to continue as bus has slid 2224 X Old call 2225 75 Old call 2225 269 Cut short 269 Queen Mary’s-Bexleyheath 2227 185 Road blocked due to ice 2228 343 Four buses stuck on icy road 2229 176 Call re blockage at Elephant and Castle 2229 367 Two buses have lost control and blocked road 2230 450 Three x RTAs on hill 2230 36 Old call 2232 211 Old call 2237 405 Bus stuck in middle due to ice—passable 2241 119 Dangerous conditions 2242 Gritter on scene! 2243 254 Driver informing that there is ice on the road 2244 28 Road icy 2244 86 Driver stating that road is full of ice 2244 93 Road too icy—bus stuck 2245 68 Buses still approaching Herne Hill, 15 buses stuck 2249 52 Six buses stuck road too icy—possible RTC 2251 280 Driver stuck in ice, driver on phone to police 2252 63 Buses stuck in icy conditions—aware 2254 295 Old call 2254 49 Old call 2255 144 Old call 2256 37 Old call 2257 391 Old call 2257 264 TraYc at a crawl owing to icy conditions 2257 231 Old call 2258 200 Old call 2258 28 Old call 2259 171 Enq re Walworth Road diversion 2259 295 Old call 2259 249 Old call 2300 Old call 2300 X Old call 2300 X Old call 2302 28 Old call 2302 34 Old call 2302 58 Driver infoming that roads are icy 2302 157 Slippery in bus station 2303 23 Road too icy to proceed—already reported 2304 154 Old call 2305 363 Old call 2305 171 Old call 2306 39 Roads icy 2306 285 Old call 2306 Old call 2306 363 Stuck in icy conditions—aware 2307 100 Old call 2307 277 Driver advising that road is slippery 2308 320 Old call 2309 244 Buses curtailed to Woolwich Town Centre 2311 93 Bus stuck due to ice 2311 2 Road icy 2311 432 Stand is slippery 2313 295 Old call 2313 Old call 2313 135 Bus stuck on bus stand. Road part blocked 2313 23 Old call Processed: 22-05-2009 18:37:02 Page Layout: COENEW [O] PPSysB Job: 428353 Unit: PAG3

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Time Bus Description of call route 2314 414 Old call 2315 100 Old call 2316 455 Ice making road impassable at bridge 2316 70 Old call 2317 Old call 2317 23 Old call 2318 611 Old call 2318 316 Old call 2320 277 Route 135 unable to move due to ice, ﬁve buses stuck 2326 31 Bus stuck on exit to bus station 2328 380 Side roads in Charlton becoming too dangerous 2328 362 Old call 2329 450 Old call 2330 12 Bus unable to move skidding towards parked cars 2330 Old call 2338 2 Driver advising as ice 2341 5 Roads very slippery 2343 N550 Isle of Dogs 2345 U4 Icy road 2347 169 Route 25 jacknifed in Hainault Street 2348 38 Two route 38s stuck due to ice 2350 E3 Icy conditions 2350 264 Road blocked by ﬁve buses 2351 25 Bus skidding—aware 2352 281 Bus stand an ice rink 2355 328 10 buses stuck 2356 241 Many cars and buses blocked 2357 425 Road too icy to proceed at exit 2359 28 10 buses stuck

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