CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: A CONTESTATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN TURKEY
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY
SEMİH SAPMAZ
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
SEPTEMBER 2012 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences
______Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık Director
I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.
______Prof. Dr. Raşit Kaya Head of Department
This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.
______Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aslı Çırakman-Deveci Supervisor
Examining Committee Members
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fahriye Üstüner (METU, ADM) ______Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aslı Çırakman-Deveci (METU, ADM) ______Assist. Prof. Dr. H. Nalan Soyarık-Şentürk (BÜ, SİBU) ______
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.
Name, Last name: Semih SAPMAZ
Signature:
iii ABSTRACT
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: A CONTESTATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN TURKEY
Sapmaz, Semih
M. Sc., Department of Political Science and Public Administration Supervisor: Assoc. Dr. Aslı Çırakman-Deveci
September 2012, 139 pages
This thesis discusses the politics of conscientious objection in Turkey within a framework of citizenship. In this study citizenship is identified with being political and conceived as a process comprised of acts and practices. According to this conception, while practices reproduce the discourse of citizenship in a given context, acts are the deeds that challenge this discourse. Conscription, within this framework, is defined as a citizenship practice which re/produces the militaristic, nationalistic and gendered content of the Turkish citizenship. Conscientious objection is approached as an act of citizenship that contests and challenges the established citizenship regime in the country. This challenge and contestation is presented through the interviews with the conscientious objectors and activists as well as a review of the already published material by and on them. Conscientious objection challenges the citizenship regime in Turkey on three inter-related grounds: 1. It challenges and exposes the militaristic content of the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. 2. It challenges the political content of ‘Turkishness’ –that is the nationalistic content of Turkish citizenship- with particular reference to Kurdish issue; and 3. It challenges the prevailing gender roles and the values of hegemonic masculinity in Turkey.
iv Keywords: Conscientious Objection, Citizenship Practice, Acts of Citizenship, Conscription, Militarism
v ÖZ
VİCDANİ RET: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİNDE BİR VATANDAŞLIK TARTIŞMASI
Sapmaz, Semih
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Aslı Çırakman-Deveci
Eylül 2012, 139 sayfa
Bu tez, vatandaşlık kavramı kapsamında Türkiye’de vicdani reddin siyasetini tartışmaktadır. Bu çalışmada vatandaşlık kavramı siyasal olmakla özdeşleştirilmiş, pratik ve eylemlerden meydana gelen bir süreç olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu kavramsallaştırmaya göre pratikler verili bir bağlamdaki vatandaşlık söylemini yeniden üretiyorken, eylemler bu söyleme meydan okuyan ve ona karşı çıkan edimler olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu çerçevede zorunlu askerlik, Türkiye vatandaşlığının militarist, milliyetçi ve cinsiyetçi içeriğini yeniden üreten bir vatandaşlık pratiği olarak tanımlanmıştır. Vicdani ret ise ülkedeki kurulu vatandaşlık rejimine meydan okuyan ve ona karşı çıkan bir vatandaşlık eylemi olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu karşı çıkış ve meydan okumanın içeriğinin tartışması, vicdani retçiler ve aktivistlerle yapılan görüşmeler ile birlikte hâlihazırda vicdani retçiler tarafından yazılmış veya onlar üzerine yayınlanmış yazı ve röportajların değerlendirmesi yoluyla yapılmıştır. Buna göre vicdani reddin Türkiye’deki vatandaşlık rejimine birbiriyle ilişkili üç farklı zemin üzerinden meydan okuduğu sonucuna varılmıştır: 1. Vicdani ret Türkiye’deki vatandaşlık söyleminin militarist içeriğini ifşa etmekte ve ona meydan okumaktadır. 2. Özellikle Kürt meselesine değinerek ‘Türklük”ün siyasal içeriğine –yani Türkiye vatandaşlığının milliyetçi içeriğine- meydan okumaktadır. 3. Vicdani ret Türkiye’deki hâkim cinsiyet rollerine ve hegemonik erkeklik değerlerine karşı bir meydan okumadır.
vi Anahtar Kelimeler: Vicdani Ret, Vatandaşlık, Vatandaşlık Eylemleri, Zorunlu Askerlik, Militarizm
vii
to Kamile, Kenan and my Grandmother
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First of all, I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to my adviser Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aslı Çırakman-Deveci, for her guidance and patience throughout my MS study. This thesis could not be finalized without her moral as well as academic support and encouragement. I also wish to express my gratitude to the examining committee members for their critique and suggestions. I am grateful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fahriye Üstüner and Assist Prof. Dr. Nalan Soyarık- Şentürk for their critical comments and advices on this study which I have benefited a lot.
I also would like to thank each and every respondent of this study who did not hesitate to provide their support through sharing their stories and ideas. I am also grateful to Atalay Göçer, Erinç Seymen and Salih Canova who helped me in reaching my respondents and contributed to this study through their informative comments.
I would like to provide my special thanks to my friends from METU LGBTT Solidarity Club with whom I have learned how to act and struggle together. Their contribution has been crucial in making my years in METU such a great experience.
I am also grateful to my friends Seher, İlay, Kohei, Seven, Öykü, Soner, Erdem, Öznur, Müslüm and Elçin for sharing valuable times together and for being with me throughout my academic journey. Remzi Altunpolat, my housemate, has experienced all the stress I had in the last months of the thesis. I owe many thanks to him for all his patience and understanding.
ix This thesis could not be completed without the invaluable support of my family. I would like to dedicate the thesis to my parents, my brother and my grandmother who have always been with me with their love, patience and encouragement.
x TABLE OF CONTENTS
PLAGIARISM ...... iii
ABSTRACT ...... iv
ÖZ...... vi
DEDICATION ...... viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... xi
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
1.1 Conscientious Objection as a Phenomenon ...... 3
1.2 Conscientious Objectors in Turkey ...... 8
1.3 Theoretical Framework of the Study: Conscientious Objectors and Citizenship ...... 12
2. CITIZENSHIP AND CONSCRIPTION ...... 15
2.1 Citizenship as Being Political ...... 15
2.1.1 Being Political ...... 17 2.1.2 What Is It to Be a ‘Citizen’?...... 19 2.1.2.1 ‘Citizenship as Status’ vs. ‘Citizenship as Practice’ ...... 19 2.1.2.2 Acts of Citizenship ...... 22 2.1.3 Citizenship and Conscientious Objection ...... 25 2.2 Conscription as a Citizenship Practice ...... 27
2.2.1 Militarism as an Ideology and Militarization as a Process ...... 27 2.2.2 Conscription as a Militarizing and Nationalizing Citizenship Practice ...... 29 2.2.3 Conscription as a Gendering Practice of Citizenship ...... 33
xi 2.3 Conclusion ...... 36
3. CONSCRIPTION AS A CITIZENSHIP PRACTICE IN TURKEY ...... 37
3.1 Conscription as a Nationalizing and Militarizing Practice ...... 39
3.1.1 The Ottoman Era ...... 39 3.1.2 The Military-Nation and Conscription in Modern Turkey...... 45 3.1.2.1 Formation of the “Turkishness” and the “Military-Nation” in 1930s ...... 52 3.2 Conscription as a Gendering Practice in Turkey ...... 58
4. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN TURKEY ...... 62
4.1 Introduction ...... 62
4.2 Interviews ...... 63
4.2.1 Limitations and the Relevant Literature by the Conscientious Objectors ...... 64 4.3 The History of Conscientious Objection Movement in Turkey...... 65
4.4 The propositions of the Conscientious Objectors in Turkey ...... 78
4.4.1 Conscientious Objection and Antimilitarism in Turkey ...... 79 4.4.2 Conscientious Objection, Nationalism and the Kurdish Question .... 93 4.4.3 Conscientious Objection and Gendered Citizens ...... 99 4.4.4 Conscientious Objection as an ‘Act of Citizenship’ in Turkey ...... 109 5. CONCLUSION ...... 117
LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 126
APPENDICES ...... 136
Appendix A: List of Interviewees ...... 136
Appendix B: Questions ...... 137
Appendix C: Tez Fotokopi İzin Formu ...... 139
xii CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In December 1989 Tayfun Gönül, a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, declared that he was not going to carry out the ‘national service’ according to which he had to attend military for a while. 1 A few months later, in February 1990, another citizen of the country, Vedat Zincir, made a similar declaration that he was rejecting to perform compulsory military service. 2 Zincir was telling that “…whatever the reason may be, I cannot take place within a system that is oriented towards killing. It is my natural right to live in accordance with my own values… I do not want violence. I do not want to receive or give orders. Now, I actually can not understand why I am obliged to act in other way than this.” (Başkent 2011: 13) Through those sentences Vedat Zincir was declaring his ‘conscientious objection’, and his declaration was pretty much an unfamiliar proposition for the citizens of the Republic of Turkey at that moment of her history. 3 However, it is not to say that the phenomenon of conscientious objection became popular in Turkey since then. After more than 20 years since the first declaration of conscientious objection in Turkey, what the conscientious objectors are proposing is still scarcely regarded by the public opinion in the country. The aim of this study, then, is to make a contribution on the attempts to understand what those objectors propose as the ‘citizens’ of the Republic of Turkey. In other
1 http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2
2 Ibid.
3 Although the ‘deserters’ have not been a new phenomenon for the history of modern Turkey (Zürcher 2009), Gönül and Zincir’s case was pointing out a distinct attitude against the military service. They have been the first figures publicly declaring that they will not attend the military.
1 words, this study aims to discuss the political content of the phenomenon of conscientious objection in the case of Turkey.
What does the political content of the propositions of the conscientious objectors in Turkey? How do they challenge the discourse of citizenship in Turkey? The question of their challenge to Turkish citizenship constitutes the main theme of this study. In order to discuss the political content of conscientious objection, the concept of citizenship is going to be a key concept in this study. Conscientious objection, as will be discussed in the following pages, is simply objecting to perform military service which is considered as one of the basic citizenship practices in Turkey. Conscientious objection, therefore, has inevitable consequences on the discourse of citizenship considering the role of the military service in the reproduction of the ‘citizenship regime’ in Turkey. The question of citizenship, therefore, will provide the theoretical framework of this study. Indeed, the question of how to conceive citizenship is going to be discussed in the first chapter. Following that, since it is conscription that conscientious objectors provide a stance against, the role of conscription in the militarization, nationalization and gendering the “Turkish citizen” is going to be discussed in the second chapter. In other words, the second chapter is going to provide the discursive content of conscription as a citizenship practice in Turkey. In the third chapter, I am going to provide an analysis of my original research on conscientious objectors in Turkey.
In order to deal with my question I have conducted interviews with 11 active members of the conscientious objection movement in Turkey. While 8 out of 11 interviews were made through in-depth interview method, the remaining 3 interviews were made in a written form. In defining my sample I paid attention to the dates of the declaration of conscientious objection in order be able to reflect the path of the movement of conscientious objection in Turkey followed from the early 1990s up to today. Moreover the genders aspect was also given a particular attention in order to be able to reflect the claims of the women conscientious
2 objectors. The list of the interviewees and the questions can be reached through the Appendices. Following an analysis of the discourse of COs through the interviews, I am going to present my conclusions on the question COs’ challenge to the discourse of citizenship in Turkey.
1.1 Conscientious Objection as a Phenomenon
Although it was only by the end of 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the Republic of Turkey could encounter the phenomenon, one actually cannot claim that conscientious objection has been a recent phenomenon for the West. Even before the ‘soldier-citizen’ of the modern nation-state, one can trace back the existence of war resisters, objectors and pacifists in the Western history. The young Maximilian, who refused to perform military service in the Roman army in A.D. 295 due to his religious concerns as a Christian, is referred to be the first conscientious objection in the history (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 9; Sevinç 2006: 301). Starting from the 16 th century there have appeared different Protestant communities refusing to hold arms and participate to the wars (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 10-2; Zürcher 2009: 45). Following that religiously based pacifism, starting from the 19 th century, there have been conscientious objectors grounding their arguments on the secular reasons provided by the ideologies such as anti-militarism, anarchism, socialism, etc. (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 12-15; Zürcher 2009: 45). In the 20 th century, we can observe the increasing popularity of conscientious objection. Since the mid-1960s, we witness a dramatic increase in the number of ‘citizens’ refusing to perform military service, or to be drafted in many of the Western states (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 3,4). Moreover, conscientious objection started to be known and recognized by the former socialist states and some diverse societies and states such as South Africa, Israel, Switzerland, Cyprus, etc. since the late 1980s and early 1990s (Moskos and Chambers 1993; Sevinç: 2006: 315-16). It is a fact that today conscientious objection is a very well-known phenomenon, and accepted as a right by many
3 states in the world. Yet, what does it mean to recognize the right to conscientious objection? In other words, what shall we understand by the phenomenon of conscientious objection? Who is the conscientious objector?
According to Moskos and Chambers (1993: 5) a conscientious objector is the “person who refuses either to bear arms or to serve in the military or continue to serve in the military because of religious or moral beliefs that are opposed to killing…” In parallel with this definition of the ‘conscientious objector’, Sevinç (2006: 300) defines ‘conscientious objection’ as one’s objection to perform military service due to religious, political or ethical reasons. A similar definition is put forward by Gürcan (2007) where he is trying to find out whether the right to conscientious objection can be deducted from the European Convention on the Human Rights. According to him conscientious objection is “individual’s rejection to perform / to be made to perform military service due to religious, ethical or political reasons” (Gürcan 2007: 94). However it is important to keep in mind the fact that conscientious objection refers to phenomena larger than a rejection to bear arms. As Major (1992: 350) states it may “apply to a variety of situations in which an individual decides to follow the dictates of his conscience instead of the collective interest of society.” However, as Major (1992: 350) continues, “the most dramatic, and perhaps the most complex, form of conscientious objection relates to military service.” Moreover, it is a fact that conscientious objection basically appears as rejecting to perform the military service (Kardaş 2006: 39). However, one needs to further this definition of conscientious objection and the objector when different cases so far are considered. For instance, the question whether one needs to be an ‘anti-militarist’, in other words categorically a pacifist, in order to be defined as a conscientious objector is an important one. According to (Gürcan 2007: 93), what can be derived from the European Convention on the Human Rights is that in considering one’s right to conscientious objection, they are not the reasons behind an objection but it is the act of objection itself that should be taken into account to determine a deed as a conscientious objection. That is to say, different motivations may direct an individual to declare
4 conscientious objection. They are not those different motivations but it is the act of objection itself that should be considered in defining who the conscientious objector is. However in the following pages, when he is trying to find out who the objector is with respect to the precedent of the European Court of Human Rights and the relevant literature on the issue, he is concluding that in order one to be accepted as a conscientious objector in the light of the Convention, s/he needs to have a categorical position against any armed struggle. (Gürcan 2007: 96) According to this proposition, a deed of objection can not be circumstantial, or depending on a given conjuncture, but it is supposed to be universal, and objective as a result of the objector’s world-view or way of life. Indeed, following the definition of Moskos and Chambers (1993) given above, it seems that a conscientious objector is supposed to be against killing in any case. However, isn’t this sort of a definition of the conscientious objector reducing its meaning to anti- militarism? Cannot we mention about a circumstantial conscientious objection? The case of Enver Aydemir in Turkey is one of the obvious examples of a circumstantial objection. Aydemir does not hesitate to state that he is refusing to attend military only because he does not believe in the rightfulness of the Turkish Armed Forces, and he would rather be a soldier in an Islamic state, and not in the Turkish military. (Oral 2010: 111) As long as one considers the conscription policy in the Republic of Turkey, it wouldn’t be hard to imagine the consequences of his objection to military service. He was sentenced, tortured and deprived from his citizenship rights as the other ‘anti-militarist’, anarchist, socialist or pacifist objectors. 4 How are we going to evaluate his position then? According to the War Resisters’ International 5, Amnesty International 6, and the savaşkarsitlari.org 7
4 http://www.wri-irg.org/node/9483 ; http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=61615
5 http://www.wri-irg.org/node/9478
6 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/012/2010/en
7 The website of the anti-militarists’ and war resisters’ in Turkey; http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2
5 Aydemir is a conscientious objector. Yet, still the question remains; how can we define Aydemir as a conscientious objector?
According to Cockburn (2009: X) “[conscientious objection] offers a route, full of choices, from a limited and co-optable to a powerfully comprehensive form of resistance.” As she continues;
In any given country it may at the start take the form of refusing to fight a given war, or in a given theatre of war, or with particular weapons. It may progress to a more comprehensive refusal of compulsory military service, and thence seek a legal ‘right to refuse’. It may go beyond that again to refuse service to a militarized state in any form, even obligatory social service as an alternative to a stint in the armed forces. (Cocburn 2009: X)
In parallel with Cockburn, Major (1992: 350-1) identifies two kinds of objection, both of which can be titled as conscientious objection. While it is ‘pacifist objection to military service’ in which “an individual believes that it is wrong under all circumstances to kill,” there is also ‘partial objection to military service’ in which “the opposition to war is based on political ideals…” and the individual hold the idea that “war can be morally acceptable only in certain circumstances.” Following Major’s point we can turn back to Moskos and Chamber (1993). As we already mentioned their definition seems to be connoting an absolute anti-violence and anti-militarist attitude towards the military. However, in the following pages Moskos and Chambers (1993: 5) provide some sub-categories in order to make their definition of conscientious objection more comprehensive. Three reference points were mentioned to define those sub-categories; “the motivation of an objector”, “the scope of his/her beliefs”, and “his/her degree of willingness to corporate with the state”. According to their motivation, “conscientious objectors can be either religious COs… or secular COs.” 8 As they continue;
On the basis of the scope of their beliefs, conscientious objectors can be universalistic COs, who are opposed to all wars (these pacifists are the kind of COs most commonly recognized by the state), selective COs, who oppose a particular conflict, or discretionary COs, who reject the use of particular
8 ‘COs’ is used as an abbreviation for ‘conscientious objectors’.
6 weapons (primarily weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons). (Moskos and Chambers 1993: 5)
Finally they refer to the categories with respect to COs’ degree of willingness to corporate with the state. According to that there are groups: Noncombat COs who “are willing to serve in the military without bearing arms;” alternativist COs who “agree to participate in civilian alternative service in public or private agencies, in lieu of military service;” and finally absolutist COs who “refuse to cooperate with the authorities in any way in regard to the conscription system.”(Moskos and Chambers 1993: 5) In regard of this background, it is possible to consider Enver Aydemir as a conscientious objector then. One may be a universalist or pacifist conscientious objector, refusing to bear arms in any case, as a result of either religious or secular reasons, and refuse to make any corporation with the state as an absolutist, or as it is more prevalently used, ‘total’ objector. But also, referring to religious or secular reasons one may also ‘partially’ object to military service as a selective conscientious objector, just like Aydemir. This comprehensive definition of conscientious objection is important in an analysis on the case of Turkey, considering the application of compulsory military service by the Turkish state. Whatever the reason behind a decision to object to conscription for a citizen of the Republic of Turkey is, the consequences appear to be the same, because he is refusing a ‘compulsory’ citizenship duty, or s/he is alienating the Turkish people from the military and the military service. Therefore, conscientious objection is “a rejection of conscription owing to one’s conscience or religious, political, philosophical or similar convictions” whatever the content of those convictions are (Üsterci and Çınar 2009: 1; my emphasis). Whether one is referring to Islamic reasons which are not anti-militaristic, or to secular ones that are anti-militaristic or pacifist, the objection to conscription itself appears to be the point to be referred considering the consequences that the objector is facing. As long as one considers the meaning of the military service in the given discourse of citizenship in Turkey, the meaning of conscientious objection is going to be more clear.
7 1.2 Conscientious Objectors in Turkey
As it is already mentioned the phenomenon of conscientious objection has already been recognized as a right, and become a well-known concept by many states in the world. The case of Turkey, however, still provides a different story despite the increasing number of resisters to the military service in the last two decades. The following years, after Tayfun Gönül and Vedat Zincir’s objection, witnessed hundreds of men (and women, although women are not allowed to perform compulsory military service in Turkey) declaring that they are refusing to perform compulsory military service. Including Tayfun Gönül and Vedat Zincir, there have been more than four-hundred conscientious objectors that could be listed between 1989 and 2012. Moreover, including the war resisters who do not declare their conscientious objection publicly due to the given harsh consequences following that kind of a declaration, as well as the citizens applying every option to be exempt from the military service, 9 the actual number of resisters to the compulsory military service appears to be higher than this number. Despite the increasing numbers of objectors, and the men showing indirect resistance to be drafted, however, one can not mention about a corresponding public or academic attention on the phenomenon of conscientious objection in Turkey. Altınay (2004: 2) mentions that there is a lack of academic concern on the question of militarism as an idea in Turkey, in spite of its prevalence in the civilian life. Likewise there is a lack of academic concern on the phenomenon of conscientious objection. However it is likely that the increasing number of conscientious objectors in Turkey, and their organized political struggle, make their existence impossible to be ignored by the public attention today. 10 In addition, we can also see an
9 An example for this would be the gay, bisexual, travesty and transsexual citizens of the country. In Turkey, because the Turkish Armed Forces considers homosexuality as a psycho-sexual disorder, it offers ‘pink report’ to those citizens, and accepts them as noneligible for the military service. Many of those citizens then apply for this report to be exempt from the military service despite the humiliating procedures throughout the process. See (Biricik 2009).
10 A survey on the archives of popular newpapers in Turkey may reflect the fact that conscientious objectors are more visible on the public level in Turkey today. While it is not possible to find any link or news on Tayfun Gönül or Vedat Zincir in the archives of Hurriyet, Milliyet or Sabah, we
8 increasing concern on the propositions of conscientious objectors in the academia. 11 However, there is still so much to understand about the phenomenon of conscientious objection in the case of Turkey. This study is intended to contribute to this understanding process. In this study I aim to discuss the phenomenon of conscientious objection in the case of Turkey with respect to the given discourse of citizenship in the country. What exactly does a conscientious objector propose considering the discourse of citizenship in modern Turkey?
The question on the meaning of the conscientious objection can be understood through an examination on the meaning of what the objectors oppose. That is to say, to understand the proposition of the conscientious objectors in Turkey, one needs to, first of all, consider the meaning of military service in the discourse of citizenship in modern Turkey. To do this we can start by an overview of the relevant national law on the military service in Turkey.
As already mentioned, Tayfun Gönül, Vedat Zincir and the following hundreds of ‘citizens’ of the Republic of Turkey were conscientiously objecting to hold arms, or to act in other way than they believe, through rejecting to attend the military. However, by this rejection they were committing a crime according to the national law in Turkey. The Article 72 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey states that “[n]ational service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, either in the Armed Forces or in public service shall be regulated by law.” 12 While the Article leaves the proper regulation about the ‘national service’ to the specific codes, the Military Law of 21.06.1927 no. 1111 states that “in accordance with this law, every man
can find news about O. Murat Ülke, Mehmet Bal, Mehmet Tarhan, Halil Savda and some other relatively recent objectors.
11 For some of the studies concerning the case in Turkey see; Altınay (2004); Sevinç (2006); Gürcan (2007); Üsterci and Çınar (2009); Oral (2010); Yıldırım (2010).
12 http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REP UBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf
9 who is the citizen of the Republic of Turkey is obliged to do his military service” (Sevinç 2006: 306). Following the relevant regulations, we can summarize that every ‘healthy’ man who is 20 years old or older is obliged, by the given law, to attend military ranging from 6 months to 15 months in Turkey. Rejecting to attend military service, therefore, is not an option. Considering regulations in practice, not only its rejection but also the pronunciation of its rejection is even considered as crime. The Article 318 of the Turkish Panel Code prohibits any attempt, statement or action that may alienate the people from the military. 13 A conscientious objector in Turkey, then, commits a double crime as a citizen of the Turkish state; refusing to perform military service which is defined as an obligation for all healthy men by the given law; and at the same time, making a declaration which can easily be understood as an attempt to ‘discourage’ the citizens of the Republic of Turkey to perform military service, and ‘alienate’ them from the military service.
The given law on military service is the outcome the meaning attributed to military service by the discourse of ‘Turkish nation’. It is the militaristic content of the discourse of ‘Turkish nation’ and ‘Turkish citizenship’ what constitutes the legitimacy of these regulations on military service. The ‘myth of the military- nation’, which proposes that “Turkish nation is a military nation” (Altınay 2004: 14) explains the militaristic background of these regulations in law. Considering that proposition, the question of ideological background of Turkish citizenship is going to be the concern of this study in identifying the meaning of conscientious objection in the country. In other words, in this study, the discursive content of citizenship and conscientious is going to be in question.
Conscientious objectors represent a group of “outcast” in Turkish society. A reference to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on the case of
13 Article 318: (1) Persons who give incentives or make suggestions or spread propaganda which will have the effect of discouraging people from performing military service shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of six months to two years. (2) If the act is committed through the medium of the press and media, the penalty shall be increased by half.
10 Osman Murat Ülke would be helpful to me to clarify this point. The Republic of Turkey was convicted of violating the Article 3 of the European Convention on the Human Rights, and making the conditions of ‘civil-death’ for the conscientious objector Osman Murat Ülke by the European Court of Human Rights in its decision of 24 January 2006 (Yıldırım 2010: 85-6; Üsterci and Yorulmaz 2009: 76; Boyle 2009: 215). The term of ‘civil death’ was referring to the fact that Ülke was not let have the conditions that the citizens of the Republic of Turkey normally have. First of all, he was left into a vicious circle of imprisonment and release. He does not have a national identification card, and can not take part in any commercial activity. He is not able to get involved into an official political activity such as registering to political parties; he can not get an official record of residence, he even can not marry and adopt his own child (Boyle 2009: 215). In other words, he was stripped all his citizenship rights. His existence has not been recognized by the state of the Republic of Turkey. Referring to the European Court of the Human Rights, he is the ‘civil dead’; he is exposed to the conditions of ‘civil death’. A reference to this term of ‘civil death’, then, would explain why it is possible to refer conscientious objectors as ‘outcast’ with respect to the citizenship regime in Turkey. The term of ‘outcast’ is referring to conscientious objectors’ existence in the ‘margins’ of the citizenship regime in Turkey. Then, a consideration on the ‘marginal’ position of the conscientious objectors would also let us demonstrate the ‘limits’ of the citizenship regime in Turkey. As long the state’s attitude towards the objectors is considered, the disturbing content of their deed for the state becomes obvious. As Cockburn (2009: VIII) states “[t]he individual’s refusal to fight the state’s ‘enemies’, and the response to that disobedience, exposes the full extent of the state’s power.” In parallel with this point, Moskos and Chambers (1993: 3) states that “[c]onscientious objection is at the core of the individual's relationship to the state because it challenges what is generally seen as the most basic of civic obligations—the duty to defend one's country.” Conscientious objection provides a challenge against the state. Considering the cultural content attributed to the military service in Turkey, this challenge becomes more obvious. However the
11 content of this challenge is in need of further analysis. This analysis is going to be the central question of this study. The questions of how it touches upon the nationalistic, militaristic and gendered content of citizenship in Turkey; and to what extent it provides a “political” content are going to define the path I will follow in this study.
1.3 Theoretical Framework of the Study: Conscientious Objectors and Citizenship
In this study, the concept of citizenship is going to be conceived “as central to political subjectivity and [define] it as political activity involving a struggle for hegemony, possible at any site from an engagement with the state, in the economy, or in the everyday practices of identity formation” (Rasmussen and Brown 2002: 178). A citizenship conception that makes an emphasis on the ‘political activity’ of ‘citizens’ will let me have a “recognition of the complexity of political struggles by marginalized groups” such as conscientious objectors in Turkey (Rasmussen and Brown 2002: 176; my emphasis). That is to say, this study conceives citizenship as a political practice rather than a title corresponding to some official paper, or a ‘status’ provided by the state. It is conceived as an open process that corresponds to a continuous political struggle of the ‘citizens’ who are enacting themselves by that struggle for the expansion and re-definition of rights.(Işın and Wood 1999; Balibar 1994) In other words, instead of understanding citizenship as a concrete category that signifies an absolute category of rights and duties attributed to the citizens, who are no more than passive recipients of those rights and duties from the state, the concept is understood as a ‘process’ of struggles for rights by the self-enacting citizens (Işın and Wood 1999; Işın 2002). Then if we make an analytical distinction between ‘citizenship as a status’ and ‘citizenship as a process’ (Işın and Turner 2002), it is going to be the latter that this study will follow. That corresponds to understanding citizenship through an emphasis on “norms, practices, meanings, and identities”
12 (Işın and Turner 2002: 4). The ‘process’ in question can be inquired through an analysis on those ‘norms, practices, meanings, and identities’ therefore. However, it is important to note that this definition of ‘process’ covers the practices that reproduce the given discourse of citizenship as well as the deeds which challenge that discourse. Therefore, at this point we need another analytical distinction between those practices that reproduce a given citizenship regime, and those that challenge it. Regarding this point, Işın and Nielson (2008) mention about the distinction between the ‘practices of citizenship’ and ‘acts of citizenship’. They state that “[w]hereas citizenship practices like voting, paying taxes or learning languages appear passive and one-sided in mass democracies, acts of citizenship break with repetition of the same and so anticipate rejoinders from imaginary but not fictional adversaries” (Işın and Nielson 2008: 2; my emphasis). In other words “[acts of citizenship] instantiate ways of being that are political” (Işın and Nielson 2008: 2). Citizenship is, in that sense, nothing but ‘being political’ (Işın 2002). It is, first of all, corresponding to our capacity of being political. To address the question of the “political” I will apply to Ranciere (2001) at this point. According to him, politics should be conceived as “disclos[ing] the world of its subjects and its operations,” (Ranciere 2001: Thesis 8 section, para. 22) and addressing to the one “who is required to see the object and to hear the argument that he or she 'normally' has no reason to either see or hear” (para. 24). This is the way in which an ‘act of citizenship’ is being political. Following this terminology, we can claim that while the term of citizenship regime or citizenship discourse corresponds to a set of ‘citizenship practices’ that reproduce a given set of meanings; ‘acts of citizenship’ correspond to the resisting, challenging, rebelling or queering performances, or ‘deeds’ that challenge this regime or discourse (Işın and Nielson 2008: 2). Within this framework, I will question whether performing military service corresponds to a ‘citizenship practice’ while declaring conscientious objection is an ‘act of citizenship’ in this study.
In the first chapter I am going to present an elaborated presentation of the theoretical framework of the study. In the second chapter I will provide an
13 overview of on the content of compulsory military service as a practice of citizenship in Turkey. This is going to be an analysis on the norms and meanings which are reproduced through the practice of military service. Following this background, in the third chapter, I will be able to deal with the question how the phenomenon of conscientious objection can be considered as an ‘act of citizenship’ in the case of Turkey.
14 CHAPTER 2
CITIZENSHIP AND CONSCRIPTION
As it is mentioned in the introduction chapter, the question of citizenship will provide the theoretical background of this study. In this chapter, firstly the question of citizenship and the relevant conceptual tools to evaluate the concept are going to be discussed. As the question of conscientious objection represents a stand against conscription, in the second section of the chapter the political content of conscription as a citizenship practice is going to be discussed. A particular attention will be paid to conscription’s militarizing, nationalizing and gendering content.
2.1 Citizenship as Being Political
Citizenship, just like many other key concepts of our times, can be articulated to distinct political discourses (Hall and Held 1995). While a neoliberal ideologist, or a politician, may refer to citizenship as a tool to relax the harsh consequences of the lack of welfare policies in order to facilitate the settling of a neoliberal agenda, the concept may also be applied as a conceptual tool to attack those neoliberal policies by the other actors (Hall and Held 1995). Therefore the concept of citizenship can not be attributed to a single political discourse whether it belongs to the right or the left. It is obvious, then, if one refers to the concept of citizenship, s/he needs to clarify the content of the citizenship that s/he refers. In this study, a definition of citizenship relevant with the question of the ‘political’ as provided above is going to be provided.
15 As mentioned, there is a wide range of different approaches to citizenship in the literature. Kadıoğlu (2008: 21), for instance, mentions about four different reference points in the literature in defining the concept; ‘citizenship as a national identity or nationality’; ‘citizenship that is defined on the basis of ‘documents’’; citizenship that is defined on the basis of ‘rights’’; and finally ‘citizenship that is defined on the basis of ‘duties and responsibilities’. Işın and Turner (2002: 4) refer to three historical trajectories as liberal state, corporatist state and social democratic state; all of which reflects different interpretation of citizenship. There are three modern political theories about citizenship that roughly correspond to those three types of states and grow out of those trajectories; liberalism 14 , which makes strong emphasis on the individual; communitarianism 15 which makes an emphasis on the community whether one conceives it as society or nation; and finally republicanism 16 which not only refers to individual and group rights, but also makes a strong emphasis on the processes of participation, and the role of conflict and contest in the expansion or construction of rights. Instead of these traditional approaches to citizenship, however, this study approaches to citizenship through a conception of “being political” which lays stress on the emancipatory politics of the ‘outcast’. This is, as will be discussed in the following sections, a conception of citizenship which conceives the concept as a process comprised of acts and practices. An approach to citizenship framed by a reference to “being political” will provide the basis on which the political content of conscientious objection in Turkey will be discussed in this study. Before having a more comprehensive discussion on the meaning of citizenship in this study, therefore, an overview of what is meant by “being political” would be helpful at this point.
14 Walzer (1989); Schuck (2002); Pocock (1995)
15 Delanty (2002); Sandel (1982); Oldfield (1990); O’Neill (1997); Frazer (1999)
16 Dagger (2002); Oldfield (1990); Petit (1997)
16 2.1.1 Being Political
In one of his articles on ‘the political’, Jacques Ranciere (1992) offers a definition which would easy our path to achieve an understanding on how to conceive citizenship in this study. According to him “the political is the encounter between two heterogeneous processes,” namely ‘the process of governing’ and ‘the process of equality’. (Ranciere 1992: 58) While the former corresponds to a process of “creating community consent, which relies on the distribution of shares and the hierarchy of places and functions,” the latter “consists of a set of practices guided by the supposition that everyone is equal and by the attempt to verify this supposition” (Ranciere 1992: 58). Ranciere prefers to call the former as policy , and the latter as emancipation . It is the encounter between those through which “the political” emanates. The political, then, corresponds to a process which is comprised of the dissatisfied demands to equality against the policy . The process of governing corresponds to ‘identification of politics with the self of a community’ with its hierarchical structure. The principle of the policy is “to turn the techniques of governing into natural laws of the social order” (Ranciere 1992: 59). Therefore, within a frame provided by the policy , politics is reduced to the community consent. However, according Ranciere “politics is not the enactment of the principle, the law, or the self of a community… [it] has no arche, it is anarchical” (Ranciere 1992: 59); or as he states in his prominent text ‘Ten Theses on Politics’ “[it] is a specific rupture in the logic of arche” (Ranciere 2001: Thesis 3 section, para. 9), which means that “[p]olitics is not the exercise of power” (Ranciere 2001: Thesis 1 section, para. 1). It should be sought in the equality demands of proletarians in his terminology. Here the name of proletarian , going beyond its use in the orthodox Marxist notion, is used as “the name of an outcast;” in other words, it is “the name of those who are denied identity in a given order of policy , …who do not belong to the order of castes, indeed those who are pleased to undo this order” (Ranciere 1992: 61; My emphasis). The equality demands of those who are ‘outcast’ would realize their emancipation . It is, therefore, in the encounter of the policy and the emancipation that we need to look upon to
17 understand “the political”. In other words, “policy wrongs equality,” and according to Ranciere, the political is “the place where the verification of equality is obliged to turn into the handling of a wrong” (Ranciere 1992: 59). To sum up, the political is the name of a process in which equality is to challenge the order of policy . This content of the political as a process , which is comprised of a struggle against policy , is going to provide the framework of this study in evaluating the political existence of the COs in Turkey. Following this sort of a framework on “the political”, our analysis will require further clarification on the question of subject of this process . Indeed, the question of subject is being addressed as a crucial aspect of ‘the political’ by Ranciere. According to him “[w]hat is proper to politics is the existence of a subject defined by its participation in contrarieties” (Ranciere 2001: Thesis 2 section, para. 6). As he continues;
If there is something specific about politics that makes it something other than a more capacious mode of grouping or a form of power characterized by its mode of legitimation, it is that it involves a distinctive kind of subject considered, and it involves this subject in the form of a mode of relation that is its own. This is what Aristotle means when, in Book I of the Politics , he distinguishes between political rule (as the ruling of equals) from all other kinds of rule; or when, in Book III, he defines the citizen [My emphasis, S.S.] as 'he who partakes in the fact of ruling and the fact of being ruled.' Everything about politics is contained in this specific relationship, this ' part-taking ' [ avoir-part ], which should be interrogated as to its meaning and as to its conditions of possibility. (Ranciere 2001: para. 1)
In an attempt to interrogate this relationship of part-taking ‘ as to its meaning and as to its conditions of possibility’, as Ranciere’s reference to Aristotle shows, the question of citizenship provides a valuable base. According to that the political can be conceived through a consideration on the subject who ‘part-takes’. Citizenship, in that sense, is closely linked with “being political”. Indeed as Işın (2002: 1) states by reference to the experience of the West, throughout the history “citizenship has expressed a right to being political, a right to constitute oneself as an agent to govern and be governed, deliberate with others, and enjoin determining the fate of the polity to which one belongs” (Işın 2002: 1). This is the way in which “ [e]very age since the ancient Greeks fashioned an image of being political based upon citizenship” in the West (Işın 2002: 1). Citizenship, within this framework, reflects
18 “intense struggles, conflicts, and violence to wrest the right to becoming political from dominant groups, which never surrendered it without struggle... [Those] social struggles often determined the content (rights and obligations) and extent (criteria of inclusion) of citizenship” (Işın 2002: 2). That is to say, citizenship has expressed the process of part-taking which corresponds to a struggle of those ‘outcasts’ for equality against policy , or “dominant groups” in Işın’s terminolgy.
Considering the particular attention paid on the relation between being political and citizenship, a reference to the radical democratic conception of citizenship would also be helpful at this point. Rasmussen and Brown (2002: 176) defines radical democratic citizenship as “a reinvigoration of citizenship and recognition of the complexity of political struggles by marginalized groups.” According to Mouffe (1992: 2) citizenship is an idea to revive . It is through this revival, according to Mouffe, “[citizenship] might provide the rallying cry of all democratic forces in the attempt to defeat neo-liberalism.” Citizenship, therefore, is presented as a sphere within which the political as a struggle occurs.
2.1.2 What Is It to Be a ‘Citizen’?
Following the framework provided above the link between “being political” and citizenship becomes inevitable. Correspondingly, as long as conscientious objection is approached through a perspective framed by the question of the political, citizenship provides a valuable base to evaluate its content. Following this background we can now have a more elaborated discussion on the meaning of citizenship as it is approached in this study. The theoretical distinction between “citizenship as status” and “citizenship as practice” will be critical at this point.
2.1.2.1 ‘Citizenship as Status’ vs. ‘Citizenship as Practice’
19 The distinction between citizenship as status and citizenship as practice is crucial to address the question of the political content of citizenship. Turner’s criticism to Mann’s thesis on citizenship would be helpful at this point to clarify what is meant by this distinction. 17 While criticizing Mann as underestimating and ignoring the political content of citizenship, and comparing his approach with that of Engels’s, 18 Turner (1992: 45) notes that “[i]n ideal-typical terms, and as a heuristic device for the development of theory, we can either regard rights as privileges handed down from above in return for pragmatic cooperation (Mann's thesis), or we can regard rights as the outcome of radical struggle by subordinate groups for benefits (Engels's thesis).” The distinction that Turner refers here is about conceiving citizenship either from “above” as a category that represents the rights and duties granted by the authority (the state), or from “below” as a struggle of the subordinated against dominant groups. Following this differentiation between the “above” and the “below”, Turner is pointing out the need to recover our understanding of citizenship and cease to ignore its “political” content. Citizenship can not be reduced to “status” according to him. In order to express its “political” content Ettienne Balibar identifies citizenship as a fragile concept in one of his lectures. 19 It is fragile because “it has always been at stake struggles and the object of transformations”. Indeed, it marks only a temporary equilibrium considering its absolute and thematized content in a moment of history. That is to say, it may mark another content in another context considering the prevailing power relations. Within this framework, its ‘status’ content marks no more than the conditions of a temporary equilibrium in a moment, in a given context
17 See Mann (1987). In his paper, Mann evaluates T. H. Marshall’s thesis on citizenship provided in his prominent work of Citizenship and Social Class (1950). Mann mentions about five citizenship strategies (liberal, reformist, authoritarian, monarchist, fascist and authoritarian socialist) within a historical framework. Following this background Mann conceives citizenship through a consideration on the ruling-class strategies.
18 Turner summarizes Engels’s approach through a quotation from him. As Engels states “in the same way bourgeois demands for equality were accompanied by proletarian demands for equality. From the moment when the bourgeois demand for the abolition of class privileges was put forward alongside it appeared the proletarian demand for the abolition of classes themselves – at first in religious form, leaning towards primitive Christianity, and later drawing support from the bourgeois equalitarian theories themselves. (Engels 1959: 146-7)” (Quoted in Turner 1992: 44-5).
19 ‘Antinomies of Citizenship’; Lecture given in University of London in 12 May 2009.
20 (Balibar 1988: 724). Following Işın (2002)’s terminology, we can identify those conditions as consequent images of citizenship . Within this framework, a conception of citizenship that merely refers to citizenship as a “status” reduces its content to an image of the citizen. The image in question is constituted through the struggles and transformations of the subjects of a given context. As Işın (2002: 2) states “[t]hroughout the history citizenship has been associated with particular forms of identity: aristocrats, warriors, merchants, nobles, and the bourgeoisies claimed the rights to being political, and constitut[ed] themselves as citizens.” Within this context “[w]hat the peasants demanded, the plebeians dreamed, the artisans claimed, and the workers sought have been of less concern. We have been given these images by the victorious citizens themselves, who established narrative continuities and affinities between themselves and historical forms of citizenship” (Işın 2002: 2). As “the images of being political bequeathed to us come from the victors ”, the consequent images of citizenship , in consequence, are determined through the discourse of those victors . (Işın 2002: 2; My emphasis).
Following this framework, a practice-based understanding of citizenship would provide us the theoretical background to expose the political and discursive content of “consequent images of citizenship” in their particular contexts. Conceiving citizenship through practices would bring us the theoretical tools we need to expose the victorious ‘citizen’ with its corresponding ‘narrative continuities and affinities’. This exposition of the victor would, simultaneously be the exposition of the ‘outcast’ of a given policy , of a given discourse of citizenship, or of a given image of citizenship as well.
Conceiving citizenship through practices, in other words, will let this study approach to the conscientious objectors within a framework of “intense struggles, conflicts, and violence to wrest the right to becoming political from dominant groups, which never surrendered it without struggle” (Işın 2002: 2). They are those social struggles that determine the content (rights and obligations) and extent (criteria of inclusion) of a consequent image of citizenship in a given context (Işın
21 2002: 3). That is the reason why “investigating citizenship historically ought to require contrasting the claims of citizens against the claims of their others...” or this is the reason why “[r]ather than focusing on the glorious images given to us by the victors, it [is] more revealing to problematize the margins or points of contact where the inside and outside encounter, confront, destabilize, and contest each other” (Işın 2002: 3). The outsider, or the ‘outcast’ as Ranciere names, can also be named as the non -citizen within this framework; a non -citizen considering the consequent image of the citizen in a given context. 20
Following this background, as long as this study will refer to citizenship regime or discourse of citizenship in the context of Turkish citizenship, this reference will pose the “consequent image of citizenship” in the country, provided by the ‘victors’ of the country, and reflecting the conditions of temporary equilibrium in the country. This background will help me to evaluate the “political” content of conscientious objection with respect to the discourse of citizenship in Turkey.
2.1.2.2 Acts of Citizenship
Following the background provided above, we can conclude that citizenship, with its political content, corresponds to a process ; a process of being political. The concept is referred to explain self-enacting and self-constituting subjects of the political, which requires an understanding of citizenship by reference to practices rather than status. Following this background, a further explanation on the meaning of these practices would be helpful at this point.
Although we refer to practices to conceptualize citizenship as being political, it is not possible to claim that each and every practice is about being political, or is about challenging a given policy . Indeed, as Işın (2008: 17) states the shift from status to practices in citizenship studies has resulted in the production of studies
20 See Işın (1996), (2002).
22 dealing with routines , rituals , customs , norms and habits of everyday life to explain how subjects become citizens. In this section, then, a further articulation on what is meant by ‘practices’ is going to be provided. Işın’s (2008) distinction between ‘practices’ and ‘acts’ of citizenship is going to be helpful at this point.
According to Işın (2008: 17) practices correspond to those “routines, rituals, customs, norms and habits of the everyday through which subjects become citizens.” While throughout this chapter the “citizenship as practice” is referred to explain being political, according to Işın, a mere focus on the practices themselves does not reflect a “political” point. At this point the question of “how subjects become claimants when they are least expected or anticipated to do so” is in need of a consideration (Işın 2008: 17). It is, in other words, asking the question of “how subjects become claimants under surprising conditions or within a relatively short period of time” (Işın 2008: 17). At this point Işın mentions about the moments of breaks with a given conduct of citizenship. The “acts of citizenship”, according to Işın, explains those “creative breaks”. These are the momentous acts that require “the summoning of courage, bravery, indignation, or righteousness to break with habitus” (Işın 2008, 18). 21 It is not possible to consider the political or to answer “how subjects become citizens as claimants of justice, rights and responsibilities” without a consideration of such “creative breaks” (Işın 2008: 18). Following this background, Işın provides a distinction between practices and acts : Acts are breaking with and challenging the policy (in Ranciere’s terminology), while the practices are reproducing it. According to Işın (2008: 18) “acts cannot be reduced to practices because to enact oneself as a citizen involves transforming oneself from a subject into a claimant, which inevitably involves a break from habitus.” Investigating citizenship, following this, should be through investigating ‘disruption’ or ‘rupture’ rather than ‘order’ according to Işın (2008: 20). It is, in other words, valuing rupture over routine; and deviation over habit (Işın 2008: 20).
21 Işın (2008: 17) provides a brief definition of the concept of ‘habitus’ as “internalized or embodied ways of thought and conduct”.
23 Following the distinction between practices and acts, Işın (2008: 38) also proposes another distinction that is between the ‘activist’ and the ‘active’ citizens. 22 While the activist citizen is the one who acts , according to him, the active citizen is the one “who act out already written scripts;” that is, in other words, “while activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene, active citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created. While activist citizens are creative, active citizens are not” (Işın 2008: 38).
In this study, Işın’s distinction between the ‘acts of citizenship’ and ‘citizenship practices’ is going to be considered two minor categories under the major title of ‘citizenship as practice’. Therefore, as the major distinction in understanding citizenship between ‘citizenship as status’ and ‘citizenship as practice’ is kept, those concepts of the ‘act’ and the ‘practice’ are going to help this study to grasp how citizenship can be conceived as being ‘political’. To sum up, while it is through ‘practices’ that a given policy or a citizenship regime is maintained and reproduced on the discursive level, acts are the ‘rebellious’, ‘creative’ and challenging deeds against that given policy , or citizenship regime .
To achieve an investigation on the ‘acts of citizenship’, the dialogical character of the enactment of citizenship is in need of a consideration. As Işın (2008: 18) states, “an enactment inevitably creates a scene where there are selves and others defined in relation to each other.” This relational aspect of that scene connotes “fluid subject positions in and out of which subjects move” rather than fixed identities (Işın 2008: 19). This is the way in which Işın mentions ‘the dialogical
22 Işın also mentions about the distinction between ‘acts’ and ‘actions’ at this point to reach that distinction of the ‘activist’ and the ‘active’ citizens. According to Işın ‘acts’ are different from ‘actions’ (while still being related) in the way that; while an act, just like an action, indicates a doing that corresponds to a motion, it is necessary for an act to realize a rupture or break in a given order or order of practices, or habitus. That is to say, while an act “indicate[s] transcendent qualities (this is called ontological) of an action,… an action indicates a deed, a performance, something that is done (this is called ontic)” (Işın 2008: 25). “The essence of an act”, in a broad sense, is “an expression of the need to be heard,” and that brings us to the point where “acts are ruptures or beginnings” in a given habitus (Işın 2008: 24-27). This very brief explanation on the difference between acts and actions is of course not an exhaustive one. See Işın (2008: 23-25).
24 principle of citizenship’ which connotes ‘being’ as ‘always being with the other than selves’; or, in other words, which is to say “being-in means being with other” by reference to Heidegger (Işın 2008: 47). Neither an emphasis on the practices as the tools of maintaining a given policy nor an emphasis on the ‘actor’ who is enacting, but an emphasis on the ‘acts’ would help to grasp this dialogical principle of citizenship. Indeed as Işın (2008, 34) states related with the question of the ‘actor’, we can not directly refer to the ‘actor’ to understand citizenship since s/he “is produced through the scene [provided by the acts] and is constituted by the act itself” (Işın 2008: 34). In other words “[a]cts produce actors and actors do not produce acts;” actors are only the ones who “actualize acts and themselves through action” (Işın 2008: 37). In other words, they are the acts of citizenship that “produce citizens and their others” (Işın 2008: 37). It is through an inquiry on the ‘acts’ as Işın (2008) proposes, therefore, the dialogical characteristic of citizenship can be conceived. To sum up, since it is a continuous subjectification and transformation that is in question, they are the ‘acts’ that would help us to conceive that dynamic characteristic of citizenship as a process .
In summary, as we approach citizenship as ‘being political’, it is “[t]hrough orientations (intentions, motives, purposes), strategies (reasons, manoeuvres, programmes) and technologies (tactics, techniques, methods) as forms of being political, beings enact solidaristic, agonistic and alienating modes of being with each other” (Işın 2008: 37). Following this, the distinction between ‘practices’ and ‘acts’ helps to evaluate those solidaristic, agonistic and alienating modes of being in a more elaborate manner, and to consider the dialogical characteristic of citizenship considering the ‘citizens’ and ‘ non -citizens’, or the ‘outcasts’.
2.1.3 Citizenship and Conscientious Objection
Citizenship, to sum up, is conceived as a ‘process’ within which the subjects are ‘acting’ and being ‘political’ to provide emancipatory challenges to the given
25 images of citizenship. These challenges are carried out by the ‘acts’ or the ‘acts of citizenship’. These are the deeds that disturb a given citizenship regime which corresponds to a temporary equilibrium in a moment of history, in a given geography. That is the way in which we refer to the ‘acts of citizenship’ as political interventions from the subject positions in, or out of, the margins or limits of a given discourse of citizenship . Following this, to sum up, in this study the concept of citizenship is applied to grasp the ‘political’ in a given discourse of citizenship through the concept of ‘acts of citizenship’, which refer to a politics of emancipation that exposes and challenges the content of the victors ’ discourse.
As this study is aiming to provide an analysis on the political content of conscientious objection in the case of modern Turkey, this theoretical background is going to provide me the conceptual tools I need to evaluate conscientious objection in Turkey. Conscientious objection, following this background, corresponds to a deed that is not welcomed by the prevailing citizenship regime in the country. It is a performance providing a stand against one of the basic citizenship duties, conscription, in Turkey. Considering the ‘cultural’ content of the military service in Turkish citizenship, as it is going to be discussed in the second chapter, conscientious objection creates inevitable consequences on the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. Following this framework, conscription is approached as a ‘citizenship practice’ which reproduces the political content of the discourse of citizenship in Turkey; it is a determinant in the definition of the ‘margins’ of the citizenship regime in the country. This even becomes obvious as long as one considers the conditions of ‘civil death’ conscientious objectors are imposed in Turkey (Üsterci and Yorulmaz 2009; Boyle 2009; Üçpınar 2009). It demonstrates that conscientious objection, regardless of the particular intentions of the conscientious objectors –that is whether they are anarchists, antimilitarists, Islamists or socialists- disturbs the discourse of citizenship in the country. Conscientious objection, therefore, should be corresponding to a political deed touching upon citizenship within this framework. Objecting to conscription, in other words, should have inevitable consequences on the discourse of citizenship
26 in the country. Following the theoretical background provided above, approaching to conscientious objection through a framework of citizenship will let us make an evaluation on the content of these consequences. The conceptual tools provided in this chapter, in other words, will let this study analyze the political content of conscientious objection in Turkey.
Following this framework, in the next section, the content of conscription as a practice is going to be discussed following the relevant literature. Before moving to the specific case of Turkey in the second chapter, this presentation of the literature on the content of conscription will let us define the framework within which conscription can be evaluated within specific contexts.
2.2 Conscription as a Citizenship Practice
2.2.1 Militarism as an Ideology and Militarization as a Process
An inquiry on the proposition of conscientious objection in Turkey is going to have inevitable references to the concepts of “military”, “militarism” and “militarization”. To start with a brief definition of the concepts would be helpful therefore. In order to define these concepts I will apply to Altınay’s (2004: 2) differentiation as; “military as a social institution, militarism as an ideology, and militarization as a social process.” While militarism corresponds to a set of values and corresponding practices, militarization corresponds to “a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being, on militaristic ideas” (Enloe 2000: 3). It is a process which involves “cultural as well as institutional, ideological, and economic transformations” (Enloe 2000: 3), which “happens over time – sometimes rapidly, though often at a slow, ard-to-spot creep” (Enloe 2007: 3-4). It is a process of achieving “a discourse of ‘‘normalcy’’ in public discussions surrounding the power of the military in civilian life, politics, economics, and
27 people’s self-understandings” (Altınay 2004: 2). As Enloe (2000: 3) states “[t]he more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal ” (My emphasis).
To describe how militarism and militarization is practiced Alfred Vagts’s concept of “civilian militarism” will also be helpful at this point. In order to define militarism, Vagts (1967: 13), first of all, refers to a distinction between ‘militarism’ and ‘the military way’. According to him;
the military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure. It is limited in scope, confined to one function, and scientific in its essential qualities. Militarism, on the other hand, presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes… Its influence is unlimited in scope. It may permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts. Rejecting the scientific character of the military way, militarism displays the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief.
Following this definition of militarism, we can conclude that the role of civilians deserves more attention than the ones in uniform in order to address militarization of the society. Indeed, as Enloe (2007: 4) states “[m]ost of the people in the world who are militarized are not themselves in uniforms. Most militarized people are civilians.” Therefore, we need a particular attention on “civilian militarism”. Vagts (1967: 453) defines the civilian militarism as;
the unquestioning embrace of military values, ethos, principles, attitudes; as ranking military institutions and considerations above all others in the state; as finding the heroic predominantly in military service and action, including war— to the preparation of which the nation’s main interest and resources must be dedicated, with the inevitability and goodness of war always presumed.
It is, in other words, the contempt of the civilian “for civilian politics, parliamentarism, parties, the hatred of civilian supremacy, of trade, of labor, and of diplomacy” (Vagts 1967: 453). Therefore, it is “to see military solutions as particularly effective, to see the world as a dangerous place best approached with
28 militaristic attitudes” (Enloe 2007: 4). Those militaristic attitudes and the military values, opposed to civilian ones, can be summarized very roughly as follows: A belief in hierarchy, obedience, and the use of force; and a glorification of death opposed to life through the discourse of martyrdom; which is, in other words, a definition of patriotism as being ready to kill or die for the country (Altınay 2003: 138-9; Enloe 2007: 4).
As long as militarization is the name of the process that re/produces militarism as an ideology, the ideology of militarism can not be inquired without a consideration on the practices that enables this process. Following this point, conscription, as a citizenship practice, appears to be a central point of reference.
2.2.2 Conscription as a Militarizing and Nationalizing Citizenship Practice
Compulsory military service is a modern military practice whose first application was seen in France, after the Revolution, in the final decade of the 18 th century (Yıldız 2009: 132; Vagts 1967: 108-9). The right to carry weapons, as Aydın (2009: 17) states, “ceased being a privilege of the nobility and military rank ceased being a status bought with money,” that it “was granted to all citizens.” Following the experience in France, throughout the 19 th century conscription as a military strategy as well as a strategy of forming citizen-armies, applied in different forms, ways and degrees throughout the European states including the Ottoman Empire (Aydın 2009; Aksan 1999; Yıldız 2009; Lucassen and Zürcher 1999; Zürcher 1999). Indeed it has been a process of establishing ‘the people’s armies’, or the citizens-armies of the nation-states that was in question throughout the 19 th and 20 th centuries.
Following Vagts’s distinction between the ‘military way’ and ‘militarism’, conscription has been one the primary citizenship practices that enabled the normalization of the values associated with militarism in modern societies.
29 Conscription -along with the institution of the compulsory education system- has been one of the very basic tools of achieving this process of normalization for the modern states (Altınay and Bora 2009: 140). In order to identify this content of military service we can firstly refer to men’s experience of military discipline within the barracks. For the ones who are recruited, as Whitworth (2004: 156) states,
the process of military indoctrination begins immediately upon arrival, when all evidence of the recruit’s civilian life is stripped away: clothing, hair, and most belongings. New recruits are separated from families, undergo tests of physical endurance and sleep deprivation, and forces to participate in numerous arbitrary, often mundane, and apparently irrelevant tasks. All have the same shaved heads, the same uniforms, eat the same food, sleep in the same uncomfortable beds, and must conform to the same expectations and follow the same rules.
These disciplinary practices remain throughout the duration of military service. Soldiers’ freedom of movement is restricted within and without the borders of the barracks; the ways in which they can and can not behave, the places where they can and can not go are strictly defined and checked by other appointed soldiers (Peker Dogra 2010: 439-40). Even the architectural structure of the barracks reflects a disciplinary content that the ‘inside’ is strictly separated from the ‘outside’ (through wire fences, walls, gates and the guarding soldiers); and that the interior design of the barracks is thoroughly made as a field of discipline with the dorms, dining halls, fields of training, etc. (Peker Dogra 2010: 440). Moreover, soldiers’ relation to time is also strictly arranged through strict timetables which aim to control each moment of the individual soldier (Peker Dogra 2010: 440). 23 Their minds and bodies are disciplined through these practices of military indoctrination. The outcome becomes the ‘productive’ but ‘obedient’ bodies (Altınay 2004: 63). A reference to Foucault’s definition of discipline would be helpful at this point. Discipline, as Foucault (1995: 138) states;
23 Following an analysis on the practice of conscription in Turkey, Peker Dogra (2010) notes that despite the strict characteristic of these procedures, rules and practices, they can still be broken by the soldiers. However each break from these rules results in another disciplinary process because these breaks result in an ambiguity in the operation of power where the concerns about getting caught become dominant; and this ambiguity results in an increasing pressure on the soldiers’ practices (Peker Dogra 2010: 444-5).
30
produces subjected and practices bodies, ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power form the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a ‘capacity’, which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.
The military indoctrination, through its disciplinary content, results in the obedient –‘docile’- bodies which are productive at the same time. Following these practices of indoctrination, conscription has never been a practice that is simply within the barracks and merely related with the military, but it has been a citizenship practice that plays a crucial role in the militarization of the entire society. Its influence goes beyond the borders of the barracks and affects the lives of each and every citizen whether s/he is recruited or not. As Aydın (2009: 17) states conscription
does not only pose a quantitative issue, but also manifests as a phenomenon that encompasses all stages of human life and involves the recruitment of groups that were previously not expected to serve in the military – such as women and children – or causes them to be directly affected by the conditions of war.
As Vagts (1967: 15) states militarism “flourishes more in peacetime than in war”. What has been provided through conscription as a citizenship practice is a break from the identification of the military with war (Altınay and Bora 2009: 143). The military is not serving merely in the war time anymore. This results in the popularization of the military values among the civilians in peace time as well. The need to security is emphasized and the idea that the world is a dangerous place becomes popular. Conscription, as a militarizing practice, plays a central role within this process.
As Altınay and Bora (2009: 140) states militarization and nationalization are two intermingled processes that construct and re/produce each other in a reciprocal manner. Conscription has a critical role in the formation of these relational processes. Military service enables modern states produce ‘obedient’ subjects where to kill or die for the country becomes a matter of virtue. Modern militaries have taught those subjects to value the interests of the state above any of their
31 individual interests that even they would not hesitate to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their state (Bröckling 2008: 24). The introduction of conscription as a citizenship practice in the 19 th century, as Aydın (2009: 17) notes, was indicating a new process “whereby a nation in its entirety became the actor of war and the state devoted all its attention to mobilizing these masses with feelings of patriotism and keeping them ready for war.” The ‘feeling of patriotism’ and the idea of ‘homeland’, in other words, were critical within this process. These have been the ‘sentimental requirements’ to form and maintain the citizen-armies. Military service requires these sentiments because as a ‘right’ and ‘duty’ to carry weapons for all the citizens it “does not promise any individual or direct benefit, as it did in the Middle Ages” as Aydın (2009: 18) notes. Military service, within this framework, requires the ideology of nationalism whose “base will primarily consist of the concept of ‘homeland’” (Aydın 2009: 18). As Aydın (2009: 18) continues;
…the construction of a framework in which conscripted citizens still say ‘long live our country’ in the face of all manner of material and emotional losses would require the indoctrination of those to be conscripted towards this end, and, more importantly, persuasion to commit altruistic acts in the name of this abstraction. In fact, it has been necessary to turn the losses suffered ‘in the name of the country and the nation’ into a matter of honour, privilege and respectability in social thought
Conscription, as a field of indoctrination, also serves in the re/production of those sentiments that it needs for its survival. As it will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter while pointing out the nationalizing capacity of conscription in the case of Turkey, military service corresponds to a practice “through which the soldier learns about his nation as a community and his homeland as a territory” (Altınay 2004: 70). Military service, in other words, has a particular capacity in the re/production of the idea of ‘homeland’ and the nation. While establishing the ‘people’s army’, the introduction of military service both requires and enables the formation and the re/production of nationalism as an ideology. Its militarizing content, within this framework, can not be approached without its nationalizing content. To sum up, militarization and nationalization corresponds to two parallel
32 and intermingled processes; and despite the prevalence of professional armies today, conscription, as a citizenship practice, remains its particular position in the formation of these processes in many countries including the Republic of Turkey.
While discussing the militarizing and nationalizing content of conscription, its gendering content as a citizenship practice can not be ignored. In the next section the gendering content of conscription will be discussed, and its relation to the processes of militarization and nationalization will be pointed out.
2.2.3 Conscription as a Gendering Practice of Citizenship
“Conscirption”, as Altınay and Bora (2009: 144) state, “is not only an application of ‘protection of the homeland’, but it is also an application that defines (and differentiates due to the fact that women are not soldiers) the citizenship relation of men and women with the state.” Indeed as Sancar (2009: 153) states the military service is one of the primary practices of masculinity in the modern times. Its role in the re/production of the modern hegemonic masculinity is very determinative and it can not be ignored that it is a process of ‘instruction and education’ consisted of elaborate techniques, institutional organizations, cultural practices on being man as a fearless warrior (Sancar 2009: 155). This is the man , in other words, who has an iron will and who is fearless; who never hesitates to suffer any torture or to die to protect his honor; who is strictly disciplined to achieve self-education and who is physically strong enough to resist any pain or trouble; who reflects a strong personality in other words that can not be injured or influenced easily from the outside world; who is never hesitating taking risks and competing to achieve the best; who is adventurous, fearless in other words; who is active in his sex life; and who cares and places an emphasis on the protective values of patriarchy (Sancar 2009: 156).
33 Following this framework, the hierarchy between man and woman is strictly underlined within the barracks. A consideration on the humiliation strategies within the barracks would be a revealing example of this point. As the constant reminder of the new recruit’s supposedly incompetence to be a soldier is observed as a common practice within the militaries of the different contexts, it is seen that this incompetence is mainly defined through the capacities of being man , or not man enough . As Whitworth (2004: 156) states a new recruit is “fac[ing] a variety of gendered and raced insults… including ‘whore’, ‘faggot’, ‘sissies’, ‘cunt’, ‘ladies’, ‘abortion’, ‘pussies’,… and sometimes simply ‘you woman’ ” (My emphasis).
The question of who the man is, as well as the question of who the man is not has been addressed through direct references to the values of hegemonic masculinitiy. As the quotation from Whitworth reflects, being woman is considered as a sort of incompetence. In other words, being woman is presented as a condition of being not man enough . It corresponds to a hierarchy, therefore, between feminity and masculinity which is relevant with the patriarchic formation of the gender relations in the military nations of the modern times. Military service plays its particular role in the reproduction of these values as a sacred and cultural practice of masculinity. The case of modern Turkey, in which military service is one of the prime determinants of masculinity, can be considered as one of the obvious examples of this process. The scholars, such as Sancar (2009) and Selek (2010), exposed the sacred meaning attributed to the military service as a stage of being man by the Turkish male citizens.
The gendered discourse within the barracks, following this framework, has its reflections outside the borders of the barracks, in the civilian life. It is a practice whose consequences reflect itself in the gendered practices of civilian militarism. Men are being the “active” members of the society while the women are being the “passive” ones. It facilitates an understanding according to which male citizens are active in the sense that they are protecting the homeland, while the women became
34 more identified with passive subjects of that homeland who are in need of protection (Altınay and Bora 2009: 145). As military service, as a primary practice of citizenship for the citizen-armies, is left to the men, women could only play the “supporting roles” as the mothers, wives, servants of the soldiers –that is men-, or their entertainers as in the case of prostitution (Sancar 2009: 154-5; Altınay 2009: 88) . Conscription, following this framework, has become a substantial tool in the re/production of manhood and womanhood for the citizens of the nation-states throughout the 19 th and 20 th centuries.
To sum up, since militarization itself is a gendering process, conscription, as one of the primary tools of militarization in modern societies, corresponds to a primary gendering practice. As Enloe (1990: 204) states militarism needs women “to behave as women ”. Following the experience in the United States, she continues that;
Otherwise their militarizing goals won’t be achieved. They need some American women to feel protected by a massive arms build-up and by their sons and husbands in uniform. They need wives of soldiers to accept the extra duties of household maintenance when their husbands are on maneuvers in Honduras and El Salvador without worrying too much about the rumors they’ve heard about Honduran brothels. They need some –not too many- American women to view the military as the place prove their equality with men (Enloe 1990: 204).
The quotation from Enloe explains the gender roles that military-nations of the modern times need. It is true that the militarizing processes work through different practices for the countries where compulsory military service is abolished and the military system is based on the professional armies. However, conscription remains its central role in the re/production of the gender roles for many nation- states today.
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2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the concept of citizenship and its political content. Understanding citizenship through being political and through ‘acts’ and ‘practices’ provides me the framework I need in analyzing conscientious objection with respect to its relation to the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. In the second section of the chapter I have provided the political content of conscription as a citizenship practice through the relevant literature. Following this section I am going to discuss the political content of conscription in the case of Turkey.
36 CHAPTER 3
CONSCRIPTION AS A CITIZENSHIP PRACTICE IN TURKEY
In the previous chapter I have discussed the political content of citizenship as a concept, and described it as a process comprised of practices and acts. The distinction between acts and practices of citizenship was to point out the distinction between the deeds that re/produce a given discourse or citizenship and the deeds that challenge it. Following this theoretical background, in this chapter I am going to discuss the political content of conscription as a citizenship practice in Turkey. As it is conscription that conscientious objectors are objecting to, the question of the political content of conscription as a citizenship practice in Turkey will help me reach my conclusions on the political content of conscientious objection in the country. Considering the prevalence of sayings such as “every Turk is born as a soldier”, military service is attributed a sacred meaning in Turkey. The question of the ways in which military service re/produces the “Turkish citizenship”, or the “image of citizenship” in Turkey is going to be addressed in this chapter. Within this framework, conscription is going to be discussed through its militarizing, nationalizing and gendering roles as a citizenship practice in Turkey.
As Kadıoğlu (2005: 106) states “Turkish men and women, first and foremost perceive themselves first and foremost as Turkish citizens who have the responsibility of performing certain duties.” Duties content of citizenship has a strong reference in the perception of citizenship among the citizens of the Turkish state. While it has not been a new phenomenon, Birol Caymaz’s recent study shows how prevalent this perception is among the citizens of the 2000s’ Turkey (Caymaz 2008). Citizenship, in other words, connotes duties to the state for the
37 majority of the citizens in the country (Caymaz 2008: 66). The “rights” content of citizenship, within this framework, is being ignored and replaced by a strong emphasis on the citizens’ duties such as taxing, voting or military service (Caymaz 2008: 66). Citizenship, in other words, connotes commitment to the state through an emphasis on the duties defined by the state. While having this point in mind, the ways in which citizenship evolved into a concept that merely perceived as a relation of commitment will not constitute the central question of this chapter. Instead of this question, however, considering the question of the political content of conscientious objection, a particular attention will be paid to the role of the military service in the re/production of the content of this relation of commitment. Indeed, military service, among these duties, plays a particular role in the re/production of this commitment to the state and the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. It appears to be one of the primary citizenship practices that defines the militaristic, nationalistic and gendered content of this relation of commitment between the state and the citizen in Turkey. Considering the question of conscientious objection in Turkey, this particular role of the military service will be addressed in the following sections. Following this framework a particular attention will be paid to the militarizing, nationalizing and gendering content of conscription as a citizenship practice in Turkey, which in turn will also let us discuss the political content of the relation of commitment to the state in modern Turkey. To sum up, the questions of the ways in which conscription became one of the major duties of citizenship in modern Turkey, and its role in the re/production of the discourse of citizenship in Turkey will be addressed in the following sections. Firstly the nationalizing and militarizing content of conscription will be presented within a historical framework. Following that, a particular attention will be paid to conscription’s role in gendering the society framed by the values of militarism and nationalism in Turkey.
38 3.1 Conscription as a Nationalizing and Militarizing Practice
3.1.1 The Ottoman Era
The origins of the practice of conscription in Turkey reaches back to the 19 th century military reforms of the Ottoman Empire. Following the military defeats of the 17 th and 18 th centuries, it became obvious for the Ottoman State that not a restoration but a reformation in the military system was inevitable (Belge 2012: 540). The initial steps of this military reformation process were taken by Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) in the early 1790s. It was obvious by the 18 th century that the Empire was in need of an alternative military power against the Janissaries (Yeniçeriler ), who were the central class of soldiers since the 14 th century (Altınay 2004: 26; Lucassen and Zürcher 1999: 8). Following the corruption of the Janissaries since the mid 17 th century, the military capabilities of the Empire got deteriorated compared with the strong armies of the time such the French and the Russian (Aksan 1999: 23-5). 24 Following this background, Sultan Selim III introduced New Order ( Nizam-ı Cedid ), a series of reforms including the foundation of a new army trained by modern techniques. That was an attempt to achieve a reformation in the military system of the Empire and to balance the power of the Janissaries (Altınay 2004: 26). The new army, however, could not survive and the reformation programme ended by the rebellion of the Janissaries and the murder of Sultan Selim III by the rebels. The guild of Janissaries could only be annihilated by Mahmud II, the successor of Sultan Selim III, in 1826, which was followed by the formation of Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad ( Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye) , a new army organized in Western-style. Following this period until the end of the Ottoman Empire, military reforms remained to be at the center of modernization policies (Altınay 2004: 26).
24 See Aksan (1999) for a detailed analysis on the history of this corruption of the Janissaries.
39 It was through the proclamation of the Gulhane Charter ( Tanzimat Fermanı ) in 1839 that for the first time the military service became compulsory in a systematic manner. By the new regulation each region was obliged to provide a certain number of soldiers on a regular basis (Altınay 2004: 26). In 1843, a new law, which defines the duration of the service as 5 years, was passed (Zürcher 1999: 82), and by the late 1840s the lottery method was adopted as a method of recruiting soldiers (Ünsaldı 2008: 26). By the Lottery Directory ( Kur’a Nizamnamesi ) of 1848, the operation of the compulsory military service had a more elaborate definition (Zürcher 1999: 82). All these reforms, as Ünsaldı (2008: 26) states, laid the foundation of an actual military army of the modern times in the Ottoman Empire.
Following these reforms in the first half of the 18 th century, non-Muslim subjects of the Empire were made eligible for the military service in 1856; and participating to the lottery became compulsory for every male subject of the Empire in 1870 –while keeping exceptions in law and in practice and defining the conditions of exemptions for some particular professions and groups- (Altınay 2004: 26). A point to be noted here is that despite the phrase of “every male subject” the scope of these exemptions and the exceptions in law and practice was pretty wide that even the army was experiencing a manpower problem (Zürcher 1999: 86). The exemptions included non-Muslims, inhabitants of the holy places, religious functionaries, students in religious schools and a wide range of professional groups (Zürcher 1999: 86). Until 1909, non-Muslim minorities remained exempted from military service through paying a particular tax (bedel-i askeri ) through which they could avoid attending military service (Zürcher 1999: 88-9). Moreover, there were exceptions for the Kurdish and Arab subjects of the Empire. Despite their Muslim identity, it was not easy for Kurdish and Arabic population to be included within the practice of conscription as it is defined by law due to their distinct traditions and languages from the Turkish population (Ünsaldı 2008: 26). The Ottoman State, instead, had another form of army, Hamidiye Alayları , for their inclusion (Ünsaldı 2008: 272).
40
In 1909, a year after the proclamation of the constitutional monarchy ( II. Meşrutiyet ) in 1908, a new legislation on the operation of the military service was made. Through the new law, military service was made compulsory for every Ottoman subject, including the Ottoman subjects of the non-Muslim communities. This legislation was important considering the fact that despite the regulation before 1909 which also obliged non-Muslim subjects to attend the military service, as Zürcher (1999: 88-9) states, that regulation remained only in theory. Despite the emphasis by the Ottoman State on the equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, as mentioned, the State remained collecting the tax of exemption ( bedel-i askeri ) from the non-Muslim subjects (Hacısalihoğlu 2010: 103). As Zürcher (1999: 88) notes the Ottoman State needed these taxes for its ill- conditioned budget. The unwillingness of the Christian subjects in joining to the Ottoman Army facilitated this application of the exemption policy of the Ottoman State (Zürcher 1999: 88) 25 . There were only a few non-Muslim subjects in the military before 1909 –such as the Armenian and Greek officers in the medical department- who could occupy only some particular positions (Zürcher 1999: 89). Following the new legislation in 1909, for the first time an order calling every obligant subject -regardless of his religion- to get recruited was issued (Zürcher 1999: 89). Many young Christian men, who had the opportunity, left the country; and the ones who could not leave were recruited. Following the legislation in 1909, therefore, the exemption practices of the 19 th century were left and the recruitment practices included the non-Muslim subjects as well. While following an inclusive practice in the recruitment process, however, the Ottoman army remained its discriminatory conditions between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Despite this comprehensive application of conscription after 1909, the recruited non-Muslim subjects remained their secondary position in the army. As Zürcher (1999: 90) notes, they were occupied only in unarmed positions such as serving in labor battalions, carrying load to the front lines. As the military reforms
25 As Zürcher (1999: 88) notes the Christian subjects were conceiving themselves not as “Ottomans” but as “the subjects of the Empire”. An outcome of this perception was their unwillingness in joining the Ottoman Army.
41 were occupying a central role in the modernization and centralization of the Ottoman State, remaining hierarchies within the Ottoman army -despite the inclusive policies of conscription after 1909 legislation- was reflecting the limited capacities of this reformation process. An evaluation on the role of the military service as a reforming practice would be helpful to clarify this point.
The introduction of military service to the Ottoman military system was not only a military issue but also had its political consequences. Reformation in the military system and the centralization of the State were two simultaneous processes (Ahmad 1993: 2), and these military reformations brought simultaneous reforms in the other institutions such as the education, medical or taxing systems (Belge 2012: 541). Besides its military aspect, compulsory military service had its particular capacities in the centralization of the state.
Following the successes of the Napoleon’s army in the late 18 th and the early 19 th centuries, and later, the Prussian army throughout the 19 th century, it became obvious that adopting the practice of compulsory military service was not an option but a need for the states of the time (Lucassen and Zürcher 1999: 9-10). The Ottoman State was not an exception in this regard. However, the application of compulsory military service was more than being a mere military issue. As Lucassen and Zürcher (1999: 10) states conscription was applied as a substantial tool in nation-building by the states of the 19 th as well as the 20 th centuries. Considering the Ottoman case, we can see that compulsory military service enabled the conditions of a more centralized state. Despite the limited outcome of the 1909 legislation, the motivation behind its enactment should also be considered within this framework; the aim was the integration of all the communities of the Empire as the “Ottoman citizens” (Hacısalihoğlu 2010: 94). It is obvious, however, that the military reforms of the 19 th and early 20 th century could not bring the intended outcome by the end of the reformation period. Compulsory military service in the Ottoman case did not bring the unified subjects of the “Ottoman citizens” (Aydın 2009: 20). The reasons behind this outcome
42 were several. First of all the Ottoman State had infrastructural problems to achieve a proper operation of conscription. As Lucassen and Zürcher (1999: 10) states;
First of all a reliable census has to be in place to determine where the potential manpower can be found. This requires a sizeable growth in the state bureaucracy quite apart from the prely military apparatus. Then an efficient apparatus for the actual recruitment and, in almost every case, efficient sanctions … to combat desertation have to be put in place. In most cases service was determined by the drawing of lots, in which case a system of lottery has to be introduced and executed. The troops have to be moved, fed, clothed and armed in much larger numbers than before, which presupposes a certain degree of economic efficiency, or even industrialization, which was non-existent in the Ottoman Empire or Persia.
Despite simultaneous modernization moves such as the first census in 1831, the Ottoman State did not have the adequate infrastructure for a properly working system of compulsory military service (Zürcher 1999: 84-6). Besides this infrastructural incompetence, however, the incompatibility in the state ideology and the logic of military reforms was more crucial. Considering its “nation- building” content, compulsory military service was applied as a tool to construct an “Ottoman identity” (Soyarık-Şentürk 2010: 124). However, as Aydın (2009: 20) states the Ottoman Empire was into a paradoxical process that;
The demanding military agenda, taxed by military modernization and the necessity to preserve the empire, required conscription. As a result of the leaps of that same modernization, however, different ethnic constituents experienced a ‘nationalist awakening’ and imperial ideology became an insufficient basis for the new ideological stance that had served as an example to Europe since the time of Napoleon, and which was required by conscription. For all these different ethnic and religious groups the idea of a ‘nation’ inclusive of all imperial subjects was far fetched and the idea of a ‘homeland’ did not have much import. The bankruptcy of Ottomanism, which rested on the idea of a large Ottoman nation as an ideology, was a consequence of this conjuncture.
This paradox of the process reflected itself in what Zürcher (1999: 84) calls as “the problem of exemptions”. As mentioned previously, a large number of the Ottoman population -women, non-Muslim subjects, inhabitants of sacred lands of Mecca and Medina, students, and many other occupational groups- were exempt from the military service (Zürcher 1999: 86). The exemption of the non-Muslim minorities deserves particular attention at this point. The idea of the millet system
43 was behind the definition of those exemptions. The Ottoman State was operating through the millet system, according to which the Ottoman subjects were identified with millet s regarding their religious affiliations, in administering the relations between its subjects of different religious communities (Soyarık-Şentürk 2010: 123). 26 Conscription, as a tool in achieving a single “Ottoman identity”, would be expected to affect adversely the rise of the separatist movements emanating from the nationalisms of the millet s within the Ottoman borders. However, considering its practice throughout the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, it is observed that the application of conscription was itself influenced by the structure of the millet system . As stated previously, the non-Muslim subjects became eligible for the military service in 1856 but this regulation remained only in theory up to 1909. The Islamic spirit and character of the Ottoman army was not welcoming the non-Muslim soldiers (Zürcher 1999: 88), and as mentioned, the non-Muslim subjects were also not willing in joining to the Ottoman army (Zürcher 1999: 88). The tax of exemption ( bedel-i askeri ) from the non-Muslim subjects was an important item of the Ottoman budget, and the Sultanate was benefiting from the unwillingness of the non-Muslim subjects. However, even after the legislation in 1909, through which the exemptions were abolished and military service became compulsory for the non-Muslim subjects not only in theory but also in practice, the conscripted non-Muslim subjects were given only unarmed positions, different from the Muslim recruits, as mentioned previously. Following the nationalist uprisings of the non-Muslim communities throughout the 19 th century, and their close relations with the Western states, the non-Muslim subjects were never trusted and let take part in critical state mechanisms by the Ottoman State elites (Akçam 2009; Göçek 2009: 70). This mistrust was reflecting itself even in simpler positions such as any armed position in the army. The outcome was, therefore, a culturally Muslim army even in the final years of the Empire. As Zürcher (1999: 91) states “[e]ven at the end, the Ottoman army remained an army of Anatolian Muslim peasants”. Despite the inclusive definition
26 Each millet was representing a community of religion, and they were free in their internal affairs and could operate their own legal system (Soyarık-Şentürk 2010: 123).
44 in law, in other words, the practice of conscription in the Ottoman State resulted in an army that was basically composed of Anatolian and Rumelian Muslims and Turkish subjects of the Empire (Ünsaldı 2008: 26; Zürcher 1999, 86-8). This structure of the army by the final years of the Empire, as Zürcher continues, “in a sense foreshadowing the establishment of a Turkish nation-state in Anatolia after World War I.” In parallel with these processes, the beginning of the 20 th century witnessed the bankruptcy of Ottomanism and the rise of the Turkish nationalism. The Turkish nation-state was on its way to be formed by the collapse of the Empire.
3.1.2 The Military-Nation and Conscription in Modern Turkey
The Ottoman State, despite the reforms in law, as mentioned above, could not actualize the universal characteristic of compulsory military service in practice. However this should not hide the fact that conscription had influences on the Ottoman state’s relation with its subjects. As Altınay (2004: 27) states “[t]he introduction of conscription … not only signaled the modernization of the Ottoman military … but it also meant that the ordinary population would, for the first time, come into direct contact with the Ottoman center and that their services would be mobilized direcly by the state … Being the subject of the Ottoman Empire no longer meant simply the payment of taxes, but involved a new conception of rights and duties towards the state, parallel to developments in the rest of Europe.” The military reforms of the Ottoman State by the 19 th century - particularly the compulsory military service system- provided the background of the process within which the “Ottoman subjects” transformed into the “citizens” of the Turkish nation-state (Altınay 2004: 27).
To clarify this path to Turkish nation-state a brief reference to the conditions of the formation of the Turkish Republic would be helpful. The role of the military elite in the formation of the Republic of Turkey was central. Those were the elites
45 graduated from the military schools established as a part of the reformation process throughout the 19 th century. By the second half of the 19 th century, the young officers graduated from those schools started to become influential in the Ottoman politics (Ahmad 1993: 2). Those officers, aware of the Western thought as well as the modern military techniques of the time, were being attracted by the liberal and constitutional ideas of the time (Zürcher 2004: 86; Ünsaldı 2008: 18). Those officers started to reflect their discomfort against the Sultanate and the monarchic regime as early as the second half of the 19 th century. The proclamation of the first constitution in 1876, which was a short-lived period, was an outcome of this conflict between the reformist young officers and civil intellectuals, and the Sultanate (Ünsaldı 2008: 18). Since then the reformist officers had a very central role in the Ottoman politics:
…when the sultan, Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), shelved the constitution and ruled as a despot, officers began to scheme for his overthrow and for the restoration of constitutional government. They set up a secret society, known as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889, and officers like Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha, and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who all played critical political roles in modern Turkish history, were its members. The CUP-led rebellion in the army took place in June-July 1908 and, as a result, Abdülhamid was forced to restore the constitution he had shelved 30 years earlier. This was the beginning of the Young Turk revolution which continued for the next ten years, ending with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. (Ahmad 1993: 2)
Since the Gulhane Charter in 1839 the Sultanate had promoted an ‘Ottoman identity’ to achieve a degree of equality between the non-Muslim and Muslim communities, and to overcome the nationalist-separatist interventions of the non- Muslim subjects (Göçek 2009: 68). That was within this climate of reformation that Ottomanism, as an ideology, emerged. As the “Young Ottomans”, a group of intellectuals in Istanbul, were promoting constitutional monarchy opposed to the absolute monarchy; Ottomanism was promoted as a solution to the prevailing conflicts within the Empire (Soyarık-Şentürk 2010, 130). When the second constitutional regime proclaimed thirty-two years later in 1908, Ottomanism was the official ideology of the revolution (Zürcher 2004: 128). However despite the dominance of Ottomanism in the political arena, “Turkish” language and
46 “Turkish” history became a particular concern for the military school graduate officers since the late 19 th century (Göçek 2009: 70). Turkish nationalism was achieving prominence among the military elites particularly by the early 20 th century. Considering the constitutional revolution in 1908, for instance, as Göçek (2009: 70) notes, non-Muslim subjects were not allowed to join to the head team which decides the Union and Progress politics, despite the fact that Ottomanism was the official ideology of the revolution. Indeed when those officers came into power following the revolution in 1908, Turkish nationalism, with its ethnicist content, became a concern of the political agenda (Göçek 2009: 70). Moreover the influences of these nationalist concerns remained in the following decades after the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. As Soyarık-Şentürk (2010: 134) notes, considering the ideology of Turkism, or Turkish nationalism, it is a relation of continuity rather than a rupture between the Ottoman State and the Turkish Republic. The nationalist agenda of the Republican elites, in other words, had its roots in the late Ottoman politics. Furthermore, in parallel with the dimension of nationalism, this relation of continuity was also reflected itself in the ways in which the leaders of the CUP and the Republican elites define the state and society relations. As Zürcher (2004: 132) underlines the fact that the leaders of the CUP were “men of action” instead of being “ideologues”, he defines “a set of attitudes” of those officers:
Important elements in this set of attitudes were nationalism, a positivist belief in the value of objective scientific truth, a great (and somewhat naive) faith in the power of education to spread this truth and elevate the people, implicit belief in the role of the central state as the prime mover in society and a certain activism, a belief in change, in progress… (Zürcher 2004: 132)
According to them “the state was the logical, indeed the only, means to achieve change” (Zürcher 2004: 128). When we come to the Republican period, it appears to be the same “revolutionary” sprit that defines the state and society relations. Conscription as a citizenship practice, considering its nationalizing and militarizing content, had its central position during this process.
47 By the formation of the Turkish nation-state in 1923 after a long period of war, including the World War I and the War of Independence, a serious of reforms were put into force. The Sultanate and Caliphate were abolished in 1924; in the same year a new law, Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu , which centralized the education, was enacted to achieve a “national” education system; the European calendar was adopted in 1926; new penal and civil codes were put into force in 1926; Latin alphabet, instead of Arabic alphabet, started to be used in 1928. As the “men of action” were in power, those radical changes could only be achieved by the powerful role attributed to the state. Conscription was introduced under these circumstances where the state was shaping the society with its radical interventions.
The first law on conscription was enacted in 1927, in the same year with the first census of the Turkish Republic (Altınay 2004: 27). As a reliable census was the precondition for a proper execution of conscription, this was of course not a coincidence. Considering its military aspect, conscription was an important application to fix and strengthen the military capacity of the new state. After more than a decade of devastating wars before the foundation of the Turkish nation- state, its military capacities were in need of recovery. Considering the high number of deserters as well as the war torn conditions of the military, conscription, as a more systematic method of recruiting, provided the basis to achieve this recovery. 27 By the end of the 1930s the number of conscripted soldiers increased 900 percent compared with the number of those by the early 1930s (Altınay 2004: 28). From a military point of view, conscription brought successful results therefore. Besides this military background, however, introduction of conscription by the new state meant more than responding to the military needs and achieving a recovery in the military.
27 Zürcher (2009) decribes the extension of the problem of deserters in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods.
48 “When the nation-state came into being,” as Keyder (2005: 11) states, “its ideology was yet to be formulated; there was no ready sentiment which could be culled and refashioned into serviceable nationalism.” Despite the prevalence of the nationalistic ideas among the military elites of the time, nationalism did not have prevalence among the people yet. The majority of the compatriots, for instance, did not fight in the name of the “Turkish nation” but in the name of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I and the War of Independence. Nationalism, therefore, “was bound to be a sentiment which had to be taught” (Keyder 2005: 11). Conscription, within this framework, was an important tool for the newly-formed Turkish state in order to “turn young men into national citizens” as Altınay (2004: 70) notes.
With universal military service, the apparatuses of the state reached an increasing percentage of the adult male population. Very soon, every single citizen of the new nation-state would be ‘‘connected’’ to the military, either directly (by serving in it) or indirectly (by sending their sons, husbands, brothers, lovers, friends for military service).
While compulsory education let the state had access to the children, compulsory military service let it reach adult male population (Altınay 2004: 71). Indeed the military service had its role in transmitting the nationalist discourse and ideology, prevalent among the elites, to the people throughout the Republican era. Military service was a field of indoctrination in creating the “Turkish citizen” as well as being a field of training for the “Turkish” soldier. The content of this indoctrination was defined through the nationalistic concerns of the founding elites. The tenets of “military-nation” were of particular attention within this process. As the leading actors of the time were the military elites of the late Ottoman period, a brief reference to the military school background of those elites of the Republic would be helpful at this point to clarify the content of this indoctrination.
As mentioned previously military school graduate officers had played a central role in the Ottoman politics since the late 19 th century. Those were the graduates
49 of the same schools who founded the Turkish Republic. An important aspect of the military modernization in the Ottoman Empire and the education in those schools was the Prussian influence. The Ottoman State started its contact with the Prussian system as early as the 1830s (Aydın 2009: 22; Zürcher 1999: 80-1). Although -following the victories of the Napoleon’s army- it was the French military system the Ottoman State decided to adopt in the first half of the 19 th century, by the second half of the century the Prussian style became the only point of reference for the Ottoman military system (Aydın 2009: 22). By the 1880s experts from Germany were invited to modernize the military training and organization (Aydın 2009: 22). Colonel van der Goltz was a particular figure among those military experts. Goltz was the writer of the Millet-i Müsellaha (The Nation in Arms) which became the most important theoretical source for the officers of the constitutional revolution in 1908, and later for the founding elites of the Turkish Republic (Aydın 2009: 23). Goltz and other German experts were emphasizing the need to achieve “military-nation” (Aydın 2009: 23). This ideological background of the German influence on the late-Ottoman officers reflected itself on their political agenda when they became in power. Aydın (2009: 23) identifies three principles to describe the political agenda of those German- cultivated officers of the second constitutional period and the republican era;
The first of these is the perception of history as a ‘struggle of nations’. The second is the belief that only a strong and military nation can emerge from this struggle with success. The third principle is the necessity for the rapid transformation of the country into a ‘homeland’ and the imperial subjects into a ‘nation’ for the ideological consolidation of the military state.
“The common denominator of these three principles,” as he continues, “is the wholesale militarization of society.” Creation of a “military-nation”, then, was the central point of reference in the political agenda of those officers. Within this framework, introduction of conscription in 1927 in the newly-formed Turkish state was a path to achieve the formation of Turkish military-nation. Military service was a field of indoctrination whose ideological content was identified by the tenets of military-nation as provided above.
50
Formation of military-nation, as Aydın (2009: 18) states, requires “turn[ing] the losses suffered ‘in the name of the country and the nation’ into a matter of honour, privilege and respectability in social thought”. It is to point out two fundamental references in motivating the citizen-subjects; the “nation” and the concept of “homeland” that the citizens may even die for to protect it (Aydın 2009: 18). Conscription, as a field of indoctrination for the young adult citizens, had a very central role in achieving the formation of these sentiments to the “nation” and the “homeland”. We can identify two items related to conscription’s capacity in achieving the formation of these sentiments. Firstly, we can refer to its physical capacity of bringing together the citizens of a “nation”. Conscription has a particular capacity in reaching the citizens of the “nation” from different regional backgrounds, meeting them within the barracks, and having them experience the idea of nation. As Altınay (2004: 70-1) states, military service “becomes an important experience through which the soldier learns about his nation as a community and his homeland as a territory.” “Turkish citizens” from different regional backgrounds meet each other in the barracks; and as the barracks spread all around the country, they become familiar to different regions of the country. This content of the military service helped in the creation of the feeling of belonging to the “Turkish nation” as well as belonging to the “Turkish homeland” for the subjects of the newly-formed Turkish state.
Secondly, the “civilizing” content of military service is crucial in the formation of the idea of “nation” and “homeland”. The male citizens are taught the idea of nation and the homeland through several practices and discursive processes within the barracks. Considering the early years of the Turkish Republic, this content of the military service represented the “civilizing” mission of the military. As Mevlüt Bozdemir states in one of his articles on the relations between the military and politics in Turkey;
In the process of nationalization, the military played a very important role. Besides acting as a kind of ‘‘national school’’ and teaching literacy (the military
51 has taught the alphabet to more than half a million citizens and the Turkish language to tens of thousands), the military has contributed to the making of a ‘‘national citizen’’ with a national language, culture, and set of goals. (Quoted in Altınay 2004: 71)
As mentioned previously, the reformist officers of the late Ottoman period were attributing a civilizing mission to the military. This mission was represented by the practice of compulsory military service in the Republican period. This “civilizing” practice was to produce “Turkish citizens” as Bozdemir states. Following these points we can conclude that conscription, in summary, had its particular role in the formation of the “Turkish military-nation” through its particular capacities of meeting “citizens” from different regional -and so ethnic- backgrounds, introducing to them the idea of “homeland”, and “teaching” them to be the “citizens”, that is the “Turkish citizens”.
3.1.2.1 Formation of the “Turkishness” and the “Military-Nation” in 1930s
In identifying the role of the military service as a militarizing and nationalizing citizenship practice in modern Turkey, the political discourse of the 1930s deserves particular attention. As Çağaptay (2009: 3) states 1930s were a decade “authoritarian nationalism” in which “Ankara concentrated its energy on state- sponsored nationalism, defining what constituted Turkishness” (Çağaptay 2009: 3). 1930s, in other words, marked the vigorous efforts of the Turkish state in forming the “official” Turkish nationalism (Çağaptay 2009: 3). The ethnicist references in the definition of Turkish nationalism became central in those years (Yıldız 2010: 155; Çağaptay 2009: 100). The racist concerns were defining the path to be taken in achieving the unity in the country (Yıldız 2010: 170-1). In putting the ethnic and racial definition of the Turkish nation, the ideologues of the time claimed Anatolia to be a Turkish land since the very beginning through claiming that all the inhabitants of the country had been Turkish in origin since the first settlements in the region (Cagaptay 2009: 91). The claims on the “Turkish history” were crucial in forming the “Turkish nation”. Indeed as early as the late
52 1920s the “official thesis” of the Turkish history was started to be written (Ersanlı 2009: 803). Following the late 1920s, textbooks on Turkish history, whose content was formed through ethnicist and racist references to the characteristics of Turkishness, were prepared; two congresses on Turkish history was organized; and the Faculty of Language, History and Geography and the Turkish History Association were established (Ersanlı 2009: 804-6). As these attempts of the Turkish state were representing the willingness of the state in achieving an “official” definition of Turkishness, the outcome was the Turkish History Thesis whose influence has remained today in the nationalist and militarist definition of Turkish citizenship. According to the Thesis, race and language were two primary points of reference, and religion could not be considered as a determinant in the definition of Turkishness (Çağaptay 2009: 84). In parallel with this point of the thesis, as Yıldız (2010: 158-9) notes, the racist concerns of the elites (Kemalists) were represented in the fields of culture and language, which left out the Islamic references in the definition of Turkishness and constituted its secular content. The ethnicist and racist references, within this framework, were responding to the need of a new point of affiliation to the state which takes place of the Islamic references (Yıldız 2010: 158-9). In other words, because the secular-nationalist ideals of the Kemalists could not achieve a popular identity, ethnicist and raicist references became crucial to achieve a public support and identification for the new Republican ideals. However, besides this secular emphasis of the History Thesis and the Republican elites, a further consideration on the discourse of the 1930s demonstrates that religion remained to be an important point of reference in the definition of Turkishness in addition to race and language. Religion remained as a cultural aspect of Turkishness in the ethnicist definition of Turkish citizenship (Çağaptay 2009: 27). The citizens remained to be classified on an ethno-religious basis by the Turkish state, just similar to the Ottoman Millet system (Cağaptay 2009: 105). Indeed the naturalization policies of the time demonstrate that the non- Muslim subject was accepted to the citizenship as long as they converted to Islam (Cağaptay 2009: 130). Çağaptay (2009: 27) refers to the concept of “nominal Islam” to identify the role of religion in the secular context of the Turkish
53 Republic. This concept was referring to the cultural content of Islam as an aspect of identity while leaving its dimension of faith out of the political sphere (Çağaptay 2009: 27). An outcome of this position of religion in the definition of citizenship was that the Muslim communities who are not Turk, like Kurds and Arabs, were considered to be “prospective” Turks, and were expected to be assimilated (Çağaptay 2009: 254). Kurdish population, as the largest non-Turk Muslim community, took particular attention of the Turkish state within this framework, and the assimilationary politics of the Turkish state was replied by a strong reaction of the Kurds (Çağaptay 2009: 94-5). The Christian subjects, on the other hand, were not considered as prospective Turks like non-Turk Muslim subjects (Çağaptay 2009: 252). They were not considered to be “eligible” for assimilation in other words. While having this hierarchy between the Muslim and non-Muslim non-Turk subjects, the position of the ethnic Turks was occupying the top of the ethno-religious hierarchy in the definition of the Turkish citizenship (Çağaptay 2009: 254).
The 1930s, in summary, were the years of the formation of the official definition of Turkishness. In addition to its ethno-religious content, the “warrior” characteristic of the Turks was also not forgotten in this formation. 1930s were the years of the formation of the “myth of military-nation”, as Altınay (2004) names. Altınay (2004: 29-30) identifies a “discursive shift” in the definition of military service between the 1920s and 1930s. According to her, in the beginning military service was tried to be legitimized by the application of a rational discourse which stresses the needs of the homeland. Following the writings of Mustafa Kemal and Afet (Inan) in the early years of the Republic, Altınay (2004: 29-30) observes that military service was presented as a “necessity of the times”, and a “duty to the homeland” throughout the 1920s in state discourse. However the discourse changes in the 1930s, and military service becomes a matter of “Turkish culture, nation and race” (Altınay 2004: 29-30). According to Altınay, the articulation of the Turkish History Thesis plays a crucial role in this process. The Thesis, according to which “Turks are the best soldiers because they carry the cultural
54 elements that make good soldiers”, represents this shift in the state discourse (Altınay 2004: 29). Military service, therefore, becomes a cultural characteristic of Turkishness, which does not need a rational account anymore. 1930s mark the years of the formation of the “cultural” content of military service in Turkish citizenship which remains as the dominant definition of conscription as a citizenship practice today in Turkey. The outcome of this shift in discourse and the culturalization of military service has had several consequences. As Altınay (2004: 30) states;
First, the marriage of military service with an ahistorical sense of culture/nation/race has accompanied a distancing (if not a divorce) of military service from wars, fighting, and possible death, connections that the ten years of warfare had firmly established. Second, it has placed military service outside the realm of history, making it immune to historical change (or the imagination of such change in the future). Third, this shift places military service outside the realm of political debate as well. If the nation is ‘‘by its very nature’’ a military- nation, then challenging compulsory military service would not be about discussing the nature of the relationship between the state and its citizens; it would necessitate a challenge to the essential characteristics of the Turkish culture/ nation/race. Fourth, this formulation leaves little room for an independent, nonmilitary, civilian sphere in national politics and cultural practice. …Imagining ‘‘the outside’’ would be equivalent to being a non-Turk, if not a traitor. (Altınay 2004: 30)
1930s were important not only for the formation of the “official” Turkish nationalism, but also for the formation of the “military-nation” therefore. The decade was critical in the sense that the state’s nationalizing and militarizing interventions of that time remain their influence in the question of Turkish citizenship today. That was the decade of the discursive shift in the definition of Turkishness, as Altınay identifies, whose influences remain in the 2000s’ Turkey (Altınay and Bora 2009: 144). Following the 1930s, military service has become an integral part of being Turkish citizen. Unlike the 1920s, military service did not need a rational basis to be legitimized as a state policy anymore. By the 1930s, “every Turk has started to be born as a soldier”28 in other words. As recent studies on Turkish citizenship demonstrate, military service is being conceived as one of the primary citizenship duties by the majority of the population today (Caymaz
28 Derived from a popular saying: “Every Turk is born as a soldier!”
55 2006: 66). In other words, the military remains its central role in achieving the permanence of Turkish national identity which is defined by an ethno-religious ideological background (Altınay and Bora 2009: 153). Non-Muslim citizens, for instance, can still not be able to attend military schools in practice today (Altınay and Bora 2009: 148). While recruiting the non-Muslim citizens, the reflections of this ethno-religious hierarchies remains and being reproduced in modern Turkey. 29 To point out this situation Altınay (2004: 73) refers to a practical example that the non-Muslim soldiers bear the mark “GM”, a sign for gayri-Müslim (non-Muslim), on their nametags to indicate that they are not Muslims. Because “the discourse inside the army is based on the assumption that all soldiers are Muslims,” as Altınay (2004: 73) points out, the non-Muslim subjects, regardless of their religion, are needed to be identified and marked. Besides this religious discrimination, ethnic affiliations still play an important role in the experience of the soldier as well. Kurdishness, for instance, is attributed “illiteracy” and “ignorance”, and Kurdish soldiers are considered as subjects to be taught “Turkishness” (Altınay 2004: 72). 30 Military service operates as a field of reproduction of the ethnic definition of Turkish citizenship. Considering the conditions of war in the South-eastern part of Turkey between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerilla, this reproductive role of the practice of military service facilitates the reproduction of hostilities between the “Turkish nation” and peoples
29 See Bali (2011) for a collection of military service memories of the non-Muslim citizens of the Republic of Turkey.
30 This observation of Altınay can be approached within a framework of Yeğen’s (2006) point on the Kurdish issue and the state discourse. According to Yeğen (2006: 21) the ethno-political content of the Kurdish issue has been denied by the state discourse in Turkey. Instead of considering its Kürdi and national content, the Kurdish issue is identified with “reaction” and religious fundamentalism; “tribes’ and bandits’ resistence against the modern and centralized state”; “provacations of the other states”; and the question of “regional (economic) backwardness (Yeğen 2006: 20-1). Through these identifications, asYeğen claims, the state discourse, as an ideological narrative, have hidden the ethno-political content of the problem. Following Altınay’s observation, we see that these identifications are represented and re/produced through attributions of “illiteracy” and “ignorance” within the barracks. The ethno-political content of Kurdishness is, again, being denied and its content is represented through the references of “illiteracy” and “ignorance” among the soldiers. Kurdishness, within this framework, is identified with a state of deficiency, and this deficiency is trying to be overcome through teaching “Turkishness”. Military service, within this framework, becomes a field of assimilation for the Kurdish population in Turkey.
56 of other ethnic affiliations; particularly the Kurds. 31 To sum up, military service remains its position in the reproduction of the discourse of “every Turk is born as a soldier” with an attention on the ethno-religious definition of the Turk. Conscription remains its particular position as a militarizing and nationalizing citizenship practice, which re/produces the militarist and nationalist content of the “image of citizenship” in Turkey.
1930s were paid particular attention in this section because that was the decade in which the ethno-nationalist and militarist content of Turkish citizenship was formed. The ways in which we identify the image of citizenship in Turkey today were basically defined throughout the 1930s. In the following decades we can observe a continuity in the discursive content of the Turkish citizenship with respect to its nationalist and militarist content. It is also a continuity in the meaning of conscription as a sacred citizenship practice relevant with the myth of military nation constructed throughout the 1930s. Military service has remained to be a major point of reference in the definition of Turkish citizenship and Turkishness up to today in Turkey.
It is important to note that the following decades after 1930s, Turkey witnessed four military interventions to the civilian politics; the coups of May 27 1960, March 12 1971; September 12 1980; and so-called the ‘post-modern’ coup of February 28 1997. Each coup resulted in the increasing prevalence of militarism in the society. Each coup reinforced the central position of the military as an institution in Turkish politics and resulted in the increasing devaluation of and mistrust to the practices of civilian politics among the civilians (Cizre 2011: 320, 326). The coup of 1980 requires particular attention regarding our question of conscientious objection in Turkey. Following the coup in 1980, the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was adopted by the military elites of the coup (Ahmad 1993: 184), and the ethno-religious content of Turkish citizenship was re- emphasized within a framework provided by this synthesis. This emphasis on the
31 See Mater (2012)
57 ethnicity and religion reflected itself as intensifying oppression on the other ethnic and religious communities. The oppression on the Kurdish community deserves particular concern at this point. Any fragments of Kurdish political movement were imposed a strong oppression (Bozarslan 2011: 369). Following these oppressing practices by the Turkish state, a guerilla war was started by the Kurdish guerilla leaded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1984 (Bozarslan 2011: 370). The armed conflict between the Kurdish guerilla and Turkish army could already be defined as a low intensity war by the early 1990s. Those were also the years of the emergence of the first conscientious objectors in Turkey, and considering the timing, that was not a coincidence. As it will be discussed in the following chapter, since then, the Kurdish question has always been a central point of reference for the conscientious objection movement in Turkey, and its emergence represented a stand against the conditions of war in the country. Before having an elaborated analysis on this point, however, another aspect of conscription will be discussed in the following section.
Along with the dimensions of militarization and nationalization the gendering content of conscription is also crucial in identifying the political content of conscription as a citizenship practice in Turkey. The next section will discuss the ways in which conscription re/produces gendered citizens of the Republic of Turkey.
3.2 Conscription as a Gendering Practice in Turkey
In the previous section the key position of the compulsory military service in the formation of military-nation in Turkey is discussed through its militarizing and nationalizing content. Formation of military-nation, as mentioned previously, is about the prevalence of military values outside the barracks, that is, among the civilians. Military service has its substantial influence outside the barracks in that sense. Identifying the ways in which conscription’s influence goes beyond the
58 borders of the barracks is, therefore, important in order to clarify how it becomes a primary citizenship practice in the making of military-nation in Turkey. The title of gender provides a valuable basis at this point. The ways is which men and women subjects are re/produced by conscription in the case of Turkey is the particular concern of this section.
As discussed in the first chapter, military service plays an important role in the re/production of the values of hegemonic masculinity. The case of Turkey does not represent an exception in the gendering capacity of conscription. Military service appears as an important field of re/production of the gender roles as “man” and “woman”. It appears as a field where “feminine” values is being ostracized and considered as insulting, while masculine values are praised as the characteristics of heroic warriors (Sancar 2009: 155-6). Feminity is equalized with incompetency. Men having sexual orientations other than heterosexuality, for instance, are considered to be not eligible for military service (Biricik 2009). Moreover, the barracks represent the field where militarism and hegemonic masculinity is mutually constructed. As Sancar (2009: 157) states the relation between hegemonic masculinity and militarism produces “warrior” men and “supporter” women as “loyal” and passive subjects. Military service functions at the centre of this relation where this hierarchical structure between men and women is re/produced. As conscription is identified as one of the primary and sacred citizenship duties, and as only men are required to perform this practice, “a strong connection between masculinity, the state and military service” is established Altnay (2009: 90). While men get the “first-class citizenship” as the defenders of the nation and the state, women as well as the male citizens who are considered to be incompetent to attend military –such as gay men, disabled men, etc. - are identified with a “passive” and “second-class” position as citizens (Altınay 2009: 90-1; Altınay and Bora 2009: 145).
As military service has been conceived as a cultural characteristic of Turkishness since 1930s, the relation between masculinity and military service also gets a
59 cultural content. As Altınay (2004: 32) states “[i]n state discourse, as well as in the perception of many Turkish citizens, men become ‘‘men’’ only after serving in the military.” In parallel with this point, Selek (2010: 19) identifies military service as a step to be recognized as a man in Turkish society. Performing military service has its practical consequences in Turkish men’s life such as being able to find proper jobs or get married. This should be a factor in defining military service’s central position in Turkish male citizens’ lives. Besides its practical consequences, however, its cultural content deserves more attention. Referring to the ways in which a male subject is turned into a “man” would be helpful at this point.
Military service appears to be a field of experience and test for men where they are tested through harsh experiences and conditions (Selek 2010: 209). They are taught how to fight and the practices of defence within the barracks. As they turn back to the civilian life, this content reflects itself in the protection of the home, women, and the honor of the family (Selek 2010: 210) As Selek (2010: 210) states man after the military service turns back to his family as a defender, and becomes “the soldier of his family” as a “father”. Military service, within this framework, facilitates the reproduction of the patriarchic roles and institutions.
Men’s experience with the hierarchies of the barracks provides the basis of this reproduction. Men learn how to deal with and benefit from social hierarchies within the barracks (Selek 2010: 211). It appears to be a learning process which makes them interiorize the hierarchies, firstly within, and then outside the barracks. The internalization of the hierarchies in the military reflects itself as the normalization of the social hierarchies in the civilian sphere, whether these hierarchies depend on class, gender or status. Military service, in other words, teaches men the motto of “the stronger is right” (Selek 2010: 211). While this outcome facilitates the dominance of civilian militarism in society, its reflections on the gender relations are experienced through the practices of masculine domination. Following this background, man becomes the commander of his home, or his wife as a civilian after the experience in the barracks (Altınay and
60 Bora 2009: 145). As the man becomes the commander, the woman becomes the self-sacrificing mothers giving birth to soldiers, and raising obedient children to the nation, the obedient wives; or the “supporters” of men in summary. Or, as will be discussed in the next chapter, she becomes a conscientious objector who resists adopting these roles.
61 CHAPTER 4
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN TURKEY
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I have provided the political content of the practice of conscription in Turkey. Following this background in this chapter I am going to analyze the ways in which the deed of conscientious objection challenges the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. In order to do this I am going to provide the discourse of the conscientious objectors (COs hereafter) in Turkey. 11 interviews, I’ve conducted in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, are going to provide the major input in this chapter. In addition to those interviews, I will also refer to the previous discussion on the content of conscription as well as the already published material about the COs in Turkey. In conclusion, I attempt to interpret the political content of conscientious objection with respect to discourse of citizenship in Turkey.
In the first part I am going to provide the details related to my research as well as its scope and limits. Following that I am going to provide the history of the conscientious objection movement in Turkey through the interviews as well as the relevant literature. The interviews are going to play a crucial role in this part. Dividing the history of the movement into two major periods, I will refer to the interviews of the COs from a chronological framework which includes the COs from the early 90s as well as the late 2000s. Considering the fact that the literature on the history of the movement in Turkey is pretty limited, this will help me to provide a valuable historical background before I move to the issue of the propositions of the COs in Turkey. Following the historical background of the
62 movement, then, I am going to provide the propositions of the COs by reference to the themes of “militarism”, “nationalism”, “gender”, “citizenship”. In other words, this section is going to include four thematic subtitles on the relation of conscientious objectors with those titles. Finally I will provide my concluding remarks on the presented material and discuss how conscientious objection is connected to the question of citizenship in Turkey.
4.2 Interviews
The interviews I have conducted as a part of this study provide the major material of this chapter. There are 11 interviews made in total. While 10 of the 11 interviewees are COs, 1 of the interviewees is not a CO but an antimilitarist and LGBT 32 activist who did not attend military by getting ‘pink report’ 33 , and who was also active in the campaigns of Mehmet Tarhan (Mehmet hereafter) -a conscientious objector and an interviewee- when Mehmet was in prison. 34
8 interviews out of 11 are made as in-depth interviews. The remaining 3 of them were made through e-mail due to the lack of proper conditions to meet.
While 3 interviewees, Hilal Demir, Ferda Ülker and İnci Ağlagül, are women, 2 interviewees -Mehmet and Buğra 35 - out of 8 male COs define themselves as gay.
32 Abbreviation for lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans people.
33 Nickname used to define the report according to which homosexuals are not ‘eligible’ to attend military. They are being exempted from military service. See Biricik (2008; 2009)
34 To reach detailed information on the history of Mehmet’s declaration and the campaings organized for him see: http://wri-irg.org/co/cases/tarhan-en.htm , http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2&ArsivAnaID=25675&ArsivSayfaNo=1
35 Buğra is a pseudonym as he did not want his real name to be referred in this study.
63 My questions include their perspectives on the topics of militarism, antimilitarism, conscription, citizenship, gender, nationalism, heroism as well as their insights on the antimilitarist and conscientious objection movement in Turkey.
4.2.1 Limitations and the Relevant Literature by the Conscientious Objectors
The basic target of the interviews is to achieve an understanding on the political content of conscientious objection in Turkey. The question of the conditions that motivates COs to object to conscription is crucial, and it is going to constitute the content of this chapter. The aim is, in other words, to disclose the codes of their ‘act’ of conscientious objection. To achieve this aim I will not only refer to the interviews but also to the already published material on the COs and the movement in Turkey. This point is important because, while the interviews are quite explanatory, in order to achieve a comprehensive picture of the COs in Turkey I will need the relevant publications on the issue as well. Unlike the 1990’s, there are greater number of COs today, and their motivations and the ways they conceive conscientious objection change despite the similarities as well. The COs do not correspond to a fixed number of persons; they are quite diverse group of subjects with increasing numbers as well as differing motivations. Although this point was not ignored in deciding the sample, it is also likely that additional material/publications would help me to improve the content of this chapter.
As mentioned in the first chapter, in analyzing ‘acts of citizenship’, one of the distinguishing points is that the act itself speaks rather than the actor him/herself. Therefore the attention should be paid to the ‘deed’ itself rather than the question of the subject. This is also the framework how this study conceives conscientious objection in Turkey. Therefore, the ‘deed’ of conscientious objection rather than the COs will define the concluding remarks of this study. However, this is not to ignore or underestimate the fact that how the actors situate themselves in their struggle, how they define and construct their cause is an important variable to
64 evaluate the ‘deed’ itself. This attempt will let us clarify the content of the COs’ contestation of the Turkish citizenship. To achieve an understanding on the capacity of ‘acting’, the questions of how those subjects got motivated, and which of those conditions made them feel uncomfortable about conscription and citizenship in Turkey are important to refer. Considering the previous chapter, in which I have provided the content of Turkish citizenship with particular reference to the practice of conscription, the ways in which COs are responded by the citizenship regime in Turkey become obvious. The claims of the COs themselves against this regime of citizenship, then, help us to provide the political content of conscientious objection in Turkey. In this chapter, therefore, the claims and intentions of the COs are going to be provided. Following those claims and intentions I will reach my conclusions on the outcome of the ‘deed’ of conscientious objection itself with respect to the Turkish citizenship, without a particular consideration on the intention of the ‘subject-conscientious objector’ him/herself.
4.3 The History of Conscientious Objection Movement in Turkey
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, conscientious objection is not an old concept for the history of modern Turkey. It is of course not to say that there was no resistance to conscription or military service at all. As Zürcher (2009) provides, for instance, one can observe quite a lot of cases of deserters from military service in the history of modern Turkey. However, conscientious objection, as it is defined in the literature, could only emerge in 1989 in Turkey. Tayfun Gönül, who made his declaration following a campaign of conscientious objection in Sokak Dergisi (Sokak Magazine), was the first conscientious objector in Turkey. 36 Following him, 2 months later, Vedat Zincir declared his conscientious objection in February 1990. These two declarations were denoting a start of an organized struggle to
36 See http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2 ; To reach an interview with him and his declaration of conscientious objection, see http://bianet.org/biamag/insan-haklari/136260- turkiyenin-ilk-vicdani-retcisini-hatirlayin .
65 resist against conscription in Turkey. Following the first conscientious objectors, since 1990, there have been hundreds of conscientious objectors who collectively or personally declared their objection to conscription. Although the numbers do not seem to be remarkable for an almost 22 year-old movement, considering the conditions of those declarations and the risks COs bear by their declarations, those numbers can not be underestimated. The COs are growing in numbers day by day despite the harsh conditions they are imposed. Moreover, in parallel with the numbers, one can also observe a diversification in the motivations of COs in declaring conscientious objection. While conscientious objection came from anarchists and antimilitarists in the 1990s, the 2000s witnessed an expansion in the meaning of the concept and the COs from diverse political orientations. A very rough periodization would be helpful to clarify this point. Mehmet’s definition of periods may help at this point;
…vicdani rette üç kuşak var. 1. anarşistler var, ilk kurucular diyebileceğimiz. 2000'lerle birlikte hafif genişlemeyle birlikte benim de içinde olduğum kendisini anarşist olarak tanımlamasa da bir militarizm eleştirisi üzerinden getirenler, kadın retçileri de bunun içine sokabiliriz. Bir de üçüncü dönem var, işte Kürt retçiler, Enver falan gibi daha geniş bir kesimi oluşturan 3 kuşak var. bunlar birbirine içkin, birinci kuşakta da ikinci kuşağın ilk nüvelerini görebilirsin. İkinci kuşak ortaya çıktıktan sonra 1. kuşağın söylemleriyle ortaya çıkan yeni anarşist retçiler, daha bugün için de var; ama yine 3 farklı şeyden bahsedebiliriz, bunlar işbirliği içinde çalışabiliyor.
... conscientious objection consists of three generations. First, there were the anarchists, what we might call as the founders. As it expanded during 2000s there came a new group of people, who would not identify as anarchists but still criticize militarism, including female objectors as well. And the third generation with the Kurdish objectors, Enver and so on; they make up the third, which is a bigger group. These three are intertwined, you can get the glimpse of the second generation in the first. Following the appearance of the second generation, new anarchist objectors which formed through the rhetoric of the first generation exist even today, but still we can talk about three different sections and they do work in cooperation.
Mehmet’s periodization of the path the conscientious movement followed in Turkey is pretty much explanatory. However, instead of a three phases, I would rather mention two basic phases, and a process of a mild transformation between these two periods in this study. Considering the declarations and the profiles of the
66 COs by the early 2000s, it does not seem to be clear enough to define a “second phase” such as ‘antimilitarists but not anarchists’ as Mehmet proposes.
The 1990s correspond to the first phase of the conscientious movement in Turkey. It was, in other words, a period of emergence of the phenomenon of conscientious objection in Turkey. Following Tayfun Gönül and Vedat Zincir, tens of objectors appeared throughout the decade. İzmir was a center for the movement. The activists were organized through Savaş Karşıtları Derneği (War Resisters Association) which was founded in 1992. 37 While the conscientious objectors were organizing through this association, as Üsterci and Yorulmaz (2009: 169) states;
This association in Izmir did not limit its work to the issue of conscientious objection. It worked on such diverse issues as the democratization of the country, human rights, the environment, racism, sexism and discrimination, relationships with Greece, the Cyprus issue, and especially the ongoing war resulting from the Kurdish problem. Any other way of organizing would have been unimaginable, as the association was established in order to struggle against militarism as a whole and against the structural violence that materializes within the socio-political system in which we live.
Conscientious objection was, within this kind of a comprehensive and structural understanding of militarism, conceived merely as a tool for an antimilitarist struggle. The basic concern was to conduct an antimilitarist struggle against the militaristic institutions of the society. This point of an emphasis on antimilitarism constitutes the distinguishing characteristics of the conscientious objection movement of the 1990s. In other words, conscientious objection emerged as an antimilitarist act, instead of being based on a religious or culturally particularistic ground, in Turkey. The motivation behind was relying on an antimilitarist
37 The Governorship of Izmir decided on the dissolution of The Association because the Association refused to remove the statement “being against militarism” from its constitution; however, the following year in 1993, another association, Izmir Savaş Karşıtları Derneği (War Resisters Association Izmır) was founded by the same group of activists with higher numbers of participants (Üsterci and Yorulmaz 2009; 168-9).
67 perspective. As Osman Murat Ülke (Ossi) 38 , one of the active figures of the time and one of my interviewees, states “from the very beginning, what we said was that our problem in Turkey is demilitarization; ripping off this very culture which penetrated into the cells of society.” 39 Therefore, the ground on which the conscientious movement was founded and remained during the 1990s was antimilitarist. Moreover, an anarchist background was also influential. The anti- statist discourse was prevalent among the COs of the time. Therefore, the COs and the activists of the time followed an antimilitarist-anarchist trend in their political struggle. Indeed, the actors of the movement meet around antimilitarist-anarchist network before the foundation of the War Resisters Association. Ossi, for instance, heard about Tayfun Gönül through Sokak Dergisi (Sokak Magazine) which organized the first campaign of conscientious objection in Turkey, and where Tayfun Gönül declared his conscientious objection. Following his activism in Antalya, Ossi met antimilitarists in İzmir;
İzmir’den Amargi Dergisi ile karşılaştık. Öğrendik ki, Vedat Türkiye’nin ikinci vicdani retçisiymiş. Amargi Dergisi’nden değil ama Amargi’yle yakın ilişkili Tayfun birinci retçi falan. Onları Sokak Dergisi’nden de takip etmiştim zaten. İlk ret kampanyası orada yapılmıştı. Dolayısıyla bizim de kendi dergimizden ötürü benzer sorunlar yaşamamızla –bir iki yazıdan dolayı bize de halkı askerlikten soğutmaktan soruşturma açılmıştı- bir hat git gide belirginleşti. Somut bir şey yapacaksak, bunun alanı antimilitarizm olacaktı. Bunun üzerine vicdani reddimizi açıklamaya karar verdik.
We came across with the Amargi Magazine 40 from İzmir. We learned that Vedat is the second conscientious objector in Turkey. Tayfun -who is not from the Amargi Magazine but in contact with it- is the first objector. I had already known them from the Sokak Magazine. First objection campaign was launched there. Therefore, as we got in the similar troubles - we were investigated for a few articles due to alienating people from the military - our track became clear. If we would do anything concrete, anti-militarism had a space for that. Then, we decided to declare our conscientious objection.
38 Osman Murat Ülke uses the name of “Ossi” instead of his first name or surname. I will also use “Ossi” to refer him in the rest of the chapter.
39 “Baştan beri, biz zaten şunu söyledik: Türkiye'de bizim derdimiz demilitarizasyon. Toplumun hücrelerine sinmiş bu kültürün sökülmesi.” 40 The Amargi Magazine was published by the anarchists in Turkey between 1991 and 1994. It should be noted that it has nothing to do with the feminist magazine of Amargi being published since 2006. http://propagandayayinlari.net/amargi.html
68 Following this network among anarchist activists the War Resisters Association was founded in İzmir.
Considering the strategy they followed, particularly by the first half of the 1990s, their methodology can be named as ‘confrontation politics of conscientious objection’. The COs were intentionally encountering with the state departments, officials, and the army itself through their declarations of conscientious objection. As Üsterci an Yorulmaz (2009: 171) states;
Given the power and nature of the militarist structure and the political situation of the time, the prospect of advancement in the democratization of Turkey, and thus the implementation of a legal arrangement concerning conscientious objection, was seen as a distant possibility, so the association focused more on the strategies of ‘resistance’ and ‘popularizing the resistance’. The aim was to get another arrested after the release of each conscientious objector and thus to keep the confrontation constant.
At this point, ‘ignoring’ strategy of the army has also become a motivating factor for the COs in following a politics of confrontation. What the army was following as a strategy is to ‘ignore’ the COs. When I asked Ossi whether his arrest was an ‘achievement’ or not, considering their strategy, he replied as;
Kesinlikle. Çok önceden beri bunu hedefliyorduk biz zaten. Biz İzmir’de 1992-95 arası sürekli, birkaç haftada bir yeni retçi açıklarken birimizden birinin tutuklanmasını bekliyorduk. Ama ordu o zaman çok akıllıca davrandı ve bu insanları görmezden geldi.
Exactly. That’s what we aimed from early on. We were expecting detention of any of us in İzmir between 1992 and 1995 as in every few weeks a new objection was being announced. But back then the military acted so cleverly and ignored all those people.
Politics of confrontation involved an elaborate planning. The crucial point was to maintain the continuity of the antimilitarist agenda. COs were searching for a ‘snowball effect’ in Ossi’s terms:
Bizim o zaman yaratmayı istediğimiz şey kartopu etkisiydi. Yani bu iş bir gelenek olsun, taş üstüne taş konsun, aşama aşama gelişsin ve hep çoğalabilelim istedik. Bunu döşemeye çalıştık .
69 What we wanted to create was a snowball effect. I mean, we wanted it to turn into a tradition, stone by stone, stage by stage, to grow something much bigger than it used to be. We tried to pave the road for that cause.
The timing and the number of the declarations were important to achieve that. Therefore, to achieve continuity, the declarations were put in a sort of order, although it was not a strict schedule of declarations. This order was being decided in a collective manner;
Ben 1992’de karar verdim. İlk bizim dergiye soruşturma açılır açılmaz. 1992 yazı. Ama fiilen açıklamam 1995’i buldu. Bir kere derneğe girerken herkes şöyle bakıyordu; “Ossi nasılsa elde var bir, başkaları önden açıklasın, kriz durumlarında da net olan insanlar dayanışma açıklaması yapar, oradan devreye girer.” Bu sebeple benim reddimi 3 sene boyunca sürekli erteledik. (Ossi)
I made my mind in 1992. As soon as our magazine was investigated for the first time. The summer of 1992. But my de facto declaration took place in 1995. While joining the association people felt like “We got Ossi, let the others declare it first, in the times of crisis decided ones make a solidarity release, supporting them in that way.” So we postponed my declaration for 3 years. (Ossi)
Aslında 1991’de retçiydim. Ama o zaman Amargi ekibi olarak aramızda şöyle bir karar almıştık; “zaten açıklayacak olanlar açıklar, biz bunu zaman yayılan bir kampanya haline getirelim, yeni insanlar çıkarsa onlar açıklasın, aralı aralı açıklayalım, zaten hazır olanlar da bir zaman açıklarlar” diye düşünüyorduk. Ben zaten fiili vicdani retçiydim de deklare etmek işin başlangıç tarihi sayılıyor ya… Ama 1991’den beri vicdani retçiydim ben. (Yavuz Atan)
Actually I was an objector in 1991. But back then as the Amargi team we made a decision that “let those willing ones declare it first, let’s extend this campaign over time, as new people come up they would declare it, let’s give it some breaks and the ones who are ready would declare it some time too.” I was already a de facto objector but you know, your declaration is taken as the starting point... But I have been a conscientious objector since 1991. (Yavuz Atan)
That was a strategy to keep the power of the antimilitarist struggle to achieve continuous public visibility. It was to maintain continuous confrontation with the state and the army. In other words, conscientious objection in the 1990s was a well-organized collective act.
While the army was ‘ignoring’ the COs, that was not an ‘underestimation’ of their political activities. Even in 1993 four citizens, two of whom were from the War
70 Resisters Association Izmir were arrested because they committed the crime of “alienating the public from the military service” according to the Article 155 of the Turkish Criminal Law, which had not been applied for the last sixty years (Usterci and Yorulmaz 2009: 170). A broadcast on HBB channel, a national TV channel of the time, was the reason behind this arrest. Following the broadcast, which contained interviews with the director of the Association and with a conscientious objector member, the producer and the cameraman of the program as well as those two interviewees were convicted of “alienating the public from the military service” according to the Article 155 of the Turkish Criminal Law (Usterci and Yorulmaz 2009: 170). That was the first obvious ‘warning’ of the military as well as the state officials to the COs despite the previous cases of Tayfun Gönül and Vedat Zincir. However up to the Ossi’s arrest, the army can still be considered as successful in operating this kind of an ‘ignoring’ strategy.
Considering the path the movement followed throughout the 1990s, if the foundation of the War Resisters Association can be counted as the first phase in achieving public awareness, Ossi’s arrest in 1996 can be referred as another phase. Ossi got arrested in 1996, one year later following his declaration in 1995. His arrest was an obvious outcome of the ‘confrontation politics’ of the time. The activists were already ready for the campaigns following the arrest of a conscientious objector. As Usterci and Yorulmaz (2009: 170) states “[p]rior to Osman Murat Ülke’s arrest, a support and solidarity campaign was planned by İSKD [War Resisters Association Izmir] in case of possible arrests and imprisonment.” However,
What was experienced after the arrest greatly exceeded the predicted plan. Solidarity groups were formed for Osman Murat Ülke in numerous cities. The Anti-militarist Initiative (Antimilitarist İnsiyatif – AMİ was formed in Istanbul and various support actions were organized. As part of the support and solidarity campaign, a comprehensive file was prepared for national and international distribution. (Usterci and Yorulmaz 2009: 171)
71 Ossi’s case helped conscientious objection to become further public than it had even been before. Moreover, because of the needs of a very hot agenda on the imprisonment of a fellow, antimilitarist activists could be mobilized more effectively. The confrontation politics of the time was operated successfully through Ossi’s imprisonment. Although, COs were not able to achieve the grass- roots’ support which would enable the continuity of the movement, the public support around Ossi’s case was still important, and it can be considered as a successful operation. It was successful because following the campaigns and the use of media, the outcome was increasing public visibility.
In the 1990s, therefore, the movement had homogeneous characteristics. The actors were organized around anarchist and antimilitarist networks. They were well organized in giving immediate responses. The foundation of the War Resisters Association (which has become Izmir War Resisters Association then), and Ossi’s arrest and imprisonment were two basic phases in its path. While the foundation of the Association was important in achieving coordination and organization of the movement, Ossi’s arrest and imprisonment let the issue be more public. Ossi’s arrest also provided a stronger motivation to get organized and struggle around the issue of conscientious objection among the actors and supporters. However it was still not fully successful in achieving what was projected as the ‘confrontation politics’ in the very beginning that the conscientious objection movement of the 1990s failed to create a public support, a durable and stable progress.
While the movement had homogeneous characteristics as antimilitarist and anarchist in the 1990s, the 2000s reflect a more diversified picture considering the profiles of the conscientious objectors. 2000s represent the second phase of the conscientious objection movement in Turkey. During the last decade, conscientious objection started to extent to other groups and persons motivated by the incentives other than anarchism or –even- antimilitarism. For instance, Mehmet Tarhan, who made his declaration in 2001, despite his anti-statist
72 discourse in his declaration, defines himself as an antimilitarist but not an anarchist. Or, in 2004, for instance, a group of conscientious objectors make a joint declaration in which a strong emphasis on the need of physically disabled persons’ resistance to war;
Bizler, engelli insanların bu savaş yanlısı askerlik propagandasının kesinlikle dışında olmak gerekliliğini vurgulamak istiyoruz. Zira savaş engelli insanların var olmasına asla anlam kazandırmaz. Aksine, fiziksel engellilerin en büyük nedeni savaşlardır. Bu nedenledir ki, fiziksel engel üreten savaşlara kar¸sı durmak, zorunlu askerliğe hayır demek öncelikle en derin problemleri yaşayan fiziksel engellilerin görevidir. Fiziksel engelli insanlar silahlı kuvvetlerin propagandasına alet olamazlar. Bu bilinçle bir günlük askerlik olgusunu tamamiyle reddediyor ve her türden silahlanma anlayışına karşı çıkıyorum. …Her türden askerliğe, savaşa, saldırıya hayır diyerek, bu ucuz propagandanızı dikkate almadığımızı, bir günlük değil bir anlık bile silahların savaşların aleti olmayacağımızı haykırıyoruz. (Ömer Sezer; İmdat Şanlı; İsmail Sabancı; Salih Arıkan; Hasan Akyürek, 2011) (Başkent 2011: 32-3)
We want to highlight that “handicapped people should definitely be away form this pro-war military propaganda. For wars never justify the very existence of the handicapped. That’s why it is primarily the handicapped people’s responsibility to stand against wars as wars result in physical disability and to say no to compulsory military service. The handicapped cannot be an instrument for the propaganda of the armed forces. With this awareness I completely object to the daily military phenomenon and I oppose all kinds of arming. …We shout out loud that saying no to any kind of military, war and attack, we disregard this cheap propaganda and we won’t be an instrument for the arms and wars let alone for a day, not even for a brief moment. (Ömer Sezer; İmdat Şanlı; İsmail Sabancı; Salih Arıkan; Hasan Akyürek, 2011) (Başkent 2011: 32-3)
The same year we also witness the first women conscientious objection. While antimilitarism kept being the central concern, feminist concerns also played a central in their declarations. 41 In 2007 Enver Aydemir declared that he object to attend military due to his religious concerns. Aydemir is the first conscientious objector who makes his declaration due to his Islamic concerns;
Ben Enver Aydemir, 24.07.2007 tarihinde zorla askerlik yaptırılmak üzere evimden alınarak Bilecik Jandarma Er Eğitim Tugayına getirildim. Burada, beni oraya getiren yetkililere TSK Seçkinlerinin laik değerlere dayanarak dini inançlarıma karşı hasmane duygular beslediğini bu yüzden laik bir ülkede askerlik yapmayacağımı ve böyle bir düzenin asla ve asla bir neferi
41 A detailed evaluation of the women’s point in conscientious objection is going to be provided in section 4.4.3.
73 olmayacağımı beyan ettim. …Hayattaki en önemli değeri inançları olan birisi olarak, özellikle T.S.K Seçkinlerinin İslami değerlere karşı gösterdiği bu tutumu kabul etmem mümkün değildir. Tüm bu sebeplerden dolayı vicdani reddimi açıkladım. Müslümanların en temel inançlarını bile bu kadar açık bir şekilde tahkir eden bir kurumda benim yer almam söz konusu olamaz. (Enver Aydemir, 2007) ( Başkent 2011: 49)
I am Enver Aydemir, on 07.24.2007 I was taken from my home by force to Gendarme Brigade for Soldier Training in Bilecik to serve in the military. Here, I declared that the elites of secular Turkish Armed Forces which brought me have hostile feelings against my religious beliefs based on secular values and that I would never ever be a soldier for such a system. …As a person who values his beliefs the most, it is impossible for me to accept this attitude of the military elites towards Islamic values. Because of all these reasons, I declared my objection. It is not a question for me to be part of an institution which insults the very beliefs of Muslims this explicitly. (Enver Aydemir, 2007) ( Başkent 2011: 49)
Different from the previous objecters, Aydemir did not make any reference to antimilitarism. He did not make a absolutist (total) objection against the militarist system. Different from the previous objections, Enver considered alternative civil service as an option for himself;
Bununla beraber yaşadığım coğrafyanın gerçeklerini de göz önüne alarak, ortak yaşamın getirdiği sorumluluklar çerçevesinde inançlarıma uygun ve bireysel haklarımın tanındığı (eğitim özgürlüğü, kılık-kıyafet özgürlüğü, düşünce özgürlüğü vb.) bir ortamda kamu hizmeti yapabileceğimi beyan ediyorum. (Enver Aydemir, 2007) (Başkent 2011: 49)
Besides that, considering the realities of the geography I live in, I declare that I can do a civil service in an environment which conforms with my beliefs and recognizes my individual rights (freedom of education, freedom of appearance, freedom of expression, etc.) because of the responsibilities common life puts on us. (Enver Aydemir, 2007) ( Başkent 2011: 49)
Following Aydemir’s objection, there have been some other COs referring to their Islamic concerns as well, although it could never turn out to be a collective movement of Islamic conscientious objection.
The “Kurdish Conscientious Objection Initiative”, which is also known as the “Kurdish Conscientious Objection Movement” provide another example of this diversification in the 2000s. 42 Those COs, who got organized by a common
42 http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=8&ArsivAnaID=45501
74 affiliation of Kurdishness, have a particular concern on the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Because it does not have a solid organizational structure, the way Kurdish COs approach to antimilitarism remains unclear considering the contradicting statements by the actors of the movement. Despite the obvious antimilitarist content of their first declaration which emphasizes the need to stand against violence as way to solve problems, Ahmet Demirsoy, one of the recognized members of the movement, do not hesitate to state that they are not antimilitarists at all;
Kürt Vicdanî Ret İnisiyatifi olarak insanların, halkların meşru müdafaa hakkını savunuyoruz. Dünyanın her yerinde de böyle olduğunu düşünüyoruz. Anti- militarizm meşru müdafaaya olumlu bakar mı, bundan çok emin değilim. Her türlü savaşa karşı çıkmayı çok gerçekçi bulmuyorum. Bu nedenle kendimizi anti-militarist olarak görmüyoruz. Ama profesyonel orduya da karşı olduğumu- zu söyleyelim. Zorunlu askerlik kalksa da, askerlik paralı hale gelse de biz askere gitmeyeceğiz; paralı askerliğe karşı da ses çıkaracağımızı şimdiden ilan etmiş olalım. 43
As the Kurdish Conscientious Objection Initiative, we are in support of the right to self-defense of persons and people. We think that this is how it is all around the world. I am not pretty sure how anti-militarism receives self-defense. I don’t find it realistic to oppose any war. Therefore, we don’t identify as anti-militarist. But we must say that we are against the idea of professional military. We will not serve in the military no matter obligatory military service gets repealed or mercenary, let’s make it clear from now that we will stand against mercenary military service, as well.
With an emphasis on the need to end war between the Kurdish guerilla and the Turkish Army, the particular attention is paid on the need to avoid attending Turkish Armed Forces. The way they approach to the Kurdish armed struggle, however, do not seem to be negative. 44 To sum up at this point, the Kurdish COs, who organized by an identity based affiliation, and who do not hesitate to state that they are not antimilitarists at all, correspond to another mark of the diversification within the conscientious objection movement in the 2000s.
43 http://bianet.org/biamag/ifade-ozgurlugu/129978-muazzam-bir-gelisme
44 Their approach to the Kurdish armed struggle will be presented in more detail in the next section.
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Ercan Aktaş, one of the founders of the Barış İçin Vicdani Ret Platformu (the Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace) and one of the interviewees of this study who declared his conscientious objection in 2005 following his release after more than a decade long imprisonment, also mentions this diversification and emphasizes the need to make COs come together despite their distinct particular incentives. His particular concern is to have a word against the prevailing conditions of war in Turkey; the war between the Kurdish guerilla and the Turkish Army. According to him, COs should have a common platform regardless of their particular incentives, and achieve a collective stand against the war in the country. Conscientious objection, according to him, can be a useful tool against the conditions of war in the country. It can be presented as a way of struggle for peace. Following this kind of an approach Ercan and his friends founded Barış İçin Vicdani Ret Platformu (the Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace). 45 While defining himself as an antimilitarist, according to Ercan, conscientious objection can not be reduced to antimilitarism. Criticizing the previous antimilitarist discourse of the movement, he states that any single CO, regardless of his/her political orientation, should be included to achieve a common stand against the war in Turkey;
Vicdani ret daha önce Türkiye’de anarşist ve antimilitarist bireylerin atmosferinde olan bir şeydi. Ama biz de şunu tartışıyorduk; savaşın olduğu bir ülkede savaş karşıtı hareketin gelişmesi gerekiyor. Ve bunun güçlü bir dinamiği vicdani retçilerdir. O zaman vicdani ret meselesinin toplumsallaşması gerekiyor. Vicdani ret meselesinin toplumsallaşması ise şu demek: benim dışımda, benim gibi durmayan başka vicdani retçilerin de oluşması gerekiyor. Bunun üzerine biz savaşa doğru söz söyleyeceğiz, daha farklı kesimlere dokunacağız, ve vicdani ret meselesi Türkiye’de daha farklı bir kanala doğru akmalıdır dedik. 2009 senesinde Boğaziçi Üniversitesi’nde Barış İçin Vicdani Ret Kurultayı gerçekleştirdik. Daha sonra bu duruşumuzla Savaş Karşıtları Grubu içerisinden çıkarak böyle bir şeye evrildik (Ercan Aktaş).
Conscientious objection was previously in the atmosphere of the anarchist and the anti-militarist people in Turkey. So, we discussed that in a country where there is an ongoing war, anti-war movement has to grow. And conscientious objectors make a strong dynamo for that. So, we have to make it public. What we mean by this publicizing is that there must be other objectors whose stance is
45 http://www.barisicinvicdaniret.org/?page_id=66
76 different than mine. In that way, we could talk about war, touch different parts of society and there must be a new channel in Turkey for conscientious objection to flow through. Therefore, in 2009 we organized the Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace in Bogazici University. We evolved this stance getting out of the War Resisters Group. (Ercan Aktaş)
In the late 2000s and early 2010s, it became clear that conscientious objection is no longer solely anarchist and antimilitarist. Ercan mentions the name of ‘War Resisters’ ( Savaş Karşıtları ) to identify the only organized 46 group of conscientious objectors and antimilitarists in the mid 2000s. However, it is not the case anymore as he states. In addition to the individual declarations, he mentions three different organized groups of COs to identify the diversification within the movement today;
’Savaş Karşıtları’ iki yıl önce hepimizi kapsayan şemsiye bir ifadeydi ama oradaki reaksiyon daha çok savaşa dair bizim eleştirdiklerimizdi. Çok da söz ve eylem geliştirmeyen bir yerdeydi. Gerçi arkadaşların bizim bu eleştirilerimize karşı farklı söylemleri de var. Son iki yıl içerisindeyse bir şeyler değişmeye başladı Türkiye’de. İki yıl önce bana sorsaydın vereceğim cevapları Savaş Karşıtları Grubu olarak verirdim ama şu an o gruptan çıkan Barış İçin Vicdani Ret Platform’u, Antimilitarist Payanda ve bizlerin içinde oluşan Kürt Vicdani Ret Hareketi var. Şu an vicdani ret meselesiyle ilintili doğrudan üç tane ayrı yapı var. (Ercan Aktaş)
The War Resisters” was an umbrella for all of us two years ago but the reaction there was more like what we criticized about war. It was not a place where new expressions and actions were produced. Anyway, they have various rhetoric against our criticisms. In last two years, things started to change in Turkey. If you asked me this two years ago I would answer on behalf of the Anti-War Group but now there are the Conscientious Objection Platform for Peace, Anti- Militarist Support and the Kurdish Conscientious Objection Movement which formed within us. Now, there are three structures directly related to the conscientious objection issue. (Ercan Aktaş)
In summary, we can identify two periods in the history of conscientious objection in Turkey; the homogeneous characteristics of the 1990s identified by the antimilitarist and anarchist movement; and the diversified characteristics of the 2000s including different organized groups as well as individual declarations. This periodization is to provide the changing characteristics of the meaning of
46 The word of “organized” is used to avoid taking no notice of the individual declarations of concientious objection, or the COs of different point of reference within the War Resisters group. As I mentioned in the previous pages, there were already diversified points of reference by the COs in the mid 2000s, such as Islamists, women COs.
77 conscientious objection in Turkey throughout the years. The diversifying subjects, with respect to their apparently distinct incentives, represent the increasing comprehensiveness of the phenomenon of conscientious objection in Turkey. While it was solely an act belonging to anarchist-antimilitarists in the 1990s, it has now become an act of the people who even do not claim themselves as antimilitarists at all (as in the cases of Enver Aydemir or the Movement of Kurdish Conscientious Objectors). However, it would also be wrong to underestimate the role of antimilitaristic concerns among the COs in the 2000s as well. Antimilitaristic concerns have still been playing a very central role among many objectors today. However, as well as the COs having no claim of antimilitarism, antimilitarist COs having distinct approaches to militarism and antimilitarism brought different perspectives to the concept of antimilitarism today. Therefore a crucial point to be referred at this point is that, along with the diversified motivations within the movement, the late 2000s brought a contestation in the meaning of antimilitarism among the COs as well.
In the following section, the relation between antimilitarism and conscientious objection will be presented in a more elaborated manner. Following the recent debates among the COs on the meaning of antimilitarism, I am going to start by providing a more elaborate presentation of the relation between conscientious objection and militarism in Turkey.
4.4 The propositions of the Conscientious Objectors in Turkey
In this section an overview of the propositions of the COs in Turkey are going to be provided under three subtitles; militarism, nationalism, and gender. Following these themes, the concluding remarks on the relation between conscientious objection and citizenship in Turkey are going to be provided in the last section. The question of the relation between militarism and conscientious objection in Turkey is going to be the first title.
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4.4.1 Conscientious Objection and Antimilitarism in Turkey
In the previous chapter the role of conscription in the formation of the military- nation was provided. Military service, as discussed, was attributed a cultural characteristic, and it was applied as a tool in the militarization of the society. Objecting to military service should, therefore, correspond to a capacity of a challenge to militarization of the society. In this section I am going to discuss the ways in which conscientious objection challenge militarism and militarization of the society. COs’ points on militarism and antimilitarism will help me in exposing the content of this challenge.
Considering the conditions within which the conscientious objection movement emerged in Turkey, the terms of “conscientious objection” and “antimilitarism” have been used interchangeably for a long time. However, as it is provided in the previous section, the diversification of the incentives of the objectors, particularly starting from the mid 2000s, made this image a questionable one. The recent condition of the COs with respect to their relatively diverse incentives provide a more relevant picture with the definition of the concept in the literature, according to which conscientious objection is solely an objection to conscription, regardless of the motivation or the incentive behind. COs may or may not be antimilitarists and conscientious objection does not have to be ‘antimilitarist’ by its nature. However, this shortcut definition still does not seem explanatory enough to express the position of COs with respect to militarism in Turkey. An overview of the claims of the COs from different backgrounds would help me provide a more comprehensive definition of the concept in the practice of Turkey.
Conscientious objection in Turkey, different from the Western experience, did not emerge with reference to particularistic identity-based concerns or pacifist- religious concerns as it is represented by Protestants, or Jehova’s Witnesses in the
79 West (Zürcher 2009: 46). It was introduced through a secular basis relying on the critique of militarism, and throughout the 1990s, as I have already mentioned, it was applied solely within an antimilitarist agenda. Considering this historical background, the interchangeable use of the terms of “conscientious objection” and “antimilitarism” becomes comprehensible. Considering the lack of a historical background of religious or identity-based resistance to conscription or military service, and considering the fact that they were only antimilitarists who applied to the concept by the 1990s, conscientious objection’s identification with antimilitarism in Turkey appears to be a understandable outcome. This is the way in which conscientious objection was conceived as solely “absolutist objection”, or “total objection” 47 in Turkey.
Considering the post-coup conditions of the early 1990s in Turkey, the military remained as the most powerful institution in Turkey. Providing an objection to military service was to take a stand against the most powerful institution in the country. Nobody was aware of the military’s prospective response to a declaration of conscientious objection. Under these circumstances, a collective will of an organized struggle and a strong political motivation were two prerequisites of introducing conscientious objection to “Turkish military-nation”. That was only through an organized support the risks could be borne and minimized. The antimilitarists and anarchists, despite their limited numbers, had this organizational will and power to have a stand against the military. Considering the cultural background of a lack of a pacifist tradition in Turkey, conscientious objection, then, could only be applied by a group of organized antimilitarists in Turkey. The unintended outcome was, however, a representation of conscientious objection with a sole reference to antimilitarism. The outcome was unintended because the activists of the time aimed not to reduce the cause solely to anarchist or antimilitarist agenda, but politically expand it to other groups or subjects. As
47 “Total objectors”, who applies absolutist objection on a secular basis, different from the conscientious objectors, define themselves as objecting not only to conscription but also to any kind of subordination relation between the state and the individual.
80 Ossi, an active member of the movement in the 1990s, states, they never claimed conscientious objection as solely antimilitarist;
O zaman ikili bir karakteri vardı bizim duruşumuzun. Biz, hemen hemen hepimiz, çoğumuz, çok az istisnayla, anarşist bir arka plana sahiptik. Bu bir yanıydı. Ama diğer yanı da şuydu; biz kesinlikle ve kesinlikle vicdani rettin anarşizmle özdeşleşmesini ya da ikisinin birbirine koşulsuz olarak bağlanmasını da istemiyorduk. Bizim motivasyonumuz oradan besleniyor olabilirdi, genel bir devlet karşıtlığı ve otorite tanımazlığından ve ideolojik olarak yüklü bir antimilitarizm anlayışından besleniyor olabilirdi; ama aynı zamanda vicdani rettin daha evrensel, geniş bir şemsiye de olduğunu düşünüyorduk. Ve bu şemsiyenin altında, aynı motivasyona sahip olmasak da, sivil hizmet isteyen bir vicdani retçinin de gireceğini; dini nedenlerin de gireceğini -nasıl yehova şahitleri vicdani retçiyse, buna pekala İslami motivasyon da girebilir, tamamen bireysel hat ve arka planla, yorumla ilgili bir şey bu-; yani bütün bu farklı renklere vicdani ret şemsiyesinin altında yer olduğunu düşünüyorduk.
Back then our stance had a binary character. Most of us had an anarchist background. That was one side. But the other side was that we definitely did not want conscientious objection and anarchism to be seen as one, that they cannot be categorically connected to one another. Our motivation could be feeding upon that, it could learn from a general anti-State and anti-authoritarian stance; but we also thought that conscientious objection is a more universal and wider umbrella term. And under that umbrella, there is a space for conscientious objectors who want to do civil service or whose religious beliefs contradict with military service -just like Jehovah's witnesses, this could well be an Islamic motivation as well, this is all about your personal route and background- we don’t have similar motivations with them, though.
Indeed, as Yavuz Atan, another interviewee who declared his conscientious objection in1994 and has been active in the movement since the early 1990s, states;
Vicdani ret bizim için bir fetiş değil, biz Amargi’de söyledik bunu. Keşke liberaller çıkıp bununla uğraşsalar, biz anarşistler olarak anarşitliğimizi yapsak diyorduk.
Conscientious objection is not a fetish for us, we said that in Amargi. If only liberals paid attention to this issue so that we could turn back to our anarchy.
In order to overcome the risks of reducing conscientious objection to antimilitarism, emphasis on “total objection” was made by the activists of time. As Ossi states;
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Peki, hem bir yandan kimliğin böyle olacak hem de bir yandan kavramı geniş bir çerçevede değerlendireceksin; o zaman senin hareket hattın ne olacak? Hareket hattı olarak da kendimize şunu belirlemiştik; er ya da geç Türkiye’de bir sivil hizmet tartışması doğacak; vicdani reddi bir sivil hak, salt bir yurttaşlık hakkı temelinde ele alacak insanlar çıkacak haklı olarak. Ancak onların tartışmasını yapmak bizim işimiz değil diye düşündük. Ne onların önünü kapatmalıydık kaba bir total ret vurgusu ve vicdani retti salt radikal antimilitarizme yamama yoluyla. Ne onların önünü kapatmalıydık, ne de ama vicdani rettin antimilitarist özünü geliştirebilecekken bundan imtina edecektik. Böyle bir ince hat tutturmaya çalıştık biz 90lar boyunca.
You will both have this identity and consider the concept in such a wide frame, so what would be your line of action? Here it is: Sooner or later a debate on civil service will come up in Turkey; people who consider the conscientious objection as a civil right will turn out to be right. But we thought that it is not our business to own their discussion. We shouldn’t block them by a crude emphasis on total rejection or connecting the conscientious objection only to radical anti-militarism. We avoided from that and focused on developing the anti-militarist essence of the conscientious objection. That was the fine line we followed during the 90s.
However, despite their effort to avoid presenting conscientious objection as solely antimilitarist, they could not prevent the interchangeable use of the terms of ‘antimilitarism’ and ‘conscientious objection’. Considering the conditions of its emergence, we can say that it was not an intentional but an understandable outcome.
Different from the 1990s, however, as mentioned in the previous section we now have a more diversified picture of the COs in Turkey by the late 2000s. The “unintended outcome” of the identification between antimilitarism and conscientious objection is being contested today. However, this contestation does not represent an absolute split with antimilitarist concerns within the movement. It is more of a contestation in the meaning of militarism. In other words, militarism remains to be an important question within the movement, however its meaning is being contested by the expanding participation. The content of this contestation let me reach my conclusion on the relation between conscientious objection and militarism today.
82 When I asked for the meaning of militarism to the interviewees, none of their definitions contradicted with Vagts’s definition of ‘civilian militarism’;
Ordu ve benzeri yapılanmaların ve ilişkiler biçiminin toplumsal alana yayılması, toplumsal alandaki tezahürü. Kaynağının orda olduğunu söylemiyorum, sadece somut görünürlük açısından söylüyorum. (Mehmet)
Expansion of military and similar structuring, and relations in the social domain, their appearance in the social domain. I’m not saying that the source of it is the military, only in terms of its concrete visibility. (Mehmet)
Biz okula başlar başlamaz içtimalardan geçiyoruz, sabah nöbetler, dışarıdaki askeri disiplin içerisinde yürümeler falan. Toplumu zaten çocukluğundan itibaren -aileyle birlikte bunu yapıyorlar- sorgulamayan, biat etmeye açık olan, tabi olmaya açık olan, bir yerde hep bir komutanı olan bir şey gibi kuruyorlar. (Ercan Aktaş)
As soon as we start to go to school, we are gathered in musters, morning watch, marching in an soldier-like discipline outside and so on. From the early childhood in the family, society is formed as something which should not be questioned, always to be liable to and obeyed, something of which commander is omnipresent. (Ercan Aktaş)
Militarizmi zihniyette tanımlıyorum. Dünyanın hiçbir yerinde Türkiye’deki kadar çıplak bir dille tarif edilmiyor militarizm. Militarizmin başarısı toplumdan kaynaklanıyor, okullar kışladan ne kadar farklı ki; sabahları ant içiliyor vs. Askerde de buna benzer pratikler var. (Yavuz Atan)
Militarism definition lies in mentality. Militarism is not being expressed with such an obvious language anywhere in the world like it is in Turkey. The success of militarism is resulted from the society, schools are not very different than barracks, making oaths in the morning and so on. There are similar practices in the military, as well. (Yavuz Atan)
In parallel with Vagts’s definition of “civilian militarism”, normalization of the military values in our daily lives and a perception of society which is ‘put in order’ by those values define the meaning of militarism. ‘Obedience’ can be deducted as a key concept, which also connotes a hierarchical understanding of social relations.
Militarizmi, savaş ve savaş çerçevesinde ve savaş çerçevesinin içinde veya dışında, bu savaş olgusundan dolayı olan askerlik, toplum baskısı, herşey için bir bahane olarak kullanılıp her şey için razı etme girişimleri olarak görüyorum. (Fazıl)
83 Militarism, war and -following the facts in and out of wars- military are the collection of attempts and pretexts for creating a pressure for the society to make us obey anything they want. (Fazıl)
In addition to her emphasis on the prevalence of military values in daily life, Hilal Demir, who made her declaration in 2005, also emphasizes the relation between militarism and patriarchy, and points out the sexist content of militarism;
Militarizmin benim için gündelik yaşamlarımızdaki o düşünüş şeklindeki varoluşu beni en çok ilgilendiriyor. Militarizm denilen bir sistem, özellikle kapitalizmle çok iyi anlaşan bir sistem. Ve bu sistemin ayakta kalabilmesi için militarizm seksizm, patriarki ve buna bağlı yapılara muhtaçtır. Militarizmi gündelik yaşamdaki varoluş şekli; nasıl oturduğumuz, nasıl baktığımız vs. bütün bunlarda kendisini var ediyor militarizm. Çimere basmayın bile militarist bir söylem; kısıtlayıcı olması, sana sınırlar dayatması, neyi yapıp neyi yapamayacağını bir üst merci tarafından sana söylenmesi, yerine getirilmemesi halinde cezalandırılması… Bütün bunlar militarist sistemin yaşanış biçimleridir. Ailelerimizde veya birebir ilişkilerimizde de bunları yaşıyoruz her gün. Üstte olan bir takım kurallar koyuyor; bunu yapamazsın, bunu şimdi yiyemezsin, bunu bu saatte yapamazsın… Aileden başlayan ve gündelik hayatımızın içerisine de sinen bir sürü kural tarzı yaşam biçimleri.
What keeps me thinking about militarism is its presence in how we think in our daily lives. The system we called as militarism is quite compatible with capitalism. For the survival of this system, it is in need of sexism, patriarchy and related structures. The presence of militarism in everyday life, how we sit, how we look etc.make the militarism itself. Even “don’t step on the grass” is a militarist rhetoric; it’s restrictive, putting limits on you, telling you what to do and what not to do from a higher position and punishing you if not obeyed... This is how the militarist system is experienced. Everyday we exercise these things in our families and in one-to-one relations. The one on top makes some rules, you cannot do that, you cannot eat not, you cannot do this at this time... A lifestyle with lots of rules starting from family and permeating our daily life.
Following that, she makes a definition of ‘being civilian’ as “one’s being able to exist in his/her own space freely.” 48 The practices defined through the hierarchical and authoritative content of militarism, however, do not provide a space of freedom but only the authoritative world of the barracks. Militarization ‘orders’ the prevalence of the military values beyond the borders of the barracks. COs do not want to be within the borders of the barracks. Their approach to militarism (through the practices and institutions of everyday life) represents their declaration against the values, rules and order of the barracks. Their stand against military
48 “Kişinin kendi alanında özgürce var olabilmesi.”
84 service as COs, therefore, becomes their political stand against the prevalence of the military values in the formation of the society. As it was discussed in the second chapter, conscription played a central role in the militarization of the Turkish society. It is attributed a cultural content and provided as a cultural characteristic of Turkish citizens. COs’ stand against conscription, in that sense, provides an obvious stand against the militaristic content of Turkish citizenship.
While the quotations presented above provide an important insight on the political content of conscientious objection considering the question of militarism, they do not provide an exhaustive definition of militarism for the all COs. According to a group of COs, in order to conceive the meaning of militarism we need more than a reference to the practices and institutions of everyday life. Deniz, another interviewee of this study, points out the need to refer to the State in defining militarism. While not underestimating the reflections of militarism in daily life, he emphasizes the need to make definition by reference to the State itself. According to him, when we refer to militarism,
Devletin, çok bariz olarak örgütlenmiş toplum üzerinde, insanların bedeni üzerinde kurdugu butun o şiddeti, örgütlenmiş baskıyı anlamamız gerekiyor. Daha cok şöyle gormek gerekli; kamusal hayat, yani devletin yönlendirdigi kamusal hayatta yasanan bir militarizm, güvenlik üzerinde kurulan militarizm ve bir baskı söz konusu. (Deniz)
We need to understand the violence and the organized pressure the State puts on people’s body in an apparently organized society... Public life should be taken as the militarism the State directed and the militarism and pressure due to the pretext of security. (Deniz)
Within this framework, domestic violence -for instance- can not be defined as militarism but a reflection of militarism in everyday life;
Dolayısıyla onu militarizmin tezahurleri olarak yorumlamak mümkün… Mesele aile içinde yaşanan şiddeti, ilişkiler arasında yaşanan şiddeti ve o baskıyı... (Deniz)
Therefore, it is possible to interpret it as the appearances of militarism. For example, domestic violence… (Deniz)
85 While keeping a notion of ‘civilian militarism’ in his definition, Deniz’s approach to militarism and his emphasis on the role of the State in understanding militarism connote a wider diversification within the conscientious objection movement in Turkey. Deniz’s approach to militarism represents a critique of antimilitarist movement in Turkey. A consideration on the ways in which the question of “violence” is approached by the COs would be helpful at this point to provide an analysis on the content of this critique. Their approach to the use of violence relates to the way in which they define militarism; and their different approaches to militarism and antimilitarism explains the current diversification within the movement. Therefore, a particular attention is going to be paid to the title of violence in the following paragraphs.
To classify basically, I will mention three approaches of COs to the question of “violence”; the COs who have an unconditional stand against the use of violence; the COs who refer to “legitimate violence” and draw the limits between the individual’s violence and the organized violence; and finally the COs who draw the limit for legitimate violence between the state-led violence and the resisting group’s violence. Considering the first approach İnci Ağlagül’s 49 and Ferda Ülker’s 50 points would be helpful;
Ben hem eylemlilik, aktivizm hem de yaşamsal olarak şiddesizliği benimsiyorum. Ben şiddetin işlevsel olamayacağını ve sadece daha fazla şiddeti, öfkeyi körüklediğini düşünüyorum. Dolayısıyla bir direniş biçimi olarak da şiddetsizliği benimsemeye devam ediyorum. (İnci Ağlagül)
I adopt anti-violence in my actions, activism and daily life. I think that violence cannot be functional and it triggers more violence and wrath. Therefore, I keep adopting anti-violence as a way of resistance. (İnci Ağlagül)
Şiddettin hiçbir koşulda işlevsel olduğuna inanmıyorum. Şiddeti bir şekilde ve bir nedenle meşru görmeye başladığında ipin ucu kaçar gider. Herhangi bir şekilde şiddeti meşru bir araç olarak gördüğünde karşı şiddete de meşruluk
49 İnci is an interviewee of this study, and the first woman CO in Turkey who had her declaration in 2004.
50 Ferda is an interviewee of this study, and one of the first woman COs in Turkey who had her declaration in 2005.
86 zemini hazırlamış olursun ve bu bana çelişkili geliyor. Hiçbir şekilde şiddeti meşru görmüyorum. (Ferda Ülker)
I don’t believe that violence can be functional in any way. When you legitimize violence in some way or for some reason, it’s unstoppable. When you do this, you prepare the ground for the counter-violence too and this seems to me contradictory. I don’t find violence legitimate under any conditions. (Ferda Ülker)
The statements from İnci and Ferda represent an unconditional refusal of any use of violence. However, according to the second approach, an unconditional objection to the use of violence is not applicable, and not justifiable. According to those COs, we need to apply to a distinction in evaluating violence; a distinction between the individual and the organized violence;
Ben şiddet karşıtıyım. Anti-militarist olmak şiddet karşıtı olmayı gerektirir bence; ama şiddet tartışmalarının zeminini iyi oturtmak gerekiyor. O yüzden ben artık örgütlü şiddet karşıtıyım diyorum. Hani yoksa aslanın ceylanı yemesinden dayak yiyen kadının kocasına vurması noktalarına kadar sürüklenebiliyor; ama örgütlü şiddet tanımı başka bir şey. (Mehmet)
I am against violence. I think being anti-militarist requires being anti-violence too; but we need to get the violence discussions straight. That’s why now I say that I am against the organized violence. Otherwise it goes from a lion eating an antelope to a beaten woman to hit back her husband, but the definition of the organized violence is something else. (Mehmet)
Ben şahsen sınırı ‘örgütlü şiddet’le çiziyorum. Örgütlü şiddet başladığı anda o kurumsal yapı içerisinde o dinamikler insandan bağımsızlaşıyor. Çok örnek gösterilir ya; “ama sokağın köşesinde biri sana saldırdı, ne yapacaksın?” Ama bu iki hattın birbiriyle çok alakasız olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bireysel olarak senin orada ne tepki vereceğinle, kalkıp bir araya gelmiş bir sürü insanın, oturup, uzun uzun düşünüp bir şeye karar vermesi arasında büyük bir fark var. Bir araya gelip, uzun uzun bir şeyler düşünüp karara bağlayacak fırsatı olan insanların seçenekleri var demektir. (Ossi)
Personally, I draw the line from the ‘organized violence’. When it starts, dynamics get independent of people in that institutionalized structure. They always give the example ‘what if someone attacks you in the corner of a street, what would you do?” I think that these two cases are so different. There is a huge difference between how you would react to that attack and many people gathering together and planning their next step for a long while. If people could gather together and plan their actions, it means that they have options. (Ossi)
87 Another point of approach to violence, on the other hand, emphasizes the need to consider resisting group’s use of violence;
…halkların, insanların, özellikle bu neoliberal güvenlik devleti sürecinde kendi öz savunmalarını meşrulaştırmazsak, buna da oynamazsak elimizde hiçbir şey kalmayacak. Zaten devlet her şeyi bizim elimizden almış. Ama sistem karşıtı olması gereken antimilitarizm örneği de bunu elimizden alıyor. Öz savunmayı da alıyor, savunmayı da alıyor her şeyi alıyor elimizden… Bu şiddet kullanmayı, silaha sarılmayı önemsemek veya istemekle, arzu etmekle, talep etmekle ilgili bir şey değil. Sadece eldeki olanaksızlıkla verilmesi gereken o öz savunma mantığına dair bir şey soyluyorum aslında. Ben mesela burada Kürtler üzerine hiçbir şey söyleyemem. Yani antimilitarist olarak örneğin, bir total retçi olarak böyle bir lüksüm yok. Kürtlere silah bırakmalarını söylemek, işte çocuklara taş atmamalarını söylemek… Öyle bir lüksüm yok benim. (Deniz )
... if we don’t legitimize people’s self-defense in this neo-liberal security State period, our hands will be all empty. The State has already taken everything from us. Anti-militarism - which has to be against the system- is doing it either. This is not about regarding the use of violence or demanding and desiring to arm ourselves. I am actually saying something about the mentality of self-defense in this environment of no opportunity. For example, I cannot say anything about the Kurds. As an anti-militarist or as a total objector, I don’t have such a luxury. Telling the Kurds to get rid off the weapons, telling the children not to throw stones... I don’t have such a luxury. (Deniz)
How Deniz defines his approach to violence is through his critique of antimilitarist movement’s anti-violence attitude in Turkey. He is emphasizing the need to distinguish “state led violence” from the “resisting group’s violence”. According to him it should be the “state led violence” that antimilitarists as well as COs are concerned with. According to him that was not the way in which the question of violence was conceived by the movement so far. This kind of a classification in dealing with the title of violence therefore let Deniz distinguish himself and his conscientious objection from the previous approaches provided above. According to Deniz, we need this emphasis on the state-led violence to avoid equalization of conscientious objection with pacifism, and to avoid the interchangeable use of conscientious objection and antimilitarism as well as the identification of antimilitarism with pacifism. He claims that the conscientious objection movement in Turkey is reduced to pacifism, and they were the COs who claim themselves as antimilitarists that are responsible for this situation. Deniz’s critique
88 of the conscientious objection movement in Turkey explains the diversification in the late 2000s within the movement. It is through the critique of the ways in which the use of violence, antimilitarism and conscientious objection are conceived, we observe the diversification of the 2000s within the movement. “The Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace” is the most obvious manifestation of this critique and diversification. The Platform underlines the distinction between conscientious objection and total objection, and defines its goal as applying conscientious objection as tool to achieve peace in Turkey as mentioned in the previous section. 51 They invite any CO to participate their cause for peace and to end the war between the Kurdish guerilla and the Turkish Army. 52 The Platform includes antimilitarists, Kurdish Conscientious Objectors, socialists, and individual COs who do not define any affiliation for themselves. In an interview with Eray Güven, a socialist CO and the member of the Platform, he states that socialists have never felt themselves close to the idea of conscientious objection just because the phenomenon connoted antimilitarism and pacifism as well as anarchism in Turkey. As he states;
Sosyalistler vicdanî ret tavrına başından beri mesafeli durdu, hep burun kıvırdı. Büyük bir kısmının ise doğrudan karşı çıktığı bir alandı. Bunda, ilk vicdanî retçilerin genelde anarşist olması hasebiyle hareketin anarşist karakterli olmasının payı büyük. Bir diğer neden de, sosyalist örgütlerin ezilenlerin mücadelesinde meşru şiddet kullanımına verdikleri desteğin vicdanî ret hareketinde pek itibar görmemesi, her türlü şiddet kullanımının reddedilmesi eğiliminin daha baskın olması. Biz SGDF olarak düzenlediğimiz bir kampta vicdanî ret konusunu tartışmaya açtık. Sosyalistler olarak buna uzak durmayalım dedik. Vicdanî ret tavrını benimseyerek Kürt halkına karşı yürütülen savaşa ortak olmama yolunu seçebiliriz diye bir tartışma yürüttük. Vicdanî ret tavrını kimsenin tekelinde görmüyoruz. Bu tartışmalar sırasında, "bu anarşistlerin işi, biz bunu yapmayız" diyen arkadaşlar da oldu. Ama yine de bu yönde bir eğilim ortaya çıktı. 53
Socialists has remained distant from the idea of conscientious objection from the beginning. Majority of them have even had an explicit stand against it. The anarchist charateristic of the movement in consequence of the anarchist affiliations of the majority of the first conscientious objectors played an important role in the formation of this distance. Another reason behind this
51 http://www.barisicinvicdaniret.org/?page_id=66
52 Ibid. 53 http://bianet.org/biamag/ifade-ozgurlugu/129978-muazzam-bir-gelisme
89 distance is the fact that socialist organizations’ support to the use of legitimate violence in the struggle of the oppressed is not being enjoyed credit within the conscientious objection movement; and the dominance of the idea of taking a stand against any use of violence within the movement. We, as SGDF 54 , brought the issue of conscientious objection up for discussion in a camp that we organized. We as socialists decided not to remain distant to this issue. We discussed that we can avoid participating to the war followed against the Kurdish people through adopting the attitude of conscientious objection. We do not consider the attitude of conscientious objection as a monopoly of any group or person. During these discussions we also had friends who claimed that “this is anarchists’ issue, we do not have this attitude”. However in the end the tendency was not to consider conscientious objection as a monopoly of anarchists.
Therefore, how they approach to conscientious objection is without a reference to antimilitarism. As Eray Güven continues;
Biz bu işe girdiğimizde, sosyalist çevreler bize şunu söylediler: "Siz anti- militarist olamazsınız, siz şiddete karşı değilsiniz ki." Biz anti-militarist olduğumuzu düşünmüyoruz. Anti-militarizmin bir ortaklaşma zemini olması bizim açımızdan zor görünüyor. 55
When we joined this struggle, the socialists told us: “You cannot be anti- militarist as you are not against violence.” We don’t think that we are anti- militarist. It seems difficult for us to use anti-militarism as a common ground.
Another interviewee from the same interview that I have already referred in the previous section, Ahmet Demirsoy, who is a member of the Kurdish Conscientious Objection Movement as well as the Platform, states that;
Kürt Vicdanî Ret İnisiyatifi olarak insanların, halkların meşru müdafaa hakkını savunuyoruz. Dünyanın her yerinde de böyle olduğunu düşünüyoruz. Anti- militarizm meşru müdafaaya olumlu bakar mı, bundan çok emin değilim. Her türlü savaşa karşı çıkmayı çok gerçekçi bulmuyorum. Bu nedenle kendimizi anti- militarist olarak görmüyoruz. Ama profesyonel orduya da karşı olduğumuzu söyleyelim. Zorunlu askerlik kalksa da, askerlik paralı hale gelse de biz askere gitmeyeceğiz; paralı askerliğe karşı da ses çıkaracağımızı şimdiden ilan etmiş olalım. 56
As the Kurdish Conscientious Objection Initiative, we are in support of the right to self-defense of persons and people. We think that this is how it is all around the world. I am not pretty sure how anti-militarism receives self-defense. I don’t find it realistic to oppose any war. Therefore, we don’t identify as anti-militarist.
54 Sosyalist Gençlik Dernekleri Federasyonu – The Federation of the Socialist Youth Associations. 55 Ibid.
56 http://bianet.org/biamag/ifade-ozgurlugu/129978-muazzam-bir-gelisme
90 But we must say that we are against the idea of professional military. We will not serve in the military no matter obligatory military service gets repealed or mercenary, let’s make it clear from now that we will stand against mercenary military service, as well.
The way they approach to the question of violence reflects the way they interpret antimilitarism, and the way they differentiate themselves from the previous actors of the movement. Indeed, the critique of antimilitarist content of the conscientious objection movement in Turkey was the particular point of reference in the formation of the Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace. Along with the individual declarations of conscientious objection referring to identity-based claims such as Islam or Jehova Witnesses, the Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace represents the split and diversification within conscientious movement of the late 2000s’ in Turkey. The question of how to approach antimilitarism played a central role in this split.
To conclude this section we can say that despite different perspectives among the COs on the question of militarism today, conscientious objection is providing a challenge to the militarist content of citizenship in Turkey. Conscription is applied as one of the basic tools in the re/production of the military nation in Turkey, as discussed in the second chapter. Military service is attributed a cultural content. Objection to military service, then, provides a challenge to the citizenship regime in Turkey. It provides a rupture in the discourse of military nation that it shows the fact that not every Turk is born as a soldier. As long as conscription is conceived as one of the basic tools of the militarization of the society, COs are exposing and politically interfering the militarization of the society. It is an exposition of the militaristic content of citizenship. Considering the fact that conscientious objection provides a challenge to the discourse of military-nation in Turkey, the question of the content of this challenge can be followed through the discourse of COs on the issue of militarism.
Firstly it is seen that ‘civilian militarism’ represents the common concern of the majority of the COs. Within this framework an objection to the military service
91 can be applied as an interference to the aspects of militarism in the practices and institutions of civilian sphere. Conscientious objection can be considered as a stand against the prevalence of civilian militarism. Secondly, while civilian militarism provides the general framework, COs’ approach to strategies of antimilitarism can be classified under three categories. The question of violence helps at this point. According to this categorization, a group of COs categorically avoids using or approving the use of any tools of violence. The unit in their definition of militarism is the individual . In other words, their point of departure in the definition of militarism and antimilitarism is individual . They do not need to refer to any organizational structure or to the State. Considering this ideological background, their act of conscientious objection pays particular attention to a critique of militarism in the everyday practices of individual . They do not approve any armed struggle regardless of the cause or actor. As the military is the prime institution of the use of ‘legitimate’ violence, objecting to attend military service becomes an important tool to take a stand against the militarization of the society. Another group of COs applies to the distinction between the individual’s violence and the organized violence in order to identify the ‘legitimate’ violence. There is legitimate violence in other words. Their unit in the definition of militarism can be identified as institution , such as national armies or armed groups of resisters. According to them, organizational structures are important to refer in the definition of militarism. The military is the primary institution of these organizations. Objecting to attend military becomes an interference to the re/production of civilian militarism therefore.
According to the third approach, militarism ought to be approached through the State. They do not exclude the use of violence as long as it is applied by the resisting groups. The unit in the definition of militarism can be identified as the State. The use of violence becomes legitimate in the emancipatory struggles against the state within this framework. An antimilitarist agenda should solely refer to the State in defining its strategy. It is neither through the individual practices nor through the organized structures of resisting groups militarism can be
92 sought. Militarism can only be defined through the State. Particular practices of militarism, such as domestic violence, can only be a reflection of the grand structure of militarism whose architect is the State. The military is the representative of the State within this frame, and objecting to attend military is to take a stand against this grand structure of militarism.
A crucial point to be referred at this point is that while inquiring the relation between conscientious objection and militarism, it is observed that, whether explicitly or implicitly, the question of Kurdish issue was always a particular point of reference. How to interpret and take position to the Kurdish struggle was the particular concern for all three approaches. What is particular concern for all the three approaches is how to situate Kurdish struggle in the case of Turkey. While the first two groups of COs do not approve, or at least are being suspicious of the Kurdish armed struggle, the third group of COs are clear that Kurdish armed struggle can not be considered within the title of militarism. The third group strictly avoids any critical reference to the Kurdish struggle. Kurdish case becomes the issue through which the meaning of militarism is contested within the COs. This content of their approach to the Kurdish struggle is going to be provided in more detail in the following section.
4.4.2 Conscientious Objection, Nationalism and the Kurdish Question
The issue of nationalism 57 do not correspond to a complicated question for the majority of the COs in Turkey. Considering the fact that the anarchists, antimilitarists, socialists, and activists from the Kurdish political movement constitute the majority of the COs in Turkey, the question of nationalism have a clear and short-cut answer for the majority of them. Ossi’s reply to my question about nationalism reflects this clearness on the issue;
57 Unless it is specified in another way, what is meant by ‘nationalism’ in this section is ‘Turkish nationalism’.
93
O çok açık, o kadar net ki benim için, milliyetçilik benim için doğrudan devletin kuruluşuna, resmi tarihe bağlanıyor; koca bir refleks benim için. Militarizmi hedef almak bütün bunları hedef almak benim için.
It is so obvious, so clear for me, nationalism is directly connected to the founding of the State, to the official history, it is a giant reflex for me. Targeting militarism means targeting all these for me.
However, besides this general framework of their approach, a further consideration on the ways in which the question of nationalism is approached by the COs in Turkey reflects the content of their particular concern related to nationalism. The issue of Kurdish question is an intersection point for the majority of the COs in Turkey. It appears to be a fundamental point of reference for the conscientious objection movement in Turkey. Considering this point, the ways in which Kurdish question is approached by the COs provide the ways in which conscientious objection in Turkey touches upon the question of nationalism in the country. Starting by reference to an extreme case among the COs, Muhammed Serdar Delice, would be helpful at this point to demonstrate this content of conscientious objection in Turkey.
Muhammed Serdar Delice, who declared his conscientious objection in 2010, defines himself as a “nationalist and religious objector”. 58 He does not take a categorical stand against nationalism like the majority of COs. His declaration of
58 Delice prefers to call himself imani objector . This term of imani objector appeared following Enver Aydemir’s objection to military service due to his Islamic references in his objection. Considering the secular image of conscientious objection in Turkey, according to which conscientious objection can only be secular, imani objection was used to describe the religious- islamic motivations behind declaring conscientious objection. Aydemir introduced a new topic to the agenda of COs in Turkey, and how to approach this topic was not an easy task for them. While some were concerned about Aydemir’s conditional objection, because what he was saying had had contradictory points with antimilitarist agenda, the term of imani objection helped them to distinguish Aydemir from their point of reference. For an example of this discussion over Aydemir’s case, see: http://bianet.org/bianet/biamag/119483-vicdani-ret-imani-ret . However, today this discussion appears to be over. Aydemir is being defined as a “conscientious objector” by savaskarsitlari.org, Amnesty International, War Resisters International, The Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace and many individual COs within or without the antimilitarist movement (including all of my interviewees). This appears to be the same for Muhammed Serdar Delice, although he does not hesitate to define himself as an imani objector .
94 conscientious objection, which includes nationalistic and religious references, describes his discomfort from “degeneration” from the cultural roots. Delice defines conscription as a part of this degeneration;
Bizler bu ülkede Çanakkale destanları ile büyüdük. Kendimize Osmanlı’yı örnek, Kuran-ı Kerim’i kılavuz rehber edindik. Dedik ki: Allah Allah, dedik ki: Hak birdir, ümmet tek’dir dedik. Hoşgörüyü sadakati Atilla’dan, Selahattin-i Eyyubi’den öğrendik. Bizler yıllarca üç kıtaya hükmettik. Ama ne silahla ne de zorbalıkla. Maneviyatla, imanla, hoşgörümüzle sahip çıktık bütün uluslara. Fakat yozlaştık, unuttuk geçmişimizi. Kendimize hayali düşmanlar yarattık. Kürt kardeşlerimizi hedef aldık. Yıllarca bir takım yalanlarla kandırdık gençliğimizi. Şu anda ise artık maskeler düşmüştür. 5 aylık askerlik süresi, neyin ne olduğunu görmeme vesile olmuştur. Müslüman olmayan bir ordunun mensubu olmayacağım. … Bu zorunlu askerlik görevini reddediyor, vicdani reddimi açıklıyorum. 59
In this country, we are grown up by Canakkale epics. We saw the Ottomans as our model, Quran was our guiding book. We learned tolerance and loyalty from Atilla and Selahattin-i Eyyubi. We dominated three continents for years. Not by weapons or by force. We protected all these nations with spirituality, belief and tolerance. But we got assimilated and corrupted. We created imaginary enemies for ourselves. We targeted our Kurdish friends. For so many years we deceived our youth by some lies. Now the truth is unmasked. 5 months of military service made me realized what is what. I am not going to be a part of a military which is not Islamic. … I object this obligatory military service and declare my conscientious objection. (My Emphasis [S.S.])
Delice’s strong emphasis on the nationalistic and Islamic points is obvious in his declaration. What is striking in his position is, however, his critical approach to the Kurdish case compared with the mainstream nationalist discourse in Turkey. Despite its weak content, the way he refers to the Kurdish case is important to mention. It demonstrates the fact that even for a nationalistic CO, who corresponds to an extreme case among the other COs, Kurdish case is referred in a critical manner. This provides the reason why I refer to Delice’s point of critique on the Kurdish case at this point. It is to demonstrate the central position of Kurdish question among the COs in Turkey. Considering his reference to the Kurdish question, despite differing approaches, Delice acts together with the other COs who have an ontological stand against nationalism as an ideology.
59 http://www.muhammedserdardeliceyeozgurluk.org/2011/12/muhammed-serdar-delicenin- vicdani-ret.html .
95 It is obvious that objecting to perform a very basic practice of citizenship, supposed to be sacred by the discourse of citizenship, corresponds to a critical perspective on nationalism. However, the Kurdish question appears to be providing the content and motivation of this critical approach in Turkey. Whether they are anarchists, socialists, Islamists, or do not claim any of these titles, one can observe a common reference to the Kurdish case among the COs in Turkey. It appears inevitable, even in the declaration of a nationalist CO, that the Kurdish problem is crucial. The ethno-nationalist content of Turkish citizenship, as discussed in the second chapter, resulted in the policies of exclusion and assimilation. According to the ethno-nationalist content of citizenship, while the communities who are Muslim but not Turkish –like Kurdish and Arab subjects- were considered to be “prospective Turks” and imposed assimilationary policies, the non-Muslim subjects of the country were considered as impossible to be Turkified. The outcome was the exclusionary politics against the non-Muslim subjects, and assimilationary politics against the Muslim but not Turk subjects. Military service has been approached as one of the basic tools of the operation of this political agenda with its nationalizing content since the Republican era. Considering the discourse of the COs, on the other hand, while we see a significant emphasis on the Kurdish question, it is observed that the question of the exclusionary policies against the non-Muslim subjects, and the role of the military service within this process are not paid particular attention by the COs. The lack of collective will against the military service among the non-Muslim subjects can be applied as an answer for this outcome. It becomes through the Kurdish problem in Turkey, the COs, regardless of their political orientation, express their discomfort with the nationalistic practices of the state. Kurdish question has been very central to the agenda of COs. Considering this point, conscientious objection in Turkey challenges the nationalistic content of citizenship through making particular reference to the Kurdish question.
The central position of the Kurdish question within the conscientious objection movement is not a new phenomenon. It is even true that the conscientious
96 objection movement in Turkey is formed through a critique of the Kurdish politics of the Turkish state. It has been central to the conscientious objection movement since its birth in the early 1990s.
Yavuz describes their motivation to start a movement in the early 1990s as their will to take a stand against the conditions of war in the Kurdish region of Turkey, Kurdistan. Conscientious objection was conceived as a tool for this purpose;
Amargi Dergisi’ni çıkarmaya karar verdiğimiz toplantıda tartıştığımız bir şey de –en önemli şeydi- Kürdistan’daki savaştı. Vardığımız sonuç net olarak şuydu; burada bir savaş var, biz bu savaşa karşı nasıl bir tavır almalıyız, ne yapmalıyız meselesiydi. Verdiğimiz cevap şu oldu; vicdani ret kampanyası, askere gitmeme, orduya katılmama, militarizmle işbirliği yapmama çağrısı yapmalıyız.
One thing -the most important one- we discussed during the meeting when we decided to publish the Amargi Magazine was the war in Kurdistan. Our conclusion was: There is war there, what would be our attitude towards it, what could we do? And the answer was: we have to launch a conscientious objection campaign and make a call not to join the army, not to cooperate with militarism.
Conscientious objection was, therefore, a declaration against war; however, not simply any war in its abstract sense, but the war between the Kurdish guerilla and Turkish Army. This critical reference to the Kurdish question, apart from their theoretical stand against nationalism in its abstract sense, represents the concrete base of COs’ particular critique of nationalism. Despite this strong emphasis on the Kurdish problem by the early COs, however, they were criticized by the later fractions of the movement. The reason behind their critique, as provided in the previous section, was the antimilitarist content of the conscientious objection movement, and the ways those antimilitarist COs approach to the question of use of violence. Therefore, that was the question of how to approach to the Kurdish problem and the war in Turkey that brought those later COs to the critique of the antimilitarist content of the conscientious objection movement in Turkey. 60
60 The Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace and the Kurdish Conscientious Objection Movement represent this collective split within the movement considering the critique of the movement through the Kurdish question. As it is mentioned in the previous section, the Platform criticized the antimilitarist and pacifist content of conscientious objection in Turkey, and mentioned the need to expand conscientious objection to other groups. The need to expand
97
According to this critique, conscientious objection was reduced to pacifist understanding of antimilitarism, and the antimilitaristic understanding of conscientious objection would only produce some abstract arguments about the war between the Kurdish guerilla and Turkish army. This pacifist content avoided the expansion of conscientious objection in meaning and reach other groups than antimilitarists and anarchists. A long quotation from Ercan, a founding member of the Platform, would be explanatory enough;
Barış için Vicdani Ret Platformu da şuradan doğru gelişti: Savaşa dair doğrudan söz söylemek. Şöyle bir şey var, vicdani retçi olmak bir şekilde savaş karşıtı bir duruştur aynı zamanda ve bunun da pratik bir karşılığı olmalıdır. İsrail’deki işgale karşı olmak, Irak işgaline karşı olmak, Afganistan’daki işgale karşı olmak… bütün bunlar evet, ama bir de içinde olduğumuz bir savaş var, hergün hepimizi doğrudan etkileyen bir savaş var. Buna dair de söz ve eylem üretmek konusunda Savaş Karşıtları grubunda çok şey geliştiremedik biz. Onun çatışmasını çok yaşadım. Çok fazla tartıştık arkadaşlarla, hatta baya baya kavga ettik. Şöyle bir algı var mesela, “devlet hiyerarşik, militer bir yapıdır, PKK hiyerarşik, militer bir yapıdır”. Böyle bir eşitlemeyi ben hiç doğru bulmuyorum. Kaldı ki İngiltere’de bir tane onbaşı ben Afganistan’daki işgale katılmıyorum dedi diye -ki rütbeli bir insan bu, üzerinde asker üniforması var- Afganistan’da asker olmak istemediği için biz onun için İstanbul’da eylem yapıyoruz ve onun vicdani reddini hiç sorgulama gereği duymuyoruz. İsrail’deki askerler için de aynı geçerli oluyor; onlar “ben devletin askeriyim ama İsrail’in işgal ettiği Filistin topraklarında askerlik yapmak istemiyorum dediğinde de biz yine onun için sokaklarda oluyoruz ve o İsrailli gençlerin vicdani reddini tartışma gereği duymuyoruz. Ama Türkiye’ye geldiğimizde birisinin İslami kimliğinden doğru, birisi “Kürdistan’da savaş var, ben bir Kürdüm, buradan doğru vicdani reddimi yapıyorum” dediğinde buna dair baya bir itirazlar vardı. Bu itirazları ben hiç doğru bulmadım. Bir insanın vicdani ret gerekçesi benim için aynı olmak zorunda değildir.
The Platform of Conscientious Objection for Peace evolved as having our say on war directly. Well, being a conscientious objector also means having an anti-war stance and there must be a practice of it. Being against the Israeli occupation, being against the occupation of Iraq and of Afghanistan... All of them are fine but there is a war we are living in, too, a war which directly effects all of us every day. In the Anti-War Group we couldn’t produce much related to this issue. I had many problems about it... We discussed so much, had many fights conscientious objection is about the need to achieve peace. Conscientious objection can be a tool to achieve peace according to the Platform. It is the peace between Kurdish guerrilla and Turkish Army. In other words, the Kurdish problem has a central place in their cause, and they formed another body for themselves to differ their approach from the early antimilitarist content of the movement. They have also been active in the campaigns for Muhammed Serdar Delice, who defines himself as a nationalistic and Islamic objector. See: http://www.barisicinvicdaniret.org/?page_id=66 ; http://www.barisicinvicdaniret.org/?p=142 . The Kurdish Conscientious Objection Movement is another representation of this split.
98 with our friends there. There is such a perception: “The State is a hierarchical and militaristic structure, so is PKK.” I find such an equation ridiculous. When a noncom from England objects to join the occupation of Afghanistan we celebrate it in İstanbul, we don’t question that noncom’s conscientious objection. Similarly, when Israeli soldiers don’t want to serve in the military in Palestinian territory, we are in support with them, their stance is not questioned. But when in Turkey someone objects due to his/her Muslim identity or says “there is a war in Kurdistan, I am Kurdish, that’s my point of conscientious objection” people could not take it. I don’t find the criticism towards such points right. No two people must have the same reason for conscientious objection for me.
As it is clear by the words of Ercan, it is Kurdish question which constitutes the basis of their critique.
To sum up, the question of the relationship between nationalism and conscientious objection can be dealt with through a focus on the Kurdish question in the case of Turkey. Since military service is defined as a cultural characteristic of Turkishness by the discourse of citizenship in the country, it is obvious that conscientious objection is automatically problematizing nationalism. However, what constitutes the content of this problematization can be reflected through the ways in which COs approach to the Kurdish question. Following the interviews it is observed that Kurdish question has been representing one of the fundamental points of reference in objecting to attend military since the birth of the movement in Turkey. It represents a critique of the state policies related to the Kurdish people and the armed conflict between the Kurdish guerilla and Turkish army. In summary, conscientious objection in Turkey, regardless of the COs’ political orientation, touches on the question of nationalism through a critique of the Kurdish politics of the Turkish state.
4.4.3 Conscientious Objection and Gendered Citizens
How military service is related to the question of gender in theory was described in the first chapter. Military service is a critical destination not only for nationalization and militarization of the society, but also for gendering of the
99 citizens. Considering the question of the citizenship relation of men and women with the state, conscription plays a very central role as a citizenship practice. Considering the central position of conscription as a gendering citizenship practice, how conscientious objection touches upon the question of gender becomes an important question.
Military service, as mentioned previously, takes its own role in the construction and the reproduction of the values of hegemonic masculinity. It is in fact one of the primary fields of this reproduction process. This even becomes clearer considering the masculine content of the military as an institution itself. Yavuz’s analogy is pretty much descriptive about its masculine characteristics;
Süngüyle dürtüyor sürekli. Çüküyle dürtmesiyle, süngüyle dürtmesi aynı şey. Fallik bir şey bu. Ordu çok fallik bir sembol. Her şeyi öyle; duruşlar dik olmalı, tam erekte olmalı her şey.
Always poking with the bayonet. It is the same thing as poking with his dick. It is phallic. Military is a very phallic symbol. All of its parts. Every posture must be straight , everything is supposed to be fully erected, everything.
Military service, with its straight and erected characteristics, teaches its subjects how to be a man . As it is completed, those men spread into civilian life as the men they were taught. Through those men in the civilian life the prevalence of the military values, which are translated into hegemonic values of masculinity, goes well beyond the borders of barracks. Then, the military service appears to be not a single moment in citizen’s life that is left behind when it’s over, but a moment whose influence spreads into the civilian life as well. As referred previously, Sancar (2009) and Selek (2008) provide very useful source texts on this specific question with a particular attention on the experiences of men before and after the military service. Those experiences demonstrate the ways in which military service re/produces the conditions of patriarchy and the values of hegemonic masculinity in Turkish society. Women’s conscientious objection, at this point, stands as a declaration against the military service through exposing its role in gendering the society. Since 2004, increasing number of women have been
100 declaring conscientious objection in Turkey, although military service is obligatory only for men. The phenomenon of woman conscientious objection deserves a thorough analysis in order to reflect the ways in which the gendering consequences of conscription and militarism are being experienced outside the barracks.
Ferda Ülker’s declaration would provide a useful introduction at this point. Ferda, one of my interviewees who made her declaration in 2005, states in her declaration that,
…biz kadınların bu harekette “destekçi” konumundan daha fazlasına dair sözümüz ve duruşumuz var. Vicdani ret militarizme ve onun bütün yüzlerine karşı doğrudan bir karşı duruşun adıdır. Militarist düşünce sadece ‘askeriye’nin sınırları içinde kalmayıp, günlük hayatın içine de yedirilen “militer” bir dünya kurgular. Ki bu kurguda; kadınlık aşağılanır, kadınlar genellikle görmezden gelinir, yok sayılır. ( Ferda Ülker, 2005) (Başkent 2011: 38)
... we, women, have a say and stance more than just a “supporter” for this movement. Conscientious objection is the term for opposing militarism and all of its facades directly. Militarist thinking is not confined within the limits of the ‘military’, it fictionalizes a “military” world in daily life as well. In this fiction, womanhood is humiliated and women are generally ignored. (Ferda Ülker, 2005) (Başkent 2011: 38)
Indeed, when I asked the women interviewees of this study, including Ferda, about their motivation behind declaring conscientious objection, the responses were as follows;
Vicdani reddi askerlik hizmetinin reddi olarak görmek kavramı sınırlandırıyordu. Askere gitmeyi reddeden vicdani retçi askerlerin destekçisi konumunda olmak rahatsızlık veriyordu. Tabii ki birbirimize destek olacaktık ama vicdani reddin kadınlar için tek anlamı bu olamazdı. Zira militarizm en az erkekler kadar kadınların hayatında da söz sahibiydi. (Ferda Ülker)
Considering conscientious objection as objecting the military service limits the notion. Being in the supporter position of objector soldiers gave us irritation. We would support one another for sure, however, that could not be the only meaning of conscientious objection for women. For militarism dictates over the lives of not only men but also women. (Ferda Ülker)
Dedik ki, ne antimilitarizm ne de feminizm birbiri olmadan var olamaz. Hatta söylediğimiz söz şöyleydi, feminizm antimilitarizmin yapıtaşıdır. …. O zamanki
101 en önemli yürütülen politika vicdani ret üzerindendi ve biz kadınlar olarak ‘destekçi’ydik. Politika üretmede, söz üretmede, strateji üretmede, niyeyse hep ya kendimizi ikincil hissediyorduk ya da öyle hissettiriliyorduk. Sanki bu bizim derdimiz ve alanımız değilmiş gibi. Çünkü orada net bir durum vardı: erkekler askerliğe karşı! Bunun içerisine bir şekilde kadın olarak giremiyorsun… Hani birlikte politika yürütüyoruz ama niyeyse kadın olarak son sözleri biz söyleyemiyoruz, ya da birlikte söyleyemiyoruz. İşi götüren ya erkek bir vicdani retçi ya da erkekler son sözü söylüyor. (Hilal Demir)
We said that neither anti-militarism nor feminism can exist without each other. We even said that feminism is the building block of anti-militarism. … The most important politics implemented back then was on conscientious objection and we, as women, were ‘supporters’. For some reason, we felt subordinate or were made feel so in terms of policy making, having a say and strategy making. As if it was not our problem and domain. Because there was a clear situation: men are against military! It is not easy to get into it as a woman... Alright, we make our policy together but somehow women could not say the last words or we couldn’t say it together. Things are done by a male conscientious objector or men say the last words. (Hilal Demir)
(Zorunlu askerlikle ilgili olarak [S.S.]) Herşeyden önce öyle ya da böyle muhatap alınmamış oluyorum. Yani biz kadınlar neredeyse yokmuşuz gibi. Önce bir kadın olarak toplumsal hayatın içerisindeki yerimi anlamımı daha sonra da zorunlu askerliğe ve savaşa karşı duruşumu anlatmam gerekiyor kısacası. "sistemin etkisiz eleman"ı olmadığımı bilgi, hak, söz ve fikir sahibi olabileceğimi üstelik kurulmuş bu berbat sisteme taban tabana zıt düşündüğümü haykırmam gerekiyor. Sadece bu bile vicdani ret açıklaması yapmam için gayet yeterli bir gerekçe... İlk defa Mehmet ve Erdem’in ret eylemlerine destek anlamında, öte yandan da antimilitarizme, savaş karşıtlığına ve özellikle de vicdani ret konusuna bir aktivist kadın bakışından “sadece destekçi” değil, dolaylı değil, doğrudan katılabileceğimi düşünmüş ve bir deklarasyon hazırlamıştım. (İnci Ağlagül)
(Related to the compulsory military service [S.S.]) Above all, I am not taken seriously. It is like women are not there. In short, I need to tell my position and point as a woman in society and why I oppose obligatory military service and wars. I need to shout out loud that I am not the ‘neutral element of the system’, that I can have my own knowledge, opinions and rights and that my thinking is completely dissimilar to this awful system. Only this could well justify my declaration for conscientious objection... I prepared my declaration in support of Mehmet and Erdem’s objections, and also I thought that as a woman I can directly -not as a mere supporter- participate in this anti-militarism, anti-war and especially conscientious objection issue from a female perspective. (İnci Ağlagül)
Two points can be deducted from those statements. First of all women’s declaring conscientious objection was about making a re-emphasis on the gendering content of militarism. Secondly those declarations were addressing not only the militaristic institutions but also the gendered content of the conscientious movement itself. Indeed as Hilal states;
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Dedik ki bu bir sivil itaatsizlik eylemi ve devletin ordusuna karşı bir söz söyleme amacı var, o zaman burada durup söyleyebiliriz. Bu birinci nedendi. İkinci nedense hareketin gittikçe kahramanlaşmaya başlayan taraflarına karşı bir eleştiri getirmekti.
We thought that this is civil disobedience, its aim is to stand against the State’s military, so we are in. That was the first reason. The second reason was to bring a criticism for the parts of the movement which started heroism.
Following the first point, conscientious objection was pretty much a useful tool for antimilitarist women to reflect how gender relations have been constructed through militaristic processes. Militarism constructs women as an inferior category as Ferda states. As long as military service is conceived as an important stage in the militarization of the society, conscientious objection of women becomes a declaration against the gendering content of militarism then. A group of quotations from the declarations of women conscientious objectors would let this point clearer;
Bu topraklarda kadınların zorla askere alınması söz konusu değilse de, militarizmin altında en çok kadınlar eziliyor. Erkek egemen bir ideoloji olan militarizm, tüm yaşamımızı belirliyor ve kadınların toplumda mal, hizmetçi köle, susturulacak ve taciz/tecavüz edilebilecek nesneler olarak algılanmasına sebep oluyor. Askeri darbenin ve cunta yönetiminin izlerini taşıyan ve savaşın sürdüğü bu topraklarda kadınların özgürleşmeleri militarizme karşı mücadeleden geçer. (Figen Yüksekdağ, 2005) (Başkent 2011: 43)
Although in this geography women are not obliged to serve in the army, militarism suppresses women the most. Being a patriarchal ideology, militarism determines all our lives and causes women to be perceived as property, servant slaves and objects to be harassed and raped. In a country where the traces of military takeover and junta administration are still visible and the war is continuing, women’s emancipation requires a fight against militarism. (Figen Yüksekdağ, 2005) (Başkent 2011: 43)
Bir KADIN olduğum için birilerinin mülkiyetinde olmayı, birilerinin namusu olduğum gibi çarpık bir düşünceyle kapatılmayı, dayak yemeyi, öldürülmeyi istemiyorum. Sırf KADIN olduğum için boynuma takılan "anne", "karı", "evlat" etiketleriyle beni mülkiyetleri altına aldıklarını varsayan birtakım erkekler ve toplum tarafından yönetilip yönlendirilmeyi, güdülmeyi, yaşamımın, kimliğimin, bedenimin üzerinde hiçbir hak ve söz sahibi olamamayı istemiyorum. Sırf KADIN olduğum için gece sokaklarda yürümemin, yüzümdeki gülümsemenin taciz ve tecavüzle "ödüllendirilmesini" (!) ve bu nedenle cinayete kurban gitmeyi istemiyorum. Ayni şekilde bir eşcinselin, bir travestinin ve diğer tüm insanların sırf cinsel kimlikleri nedeniyle ezilmesini, sömürülmesini, dayak yiyip öldürülmesini istemiyorum. Örgütlü/ örgütsüz her çeşit şiddeti reddediyorum.
103 Savaşlarda ölmek, öldürülmek istemiyorum. Bizden sonra da bu gezegen üzerinde var olacak canlı/cansız ya¸samı için bir tehdit unsuru, bir terminatör olmayı reddediyorum. Ezmeyi, ezilmeyi; Emir vermeyi, emir almayı; Öldürmeyi, öldürülmeyi; Savaşı, askerliği, şiddeti yaşamımızın her alanına nakşeden, MEŞRU kılan militarist anlayışı; Reddediyorum. (Nazan Askeran, 2004) (Başkent 2011: 30)
Just because I am a WOMAN, I do not want to be trapped, beaten and killed for the distorted idea that I am the honor or property of someone. Just because I am a WOMAN, I do not want to be governed and directed by men and society that thinks that their “mother, wife, daughter” labels make me their property, I do not want to lose my right and control over my life, my identity and my body. Just because I am a WOMAN, I do not want my walking in the streets at night and the smile on my face be “rewarded” (!) by harassment and rape, I do not want to be murdered. Similarly, I do not want gays, transgenders and everyone to be suppressed, exploited, beaten and murdered because of their sexual identity. I object any kind of violence, whether organized or not. I do not want to kill or be killed in wars. I object to being a threat for living and non-living life on our planet after us, I object to being a terminator. I object the militaristic understanding which legitimized commanding or being commanded, killing or being killed, the war, the military, the violence in every part of our lives. (Nazan Askeran, 2004) (Başkent 2011: 30)
Bir kadın olarak, bedenimin vatan ve namusla özdeşleştirilmesinin, varlığımın erkek üzerinden tanımlanmasının, en yakınımızdaki iktidar sahibi olan erkeğe itaatin sıradanlaşmasının nedeni olan militarizmi sorgulamamak; İnsanların zorla askere alınmasına, gitmeyi reddettiği durumda hapse atılmalarına veya sivil ölüm olarak nitelenen yaşam biçimine itilmelerine sessiz kalmak; Bölgede yaşanan iç savaşa ve gelen ateşkes çağrılarına devletin silahla ve bombayla karşılık verişine sessiz kalmak; Devletlerin ve bütün iktidarların suçlarına ortak olmaktır. Ben, ELİMİN HAMURUYLA, doğaya ve insanlığa karşı işlenen tüm suçlara ortak olmayı reddediyorum. (Özlem Mollamehmetoğlu, 2007) (Başkent 2011: 48)
As a woman, not questioning military which is the very reason for my body being identified with country and honor, for my presence being defined over men and for our obedience to the nearest man getting so ordinary; keep silent when people are taken to the army by force, jailed when objected to it or pushed into a way of living called as civilian death; keep silent towards the civilian war and the State’s answer to ceasefire with bombs and weapons is being part of the crimes committed by the States and all powers. I, TRYING TO DO A MAN’S JOB, object to being part of this crimes committed against the nature and humanity. (Özlem Mollamehmetoğlu, 2007) (Başkent 2011: 48)
As Altınay (2009: 88; 2008: 113) states the women are being conceived as “obedient wives”, “sacrificing mothers”, and “proud warriors of the Republic where in need” within a gendered, heterosexualized and militarized conception of Turkish citizenship. The declarations above provide a stand against this content of Turkish citizenship from women’s point of view. Conscientious objection, then,
104 becomes a declaration against those roles attributed to the women by the militaristic institutions of the society. In other words, the declarations above cover a critique of militarism with a particular attention on its gendering content. Since military service is being a very central institution for the militarization of the society, and since militarization corresponds to a process that reproduces patriarchic values of the society, conscientious objection, then, becomes a very useful tool for women to expose and attack its gendering content. Women are applying to conscientious objection in order to show how militarization is related to the inferior role attributed to them in the society. Conscientious objection is being a tool for them to provide a stand against the roles attributed to them by the patriarchic institutions of the society. Hilal’s point on the question of how military service re/produces the citizenship relations of men and women with the state can also be explanatory at this point:
Aslında iyi vatandaş denilen kişi erkek oluyor. Çünkü iyi vatandaş olabilmek için askere gitmek, askerliğini yapmak gerekiyor. Bu en büyük kriter. Dolayısıyla buradaki çıkarımlardan biri kadınların zaten hiçbir zaman iyi vatandaşlık durumunda olmadığıdır. Ne yaparsa yapsın olmadığı, en fazla çocuk doğurup askere gönderebilir.
Actually what is meant by a good citizen is a man. Because in order to be a good citizen, one needs to join the army. This is the ultimate measure. Therefore, one of the deductions to make here is that women can never be good citizens. At most they can give birth to many sons to be drafted for the military.
Then, following Hilal, we can conclude that conscientious objection becomes a declaration against the secondary role attributed to the women. This even becomes more obvious considering the citizenship roles between men and women. Woman becomes the less active citizens considering the fact that they can not perform a very basic duty of citizenship, that is attending military service. Man becomes more privileged that he learns the tenets of being proper citizen in the army. He becomes more active considering his direct relation with the state within the barracks, where women are not allowed. A stand against the military service, then, also becomes a stand against this hierarchical relation between men and women with respect to their relation with the state.
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The second point that can be deducted from the statements of the women COs is that it was not only about to have a stand against the militaristic institutions in general but also against the masculine discourse prevalent within the conscientious objection movement itself. Through their own declarations of conscientious objection women within the movement aimed to show that they are more than “supporters” of the men in the movement;
O dönemlerde (1990lar sonu ve 2000ler başlangıcı) artık vicdani retçilerin durumu şöyle bir şeye dönmüştü; yoklama kaçağı olduğu için içeri alınıyor, ondan sonra birden onu içerden çıkarmak için destek eylemleri yapılmaya başlanıyor. Ve oradaki dil bazen öyle dikkatsizce kullanılıyordu ki, sanki bu bir birey odaklı eylem ve biz o bireye başına bir şey gelmesin diye destek oluyoruz... Bizim yaptığımız bu duruma biraz da fren vermekti aslında. Bu sadece bir erkek mücadelesi değil, sadece orada bir erkek orduya karşı öne çıkıyor ve biz de ona destek çıkıyoruz değil; hayır, bu genel bir tavır, hepimizin derdidir ve militarist sisteme karşı mücadeledir. Bu militarizm sadece ordudan ibaret değildir demektir. Şöyle özetleyeyim; o dönemde, kampayalardan sonra (Ossi ve Mahmet Bal için yaılan kampanyaları kastediyor. [S.S.]) bir hareketlenme oldu vicdani ret hareketinde ve o dönemde dil gittikçe cinsiyetleşmeye başlamıştı artık. Genel üretilen stratejilerin hiç birinin içerisinde militarizmin cinsiyetçiliğine dair bir söylem üretilmiyordu. Ama bu nerde diyordum. Militarizm sadece ordunun eleştirilmesi değildi ki, bütün o sistemin eleştirilmesiydi. (Hilal Demir)
At that time (late 1990s and early 2000s) the situation for conscientious objectors were like this: They are imprisoned as they are draft dodgers, then support protests were taking place to take them out. And sometimes there was such a clumsy use of language that as if our protest was only for one person to be safe, as if it was individual-oriented... What we did was to stop this situation. This is not a men-only struggle, it is not that we are supporting a man who objects the military service, this is a general problem, it is a struggle against the militarist system. It means that militarism is bigger than the military itself. To summarize it, at that time, after the campaigns (she means the campaigns for Ossi ad Mehmet Bal. [S.S.]) there was a motion in the movement and the language already got more and more sexist gradually. None of the general strategies produced a rhetoric the sexist side of militarism. And I used to say ‘Where is it?’ Militarism is not a mere questioning of the military, but of the whole system. (Hilal Demir)
Men were accepted as the only actors of conscientious objection because they were the only ones who were obliged to attend military. Because of the risks taken by them in this process, those men started to be referred as “heroes”. That became prevalent within the movement as Hilal, who has been active within the
106 movement since the late 1990s, says. This is obvious in the words of Ossi and Mehmet, two popular figures of the movement, as well;
…bu sürecin dışına çıkmamın en önemli nedenlerinden biri bir yandan simgeselleşmek ama bir yandan da fiili olarak elimin kolumun bağlanmasıydı, bu çok belalı bir bileşim. Kendi dışında bir şey haline geliyorsun. İnsanlara bir şeyleri simgeliyorsun aslında; ama sen birey olarak artık orada var olamıyorsun. Bu çok acıtıcı bir şey. (Ossi)
...the reason why I got away from this process was being both a symbol and physically locked up, it is a very troublesome combination. You turn into something other than yourself. It is like you are symbolizing something for people but you cannot exist there as an individual. This is so hurtful. (Ossi)
Gösteri toplumu böyle bir yer hani kişiler figürler üzerinden oluyor. İlk çıktığımda bayağı bir celebrity modunda dolanıyordum ortalıkta hani kendi isteğimle değil ama hani Ankara'ya gidiyorum, akşam arkadaşımla içeceğim 30- 35 kişi var masada ve hepsi geliyor sen ne tatlı bir insansın, bayılıyoruz sana ve ben nefret ediyorum bundan; çünkü karşımdakini tanımıyorum ve aslında onun tanıdığını zannettiği kişi de ben değilim. Çok saçma, özgürlüğün yok, tartışma özgürlüğün yok, akıl yürütme özgürlüğün yok, el yordamıyla gitme özgürlüğün yok. (Mehmet)
That’s how the society of the spectacle works through figures. When I am first known, I was like a celebrity. Not out of my own desire, but for example I’m in Ankara and I’m going to have a drink with my friend but all of a sudden there are 30-35 people on our table. They are all like “oh, you are such a sweet person, we love you” and I hate it because I don’t know who they are and I am actually not the person they think I am. It is ridiculous, no freedom, no freedom to discuss, no freedom to have an opinion, no freedom to find your way on your own. (Mehmet)
These experiences show how heroic positions can be attributed to the COs regardless of their intention. Superiority can easily be attributed to those figures. This corresponds to a hierarchy within the movement itself, although taking a stand against structures of hierarchy is a part of their struggle, particularly for the antimilitarists within the movement. This hierarchy within the movement results in the deterioration in the conditions of following their cause, particularly for the antimilitarists, therefore. As men become “heroes”, women turn out to be no more than “supporters” of those heroes. While men become the “leading actors”, then, only supporting roles are attributed to the women. This turns out to be a reproduction of the superior and inferior roles attributed to men and women by the institutions of patriarchy. In addition to providing an antimilitarist stand
107 against the militarist institutions of the society, women’s conscientious objection, then also, becomes a declaration against the gendered content of the conscientious objection movement itself.
To sum up, considering the content of the women’s conscientious objection in Turkey, there appears two major titles: First of all it is a re-emphasis on the meaning of militarism, and its gendering content. Secondly it’s a declaration against the hegemonic position of men within the conscientious objection movement itself. As these two titles show, women’s conscientious objection demonstrates the content of the relation between conscientious objection and gender in Turkey. Women’s conscientious objection demonstrates the fact that military service is not restricted within the barracks, but it remains its influence in the civilian life as well. Moreover, it reveals the gendered content of Turkish citizenship through pointing out the ways in which conscription, as a citizenship practice, reproduces the militaristic and nationalistic content of Turkish citizenship. Women’s objection, in that sense, demonstrates the ways in which “civilian militarism” is being reproduced by the practice of conscription and how the question of militarism is inter-related with the issue of gender. Moreover, women’s conscientious objection also demonstrates the fact that the patriarchic values may even be reproduced among the groups that are supposedly struggling against those values and their institutions. In other words, women’s conscientious objection has also revealed the hegemonic position of men within the conscientious objection movement.
Considering the gendering content of conscription as a fundamental citizenship practice in Turkey, conscientious objection provides a stand against the gendered content of Turkish citizenship. While men’s objection corresponds to a stand against the values of hegemonic masculinity in Turkey, women’s conscientious objection exposes conscription’s gendering effects in the civilian life in the most obvious way. Women claim themselves more than “obedient wives”, “sacrificing mothers”, and “proud warriors of the Republic where in need”. Moreover, this act
108 of exposing includes even their fellows within the movement, and demonstrates that they are also more than “supporters” of men in the movement as well as being more than wives or mothers of the “heroes”.
4.4.4 Conscientious Objection as an ‘Act of Citizenship’ in Turkey
Following the discussion provided above, this study claims that conscientious objection is an ‘act of citizenship’ which challenges the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. As discussed in the introduction chapter, in order to grasp the political content of conscientious objection, we need a framework of citizenship. It is because conscientious objection is an act which defines itself through a rejection to a primary citizenship practice, its political influence will also take place in the field of citizenship. However the concept of citizenship, as referred here, makes a particular reference to discursive processes rather than a juridical framework of the status aspect of the concept. According to that, conscription is identified with a practice which re/produces the militarist, nationalist and gendered content of the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. As conscientious objection constructs itself through rejecting military service, it turns out to be an ‘act’ which challenges the militarist, nationalist and gendered content of citizenship therefore. However, this approach to conscientious objection makes us re-emphasize a prerequisite in understanding the acts of citizenship. The concept of the ‘acts of citizenship’ provides the theoretical background which let this study consider the ‘acts’ before the ‘actors’. While a consideration on the political orientation, motivation and intention of the actor is crucial, an analysis on the political content of an act itself requires a consideration on the context within which the act in question takes place as well. Considering the act of conscientious objection in Turkey, the context within which conscientious objection is preformed is the discourse of Turkish citizenship. It is the discourse that COs are being subjected to before, during and after they declare conscientious objection. As will be provided below, in parallel with this point, the concept of citizenship will have a negative
109 connotation for the majority of the COs in Turkey. Their aim is to destruct the relation of subjection with the discourse of citizenship through objecting to conscription. The outcome of objecting to military service, therefore, represents itself within the field of Turkish citizenship. Conscientious objection movement can hardly be conceived as a citizenship movement comprised of actors claiming membership to the state. However, as this study claims, conscientious objection becomes an ‘act of citizenship’ considering the ruptures it creates in the discourse of citizenship as a consequence of rejecting to perform a ‘cultural’ and ‘sacred’ practice of citizenship in Turkey. The interviews conducted as a part of this study provide the content and extent of these ruptures in ‘Turkish citizenship’. A brief presentation of the ways in which citizenship is conceived by the COs would be helpful at this point.
Following the interviews of conducted as a part of this study, we can identify a dominant approach to the concept of citizenship among the COs in Turkey. According to that, citizenship connotes a relation of subordination between the individual and the state; the individual is made ‘citizen’ through the rights and duties attributed to him/her without his/her intent or consent.
Vatandaşlık derken benim anladığım devletin ortaya koyduğu yükümlülükler ve ödevler zinciri. … Aslında benim kendi kendimin inkarı olarak anlıyorum. Ben vatandaşlıkla birilerine birebir bağlı olduğumda kendimi inkar etmem gerekiyor. Yani bir Halil Savda, bir Kürt Halil Savda, bir yoksul Halil Savda, bir genç Halil Savda olarak benim kendimi inkar etmem gerekiyor. (Halil Savda)
By citizenship what I understand is the chain of responsibilities and duties that the State imposed on us. … Actually I read it as self-denial. When I am directly connected to some people I have to deny myself. I mean, I have to deny myself as a Halil Savda, a Kurdish Halil Savda, a poor Halil Savda and a young Halil Savda and so on. (Halil Savda)
Aslında devletin boynuna attığı bir ilmek gibi geliyor. Seni kapsama alanı. Sen ne kadar vatandaşsan, ne kadar o belgeleri yerine getiriyorsan, o kadar devletin ve sistemin cenderesi içinde var oluyorsun. O yüzden boynuna attığı ilmek gibi, kölelik cağrıştıran o ilmekten bahsediyorum. Daha çok boyle beliriyor. Başka bişey ifade etmiyor. (Deniz)
110 It sounds like a knot on your throat cast upon by the State. That’s how it includes you. The more you are a citizen and fill out all those documents, the more you exist within the press of the State and the system. I’m talking about that knot which reminds me of slavery. It looks like this to me and nothing else.” (Deniz)
Vatandaşlık bana karamsar bir şey ifade ediyor. Vatandaş, belli bir bölgede yaşaması için bir otorite tarafından hak ve ödevler başlığı altında tarif edilen koşulları kabul etmek durumunda bırakılmış kişi… Bir şeyler esner sürekli vatandaşlıkta. 15 sene önce insiyatifler yasadışı örgüt muamelesi görür. Sonra derler ki dernek başvurusu yapmak zorunda değiller, eğer insiyatif olarak devam etmişlerse isterlerse çeşitli avantajlardan yararlanabilirler. Genişler ve daralır; körüklü bir şey vatandaşlık. Ama körüğün en geniş olduğu yerse bile körüğün içindesin. (Yavuz Atan)
Citizenship states something pessimistic to me. A citizen is a person who had to accept some conditions which have been set by an authority as rights and duties in order to live in a certain area... In citizenship some things are always flexible. 15 years ago initiatives were considered as illegal organizations. Then they say, you don’t have to apply to be an association and you can make use of some advantages. It swells and shrinks, citizenship is something hooded. But even the widest part of the hood is within. (Yavuz Atan)
Vatan-daş arka-daş karın-daş (kardaş(gardaş)) daş daş daş "yandaş" kalabalığın dediğinin olması gerektiği bilincini aşılamak demek. (Fazıl)
Citizenship, friendship -ship -ship -ship, means inoculating the awareness that what “partisanship” crowd wants happens. (Fazıl)
Vatandaşlık ilişkisi dediğimiz şey devletin bize yüklediği yükümlülükler. Devlet tarafından konulmuş bir kavram vatandaşlık. İyi vatandaş, kötü vatandaş algıları mesela… Kim iyi vatandaş? Askere giden vs.. yani devletin verdiği yükümlülükleri yerine getiren anlamında bir ‘iyi’lik. Kötü vatandaş ise devleti bunaltan, her türlü yükümlülüklerden kaçan kişi oluyor. (Hilal Demir)
Citizen relations refer to the responsibilities the State gave to us. Citizenship has been defined by the State. For example, the notions of good citizen and bad citizen... Who is the good citizen? ’Goodness’ is measured by doing the military service etc... I mean, fulfilling your responsibilities toward the State. Whereas the bad citizen is someone who exhausts the State and avoids such responsibilities. (Hilal Demir)
Birileri tarafından belirlenip bana sunulan bir şeye tabi olmak fikri bende geçmişten beri çok ciddi bir reaksiyon yaratıyor. Ben durduğum yerden kurmamışsam, ona dair bir şey üretmemişsem, ya da birilerinin ürettiği bir şeyin içerisinde kendimi bulamıyorsam o vatandaşlık tanımı bana başka bir baskı aracı gibi geliyor bana. Türkiye’de vatandaş olmak vergisini vermek, askere gitmek, zamanı geldiğinde evlenmek, çoluk çocuk yapmak vs. Böyle bir vatandaşlık algısı var ve bu benim hiç de içinde olduğum bir şey değil. Buna çok ciddi bir itirazım var. (Ercan Aktaş)
111 The idea of being tied to something that others decided upon results in a serious reaction in me from early on. If I didn’t make it, if I didn’t produce in regard to it or if I cannot find myself in their production then such a definition of citizenship feels like an instrument of pressure to me. Being a citizen in Turkey means things like paying off your taxes, joining the army, getting married when the time comes, having children and so on. There is such a notion of citizenship and I don’t belong there. I have huge objections to it. (Ercan Aktaş)
“Dependency” and “obligation” can be identified as the two key words from those quotes. According to that, citizenship connotes “a relation of dependency and obligation”, and “rights and duties defined and imposed by the authority”. Within this kind of a framework, citizenship is solely defined as a category that is being imposed by an authority from “above”, in Turner’s terminology, in an extrinsic manner. Therefore, citizenship, following those statements, is being conceived in a status-based manner that is limited to the membership to the state. In other words, despite Yavuz’s emphasis on citizenship’s elastic content, it becomes no more than a “bellow” ( körük ) whose boundaries are already defined once and for all. Citizenship is, therefore, conceived in a static manner, rather than as a process . Or, in Engin Işın’s terminology, the concept of citizenship is reduced to the “images of citizenship”, which are the consequent images that can be deducted from a particular social context in a moment of history. Within this framework citizenship is not conceived from “below” but from “above” according to which rights are being given by the authority instead of being achieved by the struggles of the oppressed or the subordinates. This is the frame within which Halil mentioned the features of Turkish citizenship. To provide a definition of the images of citizenship in the particular case of Turkey, Halil’s description would be helpful;
T.C. babında ise vatandaşlığı devlete hizmet eden, devletin ortaya koyduğu ödevler içinde Türklük olan, kimliği Müslüman olan, erkek ve egemen olan, heteroseksist olan, egemenin çıkarları etrafında bir araya gelinmişlik olarak anlıyorum ve bütün etnik yapıların ve emek mücadelesinin bastırılması ve bunun yok sayılması olarak anlıyorum. (Halil Savda)
Within the scope of the Turkish Republic, what I understand from the citizenship is serving for the State, being Turkish, Muslim, male, dominant and heterosexist and getting together for the interests of the State. I also understand suppressing all ethnic structures and labor struggle and ignoring them. (Halil Savda)
112
Through a static conception of citizenship defined by the features of “obligation” and “dependency”, Turkish citizenship is described in the way as Halil provides above. Following his definition, conscientious objection becomes a tool for Halil to take his own stand against those conditions of Turkish citizenship;
Vicdani retçi olarak burada hiçbir yerde değilim. Çünkü ben Türk değilim, Türklük üzerine kurulan bir ulusçuluğun, milliyetçi bir halde olduğuna inanıyorum. Evet belki ailem Sünni Müslüman ama ben Sünni Müslüman değilim. Evet belki ben erkeğim ama kadınların sömürülmesinden yana değilim. Ben bu ülkede yaşıyorum ama bu ülkede devletin bir ödev olarak ortaya koyduğu askerliği reddediyorum, askerlik yapmak istemiyorum. Ben devletin bir dizi kutsalını, Kemalizm kutsalını da reddeden bir insanım. Dolayısıyla bu bahsettiğimiz vatandaşlık ödevleri içinde kendimi görmediğim ve bunları reddettiğim için zaten vicdani retçiyim. Bu vatandaşlık tanımı varoluduğu için ben vicdani retçiyim. Aslında bu vatandaşlık tanımı da benim vicdani retçi olmamın da bir nedeni. Böyle ifade etmek gerekiyor. (Halil Savda)
As a conscientious objector I am in the middle of nowhere. Because I am not a Turk and I think that a country based on Turkishness is a nationalist one. Yes, my family is Sunni Muslim but I am not. Yes, I am a man but I am against the exploitation of women. I live in this country but I object to the military service the State had set as a duty for me, I do not want to be in the army. I am objecting some of the sacred notions of this State, including Kemalism. Therefore, I am a conscientious objector since I cannot find myself within these citizen’s duties that I object to. For this definition of citizenship exists, I am a conscientious objector. Actually this definition of citizenship is one of the reasons why I became a conscientious objector.That’s how I should put it. (Halil Savda)
Halil explains the motivation of his declaration of conscientious objection through his discomfort from the “image of Turkish citizenship”. This content of Turkish citizenship brought him to the declaration of conscientious objection. Conscientious objection, in other words, provided him the way to be “political”, as this study conceives. Conscientious objection was applied as a deed of being political which could provide a rupture in the discourse of citizenship in Turkey. This is the point where I will refer Halil’s stand as an “act of citizenship” in the particular case of Turkey, because it is a deed which exposes and challenges the prevalent definition of Turkish citizenship.
While the dominant approach to the concept of citizenship is status-based, there are still alternative approaches that consider the concept’s dynamic potential. As
113 quoted above, according to Ercan, citizenship connotes a tool of oppression. His main concern is related to its “given” content. According to him, the idea of citizenship is disturbing because it corresponds to a set values that he can not intervene but only adopt. However, when I asked him whether there are ways to interfere this given content to create his set of values, he replied as;
İşte onu yapmaya çalışıyoruz. Mesela İstanbul’da Barış Çadırları adlı bir organizasyona biz de vicdani retçi olarak katıldık. Çeşitli tartışmalara katıldık. Orada yapılan tartışmaların birisi de “nasıl bir vatandaşlık istiyorum, devletle nasıl bir bağ kurmak istiyorum” sorusu etrafındaydı. O tartışmalar bana çok çok iyi geliyordu. İnsanların “ben birey olarak buyum, topluluk olarak buyum, bu aidiyetlerim var, kendimi bunlardan doğru böyle kurmak istiyorum” tartışmaları. Kişi olarak da kendimi bunun içerisinde buluyordum. Ve aslında şu an o çatışmayı da yaşıyoruz. Bir yandan devletin kurduğu, koruduğu ve sürdürmek istediği bir vatandaşlık algısı var, diğer tarafta buna itirazı olan, bunu kırmak isteyen, daha farklı, durduğu yerden bir vatandaşlık yaklaşımı geliştirmek adına bir çatışma var.
That’s what we are trying to do. For example, we joined an organization in İstanbul called Peace Tents as conscientious objectors. We joined various discussions. One of them was about the question “what kind of a citizenship do I want, how do I want to relate to the State?” Those discussions made me feel really good. Discussions that people can say “this is who I am as an individual or as a community, I have this and that belongings, I want to realize myself this way”. Personally I find myself within such discussions. Actually right now we are experiencing that conflict. On one hand, there is the notion of citizenship the State established, protects and wants to continue. On the other hand, there are those who object to that notion, who want to break through it and develop a brand new citizenship approach from their own perspective.
According to Ercan, then, citizenship may not only be a “given” category, but also a title to be contested through different occasions of conflict. Ercan defines the conflict in the confrontation of the “citizenship defined and protected by the state”, and the “citizenship which interrupts that definition of the state”. The meaning of citizenship, therefore, is being re-defined by the conflict between those. While the definition put by the state corresponds to the image of citizenship in this study, the confrontation of the alternative definitions of citizenship corresponds to being political within this framework. As long as those alternative definitions of citizenship are translated into a practice of objection to the given definitions –or images- of citizenship, they constitute the “acts” which are referred as being political in this study. Ercan’s emphasis on the concept of
114 conflict in explaining citizenship connotes the distinction between “citizenship practices” and “acts of citizenship”, and the conflict between those which is referred in the first chapter.
Mehmet is also another figure providing an alternative approach to the concept of citizenship. According to Mehmet, first of all, citizenship can no more be confined into legal membership to a nation-state; it is more than a legal status. Citizenship today connotes the ways in which “citizens” participate in the decision making processes;
Vatandaşlık fikrinin ortaya çıkışı bu uluslaşma süreçleriyle birlikte olduğu için zaten hani doğumu henüz tamamlanmış bir şey olarak görmüyorum. Ulus- devletlerle birlikte ortaya çıkışı bir tür prematüre doğum. Küvözlerden geçti ve bugün dünya vatandaşlığı dediğimiz bir şeye doğru gidiyor. Ulus inşasında kullanılan kavramlardan biri bu aslında. İşte temel eğitim, askerlik ve vergi üzerinden tanımlanmış bir şey. Bugünkü durum bundan farklı yani devletler sınırıyla tanımlanabilecek bir şeyde değiliz, noktada değiliz. … Artık küreselleşmenin sınırları belirlenebilir durumda değil, o yüzden de vatandaşlık tanımı daha çok birarada yaşayan insanlar gibi, bunun ölçütü ne olur sorusuna evden başla, mahalle, kent, bölge, ülke, kıta ve dünya ve uzayda formlar bulunursa ordaki olacak, bütün o şeyin temel hukukunu belirleyen yapı. Berbaer yaşamanın... Burda hukuktan kastım tabi yazılı metinler değil.
Since the notion of citizenship came up with the nationalization process, I don’t see its birth as complete. It is a premature birth. It survived in incubators and it is growing into something called world citizenship. This is something used in the formation of nations. Well, it is defined through primary education, military service and taxes, What we got today is something different, something that cannot be limited by the borders of the States. The borders of globalization are not to be determined, so the definition of citizenship becomes more like people living together. The scope of it could be started from house, neighborhood, city, area, country, continent, world and maybe other planets in the future. It is the structure which will define the basic laws of all that living. But here, what I mean by law is not the written documents for sure.
Mehmet’s definition of being civilian is also in paralel with his approach to citizenship;
Yaşadığın yerde, o hayatın örgütlenişinde karar alma mekanizmalarında eşit söz sahibi olabilmek demek. Bu kadar. Yani o yaşamın kurgulanışında ve devam ediş sürecinde her konuda sürekli müzakere edebiliyor olmak. İradeyi devretmeden ya da irade devretme koşullarını sen belirleyerek...
115 It means being able to have your say equally in the place you are living in. That’s it. It means being able to negotiate constantly for the formation and continuation of that living. Without leaving your willpower and if you will ever leave it, determining the conditions to do so by yourself...
Civilian practices correspond to one’s participation to the decision making processes in his/her own social context. While not articulating the ways in which participation can be achieved, he emphasizes citizenship’s participatory content. Different from the dominant approach to citizenship by the COs provided above, citizenship is not approached in a static manner as a status by Mehmet. Instead of the words of “obligation” and “dependency”, according to Mehmet citizenship connotes the conditions of “equal access to the decision making processes”.
The dominant approach to the concept of citizenship among the COs in Turkey corresponds to a status-based definition of the concept. Following the theoretical framework of this study, it is the consequent image of Turkish citizenship that COs have their declarations against. They are being political against the content of discourse of citizenship in Turkey. Objecting to perform military service becomes a tool for the COs to challenge this discourse, as military service is one of the major practices that enables the re/production of this discourse. This definition of citizenship, in other words, brings them to the idea of conscientious objection as a political act. Conscientious objection appears as a deed targeted against the conditions of the ‘consequent images of citizenship’ in Turkey. Through the act of conscientious objection the consequent image of citizenship in Turkey is being exposed and intervened with respect to its militaristic, nationalistic and sexist content. This is the way in which I refer conscientious objection as an “act”, or an “act of citizenship” in this study.
116 CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this study I aimed to discuss the political content of conscientious objection in Turkey. The question of the propositions of COs with respect to the discourse of citizenship in Turkey was my particular concern. Following the relevant literature on citizenship and on the practice of conscription in Turkey, I have provided the results of my original research on the field. It is concluded that conscientious objection is an act of citizenship which exposes and interferes the militaristic, nationalistic and gendered content of citizenship in Turkey. In this regard I have come to the conclusion that conscientious objection contests the citizenship in Turkey.
Considering the sacred meaning attributed to the military service in the discourse of Turkish citizenship since the 1930s, conscription’s central role in the re/production of the political content of Turkish citizenship becomes obvious. Conscription is a particular citizenship practice with its militarizing, nationalizing and gendering capacities. In other words, it plays a particular role in the re/production of the militaristic, nationalistic and gendered content of “Turkish citizenship”. As mentioned previously, citizenship in Turkey connotes a relation of strong commitment to the state for the majority of the citizens in the country. Conscription, through its militarizing, nationalizing and gendering content, has played a particular role in the formation of this relation of commitment between the citizen and the state. The militaristic, nationalistic and gendered characteristics, therefore, have occupied a central position within this relation of commitment in Turkey. Objecting to conscription, within this framework, provides a rupture in Turkish citizens’ relation of commitment with the state
117 whose content is identified with the militaristic, nationalistic and gendered references of Turkishness. It is within this framework this study claims that conscientious objection is an act of citizenship which challenges the militaristic, nationalistic and gendered content of Turkish citizenship.
In order to identify the content of this challenge my research included 11 interviews with the COs and activists as well as a complementary review of the already published material by and on them in Turkey. In presenting my points, first of all, I have pointed out the need to follow a periodical framework in analyzing the conscientious objection movement in Turkey. The COs in Turkey have relatively diverse backgrounds today than the anarchist and antimilitarist atmosphere of the 1990s. In this regard two periods have been identified within the conscientious objection movement in Turkey; the homogeneous antimilitarist and anarchist content of the 1990s, and the heterogeneous content of the 2000s which included not only antimilitarists and anarchists but also other political groups and individual COs. Today there are COs who identify themselves as antimilitarists, anarchists, Kurdish activists, socialists, Muslims, feminists, etc. An analysis on the political content of conscientious objection in Turkey today should, therefore, consider these diverse motivations in identifying the ways in which conscientious objection contests the Turkish citizenship. Considering the militaristic, nationalistic and gendering content of conscription, I have provided my analysis –which included the common as well as the contesting points among the COs- under three inter-related themes; militarism, nationalism and gender.
Considering the question of militarism, conscientious objection appears as an absolute negation of the ‘myth of military nation’ according to which “every Turk is born as a soldier.” Through their rejection to military service, which has been considered as a ‘cultural’ aspect of Turkish citizenship since 1930s, they are contesting the militarist content of Turkish citizenship. Despite the diversification within the movement throughout the 2000s, it is seen that the issue of militarism – or civilian militarism in Vagts’s terminology- remains to be a central concern for
118 the majority of the COs. However, it is also observed that, this diversification reflected itself in the contestation of the meaning of militarism and antimiltarism among the COs. While a group of COs emphasized the role of everyday practices in the definition militarism, another group of COs emphasized the role of the institutions or organizations in the formation of militaristic practices. Different from these two groups, a third group of COs pointed out the role of the state in militarization and make the sole reference to the state in the definition of militarism. It is seen that this contestation on the meaning of militarism and antimilitarism emanated from the question of Kurdish case. While the first two approaches to militarism are either being critical or –at least- suspicious of the armed struggle of the Kurdish groups, COs of the third approach to militarism are even mentioning the need to support Kurdish armed struggle, as it is a movement of resistance to the state. It seen that, therefore, the question of the Kurdish struggle lies in the centre of the conscientious objection movement in Turkey. This becomes more evident considering the COs’ approaches to nationalism.
As conscription is a nationalizing practice, the question of how conscientious objection touches upon the issue of nationalism constituted another crucial point of reference in this study. Considering my research, it is seen that the Kurdish question is the central point of reference for the majority of the COs in Turkey, since the beginning of the movement in 1990s. The nationalistic content of Turkish citizenship is defined particularly through its discriminatory content against the Kurdish people. In approaching to nationalism non-Muslim citizens’ condition, or the citizens of different ethnic categories other than Turkish and Kurdish were hardly referred. Considering the conditions of war between the Kurdish guerilla and Turkish army since the mid 1980s, the Kurdish question has been a point of motivation for the emergence of the conscientious objection movement, and it remains to be a central point of reference today. To sum up, it is concluded that conscientious objection’s particular challenge to the nationalistic content of Turkish citizenship is through its particular reference to the Kurdish question.
119
As provided in the second chapter, conscription also has a role in gendering the society. Women’s conscientious objection is crucial in that sense to reflect the gendering outcome of the military service. Women’s rejection is important in two respects; firstly they have provided an opposition to the gender roles attributed to them as the women-subjects of military-nation. They declared that they are not the ‘supporters’ of men as the self-sacrificed mothers, wives or servants. Following this militaristic content of civilian life, they have also provided a critique of their own movement. They declared that as men are not the only one who are subjected to the consequences of conscription, women can not be the ‘supporting’ subjects within the movement. They reject the ‘supporting’ role attributed to them, and make their own declarations of conscientious objection. While rejecting to be the self-sacrificing mothers, wives or servants of the man in a militarized society, they have also provided an objection to the “supporting role” attributed to them by within the conscientious objection movement as well.
An important point to be noted in conclusion is that, while the act of conscientious objection provides challenges to the discourse of citizenship as provided above, its capacity to challenge those aspects is not unlimited. In other words, conscientious objection’s challenge to the discourse of citizenship in Turkey is limited with the role of conscription in the re/production of militaristic, nationalistic and gendered content of citizenship. This point is important to note under the circumstances where the debates of ‘professional army’ is getting more prominence in Turkey. Bröckling (2009) demonstrates how right to conscientious objection can be a tool in the reproduction of militarist system. Referring to the German case after World War II, Bröckling (2009: 56-7) states that;
It was observed that legalized conscientious objection was very suitable to the military structuring needs of the time. The state no longer needed all young men as soldiers; further; it needed these young people outside the military for armament efforts. Thus, keeping potential ‘insurgents and the weak’ outside the barracks from the outset seemed to make more sense than attempting to make effective soldiers out of them through intense, and perhaps futile, efforts. Arms, transportation and communication systems were too sensitive and expensive to
120 be handed to unwilling and therefore unreliable personnel. As a fundamental right, conscientious objection served as a filter that kept away those who could be ‘sand in the wheels’ of the military.
The right to object military service was recognized as a right to attend civilian service instead of a right to total or absolutist objection (Bröckling 2009: 57). “The examined conscientious objectors were,” under these circumstances, “at the state’s disposal;”
And the state needed them at least as much as it needed the uniformed soldiers. The availability of a choice between conscription and civilian service both relieved the conscience, and made possible the efficient distribution of capacity. For the male half of the population the obligation to serve continued, but forced conscription with no alternative was replaced by the obligation to choose between two services. (Bröckling 2009: 57)
We are not yet aware of the ways in which professional army in the case of Turkey would function considering the myth of military nation, and the nationalist, militarist and gendered aspects of citizenship in Turkey. How, for instance, would professional army function in the reproduction of the hegemonic values of masculinity is a question to be addressed (Sancar 2009: 155). 61 This point is important to conclude that conscientious objection is an act of citizenship only under the circumstances where conscription plays a central role in the militarization of the society as a practice, and –as in the case of Turkey- where it is attributed a cultural characteristic.
A presentation of the recent developments on the issue of conscientious objection in Turkey would be helpful at this point to reveal the fact that abolishment of compulsory military service is not unthinkable anymore in the country. In November 2011 Turkish public drifted into a debate which was quite unfamiliar for the majority of the citizens of Turkey. The Minister of Justice of the country, Sadullah Ergin, announced that a new legislation considering conscientious
61 See Yuval-Davis (2010: 188-206) for a discussion on the question of ‘the women in the military’ with a particular attention on the case of the United States.
121 objection was at issue and the Ministry of National Defense is working on it. 62 Several debates in media followed the announcement of the Minister. Particularly the nationalist wing, represented by the Nationalist Movement Party, was very critical on the issue and provided strong opposition. 63 Following the debates on the issue, the Minister of National Defense made an announcement stating that the right to conscientious objection was not on Turkey’s agenda. He said that it was an amendment addressing only the decision of the European Court of Human Rights which had condemned the Turkish State over repeated prison terms of the COs. The decision the Minister was addressing was Ülke v. Turkey , which was given in 2006. The decision defined the current conditions of the COs as “civil death”. The term was referred in order to note that Osman Murat Ülke could not perform any of his civil rights emanating from his citizenship. He has not been arrested since 1998 but;
he has lived with the knowledge that he could be arrested at any time. He has no official address and has broken off all contact with the state authorities. He has been sheltered by the family of his fiancée, with whom he has been unable to contract a legal marriage. He has also been unable to recognize the child born from their union as his son. (Boyle 2009: 215)
The Court condemned Turkey for her violation of the Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights 64 according to which Ülke was imposed an unacceptable punishment and degrading treatment (Boyle 2009: 215). Following this background the sole aim of the amendment in question that the Minister was referring was to reduce prison terms into one time, and let the CO be exempt from military service after his imprisonment. However the question why the Turkish state brought this issue on the agenda after 5 years following the Ülke v. Turkey decision is important. After the Ülke decision, the Turkish State was regularly
62 http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/11/14/vicdani.rette.flas.gelisme/636728.0/index.html ; http://www.todayszaman.com/news-262701-turkey-may-decriminalize-conscientious-objection-to- military-service.html 63 http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1069576&CategoryI D=78
64 The Article 3 states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
122 asked to prepare a law that fixes the conditions of COs in the country by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Turkey could postpone the amendment until another judgment by the Court on the issue of conscientious objection in 2011. The Armenian State was condemned for violating Article 9 of the Convention 65 , which addresses the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as a response to the application of an Armenian citizen, Vahan Bayatyan, to the Court who was not allowed to perform non-military service instead of military service. 66 Although the judgment was on the Armenian State, it had influences on the Turkish case as well. Despite the lack of reference to the Article 9 in the Ülke decision which was held 6 years ago, this time the Court provided a clear conclusion through its judgment on the Armenian State that conscientious objection was a matter of freedom of conscience, and could not be left to the national law. This decision of the Court resulted in a process of intensifying demands of the Committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe from Turkey to introduce a law that fixes the conditions of the COs in the country. The announcement made by Sadullah Ergin, the Minister of Justice, stating that conscientious objection was on the agenda, therefore, did not come out of blue but it was an outcome of this process. In March 2012, the Turkish military court mentioned the term “conscientious objection” for the first time and made positive references to it, while deciding that the inductee in question –Muhammed Serdar Delice, who declared conscientious objection- was not convincing as a CO. 67 Another significant development was the Ercep decision of the Court held in November 2011. Following the application of Yunus Erçep to the European Court
65 The Article 9 states that “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
66 http://bianet.org/bianet/biamag/133078-bayatyanin-gorunmeyen-yuzu-asagilayici-muamelenin- alenilesmesi
67 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-military-court-recognizes-conscientious-objection- for-the-first-time-.aspx?pageID=238&nid=15710
123 of Human Rights, the Court condemned the Turkish State again, 6 years later following the Ülke Judgment. Different from the Ülke decision, and in parallel with Bayatyan decision, however, the particular concern was on the violation of the Article 9 this time. This was followed by the Savda and Tarhan decisions of the Court in 2012 both of which have made references to the Article 9 and condemned the Turkish state. Following these recent events, we can claim that despite Turkey’s amendment referring to the Ülke decision of the Court in 2006 which did not make any reference to the Article 9, it seems likely that the Turkish government will be obliged to redefine the law in a near future.
These recent developments are reflecting two points; firstly it is showing that the conscientious objection movement in Turkey achieved a degree of prominence and finally took the public attention. In addition to the international developments on the recognition of the right to conscientious objection, it is mainly an outcome of the political struggle of the COs in Turkey. Secondly, these public debates are also showing that the trancendental position attributed to military service as a culture aspect of Turkish citizenship starts to be ruptured. It is, of course, not to declare the end of the myth of military nation in Turkey, but to point out a prospective transformation in the meaning of military service, and potential changes in the practice of militarization in Turkey. The debates on professional army are getting more prominence day by day in Turkey. Abolishment of compulsory military service, and recognition of the right to perform civil service is becoming less and less unthinkable in Turkey following the juridical developments and the debates on the irrationality of the compulsory military service in Turkey. 68 Under these circumstances conscription may not remain its primary position in the re/production of the militarized, nationalized and gendered content of citizenship in Turkey. The political content of conscientious objection as an act of citizenship which contests the militarized, nationalized and gendered content of Turkish citizenship, following this point, would become questionable
68 For a recent example see: http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1343272&title=25-sehit- profesyonel-orduya-gecis-icin-son-dersimiz-olsun
124 within this framework. Conscientious objection, following Bröckling’s point, would even be a tool in the reproduction of the militarist system through its potential to serve as a filter to clean the “sand in the wheels”. While conscientious objection remains to be an act of citizenship in Turkey today, these points reflect that it may or may not remain to be the case in the following years.
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135 APPENDICES
Appendix A: List of Interviewees
Date of Name Gender Declaration
Yavuz Atan Male 1993
Osman Murat Ülke Male 1995
Mehmet Tarhan Male 2001
İnci Ağlagül Female 2004
Halil Savda Male 2004
Ferda Ülker Female 2005
Hilal Demir Female 2005
Ercan Aktaş Male 2005
Fazıl ∗∗∗ Male 2007
Deniz ∗∗∗ Male 2008
Buğra ∗∗∗∗∗∗ Male ------
∗ Pseudenoym
∗∗ Pseudenoym - Activist in the antimilitarist and LGBT movement
136 Appendix B: Questions
1. Would you briefly define the conditions of your family and the city/town/village you are from?
2. Would you please explain the path that brought you to the declaration of conscientious objection?
3. Would you state the reasons behind your declaration of conscientious objection?
4. Have you ever been taken to court concerning your declaration?
5. Did you need to rearrange your daily practices after your declaration such as avoiding participating to any event or going to any place where you may meet the police?
6. What is militarism?
7. What does it mean to be a civilian?
8. How would you define citizenship?
9. Being a citizen of Turkey, how would you define conscription?
10. (For woman conscientious objectors) How does the practice of conscription affect your life as a woman?
11. (For woman conscientious objectors) What exactly are you being against when you declare conscientious objection as a woman?
137
12. Do you consider yourself as an antimilitarist?
13. What is antimilitarism?
14. What is the relation between conscientious objection and antimilitarism?
15. Is conscientious objection always an antimilitarist act?
16. What do you think when a conscientious objector is defined as a “hero”?
17. Do you think that the use of violence can be a legitimate and a useful tool in a given political struggle?
18. How do you approach to the issue of professional army in Turkey?
19. Do you think that the deserters or the holders of the “pink report” can also be included within a category of objection?
20. Is conscientious objection a deed of civil disobedience?
21. Is it possible to identify a “movement” of conscientious objection which represents the collective and organized will of the conscientious objectors in Turkey?
22. What is your observation about conscientious objection’s relation with the other social movements?
138 Appendix C: Tez Fotokopi İzin Formu
ENSTİTÜ
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü X
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü
YAZARIN
Soyadı : ...... Adı : ...... Bölümü : ......
TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : ......
TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans X Doktora
1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.
2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullancılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)
3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)
Yazarın imzası ...... Tarih ......
139