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"The British Administration ofthe Ionian Islands: 1815-1831"

MASTER'S THESIS

David Bhamjee McGill University

April25, 1996 0 "The British Administration of the 0 Ionian Islands, 1815-1831"

Table of Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgments pp.i-ii

Chapter 1:

"The Fall ofthe Venetians and the War­ pp.l-11 Time Occupations, 1797-1814"

Chapter 11:

"British Sea Power and the Peace, 1815- pp.l2-17 1825"

Chapter Ill:

"The Ionian Islands Under Sir Thomas pp.l8-35 Maitland, 1815-1819" c Chapter IV: "Great Britain and the Greek War for pp.36-73* Independence, 1821-1827"

Chapter V:

"The Neutrality of the Ionian Islands pp.75-97 During the Greek War of Independence"

Chapter VI:

"The Ionian Islands, 1815-1831: A pp.98-115 Social, Political and Economic Analysis"

Chapter VII:

"British Strategy and the Ionian pp.ll6-123 Islands, 1815-1831"

Appendices

Introduction to Bibliography c Bibliography *please note, due to a reprinting, there is no page 74. 0 ABSTRACT

In 1815, the British protectorate of the Ionian Islands was established by the Treaty of Paris. Great Britain acquired the islands for two purposes: First, to prevent Russia from establishing itself in the Mediterranean; Second, to provide a base in the eastern Mediterranean from which Britain could promote a balance of power favourable to its Levantine interests. From 1815 to 1831, those purposes were threatened by the outbreak of the Greek War for Independence. This thesis examines that period, so as to illustrate how Britain met this challenge, and protected its strategic interest.

***

RESUME

Le protectorat Britannique des iles Ioniennes fut etablit en 1815 par le Traite de Paris. Les deux principales raisons de la Grande Bretagne justifiant cette aquisition etaient, dans un premier lieu, d'empecher la Russie de s'installer dans le bassin Mediterranee. Aussi, cela donnait a la Grande Bretagne une base a 1'est de la Mediterranee de loquelle elle pouvait assurer un equilibre des forces, reaffirmant les interets qu'elle avait au Levant. De 1815 a 1831, la guerre d'Independence en Grece remit en question ces objectifs. Ce memoire couvre cette periode, a fin d'exposer en detail le fa~on dont la Grande Bretagne a releve ce deft et a protege ses interets strategiques.

c Acknowledgements 0 In completing this thesis, I would like to thank all the

people who assisted me throughout my work, beginning with my supervisor, Dr. Hereward Senior, of McGill University. After arriving at McGill in September, 1994, without a supervisor

available, Dr. Senior agreed to add yet another student to his list, and for that I am grateful. His suggestions and advice

throughout the writing process were invaluable.

In researching my topic, the library staff at McGill, and in particular the Inter-Library Loan department, were a great help. Furthermore, the staff at the D.B. Weldon Library at the University of Western Ontario made researching away from Montreal significantly easier.

In the department of History at McGill, Mary McDaid's tireless work on behalf of all graduate students must be

acknowledged. Her constant enthusiasm is greatly appreciated. I would also like to thank Georgi Mikula, whose help in finding

work as a teaching assistant made the past year's work that much easier. c i Throughout my time at McGill, my friends and roommates,

c especially Steve, were a constant source of support and encouragement, always supplying welcome diversions from research

and writing. I would also like to thank Margot for all of her

support, encouragement and understanding. When I didn't think I could finish, or got frustrated writing, she kept me going. Her

support helped me get through it.

My family in London have always been there for me, listening to all my plans and trying to help in any way they could.

Without them, I could not have finished. I would especially like to thank my father. He has always done his best to teach me the value of education, and has constantly encouraged me to do my best, in everything I do. Without all of his support, this thesis would not have been possible. I dedicate it to him.

0 ii Chapter 1: "The Fall of the Venetians and the c War-Time Occupations, 1797-1814"

Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean to play a greater part in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after nation has striven to control it and the strife still goes on. 1

As a juncture between three continents, the Mediterranean

Sea has long been a sight of conflict between the powers of

Europe, Africa and Asia. As Mahan noted, nation after nation has attempted to control it. History is replete with examples of Mediterranean conflict. The period which followed the French

Revolution is no exception.

The French Revolution unleashed a new power in Europe;

nationalism. That power would, in part, shape European politics right into the twentieth century. Nationalism, inspired by the

agents of liberte, egalite, et fraternite, attracted peoples who were living under the control of a foreign power. One such group were the Ionians.

1 A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, (London, 1889), p.33.

0 1 The history of the Ionian Islands is a story of foreign c occupation and control. From roughly the sixteenth century until 1797, the islands were under the control of the Venetian

Republic. However, in 1797 the period of Venetian rule came to an end. At that time, the Ionian Islands entered into a period which saw a change of five foreign masters before their

nationalist aspirations were ultimately realized by their reunion

with Greece 2 in 1864. During that period, the longest of the foreign occupations belonged to Great Britain. In 1815 the British controlled the Ionian Islands in the form of a

protectorate, created by the Treaty of Paris. 3

Britain's decision to administer the islands was, in part, based on the belief in their strategic importance. For Britain in the nineteenth century, strategic importance was ultimately linked to the Royal Navy. The Ionian Islands, and particularly Corfu, offered the British the opportunity to establish a naval

2 Michael Pratt, Britain's Greek Empire, (London, 1978), p.xiii.

3 Treaty between the Allied Powers respecting the Ionian Islands, 1815, cited in Henry Jervis-White Jervis, History of the Island of Corfu and of the Republic of the Ionian Islands, (London, 1852), p.291.

0 2 base in an area of immense importance. Furthermore, the protectorate c created by the treaty would allow Britain to administer the islands and influence politics in the Eastern

Mediterranean, thereby protecting their interests in the Levant. Consequently, when revolt erupted in Greece in 1821, Great

Britain had an immensely strategic vantage point, from which to view and act on the revolt's developments. To that end, the British administration of the Ionian Islands, from 1815 until

1831, will be examined in order to illustrate how British

strategic interests were protected through the crucial first

fifteen years of the protectorate.

The Ionian Islands, comprised of Corfu, Paxos, Levkas, Cephalonia, Ithaca, Kythera and Zante are located off the Western

coast of Greece (Appendix I). Historically, their geographical

position have caused the islands to serve as a bridge between

Greece and 4 Western Europe. Their proximity to both the east and the west helps to explain why they have been coveted by powers such as Britain, France, Russia, the Ottomans and the Venetians.

4 Pratt, p.v.

0 3 From the sixteenth century until 1797, the islands were part c of the Venetian Republic. This period has been referred to as,

" ... the most vital formative influence on Ionian history''. 5

However, in 1793 the revolutionary zeal of the new French

Republic was spread throughout Europe. By 1797, it had reached

the islands.

In a despatch to the Directory in Paris, Napoleon Bonaparte

wrote:

The islands ... seem of more importance to us than all of Italy. The Turkish Empire is decaying; the possession of the islands would enable us to support it if that were possible, or take our share. 6

For Napoleon, the Ionian Islands were a key piece in the

Mediterranean puzzle. He continued, "The time is not far off

when we will feel that to destroy England we must seize Egypt and

the 7 route to the East". The islands were an important part of that plan.

5 Ibid., p.xiii.

6 Cited in Pratt, p.61.

7 Ibid., p.61. c 4 In 1797, Napoleon's army overwhelmed the Venetians who quickly sent envoys to receive terms. What followed was the

Treaty of 8 Campo Formio. Article five of the treaty stated that: "His Majesty, the Emperor, King of Hungry and Bohemia agrees to the Republic of France having full sovereignty and possession of

the Venetian 9 Isles of the Levant ... ". For roughly two years, the French attempted, with very limited success, to administer

the islands on a model similar to that in France. However, in late 1798, a combined Russian-Turkish force moved against the

French in an effort to remove their presence from the Levant. By 1799 the islands had fallen, and the second foreign occupation

since 1797 began.

On 21 March 1800, the Convention between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Constantinople, relative to the Ionian Islands and

their 10 Dependencies was signed. Article one stated that:

8 Fred L. Israel, ed., Major Peace Treaties of Modern His­ ~' vol.1., (New York, 1967) , pp. 433-444. 9 Ibid., p.435.

1 ° Convention between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Constantinople, relative to the Ionian Islands and their Dependencies, 21 March 1800, cited in Jervis-White Jervis, pp.284-288.

0 5 ... the said islands shall ... form a Republic, under the title of Suzerainty, to the Sublime c Porte, and governed by the principal notable men of the country. His Imperial Majesty of of all the Russias engages for himself and his successors to guarantee the integrity of the States of the said Republic ... 11

For the next seven years the Ionian Islands would be governed by a series of constitutions that brought a return of the aristocratic rule that had flourished under the Venetians.

During that period, "· .. political instability was evident, all the corrupt practices of aristocratic control were reinstituted,

and the political needs of the lower classes of Ionian society

were again neglected" 12 . However, in 1807 the islands once again

passed into the hands of the French.

Following Napoleon's series of victories in eastern Europe, Russia decided to enter into treaty negotiations with the French.

What resulted was 13 the Treaty of Tilsit , signed on 7 July 1807.

The treaty ceded the islands back to the French. In September, a

11 Ibid., p.285.

12 W.D. Wrigley, The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality. 1821-31, (New York, 1988), p.43.

13 In Israel, ed., pp.469-486.

0 6 declaration was issued by the French Empire announcing its c return:

La Republique Septinsulaire fait partie des etats qui dependent de ]'empire fran­ qais. Les habitans des Sept-Iles sont sujets de S.M. l'Empereur des Francais et Roi d'Italie. Les armes et les etendards de ]'empire leur sont communs. Toutes cites dependantes de la Republique Septinsulaire conserveront provisoirement la presente organisation . 14

This phase of the French occupation would last until 1809, when

the British began to seize the islands one by one.

Throughout the Napoleonic Wars, the British Government was constantly urged to invade the Ionian Islands as a means of

protecting 15 its Levantine interests. To that end, 1 857 troops, with the support of the Royal Navy, embarked from Malta on 22

September 1809 for Zante under the command of Brigadier-General

Oswald. By the end of the year they had taken Zante, Cephalonia,

Ithaca and Kythera. In 1811 Levkas fell, leaving only Paxos and the heavily fortified Corfu. However, by June of 1814 Corfu had

14 "Declaration Du General Cesar Berthier. ler Septembre, 1807", cited in Jervis-White Jervis, p.289.

15 Wrigley, p. 53.

0 7 at last fallen, and the British were in possession of the Ionian

16 0 Islands. They would continue to be held by the British until 1864.

The fate of the Ionian Islands lay in the hands of the

European Powers, which met in Vienna beginning in September,

1814. Castlereagh, writing to Lord Liverpool from Vienna in

December, was already anticipating the Ionian question, which had not yet been addressed by the Congress. He remarked that, "· .. my object has been to keep this possession in our hands to the last,

as a security for the due observance of all engagements in which

we 17 are interested". For Castlereagh, if Britain were not to

retain possession of the islands, then Russia could not acquire

them. He informed Liverpool that, "The principal utility of the

Seven Islands being the convenience of their harbours for

purposes of refreshment and commerce, especially in war ... ". 18

Aware of the dangers to British interests should an aggressive

16 Quentin Hughes, Britain in the Mediterranean & the def­ ence of her naval stations, (Liverpool, 1981), pp.99-103.

17 Castlereagh to Liverpool, cited in Correspondence. Despatches. and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Charles Vane, ed., vol.X, (London, 1852), p.224. 18 Ibid., p.225

0 8 power be given authority over the islands, several options were

0 discussed, including transferring possession of the islands to

the King of Sicily. However, in the end it was decided that

Great Britain would best protect the interests of the Ionian

people.

On 5 November 1815, the Treaty between the Allied Powers

respecting the Ionian Islands was signed. Article I stipulated

that the Ionian Islands would form, " ... a single, free and

independent state, under the denomination of the United States of

the 19 Ionian Islands" . However, it qualified this 'freedom' in

Article II by stating that:

This State shall be placed under the im­ mediate and exclusive protection of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his Heirs and Successors. The other Contracting Powers do consequently renounce every right or pretension which they might have formed in respect to them, and formally guarantee all the dispositions of the present Treaty. 20

19 Treaty between the Allied Powers respecting the Ionian Islands, in British and Foreign State Papers 1815-1816, (London, 1838), p.255.

20 Ibid., p.255.

0 9 For the next fifty years, the Ionian Islands would be

0 administered as a protectorate of Great Britain.

For Britain, the importance of the islands lay in the fact

that they represented their only territory in the eastern Mediterranean. They provided an opportunity to monitor and

increase trade in the Levant, and were strategically located near the overland passage to India. Furthermore, with the retreat of Turkish power in the Balkans, the area was often the site of instability.

As the nineteenth century progressed, the Sultan was increasingly referred to as the "sick man of Europe". What Britain, as well as the other European powers, feared most was the vacuum that would be created if the Sultan's Empire broke up. More importantly, the Powers were wary as to whom would fill that vacuum. 21 Therefore, in possessing the islands Britain could influence events and promote stability. Lastly, the islands allowed Britain to keep a continued check on Russian influence

and expansion. For those reasons, the British argued for, and

21 C.M. Woodhouse, The Battle of Navarino, (London, 1965), p. 23.

0 10 eventually received, de facto control over the Ionian Islands in 0 1815.

0 11 Chapter Two: "British Sea Power 0 and the Peace, 1815-1825"

The islands were acquired, in part, to provide harbour for the Navy in the eastern Mediterranean. The Royal Navy was Britain's most effective means of influencing policy and

promoting stability. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the

role they envisioned the navy playing in that area.

The Royal Navy, like the Ionian Islands themselves, was undergoing a transformation following the war. That transformation centred around the need to adapt the Navy to the realities of a peaceful Europe. Therefore, for the Admiralty,

the task at hand was the transition from a wartime to a peacetime

fleet. In Great Britain 22 and Sea Power. 1815-1853 , Britain's

standard policy during the first half of the nineteenth century is clearly summarized. The Royal Navy must retain supremacy over

her next 23 two naval rivals. As Castlereagh told the Commons,

"To keep the navy equal to the navies of any two Powers that can

22 C.J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power. 1815-1853, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.

23 Ibid. I p. 1.

0 12 c be brought against us ... ".M

However, while that policy was generally accepted, all

British governments during that period had the task of meeting

that objective at a time when calls for drastically reduced

budgets were increasingly voiced. After two decades of war

expenditures, the British were eager to return to a period of

fiscal restraint, during which they could enjoy the fruits of

their victory in the Napoleonic Wars. Naval policy during this

period, therefore, had three main considerations.

The first consideration of the navy was, as mentioned, the

demand for economy. The second focussed on commercial and colonial interests.

However, in a period of

prolonged peace, they would be of paramount importance.

Furthermore, with Britain•s place as the world•s only real

industrial nation so firmly unchallenged, the navy would be

called upon to patrol the transport of the nation•s export goods.

Lastly, the Admiralty was aware of the need for preparation and

24 Hansard, 3rd series, xcvii. 779-880.

13 maintenance of the fleet in the event of an emergency. 25 With 0 those considerations in mind, the Admiralty brought the Royal

Navy into the period of peace.

On 8 December 1815, the Admiralty sent the Navy Board a series of instructions that outlined what size of fleet they hoped to maintain during the peace. The memorandum clearly

expressed the desire for economy while maintaining the fleet in a

state of "war-readiness". It stated that:

The first object of their Lordship's atten­ tion is the force which it may be proper to keep in a state of readiness of for sea and actual service. This force, my Lords are of opinion should be about one hundred sail of the line ... 26

Furthermore, a full one hundred and sixty frigates were also to be maintained. However, time showed that such plans were overly optimistic. The dockyards were unable to maintain a repair and

25 Bartlett, pp.1-3. Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery provides an excellent analysis of the relationship be­ tween the Royal Navy and Britain's expanding commercial empire.

26 Adm. 2/1382, fos. 281-6, Croker to the Navy Board, 8 Dec. 1815, cited in Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, p.23.

0 14 replacement programme that would meet the Admiralty's plans, 0 while answering the demands for economy. Consequently, the

number of ships of the line fit for immediate service fell from

approximately eighty in 1817 to fifty-eight in 1835. 27 During

that same period, the total naval supplies voted fell from

13,114,354 in 1816 to 4,434,783 pounds sterling by 1835. 28

An equally important companion to the navy's size was the

number of bases it possessed. Following the Napoleonic Wars,

Britain was in possession of numerous islands which were located

in some of the most strategically important places on the globe.

In addition to the Ionian Islands, those included were

Heligoland, Malta, Cape Town, Ceylon and Malacca, to name a

29 few. How were those bases affected by the demands for economy?

More specifically, what role did this post-war fleet play in the Mediterranean?

Bartlett notes that the standard eighteenth-century, peace-

27 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 3rd. ed., (London, 1991), p.184.

28 Bartlett, p. 339.

29 Kennedy, p .181.

0 15 time programme for the Mediterranean consisted of a solitary ship

0 of the line and five smaller warships. 30 However, in twenty

years, from 1815 to 1835, that programme was adjusted for a

variety of reasons.

In 1814, Castlereagh had expressed his fears concerning the

stability of the eastern Mediterranean, and the need for a strong

British presence there. Writing to Lord Liverpool from the

Congress he stated that:

In disposing of these Islands there are, as it appears to me, two paramount objects to be attended to; the first to provide adequate­ ly for the protection of the people who have so long confided themselves to our care; the other, not to suffer Russia to acquire any establishment in those islands. 31

Time soon proved that Castlereagh's fears were not unfounded.

As Greek national aspirations grew, the possibility of the

dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and the spectre of a political

30 Bartlett, pp.60-1.

31 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 24 Dec. 1814, in Charles Vane, ed., Correspondence. despatches ... , vol.x., pp.224-5.

0 16 c vacuum loomed large. Furthermore, political instability increased in both the Italian and Iberian peninsulas, and the

French began to look towards establishing a presence in North

Africa. Consequently, the Royal Navy was forced to gradually

concentrate the majority of its ships of the line in commission

in 32 the Mediterranean. While those political changes could not

be foreseen in 1815, their evolution forced the Admiralty to

continually alter its estimates for the Mediterranean.

32 Ibid. I p. 61 .

0 17 Chapter III: "The Ionian Islands Under 0 Sir Thomas Maitland, 1815-1819"

In creating the United States of the Ionian Islands, article three of the Treaty between the Allied Powers respecting the

Ionian Islands stipulated that, "His Majesty will therefore appoint a Lord High Commissioner to reside there, invested with

all the 33 necessary power and authorities ... " to regulate the internal organisation of the new state. The first man to occupy

that post was Sir Thomas Maitland.

Thomas Maitland was born in 1759, the younger son of the

seventh Earl of Lauderdale. In 1778 he abandoned his studies in law to enter the Army, where he served in the Channel Islands and India. In 1790, he left the Army and entered Parliament, sitting for the Haddington burghs. After only five years, he re-entered

the Army where he remained until 1802. At that time he began his colonial career, serving first on the Board of Control for India, then as Governor of Ceylon, from 1805-1810. In 1813 he was made Governor-General of Malta, and two years later was appointed as

33 Treaty between the Allied Powers respecting the Ionian Islands, in British and Foreign State Papers, 1815-1816, p.255.

0 18 the first Lord High Commissioner of the United States of the c Ionian Islands, a title he would hold for nine years, while

retaining his position in Malta. 34

Walter Frewen Lord wrote that, "The eyes of all Europe were

on him; for all the nations of Europe had coveted the islands

over which he was now called to rule". 35 For his part, Maitland

reluctantly accepted the post, taking it only after he was

assured the full confidence of the British government, and the

Colonial Office, under which he directly served. His intention

was to reform what he believed were the deceitful ways of the

native inhabitants. Furthermore, he wished to curtail the

strength of the aristocracy, who had wielded great power during

the Venetian period, and again during the years of the

Septinsular Republic. As Pratt notes, "· .. he was a convinced

autocrat, whose regard for the material welfare of his charges

was equalled by his contempt for their political capacity". 36

The constitution he promulgated reflected those desires.

34 Wrigley, pp.71-2.

35 Walter Frewen Lord, Sir Thomas Maitland and the Mastery of the Mediterranean, (New York, 1897), p.179.

36 Pratt, p.105.

0 19 Jervis notes in the History of the Island of Corfu and the

0 Republic of the Ionian Islands that:

... as a constitution had to be given, he drew one up; while placing as little power as possible in the hands of the Legislative Assembly, materially effected what he con­ sidered should be his primary object; viz. an improved administration of the civil and criminal code and an ameliorated con­ dition of the peasantry. 37

To that end, Maitland drafted what became known as the Constitu-

tional Chart of the United States of the Ionian Islands. 38

Wrigley has noted that the Constitutional Chart reflected the

dominating influence of the Lord High Commissioner in all

official 39 matters. Its swift, unanimous passage was achieved in large part through Maitland's efforts in handpicking those who

voted on its ratification. On 26 August 1817 it received Royal

Assent, and was promulgated on the Islands the following

December. 40

37 Jervis, pp.205-6.

38 Sessional Papers, 1818 (132) xvii.1.

39 Wrigley, p. 77.

40 Ibid. I p. 77.

0 20 Maitland's constitution effectively concentrated power 0 solely in the hands of the Lord High Commissioner. An examination of its various articles substantiates this fact.

Articles two and three fixed the capital at Corfu, and made the Greek Orthodox religion the official state religion, while establishing full Christian toleration. 41 However, of greater

importance was Article seven of the first chapter, which created the Civil Government. That government would be comprised of a Senate, a Legislative Assembly, and a Judicial Authority. 42 The subsequent chapters outlined the procedures through which the members of those administrative bodies would be selected.

The Ionian Senate would be comprised of a President and five members. The President would be selected by the Lord High Commissioner, while the five remaining members, although selected by the Legislative Assembly, had to be approved by the Lord High

Commissioner. 43 In effect, Maitland had full control oyer the

41 Sessional Papers, 1818 (132) xvii.1.

42 Ibid., Chapter 1, article seven.

43 Constitutional Chart of the United States of the Ionian Islands, Chp.II, sec.2, articles 1 and 2. In Sessional Papers, 1818 (132) xvii.2.

0 21 Ionian Senate. Consequently, the office of the Lord High c Commissioner controlled the body responsible for the regulation

of, " ... all the necessary and minute details relative to the

general administration of the Government" . 44

At the local level, the power of the Lord High Commissioner

was equally impressive. A Regent was in charge of each local government. This Regent needed the approval of the Lord High Commissioner in order to secure office. Therefore, the execution

of all laws at the local level was administered by the Lord High

Commissioner, through his appointed Regent. 45

The Legislative Assembly was elected through a restricted

franchise. Its members were selected from the Island's

aristocratic families. However, the amount of power it could exercise was negligible, due to the Constitutional Chart. The Senate had to approve all legislation drafted by the Assembly. Furthermore, the constitution stated that, " ... the Lord High Commissioner ... shall possess the power of transmitting to the

44 Ibid., Chp.II, sec.3, article 10.

45 Ibid. , Chp. IV, sec .1-3.

0 22 Legislative Assembly the projets of laws ... ". 46 Legislation

c could be drafted by either the Senate or the Legislative

Assembly, but in the end, it had to be approved by the Senate, or

it would " ... fall to the ground". 47

The Judicial Authority was equally influenced by the Lord High Commissioner. All judicial appointments, including those to the Supreme Council of Justice, had to be approved by the office

of the Lord High Commissioner. Furthermore, the Constitution

stipulated that the Lord High Commissioner would be deemed an

extraordinary member of the Supreme Council of Justice. 48

The military defence of the islands was the responsibility

of the protecting sovereign. However, the local militia would be under the authority of the Commander in Chief of the Crown•s

forces. This Commander in Chief was subject to the approbation

of the Lord High Commissioner. Furthermore, the police of the

46 Ibid. I Chp. III I sec.3, article 14, pt.1.

47 Ibid. I Chp.III, sec.3, article 23.

48 Ibid. I Chp.VI, section 1, article 2, and section 2, articles 4 and 5 .

0 23 islands were under the authority of the Lord High Commissioner. 49 0

Without question, the Constitutional Chart of the United

States of the Ionian Islands placed absolute power in the office of the Lord High Commissioner. Maitland himself believed that,

" ... the political interests of both the Ionian and British

governments should be analogous especially since he was formally responsible for the welfare of the Ionian populace ... ". 50

Commenting on the Constitutional Chart in 1858, Gladstone

acknowledged its almost dictatorial nature. Writing to the

Crown, he noted that, "· .. at the period when it applied to the Ionian Islands, restrictive modes of Government for your

Majesty 51 • s own Colonies were in vogue". Continuing, he stated that:

Again the object of its framers and ad­ ministrators, though it did not embrace

49 Ibid., Chp.VII, section 2, articles 1-4.

50 Wrigley, pp.75-6.

51 "An unpublished report (1858) by W.E. Gladstone on the political situation and administrative system in the seven islands (1815-58) ", in S.E. Tsitsonis Balkan Studies, vol.21 (1981), p.306.

0 24 either political or municipal freedom, doubtless was to introduce into the c Islands the essential and all important principles of equality before the law ... 52

Gladstone's observations, although ultimately supportive of the

Constitutional Chart, mirrored those of the Ionian aristocracy.

In 1822, a petition drafted by members of the aristocracy

was sent from Zante to the Crown. Its contents were highly

critical of Maitland's actions in the drafting of the Constitutional Chart. They noted how, "· .. the power of one

person has rendered vain those expectations which had been raised

by the magnanimous intentions of the higher powers who made the

treaty". 53 Citing the Treaty of Paris, the Zantiots argued that Britain was obligated to assist them in the drafting of a liberal

constitution. They continued:

... it is not to be presumed that a constitu­ tion which places every power in the absolute will of a single person, can be the means of bringing about those august intentions. Never­ theless, such is the nature of the Constitu­ tion which the Lord High Commissioner caused to

52 Ibid., p.306.

53 "Petition Against the Constitutional Chart", Sessional Papers (1822) xx.513.

0 25 be signed by the primary council, and by a con­ stituent c assembly created by himself alone. 54

Unfortunately, accompanying the petition was a letter from the President of the Senate, which praised the work of Maitland.

President Marino Vega, in contrast to the aristocrats,

argued that the Constitutional Chart, "· .. promoted the prosperity

of the Ionian people and filled them with gratitude towards your

Majesty". 55 He continued by noting how:

... the most perfect satisfaction pervades every part of these States under the Con­ stitutional Chart of 1817, the results of which have blessed them with peace and li­ berty and undisturbed content ... 56

The President's letter is just one example of how Maitland's

tactics and manoeuvres helped to isolate his enemies. The powers

afforded him under the Constitutional Chart,·and his creation of offices of nobility, severely limited the power of those who

54 I bid . , p . 513

55 "Marino Vega (President) to His Majesty George the Fourth &c.&c.&c., Sovereign Protector of the United States of the Ionian Islands", Sessional Papers 1822, xx.517. 56 Ibid., p.517.

0 26 opposed him. It is not surprising, therefore, to find he was

0 referred to repeatedly as "King Tom". 57

Clearly the consensus, both at the time and later on, was that Maitland had drafted a constitution that afforded little freedom to the Island's legislators or its populace. However, the constitution did reflect what had always been Maitland's intentions; a curtailing of aristocratic power and an imposition

of social control to promote stability. As Pratt stated, "For the next thirty years Maitland's constitution, practical and

cynical as it was, remained the basis of British rule ... " . 58

Maitland's first real challenge as the Ionian administrator

came in 1817, while he was still working on the constitution. It centred around the area known as Parga. Located across the water on the mainland, "The extent of the territory of Parga is about

six miles along the coast, and generally about two in depth ... The town consists of one street, and a few narrow lanes" . 59 In many

57 Pratt, pp.104-5.

58 Pratt, p.105.

59 C.P. de Basset, "Proceedings in Parga, and the Ionian Islands, with a series of Correspondence and other just-

0 27 ways, the Parga situation foreshadowed the increasing presence of 0 nationalism in Greece.

Wrigley notes that, "In an attempt to secure its

ratification of the Treaty of Paris, the Porte was offered the Ionian dependency of Parga by the British government". 60 The intention of the Foreign Office was to offer Parga in exchange for an elimination of all future claims made by the Ottoman suzerainty with regards to the Ionian Islands. In the eyes of the British government, the cession made sense. It eliminated

the burden of administering a troublesome area, and placated an ally, in the person of the Sultan. However, in spite of their hopes, the British became involved in a two-year long negotiation

that fuelled nationalist sentiment. 61

On 28 May 1817, the office of the Lord High Commissioner

issued a proclamation announcing the negotiation of the cession

of Parga. It stated that:

ificatory Documents", in Quarterly Review, no.xxiii, (1820) 1 p.113.

60 Wrigley, p. 79.

61 Pratt, p.120.

0 28 A convention has been made between the 0 Courts of London and Constantinople, that Parga and its territory, on certain conditions, are to be ceded to the Sub- 1 ime Porte ... 62

For the residents of Parga, the situation was alarming. The British resident in Parga, Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. de Bosset wrote that, " ... they were evidently in the greatest consternation

at hearing of even a possibility of their becoming Ottoman

subjects" 63 . Their fears prompted a vigorous campaign directed

at Maitland's office.

As early as 24 March 1817, two months before the official

proclamation announcing the cession, the nobles of Parga,

62 "Proclamation on the part of the Hon. Patrick Stuart, Colonel Commandant of the Forces of His Britannic Majesty in the Ionian Isles, and exercising the Office of the Lord High Commissioner during the absence of his Excellency the Lord High Commissioner of the United States of the Ionian Isles, &c. &c.", in C.P. de Bosset, Proceedings in Parga and the Ionian Islands, 2nd ed., (Chicago, 1976), p.121.

63 Extract of a letter fro Lieut.-Col. de Basset to Lieut.­ Col. Frederick Hankey, Military Secretary, dated 19 March 1817. In C.P. de Bosset, Proceedings in Parga and the Ionian Islands, (Chicago, 1976), p.94. de Bosset's work, originally printed in 1819 was written to explain the cession of Parga. It contains numerous letters and proclamations made by all parties involved.

0 29 representing the common will, petitioned the office of the Lord High Commissioner, c:J in an attempt to block the cession. They wrote:

The grandeur of the English nation has always given the whole world unequivocal proof of its sentiments of humanity ... How should it be possible, after that, to imagine or to fear that this same generous nation should be able to abandon to the most cruel slavery four thousand European inhabitants ... 64

Despite their petitions, Maitland remained firm in his position. However, he did attempt to relieve the tension. He announced

that his office was opposed to any cession without full

compensation for those Parguinotes who decided to leave Parga.

In March of 1818 he issued a proclamation that stated that the Crown,

... cherishing a desire to terminate this affair in a manner comfortable to the in­ tention of the two Governments, declares by these presents, that, as the place of Parga and its territories must be irrev­ ocably ceded to the Sublime Porte, all

64 Petition of Pargiotes to the Lord High Commissioner, in Sessional Papers, 1820 (263) xii.447. (J 30 those inhabitants, who may be disposed to expatriate themselves, must ... make a de- Q claration of such intention ... after such declaration their respective property shall be justly and equitably valued ... 65

The property owner would receive compensation at the time of expatriation. Unfortunately, Maitland's plan was not easily realized.

The compensation plan became increasingly problematic as the year wore on. Woodhouse notes how the vast majority of Parga's inhabitants, when presented with the choice of remaining or moving with compensation, chose the latter. The result was an embarrassment for Pasha, and an added burden for Maitland. 66 Ali

67 Pasha , although representing the Sultan, would ultimately

control Parga. Pratt describes him as being the only Turk with,

65 "Proclamation on the part of his Excellency the Right Hon. Sir Thomas Maitland, G.C.B. &c.&c.&c.", in de Bosset, p.140.

66 C.M. Woodhouse, Capodistria, (London, 1973), p.200. 67 For an interesting account of Pasha's life, see Guil­ laume de Vaudoncourt's Memoirs on the Ionian Islands, William Walton, trans. (London, 1816). Vaudoncourt's account is based largely on statements made by Pasha himself.

0 31 " ... sufficient power in the area to profit by its possession". 68 c In the end, after two years of haggling, Maitland arbitrarily set the compensation total at 142 425 pounds, of which Pasha wound up paying only half, complaining of a depreciation of the property

following the original valuation. Finally, on 27 April 1819, his troops entered the area, and the cession was complete. 69

Maitland's position during the Parga situation remained

unchanged throughout. Writing to Bathurst in November 1819, he stated:

In the treaty which related to those Islands, the boundaries were marked out and Parga was irrevocably excluded; it is self-evident, therefore, that whatever might be the fate of this place, all connection between it and the Ionian States, in a political point of view, was finally barred, and that, to whatever power it fell, the village of Parga could never again be united with those states. 70

Maitland clearly recognized the dangers Britain would face if it attempted to alter the treaty stipulations. Demonstrating his

68 Pratt, p.120.

69 Ibid. I p. 12 0 .

70 Maitland to Bathurst, 24 Nov. 1819, in Sessional Papers, 1820 (263) xii.496.

0 32 knowledge of the precarious balance in which much of the eastern

Mediterranean existed, he wrote:

From my local knowledge of this part of the world, I am perfectly prepared to say that ... if we had adopted any other course, it must have been attended with consequences hostile to British interests. 71

While firm in his belief that his actions were correct, Maitland's position, along with that of the Government, was attacked.

In the House of Commons, the cession of Parga was made into a party issue. During debate, the opposition vigorously attacked the Government's position. Sir Charles Monck asked:

Could it be endured that the last spot of Greece which retained freedom, which re­ tained Christianity, should be surrendered to despotism and cruelty? Could it be endured, that the Cross should be surmount­ ed by the crescent? Could we neglect the opportunity of uniting so free and brave a people in bonds of fraternity with us? Could we fail to attach their hearts to us by gratitude for the preservation of their liberty?72

71 Ibid., 1820 (263) xii.496.

72 Hansard, series 1, vol.40, (26 May 1819), p.812.

0 33 The actions of the Government were described as acts, " ... as treacherous and perfidious as had ever disgraced modern

diplomacy". 73 In defending their position, the Government made

the same arguments Maitland had made.

Citing treaty stipulations, Castlereagh stated that, " ... we had never delivered Parga up to the Turks; all we agreed to in the treaty was, to withdraw our troops from the town, and leave

the inhabitants 74 to themselves". As testimony of the Government's good will, he cited its role in securing fair compensation for emigrating Parguinotes. According to the Government, such action was beyond its responsibility. The actions taken were, in the Government's eyes, the only ones

possible. Adherence to the treaty, the need to maintain a legitimate presence in the area, and the desire to promote

stability between allies all guided their actions. 75

73 Ibid. I p. 818.

74 Hansard, series 1, vol. 4 0, ( 15 June 1819) , p. 1177. 75 The cession of Parga remains a complicated issue. de Bosset's works were written to absolve the author from any criticism in his handling of the situation. Maitland had criticized him for making assurances to the residents of Parga, concerning Britain's commitment to them. The

0 34 While Castlereagh's arguments did little to convince the opposition c of the necessity of the Government's actions, circumstances in Greece soon pushed Parga out of the spotlight.

Lord High Commissioner went as far as to suspend de Bos­ set, and revoke his commission. A subsequent inquiry exonerated de Bosset.

c:J 35 Chapter IV: "Great Britain and the Greek 0 War for Independence, 1821-1827"76

The remaining years of Sir Thomas Maitland's administration

were spent trying to isolate the Ionian Islands from the

explosion of nationalist sentiment occurring in Greece. To that end, as Wrigley notes, the authorities in Corfu formally proclaimed the neutrality of the Ionian Islands almost

immediatE!'ly after 77 the outbreak of hostilities. In order to understand how the British administration of the islands was affected by the developments in Greece, it is necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding the Greek revolt.

Crawley notes that, " ... when Europe is at peace in herself, the East is too often ready to disturb her repose". 78 The

76 This chapter will be devoted exclusively to the role of Britain during the Greek War of Independence, exclusive of the Ionian Islands. Once having explained this period, the following chapter will more closely examine the role the Islands played in the struggle. 77 Wrigley, pp. 105.

78 C.W. Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence, (New York, 1973), p.1. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the Greek Revolt at any great length. However, Crawley's work is considered a standard for any student of this period in Greek history.

0 36 eruption of the Greek revolt in 1821 was no exception. While Metternich hoped 0 that the Congress system would return Europe to the status quo, he had not anticipated the emergence of such fervent nationalist sentiment from the Greeks. For the British, particularly Maitland and the Colonial Office, containing this

sentiment on the Greek mainland became a priority. To that end,

a policy of Ionian neutrality was put in force, beginning in June 1821. 79

In The Foreign 80 Policy of Castlereagh , Webster notes how

the Greeks had experienced a national revival long before the French Revolution. However, after 1789, that revival was

accelerated by the new ideas of nationality and liberty. Those ideas struck a chord with the Greeks, who translated them into the terms of their religious and racial quarrel with the

Turks. 81 In order to understand the Greek revolt, and its effect on British foreign policy, it is necessary to understand that

national revival Webster refers to.

79 Pratt, p.l21.

8 C.K. ° Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815- ~, (London, 1925) .

81 Webster, p. 353.

0 37 Although the Greek peoples inhabited many parts of the

c Ottoman Empire, Greek oppression was primarily confined to mainland Greece. In the rest of the empire, Greeks enjoyed

relative wealth and prosperity, particularly those involved in

shipping. 82 Furthermore, numerous Greek communities existed

throughout Western Europe. These groups laid the foundations for

the revival of Greek nationalism.

Wealthy Greeks from across Europe and the Ottoman Empire had endowed various educational institutions, the most notable being one in Padua. Through these institutions, the study of Greek history enjoyed a resurgence. As Eversley notes, "With education

came the study of the past history of Greece and the ambition to

renew its 83 nationality and greatness". Their goal was to

preserve, " ... a firm and continuous sense of a distinct and proud people with a long tradition and almost an ob~ession ... for the

recreation of 84 an independent Greek nation". To that end they

82 Lord Eversley, The Turkish Empire: Its Growth and Decay, (London, 1917), p.261.

83 Eversley, p. 261.

84 Deno J. Geanakoplos, "The Diaspora Greeks: The Genesis of Modern Greek National Consciousness", in Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830) ; Contin

0 38 succeeded. Nationalist groups, the most prominent of which was ·the 0 Philiki Etairia, emerged in the early nineteenth century. Their goal was the political liberation of the Hellenic peoples,

and their membership included virtually the entire Ionian

aristocracy. 85

Maitland was violently opposed to the existence of any secret organisations in the Ionian Islands. Compounding his

anger was his belief that Philiki Etairia was secretly headed by

Capodistria. 86 Maitland had developed what bordered on an obsession with the Russian Minister, and was firmly convinced

that he planned to ferment revolt not only in Greece, but in the Ionian Islands as well. However, while Capodistria was clearly a proponent of an independent Greek state, he was opposed to

violent revolution. Wrigley notes how Capodistria, despite his

uity and Change, John A. Petropulos, ed.. (Thessaloniki, 1976) 1 pp.59-60.

85 Catherine Koumarianou, "The Contribution of the Intelli­ gentsia towards the Greek Independence Movement, 1798- 1821", in The Struggle for Greek Independence, Richard Clogg, ed., (London, 1973), pp. 73-80.

86 Woodhouse's Capodistria (London, 1973) is perhaps the best English biography of Capodistria.

0 39 desire to see his compatriots liberated, advised patience rather

than revolt. He believed that the situation could still be

resolved through diplomatic channels. Furthermore, based on his

expert opinion of Russian foreign policy, he quite correctly

feared that violence might result in a Levantine crisis that would culminate in a Russo-Ottoman war. 87 Consequently, he continually refused the leadership of the movement, preferring to advance the Greek cause through diplomatic channels.

The Greek revolt began in earnest on 6 April 1821. 88 Europe did not react favourably. As mentioned, the primary British concern in the Eastern Mediterranean was stability. To that end, the British had consistently supported the Ottoman Empire, believing that a strong Empire would promote stability.

If that strong central power was to disappear, a political vacuum would develop, creating a race to fill it among the European

Powers. Even the Tsar, who harboured no admiration for the

87 Wrigley, p. 95.

88 Woodhouse, Capodistria, p.256. An earlier revolt organized by Philiki Etairia had failed in March 1821. As soon as it had begun, it was disavowed by Capodistria and the Tsar, and easily crushed by the Turks.

40 Sultan initially believed in the need to promote stability.

Writing 0 to Capodistria in 1818, he urged his minister to:

... induce calm in your country. Make your compatriots, and through them the rest of the Greeks, understand reason. I want to contribute to the improvement of their lot, but only on the basis of treaties. The world needs quiet. It can only be assured through the united action of cabinets. This great result of our labours would be destroyed the moment that the affairs of the Levant threw a torch of discord in our midst. 89

The revolt in the Morea in 1821, and the Ottoman reaction to it

would test the strength of Alexander's convictions.

When the Greeks in the Morea rose up in 1821, they massacred approximately 20 000 Turks. In retaliation, the Sultan lashed out at the Greek Orthodox Church, burning churches, massacring

people, 90 and executing a Patriarch. Those actions brought a Russo-Turkish rupture close at hand, and severely tested the strength of the Congress Alliance. For Castlereagh, the revolt

represented, "· .. one more example of the unaccountable

89 Tsar Alexander II to Capodistria, 22 December 1818, cited in Woodhouse, Capodistria, p.197.

9° Crawley, p. 17 .

0 41 restlessness of Europe". 91 However, the British, along with the

Austrians, refused to become involved in what was ostensibly an

internal Turkish matter.

Writing to Bagot, the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1821, Castlereagh commented how the Greek revolutionaries were part of a trend occurring across Europe. He wrote:

They form a branch of that organized spirit of insurrection which is systematically propagating itself throughout Europe, and which explodes wherever the head of the governing Power from whatever cause is enfeebled. 92

The Allies, "· .. for the safety 93 and repose of Europe" , could not encourage that trend. Metternich shared his view, and the two of them attempted to persuade the Tsar, whose rhetoric had become inflammatory.

The Russian ambassador to Constantinople, Count P.A.

91 Ibid. I p. 2 0 .

92 Castlereagh to Bagot, 17 July 1821, F.O. Russia 126, cited in Webster, pp.360-1.

93 Ibid. I p. 3 61.

42 Stroganov, had become increasingly at odds with the Sultan over the Greek situation. 0 Tension had escalated to the point where relations with the Porte had been suspended by the ambassador. 94

The British ambassador to the Porte, Lord Strangford, worked

feverishly to restore some semblance of tranquility, and effect a rapprochement between St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Strang- ford noted how, "the Porte was besieged.by our united and unceasing representations ... made in His Majesty's name ... ". 95 Those representations helped to relieve tension for the moment, thereby allowing the Russian ambassador to safely return home.

Meanwhile, both Metternich and Castlereagh worked to

convince Alexander that if he pursued war with the Sultan, " ... he would be alone in Europe, or, even worse, allied with only the

revolutionaries" . 96 Eventually, the Tsar drew back. Writing to

Bagot in January 1822, he said:

I am sensible to the danger which surrounds us all, when I look to the state of France and to the new Ministry -- when I see the

94 Webster, p.355.

95 Strangford to Bagot, cited in Webster, p.357.

96 Ibid. I p. 3 7 9 .

0 43 state of Spain and Portugal, when I see, as I 0 do see, the state of the whole world, I am well aware that the smallest spark which falls upon such combustible materials may kindle a flame which all our efforts may perhaps here­ after be insufficient to extinguish. 97

For the time being, diplomacy would be pursued.

The year 1822 has been called decisive in the struggle for Greek Independence. It was in that year that the Turks massacred the population of the island of Chios, killing or enslaving

eighty thousand people. Those actions raised the conscience of Europe, and gave rise to a massive Philhellene movement. That movement brought eight shiploads of volunteers to Greece, all enthusiastic about finally freeing Greece from Ottoman rule.

However, their enthusiasm was not enough to defeat the Turks, who overran their forces, and sent the remaining volunteers to the

97 Alexander to Bagot, 10 January 1822, F.O. Russia 135, cited in Webster, p.389. Tsar Alexander's position throughout the Greek conflict may be described as uncertain. His position changed frequently from one of conciliation to one of aggression. He did see himself as a "protector" of the Greeks, due to to their common religion. Furthermore, he was desperate to expand Russian influence into the eastern Mediterran­ ean. However, he was also tied to the Holy Alliance, and did attempt to maintain it.

0 44 c Ionian Islands, where they waited for passage to Italy. 98

While unsuccessful in a military sense, the Philhellene

movement had served a purpose. The Turks, although able to deal

with the volunteers, had stretched their forces, and gained

little in the process. Virtually all the Peloponnese was still

in the hands of the insurgents. That Greek success forced the

British to carefully re-examine their position of benign Turkish

support. 99

In March, 1823, the British formally recognized the Greek

4:) blockades. Although this action was merely an endorsement of a

practical measure already in force, it gave the misleading

impression that England was beginning to favour the Greeks. 100

98 Pratt, pp.122-3.

99 Ibid. I p.123.

10° Crawley, p.27. The Turkish minister questioned the British action by inquiring whether or not Canning would allow the right of the United States to recognize Irish rebels as belligerent. However, in "The Issue of Ionian Neutral­ ity in Angle-Ottoman Relations, 1821-1830", Wrigley notes that Canning was bound by the precedent set during the Latin American Independence Wars, to acknowledge the the provisional authority of the Hellenic States, without going so 0 far as to offer protection. 45 0 Britain's actions angered both the Austrians and the Russians. However, Canning argued that Britain's neutrality must be equal

to both sides. Furthermore, he noted how the Greeks had

acquired, 101 " ... a certain degree of force and stability" , which

must be acknowledged. It should also be noted that Canning's

decision was partially influenced by the growing popular support

for the Greeks. That support, and the continued success of the

Greek forces, gradually brought England into the "Greek camp".

Popular support for the Greek cause had grown steadily

since the revolt began in 1821. As early as September 1821, The

c:J Times had criticized the Government for pursuing a policy of

neutrality that ultimately favoured the Turks. It wrote:

England has been accused by strangers of greater coldness towards the Greeks on this occasion than becomes a free and Christian people. So far as regards the people of this country, we may be allowed to say, that it is no part of the constitu­ tion of Englishmen to speak loudly or boastingly of what they feel on any subject, where they are conscious of being unable to vindicate their declarations by their deeds. They are restrained from acting on behalf of

101 Canning to Strangford, 12 July 1823, cited in Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning. 1822-1827, c (London, 1925), p.326. 46 Greece by the condition to which their rulers c have reduced them. 102

The Morning Chronicle echoed such rhetoric by stating that:

The whole body of the Tories are now trained to scent danger at a distance. It would give them pleasure, in other circumstances, to see the feeble remnant of the Greeks emancipated; but they will not countenance the smallest violation of the rights of legitimacy, even in the person of the Grand Turk. 103

In keeping with the sentiments expressed in the papers, the

London Greek Committee was formed.

Founded in 1823, the London Greek Committee quickly became a

powerfully influential, although poorly administered, body. Its

actions increased public awareness of the Greek cause, and forced

the Tory Government to gradually alter its position.

The first public meeting of the Committee was held on 15 May

1823, with various Whig MPs and notable gentlemen in atten-

102 The Times, 29 September 1821.

103 Morning 0 Chronicle, 4 October 1821. 47 dance. 104 The meeting was characterized by enthusiastic speeches,

designed to denounce the Government's inaction towards the

plight of the Greeks. Whig MP Sir James Mackintosh summarized

the Committee's importance, and contrasted it with the opposition

it received from the Tory Government:

If we speak of liberty, they call it revo­ tionary rant -- if we speak of the interests of religion, they call it the cant of fana­ ticism -- if we give utterance to the senti­ ments we are bound to cherish for the great teachers, instructors, and ornaments of man­ kind, they deride us for using the common­ places of school-boys -- if we venture to hail the prospect of the second civilization of Greece, and to look forward with delight to another Athens, rising with new arts and 0 eloquence to rival, if possible the glory of of her predecessor -- they reproach us and laugh at us, as the dupes of visionary phil­ osophy -- as misguided enthusiasts in the cause of impracticable civilization, and unattainable improvement . 105

Speeches and statements such as those were successful in raising

enthusiasm for the Greek cause to the point were loans were

104 F.Rosen, Bentham, Byron, and Greece: Constitutionalism. Nationalism, and Early Liberal Political Thought, (Oxford, 1992), p.228.

105 Morning Chronicle, 16 May 1823. 0 48 raised to aid in the struggle. 106

An equally important force in the struggle to raise public

opinion over the Greek cause was the person Temperly referred to

as, 11 ••• the one private man then living, who could make his voice

11 107 heard in every corner of the world • He was referring to Lord

Byron, whose trip to Greece and subsequent death captured the

emotion of Europe, and took public awareness of the Greek

struggle to a new height. Adding strength to his legend was the

belief that his last words were, 11 Poor Greece! 11108 Immediately

upon his arrival in Greece, the European papers filled with

4:J stories concerning the revolt. A Greek Loan was successfully

subscribed in London, and enthusiasm was reaching a fever pitch.

106 F. Rosen, Bentham. Byron. and Greece: Constitutionalism Nationalism. and Early Liberal Political Thought, (Oxford, 1992), pp.104-5. The Greek Loans were negotiated between members of the Greek Provisional Government and the London Greek Committee. The Provisional Government, although not of­ ficially recognized by the Powers, had declared itself to be legitimate after much of mainland Greece had been removed from the Sultan's control.

107 Harold Temperly, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822- ~, 2nd ed., (London, 1966), p.327.

108 cited in Pratt, 0 p.124. 49 Byron's sudden death in April 1824 only intensified public

opinion towards the Greeks. In the end, Byron's death did more

for the Greeks than did any of his actions while alive. 109 The

years following his death saw Canning gradually move towards

sponsoring the creation of an independent Greece.

If 1822 was considered a decisive year in Greece's struggle

for independence, 1825 must merit almost equal importance. It

was in that year that Britain began to move for a settlement that

would include an independent Greece. Previous British policy had

been strictly designed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities c between Russia and the Porte. By the end of 1825, Canning and the Government were ready to consider acting for the Greeks.

On 1 December 1824, Canning had written to M. Rodios, the

Secretary to the Greek Government, explaining to him the

circumstances behind Great Britain's inaction. He wrote:

Connected with The Porte by the established relations of Amity, and by the ancient obli­ gations of Treaties, which The Porte has not

109 Temperley, pp. 328-9. 0 50 violated, it surely cannot be expected that England should engage in unprovoked hostili­ ties against that Power in a quarrel not her own.no

However, while Canning was non-committal towards the Greeks,

personally he was moving towards action.

In an effort to end the Greek revolt, the Sultan had

enlisted the aid of Mehemet Ali of Egypt. The Egyptian Pasha

agreed to send his son, Ibrahim, along with a fleet and the

Egyptian army to aid the Sultan. 111 Upon his arrival, he began to

settle the Greek situation with a savagery and efficiency that

4C) had not been anticipated by the Greeks, or the European Powers.

Ultimately, Ibrahim and the Sultan, according to Russian sources,

and various sparples throughout the Balkans, planned to remove

the remainder of the Greek population to Egypt for enslavement,

and repopulate the mainland with their own people. This . "Barbarization Plan", as Canning called it, forced the British to

11 ° Canning to M. Rodios, 1 December 1824, cited in British and Foreign State Papers, vol.l2 (1824-5), p.902.

111 Pratt, p.l24. The ,Sultan had agreed to cede Crete to Mehemet Ali, and make Ibrahim Pasha of the Morea, in exchange for their help. 0 51 c act. 112 Writing to Lord Liverpool, Canning said: "I begin to think that the time approaches when something must be done". 113

In June 1825, the Greek Provisional Government, reeling from

the attacks from Ibrahim, requested the formal protection of the

British Government. They wrote:

En vertu du present Acte, elle place vol­ ontairement le depot sacre de sa liberte, de son independence nationale, et de son existence politique, sous las defense ab­ solue de la Grande Bretagne. 114

Canning inevitably refused what became known as the "Act of c Submission". However, circumstances now allowed him to move towards mediation, whether alone, or in concert with Russia. 115

In December 1825, Alexander died suddenly. Following a

112 Temperley, p. 34 9.

113 Canning to Liverpool, 25 October 1825, cited in Temperley, p.350.

114 "Act of the Provisional Government of Greece, proposing to place the Greek Nation under the Protection of Great Britain", cited in British and Foreign State Papers, vol.12, (1824-25), p. 906.

115 Crawley, p.48. 0 52 brief struggle, his brother Nicholas became Tsar. 116 When Russia

had stabilized internally, Canning began to move towards an

alliance. Writing to Granville, he explained his policy by

stating: "I hope to save Greece through the agency of the

Russian name upon the fears of Turkey, without a war". 117 The

result of his efforts was the Anglo-Russian Protocol. 118 In

discussing Greece's relationship with the Porte, it stated that:

Greece should be a dependency of that Empire, and the Greeks should pay to the Porte an an­ nual tribute, the amount of which should be permanently fixed by common consent ... In this state, the Greeks should enjoy a complete lib­ erty of conscience, entire freedom of commerce, and should, exclusively, conduct their own in­ 0 ternal Government. 119

This statement reflected a deal that Wellington had made

in St. Petersburg, allowing Greece to become an autonomous

province under the Sultan. Furthermore, the document did not

116 Ibid., p.52.

117 Canning to Granville, 13 January 1826, cited in A.G. Stapleton, Canning and His Times, (London, 1859), p.471.

118 "Protocol of Conference, between the British and Russian Plenipotentiaries relative to the Mediation of Great Britain between the Ottoman Parte and the Greeks", 4 April 1826, cited in British and Foreign State Papers, vol.14 (1826-27), pp.629-32.

119 I bid • 1 p • 0 6 3 0 • 53 exclude the possibility of a Russo-Turkish war. However, it was,

as Crawley notes, a tentative document, full of ambiguity. 120

Nevertheless, its importance lay not in its concrete proposals,

but in its role in firmly, and publicly, committing London to act

for Greek independence.

Canning was still worried about Russian intervention in

Greece, despite their alliance through the Protocol. He

therefore laboured to include the other Powers in the mediation

process. To that end, the Treaty of London121 was drafted. It

stated the determination of Britain, Russia, and now France, to

mediate a compromise collectively in Greece. Article One read:

"The Contracting Powers shall offer Their Mediation to the

Ottoman Porte, with a view of effecting a reconciliation between

It and the Greeks". 122 Of greater importance was Article Two,

12° Crawley,pp.59-62. Metternich questioned the protocol's ambiguity by asking "What is Greece?". He noted that the term "Greek" was alternately used to describe a race, a language, a reli­ gion, and a territory.

121 "Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Russia, for the Pacification of Greece", 6 July 1827, cited in British and Foreign State Papers, vol.14, (1826-27) 1 pp. 632-639.

122 Ibid., p.634. 0 54 which set out the terms of mediation.

The terms stipulated by the Powers were more explicitly

defined than in the Anglo-Russian Protocol. The treaty called

for the Greeks to play tribute to the Porte, but be governed by

authorities chosen by themselves. Furthermore, all Turkish

property would be transferred to the Greeks, with proper

compensation. The purpose of this transfer was to separate the

two nationalities, so as to avoid future hostilities. 123

The treaty also contained an additional article, which was

designed to force the Turks to negotiate. In the event that

mediation was not accepted by the Porte, the contracting Powers

would establish ties with Greece. It read:

It is understood that this shall be effected by establishing commercial relations with the Greeks, and by sending to and receiving from them, for this purpose Consular Agents, provided there shall exist in Greece Author­ ities capable of supporting such relations.u4

The Powers were attempting to leave the Sultan no choice but to

123 Ibid. I p. 635.

124 Ibid. I 0 p. 637. 55 accept their mediation. The treaty went so far as to suggest

that if either party refused mediation, the Powers would use

whatever means they deemed necessary to meet their terms, while,

"· .. preventing, as far as possible, all collision between the

Contending Parties ... ". 125 They had decided that the conflict

must draw to a close. It had now lasted six years, and showed no

signs of ending. Therefore, they would finish it.

The Porte rejected the terms of the Treaty of London

outright. Consequently, the Allies moved to establish commercial

relations with the Greek Provisional Government. The Porte

4:) responded by stating that any Allied interference with their

operations would be deemed aggressive, and the Porte would

respond accordingly. 126 Consequently, the Allies had no choice

but to deploy their fleets in order to protect the armistice.

The treaty stated that the Allied forces, in enforcing the

armistice, were to avoid, " ... taking any part in the hostilities

125 Ibid. I p. 638.

126 Wrigley, 0 The Diplomatic Significance ... , pp.249-50. 56 between the two 11 127 c contending parties • Therefore, in deploying their fleets, the Allies instructed their naval commanders to act

accordingly. Force was not to be used unless the Turkish fleet

persisted in running the blockade.us

Sir Edward Codrington129 was the first Allied commander to

arrive in Greek waters. Upon arrival, he found both the Turkish

and Egyptian fleets docked at the port of Navarino. He was

followed by de Rigny and the French fleet. The two Commanders

initiated proceedings with Ibrahim, informing him of their

determination to carry out the treaty. de Rigny noted how

11 Ibrahim appeared, ••• to have entertained some doubt of the

perfect harmony 11 130 which exists among the three Allied Powers ... •

To assuage this doubt, the Admirals wrote:

127 "Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Russia ... ", cited in B.F.S.P, p.637.

128 C.M. Woodhouse, The Greek War of Independence, (London, 1951) 1 pp.122-3. The Admirals were; Sir Edward Codrington (Britain), de Rigny (France), and Count Heyden (Russia)

129 Codrington, a veteran of Trafalgar, was put in charge of the combined fleet.

130 Admirals Sir E. Codrington and Count de Rigny to his Highness Ibrahim Pasha, 22 September 1827, cited in Lady Bourchier, ed., Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir c Edward Codrington, vol.II, (London, 1873), p.1. 57 0 We earnestly beg you not to oppose a res­ olution, the execution of which it is not in your power to resist; for we must not conceal from you that, although it is our desire to put an end to this cruel war by conciliatory means, our orders are such that we must proceed to the last extremity rather than forego the object for the accomplishment of which our sovereigns are allied. If then, on this occasion, as single gun is fired against our flags it will be fatal to the Ottoman fleet . 131

Three days later, both de Rigny and Codrington met with Ibrahim

to discuss the situation that was developing at Navarino.

The conference between the two Allied Commanders and the

Egyptian general was held on 25 September 1827. The Allies were

informed that, just like them, Ibrahim had orders to carry out as

well, and, as a soldier, he was not in a position to refuse.

Negotiations were to be carried out by the Sultan and his

deputies, not himself, a military commander. Despite this

argument, both Codrington and de Rigny impressed upon the

Egyptian the necessity of abiding by the treaty. He was risking

his entire fleet. Eventually, their persistence paid off, and

Ibrahim pledged to remain in port until he had heard from

131 Ibid. I p. 2 . 0 58 Constantinople. 132

In the next month, a precarious game of "cat and mouse"

developed, as Ibrahim broke his pledge to remain in port almost

immediately after the Allied forces had moved back out to sea.

For the next three weeks, the Allies attempted to track the

Egyptian-Turkish forces as they manoeuvred around the sea. On 18

October 1827, the three Admirals issued a protocol, declaring

their resolve to put an end to Ibrahim's deceitfulness. 133 Citing

the various atrocities and violations of the Egyptian commander,

the Allies declared their intention of, "· .. uniting the allied

~ squadrons in Navarin itself, and securing by this permanent

presence the inaction of the Ottoman fleets ... ". 134 As a show of

force, Codrington, the senior Commander, moved the entire Allied

fleet into the bay on 20 October 1827.

132 Memorandum of the Conference at Navarin, September 25, 1827, with Ibrahim Pacha, cited in Bourchier, ed., pp. 5-6.

133 Protocol of the three Admirals, 18 October 1827, cited in Bourchier, ed., pp.61-62. The Russian fleet had joined the British and French on 13 October 1827.

134 Ibid. I p. 61. 0 59 c Following the Allies entrance into the bay of Navarino, Ibrahim sent word that they had not attained permission for such

action, and were to leave at once. Codrington responded by

informing the Turks that should one shot be fired against the

allies, it would be the signal for the destruction of the entire

Turkish-Egyptian force. This immediate threat worked, and

Ibrahim's forces remained docked, their guns silent. However, it

did not last long. 135

While the Allied forces were still taking position, the

Turks initiated hostilities, firing on the Dartmouth. Codrington

C later wrote, "I gave orders that no gun should be fired unless

guns were first fired by the Turks; and those orders were

strictly observed" . 136 However, once fired upon, the Allies

quickly moved to act, and by evening the Turkish-Egyptian fleet

was destroyed. The Allies lost 182 men, with 489 wounded. While

the losses of the Turks and Egyptians cannot be known for

certain, estimates place them as high as 4 000. More

135 R.C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant. 1559-1853, (Princeton, 1952), p.527.

136 Sir E. Codrington to the Admiralty, 21 October 1827, c cited in Bourchier, ed., p.72 60 importantly, the great bulk of their fleet had been destroyed or

rendered inactive . 137

Following the battle, on the twenty-first, the three

Admirals sent a letter to the Turkish Commanders. They expressed

their desire to prevent any further hostilities, and wrote:

" ... it is not our intention to destroy what ships of the Ottoman

navy may yet remain ... ". 138 However, as a means of illustrating

the seriousness of the situation, they sent with the letter a

Turkish captain, captured in the battle. He was to personally

inform all the Turkish chiefs that: c ... if one single musket or cannon-shot be again fired on a ship or boat of the Allied Powers, we shall immediately destroy all the remaining vessels, as well as the forts of Navarin; and that we shall consider such new act of hostility as a formal declaration of the Porte against the three Allied Powers, of which the Grand Signior and his Pachas must

137 Anderson, pp.532-533. The Battle of Navarino is fully described in Anderson's work. Furthermore, Woodhouse's Navarino is an excellent in depth study. Lastly, Bourchier's work contains the numerous accounts of the battle given by Codrington himself.

138 Letter sent by the three Admirals to the Turkish Command­ ers at Navarin, 21 October 1827, cited in Bourchier, ed., p. 76. 0 61 suffer the terrible consequences. 139

Ibrahim apparently understood the serious implications of his

actions. Following the battle of Navarino, the Turkish-Egyptian

navy offered no serious threat to the security of the Greeks.

The destruction of the combined Turkish-Egyptian fleet

effectively sealed the fate of the Sultan's campaign against the

Greeks, and made the creation of an independent Greece

inevitable. Although it was another two and a half years until

the independence of Greece was formally recognized by the Powers,

the events of 20 October 1827 clearly settled the question 0 of Greek independence. As Capodistria noted, Navarino, "· .. opens

one more chance for the future which God seems to reserve for

this Greece of ours, for which he performs so many miracles". 140

Echoing that sentiment, Hugo wrote:

La Grece est libre et dans la tombe Byron appluadi t Navarin. 141

139 Ibid. I p. 77 0

14° Capodistria to Baron vom Stein, cited in Capodistria, p.345.

141 cited in Woodhouse, Capodistria, p.348. 0 62 The actions of Ibrahim, in the face of the combined power of

Great Britain, France and Russia, seem absurd at best.

Confronted with the choice of staying in port, or attacking the

Allies, he chose the latter, and almost certainly ensured the

destruction of his fleet. Why? The answer lies in the realities

of Ottoman power. For Ibrahim to retreat, to admit weakness,

would have been to lose face. In his situation, it was better to

confront and be beaten by three enemies, than to back down.

"Losing face" amongst ones subordinates would have sealed his

personal fate, and such a result is ultimately unfavourable to

any military commander. Codrington himself knew this, when he c quoted Nelson, who said: "No captain can do very wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy" . 142

Bartlett summed up the battle by noting how it created an

environment that prevented the Powers from standing still. That

is to say, they had become committed to finding a solution, with

Greek independence being the most obvious. However, it is

142 Instructions as to the Manner of Placing the Combined Fleet in the Port of Navarino, 19 October 1827, cited in Bourchier, ed., p.69. Although Codrington was hailed as the hero of Navarino, He was removed from his station when Wellington became c Prime Minister. 63 important note that Navarino did not end hostilities. On the

contrary, the successors of Canning, who died in August 1827,

sought to diminish the significance of the battle. British

neutrality had been swiftly cast aside by the actions of the

Allied fleets, and they hoped to reverse that trend. The result

of their actions was the prolonging of the conflict. 143 Greece

remained embroiled in war.

Up to this point, the discussion of Great Britain and the

Greek War for Independence has looked solely at the diplomatic

efforts of the British, and their culmination at Navarino. At

~ this time, it is necessary to direct the focus away from British

diplomacy, and towards two Britis~ men who played a significant

role in the Greek conflict, at its very heart. They were Sir

Richard Church, and Lord Cochrane.

Richard Church was born in 1784, a high spirited boy, who

did not share his parent's affinity with Quakerism. Before

turning sixteen he ran away from home, and enlisted in the Army.

His father eventually purchased him a commission in the 13th

143 Bartlett, p.80. 0 64 Light 144 0 Infantry, and his military career began. In 1800, he began serving in the Napoleonic Wars, seeing action in Egypt and

Malta. His bravery resulted in his appointment as assistant-

quartermaster-general, and chief of staff to General Oswald, who

was beginning the expedition that would see Britain seize the

Ionian Islands one by one. From 1809 until 1814, he remained in

the Ionian Islands, developing the skills and contacts that

eventually lead him to Greece.~ 5

Lane-Poole notes how Church's time in the Ionian Islands

confirmed the high opinion he held of the Greek people. This

~ admiration would lead him into the service of the Greek cause in

1827, to which he would remain committed until his death in 1873.

His admiration for the Greeks was matched by theirs for him.

While in the Ionian Islands, he demonstrated his skills 1n

commanding and disciplining the native regiments. He

successfully converted "rough and untutored ragamuffins" into

orderly troops. Writing to his mother in 1811, he noted that:

144 E.M. Church, Chapters in an Adventurous Life; Sir Rich­ ard Church in Italy and Greece, (London, 1895), pp.1-2.

145 Stanley Lane-Poole, Sir Richard Church, (London, 1890), c pp.24-5. 65 These men, who once knew no law but their sword, are now the admiration of the inhab­ itants for their correct, quiet, and obedi­ ent conduct. My maxim has been to treat them with mildness and humanity, and by that means I have succeeded in gaining the love of these people beyond what can be imagined. The number of troops that flock to me from all parts of Greece is really extraordinary ... ~ 6

He had, in a short period of time, overseen the creation of the

Greek regiments, many of whose members would serve under him in

Greece, in 1827. 147

Church left the Ionian Islands in 1815, and upon receiving

permission from the British authorities became a major-general in

the Neapolitan service. For the next seven years, he 0 served in Naples and Sicily, placing his life in constant danger. In 1822

following the outbreak of revolution in Sicily, and a

controversial imprisonment and trial in Naples, Church returned

to England, and retired to private life. However, throughout

146 Richard Church to his Mother, 12 November 1811, cited in Lane-Poole, p.27.

147 In 1814, when peace was restored to Europe, the Greek regiments that Church had laboured to create, were disbanded. The British Government, anxious not to disrupt relations with the Porte, decided that their participation in the creation of a force that would ultimately be antagonistic towards the Sultan would stretch the limits of diplomacy. E.M. Church, p.20, and Lane-Poole, p.30. 0 66 this period, his interest in Greece never subsided, as he kept in

close contact with his friends in the Mediterranean, and with

Canning as the Eastern Question began to rear its head with the

outbreak of revolution. Finally, in 1827, he could sit no more,

and on 7 March 1827, he arrived in Greece, commissioned to

command the Greek forces on the ground. 148

At the same time Church was entering the Greek struggle,

Lord Cochrane was commissioned to direct the naval ope-rations of

the Hellenic navy. Cochrane was born on the 14 December 1775,

the son of the ninth earl of Dundonald. 149 At an early age, his

~ career in the Royal Navy was furthered by his uncle, the Admiral

Alexander Cochrane, who entered his nephew's name on the list of

any ship he served, thereby providing him with a few years

standing in the service. His actual naval career began, after a

stint in the Army, in 1793, at the age of seventeen . 150

~ 8 Lane-Poole, pp.31-44.

149 Thomas Cochrane, The Autobiography of a Seaman, (London, 1861) 1 p.21.

150 E.G. Twitchett, Life of a Seaman; Thomas Cochrane, lOth Earl of Dundonald, (London, 1931), 0 p.l6. 67 From 1793 until 1806, Cochrane served in the Royal Navy,

both in the Napoleonic Wars, and North American waters. In 1806

he ran for Parliament, and was elected. After a brief stint in

the Commons, Cochrane obtained a leave of absence, and once again

set out to sea. His career suffered numerous setbacks during the

remainder of the war, culminating in his expulsion from

Parliament and the Navy, in 1815. 151

In 1817, the Government of Chile invited Cochrane to assume

control of their navy, assuming responsibility for its

organization and command. At this time, Spain's Latin American

c:J colonies were in full revolt, desperate to throw off the yoke of

Spanish colonialism. Cochrane accepted the Chilean invitation,

and entered their service in 1818. After five years, of varying

successes and failures, he assumed a similar role in Brazil,

holding it until 1825, ultimately leaving in a manner somewhat

less than triumphant. At that time, he turned his attention

151 J.W. Fortescue, Dundonald, (London, 1895), pp.84-101. The circumstances of Cochrane's troubles are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there are numerous bio­ graphies of him that sufficiently deal with this period. c They are listed in the bibliography. 68 towards Greece. 152

Both Cochrane and Church entered the service of Greece at

the same time. However, their careers in Greece did not mirror

one another. Cochrane's commission cannot be distinguished by

any single act of great accomplishment. Upon arrival, he found

that vessels that had been promised were missing, and there was

no money with which to pay the sailors. With no pay, the sailors

returned to piracy. Furthermore, the destruction of the Turkish

fleet at Navarino greatly reduced any military role the Hellenic

navy could be expected to play. Consequently, the majority of

~ his time was spent monitoring Hellenic piracy, and attempting to

control it. Therefore, although he arrived with much fanfare and

enthusiasm, Cochrane was never really able to effect some contri­

bution to the struggle. In 1828, he retired from the Greek

service. 153

Church's role was significantly more prominent than

Cochrane's. On 30 August 1826, an official invitation was sent

152 Ibid., pp.127-172.

153 Twitchett, pp.242-257. 0 69 c to him from the Provisional Government, requesting his services. They wrote:

Your well-known military experience, joined to your noble sentiments and love of liberty, were calculated to bring you the attention of the Greek government ... The government, there­ fore .... requests you to hasten to Greece, that you may take a principal part in her contest, and one conformable to your rank and character, and that you may employ your distinguished tal­ ents for the benefit of the Greek nation. 154

Church readily accepted, and landed in Greece on 7 March 1827. 155

Church's arrival in Greece, though heralded by the Greeks

~ themselves, was received with less enthusiasm by others. Captain

Hamilton wrote to him that same March, urging him to return to

England. The letter read, "I advise you to refuse any command.

It is evident that there is not any energy in the country against

the present danger". 156 However, Church ignored such advice and

began the task of commanding the land forces of the Greek army.

154 Provisional Government of Greece to Richard Church, 30 August 1826, cited in Lane-Poole, pp.46-7.

155 Ibid. I p. 4 8 .

156 Hamilton to Church, March 1827, cited in E.M. Church, c p. 311. 70 Church's first campaign was a failure, due to a lack of

proper preparation and the disobedience of his orders. However,

he quickly recovered, and throughout the remainder of the war,

laboured for the liberation of western Greece. He achieved this

goal in 1829. Unfortunately, his disagreements with the Greek

President Capodistria over the treatment of the army, and

Capodistria's decision not to press for the inclusion of the

newly liberated lands in the peace settlement, led to the

resignation of his post. 157

Both Church and Cochrane played important roles in Greece,

~ despite their varying degrees of success. They both added

enthusiasm and legitimacy. As British citizens, their

participation symbolized Britain's increasingly closer affinity

with he Greek cause. Neither man openly sought their commission,

but were instead invited. That they accepted said something

about their individual character, and, more importantly, about

their perception of the Greek cause.

157 Lane-Poole, pp.49-71. For a full account of Church's campaigns in Greece, see Lane-Poole's work, as well as E.M. Church's. ~: Capodistria had become President of Greece in 1828. 0 71 c The Greek Revolution effectively ended in 1830 with the Protocol of Conference between Great Britain, France, and Russia,

relative to the Independence of Greece. 158 It stated that:

Greece shall form an Independent State, and shall enjoy all the rights, political, admin­ istrative, and commercial, attached to com­ plete independence. 159

The protocol represented the culmination of the Greek struggle,

giving the Greeks more than they had dared possible at the

beginning of 1827.

From its beginnings on 1821, Europe witnessed a gradual

change in the position of the Powers, and particularly Great

Britain, towards the situation. In many ways, that change was

best characterized by the Battle of Navarino. Following that

event, the eastern Mediterranean witnessed the intervention of

French troops, a Russo-Turkish war, and the eventual establish-

ment of the Kingdom of Greece. In less than a decade, the

158 Protocol of Conference between Great Britain, France, and Russia, relative to the Independence of Greece, 3 Febru­ ary 1830, cited in Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol.II, (London, 1875), p.841.

159 Ibid., p.841. 0 72 foreign policy of the major European powers had shifted

dramatically.

Britain's role in the Greek War of Independence had two

sides. The first has just been discussed. It centred around the

diplomatic efforts of the Foreign Office to avert a Russo-Turkish

war that might increase the Russian presence in the Mediterran-

ean. For Canning, a temporary Russian presence in the area,

under the watchful eye of the Royal Navy, was far more preferable

than the advance of the Russian army on Constantinople. That was

the rationale that led to the Treaty of London. 160 In the end,

~ Britain was able to protect her interests and keep the Russians

out of the Mediterranean.

The second aspect centred around the Ionian Islands. From

the outset of hostilities, the Ionian Government attempted to

isolate the Islands from the revolt. Maitland, and his successor

Sir Frederick Adam, were well aware that if the outbreak of

nationalist sentiment was not contained on the mainland, it could

have serious reprucussions for the Corfu administration. Their

approach to the Greek situation will now be studied.

16 ° C.J. Bartlett, Defence and Diplomacy, (London, 1993), 0 p.24. 73 Chapter V: "The Neutrality of the Ionian Islands 0 During the Greek War of Independence"

While negotiations designed to relieve the tension between

Russia and the Porte were occurring in Europe, the Colonial

Office was attempting to isolate the Ionian Islands from the Greek Revolt. The outbreak of the Greek Revolution had the effect of completely disrupting the domestic tranquility that Mai tland had laboured to create and maintain. 161 Many Ionians,

frustrated by the almost dictatorial nature of the Constitutional

Chart, were quite willing to travel to the mainland and engage in the struggle against the Turks. Furthermore, those who remained on the islands began to express their support for the Greek cause, thereby undermining the Government's position . 162

On 7 June 1821, Sir Frederick Adam, acting as Lord High Commissioner while Maitland was in London, proclaimed the

official neutrality of the Ionian Islands. 163 The proclamation

161 Wrigley, p .103.

162 Crawley, p. 21. More than 3000 Ionians made their way to the Morea fol­ lowing the outbreak of the Greek Revolt in 1821.

163 "Proclamation of the Government of the Ionian Islands Relative to the Observance of Neutrality in the Greco-

0 75 had various stipulations. First and foremost, all citizens and c resident aliens of the islands were prohibited from participating

in the hostilities in the Morea, or any Provinces of the Turkish

Dominion. The Proclamation stated that:

... all Subjects of the United States of the Ionian Islands, domiciled in any of the above mentioned Countries, that, in the event of their taking part in the present disturbances, or joining in any attack or warlike operations which may take place, they will necessarily lose all right or pretension to the interference on their behalf of the Governments of these States, of which they are natural-born Subjects, or of the British Consuls who are charged with protect­ ing their rights, in whatever Foreign Countries they may reside. 164

Once they had dealt with the Ionian populace, the Government

turned its attention towards Ionian vessels.

The Proclamation of the Senate, May 7, 1821165 addressed the question of blockade. It noted how the Porte had, "· .. ordered a

Turkish War: Proclamation of the Senate. &?ril 9. 1821", cited in A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and Treaties of Various Countries, vol.l, Francis Deak and Philip C. Jessup, eds., (Washington, 1939), p.329.

164 Ibid., cited in Deak and Jessup, eds., p.329.

165 "Proclamation of the Senate, May 7, 1821", cited in Deak and Jessup, eds., p.329.

0 76 Blockade 166 of every part of the Morea ... " , with some exceptions. c Respecting the Turkish blockade, the Ionian proclamation read: " ... it is hereby ordered, that all Vessels and Barks under the

Ionian Flag, of whatever description, do respect the said

Blockade" 167 . To that end, various restrictions were placed on

both foreign and Ionian vessels.

First, the Senate placed an embargo on the export of all

munitions. Secondly, all foreign vessels were prohibited from

arming in any local port. This included both Greek and Turkish

ships. With respect to Ionian vessels, the Government required

each vessel to possess a special license to carry defensive arms.

Also, any Ionian vessel engaged in an offensive manoeuvre of any

kind would be deemed a pirate ship. Lastly, a reduction was

ordered in the number of Ionians serving on foreign ships, and

all armed Greek and Turkish ships were barred from Ionian

168 ports. It was through these measures that the Ionian

166 Ibid., cited in Deak and Jessup, eds., p. 329. Excluded from the ordered blockade were the Ports of Naupacto, Patras, Navarino, Modon, Coron, and Monem­ bassia.

167 Ibid., cited in Deak and Jessup, eds., p.329.

c 77 c Government hoped to maintain its neutrality.

In an address to the Legislative Assembly of the Ionian

Islands, Sir Thomas Maitland explained the neutrality

proclamations. Noting the severity of the conflict, he stated:

I strongly inculcated then the absolute nec­ essity of the strictest neutrality, as the only line of conduct on the part of the Ion­ ian Government that could preserve the people from a participation in those horrors which desolated the immediate vicinity ... the Morea in particular has become the theatre of bar­ barities, at which human nature shudders! 169

For Maitland, neutrality represented a"· .wise and salutary line

of 170 conduct ... " , which would promote stability and tranquility

in the Ionian Islands.

That being said, how successful were those blockades? Did they, "· .. save the Ionian people from the consequences of their

infatuation 171 ... " with the Greek cause? The answer is

168 Wrigley, p .107.

169 Substance of Sir Thos. Mai tland' s Address to the Leg­ islative Assembly of the Ionian Islands, 4 March 1822, cited in Red,path Tracts, vol.34, (London, 1903), pp.3-4.

170 Ibid. I p. 4.

0 78 complicated. The naval forces of the Admiralty, upon which c Maitland's hopes for enforcing Ionian neutrality were resting,

were unable to protect all Ionian vessels in the Levant.

Furthermore, in light of the important diplomatic ties between

the Ottoman Empire and England, the Royal Navy was not in a

position to retaliate against violations committed by the Ottoman

172 navy . Consequently, the enforcement of Ionian neutrality

encountered various difficulties.

The Ionian Government was confronted with two main concerns

in dealing with the issue of blockade. First was the Ottoman

blockade. As mentioned, the Turks had ordered a blockade of the

Morea in 1821. That order threatened the speculative endeavour

of Philip James Green, the Consul-General of the Levant Company.

Green was attempting to profit by the revolt, supplying both

sides with needed supplies. During 1822 and 1823, in an effort

to bypass the Ottoman blockade, Green met with various Turkish

authorities who promised safe passage for all Ionian vessels

171 Ibid. , p. 5 .

172 W.D. Wrigley, "The Neutrality of Ionian Shipping and its Enforcement During the Greek Revolution (1821-1831) ", in Mariner's Mirror, vol.73, No.3, (August, 1987), p.245.

0 79 destined for the remaining Ottoman strongholds in the Morea. Furthermore, 0 it was agreed that the Ionian Government would reaffirm its acknowledgement of the original Ottoman blockade, thereby prohibiting all Ionian vessels from the Albanian coast. 173

The relatively peaceful solution to the question of the Ottoman blockade was in many respects a remarkable achievement.

Writing in 1823, the Quarterly Review noted with trepidation the perceived difficulties the British would face in the prohibition

of all armed vessels of the Turkish fleet from Ionian ports, it wrote:

Even this was a grievance to the Turks. An ancient ally, with whom we have treaties, to whom we send an ambassador, an acknowledged European power, is denied the usual inter­ course, because a portion of its subjects is in a state of insurrection against the govern­ ment, and because by it we acknowledge, in fact, an unknown and unrecognized flag as a belligerent power. 1 u

173 Ibid., p.246. Ionian vessels carrying cattle were exempted from this measure.

174 William Goodisson, "A Historical and Topographical Essay upon the Islands of Corfu, Leucadia, Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Zante; with Remarks upon the Character, Manners and Customs of the Ionian Greeks: Descriptions of the Scenery and Remains of Antiquity discovered

0 80 In the end, c the question of the Ottoman blockade was dealt with, much to the satisfaction of the British Government, through

relatively cordial diplomatic channels. Conversely, the question

of the Hellenic blockade was not settled until after violence had occurred.

The nature of the Hellenic navy differed greatly from that other European navies. Perhaps the most significant difference

lay in funding. The operational funds of the Hellenic fleet were

almost entirely based 175 on the spoils of plunder. Therefore, in the eyes of Maitland's Ionian ·Administration, their actions were tantamount to piracy. To protect Ionian vessels from this outrage, Maitland repeatedly asked the Admiralty for greater

protection from Greek 176 piracy . However, due to the success of the Greek fleet in asserting control over the waters

therein; and Reflexions upon the Cyclopean Ruins", in Quarterly Review, vol.29 (London, 1823), p.107. 175 Wrigley, "The Neutrality of Ionian Shipping ... ", in Mariner's Mirror, p.247.

176 Adm. 1/438: Moore to Croker, 13 June 1821, cited in Wrigley, The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neu­ trality, 1821-31, p.108.

0 81 surrounding the mainland, the bulk of the Royal Navy's forces were being used c to escort Levantine shipping safely between Smyrna and Malta . 177

While it appeared to Maitland that the Royal Navy was proving itself inadequate to provide for the protection of Ionian neutrality, there were legitimate reasons for its apparent

sho~tcomings. Britain unquestioningly possessed the techno­

logically superior fleet, however, it could never bring the full

power of its advantage into play. Only single warships were sent on retaliatory missions, thereby severely limiting the

effectiveness of those missions. Consequently, the navy's record in recapturing confiscated Ionian vessels was, as Wrigley notes,

uninspiring. 178

In light of its failure in dealing with Greek piracy, the Royal Navy adopted different tactics. Unlike the British Admiralty, the Hellenic authorities were unable to discipline their navy. Therefore, Captain G.W. Hamilton, of the H.M.S.

177 Wrigley, in Mariner's Mirror, p.248. 178 Ibid., p.248.

0 82 Cambrian began to deal directly with the numerous faction leaders

c that were in charge of the various ports now under Greek control.

His approach was simple; he would demand compensation from the

primate for any attack on Ionian shipping made by a vessel from that port. To help convince the primate of the seriousness of

the violation, Hamilton would train the guns of the Cambrian on the offending port. His tactics were successful, and in 1821

alone, he collected over eight hundred pounds in compensation. 179

In 1822, the Turks had moved on the offensive, threatening

to brutally 180 end the revolt. The immediate result of the

escalation of Turkish attacks was an increase in the instances of piracy committed by the Hellenic navy. To compound the situation, many British merchants, located in Zante, were

179 Ibid., p.248. Hamilton's success was further facilitated by his command of the Greek language, which garnered him respect throughout Greek waters. Hamilton's success continued, and between September 1821 and June 1823, he secured the release 25 vessels registered to the British Government.

180 Neville Thompson, "The British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands and The Greek War of Independence, 1815-1827", in The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. 1750-1850: Proceedings. 1993, Ellen Evans and John w. Rooney, Jr., eds., (Miami, 1994), p.309.

0 83 providing both sides with food supplies. In the end, at least thirteen c different attacks on Ionian and British registered shipping occurred between February 1823 and January 1824 . 181

As mentioned, Britain did not recognize the belligerent

rights of the Hellenic government until March of 1823. Until that time, methods such as those adopted by Hamilton were successful in extracting compensation from the Hellenic pirates.

However, after 1823, this process became increasingly

problematic. Convention suggested that from this point on, neutrality violations could be dealt with through International Law. This was the belief of the Colonial Office. Unfortunately,

that did not prove to be the case. The lack of control the Hellenic authorities exercised over their naval forces left the pirates to their own devices. Consequently, both Ionian and British registered shipping were continually violated, with

little legal recourse to fall back on. Once again force or the threat thereof were used by the British to effect payment for

compensation. 182

181 Wrigley, in Mariner's Mirror, p.249.

182 Ibid., pp.252-3.

0 84 An example of this situation occurred in 1824, when Adam

ordered the Mediterranean fleet to seize all Greek vessels after the increasingly factionalized Hellenic government suspended all compensation payments. In abeyance of Adam's request, three Greek schooners were captured and held until the Greeks resumed

compensation 183 payments. In light of this success, the British

authorities in Corfu attempted to negotiate a settlement over the Morean blockade.

On 17 January 1824, Maitland died during an attack of

apoplexy. 184 Sir Frederick Adam was appointed Lord High

Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, with Malta now forming its own separate administration. Adam had almost exclusively dealt with the enforcement of Ionian neutrality since it was first proclaimed. On 16 October 1824, he, along with the Colonial

Office, negotiated an Anglo-Hellenic Accord designed to deal with the Morean blockade. The accord stipulated that only those

Hellenic vessels commissioned by the Hellenic government could

183 Ibid. I pp.252-3. The government had been split into two rival factions, located in Argos and Nauplion.

184 Thompson, p. 3 09.

0 85 enforce the blockade of the Morea. Furthermore, those vessels were obligated to turn away all neutral vessels peacefully,

unless resistance was encountered. Lastly, neutral vessels were to be informed of the blockade of any port in advance, and then

be given time to leave those ports. 185

In addition to negotiating the accord, Adam announced that he would be directing his attention towards those Ionian captains

who openly violated the neutrality law, either for profit, or as a means of expressing their nationalist sentiments. Such

instances were becoming increasingly numerous, and created an added strain on an already overextended Royal Navy. However,

Adam had the full support of the Crown for invoking any measure he felt would greater protect Ionian neutrality . 186

The Anglo-Hellenic accord on the Morean blockade did act as an effective control against piracy in that area. However, in the long-run, it only served to move Hellenic acts of piracy away from the Peloponnese, towards Malta. In a ten month period,

185 Wrigley, in Mariner's Mirror, p. 253. 186 Wrigley, The Diplomatic Significance ... , p. 213.

0 86 beginning in January 1825, thirteen acts of piracy were committed

around the island 0 of Malta. While the majority of those acts were deliberate, some were the result of misunderstandings. Many Ionian captains refused to recognize the belligerent rights of the Hellenic navy, and therefore attempted to sail through the blockades. The subsequent seizure of cargo by the Hellenic captains could not be pursued by Adam, as the Ionian captains

were solely at fault. However, those attacks that were deemed by the Corfu administration to be unwarranted were pursued by the

Royal Navy. 187

The Royal Navy's campaign against Hellenic piracy reached new heights in the spring of 1825. For the next eighteen months, the Mediterranean fleet made a concerted effort to seize every Hellenic vessel, with the intent of coercively instructing it on the limitations of its belligerent rights. During one week in June 1825, two British vessels captured twenty-three piratical

vessels. 188 Unfortunately, despite its best efforts, the Royal Navy never had sufficient numbers to effectively control Hellenic

187 Wrigley, in Mariner's Mirror, pp.253-4.

188 Wrigley, The Diplomatic Significance ... , p. 217.

0 87 piracy. From March 1825 until April 1826, there were twenty- eight recorded acts of piracy in Greek waters. 189 Such large-

scale piracy prompted one French admiral to note that, "It is impossible for a vessel to go ten leagues in these seas without

being attacked" . 190

The signing of the Treaty of London further hampered the Navy's efforts in enforcing Ionian neutrality and controlling piracy. By requiring the fleet to protect the ally-imposed

armistice, anti-piratical patrols suffered from a depletion in their ranks. This deficiency prompted Codrington to complain to the Admiralty, and the Hellenic government, suggesting that the Greek privateers would do better to attack Turkish vessels . 191 With the destruction of the Turkish-Egyptian fleets at Navarino in October 1827, the fate of Ionian shipping grew more precarious, to the extent that throughout November 1827, all Ionian ships were subjected to acts of piracy. The result was

189 C.G. Pitcairn Jones, Piracy in the Levant. 1827-8, (London: Navy Records Society, 1934), pp.282-284.

190 cited in Bartlett, p.78.

191 Codrington to the Hellenic Government, 26 February 1827, cited in Wrigley, The Diplomatic Significance ... , p.219.

0 88 such that as of January 1828, there were forty-one piratical

attacks on Ionian shipping that had occurred since the Treaty of

London was signed in July 1827. 192

The issue of piracy remained a key feature of the Greek revolt right up until the creation of an independent Greece.

Despite its best intentions, the Ionian Government and the Admiralty were never effectively able to control it for a prolonged period of time. Even the destruction of the Turkish fleet in October 1827 did little to control the Hellenic Navy. As the Greek Provisional Government was unable to pay its soldiers, they sought their fortunes on their own. The result

was such that British and Ionian shipping suffered dearly for a decade.

The neutrality of the Ionian Islands was further threatened by the massive influx of refugees, both Greek and Turkish, that fled the mainland, beginning in 1821. Wrigley has called the enforcement of Ionian neutrality, in the face of this

192 Pitcairn, pp.288-90, and Wrigley, The Diplomatic Signif­ icance ... , p.219

0 89 0 development, as a "Study in Selectivity". 193

It is clear that the various pressures being placed on both the Ionian and British Governments greatly contributed to this selectivity. First, the Corfu administration was not eager to

receive any number of Greek or Turkish refugees, in light of the nationalist sentiments they might incite among the Ionian

populace, either as revolutionaries or oppressors. Second, the British Government, ever eager to maintain the cordiality of Anglo-Ottoman relations, attempted to accommodate Turkish refugees. Lastly, the pressures of general humanitarianism

caused both administrations to alter the limits of neutrality. 194

In the eyes of the Corfu administration, the Greek refugees presented several problems. First, it was feared that their precarious physical condition posed a threat to the public health. Second, the government was wary of the financial burden the refugees would place on an already strapped Ionian treasury.

193 W.D. Wrigley, "The British Enforcement of Ionian Neutral­ ity Against Greek and Turkish Refugees, 1821-1828: A Study in Selectivity", in Sudost-Forschungen, vol.46 (1987) 1 pp.95-112.

194 Ibid. I p. 96.

0 90 Lastly/ there was the belief that the mere presence of Greek 0 refugees would incite revolutionary sentiments among the Ionian

populace. This third fear was based on the belief that among the

Greek refugees were members of Philiki Etairia 1 who had come to the Ionian Islands with the intention of setting up a base from which they could direct revolutionary activity. It was this final point that disrupted Angle-Ottoman relations. 195

In an effort to relieve the tension the Greek refugees were creating between London and Constantinople/ the Corfu government

decided to expel all Greek refugees in the summer of 1821. This decision was made easier by the fact that the Hellenic forces had

achieved a measure of success on the mainland 1 which could allow most of the refugees to return home. Maitland and Adam believed that this action would eliminate any further threats to Ionian

neutrality. They were wrong. In February 1822 1 the Turks launched a massive counter-offensive against the Greek

insurgents. The result was such that almost immediately after it began/ the number of Greek refugees seeking asylum in the Ionian

Islands increased dramatically. Maitland 1 in accordance with the

195 Ibid. I PP. 9 6-7 .

0 91 principles of humanitarianism and the guidelines established by ' the Colonial Office, c had no choice but to offer them haven 196 .

In an attempt to isolate the Ionian populace from the refugees, Maitland set up an internment camp on the island of Calamos, to which all refugees were sent. Insofar as isolating the Ionian population, the internment was a success. However,

despite the presence of a British garrison it failed to secure Ionian neutrality. On the contrary, Calamos became a refuge where revolutionaries placed their dependants, organized

meetings, and planned strategy. Furthermore, after March 1823, when the British recognized the belligerent rights of the Hellenic state, no one from Calamos could be deported. Once again, Angle-Ottoman relations were threatened. 197

The Porte claimed that Calamos had been ·transformed into a base for revolutionary activities directed against the legitimate

Turkish authority . 198 The British denied such occurrences, and

196 Ibid., pp. 97-99.

197 Ibid., p. 99.

198 Bathurst to Adam, 12 June 1825, cited in Wrigley, "The British Enforcement ... ", p.101.

0 92 even investigated the situation. However, despite the fact that they found little 0 evidence to support the Turkish accusations, London and Corfu decided to once again turn away all refugees, save those whose presence would not aggravate the diplomatic situation.

As mentioned, the Ionian Islands was also a place of refuge for Turks fleeing the hostilities on the mainland. In contrast with their attitudes towards the Greek refugees, " ... the British authorities in Corfu readily accepted all Turkish refugees

seeking asylum in the 199 Ionian Islands" . Such action was deemed

necessary in light of Anglo-Ottoman relations, and the need to avoid any further tension. However, the presence of Turk refugees on the islands was a clear violation of Ionian

neutrality, and on several occasions resulted in acts of violence directed against them by the Ionian populace. 200

199 Ibid. I p.101.

200 Ibid. I p. 10 2 . In October 1821, forty Turk refugees were murdered by Ionians. Furthermore, when the Turkish refugees were departed from the islands, they did so in Ionian ves­ sels, which immediately became popular targets for the Greek corsairs.

0 93 While the presence of Turkish refugees on the Ionian Islands

did result in some 0 tension between the Corfu administration and the Ionian populace, the decision to grant them asylum eventually served the British interests. By 1829, Angle-Ottoman relations were virtually restored. That restoration may be partly attributed to Britain's willingness to protect the Turkish

refugees. 201 Unfortunately, the situation regarding the Hellenic

refugees was somewhat more problematic.

The Porte's decision to enlist the aid of Ibrahim and the Egyptian forces, had dire consequences for the Greeks." Ibrahim's

success on the mainland prompted a flood of refugees. By 1827, over 9 000 Greeks had fled to the Ionian Islands, and were

placing an increasingly large burden on the treasury. Despite the recognition of Hellenic autonomy and the actions taken at Navarino, there were no signs that these refugees could return home. While Ibrahim still controlled a significant portion of the Peloponnese, the Greeks were in no hurry to leave.

201 Ibid. I p .111. Unlike the Hellenic government, the Porte agreed to pay for the maintenance of its citizens. This action no doubt enabled the British to receive Turkish refugees with greater ease.

0 94 0 Consequently, Adam moved to encourage their departure. 202

After having spent over twelve thousand pounds on the internment camp at Calamos, Adam closed it. Furthermore, he terminated all relief assistance for the Greek refugees. In doing so, he informed the Hellenic government that it was henceforth responsible for the maintenance of its own national citizens; the price of independence. His actions had the desired

result, as nearly all the Greeks returned to their homeland by 1829. The financial rewards were felt almost immediately, as the weekly cost of "refugee maintenance" dropped from 185 pounds to

33 pounds. 203 After eight years, Ionian neutrality was finally

secure. By 1830, with the close the Greek War for Independence,

it would be officially rescinded.

The enforcement of Ionian neutrality during the Greek revolt was a difficult undertaking. The authorities in London and Corfu were continually forced to weigh their actions in relation to the effect they would have on Anglo-Ottoman relations. Furthermore,

202 Ibid. I p. 110 .

203 Adam to Murray, 6 August 1829, cited in Wrigley, "The British Enforcement of ... ", p.110.

0 95 the whole purpose behind Ionian neutrality was to isolate the

0 islands from the explosion of nationalist sentiment that had occurred on the mainland. Were they successful in these regards? The answer is difficult. Maitland, Adam, and the Colonial Office argued that the presence of Greek refugees on the Ionian Islands would incite nationalist sentiments. In this regard, their fears were proved to be unfounded. However, what did prompt the Ionian populace to act was the presence of Turkish refugees in their homeland. Therefore, the very nature of Ionian neutrality was consistently undermined by the British desire to avoid straining Angle-Ottoman relations. To that end, London and Corfu were working at cross-purposes. Wrigley summed it up best in writing: "· .. the diplomatic policies of the Anglo-Ionian government were designed to assure the basic security of the Ionian Islands,

whereas the diplomatic policies of the British were designed to assure the continuance of the European status quo" . 204 The result was such that the enforcement of Ionian neutrality never

developed into a clear policy.

204 W.D. Wrigley, "The Ionian Islands and the Advent of the Greek State (1827-1833)", in Balkan Studies. vol.19, no . 2 ( 19 7 8) , p . 414 .

0 96 Adding to the difficulties encountered by the Ionian

government were the 0 numerous acts of piracy committed by the Hellenic navy. The forces of the Royal Navy were too thinly spread to exact some consistent influence. Consequently, the neutrality of Ionian shipping was continually violated throughout

the 1820s. In many ways, therefore, one may conclude that Ionian neutrality was never entirely successful because it was never

entirely enforced. There were too many contradictory forces at work, which greatly hindered any attempts at devising and enforcing a consistent policy towards both the Turks and the Greeks.

0 97 Chapter VI: "The Ionian Islands, 1815-1831: A Social, Political and Economic Analysis"

The British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands began in 1815, after nearly three hundred years of Venetian rule, and eighteen years of war-time occupation. When Britain

formally assumed control after the Treaty of Paris, there was a feeling of expectation among the populace; that years of neglect and hardship were about to come to an end, and prosperity could begin. At this point, it is necessary to examine the

protectorate to see if those expectations were met during the first fifteen years of its existence. What did it achieve

politically, socially, and economically? Was it successful, and if so, for whom? The Ionians, the British or both?

Before beginning such an analysis, it is important to keep in mind the historical realities of this period. As previously discussed, from 1821 to 1830, the islands were virtually caught in the middle of the Greek War for Independence. That conflict undoubtedly promoted a great degree of instability and uncertain- ty in the Ionian Islands. Therefore, when measuring both the accomplishments and the deficiencies of the protectorate, this factor must be kept in mind.

0 98 To best understand Ionian society during the protectorate,

one must look at Ionian c society prior to its creation. In a speech to the Legislative Assembly in April 1822, the President

of the Primary Council and Advocate General, Calichiopulo Manzaro

stated that prior to the British takeover:

... the public buildings were in a state of ruinous dilapidation, the monies voted for their repairs having gone into the pockets of those who had the charge of them ... 205

With the public treasury virtually empty, the plague raged across a third of the islands, civil discord was evident everywhere, and the course of justice had been thoroughly perverted. As Manzaro

noted, the courts were known for procuring, "· .. the escape of the guilty, the punishment of the innocent, and the sacrifice of individual liberty, honour, and fortune to private revenge". 206

Maitland would attempt to change the situation.

The Constitutional Chart drafted by Maitland was designed to

205 Calichiopoluo Manzaro, President of the Primary Council and Advocate General, to the Legislative Assembly, April 1822, cited in Goodisson, p.93.

206 Ibid., p.93.

0 99 concentrate power solely in the hands of the Lord High

Commissioner. c His purpose for doing so was clear: he wanted to effectively curtail the vast power the aristocracy wielded under the previous rulers. Both he and Bathurst agreed that the Ionian populace were not fit to govern themselves. Bathurst wrote: "The Ionians must retain no wild speculative notions respecting government, no imagine they can make a constitution as they would

a pudding upon 11 207 a British or French recipe • Maitland clearly

had the support of the Colonial Office. With that support, he

set about the task of drafting the constitution.

The result of his efforts, the Constitutional Chart of the United States of the Ionian Islands, has already been presented. Maitland himself noted that, "To the nobility liberty and independence mean liberty to plunder the country and independence

of all 208 judicial proceedings" , and therefore, the constitution must prevent them from doing so. Without question, he succeeded

in that endeavour. With the power of the aristocracy replaced by the power of the Lord High Commissioner, Maitland moved to

207 Bathurst to Maitland, (1816), cited in Pratt, p.104.

208 Maitland, (1816), cited in Pratt, p.105.

«=> 100 address the vast array of social, economic, and political

problems that the islands suffered from.

One of the main criticisms of Ionian society before 1815 was the perversion of justice. The constitution acknowledged that, " ... many judicial disorders unfortunately did, and do prevail, in

these States ... ". Therefore, its framers hoped to, " ... put an end to those arbitrary decisions which have taken place on so many

occasions ... 209 " . Simply put, the privileged position of the

wealthy was meant to be diminished so that:

... the rich and the poor, that the noble in the palace and the peasant in the cottage, are both alike amenable to the laws of the country. 210

To accomplish such a task would mean changing the Ionian judicial

process at virtually every level.

209 Ibid. , Chp. VI, sec. 3, art. 7.

21 C.O. ° 1088, Defence of Maitland's Administration, (1822), p.96, cited in David Hannell, "The Ionian Islands under the British Protectorate: Social and Economic Prob­ lems", in Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol.7 (1989), p.125.

0 101 The Ionian judicial system was severely criticized by the British, as well c as those Ionians who were disadvantaged by it. Sir Charles Napier, the Resident for Cephalonia, made

several harsh criticisms of the Ionian judicial system prior to 1815. He wrote:

The dominion of riches leave a native judge so shackled, in his own island, that no rational man can expect him to give a just sentence. When a peasant is prosecuted by a feudal lord, in either the civil, or crim­ inal court, he is a lost man. 211

In proving his charge, Napier noted that the advocate appointed by the judge for the poor man was often an individual whose

livelihood was dependant on the poor man's opponent, usually a

weal thy landlord. 212

Perhaps one of the mast critical descriptions of the Ionian judicial system came in the Review of British Protection. 213

211 C.J. Napier, The Colonies: treating of their value generally and of the Ionian Islands in particular, London, 1833, p.247.

212 Ibid. I p. 24 7-8.

213 Review of British Protection, C.O. 1260, cited in Hannell, p.125.

0 102 It described the judicial traditions that had their foundations

in the Venetian era. It noted how:

Men measured their conduct, not by the laws, but by the means which they might have of setting them at defiance, by the relative strength of their enemies compared with their own. Human life was purchased for a trifle, security of property depended on the means of corruption, and the tribunals themselves were converted by paying and subordination, into terrible engines of vengeance against the per­ sons, and fortunes for whom they were bound to protect. 214

Clearly then, the judicial administration of the Ionian Islands prior to 1815 was deplorable, by British standards. That being said, what improvements were initiated under the protectorate?

The Constitutional Chart created a Supreme Council of Justice, which consisted of four judges, two British and two Ionian. 215 This body acted as the main court of appeal in the islands. In addition to the Supreme Council, every island had its own civil, commercial and criminal courts. To ensure that the courts acted in the interest of justice, the judges for each

214 Ibid., cited in Hannell, p.125.

215 The Lord High Commissioner and the President of the Senate were ex officio members.

0 103 court came from the other islands, so that no island court had a local judge. Furthermore, the salary of judges was raised, to promote judicial integrity. Pratt notes how the pay scale for

judges quadrupled 216 between 1814 and 1820. Bribery would no

longer be tolerated.

A second problem faced during the pursuit of justice was language. Educated Ionians, particularly the nobility, used

Italian in daily affairs, while the peasantry spoke Greek. That difference caused numerous problems in the courts. As Napier

noted, "In a foreign tongue he is accused, in a foreign tongue he is defended, and he learns the result by his lawyer turning round

to tell him 217 that he is to be hanged!" . To correct the problem, the Constitutional Chart made Greek the official language of the

protectorate. However, its effects were slow in being felt, as Italian remained the first language of the nobility. It took the administration of Lord Nugent, from 1832 to 1835, to partially

remove the problem. It passed a law stipulating that after two

216 Pratt, p .109.

217 Napier, p.119.

0 104 years, c no man could be tried for his life in Italian. 218 Overall, the judicial reforms initiated under the first fifteen years of the protectorate greatly improved the administration of justice. That the situation was so deplorable in 1815, clearly helped to make any reform a success. However, it may be concluded that while frustrating to those who had

possessed an advantage before 1815, the judicial system of the protectorate offered a more equitable form of justice throughout

the Ionian Islands.

Another key issue of analysis is education. While it had been virtually neglected during the Venetian period, it received

a great deal of attention during the protectorate. Article 23 of the first chapter of the Constitutional Chart stated:

The public instruction of youth being one of the most important points connected with the prosperity and happiness of any State, and it being of the utmost importance, both to the morals and religion of the country, that its pastors in particular should receive a liberal and adequate education, it is here-

218 Hannell, p .126.

0 105 c by declared to be a primary duty ... 219 To that end, the constitution called for the establishment of primary schools, followed by the later establishment of a college.

The new emphasis on education was felt almost immediately.

In the countryside of each island, county district schools were established, based on the Lancastrian model found in Great

Britain. Therefore, parents would pay the master's salary, older students would teach younger ones, and the civil authority would provide the building and materials. The success of this system was illustrated by its rapid growth. In 1823, there were twelve such schools. By 1827, that number had increased to twenty-nine,

and by 1832 it stood at sixty such schools, with over 2 500

students. 220

In addition to the county schools, each island had a secondary school established in the capital. Those schools

219 Cons ti tu ti anal Chart of the United States of the Ionian Islands, Chapter 1, article 23, cited in Sessional Papers, 1818 (132) xvii.2.

220 Pratt, p.111.

0 106 taught the classics, languages and mathematics. Furthermore, the capitals 0 also had central elementary schools, teaching reading,

writing and arithmetic. These schools were entirely financed by

the government. 221 For the first time in their history, the

Ionian Islands had a general education system.

The education system of the Ionian Islands owed its very

life not to the Constitutional Chart, but to Lord Guildford.

Described 222 as the " ... most loving father" of the youth of Greece, Guildford was a wealthy Philhellene who became the force

that drove educational reform. His greatest accomplishment was the establishment of the Ionian Academy, on 29 May 1824. It taught theology, jurisprudence, medicine, and philosophy, and initially had 211 students and 14 faculty members. In three years time, its library boasted over 21 000 volumes, the majority of which were donated by Guildford himself. 223.

221 Ibid. I p. 111.

222 cited in Pratt, p.111.

223 Ibid., p.111. Pratt describes Maitland as showing scant interest in the Ionian Academy. Therefore, its establishment took place in 1824, after his death. Guildford himself was the first Chancellor, and died in 1827, leaving behind a popular and well-respected institution.

0 107 • Education, it must be concluded, was a much improved part of Ionian society during the c protectorate. As was the case with the judiciary, the sheer lack of any proper foundations prior to 1815 greatly enhanced the quality of any initiative after 1815. Still, thanks to Lord Guildford, the Ionian Islands benefitted

from a much improved approach to education.

In the area of public works, the Ionian Islands greatly benefitted from the British protectorate. Perhaps the most

important individual associated with this area was Charles James

Napier, the Resident 224 of Cephalonia. Appointed to his position

on 12 March 1822, Napier, "· .. at once commenced reforms, social and political, and the construction of public works on a scale

equally gigantic and 225 useful". Those reforms included the draining of marshes, the construction of roads as well as the widening of roads already in existence, the construction of quays

224 The career of Napier has been well documented. In this discussion, attention will be primarily placed on his contribution to the public works. For a more in depth analysis of his colonial career, please consult the works listed in the bibliography.

225 Sir W. Napier, The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier, vol.1. (London, 1857), p.305.

0 108 and lighthouses, 0 and the improvement of the harbour. 226

Napier successfully oversaw the completion of 134 miles of road in Cephalonia, the majority of which were over mountainous

regions of the island. The total cost of his work cost only 17 849 pounds. Looking at the islands as a whole, there were only 20 miles if road in 1824. Less than twenty years later,

that number had increased 227 to 366. Therefore, with regards to public works, the islands again benefitted from the protectorate. That benefit was based on a more efficient form of administra- tion. Previously, there had been little impetus for public

works, as long as the aristocracy was satisfied. However, the

British administrators, and particularly Napier, saw the need for an improved public works programme. While the manner in which the work was accomplished was a contentious point, the results could not be ignored.

226 W. D. Wrigley, "Dissension in the Ionian Islands: Colonel Charles James Napier and the Commissioners (1819-1833) ", in Balkan Studies, vol.16, no.1, (1975), pp.17-8. Napier's massive public works programme greatly benefit­ ted from his institution of the corvee. Unfortunately, Adam and Napier were continually at odds as the Lord High Commissioner felt that the corvee alienated all members of society.

227 Pratt, p.115.

0 109 One of the key issues to be analyzed when examining the successes and failures c of the protectorate during this period is the economy. In this area, the British success was not nearly as complete. Agriculture was the main industry in the Ionian

Islands, based on the olive and currant crops. However, the agricultural economy suffered from the system of land tenure

present in the islands: the colonia.

The colonia system has been described as being, "· .. not a lease of land, but a contract entered into between proprietor and cultivator with various stipulations, by which the produce is

divided in stated proportions". 228 The problem with the system was that it discouraged investment, was grossly inefficient, and created animosity between the proprietor and the cultivator. Adam, commenting on the system, noted that, "The want of

capital ... the absurd laws which exist as to the mode in which the property is held ... prevent that improvement which is to be wished

for". 229

228 C.O. 68, Memorandum by Wood, 30 October 1831, cited in Hannell, p.111.

229 C.O. 22, Adam to Bathurst, 13 July 1824, cited in Hannell, p.112.

0 110 Adding to the islands' problems was the fact that the entire agricultural 0 economy was based on two crops; currants and olives. Such dependence had been fostered by the Venetians, who had no desire to expand the Ionian productive capacity. That dependence

was further stimulated by the revolt in Greece, as the Ionian

farmers sought to reap profit from the destruction of the Greek olive and currant crops. While successful during the war, this approach eventually suffered when the Greek farmers recovered, thereby lowering the demand for Ionian products. 230

How did Britain attempt to reform the Ionian economy? Both Hannell and Pratt have noted that the British were ultimately unsuccessful. Hannell describes the British efforts as lacking consistency and co-ordination. The British, he argues, underestimated the various social, climatic and environmental

factors, thereby hampering any attempt to introduce agricultural reform . 231

Tariffs and duties also hurt the Ionian farmer. The export

230 Hannell, p .117.

231 b. d I 1 ., p.119, and Pratt, pp.115-6.

0 111 duties on oil and currants provided the islands with their main source of revenue. However, in imposing those duties, Ionian

exports were made less attractive. During the Greek revolt, this

situation was not as problematic, since the Ionian Islands had a virtual monopoly on the market. However, with the return of the Greek crops, Ionian products were increasingly unattractive to

foreign markets. 232

Why then, if they were so harmful to Ionian agriculture,

would the British impose such severe export duties? The answer lies in the Ionian opposition to direct taxation. The Ionian

populace associated taxation with subjection. The Lord High

Commissioner who imposed taxation, either directly, or indirectly

in the form of an import duty, did so at his own peril. Once Greece achieved its independence, the situation grew more troublesome. Anxious not to alienate the Ionian populace, the government continua1ly avoided taxation. They feared that such a measure would result in Ionian overtures to the Greeks for assistance, who in turn would seek Russian support.

232 Hannell, p.121.

0 112 Consequently, the Ionian c economy was a victim of diplomacy. 233 A second reason for such high export duties may be found in the cost of the protectorate. The British adminstration was hardly inexpensive. When one accounted for the maintenance of the military establishment, the salaries of the British

officials, all of whom were well paid, and the general expenses

of government, the total came to a third of all revenue. 234 As this cost could not be met through taxation, the only other

source was export duties. As Appendix III illustrates, those duties were clearly the government's greatest source of revenue . 235

Napier openly criticized the fiscal management of the Ionian Islands. In a chapter entitled, "The Ionian Islands ought not to

be an expense 236 to England" , he prosed numerous fiscal reforms, which he argued would make the Ionian Islands a fiscally

233 Pratt, p.117.

234 Revenues and Expenditures of the Ionian Islands, cited in Sessional Papers 1821 (591) xxiii.63. For a full breakdown from 1817 to 1819, see Appendix III. 235 Ibid., p.63.

236 Cited in The Colonies, pp.24-37.

0 113 responsible, and self-supporting body. However, as is so often the case, Napier's 0 recommendations were given scant attention.

For the duration of the protectorate, and particularly the period of study here, the Ionian economy never really benefitted from the British administration the way the population had hoped. While undoubtedly there was an improvement, it was severely limited.

The social, political, and economic reforms initiated during the British protectorate achieved varying degrees of success.

Without question, the lower classes greatly benefitted from the judicial reforms instituted under the Constitutional Chart. For the first time in the modern history of the Ionian Islands, there was an effort to make all citizens equal before the law. The same success may be found in education. The efforts of Lord Guildford resulted in a dramatically expanded educational system that benefitted all members of the population. Those

advancements were capped of by the founding of the Ionian Academy in 1824.

The public works initiated by the Corfu administration

provided a much needed improvement to the transportation lines on

0 114 the islands, which undoubtedly aided the agricultural sector. However, 0 as shown, this sector never really benefitted from the British adminstration to any real degree. Mismanagement and the realities imposed by the Ionian aversion to taxation forced the

government to rely on high export duties, which ultimately

inhibited any growth in the agricultural economy. It has also been shown that diplomatic concerns often inhibited the Corfu

administration's ability to effectively deal with economic

problems. Those concerns will now be further discussed.

115 Chapter VII: "The Ionian Islands and c British Strategy, 1815-1831" The Ionian Islands were acquired for two purposes. First, to keep them clear of Russian influence, and second to provide

the Royal Navy with a base in the eastern Mediterranean. 237 As they had been for centuries under Venetian rule, and had changed

hands several times during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, they had no experience of independence in modern times.

Nevertheless, the authoritarian powers given to the Lord High Commissioner were resented by the Ionian aristocracy, who had been allowed to manage local affairs under Venetian rule.

At the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris, British

interests, both commercial and political, seemed best served by maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This, it was considered, provided reasonably favourable conditions for British commerical interests, and offered insurance against Russia becoming too powerful in the Levant. The explosion of

nationalist sentiment in Greece threatened to upset that balance

that Britain had sought to maintain.

237 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 24 December 1814, cited in Correspondance. despatches ... , vol.x, pp.224-5.

0 116 The outbreak 0 of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 left the British Foreign Office with the need to reconcile growing

British public sympathy with the Greek cause, and the concern for British interests in the Near East. On the one hand, there were the British volunteers, the most notable being Richard Church,

Thomas Cochrane, and of course Lord Byron. On the other hand was the danger of an independent Greece becoming a Russian dominated state. The apparent danger of Russian influence was underlined

by the emergence of John Capodistria, a native of Corfu, and a former member of the Russian Foreign Ministry, as President of a Greek republic. This employment of an Ionian in the most senior post in the Greek resistence movement raised the spectre of a Russian dominated state, ultimately demanding the annexation of the Ionian Islands. Adding strength to those fears was the fact that Capodistria had appointed various Ionians to posts in his fledgling administration.

Upon closer examination, it appears that the fears of Sir Frederick Adam, who succeeded Maitland as Lord High Commissioner

in 1824, were unfounded. First, Capodistria no longer maintaned

his Russian ties, as Tsar Nicholas I attested. Secondly, the

0 117 appointment of Ionian Greeks to Capodistria's government was a practical 0 measure, not a political one. As Wrigley notes, the

Ionians were the best educated Greeks, and Capodistria hoped that they would help him to develop a sound, efficient bureaucracy. 238

In examining British strategy and the Ionian Islands, it is important to understand how British fears would not have been so intense if the Porte had retained control of the Morean coast. In facing the Ionian Islands, the Morean coast offered an

excellent point from which an enemy could lauch an attack against them. As such an attack would be unlikely from the Turks, their

possession of this area would have assuaged the fears of Britsh authorities in both London and Corfu, particularly since British shipping had never been seriously threatened by the Turks during the war. However, the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino virtually eliminated any chance the Turks had of

retaining 239 control of the coast. The result was such that British action resulted in Britsh apprehension. By effectively

238 Wrigley, "The Ionian Islands and the Advent of the Greek State ... ", p.420. The Ionian Greeks had been educated at the Ionian Academy, as well as various Italian universities. 239 Ibid., pp.422-3.

0 118 destroying the naval capabilities of the Ottoman Empire, Great ' c Britian had opened up the possibilty of a hostile power controlling the Morean coast, and threatening their hold on the

Ionian Islands.

The presence of Ionian Greeks in the new Greek government

was also a direct consequence of British policy. Their presence

there may be attributed in no small part to their virtual

exclusion from the political management of the Ionian Islands

through Maitland's Constitutional Chart. General dissatisfaction

with its authoritarian nature p~pted many member of the

aristocracy to leave the islands as soon as hostilities broke out

in mainland Greece. Having been deprived of the power they

weilded under the Venetian and Septinsular Republics, the Ionian

aristrocracy expressed their frustration by joining Capodistria's

movement.

The Ionian Islands were an important part of British

strategy from 1815 to 1831. In possessing the islands in 1815,

Britain denied Russia the opportunity of acquiring a strategic

position in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, possession of the

islands allowed Britain to monitor and influence events in the

0 119 Levant, so as to mainain a balance of power favourable to their interests. The independence of Greece disrupted those plans. The retreat of Turkish power in the Balkans was greated by Great Britain with apprehension. It raised fears that Russia would, through Greece, move to enhance its position in the Mediterranean.

In October 1831, John Capodistria was murdered. 240 His death almost immediately eliminated all British fears of a Hellenic­ Russian alliance that would direct its attention towards the British presence in the eastern Mediterranean, namely the Ionian Islands. The establishment of a monarchy in Greece, with a German prince on the throne a year later, made Britain feel secure in the knowledge that Russian advancement into the Levant had been checked. Henceforth, the strategic importance of the islands declined, and Britain looked towards eventually relieving itself of the increasingly ernbarassing and unpopular protectorate.

In order to maintain the strategic integrity of the Ionian

240 Woodhouse, Capodistria, p. 426.

120 Islands, the British attempted to reform the administrative

0 practices that had developed over centuries of Venetian rule. The Treaty of Paris stipulated that a constitution had to be drawn up, so as to make the islands "· .. a single, free and

independent state ... " 241 under British protection. To that end, Maitland drafted the Constitutional Chart. While its authoritarian nature has already been discussed, it is important to note how the restriction of aristocratic power resulted in a more equitible judicial system, and general improvement in the lives of the people. The introduction of the island Residents, of whom Napier was the most notable, created a more efficient

administration, and provided the Lord High Commissioner with a means through which he could monitor activity throughout the Greek revolt.

As a naval base, the islands, of which Corfu was the most

useful, were of decreasing imporatnce. As the cnetury wore on, ~ it would appear that the needs of the Royal Navy in the

Mediterranean, for coaling stations and refurbishment, would be

241 Treaty between the Allied Powers respecting the Ionian Islands, cited in British Foreign and State Papers 1815- 1816 , (London , 18 3 8 ) , p . 2 55 .

0 121 0 met by Malta. 242

By 1831, the strategic value of .the Ionian Islands was

minimal. From 1815 to 1831, they had effectively their purpose. ~ Russia had been denied the opportunity of establishing itself as a power in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the protecorate had allowed Britain to monitor events during the Greek War of Independence from a unique vantage point. When Britain was ultimately forced to act, the Ionian Islands were able to provide the Foreign Office with a wealth of knowledge and insight that would, in part, guide British actions so as to effectivle lay the foundations for a new balance of power that would continue to serve Britain's commercial and political interests, and protect

their Mediterranean hegemony.

The period from 1815 to 1831 was of immense importance in Europe. After over twenty years of war, it was hoped that peace

242 Desmond Gregory, "A Defence Policy for the Ionian Islands", in Journal of the Society for Army Histor­ ical Resseach, vol.64, (1986), pp.32-3. The obselescence of the islands was illustrated in 1859, when during the course of war between Sardinia, France and Austria, the French fleet sailed past Corfu under the power of steam, without any of the island's authorities knowing.

0 122 would be given a chance prevail. As far as Great Britain was c concerned, peace was equivelent to a balance of power that

favoured their Levantine interests. The protecorate of the

Ionian Islands was viewed as a means through which that balance

could be maintained. It would allow Britain to check Russian

expansion into the Mediterranean, protect the overland route to

India, and monitor the decay of the Ottoman Empire, particularly

through the Greek War of Independence.

In 1814, Castlereah noted that the importance in possessing

the Ionian Islands was, "· .. not to suffer Russia to acquire any

establishment in those islands". 243 His wisdom prevailed, and

Russia was denied any opportunity of establishing itself in the

Mediterranean. British hegemony was proteceted, and remained

unchallenged.

243 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 24 december 1814, cited in Correspondance. despatches ... , vol.x, pp.224-5.

0 123 AJ;>pendix I I

G l;RMAN EMPIRE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

• 0 Appendix II "The Lord High Commissioners of the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864"

1815-1824 Sir Thomas Maitland 1824-1832 Sir Frederick Adam 1832-1835 Lord Nugent 1835-1841 Howard Douglas 1841-1843 Lord Mackenzie 1843-1849 Lord Seaton 1849-1855 H. Ward 1855-1858 John Young 18591 W.E. Gladstone 1859-1864 Henry Storks

1 Gladstone only served as Lord High Commissioner for two 0 weeks. Appendix III

"'-' "Reveunes and Expenditure of the Ionian Islands, 1817-1819"1

REVENUE

Customs/Duty 223 619 318 446 194 822' on oil exports2

Currants 57 220 94 852 71 677

Rents on Public 11 251 24 925 Lands/Buildings 20 431

Tithes 10 429 12 876 15 648

Salines 13 217 17 024 10 223

Fisheries 2 022 2 221 1 405

Tobacco 21 229 19 861 21 236

Wine/Spirits 19 698 24 842 18 014

Minor Duties 9 941 15 137 on Cattle 22 955

Tonnage and 9 437 12 532 Port Duties 11 654

1 "Revenues and Expenditures of the Ionian Islands, 1817- 1819", cited in Sessional Papers, 1821 (591), xxiii.63.

2 NQI1i: The oil c.rop occurs biennially, and therefore shows in the 0 accounts, every second year (1818) . Valonia Sold 0 599 3 737 2 274

Incidental 12 356 68 784 43 089

EXPENDITURE

Civil Estab­ 365 893 237 423 236 553 lishment of General Local Gov' t 3

Military 74 465 51 671 Expenses

Public Works 23 353 26 104

Public Quarters 30 255 23 483

Sanitary 4 612 1 370

Incidental 68 202 64 055

TOTALS

Revenue 391 018 615 237 433 428

Expenditure 365 893 438 310 403 236

3 In 1817, all expenditures fell under the category of the 11 0 Civil Establishment of the General and Local Government". Introduction to the Bibliography

A study of the British administration of the Ionian Islands

is essentially a study of Britain's foreign and colonial policy in the nineteenth century. To that end, there are numerous

sources, both primary and secondary, which are invaluable to any analysis of this period.

Beginning with the primary materials available for research, the most valuable information may be found in the Ionian papers of the Colonial Office, (C.0.136), located in the Public Records

Office in London. In addition to Colonial Office documents, the Admiralty papers (Adm.l) provide useful information on Ionian

shipping, while the Foreign Office papers include records on Greece and Turkey (F.0.32, 286, and 78), as well as the Stratford

Canning papers (F.0.352).

The Sessional Papers of the British Parliament contain numerous documents relative to the Corfu administration. A complete listing may be found in the General Index of the Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers, pub- lished in Shannon, 1968. For the purposes of this study, the Sessional Papers 0 contained a copy of the Constitutional Chart, (1818.xvii.1), various proclamations of Sir Thomas Maitland,

0 (1822.xx.517), as well as correspondence relative to the Ionian Islands, (1822.xx.511). Furthermore, any study of Ionian finances would not be complete without a breakdown of the

revenues and expenditures of the Ionian Islands from 1819 to

1821, (1819-20.iv.337 and 1821.xxiii.63).

Hansard contains many numerous debates relative to the Ionian Islands, including the parliamentary discussions on the cession of Parga, and the British role in the Greek revolt, up to and including the battle of Navarino. Complimenting Hansard are the British and Foreign State Papers, (B.F.S.P.), which contain

many of the various protocols, treaties, and proclamations made by Great Britain and her European allies, relative to the

islands, as well those made during the Greek revolt. For those documents not found in the B.F.S.P., the works of Hertslet, Hurst, Israel, and Deak and Jessup, are the best sources to be consulted.

In addition to the government papers already mentioned, a wealth of autobiographical and personal testimonies exist, which provide interesting insight into this period in history. The most notable c:J of those include the works by Colonel C.P. de Bosset, one of the principle figures involved in the Parga debate. His article in the Quarterly Review, and his book entitled Proceedings in Parga and the Ionian Islands are invaluable to any study of that event. Furthermore, Vane's

collection of Castlereagh's personal correspondence provides some interesting insight into the treaty negotiations in 1815.

Any analysis of the battle of Navarino would be incomplete

without the use of Lady Bourchier's Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, which contains virtually all of her father's correspondence relative to the battle. In addition to her work, e.G. Pitcairn Jones' Piracy in the Levant. 1827-8: Selected from the Papers of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington,

published by the Navy Records Society, is an excellent primary analysis of Hellenic piracy, and the Royal Navy's response to it.

C.J. Napier's The Colonies: treating of their value

generally and of the Ionian Islands in particular provides an excellent contrast between Maitland and Adam, although due to Napier's relationship with Adam, it is generally favourable

towards Maitland. Still, as the British Resident on Cephalonia,

Napier's observations, particularly on the economic value of the islands, are 0 of immense value to any student of the protectorate. The newspapers consulted were useful in illustrating the popularity of Philhellenist c rhetoric and opinion. Both The Times

and the Morning Chronicle thoroughly monitored the activity of the London Greek Committee, and therefore are invaluable to any study of British public opinion of the Greek War of Independence.

Of all the secondary sources of use to a study of this period, none is more generally acknowledged as being essential

than J.J. Tumelty's unpublished PhD. thesis, entitled "The Ionian Islands under British Administration, 1815-1864" (Cambridge,

1952). Unfortunately, this study was not available for

consultation in Canada. In its absence, several notable works

stand out as being equally important for any study of Ionian

history during this period.

The foremost author in the field at present is W.D. Wrigley, whose book and numerous articles thoroughly trace Britain's

involvement in the Ionian Islands. Each of his works listed in the bibliography must be deemed key. In addition to Wrigley,

there are numerous standard sources which should be consulted. They include Crawley's The Question of Greek Independence,

Temperly's The Foreign Policy of Canning, and Webster's works on the c:J foreign policy of both Castlereagh and Palmerston. Looking at the Ionian Islands in particular, Michael Pratt's Britain's Greek c Empire is perhaps the best secondary source on the history of the Ionian Islands, making use of Tumelty's thesis as well as all the available documents found in the Public Records Office. Another useful source is Henry Jervis-White

Jervis' History of Corfu and the Republic of the Ionian Islands,

which contains numerous primary documents in its appendices, in addition to providing a strong narrative on Ionian history.

There is a wealth of biographical material available for any analysis of this period. Among those of importance are the two on Sir Thomas Maitland, by Lord and Dixon, Lane-Poole's account

of the life of Richard Church, and Woodhouse's Capodistria. In addition to those biographies, there are numerous general

histories of British Colonial policy in this period, and they are listed in the bibliography.

Lastly, the naval and defence aspect of this study relied heavily on Bartlett's Great Britain and Sea Power, 1815-53, a standard for any analysis of the Royal Navy after the Napoleonic

Wars. In addition to Bartlett, the works of Anderson, Hughes,

Kennedy, and of course Mahan, were invaluable. Anderson and Woodhouse each c:J provide complete accounts of the battle of Navarino, which make excellent companions to the primary source

discussion of that event.

In summary, there is a wealth of material avaliable through which an analysis of the British administration of the Ionian Islands may be undertaken. Furthermore, that material, in combination with the gerneal histories of the period, allow one to accurately illustrate British colonial and foreign policy in

the early nineteenth century for the Mediterranean.

0 c Bibliography Primary Sources:

Ansted, D.T. The Ionian Islands in the Year 1863. London, 1863.

de Bosset, C.P. "Proceedings in Parga, and the Ionian Islands, with a series of Correspondence and other justificatory Documents", in Quarterly Review, no.23 (1820), pp.111-137.

------Proceedings in Parga and the Ionian Islands. London, 1821.

Bourchier, Lady, ed .. Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington. 2 vols. London, 1873.

British and Foreign State Papers. vols.2-18. London, 1838.

Canning, Stratford Viscount. The Eastern Question. London, 1881.

Cochrane, Thomas. The Autobiography of a Seaman. London, 1861.

Deak, Francis, and Jessup, Philip C., eds .. A Collection of Neutrality Laws. Regulations and Treaties of Various Count­ ~. vol.1. Washington, 1939.

Goodisson, William. "A Historical and Topographical Essay Upon the Islands of Corfu, Leucadia, Cephalonia, Ithaca and Zante; with Remarks upon the Character, Manners and Customs of the Ionian Greeks: Descriptions of the Scenery and Remains of Antiquity discovered therein; and Reflexions upon the Cyclopean Ruins", in Quarterly Review vol.29, (1823) 1 pp.86-116.

Hansard. 21 May 1816, 1st series, vol.34, pp.636-642. 26 May 1819, 1st series, vol. 40, p.812. 15 June 1819, 1st series, vol.40, p.1177. 23 Feb. 1821, 2nd series, vol.4, pp.933-937. 7 June 1821, 2nd series, vol.S, pp.1128-1149. 14 May 1822, 2nd series, vol.7, pp.562-596. 14 Feb. 1828, 2nd series, vol.18, pp.360-422. 0 20 March 1848, 3rd series, vol.97, p.780. Harlow, Vincent and Frederick Madden, eds .. British Colonial Developments, 1774-1834. select documents. Oxford, 1953.

Hertslet, Edward. The Map of Europe by Treaty. vols.I-II. London, 1875.

Hurst, Michael ed .. Key Treaties for the Great Powers. 1814- ~- vol.1 (1814-70), London, 1972.

Israel, Fred L., ed. Major Peace Treaties of Modern History. vol.1, New York, 1967.

Jones, C.G. Pitcairn, ed .. Piracy in the Levant, 1827-8: Sel­ ected from the Papers of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington. K.C.B .. London, 1934.

Napier, C.J. The Colonies: treating of their value generally and of the Ionian Islands in particular. London, 1833.

Sessional Papers. 1816 (140) xii.551.- 1818 (132) xvii.1. 1819-20 (87) iv.337. 1821 (591) xxiii.63 1822 (375) xx.511, 517. 1834 (570) vi.200

Schuman, Donald M. "Unpublished Letters of Lord Guildford", in Ellenika, vol.41, no.1, (1990), pp.59-77.

Substance of Sir Thos. Maitland's Address to the Legislative As­ sembly of the Ionian Islands, 4 March 1822, Redpath Tracts. vol.34, McGill University, Montreal, 1903.

Temperly, Harold and Lillian Penson. Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902), or Documents old and new. Cambridge, 1938.

Tsitsonis, S.E. "An unpublished Report (1858) by W.E. Gladstone on the Political Situation and the Administrative System in the Seven Islands, 1815-58", in Balkan Studies, vol.21, (1980-1) 1 pp.287-327.

Vane, Charles William, ed .. Correspondence. despatches, and other papers of Viscount Castlereagh. vols.x-xii. London, 0 1852. de Vaudoncourt, Guillaume. Memoirs of the Ionian Islands. William Walter, trans. London, 1816.

Newspapers:

Morning Chronicle. 4 October 1821, and 16 May 1823.

The Times. 29 September 1821.

Secondary Sources:

Anderson, R.C. Naval Wars in the Levant. 1559-1865. London, 1952.

Bartl~tt, C.J. Great Britain and Sea Power. 1815-53. Oxford, 1963.

Castlreagh. London, 1966.

Defence and Diplomacy. London, 1993.

Church, E.M. Chapters in an Adventurous Life: Sir Richard Church in Itlay and Greece. London, 1895.

Clogg, Richard, ed., The Struggle for Greek Independence. London, 1973.

Cochrane, Thomas and Bourne, H.R. Fox. The Life of Thomas. Lord Cochrane. 2 vols. London, 1869.

Corbett, Sir Julian. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London, 1972.

Crawley, C.W. The Question of Greek Independence. New York, 1973.

Dakin, Douglas. The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923. London, 0 1972. Dixon, c. Willis. The Colonial Administration of Sir Thomas G Maitland. London, 1939 Dorman, Marcus. A History of the British Empire in the Nineteen- th Century. 2 vols. London, 1904.

Everlsey, Lord. The Turkish Empire; Its Growth and Decay. London, 1917.

Fleming, David C. John Capodistrias and the Conference of Lon­ don (1828-1831). Thessaloniki, 1970.

Fortescue, J.W. Dundonald. London, 1895.

Foss, Arthur. The Ionian Islands. London, 1969.

Geanakoplos, Deno J. "The Diaspora Greeks; The Genesis of Mod­ ern Greek N~tional Consciousness", in Hellenism and the First Gre~~r of Liberation (1821-1830); Continuity and Change, John A. Petropulos, ed.. Thessaloniki, 1976.

Gleason, John Howes. The Genesis of Eussophobia in Great Britain. London, 1950.

Graham, Gerald S. The Politics of Naval Supremacy. Cambridge, 1965.

Grant, A.J. Europe in the Nineteenth Century. London, 1931. Gregory, D. "A defense policy for the Ionian Islands", in Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. vol. 64, no.1. (1986), pp.24-33.

Hughes, Quentin. Britain in the Mediterranean & the defence of of her nayal stations. Liverpool, 1981.

James, William. The Naval History of Great Britain. vols.4-5. London, 1860.

Jervis, Henry Jervis-White. History of the Island of Corfu and the Republic of the Ionian Islands. London, 1852.

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. 0 London, 1976. Lane-Poole, Stanley. Sir Richard Church. London, 1890. Lord, Walter Frewen. Sir Thomas Maitland and the Mastery of the Mediterranean. New York, 1897.

------England and France in the Mediterranean. 1660-1830. London, 1901.

The Lost Possessions of England. London, 1896.

Mahan, A.T. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. London, 1889.

------The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolu­ tion and Empire 1793-1812. 2 vols. London, 1992 Napier, Sir W. The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier. 4 vols. London, 1857

Pratt, Michael. Britain's Greek Empire. London, 1978. Rosen, F. Bentham. Byron. and Greece: Constitutionalism. Nat­ ionalism. and Early Liberal Political Thought. Oxford, 1992.

Schevill, Ferdinand. The Balkan Peninsula and the Near East. Chicago, 1922.

St. Clair, William. That Greece Might Still be Free. London, 1972.

Stapleton, A.G. Canning and His Times. London, 1859.

Temperley, Harold. Life of Canning. London, 1905.

The Foreign Policy of Canning. 1822-1827. London, 1925.

England and the Near East: the Crimea. London, 1964.

Thompson, Neville. "The British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands and the Greek War of Independence, 1815-1827", in The Concortium on Revoltionary Europe. 1750-1850: Proceed­ ings. 0 1993. Ellen Evans and John W. Rooney, Jr., eds .. Miami, 1994, pp.302-311.

Twitchett, c E.G. Life of a Seaman; Thomas Cochrane. lOth Earl of Dundonlad. London, 1931.

Webster, Charles K. The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh. London, 1925.

------The Foreign Policy of Palmerston. 1830-1841. 2 vols. New York, 1969.

Woodhouse, C.M. Capodistria. London, 1973.

The Battle of Navarino. London, 1965.

The Greek War of Independence. London, 1951.

Wrigley, W.D. The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality. 1821-31. New York, 1988.

------"The Neutrality of Ionian Shipping and its Enforce­ ment During the Greek Revolution (1821-1831) ", in The Mariner's Mirror. vol.73, no.3. (1987), pp.245-258.

------"The British Enforcement of Ionian Neutrality Again­ st Greek and Turkish Refugees, 1821-1828; A Study in Selec­ tivity", in Sudost Forschungen. vol.46. (1987), pp.95-112.

------"The Issue of Ionian Neutrality in Angle-Ottoman Relations, 1821-1830", in Sudost-Forschungen. vol.47. (1988) 1 pp,l09-143.

------"Dissention in the Ionian Islands; Colonel Charles James Napier and the Commissioners (1819-1833) ", in Balkan Studies. ~ol.16, no.l. (1975), pp.ll-22.

------"The Ionian Islands and the Advent of the Greek State (1827-1833) ", in Balkan Studies. vol.19, no.2. (1978) 1 pp.413-426.

Young, Martin. Corfu and the Other Ionian Islands. London, 1971. 0