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Feminist Perspectives: from Science to Art

FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES: FROM TO ART

A Thesis submitted to the faculty of

Z o \ < l San Francisco State University

In partial fulfillment of

the requirements for

the Degree

Master of Arts

In

Philosophy

by

Hilda Loury

San Francisco, California

August 2018 Copyright by

HILDA LOURY CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read Feminist Perspectives: From Science to Art by Hilda Loury, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in at San Francisco

State University.

Professor

Professor FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES: FROM SCIENCE TO ART

Hilda Loury

San Francisco, California

2018

I offer a taxonomy to situate various positions in the spectrum of feminist perspectives on both science and art. I defend the contention that feminist perspectives are crucially important for the empirical because they have promoted and generated more reflexive bodies of scientific . My thesis is, since the fields of science and art are relevantly similar - they share epistemic, representational, and interpretive characteristics and objectives that are relevant in the application of feminist perspectives from science to art - feminist perspectives have been and will continue to be crucially important in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice. Feminist perspectives promote and generate more reflexive theories of art, beauty, taste, and value as well as contribute to more advancement, diversity, and inclusion throughout the artworld.

I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis. AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work dedicated to my , Flora. My gratitude for her labor, love, and wisdom is beyond language. Thank you for everything, . ?jE ££**j J

I thank my committee, Dr. Anita Silvers and Dr. Shelley Wilcox, for their sharp and insightful feedback, for continuously advocating on my behalf, and for the countless conversations and hours they dedicated to guiding my personal and professional growth.

I am also indebted to the many professors and mentors who have inspired or supported my journey of navigating through the landscape of in one way or another: J.

Armstrong, M. Azadpur, D. Deaver, J. Granitto, G. Greenberg, S. Goering, V. Keyser, W.

Lennertz, D. Lopes, C. Montemayor, M. Pimentel, A. Sowaal, J. Viveros, and C. Whitley.

My hope is to offer my future students and mentees the support they readily offered me.

Finally, I am grateful for the women who have come before me and for the women who will come after me. You are my greatest inspiration. TABLE OF CONTENTS

0. Introduction...... 1

1. Feminist Perspectives on Science...... 6

1.1. Soft Perspectives on Science...... 8

Equity in Science...... 9

Correcting Omissions in Science...... 14

1.2. Hard Perspectives on Science...... 20

Correcting Conceptual Distortions in Science...... 21

Restructuring Methodology in Science...... 25

2. Science and A rt...... 35

3. Feminist Perspectives on Art...... 45

3.1. Soft Perspectives on Art...... 47

Equity in A rt...... 48

Correcting Omissions in Art...... 51

3.2. Hard Perspectives on Art...... 55

Correcting Conceptual Distortions in Art...... 56

Restructuring Methodology and Traditional Theories in Art...... 62

4. Conclusion...... ,...... 81

5. Bibliography...... 82 1

0. Introduction

The application of feminist perspectives on science have generated new theories, questions, and methodology that complicate and illuminate our understanding of empirical truth and how it is acquired. The primary contribution of this thesis is to extrapolate the merits of feminist perspectives on science onto art. 1 show how feminist perspectives on art, like those on science, generate new theories, questions, and methodology that complicate and illuminate both theory and practice within aesthetics.

In the first section, 1 offer a taxonomy to situate various positions in the spectrum of feminist perspectives on science. First, 1 clarify my usage of the term “science” to refer to the empirical sciences, i.e. the sciences that employ the : physical science, life science, and social science. Additionally, 1 distinguish between what I refer to as “soft” and “hard” feminist perspectives. Soft feminist perspectives on science embrace or defend traditional systems in scientific research yet are interested in critically expanding on traditional research programs. In other words, there are lacunae in research programs - both in terms of the practitioners of scientific research and the content of their research targets - that ought to be filled in order to improve diversity and inclusion and encourage a more accurate, comprehensive, and nuanced body of scientific research. 1 focus my discussion on two soft feminist perspectives: concerns about equity and concerns about correcting omissions. In the section on equity in science, 1 offer statistics regarding the 2

disparity within the sciences, which is sometimes referred to as the leaky pipeline problem, and touch on issues regarding epistemic injustice and implicit bias contributing to the inhospitable and discouraging epistemic and social climate within the sciences. In the section on correction omissions in traditional bodies of scientific research, I offer examples of remedial research programs in both clinical research about female bodies and statistical data regarding hard-to-reach populations. I argue that there are at least three epistemic and social benefits to advocating for soft feminist perspectives in the sciences: greater representation, alternate hermeneutical standpoints, and more accurate and precise research.

On the other hand, hard feminist perspectives on science argue that soft feminist perspectives are insufficiently critical and that a radical conceptual shift must occur for true advancement, diversity, and inclusion within the sciences. I focus my discussion on two hard feminist perspectives: correcting conceptual distortions and restructuring scientific systems. In the section on correcting conceptual distortions in science, I offer examples regarding fallacious gender-based associations, namely in primatology in research on baboon populations, paleoanthropology in research on hunter-gatherer societies, and in research on sperm and egg cell interaction. In the section on restructuring scientific systems, I clarify my usage of the terms methods, methodology, and .

I show that “restructuring scientific systems” essentially means “restructuring scientific 3

methodology.” Restructuring scientific methodology involves four commitments, as outlined by contemporary feminist philosophers of science: relevance, experiential grounding (as well as the significance of what I refer to as “social identity-linked experience”), accountability, and reflexivity. Finally, I argue against the objection that hard feminist perspectives collapse into epistemic relativity and defend the position that hard feminist perspectives promote a more accurate, comprehensive, nuanced, and useful body o f scientific research.

In the second section of this thesis, I demonstrate how the fields of science and art are relevantly similar - they share epistemic, representational, and interpretive characteristics and objectives - in order to extrapolate what I have argued are the merits of feminist perspectives of science onto art. I propose that both science and art offer information about the world, albeit through different means and methods, and that the epistemic characteristic of each is influenced by how humans observe and reason. In other words, science and art share epistemic, representational, and interpretative characteristics that are relevant in the application of feminist perspectives from science to art.

In the third section of this thesis, I turn to feminist perspectives on art. I argue that the soft feminist perspectives, i.e. equity and correcting omissions, and the hard feminist perspectives, i.e. correcting conceptual distortions and restructuring methodology, have and will continue to benefit both theory and practice in art. First, I distinguish between what I 4

refer to as “aesthetic theorizing” and “art practice.” Aesthetic theorizing refers to the activity of reasoning, or at the very least reflecting, about fundamental questions underpinning aesthetics, such as those regarding the of art, beauty, value, and taste, etc. Art practice refers to the activity of generating art as well as the normative activity of evaluating art. Second, in the section on equity in aesthetics, I offer statistics regarding the gender disparity in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice and touch on the inhospitable epistemic and social climate in the artworld as revealed through activist movements like

“Me Too” and “Times Up.” In the section on correction omissions in aesthetics, I discuss the significance of the “By-ForAbout” model, i.e. storytelling by members of marginalized groups, about the lives of members of said marginalized groups, intended for members of said marginalized groups.

Then, I turn to the hard feminist perspectives. In the section on correcting conceptual distortions within aesthetics, I offer examples of fallacious gender-based associations in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice: the distinction between “high art” and “craft,” the historical definition of “genius,” the use of reductive or sexist tropes, the

Bechdel Test, and the problem of the “.” Finally, in the section on restructuring systems in aesthetics, I show how the four commitments of feminist methodology in science - relevance, experiential grounding, accountability, and reflexivity - are useful in examining theories in aesthetics. I show how the feminist methodological commitments 5

complicate, illuminate, and generate new questions in both traditional and influential

theories within aesthetics, e.g. Hume’s standard of taste and Kant’s theory of beauty, in

addition to the contemporary and burgeoning field of neuroaesthetics.

In conclusion, I offer a taxonomy to situate various positions in the spectrum of

feminist perspectives on both science and art. I defend the contention that feminist

perspectives are crucially important for the empirical sciences because they have promoted

and generated more accurate, comprehensive, nuanced, and useful bodies of scientific

research. My thesis is, since the fields of science and art are relevantly similar - they share

epistemic, representational, and interpretive characteristics and objectives that are relevant

in the application of feminist perspectives from science to art - feminist perspectives have been and will continue to be crucially important in both aesthetic theorizing and art

practice. Feminist perspectives promote and generate more accurate, comprehensive,

nuanced, and useful theories of art, beauty, taste, and value as well as contribute to more advancement, diversity, and inclusion throughout the artworld. 6

1. Feminist Perspectives on Science

“It is a delusion - and a historically identifiable one - to

think that human thought could completely erase the

fingerprints that reveal its production process.” - Sandra

Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is ‘Strong

ObjectivityI1

It would be a mistake to conceptualize feminist perspectives on science as monolithic; not all are created equal. While it is correct that most feminist theorists share the objective of liberating women - and hopefully, other marginalized groups - from oppressive systems and practices, the details of what that liberation involves or how it must be achieved are multifarious and the subject of debate.

First, in order to offer an analysis of feminist perspectives on science, I define which disciplines I refer to as “science.” The scientific disciplines of interest are those that employ the scientific method, which is generally as follows: a question is asked and a hypothesis is formulated, an experiment is designed and executed, data are collected, data

1 , “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is ‘Strong ?" The Centennial Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, (Michigan University Press, 1992), 437-470. 7

are interpreted, and a tentative conclusion is drawn.2 In other words, the scientific disciplines of interest are those that are empirical, i.e. subject to and experimentation. Three of the four major branches of science - physical science (e.g. , ), life science (e.g. biology, , ), and social science (e.g. anthropology, archaeology, , , ) - use the scientific method. I refer to these as the empirical sciences. The fourth branch of science, formal science (e.g. , ) is not empirical, but theoretical or “pure.”3 As posited in the quote by

Harding, the epistemic processes of humans influence all stages of the scientific method, and hence, the empirical sciences at-large. One goal of adopting a feminist perspective is to acknowledge and neutralize those epistemic processes where possible, while still upholding intellectual rigor and robust standards for scientific research. The epistemic, representational, and interpretative processes of humans evident throughout the scientific method are of critical interest and will occupy much of the discussion in this thesis.

In the next section, I parse the strengths and weaknesses of various positions within the spectrum of feminist perspectives on science, which range from what I refer to as “soft” feminist perspectives - approaches that aim to maintain traditional systems in the sciences while critically expanding on them - and “hard” feminist perspectives - approaches that

2 The conclusion is tentative because scientific conclusions are always subject to revision. 3 It is not the case that feminist perspectives have no bearing on formal science; I provide an example of the possibility of situatedness in physics in section two. However, it is the case that the empirical sciences are much more vulnerable to bias and situatedness, and thus, the critique of feminist perspectives since they use the scientific method. aim to reconceptualize traditional content or restructure traditional systems in the sciences.4

1.1. Soft Perspectives on Science

“With their limited access to the professional training,

resources, mentoring, and social networks of men, women

have occasionally asked different questions, used different

methods, and come up with different explanations for

phenomena in the natural world. Their marginal status in

institutional science afforded their altogether different

relationship to the nature they observed.” - Julie Des

Jardins, The Madame Curie Complex: The Hidden History of

Women in Science.5

Soft feminist perspectives on science embrace or defend traditional systems in scientific research yet are interested in critically expanding on traditional research

4 1 am aware that the term “soft” evokes about weakness or and “hard” evokes stereotypes about strength or masculinity. Suggestions for a less hypocritical pair of terms are welcome. 5 Julie Des Jardins, The Madame Curie Complex: The Hidden History of . (The Feminist Press the City University of New York 2010). 9

programs. There are at least two types of soft feminist perspectives: concerns about equity and concerns about omission.6

First, concerns about equity in science aim at understanding or balancing disproportionate demographics within the sciences. The statistical data of the National

Center for Science and Statistics (NCSES) reported in 2014 that despite women and men in the US earning roughly the same percentage of science and engineering doctorates, women account for only 35% of professional or decision-making positions within the sciences, e.g. , postsecondary teachers, or academic faculty.7

The label for this phenomenon has been coined as the leaky pipeline problem.8

Why so few women? The following four propositions, some defensive and others more progressive, are often offered reasons for the gender disparity in professional and executive roles within the practice of science.

Internal circumstances:

o Women are incapable of a career in science,

o Women are not interested in a career in science.

6 Sharon Crasnow, Alison Wylie, Wenda K. Bauchspies, and Elizabeth Potter. "Feminist Perspectives on Science," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition). 7 National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NSF). “Women, Minorities, and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering: 2017,” Special Report NSF, 17-310. 8 This term is controversial because some have argued that the “leaky pipeline” metaphor suggests women are only driven out of the sciences due to circumstances beyond their control, and it fails to capture cases where women choose to opt out of a career in science. 10

External circumstances:

o Women are barred from a career in science,

o Women are discouraged by the climate in science.

Most would not take seriously the belief that women are incapable of a career in science despite its ignominious stain upon the (and the history of many other disciplines, philosophy included). From ancient history to modernity, women like

Hypatia of , Hildegard von Bingen, Augusta Ada Byron (Countess of Lovelace), and have been - at the very least posthumously - celebrated for their contributions to philosophy, , and physics (although their names were often eclipsed by , , , and Ernest Rutherford).

Further, many heretofore unrecognized women throughout the twentieth century - such as those who worked on the - spearheaded important work while their male counterparts received credit for their discoveries or eclipsed their fame.

Otherwise, women worked in the labs of men practicing “domestic science” as “assistants, technicians, and helpmeets” or “scientific housekeepers” who “kept records, cleaned equipment, and boosted male morale” - which was, despite their trivialization, important work.9 It is simply not true that women are incapable of practicing science; rather, women

9 Des Jardins, The Madame Curie Complex: The Hidden History of Women in Science, 6-7. 11

are thought to be incapable of practicing science. The lack of women in professional and executive roles within the sciences is less about their abilities as women and more about the prejudices of those who fail to hire them or acknowledge their work. For instance, many studies have corroborated the view that gender bias is pervasive in hiring decisions. A study conducted in 2000 provided evidence for the influence of gender bias in hiring processes when a blind audition for a symphony orchestra resulted in a 30% increase in hired female musicians.10 Further, a study conducted in 2012 provided evidence that, for a laboratory manager position, science faculty participants rated male applicants as more “competent and hirable” than female applicants with identical portfolios, to which the male applicants were more readily offered higher starting salaries and possibilities for career mentoring.11

Moreover, the statistical data of the NCSES deflates the theory that women are simply not interested in a career in science. In 2014 women earned 30% of bachelor’s degrees, 46% of master’s degrees, 42% of doctoral degrees, and 35% of post-doctoral fellowships in the sciences and engineering.12 All things being equal, it could be assumed that degrees are typically pursued with some intention of practicing that discipline or something related as a career. Capacity and interest are present; the problem is beyond women - in their external circumstances.

10 Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse, "Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" Auditions on Female Musicians." The American Economic Review 90.4, 2000, 715-741. 11 Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio, Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark J. Graham, and Jo Handelsman. “Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2012. 12 NSF, “Women, Minorities, and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering.” 12

Historically, women have been excluded from entering the academy. Entering the sciences was an even greater feat, since science has been considered an inherently masculine discipline.13 Instead, women were confined to the private sphere, the oikos, and expected to fulfill their roles as homemakers, , and wives. Despite this, the participation of women in contemporary public life - including the arts, humanities, and sciences - is unprecedented. A number of initiatives - at the levels of government (e.g. H.R.

5305 (96th): Women in Science and Equal Opportunity Act of 1980), academia, and public and private organizations - encourage and support women to enter the STEM fields. Although the historical oppression of women is still very much an obstacle, women are no longer barred from careers in science, but rather, encouraged.

The most plausible explanation is that women are discouraged from pursuing or obtaining professional and executive careers within the sciences, not only due to the implicit biases of hiring committees, but also because of the epistemic and social climate.

Proponents of soft feminist perspectives regarding equity are concerned with understanding the landscape of this epistemic and social climate as well as how to render its conditions as hospitable.

In Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker outlines two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. I focus on testimonial injustice.14

13 Des Jardins, The Madame Curie Complex: The Hidden History of Women in Science, 2. 14 Miranda Fricker. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. (Oxford University Press, 2011). 13

Testimonial injustice occurs when, due to some implicitly or explicitly held identity prejudice, a listener bestows undue credibility inflation or deficit upon the testimony of a speaker. For example, a man may hear the testimony of a with reduced credibility by virtue of his prejudgment about her gender. In other words, he may hold the implicit pre judgment, “The words of women are not to be taken seriously. This speaker is a woman; thus, her words are not to be taken seriously.” On the other hand, a man may hear the testimony of another man with inflated credibility by virtue of his prejudgment about his gender. He may hold the implicit prejudgment, “The words of men are to be taken seriously. This speaker is a man; thus, his words are to be taken seriously.” Implicit

Association Tests (IAT) regularly corroborate the influence of implicit attitudes towards various social identities, including gender.15

Where testimonial injustice and implicit bias occur within disciplines, it is likely that they foster an unwelcoming or inhospitable climate for women within the sciences, among other factors. It would be useful for proponents of eqiiity to understand how internalized credibility inflation or deficit, such as those of women about women, i.e. imposter complex or internalized , internalized credibility inflation by men about men, and inflicted credibility deficit by hiring committees about women affects gender disparity. Women abandoning careers in science results in fewer women as mentors and

15 Anthony G. Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger. “Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations.” California Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 4, (JSTOR 2006), 945-967. 14

fewer women on hiring committees, which likely perpetuates the gender disparity in question through dissuading newcomers from entering an unwelcoming or male- dominated work environment.

***

The second soft feminist perspective involves correcting omissions in traditional scientific research. In the existing body of scientific research there are lacunae that - if filled - would result in a more accurate, comprehensive, and nuanced body of research.

These gaps in research exist for many reasons; the missing content may have been overlooked or considered trivial. “Remedial” research programs sift through existing research in order to locate these gaps in content and understanding. Two examples of correcting omissions in scientific research involve clinical research about female bodies and statistical data regarding women in hard-to-reach populations.

First, an activist movement in the late twentieth century raised awareness about the gender gap within clinical trials. In 2001, the Institute of Medicine, Board on Health

Sciences Policy, and Committee on Understanding the Biology of Sex and Gender

Differences jointly published an article where they argued that sex, the chromosomal arrangement of a biological organism, is an important variable that ought to be considered or controlled for in research.16 Sex differences influence disease prevalence, such as

16 Katherine A. Liu and Natalie A. Dipietro Mager. “Women’s Involvement in Clinical Trials: Historical Perspective and Future Implications.” Pharmacy Practice 14.1, 2016. 15

through disproportionally affecting one sex over another, e.g. breast cancer or prostate cancer; disease expression, e.g. sexually transmitted infections presenting in varying forms or intensities; patient responses, e.g. efficacy or dosage in pharmaceutical prescriptions, etc.

Prior to this movement, the male-sexed body - and usually the white, male-sexed body - had been the dominant demographic in clinical trials, rendering it the “universal body” to extract clinical data and draw conclusions from. The inclusion of women in clinical trials has been critical in better understanding sex-specific disease prevalence, expression, responses, etc.

Second, the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW) in collaboration with the Economic Commission for (ECE) and World Health

Organization (WHO) ordered a report to gather qualitative and quantitative data regarding .17 The report admitted to various omissions in their data due to the perilous nature of the subject; data regarding gender-based violence in hard-to-reach populations, e.g. female genital mutilation, dowry-related violence, violence against refugee women, violence in armed conflict settings, human trafficking, honor killings, etc., is difficult to collect. These populations and their cases are omitted from national surveys for a variety of reasons: cases are hidden, victims lack access or authority to report, perpetrators are unwilling to cooperate, lives are in danger, etc. The initiative by UNDAW suggested

17 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women. "Violence Against Women: A Statistical Overview, Challenges and Gaps in Data Collection and Methodology and Approaches For Overcoming Them.” Expert Group Meeting, 2005. 16

alternate ways of gathering this data, such as through public and private agencies that

encounter hard-to-reach victims of violence. Although an improvement, it is unclear how

useful this type of indirect data collection would be; there is plenty of room for error.

Regardless, the lack of quantitative and qualitative data about gender-based violence,

particularly cases involving hard-to-reach populations, renders them difficult to understand

and difficult to remedy.

***

Overall, the soft feminist perspectives of equity and correcting omissions aim to fill gaps in regard to both the practitioners of scientific research and the content of their

research topics. There is no emphasis on restructuring or reconceptualizing usual,

standard, or traditional questions and methodologies. I argue that there are at least three

social or epistemic benefits to advocating for soft feminist perspectives in the sciences: greater representation, alternate hermeneutical standpoints, and more accurate and precise

research.

First, equity increases diversity in terms of the social identities of people in

positions of power, e.g. supervisors, grant writers, teachers, mentors, etc. Hiring more

women18 to represent and practice the empirical sciences encourages more women, whom

may have previously avoided pursuing these professions due to the lack of mentors and

18 For the sake of simplicity, I focus my discussion on gender. However, I believe the same is true for diversity and inclusion of all social identities, including but not limited to race, sexuality, class, abilities, citizenship, etc. 17

role models, to join. Observing other women occupying positions of power may spark the imagination to also envision themselves in those positions. Additionally, women may feel more comfortable approaching, taking classes with, attending the office hours of, and confiding in other women in positions of power over their male counterparts, which can be discouraging due to fears regarding unwanted sexual attention, harassment, or implicit and gendered power dynamics. Overall, increasing diversity in representation relieves some of the pressure that drives women out of the pipeline and renders the climate more inviting for women to proceed.

Second, equity benefits hermeneutical resources. Women share a unique set of experiences in virtue of being women, e.g. a shared history in oppression; experiences with harassment, assault, and rape; certain biological states; sex-specific ailments, etc.19 Women may raise special insights overlooked by their male counterparts, which are especially useful in positions of mentorship and research. The second type of epistemic injustice delineated by Fricker, hermeneutical injustice, is relevant here. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when there are gaps in concepts, language, and self-understanding to the detriment of marginalized groups, who due to their historically secondary status are not only socially, politically, and economically marginalized, but also hermeneutically marginalized.20 For

19 Not all women share these experiences, but they are historically shared by the social identity of women as a group. Further, in true intersectional spirit, I acknowledge that the experiences of women vary depending on race, sexuality, class, abilities, citizenship, etc. 20 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, 155-162. 18

example, consider the case of marginalized persons in the discipline of philosophy. In

2016, the American Philosophical Association (APA) reported the demographics of their members as 75% male and 77% white/Caucasian.21 It can be inferred that roughly 25% of members were non-male and non-white; I refer to these members as marginalized because they are the minority. Although difficult to quantify, many marginalized folks in philosophy and academia broadly construed report feelings of “imposter complex,” a phrase coined by Pauline Rose Clance and Suzanne Ament Imes in 1978 to describe the

“psychological pattern in which an individual doubts their accomplishments and has a persistent internalized fear of being exposed as a fraud.”22 In their studies, Clance and Imes found that high-achieving women, and especially women of color, disproportionately experienced imposter complex relative to men. Imposter complex seems to be gendered and raced, or in other words, a social identity-linked experience.

Although imposter complex still persists in academia, marginalized members now possess more language and concepts to express imposter feelings and have more support and resources to understand its prevalence among other marginalized members. However, imagine a case from before the term was coined and recognized among academics. A young woman in academic philosophy, pre-1978, compares her feelings of inadequacy against the confidence and hubris of her white male colleagues; she compares her stuttering and

21 American Philosophical Association. “Demographic Statistics on the APA Membership, FY2015-FY2017.” 22 P. R. Clance and S. A Imes, “The Imposter Phenomenon in High Achieving Women: Dynamics and Therapeutic Intervention,” Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice, 15(3), 1978, 241-247. 19

imprecise speech to the clear articulation of her white male colleagues. She deems herself as intellectually inferior and believes that her case is an isolated one. She privately expresses her imposter feelings to other women and people of color in the department, who also express similar feelings. They collectively register that their experiences of imposter complex are not incidental but systematically experienced among marginalized members; they begin to work together to alter and unlearn their imposter feelings.

Likewise, adding women to the scientific professions develops the hermeneutical pool of concepts and language within the scientific workplace. Adding hermeneutical resources for other women to draw from renders the epistemic and social climate as more inclusive and supportive for women to succeed.

Finally, correcting omissions in scientific research benefits the epistemic pool at- large. Remedial research programs introduce new research opportunities for researchers to sift through traditional bodies of research in order to locate gaps and fill them. This, in turn, encourages a more accurate, comprehensive, and nuanced body of research to draw from and build upon, which is one of the fundamental goals of the human truth-seeking enterprise. More specifically, correcting omissions benefits some of the fundamental goals of feminist research, to provide opportunities for women to conduct research for and about women. 20

1.2. Hard Perspectives on Science

“Women are supposed to assimilate to science rather than

vice versa; it is assumed that nothing in either the culture or

the content of the sciences need change to accommodate

them.” - , Has Changed Sciencef23

Advocates of hard feminist perspectives have criticized soft feminist perspectives for being insufficiently critical.24 They argue that soft feminist perspectives fail to challenge the architecture within the sciences initially built to the exclusion of women and other marginalized groups - and to carry the metaphor - merely alter or rearrange the interior decor. Advocates of hard feminist perspectives argue that a radical conceptual shift must take place for true advancement, diversity, and inclusion within the sciences. Soft feminist perspectives, although useful, are too superficial to incite a radical shift; advocates for hard feminist perspectives call for deeper critiques.

There are at least two types of hard feminist perspectives on science: correcting conceptual distortions and restructuring scientific systems. It is important to note that

!3 Londa L. Schiebinger, Has Feminism Changed Science1 ( Press 1999), 4. 24 Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, ( Press 1986). 21

there are overlaps between soft feminist perspectives and hard feminist perspectives, as will be discussed later in this section.

First, conceptual distortions in science occur when researchers frame otherwise neutral information in a way that is biased or reductive. Conceptual distortions are imposed by researchers, often unintentionally, so they are fundamentally the result of human error and the result of the influence of a variety of factors, such as: historical or social setting, i.e. time and place, epistemic resources available, and the situatedness of the researcher.251 offer three examples of correcting conceptual distortions in the fields of primatology, paleoanthropology, and biology, as derived from Schiebinger’s book, Has

Feminism Changed Science?26 The following examples are evidence of one method of conceptually distorting information, namely through fallacious gender-based associations.

First, primatology - a female-dominated field - has benefited from the hard feminist perspective of correcting distortions. Savanna baboons are the most closely researched primate species since they live on the ground - as opposed to in trees like other primate species - like humans. Prior to the 1960s, baboon individuals were classified as either alpha male, female and children, or peripheral male. In a post-WWII, peri-Cold War era the primary focus of baboon research was to understand the hierarchal social structures within baboon populations, particularly the dominant aggression of alpha males and their

25 , “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1988, 575-599. 26 Schiebinger, Has Feminism Changed Science? 22

relations with non-alpha individuals. One political agenda of this research was to draw analogies between baboon and human behavior. A consequence of the focus on alpha behavior was that female, infant, and peripheral male baboons were inadvertently reduced to the mere negation of the alpha, or in other words, passive recipients of alpha drives and behaviors.27

Post 1960, women primatologists - Thelma Rowell and others - began to more closely examine the complex social relations of female baboons, including mother-child relations, female sexual assertiveness, female social strategies, and female competition for reproductive success. The result of reconceptualizing the character profile of female and peripheral male baboons, as well as correcting omissions in the process, resulted in the reorganization of the caricature of “hierarchal” social relations. Rather than drawing a classic pyramidal structure with alpha males at the apex, the hierarchy was toppled, and social roles were understood as different but equally complicated and important. The reconceptualization of previously reductive information resulted in more precise understanding of baboon behaviors, social roles, and social networks.28

Second, the dominant historical narrative of early human hunter-gatherers in paleoanthropology rendered “man-the-hunter” as the active and peripatetic agent responsible for propelling human evolution forward, while “woman-the-gatherer” was his

27 Schiebinger, Has Feminism Changed Science?, 127-136. 28 Schiebinger, Has Feminism Changed Science?, 127-136. 23

passive receiver and follower. Women paleoanthropologists of the 1970’s - Sally Linton

Slocum, Nancy Tanner, Adrienne Zihlman, and others - reframed the overly simplistic of gatherers in at least three ways. First, they argued that gatherers were also active agents responsible for providing the primary sources of sustenance, about two or three times the amount of food than men. Second, they argued that gatherers developed technological . Prior to this reconceptualization, “tools” were traditionally considered to be axes or knives, artifacts for breaking, sculpting, killing, or other forms of manipulating the environment (interestingly phallic shaped objects used for aggressive or dominant actions). However, women paleoanthropologists broadened the category of

“tool” to include baskets and child-carrying slings (interestingly yonic shaped objects used for collecting or holding). Third, deeper critiques of hunter-gatherer culture challenged the notion of gender-based divisions of labor. Women paleoanthropologists challenged the projection of Western social institutions, namely ideas about nuclear families, and called for alternative approaches of understanding the division of labor and responsibility, e.g. age-based divisions of labor or non-hierarchal different but equally important social roles.29

A final example of correcting conceptual distortions in scientific research was the reframing of sperm and egg cell interaction. Prior to this reconceptualization, the tale of fertilization wras recounted more-or-less as such, inspired by the work of Emily Martin and in the words of Schiebinger: “Spermatic hero actively pursues the egg, surviving the hostile

29 Schiebinger, Has Feminism Changed Science?, 136-139. 24

environment of the vagina and defeating his many rivals. The large and placid egg, like

Sleeping Beauty, drifts unconsciously along the fallopian tube until awakened by a valiant sperm. The sperm penetrates the egg and conception is achieved.”30 Gerald and Heide

Schatten reconceptualized the “sleeping beauty egg” as the “energetic egg,” which was equipped with biological tools that guided and captured the sperm and granted it access to fertilize. As Schiebinger noted, the biological tools of the egg, i.e. the microvilli, were not considered worthy of research until the mid-twentieth century. The tale of sperm and egg was not only conceptually reductive, but also punctured with lacunae that required remedial research to better understand the biological agency and tools of the egg cell.31

Correcting conceptual distortions builds upon the soft feminist perspectives. First, many of the conceptual distortions in the examples above were recognized and corrected through equity. Many of the primatologists, paleoanthropologists, and biologists who reconceptualized fallacious gender-based associations and caricatures in the sciences were women. Through increasing representation in these fields, women brought new insights into research, which resulted in important epistemic and scientific progress. Second, many conceptual distortions were corrected through also correcting omissions in research, as seen in the example of the egg cell. Reconceptualizing the egg cell as active rather than passive involved remedial research in better understanding its biological agency and tools.

30 Schiebinger, Has Feminism Changed Science?, 145. 31 Schiebinger, Has Feminism Changed Science?, 145-147. 25

In other words, the primary difference between remedial research (a soft feminist perspective) and correcting distortions (a hard feminist perspective) is that in the former there is a lacuna - a cavity - in the traditional body of research that requires filling, and in the latter an area within the traditional body of research - perhaps previously a lacuna - that contains biased, fallacious, or superficial information that must be corrected or neutralized. Conceptual distortions often supplant poorly corrected lacunae.

+ + +

Finally, I turn to the second hard feminist perspective - restructuring scientific systems. Until now, I have carefully used the terms “methods” and “methodology.” In “Is

There a Feminist Method” - to which she argues, no there is not - Sandra Harding provides a useful distinction between methods, methodology, and epistemology.32

o Methods are “techniques for gathering evidence.” Some examples of methods

in the social sciences include questioning subjects, observing behavior, and

examining historical records. Some examples of methods in the physical and

life sciences include experimentation and calculating statistics. The scientific

m ethod is a method.

32 Sandra Harding. “Is There a Feminist Method?”, Feminism and Methodology, Sandra Harding (Indiana University Press 1987). 26

o Methodology is a “theory and analysis of how research should proceed.” It

involves critically evaluating the questions asked, use of methods and practices,

broader applications, etc. For example, methodology critically considers how the

scientific method ought to be used, its limitations, its strengths, etc.

o Epistemology is the “theory of knowledge or justificatory strategy” that

underlies methods and methodology. Some common epistemological questions

include: Who is a knower?; What counts as knowledge?; Where does knowledge

come from?; etc. Epistemology critically considers the fundamental assumptions

of and the strengths and weaknesses of methods and methodology.

Although methods, methodology, and epistemology are equally worthy of consideration, Crasnow et al. argue that what I refer to as hard feminist perspectives, i.e. reconceptualizing content and restructuring scientific systems, are primarily concerned with restructuring methodology.33 Hence, the vagueness of the phrase “restructuring scientific systems” is more clearly characterized as restructuring scientific methodology.

While feminist philosophers of science, like Harding for example, reject the notion of distinctly “feminist methods” or alternatives to the scientific method, Crasnow, Wylie,

33 Crasnow et al., "Feminist Perspectives on Science.” 27

Bauchspies, and Potter advocate for “feminist methodology” in the sciences.34 Their feminist methodology, i.e. theory about how scientific research ought to proceed, involves four commitments: relevance, experiential grounding, accountability, and reflexivity.35

First, the commitment to relevance suggests that feminist researchers - i.e. researchers who share the goal of liberating women from oppressive systems - conduct research - i.e. formulate questions and hypothesis, design experiments, collect data, draw conclusions, etc. - that is relevant to the lives of women. Feminist research should not only aim to merely understand the effects of oppressive systems, but also how those systems could be altered or eradicated. Non-feminist scientific commitments diverge from the hard feminist commitment to relevance in the sense that the former assumes impartiality and freedom from agenda, i.e. the view-from-nowhere, whereas the latter embraces partiality, i.e. acknowledges the social situatedness of the researcher and the target population of their research.36

Many of the examples offered thus far - the leaky pipeline problem, omissions in clinical trial data and statistical data, reconceptualizing research in primatology, paleoanthropology, and biology - are relevant to the lives of women. Each feminist research program attempts to better understand the positionality of women, eradicate fallacious gender-based associations, and advocate for how to avoid committing similar

34 Sandra Harding, “Is There a Feminist Method?” 35 Crasnow et al., "Feminist Perspectives on Science.” 36 Carol Ehrlich and Research Group One. The Conditions of Feminist Research. (Vacant Lots Press 1975), 10. 28

epistemic mistakes moving forward. In other words, the commitment to relevance is a commitment to feminist methodology broadly construed, i.e. asking the right questions, considering the target population, acknowledging biases and positionality, etc.

Second, the commitment to experiential grounding suggests that feminist researchers start and ground their research in the everyday lives of women. In order to accept the principle of experiential grounding, one must also accept some degree of embodied cognition. Embodied cognition, i.e. embodiment, is the philosophical and psychological position that the physical body of an agent influences and shapes the experience of that agent. The term “physical body” does not refer to an essentialist account of bodies, i.e. that traits like gender or race are biologically fixed. Rather, the term “physical body” and how it is used here, refers to the visible and invisible characteristics relevant to the involuntary - e.g. gender, sexuality, abilities, race, socio-economic class, etc. - or voluntary - e.g. political or religious affiliation - membership in a certain social group in addition to the physical and mental experiences relevant to being a member of that social group. In other words, the notion of embodiment embeds the claim that an agent’s social identity shapes that agent’s subjectivity. However, henceforth I use the phrase “social identity-linked experience” in place of “embodiment” because the former emphasizes that social identity is the driving force behind certain social experiences and avoids commitment to an essentialist account of bodies. A further commitment of social identity- 29

linked experience, which is not accepted by all proponents of embodiment, is the position that agents with disparate social identities are limited in their ability to accurately and reliability imagine the indexicality of the other. For example, men are limited in their ability to accurately and reliability imagine the indexicality of women, and vice versa. This concern presses on the ability of male researchers to accurately interpret and draw conclusions about the experiences of women.

Thus, the commitment to experiential grounding implies the acceptance of some degree of the principle of social-identity linked experience because the commitment to starting and grounding research in the lives of women underwrites accepting that content and structure specific to the lives of women is worthy of consideration. Non-feminist scientific research typically treats “soft” data, e.g. testimony or anecdote about personal experiences, as low-ranking in the hierarchy of evidence, and hard feminist researchers would agree that restraint is necessary in the handling of soft data and that robust standards for research ought to be upheld in feminist methodology. Despite such caveats,

Wylie recommends that gendered experience be treated as a “critical resource” at all stages of research.37 In other words, since scientific research takes great pains to control for confounding variables, the social identity-linked experience ought to also be accounted for.

The third commitment, accountability, requires feminist researchers to adhere to a set of “ethical and pragmatic norms,” which suggest that researchers ought to acknowledge

37 Crasnow et al., "Feminist Perspectives on Science.” 30

their own epistemic limitations and include subjects in all stages of research where possible. First, as previously noted, most proponents of hard feminist perspectives reject the view-from-no-where assumption of non-feminist science and acknowledge the inevitable bias of researchers; I detail this view more closely in the section on reflexivity. In short, accountability requires that feminist researchers, despite their sensitivity to bias and their best intentions, also recognize their own epistemic limitations.

Second, the feminist methodological commitment to accountability - as Longino notes - topples one kind of hierarchy within the sciences, such as researcher versus subject, which helps decentralize epistemic power in the research process. Marx’s theory of alienation is useful here. As a central theme of many of his writings, Marx argues that the proletariat, i.e. the working class, are alienated from their labor, the act of production, and other workers in a capitalist society. Alienation involves the feeling of powerlessness over oneself as well as the feeling of being used as the means to another’s (in this case, the capitalist’s) end.

Here the research participant is analogous to the proletariat. The use of intentional deception - e.g. withholding information, deception in instructions, or manipulating the environment to establish control over variables - and nonintentional deception - e.g. incomplete disclosure or misunderstanding in communication - has been a longstanding ethical contention in social and behavioral science research. The use of both intentional 31

and nonintentional deception inhibits the ability of research participants to grant informed consent, which is an ethical transgression in any moral system that upholds human autonomy as an inalienable right. Infamous studies like the Tuskegee Syphilis Study - a study from 1932-1972 that identified and intentionally withheld the syphilis diagnosis of

400 low-income black men and subsequently denied them treatment in order to understand the effects of syphilis in humans - and the Milgram experiment - a 1963 study that instructed participants to administer painful electric shocks to a concealed and phony victim in another room in order to study the effects of blind obedience to instructions that cause extreme distress or even death, intended to collect evidence for the Nuremburg trials

- urged the US to establish the NIEHS Institutional Review Board (IRB) in order to

“provide ethical and regulatory oversight of research that involves human subjects.”38 They require that the values of autonomy, i.e. the right to self-govem, beneficence, i.e. protection from harm as well as maximizing benefits for participants, and justice, i.e. fairness and equity in participant selection, be upheld in all research that involves human subjects.39

Despite this, deceptive practices are still prevalent in social and behavioral research, albeit in less extreme cases, and remain a topic of controversy in ethics and social and behavioral science literature. On one hand, A.J. Kimmel and others have argued that the use of deception is required to obtain reliable and unbiased information or, through a

18 Michael Cheng-Tek Tai. “Deception and Informed Consent in Social, Behavioral, and Educational Research (SBER),” Tzu Chi Medical Journal 24:4, December 2012, 218-222. 39 National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. “Institutional Review Board.” 32

utilitarian framework, the net benefit of using deception for the benefit of science outweighs the net detriment to participants.40 On the other hand, Diana Baumrind and others have argued that the use of deception has significant ethical, psychological, scientific, and societal costs and ought to be avoided or even forbidden where possible.41

The hard feminist commitment to accountability condemns the use of deception because deception is incompatible with informed consent. Violating the right of a participant to grant informed consent “alienates” the participant because their autonomy is disregarded, and they are used as a means to the researcher’s end of answering their hypothesis.

Some feminist theorists might argue that autonomy is not a clear feminist value, since the traditional notion of autonomy reflects an atomistic view of the self, which is rejected by certain feminist ethical frameworks. One alternative view to atomistic autonomy - and there are many - is relational autonomy, which highlights the interconnectedness of individuals within a network of others.42 Regardless, it seems that both atomistic and relational autonomy would embrace the principle of informed consent; the kind of autonomy defended in the feminist commitment to accountability is a non­ issue.

40 Tai, “Deception and Informed Consent in Social, Behavioral, and Educational Research (SBER).” 41 Diana Baumrind. “IRBs and Social Science Research: The Costs of Deception,” IRB: Ethics & Human Research, Vol. 1, No. 6 (October., 1979), 1-4. 42 Natalie Stoljar. "Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015. 33

Accountability and involving participants in all stages of scientific research requires full disclosure and informed consent about what the experiment is testing or how the participant’s data will be used so the participant retains autonomy and some degree of power over her epistemic labor. However, complete disclosure remains at issue since deception is often used to reduce or eliminate bias; full disclosure may skew results.43 Full disclosure could work if revealed after-the-, but the problem of informed consent still remains. Regardless, the feminist methodological commitment to accountability is worthy of consideration where possible.

Finally, the fourth commitment, reflexivity, is best understood in terms of

Harding’s “strong objectivity.” Traditionally, “objectivity” is conceived of as a “view-from- no-where” and “knowledge,” as conceived by Plato, is pure and transcendent. The traditional requirements for objectivity and knowledge are that they be unadulterated by human biases and free from the influence of human epistemic processes. Science often champions its method as the closest method to reaching impartiality. However, Harding writes, not only is absolute impartiality an impossible task, but absolutely impartial information is not rigorous or useful enough. As noted in the opening of this thesis, the epistemic, representational, and interpretive traces of humans are evident throughout all stages of the scientific method; humans ask questions, design experiments, extract data,

43 Karen S. Cook and Toshio Yamagishi. “A Defense of Deception on Scientific Grounds.” Social Psychobgy Quarterly. 2008. 34

and draw conclusions. The positionality of researchers, i.e. their historical or social setting, available epistemic resources, social identity, etc., shapes how that researcher observes and reasons.

Moreover, if achieving completely impartial data were possible, it is unclear how impartial data would be useful. If one of the goals of science is to better understand the world and the human relationship to it, it is to the benefit of science to account for variables like social identity throughout the research process. Restructuring scientific methodology asks us to reconsider the traditional conceptions of objectivity or knowledge and how we expect to achieve them. One way to do this - in the words of Donna Haraway

- is to recognize that all knowledge is socially situated, or - in the words of

- to recognize that all is contextual.44 Where traditional scientific research is conducted with a false pretense of value-neutrality, strong objectivity seeks transparency by rejecting the very possibility of value-neutrality and instead requires researchers to embrace reflexivity, i.e. the acknowledgement of the researcher’s own positionality, their target audience, and the inclusion of factors like social identity within scientific research.

Opponents of hard feminist perspectives often raise the objection that hard feminist standards for knowledge and objectivity are not robust enough or are at risk of embracing epistemic relativity. On the contrary, hard feminist perspectives require that we render our conceptions of knowledge and objectivity as less abstract and more pragmatic,

44 Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is ‘Strong Objectivity?" 35

less crude and more nuanced. Researchers ought to take into consideration all context - the social history in which the research is conducted, the positionality of the researcher, the positionality of the participants, the target audience, etc. - in order to develop a more accurate, comprehensive, nuanced, and useful, body of knowledge.

2. Science and Art

“So in science too, we find interpretation at two different

levels: the theory represents the phenomena as thus or so,

and that representation itself is subject to more than one

tenable but significantly different interpretation. As in art,

we find the persons involved (those who create the work,

those who peruse or appreciate it) often unconscious of the

non-uniqueness of their interpretations and of the creative

element in their response as readers. The texts of science too

are open texts.” - and Jill Sigman,

“Interpretation in Science and in the Arts.”45

45 Bas Van Fraassen and Jill Sigman, “Interpretation in the Science and in the Arts.” Realism and Representation, edited by G. Levine, (University of Wisconsin Press 1993), 10. 36

Like Apollo and Dionysus, science and art are commonly positioned as adversaries

- the former as a valiant quest to ascertain truth and the latter as a primitive drive to express inner life. Persons with the capacity to exhibit mastery over these vastly different dom ains and draw connections between them - the Leonardo Da Vincis of history - have been considered to be polymaths or “ men”, i.e. persons with expertise spanning different subject areas, which is a mark of extraordinary intelligence.46

An alternative method of positioning art and science, however, is as complements; both share the motivation to understand and describe the world and the human relationship to it, albeit through different means and methods. Moreover, scientists are becoming more curious about the role of art in science, and artists are becoming more curious about the role of science in art. For example, scientists might utilize creativity and imagination in order to discover innovative solutions to problems; are curious about the neural underpinnings of meaningful human experiences, such as spirituality, love, or aesthetic experience; and engineers incorporate aesthetic qualities like

“beauty” or “simplicity” in design. On the other hand, artists might utilize mathematical proportions, principles of vision or auditory science, or capitalize on evolutionarily- programmed emotional responses in order to elicit a certain response to their work. Along these lines, some organizations, like the Rhode Island School of Design, have called for revising the colloquial acronym of “STEM” to “STEAM,” incorporating art and design into

40 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. “Renaissance Man.” The Encyclopedia of Britannica. 2018. 37

the mix of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics in order to acknowledge how art and design also play a critical role in the human truth-seeking enterprise and in order to better understand how science and art inform one another.471 defend the complementary view of art and science.

***

In the previous sections, I parsed the types, strengths, and weaknesses of various feminist perspectives on science as well as their goals for advancement, diversity, and inclusion, and a more accurate, comprehensive, nuanced, and useful body of scientific research. In the next section, I propose that feminist perspectives have and will continue to benefit both aesthetic theorizing and art practice. In order to draw the comparison, I discuss some structural similarities between science and art. I propose that both science and art offer information about the world, albeit through different means and methods, and that the epistemic characteristic of each are shaped by how humans observe and reason. In other words, although unique in their own respects, science and art share epistemic, representational, and interpretative characteristics, which warrant the extrapolation of feminist perspectives on science to art. Moreover, I address the objection that science and art cannot be analogized because scientific beliefs are cognitive, while aesthetic beliefs are noncognitive.

47 Rhode Island School of Design. “STEM TO STEAM," 2018. 38

First, the epistemic characteristic of both science and art are shaped by how humans observe and reason. The empirical sciences gather data through the scientific method in order to accurate and reliable theories about the physical world.

Likewise, aesthetic theories are concerned with constructing accurate and reliable theories about matters like the nature of art, beauty, taste, value, etc. Although there is no “aesthetic method,” aesthetic theories are derived through reasoning, or at the very least, reflection; humans ask questions, design arguments, formulate rebuttals, express ideas, etc.

Additionally, art objects and art critiques are generated and performed by humans.48

Hence, just as the epistemic processes of humans are evident throughout the scientific method, the epistemic processes of humans are also evident throughout aesthetic theorizing and art practice. Science and art are human projects, and like the sciences, the situatedness of the aesthetician, artist, or critic bears on the theories, objects, and evaluations they generate.

Additionally, science and art can be representational and interpretative. In

“Interpretation in Science and in the Arts,” Bas Van Fraassen and Jill Sigman draw parallels between the representational and interpretative characteristics in both art and science. First, they make the case for visual art. The notion that visual art is representational can be traced back as early as Plato’s theory of mimesis or the traditions of

48 The question of whether non-human animals and are capable of generating art objects is a fascinating and important , however, it will not be addressed in this thesis. 39

classical and renaissance art to faithfully depict form and light.49 Later, in the 20th century, philosopher and art historian Ernst Gombrich delineated a theory of what representation, or in the case of art “depiction,” involves, namely the intentional reproduction of an object in relation to a first. The success or appearance of the depiction hinges on at least two criteria: accuracy (or fidelity) - i.e. the degree to which the depiction matches the geometrical and optical qualities of an original scene - and selectivity (or completeness) - i.e. the degree to which features of the original scene are included or omitted.50 i

The selectivity aspect of depiction poses a problem. Van Fraassen and Sigman argue that depiction contains two opportunities for interpretation - the first by the artist and the second by the audience. Hence, the information decoded from a depiction hinges on both the selectivity of the artist and the situatedness of the audience.

First, the artist makes a choice regarding which features to include or omit, and in doing so, the artist holds the power to guide the attention of her audience in a certain way, i.e. toward a particular feature or away from a particular feature. This is no trivial power; the power of selectivity, and hence guiding the attention of an audience toward or away something, plays a critical role in all forms of communication, whether explicit, implicit, conscious, or subliminal. Through selecting or omitting features, the artist interprets - in

49 Not all visual art is representational, or in other words, a representation of something. For example, see a Mondrian or a Rothko. Instead, I am positing that visual art can be representational, or in order words, a representation of something in the world. I focus my discussion on the latter cases of visual art. 50 Van Fraassen and Sigman, “Interpretation in the Science and in the Art,” 2. 40

this case “interprets” means “presents their take on” - an original scene, so the depiction is

“once-removed” from the original source - a view essential to Plato’s theory of mimesis.51

The more pressing issue for Van Fraassen and Sigman, however, is that there is a second layer of interpretation; the audience interprets the artist’s depiction relative to their personal, social, and historical context. In other words, persons from disparate personal, social, or historical contexts might interpret the depiction - in this case “interpret” means

“attribute descriptive or normative characteristics” - relative to their own cultural beliefs, norms, values, etc. Then, the audience’s interpretation of the depiction is “twice-removed” from the original source. Thus, interpretation is critical in at least two stages of the representational process: the artist’s interpretation of a scene, i.e. their selectivity, and the interpretation of an audience, i.e. attribution of descriptive or normative qualities.52

Likewise, Van Fraassen and Sigman argue, science is also representational and interpretive. Where visual art conveys reference about things or concepts in the world through images, science uses language and data to piece together “a putative description of what there is in the world, and even of what the world as a whole is like.” Accuracy and selectivity are also at stake in scientific representations. Accuracy is at stake since scientific theories aim toward “a true account of the physical world” and are always subject to

51 Van Fraassen and Sigman find the view that an artist “interprets” a scene to be contentious; an artist merely strives to match geometrical and optical qualities. It is the audience, then, who attribute descriptive or normative characteristics to those geometrical and optical qualities. 5" Van Fraassen and Sigman, “Interpretation in the Science and in the Art,” 5. 41

revision; selectivity is at stake since what is included or omitted in theories and data is dependent on the or reseaircher, and as Van Fraassen and Sigman note, often

“purposeful, deliberate, and subject to evaluation.” They continue, “we ask not only if a given science provides accurate information about the aspects it has selected for attention, but whether it has selected well, whether it answers all or many of the important questions. » 5 3

For example, both the Newtonian mechanical system and the Einsteinian relativistic system are proposed representations of the mechanics of space, time, motion, , etc.54 Regarding gravity, Newton discovered an equation to describe how gravity behaves (F = G *M l*m 2 /r2), which was canon for nearly two centuries. Newton correctly posited that more massive objects generate more gravity than less massive objects and the gravitational pull of a massive object decreases with distance from that object, among other laws. However, Newton erroneously conceived of space as absolute, meaning space does not bend or warp relative to the objects within it, and gravity as force-like. Later, after discovering inaccuracies in Newton’s laws (particularly regarding the behavior of light),

Einstein proposed his theory of , where he posited the existence of a dimension called space-time, which unlike Newton’s conception of space, is relative, meaning that it does bend and warp relative to the mass of the objects within it. He also

53 Each of the quotes in this paragraph were derived from Van Fraassen and Sigman, “Interpretation in the Science and in the Art,” 7. 54 Sidney Perkowitz, et al. “Relativity.” The Encyclopedia of Britannica. 2018. 42

posited that gravity was not a force, but a consequence of the bending and warping of space- time, as caused by a massive object.55 Although both theories are accurate in certain respects, Einstein’s theory of General Relativity is more accurate - the more correct and reliable explanation of gravity, etc. - than the Newtonian theory of gravity.

Additionally, selectivity is also at stake in scientific theories. Einstein’s theory of

General Relativity is an explanation of the nature and mechanics of space-time and gravity on a cosmic scale; objects must have mass (e.g. planets, moons, stars, and blackholes) in order to appreciably bend space-time, and thus, generate gravity. However, it is unclear if the theory of General Relativity is compatible with phenomena on a quantum scale, e.g. atomic and subatomic particles, which are objects with infinitesimal mass. Thus, Einstein’s theory of General Relativity, although more accurate than Newton’s theory of gravity, only selected for a macroscopic scale of phenomena and not the quantum scale, which might operate differently.56

Moreover, the dual nature of interpretation - (i) the representation of an original source by and artist or scientist and (ii) the interpretation of that representation by an audience - is also evident in science. First, a scientist or theorist observes phenomena in the world and interprets - in this case “interprets” means “presents their take on” - the phenomena through a theory, representation, or model. The ,

55 Sidney Perkowitz, et al. “Relativity.” 2018. 56 The notion of quantum general relativity is a burgeoning research area. See Thomas Thiemann. Modem Canonical Quantum General Relativity. (Cambridge University Press 2007). 43

representation, or model is once-removed from the original phenomena in the physical world. Second, interlocuters interpret the proposed theory, representation, or model - in this case “interpret” means “attribute descriptive or normative characteristics or draw implications from” - that might not be explicitly endorsed by the original theorist. In other words, the scientists who engage with scientific theories, representations, or models as well as the professors who recite them likely infuse their own scientific and philosophical biases in their interpretation of the theories, representations, or models. Hence, interpretations of scientific theories, representations, and models are twice-removed from the original, observed phenomena.57

As Gombrich insisted “there is no innocent eye” in regard to how humans interact with the world and art, there, too, is no innocent mind in regard to how humans interact with the world and science.58

On the other hand, one possible objection is that science and art are not analogous, since scientific beliefs are cognitive - i.e. statements with truth-value that are subject to verification, which convey information about the world - while aesthetic beliefs are noncognitive - i.e. statements without truth-value that are a matter of preference, which do not convey information about the world. It is true that art diverges from science in the sense that art is not concerned with in the same way as science, but art never made

57 Van Fraassen and Sigman, “Interpretation in the Science and in the Art,” 7-10. 58 Ernest Gombrich. Art and Illusion. (New York, Pantheon Books 1960), 297-298. 44

this promise. The view that art does not impart information about the world is insular; art imparts a different kind of information than science. Art (and literature) puts on display the creativity, imagination, and talents of humans; art demonstrates the vast spectrum of human preferences and emotional responses; pictorial representations and stories highlight particular viewpoints; fiction, particularly science fiction, lends us the ability to imagine possible worlds very different from our own; historical allow us to envision how people, places, and events looked in an era before . The view that humans do not learn anything from art reflects an idealistic and Platonic view of knowledge that has been rejected throughout this thesis. It is true that science and art illuminate different kinds of information about the world and in different ways; science reveals fact-based and empirical information that is subject to truth or falsity, while art reveals information about human lived experiences, perspectives, and preferences. Although different, both science and art, as well as what they show us, are important. The cognitive and noncognitive objection to science and art does not interfere with the purpose of this thesis.

My thesis is, since the fields of science and art are relevantly similar - they share epistemic, representational, and interpretive characteristics and objectives that are relevant in the application of feminist perspectives from science to art - feminist perspectives have been and will continue to be crucially important in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice. Feminist perspectives promote and generate more accurate, comprehensive, 45

nuanced, and useful theories of art, beauty, taste, and value as well as cpntribute to more advancement, diversity, and inclusion throughout the artworld.

3. Feminist Perspectives on Art

“Art is not a free autonomous activity of a super-endowed

individual, “influenced” by previous artists and more vaguely

and superficially “social forces,” but rather ... occurs in a

social situation, is an integral element of social structure,

and is mediated and determined by specific and definable

social institutions, be they art academies, systems of

patronage, mythologies of the divine creator and artist as he-

man or social outcast.” - , “Why Are There

No Great ?”59

In the next sections, I engage with and feminist , which gained in the early 1970’s following the publication of Linda Nochlin’s essay, “Why Are There No Great Women Artists?” - to which she argues the reason is

59 Linda Nochlin. “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?” The Feminism and Visual Culture Reader, edited by Amelia Jones. (Routledge 2003). 46

exclusionary and patriarchal social institutions. I argue that both soft and hard feminist perspectives - equity, correcting omissions, correcting conceptual distortions, and

■i restructuring aesthetic methodology, which were previously explored in their application in the empirical sciences - are also useful in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice.

First, for the sake of clarity, I distinguish between aesthetic theorizing and art practice. I refer to aesthetic theorizing as the activity of engaging in reasoning or reflection in order to understand the nature of aesthetic experience, judgments, and objects, as well as the nature of concepts like art, beauty, taste, value, etc. Some common questions of interest in aesthetic theorizing include: How do we define the category of art?; What are the sufficient or necessary conditions for beauty?; How is value determined?; What does it mean to have “good taste?”; What distinguishes aesthetic experience from ordinary experience?; etc. I refer to those who engage in aesthetic theorizing as aestheticians.

On the other hand, I refer to art practice as the activity of creating, manipulating, or evaluating particular or groups of art objects. The appearance of art objects and the guidelines for evaluating them vary depending on the medium, style of the artist, resources available, motivations of the artist or critic, social setting of the artist or critic, etc. In other words, the standards for artistic creation and critique are incommensurable across mediums. For example, it would be nonsensical to use the same tools or language to create 47

or evaluate a portrait of an aristocrat, a souffle, and a Bachian cello suit. I refer to those who engage in art practice as artists or critics.

In the following sections, I parse the strengths and weaknesses of various positions within the spectrum of feminist perspectives on aesthetic theorizing and art practice, which range from soft feminist perspectives, i.e. approaches that aim to maintain traditional systems in aesthetics while critically expanding on them, and hard feminist perspectives, i.e. approaches that aim to reconceptualize traditional content or restructure traditional systems in aesthetics. I show how both the soft and hard perspectives locate detrimental practices in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice.

3.1. Soft Feminist Perspectives on Art

“Women ... did not have the good fortune to be born

white, preferably middle class and, above all, male. The fault

lies not in our stars, our hormones, our menstrual cycles, or

our empty internal spaces, but in our institutions and our

education...” - Linda Nochlin, “Why Have There Been No

Great Women Artists?”60

Nochlin, “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?” 48

Soft feminist perspectives on art embrace or defend traditional systems in

aesthetics yet are interested in critically expanding on them. Again, there are at least two

types of soft feminist perspectives: concerns about equity and concerns about omission.

First, concerns about equity in aesthetics aim at understanding or balancing disproportionate demographics within aesthetic theorizing and art practice. Equity in aesthetic theorizing is concerned with closing the gender disparity in the demographics of those who reason, teach, and publish about aesthetics, whereas equity in art practice is concerned with closing the gender disparity in the demographics of artists and critics as well as the demographics of characters in various mediums of storytelling, e.g. film, television, painting, sculpture, etc.

For example, the American Society for Aesthetics reported that in 2018 30% of article submissions for the Journal of Aesthetics and were by female authors, while 70% of article submissions were by male authors.61 Similarly, the Center for the

Study of Women in Television and Film at San Diego State University reported that in

2017, women comprised only 18% of all directors, writers, producers, executive producers, editors, and cinematographers working on the top 250 domestic grossing films, and further, only 1% of films employed 10 or more women, whereas 70% of films employed 10

61 The American Society for Aesthetics. “JAAC 2018 Annual Report,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 2018. 49

or more men.62 The National Museum of Women in the Arts reported that work by women artists makes up only 3-5% of major permanent collections in the US and Europe; only 30% of the largest museums (with over a $15 million budget) have female museum directors to which the three largest museums in the world - the British Museum, the

Louvre, and the Met - have never appointed a female museum director; of the 100 most expensive artists in history, only two women made the list; and 96% of artworks sold at auctions are by male artists.63 These statistics provide evidence for the position that women are the minority in publishing work on aesthetics, positions of power within the film and television industry, positions of power in the museum industry, underrepresented in permanent collections, and their work is perceived as having less monetary and historical value than their male counterparts.

Why so few women? Revisiting the possible internal and external circumstances as outlined in the section on equity within the sciences, it is simply not the case that women are incapable or even uninterested in careers within the arts. The likely causes, however, are beyond women - in their external circumstances. Women have been historically excluded from aesthetic theorizing and art practice and discouraged by the epistemic and social climate throughout the artworld.

62 Martha M. Lauzen. “The Celluloid Ceiling: Behind'the-Scenes Employment of Women on the Top 100, 250, and 500 Films of 2017,” Center for the Study of Women in Television and Film, San Diego State University, 2017. 63 National Museum of Women in the Arts. “Gender Disparity in the Arts.” 50

First, when women produced art - which they did throughout all of art history - it was not uncommon for their work to remain anonymous, be misattributed to the male heads of their studios, be misattributed to their husbands due to their shared , or purposely excluded altogether from mainstream art movements. historians of the late twentieth century are responsible for uncovering these practices and rediscovering lost women artists and their work.64

Second, movements of the twenty-first century, namely “Me Too” and “Times Up,” bear witness to the oppressive climate within the artworld, particularly the film and television industry of Flollywood. In 2017, a significant number of high-profile celebrities exposed Flarvey Weinstein - and many other men in positions of power within the film and television industry - as a serial sex offender. Women around the world responded with their own stories of sexual harassment and assault, many of which occurred in the

M ace. 65 66

Flence, it is not true that women are incapable or uninterested in careers in art; rather, the epistemic and social climate within the artworld rendered it hostile and unhospitable to women.

***

64 Norma Broude and Mary D. Garrard. “Introduction: Feminism and Art History,” Feminism and Art History: Questioning the Litany. (Routledge, Taylor &. Francis Group 1982). 65 , “Homepage.” 66 Times Up Now, “Statistics.” 51

While equity in aesthetics is concerned with filling in lacunae in demographics, the second soft feminist concern, correcting omissions in aesthetics, is concerned with filling in lacunae in content. For example, a contemporary activist movement has called for greater diversity and inclusion in the film industry. One method of achieving this is through the “By-For-About” model, i.e. storytelling by members of marginalized groups, about the lives of members of marginalized groups, intended for members of marginalized groups. Some examples of these films include: Wonder Woman (2017) - the first female superhero film to be directed by a woman, Patty Jenkins; Persepolis (2000/2007) - the autobiographical narrative of an Iranian woman, Marjane Satrapi, before, during, and after the Islamic Revolution of ; Black Panther (2018) - the tale of a Black superhero, based in a fictional African country, directed by Black director Ryan Coogler; and Crazy Rich

Asians (2018) - the first major Plollywood production to feature an almost entirely Asian cast, directed by Asian-American director Jon M. Chu. Each of these films located a lacuna of representation within the film industry - both in term of demographics and content - and corrected their respective omissions, to which they were celebrated with cultural and fiscal success by both nonmembers and members, but especially members of their respective groups.

The significance of the By-For-About model is supported by the theory of social identity-linked experience. Recall that the position of social identity-linked experience 52

embeds the claim that an agent’s social identity shapes that agent’s subjectivity. Members of marginalized social groups have direct access to certain experiences as well as sensitivity to cultural nuances that nonmembers may overlook or misunderstand. For instance, members of marginalized groups are more likely to resist what Jose Medina refers to as “meta- blindness,” i.e. the inability to recognize and acknowledge one’s limitations and blind spots; “meta-insensitivity,” i.e. an ignorance to the social and historical positionality of oneself and its relationality to differently bodied others; and the “white gaze” or “white im agination,” i.e. the intentional or unintentional projection of White-western-hegemonic conceptual frameworks.67 In other words, the social identity-linked experience of members of marginalized social groups are - as Wylie would note - “a critical resource” essential to more accurate, comprehensive, nuanced, and useful storytelling, especially regarding experiences pertinerit to their respective social group.

***

I argue that - like the sciences - there are at least three social or epistemic benefits to advocating for soft feminist perspectives in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice: greater representation, alternate hermeneutical standpoints, and more accurate and precise work.

67 Jose Medina. The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. (Oxford University Press 2013). 53

First, equity increases diversity in terms of the social identities of people in positions of power in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice. In aesthetic theorizing, women ought to be encouraged to teach aesthetics, publish work in aesthetics, and include the work of women philosophers and artists in aesthetics curriculums. In art practice, women ought to be appointed to positions of power or prominence all throughout the artworld, e.g. director, producer, museum director or curator, critic, as well as included in art history curriculums, displayed in galleries and museums, and sold in art auctions.

Hiring more women to represent and practice both aesthetic theorizing and art practice encourages more women, whom may have previously avoided pursuing these professions due to the lack of mentors and role models, to join. To reiterate, observing other women occupying positions of power may spark the imagination to also envision themselves in those positions. Additionally, women may feel more comfortable approaching, confiding in, taking classes with, attending the office hours of, or participating in the projects of women in positions of power over their male counterparts, which can be discouraging due to fears regarding unwanted sexual attention, harassment, or implicit and gendered power dynamics. Overall, diversity in representation renders the epistemic and social climate in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice as more hospitable and supportive to women.

Second, equity benefits hermeneutical resources. Women share a unique set of experiences in virtue of being women. Women may raise special insights overlooked by 54

their male counterparts, which are especially useful in positions of mentorship, research, artistic practices (especially character development and storytelling), and art criticism.

Adding women, and members of other marginalized groups, to both aesthetic theorizing and art practice develops the hermeneutical pool of concepts and language both in the academy and in the artworld, such as seen in the Me Too Movement and the By-For-About model of storytelling. For example, while Hollywood has been long notorious for its culture of and harassment, the Me Too movement - i.e. the sheer number of women who came forward and collectively yoked their experiences of sexism, rape and harassment by men in positions of power in Hollywood - was partly responsible for the contemporary shift in Hollywood culture. Today, men in positions of power in Hollywood who are accused of harassment, rape, or other inappropriate conduct are more likely to be disgraced and expelled from the industry, whereas prior, such conduct would rarely incite more than industry whispers.68 Additionally, adding women - and other minorities - to executive and creative positions within the film industry - e.g. as directors, writers, costume designers, etc. - generates more accurate and nuanced literary and visual (mainstream) representations of social identities, which persons from historically marginalized groups can benefit from, utilize, and empathize with, as seen in the aftermath of socially progressive films like Wonder Woman (2017), (2017), and Crazy Rich Asians (2018).

Finally, more women in aesthetic theorizing - including Laura Mulvey’s conception of the

68 Melena Ryzik. “How Saying #MeToo Changed Their Lives,” The New York Times. 2018. 55

“male gaze,” Linda Nochlin’s essays regarding the exclusionary and patriarchal social practices of the artworld, and anthologies like Feminist Visual Culture - generate novel hermeneutical insights that benefit aesthetic theorizing and the artworld at-large.69

Finally, correcting omissions in aesthetic work benefits the epistemic pool.

Remedial aesthetic theories and practices introduce new opportunities for feminist aestheticians, artists, and critics to sift through traditional bodies of aesthetic work in order to locate gaps and fill them. This, in turn, encourages a more accurate, comprehensive, and nuanced body of aesthetic theorizing and art practice and provides opportunities for women to construct aesthetic theories, generate art objects, and utilize standards of critique relevant and inclusive to women.

3.2. Hard Perspectives on Art

“In the field of art history, the white Western male

viewpoint, unconsciously accepted as the viewpoint of the art

historian, may - and does - prove to be inadequate not

merely on moral and ethical grounds, or because it is elitist,

but on purely intellectual ones. In revealing the failure of

much of history, and a great deal of history in

69 Fiona Carson and Claire Pajaczkowska. Feminist Visual Culture. (Routledge 2001). 56

general, to take account of the unacknowledged value

system, the very presence of an intruding subject in historical

investigation, the feminist critique at the same time lays bare

its conceptual smugness, its meta-historical naivete.” - Linda

Nochlin, “Why Have There Been No Great Women

Artists?”70

Hard feminist perspectives on art are interested in altering or eradicating traditional structures in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice. There are at least two types of hard feminist perspectives: correcting conceptual distortions and restructuring traditional systems.

First, conceptual distortions in aesthetics occur when otherwise neutral information is framed in a way that is reductive or biased. Just as the epistemic processes of humans are evident throughout the scientific method, tne epistemic influence of humans is evident throughout the “aesthetic process,” so to speak. Since the situatedness of the aesthetician, artist, and critic bears on the theories, objects, and evaluations they generate, conceptual distortions are fundamentally the result of human error as well as the influence of a variety of factors, such as historical and social setting, i.e. time and place, creative or epistemic resources available, and the situatedness of the aesthetician, artist, or critic. I

70 Nochlin, “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?” 57

offer examples of conceptual distortions within both aesthetic theorizing and art practice: the distinction between “high art” and “craft,” the historical definition of “genius,” the use of reductive tropes, the , and the problem of the “Male Gaze.”

First, historically, the category of “high art” had only been narrow enough to include the work of the great and male masters. High art was conceived as professional, technical, and rational, while its counterpart, “craft,” was - as Whitney Chadwick writes - the negation of everything high art was not: amateur, decorative, and sentimental.71 For instance, in 12th century Europe the industrial shift from agrarian to urban civilization recruited women to produce goods like silk, embroidery, millinery, and special garments.72

Although just as technically intricate and demanding of skill and creativity, reverence for craft shrunk in comparison to its high art counterpart. In other words, there was a hierarchy of art practice, to which high art - the activity of men - outranked craft - the activity of women. The conceptual distortion is located in gendered and hierarchal distinction between high art and craft.

Second, Christine Battersby traced the genealogy of the English term genius back to the Italian term genio and Latin term genius, which roughly translate to the divine forces associated with male fertility, and further, the Italian term ingegno and Latin term ingenium to good judgement, knowledge, and dexterity. In the eighteenth century, the genio/genius

71 Whitney Chadwick. Women, Art, and Society (Second Edition). (Thames and Hudson 1996), 9. 7" Chadwick, Women, Art, and Society (Second Edition), 62-64. 58

and ingegno/ingenium distinction collapsed into one; embedded in the colloquial English term genius was the notion of male fertility and good judgmeni 3 Women were excluded from the category of genius, and in the rare case that a woman was considered a genius, it was because she aligned with the “masculine” qualities of good judgment and dexterity. For example, during the Renaissance artistic genius was the ability to depict accurate and truthful depictions about the world, as inspired by Plato’s theory of mimesis. Only men, with their alleged and unique ability to access universal truths, could produce works of artistic genius; women were allegedly too subjective, and hence, incapable of mimesis. If women were capable of mimesis, it was because they possessed the masculine energy that granted them the ability to do so.

Third, fallacious gender-based associations found in scientific research also exist in art practice, particularly in the character development of various methods of storytelling.

Tropes are reductive or cliche stereotypes, typically used in film and literature, about members of particular social groups. An example of a gendered trope is the “Manic Pixie

Dream ” - a term coined by Nathan Rabin - which is a female character that “exists solely in the fevered imaginations of sensitive writer-directors to teach broodingly soulful young men to embrace life and its infinite mysteries and adventures.”74 She usually “has no discernible inner life,” “only exists to provide the protagonist with some important life

73 Christine Battersby. “Gender and Genius (The Clouded Mirror).” The Bloomsbury Anthology of Aesthetics (edited by Joseph Tanke and Colin McQuillan). (Indiana University Press 2012). 74 Nathan Rabin. “The Bataan Death March of Whimsy Case File #1: Elizabethtown.” (A.V. Film 2007). 59

lesson,”75 and as Roger Ebert wrote, is “completely available” and “absolutely desirable.”76

The Manic Pixie Dream Girl has been used throughout the history of cinema, from classic characters like Holly Golightly in Breakfast At Tiffany’s (1961) to modern characters like

Clementine in The Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004) and Allison in Yes Man

(2008).

The Bechdel test is one method of monitoring fallacious gender-based associations that become reductive tropes in film and literature. The Bechdel Test - popularized by

Alison Bechdel in her comic Dykes to Watch Out For - is a measurement with three criteria to test the portrayal of and literature. The criteria are as follows:

The Bechdel Test:

1. It has to have at least two named women in it,

2. who talk to each other,

3. about something other than a man.

The first two criteria are fairly easy to meet, although 10% of films in the Bechdel database fail. Most films succeed in featuring at least two women although, as noted in the

75 Nathan Rabin, Amelie Gillette, Steven Hyden, Noel Murray, Donna Bowman, and Leonard Pierce. “Wild Things: 16 Films Featuring Manic Pixie Dream ,” (A.V. Film 2008). 76 Roger Ebert. “Review of Garden State.” (RogerEbert.com 2004). 60

section on equity in aesthetics, rarely do films exceed featuring more than ten women, while most films regularly feature more than ten men. However, even if there are two named women who talk to each other, it is not uncommon for their conversations to be shallow, exclusively pertaining to love and romance, or centered around the missions of male characters. Hence, the third criterion, that women discuss something other than a man, is the most significant of the three, as it suggests some degree of autonomy, complexity, and depth in those female characters. From the Bechdel database of over 7760 films, roughly 58% pass all three criteria. Although a majority of their sample pass the

Bechdel test, it remains troublesome that 42% of films do not.77

The Bechdel test has at least two weaknesses. First, it fails to distinguish between female characters who talk about men and something other than men - who are still at-risk of perpetuating fallacious gender-based associations - and female characters who do not talk about men at all - who hopefully evade perpetuating fallacious gender-based associations altogether. Second, the test fails to distinguish between films that feature plenty of men that engage in intellectual or meaningful dialogue and films that feature plenty of men that do not engage in any intellectual or meaningful dialogue, such as in certain action or comedy films. Regardless, the test is a useful measure in .

77 Bechdel Test Movie List. “Statistics.” 61

One possible reason for the abundance of fallacious gender-based associations in film and literature is due to the majority of male directors, writers, producers, executive producers, editors, and cinematographers. In the example of film, the phrase, “the Male

Gaze” - coined by feminist film theorist Laura Mulvey - illustrates how the male eye literally frames and edits scenes as well as how the male mind designs female characters - often according to his own fantasy, notes Mulvey.78 Increasing equity, i.e. appointing more female directors, writers, producers, executive producers, editors, and cinematographers, reduces or neutralizes the effects of the Male Gaze problem in film. Alternatively, the female eye has the opportunity to frame and edit scenes and the female mind has the opportunity to design female characters, likely in more complicated and less reductive and sexualizing ways.

However, accomplishing a “” would require a critical self-awareness on the part of the female director, writer, etc. She is still at risk of assuming the masculine- neutral view-from-nowhere. A feminine style of generating art might employ the By-For-

About model, include more comprehensive and realistic character development sensitive to the social identity-linked experiences of women, or embrace the four commitments of feminist methodology, which are outlined in greater detail in the next section.

***

78 Laura Mulvey. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Reading. Eds. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen. (Oxford University Press 1999), 833-44. 62

Finally, I turn to the second hard feminist perspective on aesthetics - restructuring systems in aesthetics. Revisiting Harding’s definitions of methods, methodology, and epistemology, the debate about restructuring systems in aesthetics is essentially a debate about restructuring aesthetic methodology, or in other words, a theory and analysis of how research in aesthetics should proceed.79 I use the four commitments of feminist methodology as delineated by feminist philosophers of science, Crasnow, Wylie,

Bauchspies, and Potter - relevance, experiential grounding, accountability, and reflexivity - to show how feminist perspectives complicate, illuminate, and generate new questions in both traditional and influential theories within aesthetics, e.g. Hume’s standard of taste and Kant’s theory of beauty, in addition to the contemporary and burgeoning field of neuroaesthetics, in order to illustrate the merits of feminist perspectives on art.

In both aesthetic theorizing and art practice, the feminist commitment to relevance * suggests that feminist aestheticians, artists, and critics ought to strive to understand and abolish oppressive patriarchal structures through constructing aesthetic theories, generating art objects, and critiquing work in a way that is relevant to the everyday lives of women. In other words, aesthetic theories - such as those constructing standards of beauty or taste - ought to be critical of sexist (as well as White, western, racist, classist, and ableist) hegemonic frameworks; art objects ought to accurately, inclusively, and reliably illustrate the gendered and intersectional experiences of women; and critics ought to critique art

791 am open to suggestions regarding the possibility of distinctly feminist methods in aesthetics. 63

objects according to standards that are critical of sexist (as well as White, western, racist, classist, and ableist) hegemonic frameworks.

The feminist commitment to experiential grounding suggests that feminist aestheticians, artists, and critics use the gendered experience of women as a critical and illuminating resource in their work. Equity in the both aesthetic theorizing and art practice, the By-For-About model, and the use of accurate, intersectional, and nuanced character development in various methods of storytelling use the gendered experience of women as a critical and illuminating resource.

Third, the feminist commitment to accountability suggests that feminist aestheticians, artists, and critics adhere to a set of ethical and pragmatic norms in order to uphold values like autonomy, i.e. the right to self-govern, beneficence, i.e. protection from harm and maximizing benefits for agents involved, and justice, i.e. fairness and equity, in their work. For example, feminist aestheticians might practice beneficence in their work through refraining from producing or remaining critical of theories that are sexist (as well

White, western, racist, classist, and ableist). In the case of art practice, film directors might respect the autonomy of their actors through seeking informed consent about the characters their actors are required to play and actions their actors are required to perform.

Critics might respect justice through adopting a critical attitude toward sexist (as well as 64

White, western, racist, classist, and ableist) work and adopting a standard of critique that is inclusive and nondiscriminatory.

Fourth, the feminist commitment to reflexivity proposes the reconceptualization of objectivity from the traditional and impossible-to-achieve view-from-no-where into the acknowledgement and inevitability of the “view-from-somewhere,” i.e. the acknowledgement of the researcher’s own positionality and their target audience. Although art critics might, aestheticians or artists rarely promote objectivity as a standard. However, it is not uncommon for aesthetic theories to promote standpoints that are “neutral,” when they are at risk of perpetuating androcentric and Eurocentric conceptual frameworks, as seen in both Hume and Kant.

In the next section, I show how the feminist commitments complicate, illuminate, and generate new questions in traditional and influential theories within aesthetics, e.g.

Hume’s standard of taste and Kant’s theory of beauty, in addition to the contemporary and burgeoning field of neuroaesthetics, in order to illustrate the merits of feminist perspectives on art.

***

In “O f the Standard of Taste,” writes that it is not uncommon for persons to develop aesthetic opinions, feel pride in expressing them, demand that others agree, and further, feel irritation when those opinions are not shared or are even disputed 65

by others. Hence, it is “natural” for us, Hume writes, to seek a rule - a standard of taste - which tests the accuracy of aesthetic opinions in order to measure the aesthetic prowess of ourselves and others. The problem is that our notions about aesthetic opinions are confused; we mistake sentiment - the highly personal relationship of an individual, specifically the faculties of her mind, with some object - and judgment - matters of fact that are “just and true.” Often, Hume writes, our aesthetic opinions are merely aesthetic sentiments, which are devoid of truth-value because they are so personal, but we mistake them for aesthetic judgements, which are normative.80

How, then, do we develop a standard of taste, and further, how do we practice the standard as aesthetic judges? Hume offers a set of five criteria to satisfy in order to become a “true judge,” i.e. a person with the right capacities and right attitude toward aesthetic objects, which, according to Hume, are few and far between.

First, the ideal judge possesses a sensitive palate, one which detects “every ingredient in the composition” without confusing them or allowing one to overpower another. As derived from his example of Sancho’s kinsmen, only she who tastes not only the various gustatory notes of the wine but also the influence of the old key and leathern thong at the bottom of the bottle possesses “delicacy of taste.”81 Second, the ideal judge

80 David Hume. “O f the Standard of Taste.” Art and Its Significance: An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory (edited by Stephen David Ross). (State University of New York Press 1994), 80-87. 81 The tenn “taste” is at risk of equivocation. It just so happens that Hume’s primary example of delicacy in taste is one that illustrates, literally, a sensitive gustatory palate. However, the “taste” of concern to Hume is 66

sharpens her talents through “frequent survey or contemplation” of aesthetic objects; with practice she perceives each beautiful and defective part of a composition, to which she appropriately assigns praise and blame, rather than generalizing or evaluating the aesthetic object as a whole. Third, the ideal judge is educated in and familiar with the comparison class of the art object she considers; only through comparing the art object to others of its kind does she qualify to “rate its merits” and “assign its proper rank.” Fourth, the ideal judge clears her mind of all prejudice, particularly the influence of her social identity, historical setting, nationality, culture, etc. In other words, the ideal judge assumes the

“view-from-no-where.” Finally, the fifth criterion of Hume’s standard of taste requires that the judgements of all true judges converge. True judges ought to hail from various historical settings and cultural backgrounds to ensure the standard of taste is universal; this requirement is often referred to as Hume’s “test of time.”82

I show how the feminist methodological commitment to reflexivity strengthens

Hume’s standard of taste, particularly through revising the fourth criterion.

First, as noted, Hume’s fourth criterion requires that the ideal judge clear her mind of all prejudice, or in other words assume the view-from-no-where, in order to achieve objectivity as traditionally conceived, i.e. an epistemic state unadulterated by human biases.

However, the feminist commitment to reflexivity - sometimes referred to as Harding’s not confined to the tongue; rather, the term “taste” circumscribes all the sensory organs as well as the impressions made upon them. 82 Hume, “O f the Standard of Taste,” 80-87. 67

“strong objectivity” - contends that the traditional notion of objectivity is neither possible to achieve or epistemically useful. A hard feminist aesthetician would argue that all aesthetic judges are situated in some social setting, historical context, and constrained to some degree by their social identity-linked experiences. In other words, the situatedness of the aesthetic judge bears on her epistemic capacities, particularly her ability to completely clear her mind of prejudice, as Hume requires. She could certainly try to assume a critical attitude toward her own biases and epistemic constraints, but as LATs have suggested, human epistemic agents are riddled with implicit attitudes that regularly shape our judgements and decision-making.83 As it stands, Hume’s fourth criterion fails to capture the reality of how aesthetic judges observe and reason.

Imagine a case where an aesthetic judge convinces herself and others that she has achieved freedom from prejudice, i.e. successfully assumed the view-from-no-where.

However, what she mistakes as “objectivity” is the historically and epistemically hegemonic conceptual framework, i.e. a masculine-neutral and Eurocentric worldview. Through this framework, she asserts a string of aesthetic sentiments. Since her aesthetic sentiments align with the historically and epistemically dominant conceptual framework, her aesthetic sentiments are deemed as aesthetic judgment, i.e. as “just and true” and matter-of-fact, which in turn, reinforces the epistemic hegemony of masculine-neutrality and

Eurocentrism. Thus, there is a circularity; her alleged view-from-no-where (which is really a

83 Greenwald, “Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,” 945-967. 68

view-from-somewhere) confirms the taste of masculine-neutrality and Eurocentrism, which in turn warrants the alleged matter-of-factness of her masculine-neutral and Eurocentric aesthetic sentiment.

The naivete of the view-from-no-where and potential circular pitfall of reinforcing masculine-neutral and Eurocentric aesthetic standards could be avoided through rejecting the fourth criterion, or in other words, revoking the requirement that “true critics” free their mind of all prejudice. The position that has been defended throughout this thesis is that due to the inevitable situatedness of all epistemic agents, the traditional notion of objectivity is neither possible nor useful. Thus, in order to be productive toward Hume’s theory, the fourth criterion could be reconceptualized, as guided by the feminist methodological commitment to reflexivity, as such:

Fourth Criterion of Hume:

The ideal judge clears her mind of all prejudice, particularly the influence of her

social identity, historical setting, nationality, culture, etc.; the ideal judge assumes

the view-from-no-where. 69

Fourth Criterion Reconceptualized:

The ideal judge acknowledges her epistemic, social, and historical positionality and

critically considers how her social identity, historical setting, nationality, culture,

etc., bear on her aesthetic judgments; the ideal judge assumes the view-from-

somewhere.

In other words, the ideal judge might refrain from asserting, “This judgement ought to hold true across all dimensions of time and space.” Rather, the ideal judge might assert, “This judgment seems to reflect the general consensus of this particular culture or sub-culture during this time period,” or alternatively, “After detecting every ingredient in its composition and appropriately assigning proper praise and blame - Hume’s first two criteria - my social and historical disposition influences my aesthetic palate in such a way that I rank art object X as superior to Y.”

The fourth criterion reconceptualized might resemble mere aesthetic sentiment, i.e. the highly personal relationship of an individual with some art object that is devoid of truth-value, but it need not. Hume’s first twTo criteria - i.e. delicacy of taste and nuanced judgement - seem to hold as apt markers of an “ideal,” or at the very least, competent judge. Delicacy of taste and nuanced judgement require education, mindfulness, and practice, and are qualities that require time and experience to properly cultivate. While 70

anyone could achieve aesthetic sentiment, asserting a preference for one art object over another, delicate and nuanced aesthetic judgment, that is simultaneously critical of social and historical positionality, seems to more accurately reflect the characteristics of an “ideal” or competent judge. Moreover, delicacy of taste and nuanced judgment render the competent judge as capable of appreciating art objects from time periods and cultural settings different than her own, since she is not performing a comparative analysis and instead mindfully processing the qualities of the art object in isolation.

The third and fifth criteria, then, are incompatible with the reconceptualized fourth criterion. First, the third criterion, i.e. familiarity with the comparison class of the art object of her consideration in order to rate and rank, becomes obsolete since judges from disparate historical settings will have access to dissimilar comparison classes. In other words, the historical setting of a judge grants them access to art objects made up to that point, but not art objects that have not yet been made. As a result, judges from past and future historical settings would rate merits and assign rankings relative to the comparison class available to them. This in turn, poses a problem for the fifth criterion, i.e. convergence.

Since, judges from disparate social and historical settings, and hence access to dissimilar comparison classes, might arrive at varying aesthetic judgments, the judgements of earlier judges cannot faithfully converge with the judgements of later judges. 71

Thus, Hume’s standard of taste would benefit from the feminist methodological commitment to reflexivity because reflexivity filters out the potential uncritical confirmation of masculine-neutral and Eurocentric standards and emphasizes more apt and neutral markers of an ideal or competent judge. In other words, a standard of taste improved by feminist perspectives (i) emphasizes the first two criteria - i.e. delicacy of taste and nuanced judgment, skills that require cultivation and refinement of the sensory organs and judgment - as more apt markers of an ideal or competent judge; (ii) reconceptualizes the fourth criterion from the view-from-nowhere into the view-from-somewhere - i.e. the acknowledgement of social and historical positionality in addition to the critical consideration of how social identity, historical setting, nationality, culture, etc. bear on aesthetic judgments, which is more accurate, reliable, and epistemically responsible; and

(iii) renders the third and fifth criteria of assigning rank and convergence of judgment as obsolete.

***

In the Critique of Judgment, specifically the section “Analytic of the Beautiful,” Kant outlines four distinct “moments,” or features, of aesthetics judgments of the beautiful; 1 focus on the first two moments - disinterestedness and universality.84

84 . “Critique of Judgment.” Art and Its Significance: An Anthology of Aesthetic Theory (edited by Stephen David Ross). (State University of New York Press 1994), 98-113. 72

In the first moment, Kant distinguishes between pleasantness, goodness, and beauty. First, that which is “pleasant” immediately affords an agreeable sensation to a particular body at a particular time; like Hume’s notion of sentiment, it is a private feeling.

For example, I might consider dry and oaky wines to be most agreeable with my palate (and in the past I did not consider them so), while my friend might find sweet and florals wine to be most agreeable with her palate (but only when paired with fish). It would be silly to tell my friend that her preference in wine is incorrect, and vice versa. That which we find pleasant affords gratification, and since gratification is transitory, we feel moved (or Kant would say, pathologically conditioned) to seek more objects of its kind in order to obtain further gratification. Second, that which is “good” is always good for something, or in other words, it mediately or immediately fulfills some purpose. Our reason recognized goodness, and hence the fulfilling of various purposes, as practically or morally worth pursuing. The inclination to pursue an object, which is both present in experiences of the pleasant and good, is what Kant refers to as bound with interest. Interestedness hinges on the existence of pleasant and good entities in the world that are capable of pursuit, so pleasantness and goodness cannot exist in the mind alone.85

On the other hand, Kant argues that our judgements of the “beautiful” are disinterested. Neither gratifying to the senses nor good for something else, that which is beautiful need not exist as an object of our pursuit. The beautiful, unlike the pleasant and

85 Kant, “Critique of Judgment,” 100. 73

the good, can exist solely in the mind. I could conjure up the mental representation of something beautiful in my imagination, and the satisfaction I feel over contemplating its beauty need not hinge on its existence outside of myself.86 Thus, while interestedness is grounded in the desire to pursue a pleasant or good entity in the world, disinterestedness, such as in the case of beauty, is not grounded in the desire to pursue it, since it is not gratifying to the senses (unlike the pleasant), has no practical or moral interest (unlike the good), and need not exist in the world (unlike the pleasant and the good).

The second moment, universality, builds upon the first moment of disinterestedness. When we make claims about beauty, Kant writes, we demand that the entity we believe to be beautiful, be beautiful for all. Like Hume’s notion of aesthetic judgement, if another judge disagrees with our claim of beauty, we dispute or deny our interlocutor taste. The requirement for judgements of beauty to be universally shared is what Kant refers to as subjective universality. They are subjective because Kant insists that judgments of the beautiful are a product of the human mind, and they are universal because we demand the entity of our consideration be recognized as beautiful by all.87 88

I show how the feminist methodological commitments of reflexivity and relevance complicate Kant’s theory of beauty.

86 Kant, “Critique of Judgment,” 99. 87 Kant, “Critique of Judgment,” 103-105. 88 Douglas Burnham. “Immanuel Kant: Aesthetics.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource, 2018. 74

Although Kant does not endorse the theory of subjective universality, he does argue that it is how judgments of the beautiful behave. However, the feminist methodological commitment to reflexivity shows that the notion of subjective universality, although perhaps compelling at first pass, is not so convincing. Recall that the feminist methodological commitment to reflexivity is the notion that knowers ought to be critical of their own positionality and that all knowledge is situated. To extrapolate, all aesthetic judges ought to be critical of their positionality and all aesthetic judgments are situated or shaped by social and historical constraints.

Reflexivity, particularly acknowledging historical and social positionality, complicates Kant’s notion of subjective universality. For example, aesthetic judgements of the beautiful are more likely to behave as subjectively universal within cultures, as opposed to across cultures. For example, Japanese aesthetics and traditional Western aesthetics diverge in regard to the characteristics that each culturally regards as beautiful. In Japanese aesthetics, the principle of wabi-sabi — which is influenced by Zen Buddhism in

Japan - embraces characteristics like “imperfect, impermanent, and incomplete” as beautiful. Many forms embody the wabi-sabi aesthetic, e.g. raku pottery, Zen gardens, tea houses and ceremonies, etc. meaning their form is intentionally asymmetrical, bears appreciable traces of craftsmanship, or incorporates and ritual. On the other hand, the traditional Western conceptions of beauty - as influenced by the work of 75

Plato and as embodied in Western classical and neo-classical movements - are more likely to embrace characteristics like harmony, proportion, and symmetry.89 The aesthetic influence of classical movements are also reflected in the modem, Capitalist, and consumerist culture of the West, as seen in the inclination to replace the old and worn with the new and shiny. To illustrate the point that aesthetic judgments of the beautiful are more likely to behave universally within cultures, a 2016 study demonstrated that Chinese participants are more likely to prefer traditional Chinese paintings and Westerners are more likely to prefer Western paintings. In-group biases and feelings of “belongingness” are at least partly responsible.90

However, not all aesthetic judges in embrace traditional Japanese characteristics, nor do all aesthetic judges in the contemporary West embrace classical and neo-classical characteristics; thus, even granting universality within cultures is problematic.

The wabi-sabi aesthetic of Japan is upheld by a particular subculture, namely the older and more traditional generations that embrace the principles of Zen Buddhism. On the contrary, the modern street fashion movements of Japan - such as the Harajuku aesthetic - are popular within youth sub-cultures, which reject the requirement of conformity and modesty upheld by traditional Japanese sub-cultures and embrace avant-garde, luxury, and variegated aesthetic characteristics. Likewise, the classical and neo-classical aesthetic

89 Crispin Sartwell. “Beauty.” Plato Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016. 90 Yan Bao, et al. “Aesthetic Preferences for Eastern and Western Traditional Visual Art: Identity Matters” Frontiers in Psychology Vol. 7 1596, 2016. 76

inclination of the West is upheld by a particular subculture; a different subculture within the W est might embrace a rustic aesthetic, i.e. design that has the appearance of being slightly worn and reminiscent of the countryside, or an alternative aesthetic, i.e. design that rejects bourgeois ideals and conformity. In other words, broader cultural contexts like

Japan and the West contain subcultures - like wabi-sabi and Harajuku, or classical and alternative - that are at odds with one another.

In other words, while judgements of the beautiful are more likely to behave universally within cultures as opposed to across cultures - as indicated by the 2016 study and the examples above - even that characterization is not totally apt. Even within cultures, there are subcultures with conflicting judgements of the beauty and taste. Judgments of the beautiful are situated within particular time periods, cultural settings, and subcultural settings. Perhaps only on a subcultural level are judgements of the beautiful likely to behave universally, but even that claim is not convincing; there can also be conflicting judgments of beauty within subcultures. Where does it end? The requirement of universality seems to collapse into a regress.

Alternatively, aesthetic judges are also capable of cultivating their aesthetic palate through education, mindfulness, and practice in order to appreciate art objects from different cultures, subcultures, and time periods than their own. In a globalized world, it is 77

difficult to imagine aesthetic judges who do not or cannot consider art objects from different cultures, sub-cultures, and time periods as beautiful.

What, then, is the pull of Kant’s theory of subjective universality that at first pass seems to faithfully describe how aesthetic judgments behave? Aesthetic judgments can behave globally and cross-culturally, but they also behave culturally, sub-culturally, sub-sub- culturally, etc. Although the solution to this puzzle is not immediately clear, the feminist methodological commitment to reflexivity - through acknowledging the situatedness of aesthetic judges and their judgements - succeeds in drawing out important complications of the notion of subjective universality. Kant’s theory of beauty, which remains influential centuries after its introduction, must address these caveats for cogency.

Second, the feminist commitment to relevance also complicates Kant’s notion of subjective universality because it is at risk of justifying the expectation that women and marginalized groups conform to harmful beauty standards. Recall that the feminist methodological commitment to relevance is the idea that feminist aestheticians, artists, and critics ought to strive to understand and abolish oppressive patriarchal structures through constructing aesthetic theories, generating art objects, and critiquing work in a way that is relevant to the everyday lives of women in addition to rejecting aesthetic theories or standards of critique that are sexist (as well as White, western, racist, classist, and ableist). 78

Spade and Valentine define beauty standards, i.e. the feminine beauty ideal, as “the socially constructed notion that physical attractiveness is one of most important assets of women, and something all women should strive to achieve and maintain.”91 The pressure to achieve and maintain feminine beauty ideals have been shown to be psychologically harmful and often involve extreme, painful, or deleterious physical manipulation in order achieve the desired effect, such as long necks with the use of neck rings in Burma, thin waists with the use of corsets in Europe, body hair removal in the Middle East, and small feet with the use of foot binding in China.92 93 Feminine beauty ideals vary over time and across cultures; they can also persist across time, cultures, and continents - or be upheld

“universally” so-to-speak - such as the harmful notion that lighter skin is more beautiful than darker skin (as well as a perceived indicator of femininity, higher socio-economic class, and other positive characteristics).94

Recall that Kant’s notion of subjective universality posits that aesthetic judges expect (or even demand) their assertions of beauty be recognized by others. Moreover, matters regarding beauty, unlike matters regarding pleasantness or goodness, are subject to dispute. This expectation is precarious. Consider the case of a group of masculine-neutral

91 J. Z. Spade and C. G. Valentine. The Kaleidoscope of Gender: Prisms, Patterns, and Possibilities. (Pine Forge Press 2008). Elayne Saltzberg and Joan Chrisler. "Beauty Is the Beast: Psychological Effects of the Pursuit of the Perfect Female Body." Women: A Feminist Perspective, Edition: 5, (Mayfield 1995), 306-315. 93 Marianne Thesander. "The Feminine Ideal". (Reaktion Books Ltd 1997), 20-25. 94 Peter Frost. "Human Skin Color: A Possible Relationship Between Its Sexual Dimorphism and Its Social Perception." Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 32, No. 1, 1988, 38-58. 79

and Eurocentrically-inclined judges who expect that their assertions of human beauty be recognized and upheld by others. Since masculine-neutrality and Eurocentrism have historically possessed epistemic hegemony, their assertions of human beauty are often upheld. This case is all too familiar; a group of people dictate which values ought to be respected and which ought to be condemned - values of beauty included. These expectations are not only impossible to achieve but they also perpetuate oppressive systems that are harmful to women and other marginalized groups.

Thus, Kant’s theory of beauty, as it stands, contains some problematic implications that are illuminated by the hard feminist perspectives - in these cases, the commitments to reflexivity and relevance. Defenders of Kant’s theory of beauty ought to address these complications, namely the problem of cultural regress (in regard to judgements of beauty) and the precarity of expectations (in regard to subjective universality) for cogency.

***

Finally, the field of neuroaesthetics would benefit from the feminist perspectives at- large. Neuroaesthetics, a burgeoning research area at the intersection of cognitive neuroscience and aesthetics, is a scientific theory of art that defends the notion that - with time and technology - aesthetic perceptions of art, music, and other aesthetic experiences can be explained through identifying biological underpinnings and neural correlates.95 96

95 Anjan Chatterjee and Oshin Vartanian. “Neuroaesthetics,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences July 2014, VoL 18, No. 7. 2014. 80

For example, some neuroscientists, like Ramachandran, have offered an evolutionary and adaptive theory of art through analyzing the appeal and repulsion to particular visual scenes, while others, like Zeki, attempt to offer a neuroscientific theory of art through identifying the neural correlates of aesthetic perceptions with various brain imaging techniques.97 98

Many critics have been challenged the promise of a scientific theory of art. Some philosophers, like Alva Noe, find neuroaesthetics to be a fascinating and useful enterprise, but ultimately argue that neuroaesthetics misses the point of art and aesthetic experience, which are more than the sum of their parts.99 Others criticize methods, pointing out that it is difficult to distinguish the alleged neural correlates of aesthetic perceptions from ordinary perceptions, image detection, or thinking.100

My critique of a neuroscientific theory of art, however, is in line with what has been argued extensively in the first section of this thesis. Because neuroaesthetics utilizes the scientific method, the scientific method as it applies to a theory of art, beauty, value, etc. is susceptible to the epistemic processes, biases, and situatedness of the scientists involved. As neuroaesthetics enters mainstream scientific inquiry, it is recommended that

96 This is reminiscent of the debate between the soft and hard problem of consciousness, as originally introduced by David Chalmers. 97 V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein. “The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory of Aesthetic Experience,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 6, Numbers 6-7, (Imprint Academic 1999), 15-51. 98 Tomohiro Ishizu and Semir Zeki. “A Neurobiological Enquiry into the Origins of our Experience of the Sublime and Beautiful.” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:891. 2014. 99 Alva Noe. Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature. (Hill and Wang 2015). 100 Chatterjee, “Neuroaesthetics.” 81

neuroaesthetics research proceed with the soft and hard feminist perspectives in mind. In other words, add more women into neuroaesthetics research (which is currently a male- dominated research program), avoid and correct omissions in existing research, avoid and correct fallacious gender-based associations (which was one critique of Ramachandran’s evolutionary theory of art),101 and proceed with the feminist methodological commitments of relevance, experiential grounding, accountability, and reflexivity in mind.

(

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, I have offered a taxonomy to situate various positions in the spectrum of feminist perspectives on both science and art. I defended the contention that feminist perspectives are crucially important for the empirical sciences because they have promoted and generated more accurate, comprehensive, nuanced, and useful bodies of scientific research. My thesis was, since the fields of science and art are relevantly similar - they share epistemic, representational, and interpretive characteristics and objectives that are relevant in the application of feminist perspectives from science to art - feminist perspectives have been and will continue to be crucially important in both aesthetic theorizing and art practice. Feminist perspectives promote and generate more accurate,

101 In “The Science of Art,” Ramachandran used die example of a voluptuous female deity in order to demonstrate the evolutionary appeal of “peak-shift” in visual scenes. The peak-shift principle is the idea that objects with exaggerated characteristics are appealing to die visual system, and thus rewarded by the limbic system, since detecting changes in the environment is adaptively beneficial. 82

comprehensive, nuanced, and useful theories of art, beauty, taste, and value as well as contribute to more advancement, diversity, and inclusion throughout the artworld.

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