The Somalia Affair the Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History
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Canadian Military History Volume 22 Issue 4 Article 6 2013 The Somalia Affair The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History J.L. Granatstein Dean F. Oliver Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation J.L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver "The Somalia Affair The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History." Canadian Military History 22, 4 (2013) This Canadian War Museum is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. and : The Somalia Affair The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History The Somalia Affair The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History J.L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver n late 1992, the Mulroney breaking point by budget cuts and Little further happened until, in Igovernment dispatched the force reductions and a continuing 1994 and 1995, videos made by CAR Canadian Airborne Regiment string of high-profile and dangerous soldiers showed racist attitudes and (CAR) and, a few months later, international security deployments. vile acts during hazing rituals at a reconnaissance squadron from In 1992, the CAR, the Canadian Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, the the Royal Canadian Dragoons, to Forces’ quick reaction force, was CAR’s base. The resulting firestorm Somalia to serve in a United States- the only suitable combat unit not of public criticism all but forced run humanitarian peace enforcement already deployed, recovering from the minister of national defence in mission. The east African nation was a deployment, or preparing for one. the Chrétien government, David a failed state, with warlords fighting The regiment consisted of three Collenette, to order the disbandment and people starving, and a previous commandos (equivalent in size and of the Canadian Airborne Regiment United Nations (UN) operation had capability to infantry companies), on 5 March 1995. failed to establish control of the one each from the three regular force It was only the beginning. situation. The new Unified Task infantry regiments. On 20 March, the government Force was authorized by the United Stationed in the desert at a dot on appointed a Commission of Inquiry Nations as a Chapter VII intervention the map called Belet Huen, the CAR into the Deployment of Canadian under the UN Charter that could use lived in tents in the heat and dust, ate Forces to Somalia under Judge force to restore peace. packaged rations, and tried to restore In the early 1990s, the Canadian order in the midst of chaos. Locals Résumé : L’affaire somalienne a été Forces (CF) had been stretched to the tried to steal what they could from the l’événement militaire de la décennie. soldiers, and camp security had to be Horreur, mystère, drame, scandale; les médias en firent des gros titres. progressively tightened. There were Abstract: The Somalia Affair was Le caractère totalement vindicatif des the military event of the decade. many incidents, some shooting, and critiques côtoie toujours les plates Horror, mystery, drama, scandal: it several deaths of Somalis until, on excuses des autorités dans tous les was the perfect headline. The shrill 16 March 1993, 2 Commando caught écrits de l’époque. Nous avons écrit cette vindictiveness of critics still fences with a Somali teenager red-handed and entrée en pensant à ces deux éléments, the dull apologias of the establishment notre réflexion fermement ancrée tant took him captive. Two soldiers then in any reading of the period. We wrote sur la tragédie humaine et que sur le this entry with both irritants in mind, tortured and killed the boy, Shidane triomphe de l’être humain, ainsi que sur our thoughts fixed firmly on human Arone, taking trophy photographs of le fait que, même en expurgeant l’un, les tragedy and human triumph and how, the grisly beating. No one intervened, Canadiens ont malheureusement réussi in bowdlerizing one, Canadians had despite Arone’s repeated screams à diminuer les deux. Les historiens somehow diminished both. Historians devront se débattre pour retirer l’affaire and pleas for help and the proximity will struggle to wrest Somalia from somalienne des mains des polémistes, the polemicists’ grasp, to temper of his torture site to surrounding tents pour tempérer les feux d’artifice et la pyrotechnics and folk wisdom with and other positions. Ottawa learned sagesse populaire par l’analyse, du analysis, perspective, or knowledge. of the death shortly afterwards, recul ou des connaissances. Nous avons We succumbed here to our own and there were some punishments succombé ici à nos propres déceptions, disappointments, so rhetoric intrudes et la rhétorique s’infiltre (et semble handed out by a CF board of inquiry. – and seems warranted, just the same. même nécessaire). Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2013 22, Number 4, Autumn 2013, pp.59-63. 59 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 6 A Canadian soldier stands watch in rear hatch of a Grizzly armoured personnel carrier as it patrols through a battle-damaged Somali town. Gilles Letourneau, Judge Robert Access to Information Act had been cover-up. Most sensible observers Rutherford, and journalist/academic violated as senior officers apparently recognized an inquiry that had Peter Desbarats. The commission tried to protect their reputations become a headline-hunting fiasco, was to examine why the CAR was and those of their minister. Did this its yelps of mistreatment cloaking chosen for the mission, the events in represent evidence of systemic failure the steadily diminishing returns Somalia, and the post-deployment of command? One chief of the defence of an ever-growing mandate. The phase that involved an alleged cover- staff, General Jean Boyle, was forced resulting five-volume report was up at National Defence Headquarters to resign as a result of his disastrous unfortunately, if revealingly, titled after the torture and murder of testimony; other senior officers were Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Arone had become known. The tainted. The commission rolled Somalia Affair. It offered generally chair, Letourneau, was splenetic, along, demanding more money, an sensible recommendations on aggressive, and openly dismissive expanded mandate, and additional leadership, accountability, discipline, of many of those called to present time. personnel selection, training, and evidence, regularly badgering The government had had rules of engagement. In effect, the witnesses. This made sufficiently enough. After two years, a tough commissioners declared that no good television fodder that the and capable Liberal defence minister, future force should deploy without commission’s hearings became a Doug Young, ordered the slow- proper equipment, training, a Museum 19940035-018 Jeff by Speed, Canadian War Photo public trial of the Canadian Forces moving commission to produce its clear chain of command, and a full itself, even though much of the report promptly and closed it down understanding of its role. Had any coverage was devoted to the almost in early 1997. The commissioners, Canadian expeditionary force ever immaterial alteration of press releases the government’s political marched or sailed with such clarity at National Defence Headquarters. opponents, and some members of of purpose? Complex events and There was little public doubt that the the media cried censorship and uncertain outcomes rarely permitted https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/660 2 and : The Somalia Affair The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History such assurances. It was not the gazing to indispensable analysis. water to ease thirst, and generated report’s only broad-brush assertion. Every expert, it seemed, understood security to assist daily living in areas The commission also offered critical implicitly the deeper causes of the under Canadian military control. comments on the Somalia mission, on Somalia imbroglio, though none – for Several individuals were decorated the cover-up of the torture and murder reasons that remained nameless – had for acts of uncommon bravery, while and other incidents, and it focused on proffered wisdom before or during the force as a whole – the airborne, 12 officers, including seven generals, the ill-fated mission. Pompous reports mechanized units, engineers, pronouncing them “failures.” It made on “lessons learned” were more often doctors, and helicopter pilots – was 160 recommendations in all, of which than not lists of authors’ favourites, lauded by the campaign’s American the government eventually accepted uncompromised by perspective; commander (and many Somalis) as 132. It was a reasonable response to helpful “recommendations” one of outstanding professionalism a long and gruelling investigation flowed, unbothered by hypocrisy, and competence, perhaps the best in and painful public flogging, rendered from the military’s fiercest critics. the entire international command. quickly and with government thanks Everyone purported to have the In the short term, such kudos to still-grumbling ex-commissioners answer, and most overlooked the mattered little. The Somalia mission and a suspicious Canadian public. obvious, Arone’s murder and the became synonymous in public Photo by Jeff Speed, Canadian War Museum 19940035-017 Jeff by Speed, Canadian War Photo Subsidiary research or Airborne’s disciplinary misdeeds