Volume 9, No.Volume 3•November 2006 those oftheauthorsalone. however,are here, presented views carried out under INSS auspices. The based, for the most part, on research is and guests and researchers INSS by written Strategic Assessmentis security agenda. national Israel’s on be, should or are,that issues the on debate public ment The purposeofStrategicAssess- is to stimulate and enrich the enrich and stimulate to is http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ISSN 07938942 © Copyright. All rightsreserved. http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ the Institute’swebsite: Assessment isavailableon The fulltextofStrategic in EnglishandHebrew. Strategic Assessmentispublished Fax: +972-3-642-2404 Tel: +972-3-640-9926 Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978,Israel Tel Aviv University, Institute forNationalSecurityStudies published bythe Assessment isaquarterly Strategic Shahar Kober Illustrations Michal Semo Graphic Design Judith Rosen Editor Moshe Grundman Managing Editor Zvi Shtauber Editor-in-Chief perspective. broad a from written are edition rent say. its have will – state or government – the commission investigating the war too, clearer.So become and multiply sights to be gleaned from the war will in- the and time, over disappear will period intermediate the of area gray perspective. greater from come will that insights term fighting long the the and of end the bridge ing speak- chronologically that articles unfolding. This edition presents eight gust 2006,lookedatthewarasitwas of edition previous The criticism. and analyses, comments, thoughts, post-war initial the precisely, more War, or Lebanon second the war, a covers again once War. Iraq the and War, istence are the Lebanon War, the Gulf ex- of years thirty the its during by Center covered topics the Among T tributions inourcurrent andfuture areas ofresearch activity. con- expanded and research illustrious for known institute, new flourishing a into grow will we location, new the in and name new the under that hope inIsrael. studies strategic in research of seeds first the planted ter, ground where the late Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Yariv, the first head of the Cen- Telthe fertile on the building Aviv– Gillman campus the University – years (INSS). Studies Security National for Institute the becomes now Center the curity, se- national Israel’s on conferences and seminars, publications, of hundreds The first three articles of the cur the of articles three first The ae kon s h Jfe Cne. olwn futu yas rich with years fruitful Following Center. Jaffee the as known later period for the Center for Strategic Studies, established in late 1977 and of edition his We will also soon be parting from the Center’s home of nearly thirty nearly of home Center’s Wefromthe parting be soon also will , of , Strategic Assessment Au- n h oeig article opening the In Editors’ Note goes to press during a transitional a during press to goes Strategic Assessment hs edition This This - in advance of the next – inevitable – inevitable – next the of advance in call wake-up a as serve should war inthe failure Israel’s that suggests author The winning. of chance ithad little outset the from that conflict military a in entangled became Israel deterioration, this of result a As tion. applica- and buildup force military to approach Israel’s in deterioration the from stemmed Lebanon in paign Tira claims that the failure of the cam- Ron writer, guest a by authored also are not relevant. In the second article, deterrence of ideas classical organization where guerilla a with war a cupation with deterrence drew it into preoc- Israel’s addition, In question. into called been have war of value the about ideas traditional of lidity va- the the and weapons, force, of advantages of use very the because but over, is it once victory claim can side each because merely post-modern not war, a was War Lebanon second the that argues Shelah Ofer It is our is It round of fighting. In contrast to these second, at Hizbollah under the new deployment of the Lebanese army two critical articles, Dr. Roni Bart of circumstances created in the war’s lays the foundation for trends that INSS surveys the accomplishments of aftermath, by Dani Berkovich, a visit- if realized have positive implica- the war. These indeed do exist, and ing researcher at INSS. Kulick claims tions for Israel’s security and for re- even if they are overshadowed by that Hizbollah had long prepared for inforcing Lebanon’s sovereignty and the lapses of the war, a balanced re- this campaign governed by two prin- authority within its own territory. view of the war requires delineating cipal assumptions: the weakness of Berkovich also contends that from the positive outcomes along with the Israeli society, and the IDF’s reliance Israel’s viewpoint, the very launch- negative results. on a precision firepower campaign. ing of such a process is in itself an The following two articles, by The organization’s primary opera- achievement of the war. INSS researchers Noam Ophir and tional objective was to wage a war The final article in this edition ex- Gabriel Siboni, deal with the IDF’s of attrition on Israel’s home front, at- amines the sensitive subject of tactical confrontation with the rocket threat, tacking as deeply as possible within intelligence during the second Leba- specifically as it uses the aerial and Israel and and for as long as possible, non War, whose achievements fell ground measures available to it. even in the face of massive bombard- short of what was expected. The au- Ophir’s article looks at the perfor- thor, Yoaz Hendel, a doctoral student mance of the Israeli air force during at INSS, focuses on understanding the second Lebanon War, underscor- the reasons for the disparity between ing the air force’s abilities and limi- the real and the ideal at the tactical tations in grappling with Katyusha intelligence level, as manifested dur- fire. Ophir’s argument is that the air ing the ground forces fighting. The force drew almost in full on its ability article reviews the shortcomings that to confront surface-to-surface rocket were manifested in three major areas: launchers, and therefore in the fore- intelligence gathering, intelligence seeable future and under similar assessment, and information dis- circumstances, it is likely that aerial semination. Hendel offers a possible force cannot achieve much more explanation for these shortcomings than what was achieved in this war. ment and ground operations by IDF and proposes two recommendations In his article, Siboni examines the dif- forces. The author analyzes the orga- for improving the current state of af- ferent tactics required by the military nization’s behavior during the war fairs. for effective opposition to the threat and sketches its preparations, based This edition is likely not the last of Qassam rockets launched from the on lessons gleaed from this war, for to examine aspects of the war of July- Gaza Strip. Basing his analysis on the the inevitable next campaign. In his August 2006. It is also likely that the realistic objectives that the IDF has, article, Berkovich looks at the po- Institute for National Security Stud- given the prevailing set of limitations tential dynamic between Hizbollah ies will, in the future, open its doors and constraints, Siboni analyzes the versus the Lebanese army, which, as to guest authors who wish to express essence of the operational challenge the major executive arm of the Leba- their opinions on strategic issues at and the optimal methods to combat nese government, bears the brunt hand. In addition, readers’ comments this threat. of implementing Security Council on articles published in the editions The next two articles look at Hiz- resolution 1701. There is a wide gap of Strategic Assessment are most wel- bollah – the first, at its performance between a UN resolution and actual come, and may be published in fu- during the war, by Amir Kulick, a steps towards disarming Hizbollah. ture editions at the discretion of the researcher at the Institute; and the Nonetheless, argues Berkovich, the editors. Anti-War Ofer Shelah

In interviews he gave before Rosh Hashanah, which are in effect the first draft of his testimony to the government investigation commission he appointed, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said, “The results of the second war in Lebanon will look better with time.” Like most of the com- ments on the thirty-three days of war, this sentence can be interpreted in different ways. The dwindling number of Olmert supporters consider this a great truth that reflects how short- sighted the public is, and how it is influenced by the populist media. Opponents will argue that Olmert is trying to turn black into white and convince himself and the entire nation that what the eye sees and the heart feels is simply not true. This debate will ultimately be decided on the streets and at the voting booth. However, the very fact that the debate exists attests to the nature of the battle. The second Lebanon War (a name that in itself is controversial – there are grounds to the claim that the term “war” is a bit grandiose for the hostilities) was a post-modern war. This is not only due to the fact that after it ended both sides could parade proudly and claim victory, but also because the very use of force and the traditional importance of arms to ideas about the value of war were cast in doubt. In this regard, the fighting in Lebanon could be classed with the second intifada: two post- modern conflicts, beyond the “new wave” and the “revolution in military affairs” that were the subjects of so much discussion in the 1990s. To borrow a well-known term, albeit with a somewhat different meaning than the one given by Alvin and Heidi Toffler in a book they published over a decade before June 12, 2006, Lebanon War II was Israel’s first anti-war.1

A Farewell to Arms response, retaliation, and obsessions – which is in fact what occurred be- The first sentence any Israeli soldier with deterrence, has been applicable fore the end of the decade. Victory on learns in an officer’s course comes for over fifty years and is seemingly the battlefield, about which there is from Carl von Clausewitz: war is the clear: before you take up arms, know still a debate whether it was achieved continuation of policy by other means. what policy you are looking to imple- on a purely military level (if such a The significance of this sentence, par- ment. Looked at from a different an- level actually exists), was secondary ticularly to a country that feeds off its gle, the success of a war can be judged to achieving the political objective anxieties and instinctively inclines to by the subsequent political results. – even though the military achieve- We now know that Anwar Sadat ment of the initial days, limited as 1. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: based Egypt’s military move of Octo- it was, was essential to attaining Making Sense of Today’s Global Chaos (New York: Warner Books, 1993). ber 1973 on a clearly defined policy the political objective. Israel, on the designed to ultimately regain the Si- other hand, responded to the threat Journalist and commentator, Channel 10. nai Peninsula through an agreement as it saw it rather than to the actual

2 threat. It perceived an Arab attempt ability to use it to achieve a tangible and the French army from Lebanon. to destroy it, which was not at all part achievement, were the basis for the For its part, the Lebanese army will of Sadat’s plans (typically, Israel had declaration (and the pervading sense stay stationed along the border only intelligence information to that effect, in the Arab world, as well as in Israel as long as Hizbollah wants it to, as it but the country’s leadership ignored itself) that Hizbollah earned its victo- does not have the strength or the will it) and in the absence of any defined ry by virtue of the fact that it was still to confront the Shiite organization. policy, it did not eventually score a on its feet after thirty-three days of Hizbollah’s arsenal of rockets still victory. What would have happened fighting, and even launched over 200 poses a threat to northern Israel, and had Israel been prepared for the war Katyusha rockets at Israel on the last the fighting proved that it can con- and had the Egyptian and Syrian day of the war. Had Israel not been tinue shooting, paralyze the north of forces been dealt a decisive blow on so strong and had the post-modern the country for a long period of time, October 6, 1973 is of course a moot war not been fought in such a man- and, in a sense, force Israel to blink point, but there are grounds for argu- ner, whereby this strength did not first. Other elements in the region ing that in that case Sadat would not come into play and did not influence got a better idea of how to confront have achieved his political objective. the outcome of the battle or impact Israel’s strength and gained insight However, in July 2006, the fighting on what emerged from the hostilities, into the cracks in the decision-mak- took an amazing turn: the political Nasrallah’s losses would have been ing level, even in the IDF itself. results of the war were entirely un- more prominent. On the other hand, one of the peo- connected to the events on the battle- One could expand this line of ple who gained most from the war field. The IDF’s fumbling moves on thinking further: in the second Leba- (in the meantime, as the long term land could have succeeded or failed; non War, the party that had weapon- results of the war are not entirely the aerial bombardments could have ry and used it lost, and the side that clear) was the person who suffered been accurate or have missed their desisted from war gained. Hizbollah the most losses without firing a sin- targets; Israel could have reached the sustained a physical blow (albeit one gle shot: Fouad Siniora, the Lebanese Awali River and even Beirut or have from which it will quickly recover, prime minister. The empathy aroused stayed south of the international bor- as physical destruction does not im- by the severe Israeli attack, which der. The military moves that Olmert pact on a guerilla organization in the caused many civilian casualties – in is trying to lean on, which may ulti- same way it impacts on a country); Israel the sense was that the IDF fired mately generate a better security sit- its standing within Lebanon is un- selectively and with great restraint, uation than existed on July 11, could certain; and relations with its Iranian yet the overwhelming majority of have unfolded in any manner. More- patron have worsened as, in Iranian fatalities were innocent Lebanese ci- over, there are grounds to the claim eyes, Israel’s unexpected response vilians – together with international that the main moves were made be- damaged a strategic asset Iran had fears over the future of Lebanon as fore the shooting started, and even been building up for years. an independent entity, helped Siniora led Hassan Nasrallah to opt for the Israel’s situation did not improve adopt the status of a victim and a rep- kidnapping that sparked off the hos- either: the threat to the north of the resentative of the great hope. He used tilities. country was not removed. It is clear his image to portray Lebanon as look- What exerted pressure on Hizbol- to everyone that Hizbollah can drive ing to escape the clutches of Hizbol- lah was not Israel’s military might. In out an international force at will – it lah and stop serving as the battlefield fact, the situation was the opposite did so back in 1983, when it carried where regional forces conduct their – this strength was almost the only out a series of terror attacks that led wars. Siniora came out of the war in a asset Nasrallah had. That, and the in- to the hurried exit of the US marines stronger political position.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 3 Third party countries that did not proxies, came out of the war with an the raised hammer was far more sig- take up arms also gained, or may opportunity to improve their posi- nificant than the actual pain of the gain from the war. In an attack meant tions. The statements made by Presi- blow when the hammer was low- to obstruct the smuggling of arms to dent Bush indicate the shortcomings ered. Hizbollah, the air force killed sev- of taking a military option against In contrast to the common as- eral dozen Syrian farmers. It is easy Iran, and the Iranians themselves, sumptions and the populist ob- to imagine what Israel would have now that the general enthusiasm for servations in the media, Israel did done in a similar situation: it would confrontation has lessened, are like- not ignore Hizbollah’s stockpile of have launched a heavy bombard- ly to achieve better results from the arms. There were initial reports of ment against the aggressor. Syria, complicated game of poker they are the growing, substantial arsenal be- which knows Israel well and under- playing with the West over the mat- fore the withdrawal from Lebanon in stands the true balance of deterrence ter of their nuclear capability. Thus, May 2000 and, over the years, the in- telligence corps made sure the rising Force is no longer the continuation of policy by other figures were leaked to the media. Ev- ery Israeli knew that Nasrallah had means. In fact, the situation has been reversed: the side more than 10,000 warheads aimed that uses force has a greater chance of losing. at Israel; everyone knew that Haifa Bay and areas beyond it were within the target range. Over the years (in fact, long before the withdrawal, as between them, opted for restraint. while it is too early to predict how the even when the IDF was in southern However, Bashar Asad, who was Iranian affair will play itself out, and Lebanon there were clear instruc- driven out of Lebanon a few months notwithstanding the nascent post- tions to the Northern Command “to earlier, found a loophole in the war war stage, it is not too early to deter- do everything to prevent Katyusha that he may be able to use to remove mine the first anti-war rule: force is attacks”) the raised hammer ham- his state from the list of the West’s no longer the continuation of policy pered Israel’s freedom of movement, most detested countries. He may by other means. The Clausewitz con- heightened the sense of threat and even be able to initiate a process that nection between the two has been the anxiety of residents in the north could ultimately help him realize his severed, the ability to achieve politi- of Israel, and played on the already father’s dream and regain the Golan cal gain through a military operation strained nerves of the IDF leadership. Heights through negotiations with has almost completely dissipated, Amazingly, Nasrallah’s big mistake Israel. It is not clear if Asad either un- and, in fact, the situation has been re- was to implement his threat. derstands the opportunity he has or versed: the side that uses force has a This does not in any way imply a is able to seize it. However, it is clear greater chance of losing. cavalier dismissal of the suffering of that had he mobilized his army, even At the systems-tactics level, the the residents of the north during the for a limited response, he would have fighting in Lebanon displayed an- fighting, the economic damages, or come out of the war as a big loser, other anti-war paradox: almost every the human casualties, and certainly and may even have been ousted as weapon lost its significance and ef- not the deaths of dozens of civilians president. fectiveness as soon as it was used. All in the Katyusha rocket attacks. How- Likewise, Iran and the US, two deterrents lost their power as soon as ever, on the macro-national level, rivals who both viewed the war as a the threat was translated into reality. 4,000 Katyusha rockets were fired on kind of confrontation between their The expected pain from the blow of Israel and their damage was shown to

4 be minimal – despite the lack of prep- sic activity of the war, had no impact victory, preferably in every battle, aration by the government, and de- at all. Hizbollah made almost no ef- generates an image of strength and spite the terrible shortcomings in the fort on behalf of its soldiers trapped deterrence. This mentality has not protection, evacuation, and financial in the area controlled by Israel, and changed despite the historical facts support measures. Israel’s GDP will their death had no influence on showing otherwise for some time: suffer minimally, if at all, residents the continued Katyusha rocket fire the Six Day War, which ended in a of northern Israel (if the government – which, ultimately, brought Israel to crushing victory, did not deter the acts wisely) can receive full compen- the end of the conflict in a state of ex- Egyptians from embarking on the sation for their financial losses, and haustion – and naturally did not in- War of Attrition just two years later, the Katyusha rocket has lost its sta- fluence the decisions of the Hizbollah and the Yom Kippur War three years tus as a threat, as someone made the leadership. after that. mistake of using it to such an extent During the war the IDF fired Israel turned a localized incident that the significance of the rocket fire 130,000 shells and carried out ten into a war in order to consolidate its completely eroded. A rocket cannot thousand air sorties. Some of its basic deterrence. The political and military bring a country to its knees, certainly ammunition was used so extensive- leadership did not recognize that not a country with economic and or- ly (and uncontrollably) that stocks with an organization like Hizbollah, ganizational strength – relative to its were exhausted and immediate sup- there has never been, will not be, and enemies – such as Israel. As such, the plies were required from within and cannot be any deterrence – as it is not potential rocket is far more effective outside Israel. A confrontation with a state that takes responsibility and it than the rocket that has actually been around 1,000 men (we will prob- does not have a backbone that can be fired. ably never know exactly how many crushed. On the other hand, even fail- By the same token the IDF’s enor- Hizbollah personnel were actually ing on the land-based battlefield and mous strength has also lost its sig- armed during the war), in a limited in creating the image of victory did nificance, as it was used against an arena of less than ten kilometers in not essentially change the deterrence enemy it could not overcome. The air depth, without an enemy tank or jet, towards Syria: Bashar Asad may en- force bombardment was successful in and with an adversary that barely gage in highbrow talk, but out of a destroying Hizbollah’s mid and long launched any attacks (throughout the sense of weakness and recognition of range rocket arsenals. However, be- fighting Hizbollah initiated a single Israeli supremacy, he decided not to yond the claim (which has also yet to attack only, on paratroopers at Bint respond to the damage inflicted on be proven) that this prevented the or- Jbail, which ended in decisive success his citizens and sovereignty. ganization from firing at areas much for the IDF) brought Israel to a state The conclusion that Asad will further south than Haifa – even the air reminiscent of the need for the airlift draw from the fighting in Lebanon force does not claim that it destroyed during the Yom Kippur War. There is relates to his perception of defense: it the last rocket, yet Hadera was hit by nothing more anti-war than that. should be more similar to that of Hiz- only one rocket throughout the war bollah, be entrenched on the ground, – this was the extent of the effective- The Preoccupation with and create dispersed low profile po- ness of the IDF’s most successful Deterrence sitions with as few as possible heavy corps in the war. Another interesting outcome of the control facilities that can be struck The ground forces incursion had anti-war relates to deterrence, one of and incapacitated. On the other hand, absolutely no effect on the progress the known obsessions of the IDF and he should know that an attack on Is- of the war, a result that the IDF knew the Israeli public. The concept of the rael will end in failure. If Syrian tanks from the outset. Even killing, the ba- old war is still embraced: decisive move from their bases towards the

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 5 border, it is highly unlikely that they of death and failure – touches on the the IDF did not achieve its objectives, will get there. main conclusion to be drawn from and the deterrence of the enormous This is another anti-war turn- the second Lebanon War: in anti-war, number of unfired rockets would around, which was framed by theo- the real wisdom is not to know how have been maintained – and if it had reticians, particularly in the US, over and when to use force, but how and implemented a unilateral ceasefire twenty years ago: the old approach, when not to use it. at various exit points. In anti-war according to which offensive initia- Government ministers, senior of- the right question is not how much tive is an advantage, has been over- ficers, and commentators – in fact, time there is to fight but when should turned. Israel would have difficulty almost everyone not called Olmert, fighting stop. attacking Syria on the ground, as the Peretz, or Halutz – are united after Had the Israeli leadership recog- area between Kuneitra and Damas- the event in the opinion that few nized this fact before the anti-war, it cus has not been used for maneuvers held in real time: Israel achieved very would have set objectives that could for some time. Despite the fact that little after July 14, at a cost that does have been attained by an exten- its absolute air supremacy would not justify the gains. Almost all the sive aerial punitive operation – and, enable it to destroy control systems results in which the prime minister again, these objectives were by no and targets in the field and inflict far glories were achieved in the first two means small and local. The continued greater damage on the Syrian leader- days of the war, before all the damage fighting that no one had planned, and ship than the damage caused to the was caused – particularly the deep in- even those who ordered it did not be- diffuse Hizbollah organization, mov- ner rift in the IDF that will fester for lieve would yield benefits, stemmed ing into Syria is liable to entangle the some time. from a well-established mentality forces in something similar to Leba- Israel would have been in a bet- and from an adherence to the axioms non. The IDF reached this conclusion ter situation had it defined the event of the old war according to which fifteen years ago, but as mentality as a punitive operation rather than more time and more force produce always overcomes insight, it did not a war, without mounting a land op- more gains. This cost the lives of over even apply this in Lebanon. eration, and without using its enor- 100 soldiers and civilians. “Out of twenty-three days of this mous reserve forces, whose strength Those responsible are paying and war, twenty-one days were complete- was wasted like a heavyweight boxer will pay the price. However, the real ly superfluous.” This remark, made in punching air. Hizbollah would have conclusions are no less important. In the middle of the fourth week of the gained had it launched far fewer other words, it is not clear how long war by one of the people who know Katyusha rockets – fifteen a day the prime minister, minister of de- Prime Minister Olmert best – and would have achieved the same result fense, and chief of staff will remain in who, at the time, did not know that in wearing down the Israeli home office, but the anti-war will be with Israel was facing another ten days front and in generating the sense that us for a long time.

The Institute for National Security Studies expresses its deep gratitude to

Marcia Riklis (New York) for the support she provided to the Institute’s Outreach Program, in the framework of which Strategic Assessment is published.

6 Breaking the Amoeba’s Bones Ron Tira

While the list of lapses in the second Lebanon War is long, the root cause of the failure on the battlefield stems from the deterioration in the Israeli approach to the buildup and use of military force. This deterioration has resulted partly inadvertently and partly from staunch adherence to preexisting concepts. Reviewing the deterioration in the approach to force buildup and the use of force, this article will examine the changes in buildup and the approach to force application during the period that preceded the war, and will look at the operational concepts adopted for the war that emerged from these changes. It will examine the inadequate results of force application during the war, discuss the alternative strategies for the use of force (if at all) available to Israel after the kidnapping of its two soldiers on July 12, 2006, and look at possible future directions.

Before the War: Three Levels high-intensity scenarios. In fact, some defense and headed by Dan Meridor of Deterioration reserve units encountered first tier to examine Israel’s security concept. The first level of deterioration stems operational scenarios in the war af- The committee submitted its findings from the view adopted over the past ter a lapse of four and even six years earlier this year. However, security, a decade that the probability of war without relevant training. term taken from the world of warfare, with countries that share a border The second level of deteriora- is a continuation of policy using other with Israel (“the first tier”) is low, tion stems from the thinking that if, means and intends at times to impose and the main threat comes from nevertheless, first tier war erupts, change or generate a political result. countries like Iran (“the second-third Israel would be interested only in Those interested only in destroying tier”) and from the Palestinians (“the preventing change, not in effecting it. approaching enemy tanks engage in inner tier”). As such, resources, mili- In such a case, Israel could make do guarding the borders, but not in the tary training, and approaches to the with stopping the enemy at the bor- country’s security. use of force were diverted from the ders with accurate firepower, and the The precision firepower-oriented first tier to the second and inner tiers. importance of territory and ground approach, in practice (if not in theory) Thus, one regular division and sev- maneuvers deep into enemy terri- foregoes taking the initiative to dictate eral reserve divisions were dissolved, tory would lessen. Paraphrased, “a political objectives, as it is doubtful procurement plans were withdrawn, border patrol force rich in precision whether firepower-based operations and reserve units were not trained in weapons” would suffice, and the alone can in all cases unsettle an ene- need for armored formations moving my and cause it to experience distress heavily towards enemy towns would and defeat to the extent that it seeks Formerly the head of a unit in Is- rael Air Force intelligence (“Lahak”). diminish. This approach is also re- a ceasefire or surrenders. Moreover, An abridged version of this article was flected in a report prepared by a com- negating the ability and the concept published in Haaretz, September 15, 2006. mittee appointed by the minister of of transferring the war to the enemy’s

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 7 territory in many cases is liable to ob- the system has critical junctions; and late the nature of the second Lebanon viate achieving victory even in wars third, there is sufficient familiarity War, and adopted operational con- designed to prevent change. It may with the enemy’s system and its criti- cepts that were destined to fail. result in an inconclusive ending to cal junctions. The orders given for Operation the fighting or, at least, prolong the Against the background of these Change of Direction (the Israeli mili- war far beyond the length of the wars ideas, a flawed approach was ad- tary name for the second Lebanon Israel has experienced to date, with opted by some who believed that it War) indicate that Israel designed its all the implications this would have is possible to wage a war with mini- operations in the campaign around for the Israeli economy and society. mal friction and at a low cost, and the two themes. The first was to conduct a standoff firepower-based war against Even if motivated by Israel, the Lebanese government did the Lebanese Republic so as to push it to dismantle Hizbollah for us. In- not have the political force to confront Hizbollah and its deed, at the outset of the war Israel patrons, Iran and Syria. declared that the Lebanese govern- ment was responsible for the kidnap- The third level of deterioration in IDF entered the second Lebanon War ping of the two soldiers, and struck the Israeli concept of employing mili- imbued with the three levels of dete- targets such as Lebanese air force bas- tary force was the over-zealous em- rioration. However, in contrast to all es, Lebanese oil refineries, petroleum brace of the American effects-based preconceived notions, this war was and gas facilities, bridges inside and operations (EBO) idea. EBO’s aim is waged in the first tier; it attempted around Beirut, and so on. However, it to paralyze the enemy’s operational to effect change in Lebanon; and it soon became apparent – what should ability, in contrast to destroying its was fought against guerilla forces, have been understood beforehand military force. This is achieved by which not only do not have a system- – that even if motivated by Israel, the striking the headquarters, lines of like structure or critical junctions, but Lebanese government did not have communication, and other critical whose structure Israel barely under- the political force to confront Hizbol- junctions in the military structure. stands. lah and its patrons, Iran and Syria. EBO were employed in their most dis- Conversely, pressure on Siniora’s tinct form in the Shock and Awe cam- Misconceptions about Using government could lead to its collapse paign that opened the 2003 Iraq War. Force and harm Israeli interests in sowing However, the Americans used EBO to Clausewitz argued that the second the seeds of pro-Western democracy prepare the way for their ground ma- most important undertaking of the in Lebanon. Siniora, al-Hariri junior, neuvers, and not as an alternative to political and military echelons in any and their Sunni colleagues were in- them. Notwithstanding their mastery war (after defining its political objec- deed motivated to weaken Hizbollah of EBO, the Americans adhered to a tive) is to understand and formulate well before the war, in the wake of balanced mix of forces and operation- its unique nature, as no two wars are the Hariri assassination and the Ce- al approaches. Moreover, even Col. identical. The main question that the dar Revolution. But they had reached John Warden (US Air Force), author politician and general have to ask the limit of their political powers and of The Enemy as a System, in which themselves is, how does the impend- against their will were forced to ac- the idea of EBO was first formulated, ing military campaign differ from cept representatives of Hizbollah into claimed there are three basic precon- campaigns that preceded it? Due to the government. ditions for EBO use: first, the enemy the three levels of deterioration, Is- This campaign theme was rejected has a system-like structure; second, rael failed to understand and formu- by Israel’s American and European

8 allies, which blocked a larger scale neuvering forces or transporting sup- without Israel’s being able to hit most offensive against Lebanese infra- plies. The fighters, weapons, and sup- of the launchers with standoff fire. structures. The use of force against plies are deployed in the field in ad- Accordingly, there was no reason to the Lebanese Republic also damaged vance and blend in easily within the believe that Israel would achieve bet- the sympathy of Lebanese Christians civilian population or in “nature re- ter results, using a firepower-based and Druze with Israel’s drive to dis- serves” (concealed bunker systems in operation only, against Hizbollah’s arm Hizbollah. Moreover, after the valleys). On the other hand, Hizbollah light and medium surface-to-surface Israeli solders were kidnapped, the does not have an operational center of rocket launchers deployed dozens of Saudis, Egyptians, and other Sunni gravity whose destruction would lead kilometers inside Lebanon, in forest- countries spoke out against the Shiite to the collapse of the organization’s ed and populated mountains. Hizbollah, described it as a destabiliz- other organs and obviate the need The idea of a firepower-based op- ing element, and agreed, in fact, with Israel’s campaign aims. However, the Hizbollah does not have an operational center of gravity damage subsequently inflicted on whose destruction would lead to the collapse of the Lebanon represented the conflict as organization. an Israeli-Arab conflict, and the Sunni countries backtracked from their pre- vious position, at least publicly. As a to destroy them individually. The at- eration also failed in terms of destroy- result, Israel quickly abandoned the tempt to apply the Shock and Awe ing the enemy (BDA – Battle Damage idea of a firepower-based operation concept and the EBO approach against Assessment), namely, in terms of suc- against the Lebanese Republic, even a guerilla organization like Hizbollah cess of the firepower and in cost effec- if it did not declare this openly and is therefore similar to trying to break tiveness, whereby over 15,000 air force the official orders did not reflect this. an amoeba’s bones – using force ir- sorties and 150,000 shells fired by the The second campaign theme that relevant to the circumstances, to the artillery corps achieved the destruc- Israel adopted was to conduct an facts, and to the nature of the war. tion of only several dozen high value operation that involved as little fric- Theoretically, the use of an EBO targets, and killed about 200-300 Hiz- tion as possible and applied intensive approach that paralyzes the enemy bollah fighters (not including Hizbol- precision firepower against Hizbol- might have relieved the need to seek lah killed in ground battles). Due to lah, based on the Shock and Awe and out each individual surface-to-surface the nature of the operation against a EBO ideas. However, a guerilla outfit rocket launcher, but in practice, due guerilla organization, which is gener- comprises the least successful exam- to the decentralized and autonomous ally not distinguished by clusters of ple of a systemic structure and criti- nature of Hizbollah’s rocket units, intelligible targets, the vast majority cal junctions suitable for EBO, and this became a primary task. However, of air strikes and the shells fired were collecting intelligence on its structure Israel knew that IDF intelligence and not effective. This picture emerged is far more complex than collecting firepower formations (air force and early on in the campaign and it was information about the chain of com- artillery) had for some years failed to possible to halt and reexamine the mand in a regular army. Hizbollah obliterate Qassam rocket launchers operational design after a week or has a relatively flat and decentralized near Beit Hanoun, where the theater is two, after, say, 3,000 air strikes and organizational structure, and -com limited and accessible, and the terrain 30,000 shells. It is not clear why the prises a network of territorial units is flat. Indeed, just prior to the second same operational concept continued operating almost autonomously and, Lebanon War, hundreds of Qassam to be adhered to if it was obviously generally, without the need for ma- rockets landed in the western Negev not yielding effective results.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 9 The idea of an operation based factor in Kosovo, where the US em- ficient enough to repel a short range solely on firepower and without land ployed its forces for almost 80 days surface-to-surface rocket or achieve maneuvers is still unproven and un- until firepower accumulated to the any significant political effect. founded, and to date has scored just critical mass required to achieve the Hizbollah used only several hun- one success – in Kosovo. However, campaign’s political goals. dred fighters in southern Lebanon circumstances indicated that the and thus would not have been able second Lebanon War was very dif- The Absence of a Coherent to withstand a sustained effort over ferent from events in Kosovo, where Operational Concept for the a number of days in several loca- the Americans engaged a sovereign Ground Forces tions, even if only due to the inabil- country and its army. In Lebanon, Too little, too late: Israel introduced ity of a few fighters to cope with the however, the antagonist was a low- ground forces into the fighting in lack of sleep and manage a broad signature guerilla organization with Lebanon belatedly, indecisively, and front. However, Israel played into relatively little sensitivity to damage above all, without a clearly defined the hands of Hizbollah by introduc- inflicted on its host country. Israel operational concept. If anything, ing the ground forces gradually and also knew, or should have known, how the ground forces were used in a step-by-step manner, allowing Hizbollah to rest, regroup, assume Israel played into the hands of Hizbollah by introducing the initiative, and surprise the IDF. In general, most of the IDF forces were the ground forces gradually and in a step-by-step manner. deployed in a plain and predictable maneuver, from south to north. Hiz- bollah may have been surprised by that killing several hundred Hizbol- was a compromise of sorts between a the cause over which Israel waged lah members and damaging some of school of thought calling for the non- war, but once it began, the IDF used the organization’s storage and other use of ground forces and a school of its forces in ways foreseen by Hizbol- facilities would yield only limited thought calling for a massive deploy- lah (except for the airborne flanking leverage on decision-makers in Da- ment of ground forces, resulting in just prior to the end of the fighting, mascus and Tehran. Indeed, to date the use of limited ground forces. This which was more symbolic than effi- it does not appear that the war pro- poor compromise led to casualties cient). duced a fundamental change in the among troops, yet from the outset it The type of combat Hizbollah positions and strategy of Damascus was evident that it could not achieve prepared for was to allow IDF troops and Tehran towards Hizbollah and any campaign effect at all. Indeed, it to pass its fighters hiding in “nature Lebanon. Moreover, the Americans is unclear what campaign effect was reserves” and other places, and then operated in Kosovo free of counter- expected from using battalion-sized continue surface-to-surface rocket attacks, whereas Hizbollah fire on forces in the Lebanese border towns fire into Israel and guerilla opera- towns in northern Israel turned the of Bint Jbail or Maroun a-Ras, send- tions against rearguard forces. Thus, blows into a reciprocal affair, what ing brigade-sized forces just 2-3 ki- any Israeli movement deep into Leb- helped make Israel just as vulnerable lometers over the border to destroy anese territory had to include a thor- to the continuation of the fighting. It abandoned Hizbollah positions, or ough sweep to secure all the built up is also difficult to make a comparison eventually using division-sized forces and open areas taken by the IDF. It is between the diplomatic circumstanc- 10-15 kilometers over the border and highly doubtful whether the forces es in Lebanon versus in Kosovo, as across only part of the front. This sort that were mobilized were sufficient well as the insensitivity to the time of force application is not even suf- for this task as well as for maintain-

10 ing reserves that would be required if did not use its ground forces dynami- drawn into a type of war in which the the war spread to other fronts. cally in ways that had bought it its enemy has a relative advantage. If this The oddest deployment of ground previous victories: identification of is not possible, said Sun Tzu, fighting forces took place in the last sixty enemy weaknesses, surprise, decep- should be avoided. For Clausewitz, hours of the fighting. The ground tion, deep maneuvering, pushing the in war one should attack the enemy’s forces were deployed after the politi- enemy out of balance, exploiting suc- plans. Israel played into Hizbollah’s cal campaign ended (Security Coun- cesses, and maintaining pressure. Un- hands, and conducted the campaign cil resolution 1701); in other words, doubtedly, one cannot compare op- in accordance with Hizbollah’s plans the deployment was not intended to erations against regular armies with and strengths and, as such, from the achieve any political objectives. The action taken against a guerilla orga- outset there was almost no chance of forces were deployed without the victory. area being cleared of enemy com- batants, i.e., the aim was not to The Results of the search, destroy, and inflict dam- Inadequate Use of Force age on Hizbollah’s firing capacity It is too soon to assess the long or its forces. When the ceasefire term political results of the war came into effect, IDF forces were and gain the necessary perspec- interspersed with the enemy forc- tive to appreciate if Israel stirred es, and hence there were difficul- undercurrents in Lebanon that ties with land and air supplies (as may produce benefits in the fu- the area had not been secured). In ture. Ultimately, Lebanon expe- the words of Casper Weinberger rienced political and social trau- about Vietnam, Israel too only mas whose fallout cannot yet be asked its soldiers “to be there,” but assessed. However, the way the not to win. It should be stressed operation ended has severe rami- that the act of crossing into Leb- fications, which can be divided anon, which involved passing into two types: the direct results through the kill zones prepared of how the military force was by Hizbollah, was therefore very used, and the indirect results. dangerous and exacted a high price nization built of autonomous cells The direct upshot of the deterio- in the number of soldiers killed; thus, and lacking an operational center of ration in the IDF force buildup and it was essential that there be a clear gravity, and in the case of a guerilla in the operational design, and the understanding of this offensive’s ob- organization, cutting supply lines or consequent adoption of particular jective. Moreover, the duration of the encircling the forward operational campaign themes, was the failure to deployment in southern Lebanon and level is almost inconsequential. How- destroy, repress, or even to substan- the exit strategy were not dependent ever, all organizations – even guerilla tially impinge on enemy activity ac- on Israel, rather on the “good will” of – have their weak points. cording to the primary parameters Hizbollah to reach agreement on the The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu of Hizbollah’s operational design. conditions for deploying the Leba- claims that a military leader’s objec- Indeed, towards the end of the war, nese army and UNIFIL in the south. tive is to dictate to his enemy the na- Hizbollah fired more than 200 rock- In this war, the IDF thought in ture of a war in which he has a rela- ets per day into Israel, while at the terms of targets and firepower, and tive advantage, and he should not be start of the war around 100 rockets

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 11 were launched per day (even if the of the past, and that the Israeli (and, in guarantees, the best arms avail- mixture shifted during the war to- in generally, the Western) soldier is able, and a political umbrella. ward short range surface-to-surface weaker and finds it difficult to deal However, the manner in which rockets). Hizbollah’s fighting forces with the difficulties of battle. It is the second Lebanon War was con- continued operating while inflict- hard to overestimate the importance ducted and the way in which it is ing damage on the IDF, and even of this perception, if it takes hold. viewed may affect the perception of in most of the ground battles that Since 1967 the Middle East has op- Israel’s military superiority and, as they lost, they did not collapse or erated under the perception that the such, may impact on many aspects of the reality in which Israel has existed Hizbollah designed a war in which presumably Israel could since 1967. It is very difficult to fore- see future political intent and to as- only choose which soft underbelly to expose. sess the probability of war; however it seems that in the wake of the sec- ond Lebanon War, at least some of the retreat. Hizbollah’s command and Israeli military enjoys absolute su- relevant parties may believe they can control echelon continued to func- periority and thus, since 1967, Israel do battle with Israel and emerge from tion throughout the war. Its fighting has not been seriously challenged. In the fighting with the upper hand. As spirit for the most part stayed strong, 1973, the Egyptians and Syrians set such, it appears that the obstacles to and currently there are no signs that themselves modest operational ob- another war in the Middle East have its political will has been irreversibly jectives (penetration of about 10 km), been lowered. impaired. While Hizbollah preferred and when they achieved their objec- to arrive at a ceasefire, this was based tives, they halted at their own initia- How Could the Force Have on a justifiable wish to “lock in its tive. This allowed Israel to regroup, Been Used? profits” (i.e., to stop the fighting at a launch a counterattack, and win the In order to analyze what kind of war stage where its force was maximizing battle. Since 1973 Israel has not been and what operational concept Israel its achievements and was perceived challenged in an all-out war. The per- should have adopted following the as the victor) and not because it was ception of Israel’s military superior- kidnapping of its soldiers on July 12, in distress or on the verge of collapse. ity was responsible for generating 2006, we have to reexamine Hizbol- In Hizbollah’s eyes, and in the view the requisite conditions for the peace lah’s approach to force buildup and of some Arab onlookers, Hizbollah treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the force application, and the operational won the battle. peace process with the Palestinians, design it chose. Hizbollah established Moreover, the fact that several and thirty-three years of quiet on the two parallel formations: the first, a de- hundred Hizbollah fighters faced Golan Heights. It allowed Israel to centralized and autonomous low-sig- up to four Israeli divisions and the sustain a peacetime economy and a nature rockets formation devoid of a Israel Air Force, and ended the war society of plenty and wellbeing, de- center of gravity that on the one hand standing up after inflicting signifi- spite the absence of peace. And due applied pressure on Israeli towns and cant damage on IDF forces, may also to the perception of its military su- forced it to act immediately. On the generate indirect results that are at periority, Israel became an American other hand, certainly the short range best problematic. Some of the parties strategic asset that justified thein- rockets formation could not be neu- that followed the progress of the war vestment of an aggregate amount of tralized, suppressed, or destroyed by may conclude, correctly or otherwise, about $100 billion and the provision standoff firepower within a reason- that the IDF of today is not the IDF of dozens of billions of more dollars able period of time, but only by seiz-

12 ing the area from which it operated 2006 had, therefore, to take into ac- declaring war, the second option was and by systematic destruction of each count Hizbollah’s force buildup and to refuse to walk into the brilliant and every launcher. its mode of operation, and the nature trap set by Hizbollah but instead to However, a fighting formation of the resultant war. Taking this view, opt for an operational model of exert- was established alongside the rockets Israel had four alternatives with their ing pressure on Asad’s regime and, formation that was also decentral- own inherent logic, even if each had through this, on Hizbollah and Iran. ized, autonomous, and lacking an some basic deficiencies as well. The It was entirely feasible to inflict sig- operational center of gravity, com- first was restraint, i.e., making do nificant damage on the assets of the posed of both fortified as well as low- with a symbolic retaliation to the Alawi regime, even through the rela- signature guerilla forces. These fight- Hizbollah attack. Even if the kidnap- tively sterile model of Shock and Awe ing forces were deployed to make pings were not coordinated with Iran and EBO. Syria is Iran’s strategic as- both the act of taking and securing and did not result from a premeditat- set and Hizbollah’s patron, and when the south of Lebanon as well as the ed intent to escalate the situation to Asad’s foothold is precarious it is act of remaining in occupation and a war, the second Lebanon War was convenient for Israel and the US to ne- maintaining supply lines exhausting liable to slow down and complicate gotiate a settlement in Lebanon, and and costly in terms of human life. The the international campaign against more convenient for the Americans two formations were designed to op- Iran on the nuclear issue and against to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear erate clandestinely through selective Syria and Hizbollah with regard to issue. The disadvantage of this alter- engagement with the Israeli ground the Hariri assassination and Security native is, of course, the disproportion forces, allowing Israeli forces to pass Council resolution 1559. It was thus between the incident of the soldiers’ them, and continuing their opera- not wise to rewrite the international kidnapping and the Israeli reaction, tions in the rear of Israeli lines. Thus, agenda and have it led by an Israeli- and the danger of uncontrolled re- any Israeli movement into Lebanon Lebanese war. The main arena is, of gional escalation. could not be based on seizing only se- course, with Iran, whence derives A third option was to forego an lect dominant points while avoiding the confrontation between the West all-out war with Hizbollah, to adopt entering populated pockets and “na- ture reserves,” rather had to involve a If Israel insisted on a full scale confrontation with thorough sweep of the area. Hizbollah, this demanded full awareness of the trap set by Hizbollah designed a war in which Hizbollah, and instant, swift implementation, with full IDF presumably Israel could only choose which soft underbelly to expose: the power. one whereby it avoids a ground op- eration and exposes its home front and Iran and Syria over hegemony in more modest political objectives, vulnerability, or the one whereby it Lebanon, with the conflict between avoid the trap set in southern Leba- enters Lebanon and sustains the loss Israel and Hizbollah only a second- non, and to stage a daring, conscious- of soldiers in ongoing ground-based ary offshoot. Thus, it was possible ness-oriented operation that goes be- attrition with a guerilla organization. to wait for the American measures yond Hizbollah’s expectations such Hizbollah’s brilliant trap apparently against Iran to be fully realized, and as, for example, a large scale special left Israel with two undesirable op- wage war with Hizbollah at a more operation in the heart of Lebanon or tions. convenient time once suitable prepa- in the Beka’a Valley. Any operational model that Israel rations were made. And if, nonetheless, Israel insisted should have formulated on July 12, If, nonetheless, Israel insisted on on a full scale direct confrontation

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 13 with Hizbollah, this could only be lead to the collapse of the organiza- Examples of force buildup based on done with full awareness of the trap tion, there is no alternative to system- unproven theories include the Amer- set by Hizbollah and implemented atic face-to-face confrontation at each ican approach of the 1950s, whereby instantly, swiftly, and with full IDF of Hizbollah’s fortified positions. there was no need for a strong con- power. In addition, this should have ventional army in the era of nuclear been carried out through Hizbollah’s Honest Conclusions and arms – an approach proven mistaken backdoor and not in an offhanded Preparations for the Future in the 1960s; the American idea that maneuver from south northward. As In order to win the next war Israel in an era of air-to-air missiles, there is no longer a need for guns on fighter It is dangerous to allow temporary or reversible aircraft or a need to train pilots to circumstances to divert attention from the professional- engage in close aerial combat – what practical necessity of preparing for the worst case resulted in the loss of hundreds of pilots and aircraft in the early years scenario. of the Vietnam War; or the approach that was supported by many in Israel such, the fourth alternative was to must conduct an investigation of after 1967 that argued that in an era utilize maximum friction and military what actually happened in Lebanon, of mobile tank battles, there was no forces – in all their forms – and in the take a sober look at reality – as it has more need for an infantry corps, and shortest amount of time. This alterna- changed for the worse in the wake of that the air force could serve as air- tive required immediate mobilization the war – and take immediate action borne artillery – an approach proven of reserve units sufficient to achieve to correct the situation and prepare incorrect in 1973. deep penetration of several dozens for the next confrontation. If we just It is also very dangerous to allow of kilometers, and to sweep and se- cover over our tracks, if we allow time temporary or reversible circumstanc- cure southern Lebanon. Force should to take its course and blunt the sharp- es, or for that matter political views, have been used in a surprising way, ness of failure, we will not learn, we to divert attention from the profes- including flanking the kill zones near will not improve, and we will lose the sional-practical necessity of prepar- the border, progressing continuously next war too. ing for the worst case scenario. In the along unexpected routes, undertak- First, Israel must retain the ability words of Ben Gurion: “Let us assume ing massive operations deep in Hiz- to fight based on the classic principles that our peacemaking efforts will bollah’s strategic rear, and pushing it of war, whereby force buildup and bear fruit and most or even all the out of balance. However, this alterna- utilization must reflect an ongoing Arab countries will sign peace and tive incurs two inherent drawbacks: balance between the various branches friendship treaties with us. Even then first, it does not offer a successful exit of the military and a balance between we should be wary of the dangerous strategy and involves a protracted firepower, maneuvering, and protec- illusion that peace will maintain our occupation, since withdrawal would tive gear. Once again Israel must lend security. Even after peace is written be liable to restore the situation to its appropriate consideration to territory, and signed between us and all our pre-war status. Second, it would be both in defensive and offensive terms. neighbors, and the signatures are costly in terms of human life, since at The world is undoubtedly changing, made and ratified by the UN, security the end of the day, due to Hizbollah’s as is military force buildup and force will always be our main concern.” decentralized and autonomous na- application, but it is very risky to im- Israel’s classic security concept ture and the lack of a critical opera- plement dramatic changes based on was based on what in the 1950s and tional core whose destruction would theories that have yet to be validated. 1960s was known as “the case of

14 everything”: buildup of the IDF to Israel: using its proxies it has created aging Islamic terror, Syria, and Iran, achieve victory even in the worst case a de facto shared border with Israel and despite the window of time and scenario in which the Arab countries (something it also learned from Isra- political umbrella the US offered, Is- join forces and surprise Israel with el, with regard to the Kurds in Iraq). rael did not deliver the goods, and an all-out war. Yet preparing for “ev- However, Israel does not have a com- its image as a regional military su- erything” demands vast resources; mon border with Iran, and so Israel perpower was diminished. Second, neither is it clear if the challenge has to invest thought and resources it may very well be harder for the was met even when this was official in dealing with this lack of symmetry Americans to exert leverage against policy. However, we must at least be and strive to achieve strategic parity Iran after the precision firepower- able to cope with the full spectrum with Iran at the low-medium inten- based campaign the American proxy of threats, and likewise with some of sity conflict. On a wider perspective, conducted proved inefficient against them simultaneously. We should not Israel has to formulate a comprehen- the entrenched and obstinate Iranian confuse the scenario that we cast as sive, proactive strategy on Iran and proxy. Thus, Israel’s standing in the likely or unlikely with the need to not make do with passing the prob- US needs urgent repair work. The be able to deal with the full range of lem over to the Americans. Americans don’t buy spins and in or- threats and the full capabilities of the Maintaining the ability to handle der to preserve strategic relations, Is- enemy, whatever the probability of the full spectrum of potential threats rael must tell the truth, submit a seri- its political intent to use them accord- requires a force buildup and an op- ous plan for restructuring, and work ing to our current assessment. The erational concept based on the ability industriously to implement it. enemy’s capabilities are given while to engage in an all-out war in Syria, a To a large degree, the second Leb- its political intentions are liable to war against Hizbollah, and a war on anon War was our Vietnam. Like the change, and we ourselves might err the Palestinian front, while maintain- US in Vietnam, we tried to overcome in our assessment of them. ing strong strategic reserves in the guerillas with firepower but without While Hizbollah occupies a signif- case of escalation on another front. massive maneuvering, force was put icant role in the spectrum of threats, At the same time, this also requires into use in rolling gradualism, the we need to look beyond it at the wid- deterring Iran and, if the deterrence enemy leaned on a strategic rear in er picture. Hizbollah is a hybrid. Part fails, achieving a clear advantage in a neighboring country that was not of it is a genuine grassroots Lebanese exchanging blows with Iran and cre- attacked, and we did not engage in phenomenon and part is an Iranian- ating a strategic balance with Iran in battle wholeheartedly and with a full Syrian proxy. However, there is no low-medium intensity conflicts. The commitment to victory. The bad news doubt that Hizbollah acts as a part of timetable until the next war may be from the second Lebanon War is that a broader effort that Iran is waging short and thus it is incumbent on we failed. The good news is that our against Israel, which also includes Israel to act rapidly, diligently, and regular and reserve forces are solid the missile project and the nuclear thoroughly while increasing the de- and committed; the problem is that project and, to a lesser degree, sev- fense budget by billions of shekels. they were assembled and deployed eral Palestinian terror groups. On The second Lebanon War did not incorrectly. There is also good news the other hand, Israel is not fighting add to Israeli-US relations, to say in the fact that we received a wake- back against Iran. Iran has managed the least. First, despite the fact that up call, and a second chance to learn to craft an asymmetrical conflict with the US had a clear interest in dam- and improve.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 15 The Second Lebanon War: The Plus Column Roni Bart

The public discourse on the campaign in Lebanon has focused almost exclusively on the war’s negative aspects, while the professional post-mortems are dwelling on what must be inferred and learned from the war’s failures and lapses. Yet a balanced review of the war requires delineating the positive outcomes along with the negative results. Indeed, as we expound on the minuses of the war, it is important to remember that the plus column of the balance sheet is neither blank nor, for that matter, even sparse. What follows, therefore, is a brief overview of the positive outcomes of the war in Lebanon.

The military blow to Hizbollah. also to defend Lebanon against its Security Council resolution 1701. Hundreds of Hizbollah fighters were southern neighbor; therefore its very The Lebanese army has deployed in killed and injured. Their tactics were raison d’etre has been undermined. southern Lebanon for the first time exposed; the organization’s physical That being the case, the issue of dis- in forty years. Accompanying it is a infrastructure in south Lebanon, Bei- armament – even if far from being re- multinational force whose scope and rut, and Baalbek was substantially solved – has become more poignant, composition enable more effective damaged; the line of military out- evidenced by Hizbollah’s consent not action than demonstrated by UNI- posts running along the border was to bear arms publicly. Also, there are FIL; this force is apparently backed totally destroyed after it failed to in- potential challenges within the Shiite by greater international resolve than flict heavy IDF losses; large quantities community itself, should reconstruc- in the past. Much attention is being of ammunition were depleted and tion not progress with due speed devoted by Lebanon’s security appa- destroyed; and above all, apparently and/or if the Shiite enclaves in the ratus as well as by the international only few of the organization’s array south and in the Dahiya area suspect community to blocking routes (sea, of medium and long range rockets that Hizbollah’s operations are liable air, and land) that could enable the remain. to generate another round of hostili- flow of illegal arms from Iran and ties at their expense. Syria to Hizbollah. All this strength- Hizbollah’s status. Hizbollah’s At the very least it can be stated ens Lebanon’s sovereignty at the ex- status weakened vis-à-vis Lebanon’s that Hizbollah’s image as “guardian pense of Hizbollah and makes it dif- non-Shiite elements, headed by the of Lebanon” is less founded after the ficult for the organization to rehabili- “March 14 camp.” This has been made war than it was before it. As for Has- tate itself militarily (with equipment, clear by the escalation of tensions be- san Nasrallah, one of Hizbollah’s bas- force buildup, and training). tween the organization and the Sin- tions of strength, he has been exposed iora government. The organization as less familiar with the Israel mind- International response. The in- failed not only to deter Israel, but set than he has consistently boasted. ternational community – especially Today he is forced to live in hiding prominent European countries as well INSS Research Associate in the Marcia and command his organization from as Arab-Sunni axis countries (Egypt, Riklis Program on US-Israel Relations. a bunker. Jordan, Saudi Arabia) – has evinced

16 greater awareness of the danger em- Israel’s deterrence. Deterrence is of destroying the threat. Third, by bodied by Hizbollah as a destabiliz- a multidimensional phenomenon Nasrallah’s own admission, he was ing element connected with Iran. This (i.e., regarding “what” and “against surprised by how Israel “went hay- awareness translated into relative pa- whom”). Israel’s deterrence ability wire.” It is difficult to deter, or plan to tience towards Israel during the war will be strengthened on three levels. deter, an opponent who is perceived and support for the implementation First, in regard to long range rockets, as irrational or at least unpredictable. of resolution 1701; it is also likely to Israeli intelligence and the air force After Israel set such a disproportion- be evident in future issues that con- demonstrated extremely impressive ately high price tag, it is most likely cern Iranian involvement in Lebanon. capabilities and achievements. Sec- there will be a lengthy respite from In additional, vigorous US support ond, notwithstanding Nasrallah’s spi- Hizbollah provocations. for Israel was forthcoming not only from President George Bush Timing and the future. Isra- and his supporters, but also from el unintentionally benefited the entire political spectrum. from the timing of the war. First, if Iran had planned to Syria. For the first time in ap- involve Hizbollah in an anti- proximately thirty years, Syria Israel or anti-America/West has been unmasked as an almost context, its “vanguard” ab- irrelevant player in Lebanon. In sorbed a first blow that both previous rounds of conflict the exposed and weakened it. key to any resolution was sought Second, it was preferable that first in Damascus. This time, too, Israel manage this conflict be- there were those in the European fore Iran attains nuclear mili- arena who thought Syria played tary capability. Third, even an influential role, but in practice if Israel scraped by with a this was not the case. True, Syria marginal victory only or else did transfer weapons to Hizbol- fought merely to a draw (i.e., lah, but its impact on what actual- failure), this was a poor dress ly occurred was marginal. Moreover, der web analogy, Israel demonstrated rehearsal only, a failed mini-war, as it the Syrian weaponry used by Hizbol- its readiness to enter into a broad con- were, in a partial yet not critical test. lah focused international attention on frontation in order to put an end to Correcting the lapses in the military the negative role Syria plays and has provocations. The country proved it field (a buildup of ground forces played in Lebanon (following a long is prepared to endure extended rock- not exclusively for curbing terror, list of crimes that have originated in et fire on its home front as the price of upgrading the military reserve ap- Damascus, including the murder of achieving objectives or of continued paratus, and so on) and drawing the Hariri). The Syrians did not like reso- resistance. The combination of these necessary conclusions in the area of lution 1701, but were forced to accept two levels constitutes a strategic strategic-political planning will im- it. After the war Syria was compelled problem for Syria and Iran vis-à-vis prove Israel’s future capabilities in to announce (or at least pay lip - ser plans to attack Israel with long range confronting existential threats. It is vice to) its support for supervision of missiles. Israel has proved, on the one almost as if Israel should thank Hiz- the Syria-Lebanon border to prevent hand, that this threat does not deter bollah for the wake-up call. the supply of illegal arms. it, and on the other, that it is capable

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 17 Look Not to the Skies: The IAF vs. Surface-to-Surface Rocket Launchers Noam Ophir

During Operation Change of Direction in Lebanon, the Israel Air Force (IAF) recorded nu- merous achievements against Hizbollah’s medium range and long range surface-to-surface rocket launchers. In contrast, the results against short range rocket launchers were disap- pointing, particularly since the air force nearly maximized its ability to deal with targets of this type. In the absence of foreseeable significant improvements in this area, the future solution to the short range rocket threat lies on the ground, not in the air.

n Friday, August 11, 2006, of what remained of its heavy rock- circumstances, it is unlikely that any three barrages of medium et arsenal. However, on a day when air-based capability will achieve bet- range surface-to-surface more than 120 rockets hit northern Is- ter results. Orockets were fired towards Haifa rael and caused dozens of casualties The potential implications of this and the northern suburbs from the of varying degrees of seriousness, it claim are far from simple. If the IAF vicinity of Tyre in Lebanon. In each is hard to be impressed with the de- reached something akin to the best of these cases the launcher was de- struction of three launchers. The air result it could possibly achieve and stroyed within minutes of the launch. force’s successful morning in terms despite this Hizbollah succeeded in In some cases secondary explosions of hunting down surface-to-surface firing approximately 3,970 rockets were clearly visible, indicating that launchers was largely irrelevant. This during the hostilities – an average the launcher was probably attacked frustrating situation repeated itself of 120 rockets a day – Israel faces a before it had fired all its rockets.1 both before that day and after. difficult problem.2 In other words, The process of locating, identifying, The story of that Friday, which Operation Change of Direction has attacking, and destroying the three marked the end of the first month of shown that anyone who thought that launchers was completed in record the fighting in Lebanon, depicted one air power alone could remove the time. In approximately one hour of the important aspects of Operation threat of rockets to Israel is mistaken. Hizbollah lost a significant portion Change of Direction. The IDF man- In fact, the lessons of the campaign aged, mainly by virtue of the air force, underscore that at least in the coming to record some impressive achieve- years, that type of success for the air 1 “Attacking a Katyusha Launcher ments against surface-to-surface which Fired on Haifa,” IDF web- 2 According to official Israeli police site, August 11, 2006, http://www1. rocket launchers. At the same time, force figures, forty civilians and idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/DOVER/ the IDF reached almost the full extent twelve soldiers were killed by rockets files/0/56510.wmv. of its air-based ability to deal with the in the war, and about another 2,400 problem of surface-to-surface rocket suffered various degrees of injury. Doctoral student, Neubauer Research Fel- launchers and similar targets. In the Army figures indicate forty-two civil- low at INSS. foreseeable future and under similar ians killed and about 4,300 wounded.

18 force is far from a viable scenario. At need a custom-built truck that carries strike, such as civilian buildings in the the same time, the war demonstrated a single rocket. In all cases, the truck heart of a densely inhabited area and significant progress in an air-based acts as both carrier and launcher. bunkers that are hard to penetrate. approach to deal with complex ob- Contending with launchers can At the same time, it may be assumed jectives of locating and attacking tar- occur in two different stages: before that the enemy will not concentrate gets such as surface-to-surface rocket the launch and during/after the its assets in a few locations; rather it launchers. This progress may play a launch. will prefer to spread them out so that central role in dealing with similar even if some are located and success- targets of greater significance, such as The Pre-Launch surface-to-surface missile launchers. Stage Anyone who thought that air power alone It is best to locate could remove the threat of rockets to Contending with Surface-to- and hit the launch- Israel is mistaken. Surface Rocket Launchers er before it fires Surface-to-surface rocket launchers its load of rockets. refer to a wide range of configura- The problem is that at this stage it is fully targeted this will not neutralize tions rather than a specific model of hard to distinguish the launcher from all its firing ability, or even a signifi- weapon, and the differences between the innocuous objects around it.4 cant part of it. the launchers affect the challenge in The most effective way to hit Attacking sites suspected of serv- dealing with them. Surface-to-sur- launchers and their rockets prior to ing as storage depots for launchers face rocket launchers can generally launching is by attacking the places and rockets can be complemented by be classed by two parameters: the where they are stored. The crux is operating in places suspected of being size of the rocket, usually noted by its accurate intelligence, yet such intel- launch sites. First, certain operations diameter, and the method of launch- ligence does not always exist. Intel- can make it difficult to use the area. ing. The various sizes of surface-to- ligence about the location of storage For example, mines can be dispersed surface rockets translate into different facilities, for example, does not sup- in advance from the air, the territory ranges and weight of the warhead. ply air power capability with infor- can be exposed in various ways, and Hizbollah, for example, has rockets mation as to what lies inside the fa- continuous obtrusive air presences with different sizes and performance cilities or how the facilities are used. can be maintained in the hope that levels.3 While short range rockets can Furthermore, the enemy will likely this will deter the enemy from using be launched from a solitary launcher, make every effort to keep the exis- the location. Second, one can define which may not be more than a barrel tence of such sites secret and will po- loose criteria of incrimination so that on a stand, the larger rockets require sition them in places that are hard to any vehicle moving in a suspicious a more complex launching system. In area that meets a certain description relating to its dimensions will be at- general, this is a standard truck car- 4 Operation of the launcher is not pre- rying a number of cylindrical con- ceded by identifying activity prior tacked even if it is not possible to as- tainers in the back, each with a rocket to the launch. The launcher does certain that it is a launcher. inside. Long range rockets generally not need to transmit, and its heat ra- The chance that these steps will diation is no different from that of a lead to a significant reduction in the regular truck. This means that devices enemy’s launch potential, except for 3 For details of Hizbollah’s rocket ar- used to locate targets, such as thermal successful destruction of the rocketry senal, see the table in Yiftah Shapir, imaging systems, radar, and signal “Artillery Rockets: Should Means of intelligence devices (SIGINT) find it while it is still in storage, is doubtful. Interception be Developed?” Strategic hard to locate and identify launchers These approaches mainly make it dif- Assessment 9, no 2 (2006): 8. of this type. ficult for the enemy to operate and as

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 19 a result may reduce the volume of the Several segments of the launch What Did the Air Force rocket fire and, in particular, have an brand the launcher’s signature. First, Achieve in Lebanon? adverse effect on the accuracy of the the actual launch immediately dif- Israel scored much success in con- rocket fire. However, as long as the ferentiates the launcher from other tending with launchers at the pre- rockets fired into northern Israel are trucks. Second, the launcher can be launch stage, particularly vis-à-vis the type that lack accurate precision, located according to the amount of medium and long range launchers. if the rockets hit land and not the heat it gives off, the smoke trail of An Israeli defense source was quoted sea it is likely that something will be the rockets, and the movement of the as saying that in the first two days of damaged. rockets through the sky. Most of these Operation Change of Direction the air changes can be discerned regardless force destroyed around 80 percent of The Launch/Post-Launch Stage of the time of day. Hizbollah’s medium and long range The chances of locating and identify- ing a launcher change at the moment The air force’s ability to contend with short range when the launcher goes into action launchers was limited and did not materially affect and starts to fire rockets. In general, all the launcher has to do is to reach Hizbollah rocket capability. a launch location (which may or may not be predetermined), straighten the In order to identify a launcher rocket capability.6 This success can be rocket containers to a vertical posi- during or after the launch, surveil- attributed to the intelligence commu- tion, launch the rockets, and then lance devices or sensors are needed nity more than to the air force. vanish back into the surrounding over the enemy’s territory on an on- As was expected, the greatest area. All this takes little time.5 going basis. They must identify the challenge was in contending with the launch and its source, and guide at- launchers that were not destroyed in 5 The type of rocket and launcher de- tack systems or “shooters” that strike the opening stages of the campaign. termines how difficult it is to con- the launcher. This process, which is Estimates indicate that overall the tend with the launcher. The smaller called “closing the loop,” must occur IDF and particularly the air force de- the rocket, the less need there is for within minutes of the event. If it takes stroyed over 125 surface-to-surface a special launcher, and a single bar- too long the launcher is liable to relo- 7 rel, which can hardly be identified in rocket launchers, and hit more than advance, is all that is required. On the cate. Moreover, the enemy generally 250 targets suspected of being launch- other hand, the larger the rocket, the fires off a heavy barrage from a large ers and hundreds of sites where larger the launcher required and, in number of launchers, which means launches were carried out. Without the case of particularly heavy rock- that several launch positions have to an exact figure for the scale of the ets, a special vehicle is needed that be dealt with simultaneously. If there is different from a civilian truck. In are sufficient solid intelligence means other words, the launcher signature is 6 Steven Erlanger, “Israel Committed to greater the larger the rocket, but also in place, all the targets can be dealt Block Arms and Kill Nasrallah,” The greater the number of rocket contain- with at the same time. Without this New York Times, August 20, 2006. Ac- ers. Similarly, the larger the weapon, ability, however, a decision must be cording to another report, in the first the longer the launcher appears in the made as to which launch sites to tar- thirty-nine minutes of the war fifty- open. A barrage of rockets fired from get. four long range surface-to-surface a number of containers lasts apprecia- rocket launchers were destroyed, Ben bly longer than the launch of a single Caspit, “Amateurism,” Maariv, Au- rocket. In the case of medium range tion is longer. However, here too the gust 18, 2006. rockets and even more so in long whole operation takes no more than a 7 Yossi Yehoshua, “The Military Ac- range rockets, the launching opera- few minutes. tion,” Yediot Ahronot, August 15, 2006.

20 Hizbollah rocket arsenal prior to the on the last day of the fighting, when limited and was not reflected by fighting as well as a breakdown of the seven were destroyed. changes to Hizbollah rocket capabil- various types of launchers, including Second, it seems that the IAF ity. During the fighting Hizbollah those that were destroyed, it is hard achieved a shorter time span for clos- fired close to 4,000 rockets, whereby to assess the air force’s success. But ing the loop, shorter than the entire the rate of firing not only did not de- two main points can be highlighted. rocket launch process. No less impor- crease but peaked at over 200 rockets First, monitoring the IDF’s reports tant is the fact that the air force dem- a day in the last days of the fighting. during the fighting indicates that on onstrated this ability day after day for It is also hard, based on data current- many occasions when medium range over a month of fighting: the ability ly available, to identify substantial rockets were launched – i.e., 220 mm to maintain continuity in intelligence damage inflicted on the accuracy of and 302 mm rockets8 – particularly gathering and attacks over a wide Hizbollah fire. towards the Haifa region, the air force area of enemy territory with ongoing succeeded in destroying the launch- command and control alongside oth- The Recurring Picture ers within a short time of the launch. er air force activities, such as attack- The primary achievement of the air The figure of between 45 seconds and ing infrastructure targets, providing force’s success in Operation Change one minute as the time that elapsed close air support for the ground forces of Direction lay in proof of its abil- between locating the launchers and with assistance, and gathering other ity to focus on low-signature time attacking them sounds overly short,9 intelligence. In addition, Hizbollah’s sensitive targets. A combination of but what is important is that almost launch records indicate there were advanced technological means in the all such launchers were identified days when no medium range rockets area of intelligence gathering and at- and attacked, sometimes before they were launched, despite the ongoing tack, partly the result of innovative had completed firing all the rockets short range surface-to-surface rocket advances by the Israeli defense in- they carried. There was no report of fire. It is hard to determine if the lack dustries, allowed the air force to close how many such launchers Hizbollah of launches stemmed from a con- the attack loop in an amount of time had prior to the war, but it appears scious decision due to political con- that until Change of Direction was it was a small number ranging from siderations, or was based on a wish to considered far-fetched. It is highly isolated launchers to several dozen, maintain the launch ability for later possible that had the fighting contin- so that any strike on such launch- stages of the hostilities – or a future ued much longer Hizbollah would ers was significant. There were days confrontation – and not to continue it have had difficulty in continuing to on which a number of such launch- as a one-time device.10 launch medium range rockets, even ers were destroyed, for example, on In contrast with this success, the without the presence of ground forc- August 11, when the three launchers air force’s ability to contend with es in the launching areas. Moreover, it were destroyed, and two days later, short range launchers was far more is reasonable to assume that the rela- tively small number of barrages fired 8 The 320 mm rockets were dubbed by 10 It is also difficult to determine if long at Haifa was a direct result of the air Hizbollah Haiber 1. According to IDF range rockets were not launched dur- force’s achievements.11 figures, sixty-four 220 mm rockets ing the fighting, despite threats made and twenty-eight 302 mm rockets hit by the Hizbollah leader, because most 11 Based on Israeli police figures, ninety- Israel. An unknown quantity of these of the capability was destroyed at the two rockets landed in Haifa (thirty- types landed in the sea. Amir Buhbut, start of the fighting, because of other two in inhabited areas), seven in Afula, “Hizbollah United, We Less So,” NRG, operations carried out by the air force, six in Beit Shean, two in Tirat HaCar- September 18, 2006. or due to a political decision not to use mel, two near Hadera, and one near 9 Erlanger, “Israel Committed to Block this weapon in the current confronta- Zikhron Yaakov. Two rockets landed Arms.” tion. in Judea and Samaria. By way of com-

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 21 In the absence of precise figures er was a difficult target, but even more surface-to-surface rockets entirely, it is hard to determine whether the complicated is that most of the rockets including short range surface-to-sur- attack loop can be narrowed further were launched from single launchers face rockets? It is highly likely that or the air force’s performance im- dispersed across the terrain.12 These the answer to this question will sur- proved. However, the impression is targets pose a formidable challenge face in one of the commissions of in- that the air force realized close to its to the air force. Indeed, the IDF, in- quiry called on to investigate the war. full potential. The main improvement cluding the air force, has encountered On the other hand, it is questionable that can be anticipated is more intel- similar difficulties in recent years in whether someone who understands ligence gathering means with an eye contending with Palestinian Qas- the abilities and limitations of an air- to greater coverage, although with- sam rockets, despite the fact that the based force can make such a prom- launching ar- ise. The air force did not succeed in The air force did not succeed in contending eas are more contending with short range surface- with short range surface-to-surface rockets limited and to-surface rockets – when not carry- because of any failure or error in judgment. It the launches ing out a preventive strike when the are relatively rockets were still in storage – because is simply not capable of doing this well. fewer. of any failure or error in judgment. Even in It is simply not capable of doing this those cases well.13 However, the impression dur- out further information it is hard to when the launcher was identified ing and after the war is that many determine whether this would have after the launch, in itself a compli- in the political and defense echelons allowed narrowing the attack loop cated operation – particularly when (and as a result, many members of and the destruction of additional dozens of such launchers operate the public) expected the air force to be launchers. simultaneously in a large area – the able, almost single-handedly, to bring Despite all the justified praise question arises whether there was about a significant reduction and pos- heaped on the air force, the bottom any point in attacking. A launcher of sibly even a cessation of rocket fire line cannot be erased. The air force this sort is largely a one-time device. on northern Israel, including short did not succeed in stopping the short Hizbollah has a limitless supply of range rockets. Since this goal was not term rocket attacks on northern Israel. these launchers and in contrast with Even if the air force did hit launchers larger launchers stationed on a truck, 13 It is hard to determine the accuracy and launch units, the damage was in- they are relatively easy to improvise, of a report according to which Intel- sufficient. The air force’s actions may even in the middle of a war. Was it ligence was in possession of informa- have reduced the number of launches right to invest resources and effort tion that, if it had been passed on to somewhat; however, it does not re- in attacking a barrel that had already the air force, could have helped the air force contend with short range sur- ally matter whether Hizbollah fired launched its load, and was unlikely face-to-surface rockets: information only 200 rockets a day and not, say, to be used again by the enemy? The that would have facilitated attacks 300, which it could have launched answer is no. on launchers prior to launching. In without the air force. Did the air force, before the war, any case, however, this would not en- Why did the air force not succeed? promise it would stop the threat of tail an improvement of the air force’s Each surface-to-surface rocket launch- ability to deal with surface-to-surface rockets but its accurate guidance by 12 The air force succeeded in hitting a Intelligence. See Ze’ev Schiff, “How parison, the Kiryat Shmona area was large number of multi-barrel launch- We Missed Destroying the Short hit by 1,102 rockets, Nahariya – 808, ers of short range surface-to-surface Range Rockets,” Haaretz, September Maalot – 642, and Tzfat – 471 rockets. rockets installed on trucks. 3, 2006.

22 achieved, and particularly following ers, and striking at launchers at an to short range launchers, and partic- the significant increase in Hizbollah earlier stage of the launch process, so ularly those based on nothing more fire in the last days of the war, the that they will be able to launch fewer than a barrel, the solution will not dominant impression was that the air rockets before being destroyed. be provided by the air force. At this force failed in its mission. For many, This is true particularly vis-à- stage it is hard to think of a techno- the air force’s performance against vis medium range and long range logical means or a fighting technique the surface-to-surface rocket launch- launchers. The encouraging point that will allow substantial and seri- ers is one of the most striking failures here is that the capabilities that were ous improvement of the aerial ability of Operation Change of Direction. demonstrated in Lebanon indicate to deal with this threat. The fact that these targets were not that the air force has good – and to In view of the fact that Israel con- achievable became irrelevant. an extent unparalleled – abilities in tinues to live under an extensive There are a number of questions dealing with other targets such as threat of surface-to-surface rockets – that merit a cautious attempt at an surface-to-surface missile launchers, from the Lebanese arena, from Gaza, answer. If fighting recurs in the north, particularly in the Syrian arena. It is and possibly from the West Bank – a would the air force achieve better re- safe to assume that this message has solution is necessary to counter the sults in contending with surface-to- been received by the other side. On threat of short range surface-to-sur- surface rockets? Similarly, what can the other hand, in Operation Change face rockets. In addition to possible be learned from confronting surface- of Direction, the air force operated in means of intercepting the rockets in to-surface rockets in the Lebanese almost optimum conditions. The air- flight, which have not been addressed arena apropos surface-to-surface craft operated without being exposed by this paper, the air force’s ability to rockets and surface-to-surface mis- to airborne threats, and there were deal with the launchers must be en- siles, for example, in Syria? relatively few land-based threats. hanced. However, the air force can- Based on experience acquired in The weather in the fighting arena was not be the sole or even main actor in Operation Change of Direction and good and the distance between the air this effort. The struggle to deal with information on the means under de- bases and the area of operation was the threat of short range surface-to- velopment to confront a threat such short, what allowed the continuous surface rockets requires significant as surface-to-surface rockets, no presence of aircraft over the fighting use of land-based means, including significant improvement in the air arena round the clock. special forces and artillery. Despite force’s ability to deal with surface-to- It is unclear whether in fighting the desire to avoid using land forces, surface rockets is expected, at least in scenarios with different basic param- due to the high cost they incur, poli- the coming years. In absence of new eters the air force would be able to ticians and military personnel would detection technology that will allow repeat its achievements in Lebanon, do well to remember that as long as early location of launchers, the air particularly during the early stages the threat of surface-to-surface rock- force will – in the future too – have of the fighting. Potential enemies will ets remains substantial – and the last to deal with launchers mainly after also learn from the current hostilities war in Lebanon proved this even to they have started firing rockets. In and will try to use their rockets in skeptics – this cannot be avoided. As this context, advances may occur on new ways and provide a solution for far as short range rocket launchers are two main levels: simultaneous han- the air force’s operations. With regard concerned, the sky is not the limit. dling of a larger number of launch-

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 23 The Operational Aspects to Fighting the Qassam Gabriel Siboni

The primary manifestation of Palestinian terror from the Gaza Strip is Qassam rocket high- trajectory fire, supplemented by attempted fire with Grad-model Katyusha rockets. Although the rocket fire has not yet caused much loss of life, its impact, both in terms of emotional wear and tear on the local residents and in terms of public opinion, is considerable. Once the fighting in Lebanon ended, the focus of IDF activity returned to terrorist activities from Gaza and, in particular, efforts to curb rocket fire as much as possible. Interestingly, the Gaza arena, with its continued firing of Qassam rockets, is perceived as a more acute locus of ter- ror than Judea and Samaria: even though terror emerging from Judea and Samaria in 2006 has claimed a not insignificant number of casualties, the Israeli public senses that this area is under control. In contrast, the firing of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip generates a sense of helplessness and lack of control. Analysis of this phenomenon is not the subject of this paper, but it provides the reader with a relevant context.

uch has been written about calls to focus on combating the Qas- it to subside to a level that will lose its ways to stop the Qassam sam with standoff fire continue, and political significance. Clear and pen- rocket fire. In an effort to this summer’s fighting in the north etrating words, indeed. However, in Mprovide a quick solution, various par- provided a relevant platform for his article Ben Eliyahu does not refer ties (including in the defense estab- both supporters and opponents. For- to the depth of the Israeli-Palestinian lishment) have occasionally offered mer air force commander Maj. Gen. conflict, the extent of the enemy’s will ideas such as incursions into the (res.) Eitan Ben Eliyahu, in an article1 (and ability) to harm Israel, and the Gaza Strip for an extensive ground written after the assassination of Ja- need to harness substantial Israeli re- operation, ranging from reoccupa- mal Abu Samhadna (some argue his sources for targeted killings of a large tion of parts of the Strip to prolonged death was unintentional), suggests number of targets. Ze’ev Schiff,2 who stays in Gaza of various durations. focusing on long range precision wrote about the cumulative failure The questions regarding the objec- standoff fire. He argues that targeted of Israeli deterrence against Qassam tives of such a campaign and how it strikes from the air, over time and in rocket launches, correctly foresaw the could impact on Qassam rocket fire a systematic manner, will eventually situation. His prediction with regard over time are far from answered and destroy no less (!) than the will of ter- to the rocket fire is not optimistic: remain open. At the same time, the rorist elements to fight, or will cause “Sooner or later the Palestinians will improve the range, or will succeed in

IDF colonel (res)., military researcher, 1 E. Ben Eliyahu, “The Assassinations and doctoral candidate in information Will Win the War,” www.ynet.co.il, 2 Z. Schiff, “The Qassam Strip,”Haaretz , systems. June 9, 2006. December 31, 2005.

24 smuggling long range Katyusha rock- • Israel’s war on terror from the Gaza that drive and activate the wider pic- ets from the Sinai Peninsula. Then we Strip is subject to international political ture of terror. will see Ashdod within firing range.” constraints. Following the withdrawal The main challenge to combating If that is true, what can the IDF do in of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip, the the Qassam is the intelligence chal- the face of such a gloomy forecast? IDF’s operational conditions have lenge – the need for accurate opera- This paper will try to examine dif- changed and must be considered in tional intelligence is a condition of ferent aspects of the military-opera- any operational solution. any effective operation. The raw ma- tional fight against the Qassam threat. • Anarchy in Gaza is not in Israel’s in- terials supply processes, manufactur- First, it presents some basic assump- terests. Every effort should be made ing processes, transportation, launch, tions that place the operational chal- to resist dragging the Gaza Strip into and escape of the launch unit are all lenge in the context of realistic aims a state of anarchy, mainly because in links in the chain of the threat. Identi- and clear constraints. Guidelines de- such a situation the organization’s fying the different physical locations rived from the basic assumptions are splinter groups and their extremism that are part of this chain requires the followed by an initial analysis of the will increase, as will their motivation collection of high-quality accurate operational problem and the meth- to use all kinds of terror against Is- intelligence information. In addi- ods best suited to dealing with this rael. tion, generating quality intelligence challenge. regarding the people involved in the The Operational Challenge process and the facilities, vehicles, Basic Assumptions The operational challenges of fight- and other infrastructures will allow • Palestinian terror will continue on ing Qassam fire are only part of the more effective operational activity. varying levels and over time. Palestin- war on terror, but given the special The other operational challenge re- ian terror is not expected to disap- situation of the Gaza Strip they can lates to the ability to strike accurately pear. The confrontation with the Pal- be isolated from other components. A at any stage without harming inno- estinians is a national-religious con- key element to the challenges posed cent civilians. Inflicting damage on flict whose end is not in sight. Terror, by the Qassam is that high-trajectory the elements that comprise the Qas- including Qassam fire, will continue at different levels of intensity. There will always be a terror element that fires Qassam • The fight against Qassam fire isde- rockets that will not be deterred. The assumption is, signed to limit the rocket fire. One can- not completely eradicate the Qassam however, that the greater the overall effectiveness of the threat: there will always be some el- operational solution, the more the deterrent will increase. ement that manages to fire the rock- ets. • One should expect an enhancement of terror methods, including in Qas- fire is targeted easily at Israel with- sam threat can be carried out by vari- sam rockets. The Qassam represents a out the need for much complicated ous methods that generally belong to range of high-trajectory firing abili- preparation. Thus the operational two operational classes: standoff fire ties (such as the Grad missile). Ter- challenge can be divided into two – accurate fire from a distance, and ror elements invest ongoing efforts basic components: challenges con- direct contact strikes.3 in enhancing the effectiveness of the nected to the processes of production rocket fire, its range, accuracy, and and firing of the Qassam rocket; and 3 For an analysis of the advantages and the amount of damage it can inflict. challenges connected to the processes disadvantages of these approaches,

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 25 The operational challenges con- al approach: the most effective opera- and artillery fire. The comprehen- nected to the wider terrorism picture tional solution4 is the one that strikes sive operational solution, however, concern the need to provide targets against the sources of the threat. The demands that a range of operational that will harm the terrorist elements further away the operational solu- capabilities be examined against the in general, and in particular their tion is from the sources, the more the operational challenges, in order to ar- motivation to resort to terror. One ex- overall effectiveness decreases. Pro- rive at a balanced and effective com- ample of this operational challenge is tecting civilian infrastructures brings bination of fighting means. The ideal solution should utilize the full range Experience in combating terror proves the inaccuracy in of IDF and security forces operational thinking that it is possible to create an effective solution abilities. The components of this ap- proach to warfare include: by a one-dimensional operational solution. • Creating quality intelligence. The existence of a sustained quality intelligence effort involves the use the ability to identify quality targets the operational solution to its lower of a wide range of tools, including that will allow a retaliation of sorts limit whereby the cost effectiveness SIGINT technological abilities, fore- for Qassam fire, even if these targets is the smallest. If the funding for ci- casting abilities, and various sensing are not directly related to the specif- vilian protection resources comprises means. These tools offer an advantage ic firing chain. The goal is to create civil resources, it is better to allocate by virtue of the ability to use them an effective deterrent to the Qassam them to improving the quality of resi- from a distance, and they are critical rocket launchers and their operators. dential life rather than building pro- to the intelligence effort, even if it is In order to generate ongoing response tective measures that offer little in the difficult to create a complete quality ability, there is a need for both intel- way of benefit. picture on their basis alone. The in- ligence and strike ability that can be telligence effort also requires direct activated within a short time frame The Operational Perception access to human intelligence sources against suitable targets. True, there The operational military solution to and interrogation of involved parties. will always be a terror element that Qassam rocket fire requires a -com These two elements were substan- fires Qassam rockets that will not be prehensive approach. Experience in tially impaired with the withdrawal deterred. The assumption is, howev- combating terror proves the inac- from the Gaza Strip. Thus, the intel- er, that the greater the overall effec- curacy in thinking that it is possible ligence authorities must create means tiveness of the operational solution, to create an effective solution by a that will enhance their ability to ob- the more the deterrent will increase. one-dimensional operational solu- tain such intelligence. Restoring the The question of civilian defenses tion. One can find recent examples of ability to arrest individuals involved arises here as well, i.e., protection of seeking such a solution in redirecting in terrorist activity or wanted for in- houses and civilian facilities against the multi-faceted operational solu- terrogation should not be underesti- direct Qassam damage. The following tion to specific strikes, standoff fire, mated. Creating the ability to carry equation is relevant to any operation- out arrests, both in terms of the qual- ity and quantity required, justifies 4 An effective operational solution is rapid force assembly processes for see: G. Siboni, “The Military Battle defined as a solution that offers high against Terrorism: Direct Contact vs. cost effectiveness, in other words; a appropriate units. The ability to carry Standoff Fighting,” Strategic Assess- good operational result is achieved out a large number of arrests in urban ment 9, no 1 (2006): 42-47. with a low investment in resources. areas of the Gaza Strip also has sub-

26 stantial impact on the overall - deter tivity, and conduct arrests for inves- penetrate hostile territory, carry out rence balance.5 tigation and preemptive purposes. disruptive, punitive, and retaliatory • A balance of standoff attack and Assembling such a capability to the activity, and return home. This op- direct contact. The last few years of required extent (several operations erational tool is very important, and fighting have given rise to a fight- per night) is essential, but is not sim- the ability to execute it within short ing concept in the Gaza Strip based ple and requires time. While employ- time spans should be maintained. on two assumptions: the first is based ing forces deep inside the Gaza Strip These incursions can vary in nature on deploying armored and protected involves numerous risks, some can – secret low-profile incursions or forces to enter the field and carry out be overcome by developing a suit- massive armored operations. The in- strikes against terror elements while able operational approach, through cursions should have a defined short providing maximum protec- time frame (hours, days) and tion for IDF forces; the second the temptation to leave forces is based on standoff fire against in the field over time should terrorist parties through the be avoided. use of precision strikes, gener- • Selecting targets and ally from the air. The ability to objectives. The IDF must have carry out armored operations the ability to carry out ongo- was limited by the withdrawal ing strikes on the force build- from Gaza, and the solution that up processes of the involved remained was based mainly on organizations. Inflicting ongo- carrying out specific strikes and ing damage on these processes using standoff fire. Over time, (training, equipment, smug- the nearly exclusive depen- gling weapons, and procure- dence on this means resulted in ment) even if they are not di- its erosion. The need to build an rectly connected to the source effective ability to strike against of fire will support the overall terror elements in the Gaza Strip combat effort. The IDF must requires improving the abil- create continuous quality in- ity to act directly in this arena. telligence that will enable it One example of such activity is the training, technological support, and to build the most effective balance operation where an IDF ground force a strong support system. Standoff of deterrence. In this way it will also succeeded in carrying out a strike activity will not become redundant determine the retaliation for a spe- against a Qassam rocket launch unit but will be reserved only for cases in cific rocket attack, part of the overall before the launch. The IDF must have which direct contact operations can- response to any Qassam fire. Defer- a substanive ability to act through not be carried out to prevent an im- ring use of this response will erode its direct contact in the field. The opera- mediate attack (the ticking bomb sce- potential. The defense system must tional units must be able to achieve nario). generate an operational format that penetration in the field, carry out in- • Limited incursions. The IDF has does not require the ongoing ritual of telligence-based ground strikes, carry to maintain the freedom to operate lengthy situation evaluations at the out ambushes in expected areas of ac- in different fields in the Gaza Strip end of which the response loses some through limited incursions. The es- of effectiveness, and its use occasion- 5 See note 3. sence of incursions is the ability to ally becomes irrelevant.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 27 • Systems for intercepting airborne artillery fire for deterrence purposes Strip, including the Qassam, but also missiles. The assumption is that the and, in certain cases, the attempt to represents general sustained efforts Qassam rocket will not be completely target a specific site after the rock- at operational effectiveness. An opti- eradicated, and it will continue to ets were launched. Use of this fire is mal command and control structure be used on various levels of inten- a component of total warfare, and is needed in order to support pro- sity. Nevertheless, all technological the abilities it offers should be maxi- cesses of cooperation at all levels of warfare, especially at the operational Israel should concentrate on implementation of the levels where unity of objective and the required operational focus foster existing standards for civilian protection and not make a basis for impressive cooperation. At significant financial investments in additional protection the same time, a basis for inter-corps means whose effectiveness is unclear. and inter-organizational cooperation should be created by sharing resourc- es and information, and utilizing the relative advantages of each party. and operational abilities should be mized. Without another solution, this harnessed in order to limit the phe- type of fire is highly effective, and Conclusion nomenon as much as possible. The experience shows that it is capable The range of operational elements re- maturation of various technologies of reducing and disrupting rocket quires an ongoing total combative ef- allows development of systems that launches. fort over time, incorporating the full intercept and strike missiles of dif- • Defensive effort. The existing range of components available to the ferent kinds. Due to the fact that this protection standards in Israel provide IDF. Any single approach should not threat exists not only in Gaza but the best possible solution for civilian be expected to be capable of eradicat- also in Lebanon, one can assume that protection requirements. Thus, Israel ing the threat in one fell swoop. Israel the threat of high-trajectory fire will should concentrate on implementa- cannot allow itself to accept Qassam spread to Judea and Samaria. Thus, tion of these standards and not make fire at the level it has witnessed in re- the defense authorities must aim to significant financial investments in cent months or be maneuvered into find technological means designed additional protection means whose operational paralysis. Anyone who to strike rockets or divert them from effectiveness is unclear. neglects ongoing operational activity their trajectory or, alternately, to • Concept of command and con- will ultimately be forced to carry out achieve an immediate strike on the trol. A balanced offense against the a massive ground operation in Gaza, source of the fire (seconds after the Qassam requires the support of an even if this does not serve the overall launch). A sustained and continu- organized command and control ap- security interests of Israel. ous technological effort is required proach, to allow integrated military This paper has not touched upon in order to utilize fully these abilities activity between the various IDF other important components of war- within total warfare activities. corps and the involvement of other fare relating to the use of diplomatic, • Use of artillery fire. The predica- parties, such as the General Security economic, political, and other means. ment that forced the IDF to provide Service (GSS) and the Israeli police. The importance of these components an immediate deterrent solution to This is a specific requirement for the is clear, and should be addressed by the Qassam fire prompted the use of fight against terror from the Gaza other frameworks.

28 Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension Amir Kulick

The IDF’s Combat Approach vs. Hizbollah If one were to generalize, one might say that since the War of Independence the IDF has been perceived by Arabs as a maneuvering army, that is, whose military opera- tional doctrine centers on firepower and rapid maneuvers of large forces. And indeed, until the 1990s the major campaigns and operations waged by the IDF (except for the 1969-70 War of Attrition) were based on large scale maneuvers of ground forces. From the 1956 Sinai Campaign to the first Lebanon War in 1982, IDF infantry and armored forces operated deep in enemy territory at the early stages of fighting. The air campaign was perceived at first as mere assistance, and later as a parallel effort aimed at achieving air superiority, destroying enemy anti-aircraft installations and sur- face-to-surface missiles, and finally assisting ground forces. This perception has been evolving since the 1990s. The air campaign waged by the US in Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War and the campaign waged by NATO member states in Kosovo presented a different model of fighting, which centers on an air campaign. It seems that from this point, the weight the IDF assigned to air and artillery firepower began to shift. The low number of casualties in this brand of fighting, the hi-tech style of war, and the ability to rely on Israel’s technological advantage all promoted this combat approach. This style of fighting, whose core is the “fire-intense effort,” was waged successful- ly against Hizbollah in 1993 during Operation Accountability. Hizbollah was highly surprised by this mode of warfare. The Shiite fighters had prepared for a ground cam- paign and for face to face fighting with the Zionist enemy. Instead, they encountered a very different campaign, one waged mostly in the space outside of their reach – from the air, from the border, and from within IDF strongholds in the security zone in Lebanon. From this campaign Hizbollah reached the requisite conclusions and came to the next confrontation much better prepared. Thus, during Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996, the organization relied primarily on Katyusha rockets that it launched towards northern settlements close to the border.

Researcher at INSS.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 29 Nonetheless, the IDF persisted in its speech of May 26, 2000 in the border • A mid-range artillery forma- line of thinking that centered on in- town of Bint Jbail, soon after the IDF’s tion, set up south of the Litani River. tense firepower, and thus most of the withdrawal from Lebanon, where he This formation launched most of the IDF fighting in the 1996 operation claimed that Israeli society is as weak rockets that hit deep into Israel (the relied on the air force and artillery. as a spider web. Haifa area and southward). It in- Ground operations were few, limited On the operational level it seemed cluded 220 mm Syrian rockets and mostly to special forces operations in that Hizbollah decision-makers extended range Katyusha rockets. launch site areas. These forces were grasped that IDF fighting in the fu- • Two additional long range sent into battle only after the IDF had ture would also be based on massive rocket formations (up to 250 km) set essentially failed to reduce the vol- use of the air force and artillery. This up in the area between the Litani and ume of rocket fire into Israel’s terri- realization was reinforced by minor Beirut (seen, for instance, when the tory. In any event, as far as Hizbollah intermediate rounds of the conflict air force attacked the Zelzal launcher was concerned and regardless of the in Lebanon as well as by IDF opera- in Beirut). These two formations were political outcome of the confronta- tions in the early years of the intifa- intended as strategic weapons of de- tion, the clashes of 1996 ended with da, namely, the reluctance to deploy terrence to allow Hizbollah to deal relative success at the operational massive ground forces (at least until blows of varying intensity to Israel’s level. There were many lessons to Operation Defensive Shield in April soft underbelly – the area between be learned in the area of logistics 2002) and reliance on the air force Haifa and Tel Aviv. (weapons shortages) and in aspects and limited use of special forces. Alongside these three or four of command and control, but as a Based on these assumptions (the rocket formations was a ground array rule the organization was successful weakness of Israeli society and the created south of the Litani based on in launching Katyusha rockets into IDF’s reliance on a firepower cam- underground tunnels and bunkers, Israel up until the ceasefire. paign), Hizbollah proceeded with its explosives-ridden areas, and anti- force buildup. The recent round of fighting demon- Hizbollah’s primary operational Hizbollah’s Operational Pre- strated that the organiza- objective was to wage a war of paration for Lebanon War II tion’s primary operational From the end of the 1996 campaign objective was to wage a attrition against Israel’s home front. and up to 2006, Hizbollah prepared war of attrition against Is- for the next confrontation. Aided rael’s home front. Thus at closely by Iran, it based its prepara- the center of the organization’s com- tions on several assumptions derived bat approach was the need to strike tank units. This array was intended from previous rounds of fighting, within Israel’s borders, as deeply as to confront ground forces to a limited as well as from military and politi- possible and throughout the fighting, extent, to stall ground incursions, cal developments of recent years. At even in the face of massive bomb- and to inflict as many casualties as the center was the organization’s as- ing or ground operations by special possible, which would wear out IDF sumption that Israeli society is weak forces. On this basis, Hizbollah put forces, slow down their progress, and and cannot stomach a large number in place three or four major fighting allow continued rocket fire into Is- of casualties. In Hizbollah’s eyes, formations: rael. This operational infrastructure this weakness induced the IDF with- • A short range artillery array re- was apparently intended to form a drawal from the Lebanon security lying primarily on Katyusha rockets. basis for continued fighting by the or- zone, and Hassan Nasrallah flaunted This array was to bear the burden of ganization, should the IDF reoccupy this ostensible frailty in his victory striking within Israel’s borders. parts of southern Lebanon (the less

30 likely but more dangerous scenario ground infrastructure of bunkers and the advanced control rooms discov- in Hizbollah’s view). shelters. These were intended to help ered during IDF action in Bint Jbail) On the tactical level, in order fighters survive in the face of aerial is evidence of its ambition to conduct to face the IDF’s expected fighting and artillery attacks and allow them the fighting in an orderly, well-timed mode, the organization chose three to maintain opera- principal tactics: tions for extended Alongside the hierarchical command 1. Saturating the area with (short periods. structure it seems that Hizbollah ground range) rockets, and therefore over The organiza- recent years Hizbollah stockpiled tion has created a forces were given considerable free thousands of Katyusha launchers hybrid command reign. and rockets. The goal was to ensure a and control model. situation whereby Israel’s destruction The cornerstone of of multiple launchers, even dozens of its operational layout is a strict hi- manner. At the same time, alongside them, would not inhibit Hizbollah’s erarchical organizational structure, the hierarchical structure it seems ability to sustain firepower. Thus, with Nasrallah and the Jihad council that the ground fighting forces were the launchers were spread out both (Hizbollah’s “general staff”) at the given considerable free reign. There in villages and in open areas, and in- top of the pyramid. Below them are are two main reasons for that: one deed, the organization managed to well formed units and formations. reason is the secondary role assigned maintain this formation and continue This structure enabled the organiza- to this formation – slowing down the generating massive fire into Israel (an tion to control – throughout the fight- ground campaign and inflicting casu- average of over 100 Katyusha rockets ing – the amount of fire (”the height alties. The second reason is the esti- every day) throughout the war. of the flames”), the firing units, and mation of the Hizbollah leadership, 2. Mobility. Based on different re- the strike range inside Israel. The or- namely, that during an IDF large ports, it seems that most of the mid- ganization chose to activate its mid- scale ground operation Hizbollah range rockets fired into the Haifa, range fire array (south of the Litani) would not be able to control a large Afula, and Beit Shean areas were only after several days of fighting, number of tactical events (whose im- fired from mobile launchers (launch- while the long range rocket forma- portance for the overall campaign is ers installed on vehicles). Apparently tion was not activated at all. Similar- in any case insignificant). these launchers were intended to al- ly, Hizbollah was able to hold its fire The IDF withdrawal from Leba- low Hizbollah fighters to launch the during the 48-hour truce during the non facilitated Hizbollah’s military rockets and hide before air or artillery fighting and renew the rocket attacks buildup. The low operational activ- fire was directed at the launch site. To shortly afterwards. In the same vein, ity along the Israel-Lebanon border a large degree, this method failed. once the ceasefire came into effect, over the years allowed Hizbollah to According to Israeli air force reports, this command structure ensured that allocate most of its operational re- almost any mid-range launcher that the fighting halted in all areas. sources to preparing its units for the fired into Israel was destroyed. It is likely that with a looser orga- next campaign with no interference. 3. Advance preparation of a nizational model, Hizbollah would Without the IDF present south of the ground and logistics infrastructure not have succeeded in controlling Litani, Hizbollah was able, unhin- for waging a prolonged campaign. the massive fire formations it cre- dered, to build a wide-ranging infra- This infrastructure included many ated. Moreover, the organization’s structure a short distance from the weapons repositories south of the investment in a modern command international border. Moreover, its Litani River as well as an extensive and control infrastructure (such as presence on the border line likely en-

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 31 abled it to gather high-quality target that has evolved in previous years, deployed south of the Litani. intelligence regarding targets deep especially in the recourse to Effects Ground forces were deployed inside Israeli populated areas using Based Operations, but with firepow- after several days of air strikes, and advanced observation devices such er remaining its dominant compo- only to a limited extent, on the front as those discovered by the IDF in dif- nent. Within the framework of this lines and in a narrow area (e.g., Ma- ferent villages in southern Lebanon. approach, the methodology for con- roun a-Ras). This situation left IDF In addition, Hizbollah also operated fronting Hizbollah’s rocket array has soldiers facing an entrenched and well-prepared ground formation; While IDF fire may have disrupted Hizbollah operations, it furthermore, the IDF concentration did not significantly undermine the operational logic that in a narrow sector allowed Hizbollah dictated Hizbollah activity – waging a prolonged rocket to reinforce its troops in the area and campaign against Israel’s home front. send in fighters from adjacent sec- tors. This mode of operation not only caused many IDF casualties, but also allowed Hizbollah to continue firing agents within Israel, such as the two not changed, nor has it been upgrad- its daily quota of rockets into Israel. brothers from the village of Rajar who ed since Operation Grapes of Wrath Possibly the massive ground force were arrested in late 2003 for collabo- in 1996, relying mainly on pre-launch operations of the last days of fighting rating with Hizbollah. Other exam- preemption and destruction of the may have surprised Hizbollah, but it ples are Ahmed al-Heib, arrested in launcher afterwards. It is safe to as- seems to have been too late to dam- November 2004, and Lt. Col. Omar sume that certain technological in- age its operational infrastructure sig- al-Heib, arrested in February 2002, novations have been introduced and nificantly. Furthermore, the ceasefire both suspected of providing informa- were of some benefit during the July- apparently left a major part of the or- tion to Hizbollah. August war. Nevertheless, IDF oper- ganization’s capabilities intact (main- In addition, the short range rocket ations vs. Hizbollah continued to be ly in the region beyond the narrow array deployed on the international based on air and artillery firepower, strip where the IDF was concentrated border enabled the organization to and while IDF fire may have disrupt- for most of the ground combat). Thus extend the range of Katyusha rock- ed Hizbollah operations, it did not in the absence of a sound combat ap- ets to many urban areas in Israel that significantly undermine or impair the proach, the IDF’s combat achieve- were out of Hizbollah’s reach before operational logic that dictated Hiz- ments on the operational level were the IDF withdrawal, for example, bollah activity – waging a prolonged fairly limited. Safed and Tiberias and even Haifa, rocket campaign against Israel’s Nevertheless, at the strategic level which was targeted by mid-range home front. Thus the numerous bom- and regarding the domestic Lebanese Syrian rockets of 220 and 302 mm cal- bardments in Beirut and in the Beka’a arena, several achievements may be iber, as well as by Katyusha rockets seem to have hurt the organization, credited to the Israeli architects of whose new range extended to 27-35 but they did not substantively change the campaign, first and foremost up- kilometers. the battle plan it planned to pursue. rooting Hizbollah’s basic strategic And indeed, throughout the fighting assumption that Israel’s home front IDF vs. Hizbollah in the the IDF could not reduce the volume is incapable of sustaining prolonged Recent Campaign of rocket launches by even a narrow damage or a large number of casual- The IDF thus entered the recent con- margin, although it was successful in ties (military and civilian). In addi- frontation with a combat approach targeting the mid-range rocket array tion, the organization’s deterrence ca-

32 pability, based in recent years on the the river may push Hizbollah to build From the command and control as- threat of rocket fire, was damaged. a massive infrastructure for arrays pect, the massive bombardment of The recent campaign also exposed north of the Litani, possibly even in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut where, and jeopardized one of the pillars of Beka’a and north of Beirut. The objec- according to IDF reports, Hizbol- Iran’s security concept – Hizbollah’s tive will be to saturate the area with lah command posts were centered, long range fire capability, and this at rockets (based on the same logic that may prompt Hizbollah to disperse a time when Iran may need the or- has guided Hizbollah in setting up its offices and operational command ganization’s deterrence capabilities. the short range rocket array) in order posts across different areas of Beirut Furthermore, the destruction and to compel the air force to operate in and outside Beirut (for example, in ruin in traditional Shiite strongholds multiple areas and thereby increase Christian quarters that from an inter- in southern Lebanon do not contrib- the array’s survivability. national standpoint may be more dif- ute to Hizbollah’s stature. Domestic It is likely that from Hizbollah’s ficult to attack). criticism of Hizbollah and its leader perspective the mid-range rocket It is too early to assess the full po- by various figures outside and even array did not achieve the optimal tential for operational change that the within the Shiite community are ad- ditional results of the recent war. The psychological effect of rocket attacks in Haifa and further south did not materially alter Israel’s conduct. Hizbollah’s Preparations for the Next Campaign: Initial Conclusions It may be possible to sketch in general result. The psychological effect of organization may undergo, since such terms Hizbollah’s expected prepara- rocket attacks in Haifa and further change depends to a large extent on tions in the coming years for the next south did not materially alter Israel’s several factors that are as yet not suffi- round of fighting. It seems that these conduct. From here the organization ciently clear. These include the ability/ preparations will be centered around may draw two operational conclu- willingness of the multi-national force artillery and rocket arrays, with sions: one, to abandon the long range to prevent Hizbollah from restoring most of the organization’s fighting rocket array and focus on the short its operational infrastructure in the concentrated into attacks on Israel’s range rockets; the other, more likely south; the ability to prevent continued home front, though at longer range conclusion is that Hizbollah leaders arms transfers from Syria and Iran to and more intensively than before. In may decide that in order to obtain Hizbollah; and the internal dynamics view of the considerable operational the desired effect in the future, they that will unfold in Lebanon in the near success of the short range rocket ar- should significantly expand and for- future. Nonetheless, one question ray, this formation is likely to be rein- tify the mid- and long range rocket dominates all others, namely will Is- forced. The IDF’s systematic elimina- arrays. The goal of the next campaign rael be able to act, both internally and tion of mid-range rocket launchers in would be to launch intensive volleys internationally, to disrupt Hizbollah’s the region south of the Litani and the towards Tel Aviv and its surround- rearmament, in order to ensure a dif- (somewhat more limited) damage to ings, which Hizbollah perceives as ferent outcome for the next campaign the long range rocket array north of the nerve center of the Zionist entity. whenever it will occur.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 33 Hizbollah’s Primary Agent of Change: The Role of the Lebanese Army Dani Berkovich

UN Security Council resolution 1701 stipulates deployment of the Lebanese army in south- ern Lebanon, disarming the region of any non-government-held weapons, and prevention of hostilities. It places the major burden of implementation on the shoulders of the Lebanese army, as the principal executive arm of the Lebanese government, a situation that implies po- tential friction with Hizbollah. However, in terms of actual steps to disarm Hizbollah, there is a long way from theory to practice. The Lebanese government, led by Fouad Siniora, has no intention of acting against Hizbollah, since it is well aware that this will jeopardize the fragile domestic stability in the country. Nevertheless, deploying the Lebanese army lays the foundation for trends that, if actual- ized, will have a positive impact on Israel’s security, including instilling the concept of the Lebanese state and reinforcing its authority, sovereignty, and responsibility; and on the op- posite side, gradual containment of Hizbollah as a military organization. This is a complex and arduous process that Israel should support and Hizbollah is bound to try to sabotage, and its success depends not only on the capabilities of the Lebanese army but also on the government’s determination to advance it. But in any case, the very launching of this process is one of the recent war’s achievements.

The Lebanese Dilemma: Israeli attacks and acts of aggression, from Israel and the international Hizbollah’s Weapons but not to disarm Hizbollah.1 community to implement resolution In early October 2006 the Lebanese This move is apparently a major 1559 on disarming the militias and, as army, with much media fanfare, com- achievement for Siniora’s govern- a first step, to deploy its army in the pleted its deployment in most areas ment, as since the withdrawal of south and assume responsibility for south of the Litani River in accordance Syrian troops from Lebanon in April terrorist organization activities from with Security Council resolution 2005 it has faced mounting pressure its territory. However, it appears that 1701. This move was accompanied by no one inside or outside Lebanon has 1 See, for example, Prime Minister statements from senior Lebanese fig- any clear idea how to disarm Hizbol- Siniora’s statement that emphasized lah without causing a domestic crisis ures about the army’s determination that “the expression ‘disarmament’ to confiscate illegal weapons, to pre- is absent from our vocabulary,” Daily or, for that matter, regional escalation. vent attacks from Lebanese territory, Star, October 9, 2006; as well as remarks The expectations created in Israel and and to protect the country against by the commander of the armed forces in the international community (as General Michel Suleiman, speaking well as among more than a few Leba- at a ceremony in southern Lebanon, nese) that the IDF would be able to Visiting Research Fellow at INSS. www.naharnet.com, October 2, 2006.

34 do that with a swift, decisive military lah weapons is no longer theoretical, Lebanese army able to impose gov- campaign have been shattered in the but has moved to center stage and ernmental authority on Hizbollah, aftermath of the recent war. demands immediate action, even at to the point of its complete disarma- The international community is the risk of friction with Hizbollah. ment? This complex challenge is in- not enthused with brute force solu- Those in charge of translating resolu- fluenced by certain critical factors: tions, and no one regards the rein- tion 1701 into concrete measures and • Balance of power – quantitative but not necessarily qualitative ad- The Lebanese national ethos perceives the army as an vantage. The Lebanese army, which was rehabilitated under Syrian pa- organization of the republic that rises above sectarian tronage after the end of the civil war divisions. and the Ta’if accord of 1989,2 has more soldiers than “Hizbollah’s army.” It forced UNIFIL troops, sent to assist enforcing the government’s authority numbers about 50,000 troops3 and the Lebanese army in implementing over Hizbollah are Lebanon’s securi- purportedly has means not avail- resolution 1701, as a force that will act ty organs, led by the army. By merely able to Hizbollah (armored vehicles, to disarm Hizbollah. On the contrary, deploying in the south, the Lebanese helicopters, patrol craft) as well as a the international community has re- army has already taken the first step commando unit considered the elite verted to its pre-war position, name- in this direction. ly, that disarming Hizbollah is an in- 2 The Ta’if accord was ratified on Oc- ternal Lebanese matter, to be handled Can the Lebanese Army Do tober 22, 1989 by the Lebanese parlia- ment, marking the conclusion of the politically rather than militarily. This the Job? civil war and the establishment of a approach is common in Lebanon as The challenge of a sovereign state new order in Lebanon, under Syrian well, voiced in the extensive domes- facing an armed organization that is auspices. The accord required all Leb- tic public discourse that began before active within its territory and rebuffs anese and non-Lebanese militias to be the war on the future of Hizbollah its authority recurs in multiple places disarmed and surrender their weap- weapons. This discourse reflects the around the world, and is no stranger ons to the state within six months, and mandated that the Lebanese army clash between two opposing ideo- to Lebanon. In fact this has been the and homeland security forces be rein- logical approaches: the “resistance” status quo since the 1970s, especially forced. Based on this agreement, the embodied by Hizbollah, built on the in the south of the country (which has Syrians allowed Hizbollah’s existence idea of ongoing confrontation with metamorphosed from “Fatah-land” as an armed organization under the Israel with the goal of its destruction, to “Hizbollah-land”). Yet the circum- pretext of continued confrontation versus the “March 14 camp” (which stances that fostered such a situa- with Israel. 3 Data published by the Jaffee Center also represents the majority party tion have changed – Syria no longer for Strategic Studies in late 2005 has in government and in parliament), runs Lebanon’s domestic affairs, the the Lebanese army numbering about which strives to establish a new order Lebanese army is deployed, de facto, 61,400 (http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ in Lebanon, based on the resolution almost throughout the country, Leb- balance/Lebanon.pdf), but in fact the of domestic and external conflicts by anon as a sovereign state is deter- number is closer to 50,000, following political means. mined to bring about change, and the the new draft law of May 4, 2005, whereby the compulsory service was In the new reality created in Leba- international community is willing reduced from two years to six months, non following the adoption of resolu- to assist the Lebanese government in after which army service is voluntary. tion 1701, it is amply clear to Siniora’s exercising its responsibility. In addition, there are tens of thou- government that the issue of Hizbol- Under these circumstances, is the sands of reserve troops.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 35 of this army. In contrast, Hizbollah lation.5 This does not mean that in a withdrawal from Lebanon. Over the numbers several thousand well- confrontation with Hizbollah Shiite years, Hizbollah has amassed consid- equipped combatants, well-trained soldiers would desert en masse – as erable strength with aid from Syria in guerilla warfare, with the proven Hizbollah might wish – but the army and Iran, and the weak Lebanese ability to confront armies stronger command is highly unlikely to walk government has had to acquiesce to than the Lebanese army.4 Moreover, the tightrope and test sectoral loyal- its special status in southern Leba- the Lebanese army lacks significant ties.6 non and in southern Beirut (Dahiya). combat experience, having thus far • Hizbollah-Lebanese army rela- Both parties have forged a system of understandings and accommodation, Hizbollah seems to believe its power of deterrence in the whereby the state, represented in the south by only a token security pres- domestic arena remains unscathed. ence, does not confiscate Hizbollah’s arms, does not arrest its personnel, and turns a blind eye to its armament acted mostly in domestic security as- tions: co-existence and sharing the efforts and its military/ terror activi- signments. It lacks professionalism burden. Since the Ta’if accord, the ex- ties. and proficiency, and its equipment isting status quo in Lebanon – under Following the deployment of the is faulty in most of its units: it is still Syrian auspices – endowed Lebanon Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces awaiting the generous aid packages with two armies: the Lebanese army, south of the Litani River as part of the promised by different countries. as a formal army in charge of domes- implementation of resolution 1701, a Therefore, the army is unable to pose tic security and stability (in which new system of understandings was any formidable challenge to Hizbol- capacity it acted to disarm sectarian created between the Lebanese army lah. militias in the early 1990s), and Hiz- and Hizbollah based on the principle • The Shiite component in the bollah, which was in charge of the of (in)visibility. Hizbollah combat- army. Since the Ta’if accord a special conflict with Israel, even after the IDF ants will maintain a low profile, will effort has been made to blur the- ar not circulate in uniform, and will not my’s sectarian composition. Although openly display their weapons.7 In 5 According to Oren Barak, the in the spirit of the sectarian division contrast, the Lebanese army flaunts percentage of Shiite officers in the that reigns in Lebanon the army com- Lebanese army stood at 27.2 percent its presence and may confiscate arms mander is always Christian, today, in 1991-2004. The total percentage carried in public and arrest anyone unlike in the past, an effort is made to of Muslim officers (including Sunni, in uniform. So far, except for minor maintain an ethnic balance in differ- Shiite, and Druze) was 52.9 percent. incidents, this new arrangement has ent army formations. The army has The share of Christians was 47.1 been observed.8 percent. See Oren Barak, “The a fairly high percentage of Shiites – • The Lebanese army as a sym- Transformation of the Lebanese about 30-35 percent, proportionate to Officer Corps since 1945: Towards a bol of fragile unity. The Lebanese their percentage in the general popu- Representative Military?” The Middle national ethos perceives the army as East Journal 60 (winter 2006): 89. an organization of the republic that 6 Barak notes that the increase in the rises above sectarian divisions, not- 4 Beyond Hizbollah’s combatant nucle- number of Shiite officers in the Leba- withstanding the trauma of the civil us, the organization can also call upon nese army may indicate a process of Palestinian terrorist organizations greater identification of Shiites with active in bases within Lebanon (i.e., the Lebanese state (beyond perceiving 7 Nasrallah interview with al-Safir, Sep- thousands of additional armed per- military service as a means of social tember 5, 2006 sonnel) and arm pro-Syrian militias. mobility); Barak, p. 91. 8 AP agency, September 27, 2006.

36 war and the deep political-sectarian sions Hizbollah leader Hassan Nas- reason why Nasrallah agreed to the rifts that beset Lebanon. The army rallah has presented the organiza- deployment of the Lebanese army has earned this status with the efforts tion’s (clearly impossible) conditions to the south of the country as part of its commanders, who since the end for discussion of disarmament: re- of resolution 1701, though he had of the civil war have avoided any in- moving the Israeli threat to Lebanon opposed it since the withdrawal of volvement in domestic political-sec- (i.e., destruction of Israel’s existence) Israel from Lebanon. From his van- tarian disagreements in Lebanon’s and establishing a strong state with a tage, this is a calculated risk, since he fragile system of balances, and have strong army, capable of deterring Is- already knows how to cope with the generally demonstrated sensitivity in rael from attacking Lebanon. Lebanese army and also has means to times of political stress.9 To be sure, the situation created in put pressure on Siniora’s government • Hizbollah’s central position in southern Lebanon, with the deploy- should it exceed the scope of the un- Lebanon’s political system. Hizbol- ment of the Lebanese army and rein- derstandings regarding acquiescence lah enjoys considerable political clout forced UNIFIL troops, requires Hiz- to Hizbollah’s covert presence in in Lebanon by virtue of its being the bollah to adapt to the new circum- southern Lebanon. largest Shiite party (at the expense stances, which are less convenient As early as September 2006 Nas- of its rival, Amal) and its military than in the past. Yet even under these rallah outlined the “do’s and don’ts” might. The organization’s presence in government and parliament, the The resistance has not disappeared and it will be present, support accorded to it by pro-Syr- ian president Emile Lahoud, and the according to Nasrallah, to assist the Lebanese army support of Syria and Iran combine to covertly and unofficially. make Hizbollah a full-fledged part- ner, whose consent is required in the circumstances Hizbollah does not see governing Hizbollah and the Leba- decision-making process on major is- any real option whereby the Lebanese nese army under the new conditions. sues in the country, including the de- army, as the executive arm of the gov- According to these rules, the Leba- cision to deploy the Lebanese army to ernment, will proceed to disarm it. nese army is tasked with responding the south. On the contrary, Hizbollah seems to to any Israeli violation (as Hizbollah believe its power of deterrence in the did in the past). But – and there’s Hizbollah’s Perspective domestic arena remains unscathed, the rub – the resistance has not dis- Hizbollah rejects any scenario of vol- with the Lebanese army not posing a appeared and it will be present, ac- untary disarmament or any other cre- significant threat to it, rather, at most cording to Nasrallah, to assist the ative solution proposed to it whereby an inconvenience. On more than one Lebanese army covertly and unoffi- Hizbollah submits to the govern- occasion Nasrallah has referred to the cially. As for the “don’ts,” Nasrallah ment’s authority (e.g., incorporation Lebanese army in a patronizing and clarified that the army may not dis- of its units or combatants within the scornful manner.11 This was also the arm the resistance, spy on it, or raid Lebanese army).10 On multiple occa- locations where Hizbollah stores its more by Defense Minister al-Murr. arms.12 Later, for the sake of clarity, 9 For example, during the mass protests See www.naharnet.com, September Nasrallah conveyed a message (to in Lebanon following the assassina- 23, 2006. the state as well) accompanied by a tion of Rafiq al-Hariri (February 14, 11 For instance, after the Lebanese gov- 2005). ernment agreed to deploy the army 10 This proposal has been made in the in the south, Nasrallah explained that Lebanese army, al-Manar, August 8, past by different politicians in Leba- thus far Hizbollah has opposed such a 2006. non, and was recently raised once move because of its “concern” for the 12 Al-Safir, September 5, 2006.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 37 threat, which said that no army in the the army has largely mirrored Leba- The primary condition for these world could disarm Hizbollah.13 non’s stability, sovereignty, and inde- trends is a strong Lebanese army, ef- Nonetheless, Hizbollah has cause pendence. It seems that following the fectively deployed (alongside a re- to worry due to two perilous trends: recent war, the Lebanese army has inforced UNIFIL) along the border the focus in Lebanon’s domestic dis- again assumed a significant position with Israel and thereby rising to the course on the future of Hizbollah’s as the executive arm of the Lebanese challenge that Nasrallah posed to the arms and the continuous erosion in state. state with regard to establishment of the legitimacy of its bearing arms; Under the current circumstances it a strong, capable army as a prerequi- and the resolve shown by Prime Min- is unlikely that the Lebanese govern- site to discussing disarmament. Such ister Siniora in promoting, via the ment will instruct its army to disarm an army will not only serve as a clear Lebanese army, processes aimed at Hizbollah, and it is highly doubtful if state-level address for Israel in any revoking Hizbollah’s prerogative to the Lebanese army – with or without case of security deterioration, but “defend Lebanon” from Israel. assistance from UNIFIL troops – will may even serve as a deterrent in the Therefore, Hizbollah leaders have act on the full implementation of domestic arena against Hizbollah. clarified in a series of defiant state- resolution 1701, especially vis-à-vis Nevertheless, realization of these ments that not only will the organi- disarming the area south of the Litani trends is not merely a function of zation maintain its covert presence in of all non-government arms. Never- military might – improved as it the south (as Nasrallah underlined) theless, the deployment of the Leba- may be – under the authority of the but it will also renew attacks against nese army to the south of the country Lebanese government, but primar- Israel should it violate Lebanon’s cultivates two emerging trends that, ily the resolve of this government to sovereignty at sea, on land, and in the if realized, will have a positive im- use the Lebanese army to promote air.14 In any case, at this stage it would pact on Israel’s security and match its strategic goals and its ability to seem that Hizbollah prefers to avoid the strategic objectives of Siniora’s surmount the many obstacles fac- friction with the army, and aims its government: ing it from within and without. It criticism at Prime Minister Siniora • Reinforcing the idea of the Leba- is, indeed, likely that Hizbollah and and at the “March 14 camp.” nese state with all that implies for its patrons in Damascus and Tehran establishment of central government will object to attempts at weakening The Lebanese Army: An authority, gradual realization of state the organization’s status in Lebanon Agent of Change, not sovereignty throughout its territory, and at revoking its “legitimate right Disarmament and responsibility for hostile activi- to fight against Israel” by bolstering Since its establishment (August 1, ties in and from its territory. an already emergent effort to weaken 1945), the Lebanese army, along with • Containment of Hizbollah, as part other state security organs, has ful- of the attempt to revoke its unauthor- that the Lebanese army needs anti- filled an important role in safeguard- ized power to manage conflicts with aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, ing domestic stability, and the state of Israel and to use force against it. Even and helicopters for deterring Israel, at this early stage this is expressed by Daily Star, September 25, 2006. 13 See Nasrallah’s “victory speech” of the increased involvement of Sin- Elsewhere the defense minister September 22, 2006 (English version) iora’s government in issues at stake mentioned that the government at: http://www.moqawama.org/eng- with Israel: Shab’a Farms, the prison- has already decided to acquire such lish/_amen222.php?filename=200609 equipment in order to preempt ers, and the readiness to defend Leba- 26170043026. Hizbollah’s argument that the army 15 14 Attributed to organization senior non against Israeli operations. is incapable of protecting Lebanon, activist, Sheikh Hassan ez al-Din, www.naharnet.com, September 23, www.naharnet.com, October 2, 2006. 15 See, for example, Lebanese defense 2006. minister Elias al-Murr, who said 38 Siniora’s government and thereby 700000E 710000E 720000E 730000E 740000E 750000E 760000E undermine Lebanon’s domestic sta- 3700000N 3700000N HQ INDIA Harat al Hart 4-2 Hasbayya bility. i Shwayya an it L Marjayoun Ibil Hebbariye 4-1 Accordingly, international com- as 4-7A 4-7 Saqy Kafr Hammam 4-14 Shaba mitment and assistance to Siniora’s 4-7C Al Khiyam Kafr Shuba 4-13 Zawtar ash Sharqiyat Al Qulayah 4-30 3 000 3 000 690 N Halta 690 N an LEBANON KHIAM 4-31 government at the practical levels Tayr Lit i Mediterranean 9-66 (OGL) SYRIAN l a Falsayh s INDBATT Bastra s Arab Sea Shhur A is highly important, including aid Mine Action Shabriha Tura FMR l- a 9-15 4-28 i Republic Coordination d Frun a Cell (MACC) Metulla Marakah Barish Kafr Kila W Majdal Shams 9-1 At Tayyabah 9-64 Al Ghajar to upgrade the Lebanese army and HQ UNIFIL Sur 9-10 Mughr Shaba (Tyre) Yahun Tulin Addaisseh Misgav Am LOG POLAND Tayr Qabrikha 9-63 Dan promote its ability to fulfill its -com Ar Rashidiyah Zibna Markaba Kefar Gil'adi Mas'adah 3680000N COMP FRANCE Jwayya 8-18 3680000N Kafr Majdal HaGosherim Ayn Bal Khirbat Silm MAR Dafna MP COMPOSITE Dayr Dunin (OGL) Margaliyyot plex tasks, both internally and along Qana Silm 8-33 Qanun 8-31 HQ GHANA INDIA Hula Qiryat Shemona Shaqra 8-32 Al Qulaylah HQ CHINA 6-43 Tibnin 8-32A Manara the borders with Syria (to preventing 6-16 ITALY 6-5 Al Hinniyah 6-40 POLAND 5-10 Kafra Mays al Jabal OGL Al Mansuri Brashit arms smuggling) and with Israel. Yet Zibqin Haris Haddathah 1-26 8-34 Al Bayyadah Yatar 6-41 Bayt Yahun UNIFIL 3670000N Shama Majdal Zun 6-44 Blida the real tests, those for the Lebanese GHANBATT Deployment Rshaf At Tiri Aynata Yiftah Tayr Shihin Bayt Lif Aytarun as of September 2006 government, still lie ahead, and its Naqoura Harfa HIN Dibil Bint Jubayl Ramot 1-0A (OGL) Ramyah 3-1 Alma Naftali ash Shab Yarin 1-21 5-42 RAS 9-10 Position Ayta ash Shab (OGL) 6-52 5-20 9-66 resolve will be tested when the first 1-32A LAB 1-31 Marwahin Zarit Observation post Yarun Avivim Shomera Rmaich Dishon Operational boundary Rosh Hanita Shetula Yesud HaNiqra Adamit 5-22 Yir'on Hamaala terror attack is launched from Leba- Yara Even 6-50 Inter-battalion boundary Shelomi Menahem Alma Eilon Nahariyya Baram 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 km Dovev Sede nese territory. The boundaries and names shown and the Rihaniya 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 mi designations used on this map do not imply Fassut Eliezer official endorsement or acceptance by the ISRAEL This long and complex process United Nations. 700000E 710000E 720000E 730000E 740000E 750000E 760000E is not enough to forcefully disarm Map No. 4144 Rev. 16E UNITED NATIONS Department of Peacekeeping Operations September 2006 (Colour) Cartographic Section Hizbollah or to convince it to will- UNIFIL Forces Deployment – September 2006 ingly disarm, but this process may, Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unifil.pdf over time, reduce the organization’s ability to maneuver. As far as Israel is concerned, it is precisely the lack with advanced weapons (although ing its status, effectively applying its of an effective, available military so- each case should be reviewed on its sovereignty, and creating an attrac- lution to the problem of Hizbollah’s own merits) and perhaps it should tive alternative to Hizbollah. This is arms that dictates a clear interest in even covertly encourage countries true not only at the security level, but encouraging such processes centered such as the US and France, already also at the social level. For example, on the Lebanese army. The idea of a involved in plans for upgrading the government institutions should be Lebanese army, equipped with ad- Lebanese army, to increase their aid. upgraded to overshadow Hizbol- vanced means and deployed along The alternative may be a weakened, lah institutions and become the pre- the border, may raise some objections ineffective Lebanese army with an ferred associations for south Lebanon within Israel, especially in view of unmotivated UNIFIL, while Hizbol- inhabitants with regard to their social the unsuccessful precedent of provid- lah rebuilds its status in the south as needs, particularly regarding all that ing arms to the Palestinian Authority “the protector of Lebanon,” thereby relates to reconstruction of the south. (though the two cases are distinctly nullifying resolution 1701. In any case, even in the initial period, different). Yet here Israel should in But in any case, the physical pres- this nascent trend of creating alterna- fact wager on the Lebanese army (os- ence of Lebanese soldiers in the south tives to Hizbollah should be deemed tensibly under UNIFIL observation): is not enough, and the state should one of the significant achievements of it should not object to providing it inject practical content into restor- the recent war in Lebanon.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 39 Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War Yoaz Hendel

The recent confrontation in Lebanon forced the State of Israel, once again and after many years, into a military confrontation on two fronts – in the south against Hamas and in the north against Hizbollah. In both cases it was Israel that decided to escalate in response to the at- tacks against IDF troops and Israeli civilians. In both cases the campaign was launched based on the assumption that the army was capable of victory. The decision on intensive military action in Gaza was made following the abduction of Corporal Gilad Shalit. The underlying idea was to react forcefully to the abduction, which the Israeli public, already incensed by the ongoing flow of Qassam rockets into Israel, perceived as crossing a red line. Despite the surprise attack, the IDF was ready shortly after the govern- ment decided to escalate activities. Once the go ahead was given, the IDF took decisive ac- tion, utilizing its evident relative strength. That Hizbollah might attempt action on the northern front was indeed discussed by deci- sion-makers1 who estimated that should this occur the incident would be well under control. When the campaign against Hizbollah was launched following the abduction of the two soldiers, it seemed that the IDF was once again demonstrating the same control and relative advantage of a regular army vs. guerilla combatants. Hizbollah infrastructure and weapon stores were destroyed, and it seemed that the strategic intelligence obtained prior to the war had served its purpose.2 As the war progressed, however, battles in Lebanon claimed more and more lives, gaps emerged between expectations and abilities, and substantive weak- nesses made it difficult for the IDF to claim victory and defeat its adversary in the north as it had done in the south. The reasons for these gaps and weaknesses are numerous, ranging from IDF capabilities to the opponent’s capabilities. This article focuses on understanding the gap between ideal and reality vis-à-vis intel- ligence on Lebanon at the tactical level, as evidenced during the ground forces fighting. The article reviews the shortcomings of the intelligence as manifested on the northern front in three major areas: intelligence gathering, intelligence assessment, and information dissemina- tion to the requisite parties. It concludes by positing an explanation for these weaknesses and recommends two corrective measures.

1 S. Kadmon, “Looking for the Guilty Party,” Yediot Ahronot, September 8, 2006. 2 Yossi Melman, “Israeli Intelligence: A Positive Surprise,” Haaretz, July 24, 2006.

Doctoral student, Neubauer Research Fellow at INSS.

40 Obstacles in Intelligence aircraft with their target; in Lebanon to provide troops with accurate infor- Gathering apparently no opportunity arose for mation about the enemy. Apparently The impressive intelligence gather- forging such connections. Not in- in several areas both Military Intel- ing capabilities demonstrated by the tended here is any minimizing of ligence and Northern Command’s General Security Service (GSS) and the real difficulties facing those who Intelligence misevaluated Hizbollah the IDF in confronting Palestinian handle agents remotely, especially in capabilities. terrorism over recent years were not view of the especially suspicious and • Weapons. Intelligence failed8 manifest on the northern front.3 sensitive environment during war in monitoring the weapons shipped Whether it was due to ranking time. Nonetheless, Israel has in the from Iran and Syria to Hizbollah Hizbollah lower on the intelligence past exhibited creativity even in the prior to the war, which therefore left gathering agenda; budget cuts for face of similar obstacles. many unknowns about the type and intelligence gathering in Lebanon; Finally, the SIGINT output, in- quality of weapons available to the or obvious formidable challenges in tended to control enemy communi- organization. Reasons for the lapses agent infiltration4 into Hizbollah, the cations, was problematic. Hizbollah, include the nature of the transfer and gathering capabilities that Israeli in- fearing Israeli eavesdropping, rigor- supply routes, geographic distances, telligence had with regard to the or- ously maintained a high level of se- and the strict adherence to communi- ganization, its activities, and deploy- curity and encryption, as announced cation security demonstrated by Iran ment were significantly curtailed. by Nasrallah in a speech in May.7 and Hizbollah. These constraints ap- The lack of human contacts to pro- Despite extensive war time activity, parently rendered the material gath- vide real time intelligence prevented penetrating Hizbollah’s communi- ered by the intelligence community Israeli intelligence from producing cation systems proved a formidable information of merely limited value. a viable product at the tactical level. challenge to Israeli intelligence. • Forces and Command. In prelimi- Thus, for example, the short range nary assessments conducted prior to missile launchers remained active, Hurdles in Assessment the war, the IDF had only a fuzzy with the IDF unable to inflict signifi- Military Intelligence’s Research Divi- picture of Hizbollah’s size and troop cant damage to them.5 sion and Northern Command Intel- numbers. The figures ranged from A similar lapse was felt regarding ligence are responsible for collecting, 2,000 active combatants (the figure of preemption means (e.g., operating an analyzing, and evaluating Hizbollah a decade ago) to 8,000 members in the interceptive system), in contrast with capabilities. The evaluation is intend- organization as a whole. Today, with GSS output in Judea and Samaria and ed primarily to provide state leaders post-war hindsight, the assumption in Gaza.6 In Gaza the use of human with information to support their de- is that the organization still has more sources has essentially become a ne- cisions. No less important is the role troops available than those numbers cessity for supplying bombardment indicate, despite the significant casu- alties inflicted on it. Another critical 7 See Nasrallah’s speech of May 23, 3 Y. Halevy, “Summary of Interviews 2006 on Hizbollah website, www. lapse lay in mapping and gaining with Intelligence Officers,” News moqawama.org: “Israelis use codes familiarity with the command chain. First Class website, July 20, 2006. and closed circuits in communicat- Hizbollah has maintained secrecy re- 4 Kadmon, “Looking for the Guilty ing among themselves. We have no Party.” need for those. If our neighborhood 5 Ze’ev Schiff, “How We Missed De- and village folks hold conversations, 8 Ze’ev Schiff, “The Slap in our Face,” stroying the Short Range Rockets,” no machine and no electronics wizard Haaretz, August 11, 2006; Amos Harel, Haaretz, September 3, 2006. can decipher the hints and symbols “We Did Not Know Enough about 6 Schiff, “How We Missed Destroying used by our people. This is the popu- Border Activities,” Haaretz, September the Short Range Rockets.” lar essence of our warriors.” 19, 2006.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 41 garding its commanders, their roles, formation emerged. Moreover, where The preconception of the sec- and whereabouts. Thus only the most such information existed, it did not ond Lebanon War began with the senior among them, who in any case reach those who needed it, remaining IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in have been exposed to the media and untapped. For example, the sealed May 2000. Overwhelming interna- were well known, including Nas- boxes prepared in advance by Intel- tional pressure and wishful thinking rallah and Imad Mughniyeh,9 are ligence that included relevant infor- within the Israeli public became the “available” to figure at the top of the mation for ground forces remained cornerstones of a policy that eventu- hit list. unused, while the “obsolescence” of ally turned out to be Israel’s honey • Combat and Defense Tactics. The aerial photos, dating back to 2002, trap. On the one hand, Israel pub- IDF, whose combat training is rooted featured prominently on the list of licly acknowledged that after evacu- in familiarity with the enemy and complaints raised by reservists. In- ating the security zone, it no longer whose modern training facilities are formation that was available did not had any contest with Lebanon and based on models grounded in reality, reach its target due to inefficient in- therefore what occurred north of the found itself fighting in Lebanon in an formation pipelines. border was Lebanon’s concern. On unfamiliar “work environment.” The This shortcoming stands out in the other hand, then-prime minister camouflaged “nature reserves” (Hiz- bollah’s underground system of tun- The preconception of the second Lebanon War began with nels and fortifications), the vertical the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. bunker systems, and wireless launch- ing units posed a strong challenge to the IDF. By way of comparison, on the Palestinian front the intelligence contrast to the impressive achieve- Ehud Barak declared that any attack corps was able to supply accurate in- ments of the IDF and GSS in recent on Israel’s sovereignty would entail a formation about the opponent’s com- years in knowledge management and response of previously unknown se- bat and defense tactics, and the fight- in ensuring that information flow is a verity. ing units were trained in “authentic” reliable electronic resource. If indeed Prioritization dictated the alloca- combat scenarios. Intelligence’s claims10 about existing tion of resources to urgent tasks on the knowledge of Hizbollah’s tactical Palestinian front rather than to future Failures in Dissemination combat level are accurate, this is yet (latent) ones on the Lebanese front One of Intelligence’s major roles in all another failure in disseminating in- – be this an error originating within its units is to provide current, valu- formation. the IDF or the outcome of a political able information to fighting forces in decision, derived directly from gov- order to generate a relative advantage Possible Causes: ernment policy that contended that and to reduce the threat level they en- Preconception and the constant threat posed by Hizbol- counter. Prioritization lah notwithstanding, the potential for Upon mobilization of ground Two terms from the past – precon- conflagration is low. Decision-makers forces in Lebanon and the addition of ception and prioritization – have believed that it would be possible to other units, a shortage of current in- reappeared in Israeli discourse as contain the fire in case of a conflict in possible explanations for the tactical the north,11 and in case of deteriora- intelligence failure. 9 Yossi Melman, “Argentina Officially Accuses Iran as Responsible for Ter- 11 Moshe Arens, “Most of the Answers rorist Attacks,” Haaretz, March 11, 10 G. Weitz, “All the Way to Beirut, if are Known,” Haaretz, August 22, 2003. Necessary,” Haaretz, August 11, 2006. 2006.

42 tion there would be sufficient time to avoid crossing the border and caus- period where the northern border bridge the gaps that had been created ing provocations, and in the drive to seemed quiet, indicated, “severe gaps by the emphasis on the Gaza Strip. exercise patience, low-altitude photo exist in combat intelligence on the In actuality, several months af- reconnaissance missions for intel- northern front.” This report mandat- ter the withdrawal from Lebanon in ligence gathering were curtailed, as ed that a defined work plan be put in May 2000, the intelligence corps dis- were missions by field intelligence place to close those gaps, but as with covered that Iran and Syria started gathering units12 and other opera- the handling of other weak spots, re- shipping massive weapon shipments tions that might have been perceived ality trumped the implementation of and transferring instructors to Hiz- as aggressive. this report. bollah, and that the guerilla organi- While 2005 was declared by the zation that the IDF had confronted intelligence corps as “Lebanon Year” Conclusion in the years when it was present in and a multi-year plan was formulat- On the one hand, Israel realized in a southern Lebanon was about to timely manner the wide strategic change. Even though presumably picture, and this was indeed con- Barak and Sharon possessed this veyed to decision-makers. On the information, no action was taken other hand, gaps emerged between on this matter. Indeed, an attack what was known and what unfold- by Israel on Lebanon in order to ed, and tactical intelligence bears prevent this process of arming the burden of responsibility. These would have been denounced in- gaps affected IDF actions and pos- ternationally, severely impairing sibly also political decision-mak- the credit Israel earned following ing. the withdrawal. The Palestinian While evaluation of the war’s front, which heated up in October success requires a perspective over 2000, required intensive Israeli ef- time, the evaluation of the weak fort in both the military and dip- spots of tactical intelligence opera- lomatic arenas. It is likely that the tions necessitates immediate inves- aversion to military action was tigation in order to repair the prob- due to tolerant political preference lems as soon as possible. In this rather than to misunderstanding context one should ensure that the the dangers inherent in Hizbollah’s ed with regard to Hizbollah, in fact prioritization within the IDF – as ex- accelerated arms race. But in taking the IDF continued devoting most of isted up until the war – will change, this passive position, the seeds of the its resources to facing the immediate and that the necessary resources be “risk of convenience” were sown, threat – the Palestinian front. The de- allocated to the intelligence corps.14 which slowly led from a policy with fense establishment’s comptroller’s One should also ensure immediate a clear rationale to a policy of turning report, published in March 2006,13 a implementation of all capabilities a blind eye. available to the intelligence commu- The real problem with the political 12 A. Eichner, “Intelligence Corps Com- nity, for use in Lebanon as well as world view that claimed that “in the mander: Palestinians Attempt to Imi- elsewhere. tate Lebanese Model,” Yediot Ahronot, north you should sleep with one eye September 11, 2006. open but without rising” is its nega- 13 Ze’ev Schiff, “Everything Had Been 14 A. Buchbut, “Significant Increase in tive effect on the military, including Put in Writing,” Haaretz, August 31, Intelligence Budget,” Maariv, Septem- the intelligence corps. In wishing to 2006. ber 4, 2006.

Volume 9, No. 3, November 2006 43 JCSS Memoranda 2004 – Present

No. 85, September 2006, Aviezer Yaari, Whom Does the Council Advise? A New Model for the National Security Council [Hebrew].

No. 84, August 2006, Yoram Schweitzer, ed. Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?

No. 83, May 2006, Hussein Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi, A Framework for a Palestinian National Security Doctrine [Hebrew].

No. 82, February 2006, Ram Erez, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Israel in Times of Military Conflict [Hebrew].

No. 81, January 2006, Meir Elran, Israel’s National Resilience: The Influence of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society [Hebrew].

No. 80, December 2005, Asher Tishler and Yoed Shefi,The Optimal Structure of the Defense Industry in Israel: Significance and Implications [Hebrew].

No. 79, November 2005, Paul Rivlin, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East.

No. 78, November 2005, Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism.

No. 77, September 2005, Mark A. Heller and Rosemary Hollis, eds., Israel and the Palestinians: Israeli Policy Options [Hebrew].

No. 76, June 2005, Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, Al-Qaeda and the Globalization of Suicide Terrorism [Hebrew].

No. 75, March 2005, Uzi Eilam, L’Europe de la Défense [Hebrew].

No. 74, December 2004, Paul Rivlin and Shmuel Even, Political Stability in Arab States: Economic Causes and Consequences.

No. 73, November 2004, Shaul Kimhi and Shmuel Even, Who are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers? [Hebrew].

No. 72, October 2004, Aviezer Yaari, Civil Control of the IDF [Hebrew].

No. 71, July 2004, Anat Kurz, ed., Thirty Years Later: Challenges to Israel since the Yom Kippur War [Hebrew].

No. 70, June 2004, Ephraim Asculai, Rethinking the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

No. 69, January 2004, Daniel Sobelman, New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbollah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon.