Publications

Gilbert Harman

January 26, 2015

Contents

1 BOOKS 1 1.1 Authored ...... 1 1.2 Edited ...... 4

2 ARTICLES 4

3 REVIEWS 22

1 BOOKS

1.1 Authored

1. Kulkarni, S. and Harman, G. An Elementary Introduction to Statistical Learning Theory. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011, pp. xiv, 209. 2. Harman, G. and Kulkarni, S., Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statisti- cal Learning Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007, pp. x, 108. • Translated into Japanese by Kaniike Yoichi (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2009.) • Paperback version 2012. • Electronic version (for Kindle) 2010. 3. Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. (Oxford: Claren- don Press, 2000), pp. xiv, 238. • Online edition, 2003, with chapter abstracts and keywords, available from http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.

1 4. Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. viii, 291. [Essays.] • Online edition, with chapter abstracts and key words, 2003, available from http://www.oxfordscholarship.com. 5. Harman, G. and Thomson, J., Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. x, 225. • Brief excerpt reprinted as “How can there be more than one answer to a moral question?” in Judith Friedman et al. (eds.) What Should We Value? (Princeton University, 2000) pp. 74-5. 6. Skepticism and the Deﬁnition of Knowledge (New York, Garland: 1990), pp. xvi, 166. [This is my Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard, 1964, with a new preface.] 7. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge, Massachusetts; M.I.T. Press/Bradford Books: 1986) pp. xiv, 147. Print on demand edition 2013. • Excerpt (pp. 29-48) reprinted in Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowl- edge: Readings in Epistemology (New York, Pearson: 2004), pp. 167- 178. • Chapters 3 and 4 reprinted in Jonathan E. Adler and Lance J. Rips, Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations (Cam- bridge, Cambridge University Press: 2008), pp. 35-46. 8. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York, Oxford University Press: 1977) pp. xiii, 165. • Translated into – Spanish by Cecilia Hidalgo as La naturaleza de la moralidad. Una introduccion a la etica, revision de Eduardo Rabossi (Mex- ico, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico: 1983), second edition, revised, 1996. – German by Ursala Wolf as Das Wesen der Moral: Eine Ein- fuhrung in die Ethik (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp: 1981) pp. 186. – Japanese by Takeshi Ohba and Kosei Usami, with an introduction to the Japanese edition by the author (Tokyo, Sangyo Tosho: 1988). • Excerpts reprinted in – Steven M. Cahn, Patricia Kitcher, and George Sher, editors, Rea- son at Work: Introductory Readings in Philosophy (San Diego; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: 1984) pp. 48-53 – George Sher, Moral Philosophy: Selected Readings (San Diego; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: 1987) pp. 170-6 (second edition, 1996, pp. 205- 11)

2 – Louis P. Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Belmont, California; Wadsworth Publishing Company: 1988), pp. 429-37 – Essays on Moral Realism, edited by Geoffrey Sayre- McCord (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press: 1988) – Darwall, S., Gibbard, A., and Railton, P., Moral Discourse and Practice (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 83-7 – Cahn, S. M. & Markie, P., Ethics: History, Theory, and Con- temporary Issues (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 536-48 (second edition, 2002, pp. 634-44; third edition, 2006, pp. 625-635; fifth edition, 2011, pp. 684-694) – Rachels, J., Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 85-91 – Darwall, S., Contractarianism/Contractualism (Oxford; Black- well: 2003), pp. 138-48 – Abelson, R. and Friquegnon, M.-L., Ethics for Modern Life, sixth edition (Boston: St. Martin’s, 2003) – Perry, J., Bratman, M., and Fischer, J. M., Introduction to Phi- losophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Fourth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 761-5; Fifth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press: 2009), 732-6. – Shafer-Landau, R., Ethical Theory: An Anthology. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 36-40 (second edition, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 31-34). – George Sher, Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory (New York and London; Routledge, 2012), 159-163.) 9. Thought, Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press (1973), pp. viii, 199; paperback edition 1974. Excerpts reprinted in • George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press: 1978) pp. 206-28. • Philosophy Problems Supplementary Course Reader (Milton Keynes, England; The Open University: 1981) pp. 4-11 • Paul K. Moser (ed.), Empirical Knowledge (Totowa, New Jersey; Rowman and Allanheld: 1986) pp. 234-45 • Louis P. Pojman (ed.), The Theory of Knowledge: Classic & Contem- porary Readings (Belmont, California; Wadsworth: 1993) pp. 151-62 (second edition, 1999, pp. 157-69) • Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim, Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford, Blackwell: 2000), pp. 67-78. (Second edition, Wiley: 2008.) • Chapter 3, “Mental Processes,” Metaphysics: a Guide and Anthology, edited by Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 623-8.

3 1.2 Edited

1. Editor with Ernie Lepore, A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley Black- well (2014), pp. xiii, 581. 2. Editor, Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller (Hillside, New Jersey; Lawrence Erlbaum: 1993) pp. xiii, 277. “Preface” pp. vii-ix. 3. Editor with Donald Davidson, The Logic of Grammar (Encino, California; Dickenson: 1975) pp. x, 307. “Preface” pp. ix-x; “Introduction” pp. 1-14.

4. Editor, On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays (Garden City, New York; Anchor: 1974), pp. xii, 348; “Introduction” pp. vii-xii.

• Translated into Spanish, by Violeta Demonte and Juan Carlos Moreno, as Sobre Noam Chomsky: Ensayos criticos (Madrid, Alianza Edito- rial: 1981), pp. 354. • Second edition (Amherst, Massachusetts; University of Massachusetts Press: 1982), pp. xvi, 348. “Introduction to the Second Edition,” pp. vi-xvi.

5. Editor with Donald Davidson, Semantics of Natural Language in Synthese 21 (1970) pp. 249-487 and 22 (1970- 1971) pp. 1-289.

• Corrected and enlarged edition published by D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland (1972) pp. x, 769. • Paperback edition 1973.

2 ARTICLES

1. “Introduction: Life and Work,” in Gilbert Harman and Ernie Lepore, editors, A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley Blackwell (2014), pp. 1- 13. 2. “Indeterminacy, Relativity, and Behaviorism,” in Gilbert Harman and Ernie Lepore, editors, A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley Blackwell (2014), pp. 219-235. 3. “Rationality,” in The Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Hugh LaFollette, John Deigh, and Sarah Stroud (Blackwell, 2013), pp. 4338-4347. Also online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/.

4. “The Philosophy-Linguistics Connection 1967-76,” Donald Davidson, edited by Maria Baghramian (Routledge, 2012), pp. 42-45.

4 5. “Davidson’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Logic and Language,” in Gerhard Preyer, ed., Davidson’s Philosophy: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 2012), pp. 41-48. 6. “Naturalism in Moral Philosophy,” Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates, edited by Susana I. Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 8-23. 7. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Statistical Learning Theory and Induction,” Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning, Norbert M. Seel, ed., Springer (2012) pp. 3186-3188.

8. “Notes on Practical Reasoning,” Cogency 3.4 (Winter 2011), pp. 127-145. 9. Sanjeev Kulkarni and Gilbert Harman, “Statistical Learning: A Tuto- rial,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics, 3 (2011) pp. 543-556. 10. Brett Sherman and Gilbert Harman, “Knowledge and Assumptions,” Philo- sophical Studies 156 (2011): 131-140. 11. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Statistical Learning Theory as a Framework for the Philosophy of Induction,” in Prasanta Bandyopad- hyay And Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Amsterdam: Elservier (2011): 833-848.

12. “Quine’s Semantic Relativity,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (2011) pp. 287-289. 13. “Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity,” Philosophical Studies 154 (2011): 435-441.

14. Gilbert Harman, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Kelby Mason, “Moral Reasoning,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 205-244. 15. Maria Merritt, John Doris, and Gilbert Harman, “Character,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychol- ogy Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 354-400. 16. Erica Roeder and Gilbert Harman, “Linguistics and Moral Theory,” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John Doris and the Moral Psychol- ogy Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 272-295.

17. “Words and Pictures in Reports of fMRI Research,” in Hanson, S. J. and Bunzl, M., eds., Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping. Cam- bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010, pp. 113-114.

5 18. “Epistemology as Methodology,” in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup, editors, A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 152-156. 19. “Field on the Normative Role of Logic,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume CIX, Part 3 (2009), 333-335.

20. “Guilt-Free Morality,”Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4 (2009): 203-214. 21. “Skepticism about Character Traits,” Journal of Ethics 13 (2009): 235- 242. 22. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Response to Shafer, Thagard, Strevens, and Hanson,” Abstracta, Special Issue III (2009): 47-56. 23. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Precis of Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory,” Abstracta, Special Issue III (2009): 5-9.

24. “More on Explaining a Gap,” The American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 8.1 (Fall 2008): 4-6. Danish translation by Daniela Milton at “http://www.autoteilexxl.de/edu/?p=1575”. 25. “What Is Cognitively Accessed?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2007) [published 2008]: 505.

26. “Using a Linguistic Analogy to Study Morality,” Moral Psychology, Vol- ume 1, The Evolution of Morality, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2008): 345-351. 27. “Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Direct Speaker Meaning,” Phi- losophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (2007), pp. 173-179.

28. “Explaining an Explanatory Gap,” American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 6.2 (Spring, 2007), pp. 2-3. 29. Harman, G., and Kulkarni, S., “The Problem of Induction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006) [published April 2007]: 559-575.

30. Greenberg, M., and Harman, G., “Conceptual Role Semantics,” Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernie Lepore and Barry Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 295-322. 31. “Self-reﬂexive thoughts.” Philosophical Issues, 16 (2006): 334-45.

32. “Intending, Intention, Intent, Intentional Action, and Acting Intention- ally: Comments on Knobe and Burra,” Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6 (2006): 269-75. 33. “Moral particularism and transduction,” Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005): 44-55.

6 34. Harman, G., and Sherman, B., “Knowledge, assumptions, lotteries,” Philo- sophical Issues, 14 (2004): 492-500. 35. “Practical Aspects of Theoretical Rationality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Al Mele and Piers Rawling, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 45-56.

36. “Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 37.3 (2003): 415-25. 37. “Category Mistakes in M&E,” Philosophical Perspectives, 17, Language and Philosophical Linguistics (2003): 165-180.

38. “Reﬂection on Knowledge and Its Limits,” The Philosophical Review, 111 (2002) [published November 2003]: 417-28. 39. “The Future of the A Priori,” in Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century, APA Centennial Supplement to Journal of Philosophical Research (Charlottesville, VA: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2003), pp. 23-34. 40. Gilbert Harman and Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Inductive simplicity and the Ma- trix,” Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2003, edited by Richard Alterman and David Kirsh (Boston, MA: Cognitive Science Society: 2003), published on disk.

41. “Skepticism and foundations,” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 1-11. 42. “No character or personality,” Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (2003), pp. 87- 94.

43. “Internal Critique: A Logic is not a Theory of Reasoning and a Theory of Reasoning is not a Logic,” in D.M. Gabbay, R.H. Johnson, H.J. Ohlbach, and J. Woods, eds., Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn Towards the Practical, Volume 1 in Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., 2002, pp. 171-86.

44. “The logic of ordinary language.” In Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality, edited by Renee Elio (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 93-103. 45. “General foundations versus rational insight,” Philosophy and Phenomeno- logical Research 63 (2001), pp. 657-63. 46. “Virtue ethics without character traits.” In Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgewood, editors, Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 117-27.

7 • Translated into Portuguese by Pedro Galvãoas “Etica´ das Virtudes sem Tra¸cosde Carácter”in Trólei:Revista de filosofia moral e po- litica 1 (2003). (An online journal: http://etica.no.sapo.pt/ trolei.htmhttp://etica.no.sapo.pt/trolei.htm.) • Translated (2013) into Norwegian by Erkki Nousiaynen at http:// globe-views.com/den-ikke-eksistens-av-karaktertrekk/. 47. “Intrinsic Value,” in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 137-148. 48. “Can evolutionary theory provide evidence against psychological hedo- nism?” Consciousness Studies, 7 (2000), pp. 219-221.

• Reprinted in Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, edited by Leonard D. Katz (Bowling Green, Ohio: Im- print Academic, 2000), pp. 219-221. 49. “The nonexistence of character traits,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1999-2000, 100, pp. 223-226. • German translation 2011 by Mark Zwinger online at “http://autoersatzteile.de/blog/die-nichtexistenz-der-charakterzuge”. • Another German translation 2012 by Andrey Fomin online at “http://www.pkwteile.de/wissen/die-nicht-existenz-von-charaktereigenschaften”. • A Russian translation 2012 by Mark Pozner online at “http://goscience.ru/nonexistence-charachter/”. • A Polish translation 2012 by Nick Stasov online at “http://led24.de/blog/nieistnienie-cechy-charakteru”. • A Romanian translation by Alexandra Sermina at “http://www.azoft.com/people/seremina/edu/virresp-rom.html”. • A Danish translation 2014 by Daniela Milton at “http://www.autoteilexxl.de/edu/?p=1575”. • A Ukranian translation 2015 by Ivan Pilavskii at “http://www.10-walls.com/blog/virresp/”.

50. “Moral philosophy and linguistics,” Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy: Volume I: Ethics, edited by Klaus Brinkmann (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999), pp. 107-115. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp.217-226.

51. “Moral philosophy meets social psychology: virtue ethics and the funda- mental attribution error.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1998-99, 99, pp. 315-331.

8 • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 165-178. • Swedish translation in Ahlenius, Henrik (editor), Vad ärmoraliskt rätt?Texter i normativ etik. BokförlagetThales, Stockholm (2004), pp. 313-326. 52. “Intentionality.” In William Bechtel and George Graham, editors, A Com- panion to Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 602-610. Sec- ond edition (2010), pp. 438-444. 53. “The toxin puzzle.” In Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris, editors, Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 84-89. 54. “Précisof ‘Moral Relativism’: Part One of Harman & Thomson’s Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity” and “Reply to Critics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998), pp. 161-169; 207-213. 55. “Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief.” In Kulp, C. B., editor, Real- ism/Antirealism and Epistemology. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Lit- tlefield, 1997. pp. 123-147. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 93-116. 56. “Analyticity Regained?” Nous 30 (1996), pp. 392-400. • Reprinted in Casullo, A., ed., A Priori Knowledge: International Re- search Library of Philosophy (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 347- 355’ • Reprinted in Føllesdal, D., ed., Philosophy of Quine, Volume 1 (New York: Garland, 2000). • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 144-152. 57. “Moral relativism.” In Borchert, D. M., editor, The Encyclopedia of Phi- losophy: Supplement. New York: Macmillan, 1996. pp. 383-4. 58. “Explaining objective color in terms of subjective reactions.” In Vil- lanueva, E., ed., Perception: Philosophical Issues 7, Atascadero, Cali- fornia: Ridgeview Publishing Company (1996), pp. 1-17. • Reprinted in Byrne, A., and Hilbert, D. R. eds., Readings on Color, I: The Philosophy of Color, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1997), pp. 247- 261. 59. “Qualia and color concepts.” In Villanueva, E., ed., Perception: Philo- sophical Issues 7, Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company (1996), pp. 75-79.

9 60. “Rationality.” In Smith, E. E., and Osherson, D. N., eds., Thinking: In- vitation to Cognitive Science, Volume 3, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press (1995), pp. 175-211. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 9-45.

61. “Phenomenal fallacies and conﬂations,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18 (1995), pp. 256-7. 62. “Doubts about conceptual analysis.” In Michael,M. and O’Leary-Hawthorne, J., eds., Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Dordrecht, Kluwer (1994), pp. 43-48. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 138-143. 63. “Epistemology and the Diet Revolution.” In Michael, M. and O’Leary- Hawthorne, J., eds., Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Dordrecht, Kluwer (1994), pp. 203-214. 64. “Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding What Hypotheses to Take Seriously.” In Grue!: The New Riddle of Induction, edited by Dou- glas Stalker, (Peru, Illinois: Open Court, 1994) pp. 153-171.

• Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 75-92. 65. “La valeur intrinseque,” translated by Laurie Calhoun, Revue de M´etaphysique et de Morale 99 (1994) pp. 245- 255. 66. “Explaining Value,” Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1994), pp. 229-248.

• Reprinted in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeﬀrey Paul, editors, Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 196-216.

67. “Meaning holism defended,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1993) pp. 163-171 68. “Can Science Understand the Mind?” in Conceptions of the Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, edited by Gilbert Harman, (Hillside, New Jersey; Lawrence Erlbaum: 1993), pp. 111-121. 69. “Desired desires,” in Value, Welfare, and Morality, edited by Ray Frey and Chris Morris (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press: 1993), pp. 138- 157.

10 • Reprinted in Alan Hamlin (editor), Ethics and Economics, in The In- ternational Library of Critical Writings in Economics, London: Ed- ward Elgar Publishing Company, 1996, pp. 204-223. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 117-136.

70. “Stringency of Rights and Ought.” Comments on Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Realm of Rights. In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993) pp. 181-185. 71. “Induction: enumerative and hypothetical,” In Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds., A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) pp. 200- 206. 72. “Moral diversity as an argument for moral relativism,” in Douglas Odegard and Carole Stewart, Perspectives on Moral Relativism (Milliken, Ontario; Agathon: 1991) pp. 13-31.

73. “Intentionality: some distinctions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1990) pp. 607-8. 74. “Relativism,” The London Correspondent, March 4, 1990, p. 22. 75. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990) pp. 31-52.

• Reprinted in The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, edited by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (Cam- bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 663-675 • Reprinted in Lycan, W. G., Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 474-84. • Reprinted in Timothy O’Connor and David Robb, editors, Philosophy of Mind:Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2003) • Reprinted in John Heil, editor, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology (Oxford :Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 641-656. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 244-261. • Reprinted in Lycan, W. G. and Prinz, J. J., Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, Third Edition (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2008), pp. 681- 692. • German translation in Qualia, edited by Heinz-Dieter Heckmann and Sven Walter (Paderborn: Mentis, 2001). • Spanish translation in La Naturaleza de la Experiencia, edited by Maite Ezcurdia and Olbeth Hansberg (Instituto de Investigaciones Filos´oﬁcas:Mexico, 2003).

11 76. “Beneﬁts to Moral Philosophy of the Computational Theory of Mind.” In L. Sieg (editor) Acting and Reﬂecting (Dordrecht, Kluwer: 1990) pp. 40- 43. 77. “Immanent and transcendent approaches to the theory of meaning.” In Roger Gibson and Robert B. Barrett, eds., Perspectives on Quine (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 144-157 (paperback edition, in the “Philosophers and Their Critics” series, edited by Ernie LePore, published by Blackwell, 1993). • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 262-275.

78. “Some Philosophical Issues in Cognitive Science: Qualia, Intentionality, and the Mind-Body Problem.” In Michael I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Massachusetts; MIT Press: 1989). 79. “Competition for evidential support,” Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Hillsdale, New Jersey; Lawrence Erlbaum: 1989), pp. 220-226. 80. “The simplest hypothesis,” Critica 20 (1989), pp. 23-42. 81. “What is the intentional stance?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1988) p. 515.

82. “Wide Functionalism,” in Stephen Schiﬀer and Susan Steele, Cognition and Representation (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press: 1988) pp. 11-20. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 235-243.

83. “Rationality in Agreement,” Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1988) pp. 1- 16. • Reprinted in Will Kymlicka, editor, Justice in Political Philosophy, Volume 1: Mainstream Theories of Justice (Brookﬁeld, Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 592-607.

84. “Cognitive science?” In William Hirst, ed., The making of cognitive science: Essays in honor of George A. Miller. Cambridge, Cambridge Uni- versity Press (1988), pp. 258-268. 85. Gilbert Harman, Michael Ranney, Ken Salem, Frank Doring, Jonathan Epstein, and Agnieszka Jaworska, “A theory of simplicity,” Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, N.J., Erlbaum (1988). pp. 111-117. 86. “Philosophical issues in cognitive science,” Cognitive Science Laboratory Report 14, Princeton University (1988) 28.

12 87. Gilbert Harman, Marie A. Bienkowski, Ken Salem, and Ian Pratt, “Mea- suring change and coherence in evaluating potential change in view,” Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, NJ. Erl- baum (1987) 203-209. 88. “(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics,” New Directions in Seman- tics, edited by Ernest LePore, London, Academic Press (1987) 55-81. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 206-231. • Excerpt reprinted in Brian Beakley and Peter Ludlow, The Phi- losophy of Mind, 2nd edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 611-622. 89. Bas C. Van Fraassen, R.I.G. Hughes, and Gilbert Harman, “A problem for relative information minimizers, continued” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1986): 453-463. 90. “Quine’s grammar,” The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, edited by Lewis Ed- win Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp, LaSalle, Illionois; Open Court (1986, second exanded edition 1998), pp. 165-180. 91. “Default defeaters in explanation-based reasoning” (with Richard Culling- ford, Marie Bienkowski, Ken Salem, and Ian Pratt), The Eighth An- nual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society Amherst, Massachusetts, Lawrence Erlbaum (1986), pp. 283-291. 92. “Moral agent and impartial spectator,” The Lindley Lecture at the Uni- versity of Kansas (1986), Lawrence Kansas, 15 pages. • Reprinted in Michael Smith, editor, Meta-Ethics in The Interna- tional Research Library of Philosophy (Aldershot, Hampshire, Eng- land; Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 253-268. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 181-195. 93. “Moral explanations of natural facts can moral claims be tested against moral reality?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, Supplement (1986), pp. 57-68. • Reprinted in Michael Smith, editor, Meta-Ethics in The Interna- tional Research Library of Philosophy (Aldershot, Hampshire, Eng- land; Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 401- 412. 94. “Troubles with ﬂourishing: comments on David Norton,” Reason Papers 11 (1986), pp. 69-71. 95. “The meanings of logical constants,” Truth and Interpretation: Perspec- tives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest Le Pore (Oxford, Blackwell: 1986), pp. 125-134.

13 96. “Willing and intending,” Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Inten- tions, Categories, Ends, edited by Richard Grandy and Richard Warner (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1986), pp. 363-380. 97. Cullingford, R.E., Harman, G.H., Bienkowski, M.A., & Salem, K., “With- out logic or justiﬁcation: realistic belief revision,” Proceedings of the Workshop on AI and Distributed Problem Solving (Washington, D.C.; Na- tional Academy Press: 1985), pp. 139-153. 98. “Is pain overt behavior?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1985) p. 61. 99. “Is there a single true morality?” in Morality, Reason and Truth, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman (Totowa, New Jersey; Rowman and Allanheld: 1985) pp. 27-48. • Reprinted in Michael Krausz, ed., Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame, Indiana; University of Notre Dame Press: 1989) pp. 363-387. • Reprinted in Paul K. Moser and Thomas L. Carson, eds., Moral Relativism: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 165-84. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 77-99. 100. “Problems with probabilistic semantics,” in Alex Orenstein et. al., Devel- opments in Semantics (New York: Haven, 1985). 101. “Logic and Reasoning,” Synthese 60 (1984) pp. 107-127. 102. “Positive versus negative undermining in belief revision,” Nous 18 (1984): 39-49. • Reprinted in Hilary Kornblith, Naturalizing Epistemology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press: 1985) pp. 231-248. 103. “Internally represented grammars,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983) p. 408. 104. “Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theory,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983) p. 365. 105. “Justice and moral bargaining,” Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1983): 114-131. • Reprinted in Will Kymlicka, editor, Justice in Political Philosophy, Volume 1: Mainstream Theories of Justice (Brookﬁeld, Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 531-548. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 58-76.

14 106. “Rational action and the extent of intention,” Social Theory and Practice 9 (1983) pp. 123-141. 107. “Beliefs and concepts: comments on Brian Loar,” in PSA 1982, Volume 2, edited by P. D. Asquith and T. Nickles (East-Lansing, Michigan; Phi- losophy of Science Association: 1983) pp. 654-661.

108. “Human ﬂourishing, ethics, and liberty,” Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs 12 (1983) pp. 307-322. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 151-164.

109. “Logic and probability theory versus canons of rationality,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983) p. 251. 110. “Knowledge and the relativity of information,” Behavioral and Brain Sci- ences 6 (1983) p. 72.

111. “Libertarianism and morality,” in The Libertarian Reader edited by Tibor Machan (Totowa, New Jersey; Rowman and Littleﬁeld: 1982) pp. 226-234. 112. “Metaphysical realism and moral relativism: reﬂections on Hilary Put- nam’s Reason, Truth, and History,” Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982) pp. 568-575.

• Reprinted in Paul Horwich (editor), Theories of Truth, in The In- ternational Research Library of Philosophy (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 421-428. 113. “Conceptual role semantics,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1982) pp. 242-256.

• Reprinted in Christopher Peacocke, Understanding and Sense, Vol- ume 1 (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993), pp. 181-195. 114. “Logic, reasoning, and logical form,” in Language, Mind, and Brain edited by Thomas W. Simon, (Hillsdale, New Jersey; Erlbaum: 1982) pp. 13-19. 115. “The essential grammar of action (and other) sentences,” Philosophia 10 (1981) pp. 209-216. 116. “Reasoning,” Encyclopedia Americana, (Danbury, Connecticut; Grolier 1981), vol. 23, p. 295.

117. “Moral relativism as a foundation for natural rights,” Journal of Libertar- ian Studies 4 (1980) pp. 367-371. 118. “Comments on Fullinwider’s review,” Metaphilosophy 11 (1980) pp. 278- 280.

15 119. “What is methodological solipsism?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980) p. 81. 120. “Two quibbles about analyticity and psychological reality,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980) pp. 21-22.

121. “Reasoning and evidence one does not possess,” Midwest Studies in Phi- losophy 5 (1980) pp. 165-182. • Reprinted in Ernest Sosa (editor), Knowledge and Justiﬁcation, in The International Research Library of Philosophy (Aldershot, Hamp- shire, England: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 45-64.

122. “Reasoning and explanatory coherence,” American Philosophical Quar- terly 17 (1980) pp. 151-157. 123. “If and modus ponens: a study of the relations between grammar and logical form,” Theory and Decision 11 (1979) pp. 41-53.

124. “Eco-location,” in Gerald Mast and Marshall Cohen (eds.), Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings, second edition (New York, Oxford University Press: 1979) pp. 234-236. 125. “Studying the chimpanzee’s theory of mind,” Behavioral and Brain Sci- ences 1 (1978) pp. 576-577.

126. “Meaning and theory,” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1978) pp. 9- 19 • Reprinted in Robert W. Shahan and Chris Swoyer, Essays on the Philosophy of W. V. Quine, (Norman, Oklahoma; University of Ok- lahoma Press: 1979) pp. 9-20.

127. “What is experience made of?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1978) pp. 356-357. 128. “Is there mental representation?” in C. Wade Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 9 (Minneapolis, Minnesota; University of Minnesota Press: 1978) pp. 57-64. 129. “What is moral relativism?” in A. I. Goldman and J. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals (Dordrecht, Holland; D. Reidel: 1978) pp. 143-161. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 20-38. 130. “Using intuitions about knowledge to study reasoning: a reply to Williams,” Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978) pp. 433-438.

16 131. “Relativistic ethics: morality as politics,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978) pp. 109-121. • Reprinted in Brook Noel Moore and Robert Stewart, editors, Moral Philosophy: A Comprehensive Introduction (Mountain View, Cali- fornia: Mayﬁeld, 1994), pp. 415-425. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 39-57. 132. “How to use propositions,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977) pp. 173-176.

133. “Semiotics and the cinema: Metz and Wollen,” Quarterly Review of Film Studies 2 (1977) pp. 15-24. • Reprinted in Gerald Mast and Marshall Cohen (eds.), Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings, second edition (New York, Ox- ford University Press: 1979) pp. 204-216; ﬁfth edition, edited by Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (New York, Oxford University Press: 1998) pp. 90-98. • Excerpt reprinted in D. S. Clarke, Jr., editor, Sources of Semiotic: Readings and Commentary on the Development of Semiotic from An- tiquity to the Present. (Carbondale, Illinois; Southern Illinois Uni- versity Press: 1990) pp. 156-161.

134. “Katz’ credo,” Synthese 32 (1976) pp. 387-394. 135. “Practical reasoning,” Review of Metaphysics 29 (1976) pp. 431-463. • Reprinted in Alfred R. Mele, The Philosophy of Action (Oxford, Ox- ford University Press: 1997), pp. 149-177. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 46-74. 136. “Logic and grammar,” in Clea Rameh (ed.), Semantics: Theory and Appli- cation. Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics (Washington, D. C.; Georgetown University Press: 1976) pp. 173-180.

137. “Inferential justiﬁcation,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976) pp. 570-571. 138. “Discussion of Philosophia Problem 3,” Philosophia (1976) pp. 149-150. 139. “Reply to Lisagor,” Philosophical Studies 29 (1976) p. 477.

140. “Logic and language,” broadcast over Radio Three, BBC (England), April 29, 1976. Text published in Listener 9 5/2456 (May 6, 1976) pp. 581-582. 141. “Anaphoric pronouns as bound variables: syntax or semantics?” Language 52 (1976) pp. 78-81.

17 142. “Reasons,” Critica 7 (1975) pp. 3-13. • Reprinted in Joseph Raz (ed.), Practical Reasoning (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1978) pp. 110-117. 143. “Una teoria naturalista de las razones,” translated by Hugo Margain, Di- anoia (1975) pp. 174-181. • Reprinted in Eduardo Rabossi and Fernando Salmeron (eds) Etica y Analisis Volumen I (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico: 1985), pp. 299-308. 144. “Reply to Carrier,” Journal of Critical Analysis 5 (1975) pp. 151-152. 145. “Noun phrases as variable-binding operators and Grandy’s theory of pronom- inalization,” in B. Freed, A. Marras, and P. Maynard (eds.), Forms of Representation (Amsterdam, North Holland: 1975) pp. 23-40. 146. “Language, thought, and communication,” in Keith Gunderson (ed.), Lan- guage, Mind, and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sci- ence Volume VII (Minneapolis, Minnesota; University of Minnesota Press: 1975) pp. 279-298 • Reprinted in Finish translation as “Kielik, ajattelu ja kommunikaa- tio,” Ajattelu, kieli, Merkitys: Analyyttisen filosofian avainkirjoituk- sia, edited by Panu Raatikainen (Finland: Gaudeamus, 1997). • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 166-182. 147. “Wilfrid Sellars’ theory of induction,” in Hector-Neri Caste neda (ed.), Ac- tion, Knowledge, and Reality: Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill: 1975) pp. 265-275. 148. “Moral relativism defended,” Philosophical Review 84 (1975) pp. 3-22. Reprinted in • Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, edited by Jack W. Meiland and Michael Krausz (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press: 1982). • Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Reading, edited by Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, California; Wadsworth Publishing Company: 1988) pp. 33-42. • Michael Smith, editor, Meta-Ethics in The International Research Library of Philosophy (Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 121- 140. • Filosofinen etiikka: lukemisto, edited by Markku Oksanen and Veikko Launis (Helsinki, Finland: Gaudeamus, 1999). • Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 3-19 (a revised version).

18 • Ethical Theory: An Anthology, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau (Ox- ford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 41-50 (second edition, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, pp. 35-43). • Introducing Philosophy: A Text with Integrated Readings, edited by Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Translated in Finnish by Veikko Launis as “Moraalirelativismin puolus- tus,” in Etiikan lukemisto, Markku Oksanen, Veikko Launis & Seppo Sa- jama, editors. (Helsinki: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press, 2010). 149. “Meaning and semantics,” in Milton K. Munitz and Peter K. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy (New York, New York University Press: 1974) pp. 1-16. • Reprinted in a translation by Michael Sukale under the title “Bedeu- tungstheorien und Wahrheitstheorien,” in Michael Sukale (ed.), Mod- erne Sprach philosophie (Hamburg, Hoﬀmann und Campe: 1976) pp. 161-174. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 192-205. 150. Remarks in discussion, Synthese 27 (1974) pp. 478, 479, 486-490, 494-496, 501, 505, 509, 511, 513.

151. “Comment on Michael Dummett,” Synthese 27 (1974) pp. 401-404. • Reprinted in Follesdal, D., ed., Philosophy of Quine, Volume 1 (New York: Garland, 2001). 152. “Identifying numbers,” Analysis 35 (1974) p. 12.

153. “Epistemology,” in Edward C. Carterette and Morton P. Friedman (eds.), Handbook of Perception, Volume 1: Historical and Philosophical Roots of Perception (New York, Academic Press: 1974) pp. 41-56. 154. “Logical form,” Foundations of Language 9 (1972) pp. 38-65. • Reprinted in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), The Logic of Grammar (Encino, California; Dickenson: 1975) pp. 289-307. 155. “Is modal logic logic?” Philosophia 2 (1972) pp. 75-84. 156. “Substitutional quantiﬁcation and quotation,” Nous 5 (1971) pp. 23-214.

157. “Knowledge, reasons and causes,” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970) pp. 841- 855. • Reprinted in German translation as “Wissen, Grunde und Ursachen” in Bieri, Peter (ed.), Analytische Philosophie Der Erkenntnis (Frank- furt, Germany; Athenaum: 1987) pp. 108-123.

19 • Reprinted in Croatian translation by Zvonimir Culjak in Vjerovanje, opravdanje i znanje, edited by Zvonimir Culjak. Ibis graﬁka d.o.o. (2003). 158. “Deep structure as logical form,” Synthese 21 (1970) pp. 225-297.

• Reprinted in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, Holland; D. Reidel: 1972) pp. 25-47. • Reprinted in Peter Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Lan- guage (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1997) pp. 257- 279. 159. “Sellars semantics,” Philosophical Review 79 (1970) pp. 404-419.

160. “Language learning,” Nous 4 (1970) pp. 33-43. • Reprinted in Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychol- ogy (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press: 1980). • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 183-191. 161. “Induction: a discussion of the relevance of the theory of knowledge to the theory of induction (with a digression to the eﬀect that neither deductive logic nor the probability calculus has anything to do with inference,” in Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief (Dor- drecht, Holland; D. Reidel: 1970). 162. “A nonessential property,” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970) pp. 183-185. 163. “. . . is true,” Analysis!? 30 (1970) pp. 98-99. 164. “Reply to Arbini,” Synthese 19 (1968-1969) pp. 425-432.

165. “An introduction to translation and meaning: chapter two of Word and Object,” Synthese 19 (1968-1969) pp. 14- 26. • Reprinted in Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine (Dordrecht, Holland; D. Reidel: 1969) pp. 14-26.

166. “Knowledge, inference, and explanation,” American Philosophical Quar- terly 5 (1968) pp. 164-173. • Reprinted in Herbert Feigl, Wilfrid Sellars, and Keith Lehrer (eds.), New Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York, Appleton Cen- tury Crofts: 1972), pp. 357-368. • Reprinted in Paul K. Moser and Arnold vander Nat (eds.), Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches (New York, Ox- ford: 1987), pp. 282-292.

20 • Reprinted in Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology (New York, Pearson: 2004), pp. 106-115. 167. “Three levels of meaning,” Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968) pp. 590-602. • Reprinted in Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds.), Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology (Cambridge University Press: 1971) pp. 66-75. • Revised version in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Ox- ford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 155-165. 168. “R. M. Hare on moral reasoning,” Mind 77 (1968) pp. 427-428.

169. “Detachment, probability, and maximum likelihood,” Nous 1 (1967) pp. 401- 411. 170. “Toward a theory of intrinsic value,” Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) pp. 792-804.

• Reprinted in Ronnow-Rasmussen, T. and Zimmerman, M. J., Recent Work on Intrinsic Value (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005, pp. 349-360. • Revised version in Harman, G., Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 103-116. 171. “Quine on meaning and existence, II: existential commitment,” Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967) pp. 343-367. • Reprinted in F¨ollesdal,D., ed., Philosophy of Quine, Volume 1 (New York: Garland, 2000). 172. “Quine on meaning and existence, I: the death of meaning,” Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967) pp. 124-151. • Reprinted in F¨ollesdal,D., ed., Philosophy of Quine, Volume 1 (New York: Garland, 2000). • Revised version published as “The death of meaning” in Harman, G., Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 119-137. 173. “Scriven on the unknowability of psychological laws,” Philosophical Stud- ies 18 (1967) pp. 61-63. 174. “Enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation,” Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) pp. 529-33.

175. “Unger on knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) pp. 390-395. 176. “Psychological Aspects of the theory of syntax,” Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) pp. 75-87.

21 • Reprinted in Jay F. Rosenberg and Charles Travis (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliﬀs, New Jersey; Prentice- Hall: 1971) pp. 378-389. • Reprinted in Stephen P. Stich, Innate Ideas (Berkeley and Los An- geles, University of California Press: 1975) pp. 165-180. • Reprinted in Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychol- ogy (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press: 1980). • Reprinted in Carlos P. Otero (ed.), Noam Chomsky: Critical Assess- ments, Volume II: Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1994). pp. 198- 210.

177. “About what an adequate grammar could do,” Foundations of Language 2 (1966) pp. 134-141. 178. “Lehrer on knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) pp. 241-247. 179. “New implications of ‘someone’,” Analysis 26 (1966) p. 206

180. “The adequacy of context-free phrase structure grammars,” Word 22 (1966) pp. 276-293. 181. “The inference to the best explanation,” Philosophical Review 74 (1965) pp. 88-95.

• Reprinted in Steven M. Cahn, editor, Philosophy for the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 249-53. 182. “How belief is based on inference,” Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964): 353- 360. 183. “Generative grammars without transformation rules: a defense of phrase structure,” Language 39 (1963) pp. 597- 616. • Reprinted in Walter J. Savitch, Emmon Bach, William Marsh and Gila Safran-Naveh, editors, The Formal Complexity of Natural Lan- guage (Dordrecht, Holland; D. Reidel: 1987) pp. 87-116.

3 REVIEWS

1. With Sanjeev Kulkarni, “Models in the Mind,” a review of The Mental Models Theory of Reasoning: Reﬁnements and Extensions, in The Amer- ican Journal of Psychology 127 (Spring 2014): 129-131.

2. Review of Kathrin Gl¨uer, Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction, in The Review of Metaphysics, (September 2013): 162-164.

22 3. Review of Adam Morton, Bounded Thinking: Intellectual Virtues for Lim- ited Agents, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews http://ndpr.nd. edu/news/40972/(2013. 4. “Review of Lepore and Ludwig, Donald Davidson’s Truth-Theoretic Se- mantics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2011): 788-792. 5. Review of Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguis- tics, Volume 1: The Formal Turn; Volume 2: The Philosophical Turn, in the online Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, February 2011 http: //ndpr.nd.edu

6. “Mechanical Mind,” a review of Margaret Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science, in American Scientist 96 (2008): 76-78. 7. Review of Christopher Peacocke, The Realm of Reason, in The Philosoph- ical Review 115 (2006): 243-6. 8. Review of Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason, The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 457-9. 9. “Aspects of Reason II,” a review of H. P. Grice, Aspects of Reason, The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003) pp. 280-4. 10. Review of Chomsky, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, in The Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001), pp. 265-9. 11. “Love isn’t all you need,” a review of On Virtue Ethics, by Rosalind Hursthouse, in the Times Literary Supplement no. 5104 (January 26, 2001), p. 26. 12. Review of The Logical Foundations of Cognition, by John Macnamara and Gonzalo E. Reyes, eds., in The Philosophical Quarterly (1997), pp. 385-6. 13. Review of Inference to the Best Explanation, by Peter Lipton, in Mind 101 (1992) pp. 578-580. 14. “Justiﬁcation, Truth, Goals, and Pragmatism: Comments on Stich’s Frag- mentation of Reason,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991) 195-9. 15. Review of Margolis, Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, in Ethics 100 (1989), p. 200. 16. “A new paradigm,” a review of Alexander George, editor, Reﬂections on Noam Chomsky, review appearing in The Times Literary Supplement, no. 4,507 (August 18-24, 1989). • Reprinted in Carlos P. Otero (ed.), Noam Chomsky: Critical Assess- ments, Volume II: Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1994). pp. 486- 490.

23 17. “Semantics of mental representations,” a review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn and William Demopoulos, editors, Meaning and Cognitive Structure in Contemporary Psychology 33 (1988) pp. 259-260. 18. Review of Paul Ziﬀ’s Epistemic Analysis in The Philosophical Review. 97 (1988) pp. 122-123.

19. Review of Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use by Noam Chomsky, in American Scientist 75 (1987) p. 73. 20. Review of Logical Form in Natural Language by William G. Lycan, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1986) pp. 340-343.

21. “Philosophy: beliefs, attitudes, and justiﬁcation,” a review of The Nature of Philosophy by John Kekes, in Reason Papers no. 8 (1982) pp. 59-70. 22. “Critical review: Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right,” in Philosophical Studies 42 (1982) pp. 119-139.

23. “The Fregean framework,” a review of The Interpretation of Frege’s Phi- losophy and the second edition of Frege: Philosophy of Language, by Michael Dummett, in The Times Literary Supplement No. 4124 (April 16, 1982) pp. 433-434. 24. Review of The Formal Mechanics of Mind by Stephen Thomas, in Ethics 92 (1982) p. 350. 25. “Against moral relativism,” a review of Essays on Moral Development, Volume 1. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice by Lawrence Kohlberg, reviewed in The Nation February 3, 1982, pp. 34-37.

26. “Liberalism without foundations?” a review of Social Justice in the Liberal State by Bruce Ackerman, in The Yale Law Review 91 (1981) pp. 397-403. 27. Review of Michael E. Levin, Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem in Ethics 92 (1981) pp. 174-176.

28. “Modes of mediation,” a review of On Thinking by Gilbert Ryle in The Times Literary Supplement, June 20, 1980, p. 704. 29. Review of Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics in Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (1980) pp. 372-373. 30. Review of D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms, in Philosophical Review (1980) pp. 115-117. 31. “Specialist and citizen,” a review of Noam Chomsky, Language and Re- sponsibility, in Nation Volume 288, number 12 (March 31,1979) pp. 345- 347.

24 • Reprinted in Carlos P. Otero (ed.), Noam Chomsky: Critical As- sessments, Volume III: Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1994). pp. 159-162. 32. Review of Stephen Bradley Smith, Meaning and Negation, in Linguistics 205 (March 1978) pp. 89-91. 33. Review of Noam Chomsky, Reflections on Language, in Partisan Review 45 (1978) pp. 463-466. 34. Review of Gareth Evans and John McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning, in Times Literary Supplement number 3955 (January 13,1978) p. 41. 35. Review of Jonathan Bennett, Linguistic Behaviour, in Language 53 (1977) pp. 417-424. 36. Review of J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.), Logic and Philosophy for Linguists: A Book of Readings, in Linguistics 185 (1977) pp. 84-85. 37. Review of P. F. Strawson, Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar, in Language 52 (1976) pp. 695-698. 38. Review of Peter T. Geach, Logic Matters, in Foundations of Language 13 (1975) pp. 127-132. 39. Review of W. V. Quine, The Roots of Reference, in Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975) pp. 388-396. 40. Review of Stephen Schiffer, Meaning, in Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974) pp. 224-229. 41. Review of Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Aspects of Language, in Synthese 26 (1973) pp. 150-152. 42. Review of Bernard Harrison, Meaning and Structure, in Contemporary Psychology 18 (1973) pp. 337-338. 43. Review of Roger Wertheimer, The Significance of Sense, in Philosophical Review 82 (1973) pp. 235-239 44. Review of Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind, Revised Edition, in Lan- guage 49 (1973) pp. 453-464. • Reprinted in Gilbert Harman (ed.), On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays (Garden City, New York; Anchor Books: 1974) pp. 201-218. • Reprinted in Carlos P. Otero (ed.), Noam Chomsky: Critical Assess- ments, Volume II: Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1994). pp. 242- 258. 45. Review of Michael A. Slote, Reason and Scepticism, in Philosophical Re- view 81 (1972) pp. 253-254.

25 46. Review of W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, in Metaphilosophy 2 (1971) pp. 184-190. 47. Review of W. V. Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, in Metaphi- losophy 2 (1971) pp. 79-81.

48. Reviews of William P. Alston, “The quest for meanings” and “Meaning and use” and B. L. Blase, “Synonyms,” in Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1970) pp. 456-458. 49. Review of J. F. Staal, “Some semantic relations between sentoids,” in Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1970) pp. 132-133.

50. Review of Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives, in Journal of Phi- losophy 66 (1969) pp. 133-144. 51. Review of The Concept of Morality (University of Colorado Studies; Series in Philosophy No. 3), in Australasian Journal in Philosophy 46 (1968) pp. 294-297.

52. Review of Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy, in Philosophical Review 76 (1968) pp. 383-386. 53. Review of Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, in Philosophical Review 76 (1968) pp. 229-235.

• Reprinted in Carlos P. Otero (ed.), Noam Chomsky: Critical Assess- ments, Volume II: Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1994). pp. 850- 855. 54. Review of David G. Hays, Computational Linguistics, in American Scien- tist (1967) p. 527a.

55. Review of M. Dufrenne, Language and Philosophy, in Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (1967) pp. 113-114. 56. Review of George P. Klubertanz, Habits and Virtues, in Philosophical Review 76 (1967) pp. 237-238.

57. Review of D. W. Gotshalk, Human Aims in Modern Perspectives in Sci- ence 153 (1966) pp. 732-733. 58. Review of Jerrold J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, in Harvard Edu- cational Review 36 (1966) pp. 558-563.