Sexual Perversion
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Sexual Perversion Lee Chun Tuan Jarrod Julian Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy (Adv Seminars and Shorter Thesis)(CAPPE) (with coursework component) February 2011 Department of Philosophy The University of Melbourne For Newman College ii Abstract The concept of sexual perversion is not a new one, and yet it appears that attempts, both philosophical and non-philosophical, to provide a coherent and justified account have failed. In this paper, I explore what the four main accounts of sex and sexual perversion – procreation, love, communication and plain sex – have to say about sexual perversion and why they run into the problems that they face. Following this, I examine the arguments presented by Humber, Priest and Primoratz against the concept of sexual perversion. While Priest’s and Humber’s arguments seem to provide a compelling case against the concept of sexual perversion, attacking its logical foundations, rejoinders are available through the arguments of Baltzly and Kekes. Primoratz’s claim that he has surveyed the main possible lines that an argument for the concept of sexual perversion could take is overstated because there remains at least one more option. I argue that the aforementioned accounts of sex and sexual perversion fail because they fall too sharply along the mind-body divide, either by privileging the rational purposes that sex can be put to, over and above the physicality of sex, or because there is too much emphasis on the physicality of sex such that its rational aspects are overlooked. With this in mind, I propose a new account of sexual perversion that is premised on a view of human sexuality that acknowledges the equal importance of both the rational and physical aspects of human sexuality in the flourishing of the human being. Such an approach, I argue, allows us to generate a concept of sexual perversion that is largely in line with ordinary usage. iii Declaration This is to certify that (i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the Masters, (ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, (iii) the thesis is 22,950 words in length, inclusive of footnotes, but exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices. iv Acknowledgements To the Almighty, without whom all this would not have been possible. Thank you for your constant guidance and the many people that you have sent into my life during this period of reading and writing. To my two supervisors, Andrew Alexandra and Igor Primoratz, thank you both for your wonderful, efficient and effective supervision. Thank you for your insight and comments, without which this thesis could not have been completed. Thank you too for your encouragement and guidance, and thank you for being so generous with your time. I will be always grateful. To my two examiners, Dirk Baltzly and Raja Halwani, for their invaluable advice on how to revise the thesis and make it better. To Bill Uren, S.J., thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule for consultation on various topics pertaining to the thesis. Your guidance and love are greatly appreciated. And finally to Newman College, the community that sustained me and enriched me during my time there, my deepest thanks. Thank you all for making my time there a wonderful and life-giving time. Thank you for providing me with a space where I can call home. You kept me sane throughout the whole process and that can never be underestimated. v Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. iii Declaration ......................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. v Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 – Against Sexual Perversion ............................................................................................... 3 Section 1 – Ordinary Usage ............................................................................................................. 3 Section 2 – The Philosophical Accounts of Sex and Sexual Perversion ......................................... 5 Section 2.1 Sex as Procreation ......................................................................................................... 5 Section 2.2 Sex as Love ................................................................................................................. 11 Section 2.3 Sex as Communication ................................................................................................ 14 Section 2.4 Plain Sex ..................................................................................................................... 18 Section 2.5 The Case Against Perversion ...................................................................................... 21 Chapter 2 – Rehabilitating Sexual Perversion ................................................................................... 25 Section 1 – Making a Case for Sexual Perversion ......................................................................... 25 Section 2 – A New Account Of Sexual Perversion ....................................................................... 31 Section 2.1 Criteria for Success ..................................................................................................... 31 Section 2.2 Harmony as an Ideal ................................................................................................... 32 Section 2.3 Testing the Account .................................................................................................... 41 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 49 Works Consulted ............................................................................................................................... 50 Introduction Sexual perversion as a concept has been with us for a long time and yet if one was asked to give a definition of what it means for an act to be perverted, one would be hard-pressed to offer a definition that is coherent and justified. Not only has ordinary usage failed in this regard, philosophical accounts are charged to have singularly failed as well (Primoratz, “Sexual Perversion”). Indeed, Graham Priest argued that “the notion of sexual perversion makes no sense” as the concept rests on a discredited Aristotelian metaphysic (371). These failures to provide a coherent and justified account, coupled with its heavy condemnatory tones, have led to calls for the concept to be abandoned and replaced by other more precise terms, such as atypical sexual acts or atypical sexually immoral acts. Yet hope remains for the concept. While the case against sexual perversion as presented by Priest, Primoratz and James M. Humber seem to be a strong one, it is not insurmountable. Not only is Priest’s conclusion overstated, as Dirk Baltzly showed in “Peripatetic Perversions: A Neo-Aristotelian Account of the Nature of Sexual Perversion”, Humber’s argument that human nature is an essentially contested concept falls through as well. Primoratz’s claim that he has surveyed the main possible lines of argument for the concept of sexual perversion is also a little overstated for there is at least one more option open to us. In this thesis, I shall attempt to show how if we are willing to view the mental and the physical aspects of human sexuality as equally important in the flourishing of the human being, an account of sexual perversion that is largely commensurate with ordinary usage can be given. My approach shall be thus. This thesis is split into two parts. The first chapter is focused on setting up the problem of sexual perversion while the second focuses on rehabilitating the concept of sexual perversion. I begin by examining how ordinary usage of the term “sexual perversion” is inconsistent before proceeding to examine what Alan Goldman and Primoratz have identified as the four main accounts of sex – procreation, love, communication and plain sex – and what they have to say about sexual perversion. Each account however faces its own share of problems in putting forth their account of sexual perversion, leading Primoratz to argue that it is a concept that should be jettisoned. It is in this strain that we turn to Priest’s and Humber’s systematic analyses of why sexual perversion should be jettisoned. From there, I proceed to rehabilitate the concept, starting first with Baltzly’s rejoinder to Priest before moving on to examine why Humber’s point against sexual perversion is objectionable. I then show how the previous accounts of sex and sexual perversion presented earlier come down too strongly on either side of the mind-body divide. Finally, the last part of the paper demonstrates how a justifiable concept of sexual perversion is possible if we assume an equality between mind and body where human sexuality is concerned. 1 Before we begin proper, allow me to note that while the question of sexual perversion is concerned with the prescriptive enterprise of the philosophy of sex, the descriptive enterprise cannot be entirely neglected here for the