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Journal of Science © JSSE 2010 Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62 ISSN 1618-5293

Andreas Petrik Core Concept “Political Compass”

How Kitschelt’s Model of Liberal, Socialist, Libertarian and Conservative Orientations Can Fill the Gap in Civic Education

International surveys and misconception studies reveal the crucial role of value orientations for political judgment abilities. But in Civic Education, political opinions are generally merely asked for or remain superficial, non-committal statements that don’t get analyzed to foster identity development, perspec- tive-taking and tolerance. Thus, this article discusses Kitschelt’s coordinate system of political preferences as an outstanding solution to fill the ideology gap in Civic Education and therefore to enhance political literacy. At first, I explain and outline the landscape of the four political : -, , democratic and -. In addition, I will trace left-libertarianism to its merely known anarchist roots. After that, I will explain how our basic political values are shaped by economic and cultural developments and how they to become political ideologies, social milieus and party families. As a third point, I will outline applications of Kitschelt’s model for the subject of Civic Education. For that, I propose a map of fundamental controversial issues to help to discover their own political position. Finally, I will introduce the “Found-a-Village-Project” as highly interactive and controversial scenario to foster political identity formation.

Keywords: velop value systems as core concepts. Instead they political cleavages, ideologies, critical thinking skills, emphasize value-neutral, “objective” thinking and political judgment abilities, political compass, “Found- analytical skills. The international IEA Civic Educa- a-Village-Project” tion Study (see Torney-Purta et al. 2001) focuses on basic characteristics of democratic , like the 1. The ideology gap in Civic Education willingness to vote and to participate, but also on To obtain political orientation is no simple task. Most democratic skills like tolerance, compromise and co- American students might wonder if Obama’s health operation. “Attitudes” are related to students’ care policy is a socialist, a Stalinist or, as it was also in institutions, their country, opportunities for im- labeled, a project. German students could ask migrants, the political of women, and future themselves, if the Social (SPD) became prospect. There we find indeed traces of political ide- a right-wing party, because they cut down on wel- ology, but they are neither systematically asked for fare or if the Christian Conservatives (CDU) did turn nor properly interpreted. left, because they are about to suspend compulsory Youth surveys do normally ask for a self-placement military . Furthermore, students could get on -right scale, but since researchers do not confused about market-liberals like the German Free explain their understanding of these complex terms Democrats (FDP) who appear politically left-winged, (e.g. Schneekloth 2010, 135) they don’t get convinc- as they postulate gay , but also right-winged, ing and significant answers: Instead only a few per- when urging lower for . Students cent of students dare to choose the clear left or right need a dynamic core concept of political cleavages. A side, about 30% place themselves in the middle and (political) compass – as it is defined as an instrument about 20% declare not to be able to understand the for finding direction – could help finding orientation categories well enough to place themselves properly. within political movements, party programs and de- At the same time, those young show, when cisions and political theories, but also when it comes asked about their primary values, indeed politically to a better understanding of their friends’ and fami- relevant ecological, religious, pacifist or private life lies’ value orientations. This is precisely why most orientations that are far from apolitical. But National Standards (see e.g. NCSS 2010 or GPJE 2004) they don’t understand themselves as being part of combine their concepts with judgment abilities and political cleavages because they never learned to do individual identity development. Students should so. I call this phenomenon the Ideology gap in Civic learn to distinguish between facts and opinions; Education. they should understand the interactive formation of A couple of classroom studies revealed a lack of ex- values and should learn to be tolerant towards dif- posure to political conflicts (see Niemi, Niemi 2007; ferent value orientations. Additionally, they should Hess, Ganzler 2007, Grammes 1998, 299-332). Neither be able to analyze and solve political conflicts. But do many teachers want to know political standpoints these standards don’t really take their own claim se- of their students nor do they support politically con- riously. Neither American nor German programs de- troversial discussions in the classroom. Even verbally 45 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

open and encouraging teachers can indirectly ex- beliefs. Even worse, there are backfiring effects: Di- clude certain opinions by the power of moderation, rect factual frequently strengthens the or simply by their comments and reinterpretations, misperception of certain ideological subgroups. or even by ignorance. The IEA study stated only 25 In consequence, ideological orientations them- per cent of students across all countries are ‘often’ selves must become central concepts of Civic Edu- encouraged to their own point of view. While cation. It is far from being enough to understand in theory many teachers favour critical thinking and how work. Only the reflection of differ- values development, in practice they mostly deliver ent democratic ideologies can lead to a congruent factual using textbooks, worksheets and world view, promote tolerance as dissociation of nar- teacher talk. row views, reflecting partisanship and the ability to Due to the absence of controversial discussions the change ones perspective. Or, as Joseph Adelson (1971, students‘ own political diversity lays dormant, and 1013) phrases it in his study „the political imagination they easily develop the misperception that „every- of the young adolescent“: The development of a po- body is in the middle“. Or they might believe in the litical identity as process of „struggling to formulate absolute of their values, mislabeling dissenting a morally coherent view of how is and might views as assaults unworthy of proper consideration. and should be arranged“. The resulting fear of being misrecognized, disrespect- The main thesis of my article is that the model of ed and excluded discourages students from partici- “Ultimate values, ideologies and forms of social order” pating in public political discussions which they sense (Kitschelt 1992, 1994, 2003), with slight modifications, as dangerous ventures (Conover, Searing, Crewe 2002). should be considered as indispensable scaffolding for The competence of distinguishing and justifying political literacy. value orientations is not a random topic among oth- ers in Civic Education. Value orientations are psycho- 2. The Kitschelt model and the competitive logically and culturally essential for the democratic space of political thought development of both and even whole Herbert Kitschelt (1992; 1994; 2003) created his model societies. First, they form a developmental task, an as heuristics to outline the competitive space of po- important need of self-recognition and responsibility: litical thought. He examined (new) party programs „acquiring a of values and an ethical system as a in post-communist as well as in western democra- guide to behavior – developing an ideology“ (Havi- cies and how people’s political preference formation ghurst 1972, 69ff.). related to them. This “political universe” can be cap- Second, the European Values Study and the World tured by the slogans of the French : , Values Survey (see Inglehart, Welzel 2005 and Welzel, equality, fraternity. They represent three ultimate Inglehart 2009) conveyed that val- values or societal end-states and are associated with ue orientations should be regarded as the central factor complementary, mostly conflicting modes of social of or stagnation – both in democratic organization. The concepts of liberty, equality and and non-democratic societies. However, this is only fraternity vary depending on the political issue they true, according to Inglehart and Welzel, if we measure are applied to. Kitschelt was one of the first theorists and deal with real “deep-rooted civic orientations”. to distinguish between two cleavages that each soci- Simple preferences for , as stated in most ety has to take position on: the distributive political surveys, are often superficial and instrumen- about allocation and the communitarian/ tal. Answers are mainly based on social desirability and socio-cultural one about actors, power and decision- therefore don’t reveal anything about the motivation making. This is one main why his heuristics is to take a stand for certain convictions. Deep-rooted civ- very useful for educational purposes: Whereas cleav- ic values represent a mediating role between economic age approaches in the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan modernization and institutional settings. (1967) distinguish regional divisions such as center-pe- Third, recent misconception research showed the riphery and sometimes even more than two cleavages, crucial role of systems to analyze and under- such as religious-secular, economic left-right, libertar- stand political facts (Nyhan, Reifler 2010). The false ian-authoritarian and green values (see Knutsen 2009), belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, Kitschelt’s approach provides clear linkages of value for example remains resistant until today among families. Since every system and political program conservative adherents of ex-president Bush. False or must consider both dimensions at the same time, the unsubstantiated beliefs can even endure corrections, form of a coordinate system seems to be the appropri- depending on ideological orientations and ate type of model:

46 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

Fig. 1: Ultimate values, ideologies and forms of social order

Fraternity with equality and liberty: self-organized organizations. This corresponds mostly with modern “post-materialist” anarcho- libertarian market Planned and left-libertarian values – a allocation of fact which most other authors : Spontaneous allocation of neglect, as we will see. “Libertar- formal organization resources: markets and free ian market capitalism” combines with commands exchange, capitalism or voting; authoritarian authoritarian the notion of personal liberty socialism socialism market capitalism with unconstrained reign of mar- ket exchange. Here Kitschelt uses Fraternity without equality and liberty: paternalism and the American linguistic conven- tion, to call market-liberalism (Kitschelt 1994, 12) “libertarian”. In the European context of political the- ory we talk about “liberal”, “right-liberal” and “neo- The economic or distributive axis measures possible liberal” movements. opinions of how people should be endowed with re- The integration of the two remaining ideologies is sources. The left “equality”-pole is defined as the view the weak point of his model. Since Kitschelt doesn’t that assets should be redistributed by a clearly define democratic limits of the authoritarian (the state, in socialist tradition or a pole, he equates “” with Stalin- network of , in the libertarian or anarchist ism. Indeed is an extreme form of socialism; tradition). “liberty”-pole is defined as the nevertheless, it is not a legitimate base for democratic view that the should be left to the market parties and preferences. Instead the center of the low- system, to voluntary competing individuals and orga- er left corner of the coordinate system should be filled nizations. This is the classical left-right-conflict that with the democratic socialist idea. According to this dominated the cold . But here we don’t deal with a position, the great majority of non-owners (workers bipolar system-conflict, but with opposites on a con- and employees) has the democratic right to control or tinuous dimension of alternatives within democracies. to even annex big owners. A strong govern- The other axis - cross-cutting the first one - is con- ment representing this majority redistributes cerned with values of fraternity, understood as axi- and is also necessary to lead and enlighten those who ological principles driving institutionalization, com- are not able to identify the structural causes of exploi- munity, forms and actors of democracy, and the tation and injustice. This necessarily state-centered quality of the process of collective outcomes. This policy caused the historical socialist-anarchist conflict dimension measures possible political opinions either between Marx and Proudhon, later with Bakunin. In in a communitarian or procedural sense, considering contrast to left-libertarian ideas of democ- the appropriate amount of personal and racy or , Marx and Engels already promoted participation: „Libertarianism“ is defined as the idea in the Manifesto of the the authori- that personal freedom as well as voluntary and equal tarian (but not dictatorial) role of the party. participation should be maximized. This would be the The second problem of Kitschelt’s model is con- full realization of liberty and equality in a democratic cerned with the term “authoritarian market - sense. Parts of that view are ideas like autonomous, ism”. This ideology tries to combine political au- direct democratic institutions beyond state and mar- thority with a exchange. Kitschelt (1994, ket, transformation of gender roles, enjoyment and 29) explains this combination mainly with “strong self-determination over traditional and religious order. Christian religious affiliation” that “typically teaches On the opposing end of the axis „“ compliance with established social norms”. This sta- is defined as the belief that and religious tus quo orientation promotes a “defensive attitude” or secular traditions should be complied with. Equal about the existing of wealth. This ideol- participation and a free choice of personal behavior ogy is traditionally called “conservatism”. are rejected as being against human nature or against Kitschelt‘s coordinate system can be seen as a re- necessary for a stable society. newal of Karl Mannheim‘s (1936) classical model of Each fields of the coordinate system can be linked utopian and ideological thinking published in 1929. to one of the four political ideologies, each of them From a perspective of of he combining two ultimate values. Kitschelt introduces identified four historical types of political con- “anarcho-syndicalism” as a sort of left-libertarian so- sciousness that still influence and in- cialism interfacing economic self- and dividuals today: Orgiastic chiliasm or , liber- collective with decentralist, non-hierarchical alism, conservatism, and socialism. The anarchist idea, 47 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

however, is not developed historically correctly, as it 4. Mainly in US-American models, Socialism is some- is connected to pre-Marxist German farmer’s libera- times not seen as an equitable democratic orien- tion movement of the 16th century. Writing from a ten- tation (as represented by European socialist and dentially democratic socialist perspective, Mannheim communist parties) but equated with dictatorial underestimates the future role of 19th century grass- Stalinism. Or Socialism gets truly defined as “stat- roots ideals as Proudhon and others developed them. ist” ideology, but without labeling conservatism This original error persists in many later attempts to in an equal measure, ignoring that conservative classify historic political thinking. thoughts require strong as well as Contemporary ideology research (Arzheimer 2009) the restricting of personal behavior that might gives support to the Kitschelt perspective. Two ma- violate traditional and religious values. jor ideology schools can be identified: First Karl 5. It is most astonishingly that National Socialism is Mannheim’s and Robert Lane’s sociological approach sometimes located in the lower middle, between to view ideologies as deep-rooted belief systems con- the socialist and conservative field of the coordi- necting a societal diagnosis with a plea for social nate system (Arzheimer 2009). Or, especially in the changes. Second the more pragmatic view in the tra- US-American compass versions, National Socialism dition of Anthony Downs “Economic theory of democ- and Socialism are regarded as rather similar or relat- racy” (1957). His main is “rational choice” ed orientations. Although, the truly conservative rather than identification. The cognitive costs are German Ernst Nolte wrote down, National lowered, when relevant parties can be associated with Socialism is “a clearly identifiable phenomenon of an ideology that encompasses the of certain conservatism” (Nolte 1984). He describes it as radi- social groups. Voters don’t have to be informed about calization process of typical conservative principles each single issue to make their choice. Instead ideolo- like , and obedience. More- gies allow referring to political “super issues” as fun- over, National Socialism did neither expropriate big damental controversial questions. nor did it redistribute wealth more equally. There are a couple of resembling coordinate sys- On the contrary, the National Socialists promoted a tems which are, after all, less appropriate than clearly stratified society and supported directly big Kitschelt’s version. Arzheimer, for example proposes business research and expansion interests. To treat the Kitschelt model in a less exact version. Further- National Socialism as a form of socialism perpetu- more, there are four popular “political compasses” ates simply the of this label. aiming at measuring individual political orientations: 6. Anarchist or anarcho-syndicalist ideas are often “The Smallest Political Quiz” (www.theadvocates.org), explicitly excluded as they are seen as having de- the “Political Compass” (http://politicalcompass.org), veloped no broad impact in most countries. This the “Electoral Compass” (www.electoralcompass.com) decision ignores the great indirect impact of par- and the “Moral Matrix” (www.moral-.com). In ticipative and grassroots anarchist values in all the following, I will briefly summarize the typical western countries since “The Silent Revolution” classification problems which most of them share: (Ingelhart 1977) through the raise of post-materi- 1. The “left” distributive pole is sometimes labeled alist and left-libertarian values.1 as “command economy”, a term which tradition- The last point induces me to take a short excursion on ally refers to a non-democratic one- anarchist thought to eliminate the popular “bomber- and not to a democratically organized political re- image” or the prejudice of a “chaotic” society without . rules and order. The first person who dealt with the four 2. The vertical axis gets sometimes de-politicized by basic orientations as legitimate alternatives was prob- the usage of psychological terms like “individual- ably the “father of anarchism” Proudhon himself. In his ity” and “collectivity” without directly focusing late work „The Principle of Federation“ (1863) he modi- on communitarian issues and democratic proce- fied his earlier anti-state position and come up with a dures. decentralized „theory of federal “, calling 3. Another coordinate system based on Inglehart’s it . He developed four “forms of government” value research cause confusion about the posi- based on “two fundamental and antithetical principles” tion of German parties (Raschke 1993). There, the that each have their own “legitimacy and ”: “new” within the left-libertarian field shows the largest political with the 1 Kitschelt (and Flanagan similarily) criticizes Ingehart’s origi- “old” (market-)liberals (FDP), which is only true for nal four-item /post-materialism index for merely the distributive dimension. On the communitarian measuring materialist values but mainly libertarian versus au- dimension, and right-libertarians share the thoritarian values. Inglehart’s later work with Welzel notion of civil ; they oppose state obser- (2009) within the international team of the World Values Sur- vey is more clearly focused on emancipative (libertarian) ver- vation and the restriction of free speech, they are sus traditional (authoritarian) values. Welzel states explicit cor- more likely to tolerate social minorities etc. relations between their value research and Kitschelt’s results. 48 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

“Regime of authority “[…] puis mettez vous-même la main à l’oeuvre; entrepre- 1. Government of all by one - or patriarchy; nez, agissez, et ne sollicitez ni n’attaquez le Gouverne- 2. Government of all by all - or . ment. C’est folie et injustice de batter les murailles de The essential feature of this regime, in both its variet- l’Autorité de votre belier démocratique et social; tour- ies, is the non-division of power. nez-le plutôt contre l’intertie des masses, contre le pré- jugé gouvernemental qui arrête tout élan populaire, et Regime of liberty laissez tomber, par son inutilité même, le despotisme. 1. Government of all by each - democracy; Suscitez cette action collective, sans laquelle la condi- 2. Government of each by each - an-archy or self-gov- tion du peuple sera éternellement malheureuse, et ses ernment. efforts impuissants. Au lieu de pourchasser le pouvoir, The essential feature of this regime, in both its variet- priez-le seulement de ne se plus mêler de rien; et appre- ies, is the division of power.” (Proudhon 1979, 8ff.) nez au peuple à faire lui-même, sans le secours du pou- voir, de la richesse et de l’ordre.” (Proudhon 1849, 194) At that time Proudhon opposed supporters of the Proudhon criticizes the “democratic and social bat- liberal representative government (here referred to tering ram” which the socialist - as democrats), Conservatives (here identified with ment uses to attack the government. Instead, the monarchy and patriarchy) and Socialists alike. With people should turn the battering ram against their the socialist idea he agrees on the distributive dimen- own phlegm deriving from their prejudiced belief in sion since he sees capitalist and corporate property as governments, a belief that restrains their vigor. Not “theft”. But the communitarian dimension separates but this ‘government-faith’ works as ‘opium the two egalitarian ideologies. Proudhon defines an- for ’ (Marx). That’s why Proudhon wants archy as „the government of each by himself“, which the people to learn collective self- to create means „that political functions have been reduced to wealth and order independently of traditional and industrial functions, and that social order arises from new powers which shouldn’t intervene anymore. nothing but transactions and exchanges.“ Here we The probably first two-dimensional cleavage model find an early concept of the modern grassroots democ- including anarchism was developed as „rough-and- racy. In his earlier work “Les confessions d’un révolu- ready guide to political theory“ by the two British an- tionnaire” (1849)2 he already categorized anarchy as archist activists and writers and Albert non-violent “order without leadership”: Meltzer in 1969 (Christie & Meltzer 1970, 104). Combining the convincing parts of the different models and avoiding the five classification problems 2 Astonishingly, there is no entire English translation of this I mentioned, I am suggesting the following version: .

Fig. 2: : Four ideal-typical forms of democracy and their non-democratic extremes

Self-determination Emancipatory association Non-democratic extreme Decentralized system Liberalism “ l eft” Free (right-libertarian)Liberalism in poli-

C tics, economy, religion;

o ; minimal state m influence; ; m

Non-democratic extreme uni civil rights & liberties; t Libertarianism a r

Chaos, isolation, anti-politics i an o an (left-libertarian, “liberal”) ; grass- r roots democracy; ; ecological & social econo- rights; ; my; ; civil “” “left” Consensus: “right” Economic liberty Politically driven economy Democratic Market-driven economy & resource allocation Distributive or economic cleavage & resource allocation principles Democratic

Centralized redistribution soc of wealth;(left-authoritarian) stateSocialism control of i o-cultu big business; social rights; social ; r economic growth; c al Conservatism

l (right-authoritarian) Non-democratic extreme e anti-religion a v “ r a

g Binding traditional and reli- i e g h gioushierarchical norms; obedience; society; Stalinism and order; t” private property rights; homeland security

Authority Non-democratic extreme Traditional order Facism, National Socialism Hierarchical System

(Petrik 2007, 200ff.) 49 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

Following Kitschelt, the four poles of the coordi- body. Private property and economic growth are the nate system refer to ultimate political values. As the major sources of social, cultural and economic devel- terms equality and liberty are used in many differ- opment. Pushed to its extreme we would ent ways, the supplements “social” and “economic” get a Manchester-Liberalism as pure capitalist market seem necessary. Second, the terms “politically driven” system without any , a system auto- versus “market-driven” economy should be added matically excluding many people from political par- to make clear that the economic conflict is not only ticipation. about redistribution but also about the role of the The conservative idea is strongly rooted in Hobbes‘ state to foster an ecological or a growth-oriented view of Homo homini lupus („man is a wolf to [his . Self-determination is the logical op- fellow] man”). People need strong directives by tra- posite of authority in the sense of heteronomy. Self- ditional to establish a peaceful, stable determination can be a collective choice so the term and well-ordered society. The government should “” isn’t appropriate. Second, the term at the same time protect individual property rights ‘authority’ is compatible with ‘democracy’ whereas as well as control individual behavior in public and the term ‘’ (that some compasses use) isn’t. private life. Important moral values are supported The concepts of self-determination and authority cover at and represented by religious authorities. The natu- the same time antithetical decentralized and hierarchi- ral human inequality and destructive urges need a cal political systems, and opposed emancipative and tra- hierarchical order, in order to maintain and ditional socio-cultural norms of everyday life. safety. National Socialism and represent an The anarchist or left-libertarian idea represents a extreme form of a socially unequal, hierarchical and historical source of modern anti-authoritarian, so- nationalist society. cially just, post-materialist, feminist, multicultural, Kitschelt (2003) mentions the linguistic anti-militarist and ecological grassroots politics. This to label the libertarian-authoritarian cleavage also concept of a “strong democracy” envisions - left-right conflict, but he sticks to the convention to hood assemblies, national and referendums reserve the two terms to the economic dimension. I on congressional legislation, experiments in work- for myself consider two dimensions of left and right. place democracy, and public institutions as models for Nevertheless, I will continue, for practical , economic alternatives. In contrast to Barbers (1984, like Kitschelt does, to talk about left-libertarian and 68ff., 98ff.) misinterpretation, the basic anarchist idea right-authoritarian orientations etc. Thus, these ad- based on Proudhon doesn‘t mean „anti-politics“ but jectives clearly distinguish both dimensions. instead “order without leadership”. At the same time Barbers use of the term can be understood as the un- 3. Empirical approaches to the formation democratic extreme of left-libertarian thought: It can and change of value orientations become purely hedonistic, conflict-denying, generat- In this chapter I will give basic insights about the ing chaos and isolation through „individual self-suffi- individual and collective formation of political value ciency“ whenever self-determination is detached from orientation. Kitschelt proposes a micro-logical “phe- equality and collective responsibility. nomenology of preference formation” within his coor- consists of the idea that glob- dinate system (Kitschelt 1994, ch. 1.3 and 2003). With al and national deregulation as well as an increasing reason, he doubts Marx‘s belief that ideologies can only be overcome by a strong emerge mainly from social classes. The Marxist view government, which would set new rules to control, short-circuits the complex multi-layered process be- reduce and occasionally expropriate big business, in tween economic property and collective action. Ac- order to redistribute incomes and to supply social cording to Kitschelt, every day of markets, welfare and at least a minimal income for every citi- work organization, and the sphere of zen. Enlightenment against traditional religious and profoundly affect citizens‘ political aspirations and other “prejudices” is seen as the central instrument preferences and influence their arrangement of politi- to abolish injustice and exploitation. Other than in cal values. Stalinist communism, are conducted by a Market experiences stimulate the self-attribution of democratic government within the legal frame of the success and failure. Hence, the location of income in . the private or public sector becomes a crucial factor The liberal idea of the is a free market for the distributive dimension: People who are less system that guarantees common wealth by competi- exposed to the vagaries of international competi- tion without major state . The truly under- tive pressure and tend to prefer politi- stood liberalism doesn‘t distinguish between econom- cal redistribution. Private sector employees and wage ic and personal freedom. Private life style, sexual or earners in internationally competitive sectors tend to religious orientations should never become subject to be opposed to redistributive policies that lower their political intervention unless it is used to harm some- profitability and capacity to invest by higher taxes. 50 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

Whereas domestic sector may compensate ents as standardized cases. This is the case in , burdens by increasing to protect owners finance, , general , po- and workers. Here Kitschelt (2003) later adds profes- lice, and many legal services. A related tendency can sions in charge of the allocation of scarce resources. be found in , transportation, engineer- Those “wielders of authority” are more inclined to ing design, and natural science research, where mate- favor voluntary contracting that “sharpen individual rial , objects or documents are processed. incentives” than on centralized redistribution that The standardized and objectifying work structure en- baffles personal endeavor. courages people to prefer social compliance and un- The second occupational experiences concerns peo- ambiguous standards of behavior, to consider social ple’s control over their work environment and their action as monologue, adopted upon the commands participative opportunities. Occupations that directly of higher authorities. Kitschelt attributes the stron- deal with people or cultural symbols such as educa- gest authoritarian value orientation to the “petite tion, , communication, health care, counseling and ” of shopkeepers, craftsmen, independent social work offer and involve communica- salespersons, and farmers. tive skills in non-routine work processes. They foster As women are mostly employed in people-process- demands for social reciprocity, individual creative- ing, symbol-producing and client-interactive organiza- ness and open dialogue as cultural conception of iden- tions and furthermore involved in reproductive activi- tity. Collective decision-making structures undermine ties claiming reciprocity, Kitschelt regards gender as authority relations. As those occupations are rarely a further indirect sign of libertarian orientations. He located in the international competitive sector (only adds 2003 that women have a general preference for consultants, agencies, mass media) they the because of their additional role as tend economically to the left pole. One important in- mother making it harder for them to invest in their dicator for this group of people is education, because career and making it more likely for them to fail on job autonomy and education are highly interrelated. the market. Towards the other end of the communitarian scale On the whole, Kitschelt identifies seven “political we find occupations with bureaucratic imperatives of preference groups” and places them within his coor- costs and expediency urging employees to treat cli- dinate system:

Fig. 3: Ideology and occupational groups in advanced capitalist democracies

(high education, women, symbol and client processing) Left-libertarian Libertarian politics politics

high education symbol and client processing jobs in the public sector high skill, processing symbols and clients in the private sector

Capitalist high-skill jobs in liberal Socialist politics politics (public and/or domestic administrative the inter-nationllyinter-nationally professionals competititvecompetitve and corporate (private and/or sector, nonowners) and manual internationally public manufacturing organization men and service sectors competitive sector, sector owners) jobs low-skill jobs in domestic services and petite manufacturing bourgeoisie

Authoritarian Right-authoritarian politics politics (low education, men, processing artifacts and documents)

(Kitschelt 1994, 27)

51 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

1. Group I: Low to intermediate skill administrative more physical and liberty. Personal styles and manual sector (mainly in the so- of consumption and conduct become relatively inde- cialist quadrant) pendent forces, resulting in role conflicts between 2. Group II: High education symbol and client pro- work life, traditional family values and education. But cessing public service sector professionals (mainly since access to knowledge is still very much linked to in the left-libertarian quadrant) social classes, role conflicts between libertarian and 3. Group III: Low-skilled wage earners in domestic authoritarian values are less probable in lower classes. private services and manufacturing (mainly on the Kitschelt’s model is far from being static. Conjunc- authoritarian pole with tendency to economic lib- tural effects, ecological catastrophes and cultural con- erty) flicts can lead to at least temporarily different posi- 4. Group IV: -exposed sector of high to interme- tions. The macro- of economic modernization diate skill wage earners (the middle with slight ten- promote, according to Kitschelt’s own studies in 1994 dency to the market-liberal and the authoritarian and 2003, two general value-shifts in western societ- pole) ies. He identified five basic “party families” which in 5. Group V: High skill professionals and entrepreneurs the long run have to adjust their programs according in the symbol producing private sector (mainly in to societal value shifts: the market-liberal quadrant, partly in the left-liber- 1. Left-libertarian, mostly green parties (LL) tarian quadrant) 2. Social democratic and democratic socialist resp. 6. Group VI: Corporate managers, owners and profes- communist (labour) parties (SD) sionals in business services (mainly in the conserva- 3. Market-liberal Parties (LIB) tive quadrant, partly in the market-liberal quadrant) 4. Christian democrat and secular conservative par- 7. Group VII: Small business without professional ties (CD) training, “petty bourgeoisie” (strongest market- 5. (New) right-authoritarian parties (NR) liberal and authoritarian tendency) The first value shift took place from the postwar de- In addition to the work sphere, people’s values are af- cades until the 1970s and . The post-war decades fected by their socio-cultural experiences which they were dominated by the ’s distributive conflict gain in their leisure time. New allow (horizontal ellipse):

Fig. 4: Distribution of political preferences from the post- war decades to the 1970s and 1980s

Libertarian Socio-cultural Position

LL

LIB Allocation of income in SD accordance with Redistributive market contracting political allocation CD of income

NR

Preferences in the Postwar Era Authoritarian Main distribution of Socio-cultural preferences in the Position 1970s and 1980s

(Kitschelt 2003, 7)

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Kitschelt has never argued, as some of his readers personal services financed by a comprising welfare proclaim, that the libertarian-authoritarian conflict state caused a change from authoritarian to libertar- didn’t exist by then. This cleavage was simply less ian values. Thus, the increasing left-libertarian, “new manifested and politically articulated. According social” movements and Green parties of the 1970’s to Kitschelt, the first shift towards left-libertarian and 1980’s resulted in an authoritarian backlash in and right-authoritarian tendencies until the 1980s most western states via populist and nationalist (diagonal ellipse) had two major structural reasons: right-wing parties. Particularly losers of economic One reason was the decrease of manufacturing jobs modernization and less educated male workers in in favor of the “post-fordist” and new in- manufacturing sectors, clerks or small business own- formation that promoted a switch from ers proclaimed a new authoritarianism. socialist to liberal values. The decline of Stalinist The second shift increased the tendencies of the socialism later contributed to this tendency as well. first shift in the direction of (right-)libertarian and For another thing, the increasing financial and social (left-)authoritarian values (vertical ellipse):

Fig. 5: Distribution of political preferences from the 1980s to the turn of the millennium

Libertarian Socio- cultural

Main distribution of preferences at the turn of the millennium

LL

LIB Redistributive Allocation of political allocation SD income in of income accordance with market

CD

NR

Main distribution of preferences in the Authoritarian 1970s and 1980s Socio-cultural Position

(Kitschelt 2003, 7)

53 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

Until the new millennium, left-libertarian positions Though Kitschelt’s model has influenced many reached a “support-ceiling” because of hard budget scholars, there is a serious critique to it (Duch, Strøm restraints in the public sector due to crises of wel- 2004). First, the authors criticize Kitschelt’s mainly fare states. That’s why highly educated people prof- socio-demographic research with factors such as age, ited mostly from the job growth within the market- education, white collar/ and with personal dis- exposed sector. Consequently, left-libertarian parties positions such as religiosity, post-materialism, readi- are inclined to cautiously expand their electoral space ness to join the ecological, antinuclear or move- towards the market-liberal segment. The decline in ment. Instead the authors favor using direct and the birthrate increases the necessity of a reorienta- simple questions about distributive and communitar- tion towards rather right-libertarian young people. ian issues, just like the European Values Study and the Especially the notion of intergenerational justice World Values Survey do. Kitschelt (1994) himself men- initiates left-libertarian parties to advocate retrench- tions these studies as a possible additional approach. ments of benefits in favor of improved edu- Apart from criticizing his methods the authors also cation and similar tasks. Social democratic parties question Kitschelt’s findings – even though without less and less from the segment being very convincing. They misunderstand Kitschelt’s but rally instead better educated employees, moving first value shift (see fig. 4) as rigid statement that “the towards “economic ”. This in turn alienates political left is libertarian and the right authoritar- their old manual working base which partly switches ian“. In consequence they come up with various ex- to left-authoritarian, e.g. communist parties, or right- amples to contradict their (falsely reproduced) claim. authoritarian ones, or they join the non-voters. Con- For example, they show that leftist parties such as servative parties with increasing pressure to liberalize communists are less libertarian than rightist (market- parts of the economy and to cut down on welfare are liberal) ones – which is evidently true, but can also endangered to lose their strengths among the elderly. be understood by Kitschelt’s graphics. Furthermore, Market-liberal parties, according to Kitschelt, are (until they claim that conservative partisans also advocate 2003) the “great winners” of ongoing transformations. libertarian values since their participation in “conven- But they have to decide whether they combine their tional political acts“ is as pronounced as within the appeal to market-liberalism with socio-cultural liber- political left. Conventional participation, though, is tarianism or rather with more authoritarian and na- defined as “general in politics, party member- tionalist appeals for keeping their petty-bourgeoisie ship, lawful demonstrations, frequent political discus- constituencies. Radical right-winged parties tend to sion”. Kitschelt never suggested that left-libertarians tone down their former market liberal rhetoric in fa- were mainly striving for more conventional partici- vor of “welfare chauvinist” demands to limit welfare pation and that conservatives/ right-authoritarians benefits to the indigenous , corresponding were apolitical or generally opposed to democratic to their raising success among the working class and values. Duch and Strøm, on the other hand, find out clerical voters. Less educated workers are internally that “unconventional” participation (occupying build- divided between social protectionists and market- ings, signing a petition, joining a , attending liberal tendencies. unlawful demonstrations or strikes) correlates indeed Kitschelt couldn’t consider the of with left-libertarian values – a fact that is completely 2008 which is about to add a new shift from liberal compatible with the distinction between conserva- to socialist values, as more and more people call for tive and emancipative forms of participation. Finally, social protection, subsidies and state control of fi- the two critics stress that the socio-cultural cleavage nancial and other economic transactions. In addi- wasn’t about libertarian versus authoritarian values tion, the threat of global climate change could cause but about libertarian versus communitarian ones. a among left-libertarian ecologists, not of They found communitarian concerns of “social cohe- the classical welfare state, but of public investments, sion, integration and “ both within redistribution and business control to benefit the the economic left and right. Yet, this finding isn’t sur- , of course with strong market-liberal back- prising at all and doesn’t contradict Kitschelt’s notion lashes. If these slight tendencies came true, we would of “fraternity, paternalism and corporatism” (see fig. witness a third shift of the main sphere of preference 1). The term ‘authority’ is nothing but a metaphor for formation in the direction of its cold war horizon- orientations expecting individuals to adapt to a par- tal position – but with new “eco-socialist” forms of ticular context. This is the case in left-winged trade a politically driven economy on the left side of communities as well as in the petty bourgeoi- axis. The raise of a “socio-ecological” social milieu in sie – of course with partly different contents of their , the decline of the market-liberal Free Demo- “identity politics”. Duch’s and Strøm’s critique misin- crats’ (FDP) poll ratings combined with a real boost terpret the value shift as if it was only a simple axis of the Green Party’s ratings may be signs for that ten- with a clear cut left-libertarian and right-authoritarian dency (see below). orientation. That’s why they don’t correctly reflect on 54 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

Kitschelt’s seven occupational groups and five party cultural and intellectual interests, striving for self- families with their partly common and partly contrary actualization and self-development. values. In fact, Kitschelt is talking about the rotation 4. Modern : Enjoyable and harmonious life, of the „salient space“ of preference distributions, aspiration for material and social security, family. which means that political parties might under cer- Here the Sigma model for Germany distinguishes tain circumstances extend their political supply with- a modern moderately conservative middle-class out completely abandoning the core of their values. milieu from a slightly less traditional and more Though I mainly agree in favor of Kitschelt’s socio- libertarian milieu of employees in the high-tech and demographic research, I would like to compare it to service sector. The newest sinus model for Ger- approaches that are mainly based on interviews of many 2010 distinguishes the (more conservative) individuals expressing their distributive and commu- “mainstream ” from a “socio-ecological nitarian values. Since the European Values Study and milieu” of political correctness and the World Values Survey mainly concentrate on the critics. comparison of countries I refer to the social milieu 5. Consumer-materialistic: Will to stick with the main- approach which distinguishes “value families” of like- stream consumer standards, but often disadvan- minded people. A social milieu is defined to combine taged and disrooted precarious people. a certain social status with a certain value-orientation. 6. Sensation orientated: Search for fun and action, The two different schools (stemming from two former new intensive experiences, life in the here and now, partners who dissociated) Sigma Mannheim (www. spontaneity and individualism, provocation and sigma-online.com) and Sinus Sociovision Heidelberg unconventionality. In the Sigma model referred to (www.sinus-institut.de) use almost the same item- as hedonistic milieu, the newest Sinus model talks battery and have created almost similar results. Sinus about the “escapist milieu”. Sociovision has created seven meta-milieus based on 7. Modern performers: Young, flexible, mobile, suc- empirical surveys of most important Western coun- cess- and action-orientated, highly qualified, com- tries and (see Sinus Sociovision 2005, 2009; mitted, motivated, fascinated by multi-media. Hradil 2006). Below I outline their descriptions, add- Here the Sigma model distinguishes well-edu- ing differentiations according to the Sigma model for cated urban postmodern performers from (partly Germany (Ascheberg 2006) and the new 2010 Sinus more conservative) high achievers in highly com- model for Germany (www.sinus-institut.de/en): petitive sectors stemming mostly from the lower 1. Traditional: Security, status quo, tradition, duty, middle-class. discipline and order. The Kitschelt- and the German If we take these seven Meta-Milieus and the distinc- Sigma-model distinguish here two traditional mi- tions following the German models we get eleven pos- lieus: the right-wing “petit bourgeoisie” or tradi- sible milieus and therefore a slightly more differenti- tional lower middle-class and the left-wing trade- ated but rather similar group formation than Kitschelt union-oriented, tradition-bound worker’s milieu. (see fig. 3). We can place the eleven Milieus within the 2. Established: Commitment to achievement, claim to political compass to identify their potential basic ori- leadership, status awareness, requirement of exclu- entation. The postmodern and the hedonistic milieu, sivity, conservative attitude. going beyond Kitschelt’s groups, represent proto- 3. Intellectual: Open mindedness, post-materialist types of the idealistic and self-experimental parts of ecological and participative values, pronounced post-materialist thinking:

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Fig. 6: Potential connection between social milieus and political value orientation Self-determination Emancipative association Decentralized system

Post- modern milieu

Modern performers Liberal Hedo- nistic High achievers milieu

Social equality Modern Economic liberty Politically driven economy employees Modern Market-driven economy & resource allocation (partly “socio- middle-class & resource allocation ecological”)

Established conservative Con- milieu Traditional sumer workers mate- ria- Traditional listic “” (lower middle-class)

Authority Traditional order Hierarchical System (Petrik 2007)

Neither Kitschelt nor the Milieu approach claim a sim- 4. Closing the ideology gap in Civic ple connection between (often times latent) ideologi- Education: Individual positioning cal preferences and voting. Many other factors such as taught through fundamental issues the current personal and political situation, personali- and controversial debates ties of politicians, mass media and party In this last chapter I will outline how teachers can shape one’s actual party choice. The individual value use Kitschelt’s model in the civic education classroom. preference mainly reveals the political identity as an It can become a basic tool to sharpen the student’s important base for critical judgment. political orientation by contrasting and analyzing ide- Whereas the milieu-approach refers to politically ologies, party platforms, social milieus, social move- significant values, the explicitly opposed “life-style”- ments, comments, textbook articles and approach (Dziemba, Pock, Steinle 2007) is an example so on. Second, it can be used to locate and develop of extreme de-politicization. Instead of the “fixed life individual political preferences. If we consider the patterns” that the so-called future researchers see with- axes as vectors, each individual can be represented in the milieu approach, their own research diagnoses by an average position showing the relative impact of mostly transitory lifestyles. Value types such as Com- ultimate political values and related issues. The four muniTeens, Latte Macchiato-Families, Super-Daddies, political compasses (see above) and the European Tiger-Ladies and Greyhoppers lack in deep-rooted and Values Study as well as the World Values Survey each therefore perennial values, all the above-discussed work with highly controversial questions that cause surveys are striving for. Moreover, the life style survey people to position themselves. Exemplarily, I would is obviously restricted to left-libertarian, market-liber- like to introduce the “smallest political quiz” as the al and modern conservative groups of people, ignor- simplest variation of all compasses in order to dem- ing losers of modernization who feel the necessity of onstrate their basic functioning. According to its ex- an authoritarian backlash. plicitly right-libertarian authors, the quiz is used in many American schools and textbooks (as to the imprecise term “statist” see chapter 2):

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Fig. 7: The World‘s Smallest Political Quiz At schools, political compasses are mostly used to help students to identify parties matching with their personal values. The “Electoral Compass” (www.elec- toralcompass.com), being the most scientific of the four, has been built for the US-presidential elections of 2008. It derived from the Kieskompas that schol- LIBERTARIAN ars of the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam created in 1985 (http://www.kieskompas.nl/). Kieskompas was constructed as an alternative to the popular Stemwi- jzer voting adviser that has for his part influenced the LEFT RIGHT 100 (Liberal) CENTRIST (Conservative) 100 German voting adviser “Wahl-O-Mat”. Unfortunately, Stemwijzer and Wahl-O-Mat don’t enable voters to 0 0 0 20 40 6080 Personal Issues Score determine their position within in the whole politi- cal landscape so that I would suggest replacing those STATIST models by the Kieskompas or by Kitschelt’s model. (Big Government) If we compare the questionnaires of the four com-

20 40 60 80 passes, including items of the European Values Study and the World Values Survey which are related to the 0 Economic Issues Score distributive and the communitarian cleavage, we get a basic list of fundamentally controversial political questions: (www.theadvocates.org) 1. Which persons and agencies should be in charge of decision-making and government? You can find your own place in the chart by answering 2. How do we solve national and international con- the following ten questions positively, negatively or flicts and breaches of the rules? indifferently (the latter risking of putting you into the 3. What is the value base of our society? Which role center). Of course, the ID-question is only controver- should religion play? sial in an US-American context; it would be consensual 4. How should we include strangers and social minori- in Europe. The total of points for each answer shows ties in the mainstream ? an average political position: 5. How should politics influence private life styles, gender relations and sexual behavior? PERSONAL ISSUES 6. What impact should the state have on economy 1. Government should not censor speech, press, me- and property rights? dia or the . 7. How should people get endowed with resources? 2. Military service should be voluntary. There should 8. Which are the leading economic principles and be no draft. how do they impact on the educational system? 3. There should be no regarding sex between 9. What role should ecology play for the economic consenting . system? 4. Repeal laws prohibiting possession and use of drugs. These questions represent a political key concept 5. There should be no National ID card. helping teachers to choose controversial topics that foster political judgment skills. The following table ECONOMIC ISSUES compares the essential controversial issues that the 1. End “corporate welfare.” No government handouts different approaches use:3 to business. 2. End government barriers to international . 3. Let people control their own retirement: privatize Social Security. 3 From the European and the World Values Survey, I mainly cho- se similar basic items for the two political dimensions (for a 4. Replace government welfare with private . similar selection and differences between both questionnaires 5. Cut taxes and government spending by 50% or see Knutsen 2009, appendix). The whole item sets are available more. on the surveys’ internet sites.

57 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

Fig. 8: Highly controversial issues used in questionnaires on individual value orientation

European & Political Electoral Fundamental issues World Values Smallest Quiz Moral Matrix Compass Compass Survey Independence and Question au- deliberation vs. obe- 1. Decision making & thorities; one-party dience in family and government state; obeying and work, men’s leader- commanding ship, participation Gun control, Irak invasion; financial Spank children, contribution to discipline, death Strong security & Strong Defense, UN, and world 2. Conflict resolution Military service, penalty, rehabilita- defense; respect of fighting , free- peace; Patriot act and security tion, military action, law versus causes of dom of speech and , civil rights and crime defense spendings, counter- death penalty, tor- ture and security Religion in school, Creationism in sci- 3. (Non-) religious Role of faith (God, God’s & religion and moral- ence classes, stem value base Hell, Sin, Heaven…) significance ity cell research ; inte- Nationalism, race 4. Inclusion and UN, legalization of , ethnic gration; strangers National ID card superiority, integra- cultural identity illegal immigrants groups as neighbors tion Drug legalization, , Equality of sexes, reproduction, gen- drug abuse, homo- Sexuality, use of Same-sex marriage, traditional & non- 5. Private life styles der roles, (same-sex) sexuality, , drugs abortion traditional life marriage, same-sex imagination styles child adoption Control of mort- 6. Property rights International free Private vs. govern- Corporate interests, gage lenders, more and economic trade, government Business benefit ment ownership public funding to leadership spendings public schools Tax raises vs. tax cuts for higher Private vs. state Corporate welfare, incomes, private responsibility; more Private or state- 7. Resource allocation private division, wel- retirement fund, equal vs. more provided health and redistribution security & charity; fare, charity benefits, different incomes; care, charity flat tax reduction of income stable prices equality, obligatory health care Compulsory class- 8. Economic prin- Competition fosters room attendance, Higher wages for or equal educa- ciples and educa- creativity vs. fos- job preparation as better teachers tion tional system ters bad features major aim of educa- tion Increased taxes, Exaggerated effects higher prices and/ of global warming; Regulations for 9. Ecology and or less economic carbon tax; climate Nature protection environment protec- economy growth or jobs to change policies or exploitation tion protect environ- versus economic ment growth

On the basis of these nine fundamental topics we can tions and the contrasts between two ideologies shar- now specify the ultimate values of the Kitschelt-com- ing one ultimate value like authority, social equality, pass. The following version opens up the landscape economic liberty or self-determination. It represents of political controversy within democratic societies. the important “value-bricks” of political ideology: The grey fields represent the corporate values of two adjacent ideologies while on the contrary the white ones refer mainly to one ideology that typically fills one quadrant (see fig. 2). This political map allows us at the same time to consider the possibilities of coali- 58 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

Fig. 9: The core curriculum of controversial distributive and socio-cultural values

Self-determination

1. , unanimous vote Participation Federalist representative system, major vote

2. , pacifism, Negotiation, resocialization Violence & military intervention as ultimate ratio

3. , free Free competition of non-binding belief-systems Free religious competition, agnosticism

4. Immigration mainly as human right Decentralization, pluralism, multiculturalism, integration Immigration mainly for economic usefulness

5. Elective affinity, free , living community, gay rights Role emancipation, sexual freedom Non-patriarchic family, pluralism

7. Uncondi- 7. Equal tional basic 9. Sustaina- opportuni- 6. Competitive income or bility as ties; materi- middle class 6. Collective common 8. Motiva- prime eco- al incentive companies ownership, property tion through nomic goal 8.Motivation autogestion cooperation through Market- Private Political Social 9. Growth & driven re- initiative & Politically & satisfac- competition, redistri- equality as profit as source allo- investments, Economic Political directed tion of achieve- bution prime eco- prime eco- cation; mi- individual liberty economy needs; ment & comprehen- nomic goal nomic goal merit, tiered nimal taxes ownership & State & welfare responsibility Welfare, high sive edu- Growth as Moral limits, education ownership & taxes cation prime integrity of system Charity & Powerful respon- guaranteed system economic creation, workfare; major sibility income goal homeland compulsion protection to work

5. Emancipatory expectation Marriage & family as core of society Traditional gender role expectation

4. Guiding social policies, internationalist identity Centralization, assimilation Guiding culture, national & ethnocentric identity

3. Secular norms, state influence Binding value system Religious , church & state influence

2. Power as a means to solve conflicts; deterrence & punishment; army as peacekeeper & preserver of values

1. Hierarchical decision-making, elite- and expert-democracy

Authority

Finally, I would like to summarize my “Found-a-Vil- introduce them (genetic approach in the tradition of lage-Project” (Petrik 2007; 2008; 2011). Its basic idea Dewey and Wagenschein). Later the teacher confronts follows Adelson’s (1971) island-scenario as a frame- the students with potential village situations that sys- work for political identity development. The inter- tematically launch the nine fundamental issues (see viewed adolescents were asked to imagine a thousand fig. 8 and 9). people venture to an island to form a new society. 1. Government: Should we elect a strong leader to Adelson then presented hypothetical laws and po- solve personal conflicts and our economical crisis? tential conflicts within the community to the youth. 2. Conflict resolution: What should we do with a vil- Should a law be passed to prohibit smoking? Should lager who stole 1000 € out of the common cash a dissenting religious group be vaccinated? Beyond box? that, my simulation of a deserted Pyrenees mountain 3. Value base: Might we transform the church into a village offers a more concrete institutional setting secular cultural center? with traces of the traditional class structure, as well 4. Inclusion: Should we accommodate four tradition- as a market place, a town hall, a prison and a church. al Moslems from ? Those institutions animate students more likely to de- 5. Private life: Who should decide about a village bate basic political issues than the “naturalist” island. girl’s request to have an abortion? In each of the three acts, Kitschelt’s model plays an 6. Property rights: Do we accept an ’s offer to indirect or direct role: buy one of the houses, transforming it into a hotel, Act one: “Discovery of controversial values”: The building a road out of the small path, a parking on students get together for several town meetings to the market place, a telephone and internet line to develop their own economic, political and cultural attract more tourists? system. Those meetings are mostly highly controver- 7. Redistribution: Should the whole village pay for sial, inducing the students to establish basic debat- the reparation of the rotten roof of one of the ing rules. Some of the fundamental issues such as houses? decision-making and the distribution of incomes are 8. Economic principles: Should villagers who are raised automatically, without the teacher having to economically successful by inventing new cultiva- 59 Andreas Petrik Journal of Social Science Education Core Concept “Political Compass” Volume 9, Number 4, 2010, pp. 45–62

tion methods, computer games etc. pay a special and conflict resolution, the creation and distribution wealth tax? of wealth, religion, life styles and value change and in- 9. Ecology: Do we want to invest in a wind powered clusion of outsiders. These fundamental topics can be generation and ecological farming by neglecting modeled by two dimensions in so far as most individ- other possible investments? uals, movements and parties seek a certain “average” Act two: “From values to ideologies”: Now the village congruence between their different communitarian inhabitants get to know the four founding fathers and distributive insights. Supporters of authoritarian of liberalism, conservatism, socialism and anarchism governments, for example, very rarely promote anti- (term used as an equivalent to left-libertarianism, see authoritarian education. above) Smith, Burke, Marx and Proudhon by original By and large, Kitschelt’s model is a good example text passages. The students engage in role-plays (how of what the ‘ of Concepts’ calls the “proto- would a liberal, socialist etc. village look like?) in order type view” Murphy 2002, 488ff.): Here ideologies are to learn to perform their different argumentation pat- not “classically” perceived as precise definitions but as terns. Later they work on developing a political com- variable concepts with strong “family resemblance”. pass integrating the four ideologies. Afterwards they Prototypes like socialism or liberalism are summary compare their own solutions with Kitschelt’s model. representations of an entire category that overlap Act three: “From ideologies to current politics”: Final- with other members of the category, without having ly, the villagers discuss controversial macro-political attributes that all members (individuals, movements, questions, like homosexual marriage, national refer- parties) share. The resulting flexible operationality is endums, climate change or the decline of the welfare the major outcome of this model: state. First, by taking the four ideological perspec- Ideologies can be contrasted and related. Hybrids tives in a role discussion and second, by stating their can be mapped as well, see , social own point of views. So they pass through a learning liberalism, or socialist and con- path from the discovery of their proper values to po- servative variations of . Especially litical ideologies, systems and recent political issues. the New Social and Green movements can be seen in I am currently using the village scenario to do case a left-libertarian and non-violent anarchist tradition. studies on “politicization types” as heuristics to deal Fascism and Stalinism get contoured as two economi- with differently motivated political learning prob- cally quite different, but at the same time similarly lems. A politicization type shows a typical argumen- totalitarian extremes. tative and conflict resolution behavior depending on New political parties and movements can be asked his or her basic political value orientation: An example for their special value cocktail. Possible be- might be latent conservative student who refuses to tween parties or movements can be proved regarding justify her/his claims since he/she views them as “nat- their ideological chances. Single political problems ural” or a latent left-libertarian student who insults like can be compared for contrasting “dissident” villagers because of their unexpected op- scientific and political solutions (see Hippe 2010). position to egalitarian policies (see Petrik 2010). The model helps relating every day values, social milieus and latent political orientations. Collective Conclusions values shifts and backlashes can be traced. Contradic- Following the „Pragmatologic Theory of Models“ (Sta- tions between party platforms and actual political de- chowiak 1973) Kitschelt’s model appears to be a func- cisions can be mapped and explained as well. tional combination between overly simple and very Individual orientations can be located, even when complex alternatives. The one-dimensional left-right dealing with incongruent “patchwork-identities” such scale has always been insufficient, as it couldn’t clar- as a religious socialist. An actual individual position ify, for example, the differences between an authori- represents an average, summary spot. The value de- tarian and a libertarian left orientation. Furthermore, viations caused by special topics can be mapped as the ambiguous nature of (market-)liberalism between well. Students can learn to better articulate or alter his “left-wing” civil rights orientation and his “right- their position and at the same time better understand wing” distributive position wasn’t explained cor- their political counterparts as well as political parties rectly. A three- or four-dimensional model would be and movements (see the top of this article). less practical and less “dynamical”. Second, it is not Civic education teachers can use the model to test by accident that many scholars and publicists have and widen their material’s controversy. At the same chosen almost exactly the same coordinate system – time, they can assist their students to develop a toler- most of without knowing each other. Every ant and self-reflected political identity such as in the needs to deal with decision-making “Found-a-Village”-Project.

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