Cavalry in Built-Up Areas

PB 17-01-4 July-August 2001 Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride

“Anybody can sympathize with the sufferings of a friend, “There's a big difference between having a career and but it requires a very fine nature... to sympathize with a having a life. Be sure not to confuse the two,” said Barbara friend’s success.” — Oscar Wilde Bush, speaking at Wake Forest’s 2001 commencement. I recall my own day of infamy, that being the year in which I July is here, and with its heat comes another list of majors had vested the most hope in getting selected for promotion who are to move on to lieutenant colonel (Congrats). This to LTC. Once the results were out, I dreaded going home list marks my seventh or eighth look and final opportunity. and telling my wife that I was not selected. Fortunately, I While I resist the urge to purchase champagne, I anxiously was met outside the stairwell by running hugs delivered by await the list’s arrival with crossed fingers for some combat two of my children (apparently, it did not matter to them that buddies whose chances are significantly better than mine. I had been not been selected for promotion). This spurred I won’t use this forum or release of a promotion board’s an epiphany — my life had not ended. One’s career is im- results to rant and rave about the injustices of the OER sys- portant, but a better gauge of worth is one’s performance as tem, promotion boards, or PERSCOM. Quite frankly, I was a parent or spouse. I’ll set a good example for my kids, pleasantly surprised to attain the rank of major and thoughts working hard in a noble profession, but raising them to be of a subsequent promotion caused me to think of an old worthy adults takes precedence. quote by Groucho Marx along the lines of not wanting to join Ride hard and enjoy the ride all the way to the objec- any club that would have him as a member. Rather, I’d like tive. Life ain’t always fair; get over it! Many take the disap- to point out that, sooner or later, no matter who you are or pointment hard, slipping into a “woe is me” self-pity or bit- what heights you scale, the Army is going to tell you, terly angry mode. They let these sentiments impact both “Thanks very much.” One of my previous pass-overs oc- their performance and remaining time in the Army. Don’t curred roughly when GEN Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied define success by a job title; define success by doing your Commander Europe/Commander-in-Chief U.S. European job well. Command, and the last American general to wage war, was invited to step down early to accommodate his successor’s July also marks many changes of command. I’d like to arrival. Sure, all of us feel that we should have made this remind speakers now diligently drafting and polishing rank, commanded at this level, or attained this job; it’s the speeches that Abraham Lincoln used a mere 267 words nature of the beast, and reflects the traits of the people we and little over two minutes to deliver the Gettysburg Ad- want in the Army. However, the cruel reality is that few of us dress, not a bad benchmark. So if you find yourself stam- will reach the rank, command, or job we believe we should, mering away past the 10-minute threshold and see soldiers and this fact should not be viewed as abject failure (easier in formation with eyes glazing over, wrap it up. People rarely preached than accomplished). complain about a short speech. Blinding flashes of the obvious gleaned from my experi- — D2 ence include:

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 0113104

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-01-4

Editor-in-Chief MAJ DAVE DAIGLE Features 8 The Cavalry Paradigm Managing Editor “We Aren’t Training as We Intend to Fight” JON T. CLEMENS by Captain William E. Benson 11 Airborne Light Cavalry Gunnery Commandant The Army’s only airborne ground cavalry troop deploys to Fort Knox MG B. B. BELL by First Lieutenant Brian W. Oertel and Captain Francis J. H. Park 14 Train As You Fight Light cavalry gunnery in the 82d Airborne Division ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- by Staff Sergeant Jack Tripp and Sergeant First Class Leo Clark monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. 16 Mountain Cavalry Recon in Built-Up Areas Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- by Captain Rich Rouleau MOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect 19 Modifying the Abrams Tank for Fighting in Urban Areas the official Army or TRADOC position, nor by Sergeant First Class Ira L. Partridge does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. 25 Some Russian Tankers’ Experiences in the Second Chechen War by Adam Geibel Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored 29 Evolving Army Armor Structure in the Late 1920s cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr. headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- 35 Some Thoughts for Junior Officers on Making a Career Decision ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, by Lieutenant Colonel James F. Pasquarette and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, 38 The Poor Man’s GUARDFIST Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM by Captain Todd A. Scattini staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza- 40 The Joint STARS Common Ground Station: tions, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by A New Tool for the Maneuver Commander sending a request to the editor-in-chief. by Captain Mike Monnard Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 44 Division Capstone Exercise Verifies the Effectiveness those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor of Army’s Tactical Internet Center has proponency. That proponency by Armor Staff includes: all armored, direct-fire ground com- bat systems that do not serve primarily as Back New TSM–Soldier Office Established at Fort Knox infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively Cover in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equip- ment which armor and armored cavalry or- ganizations use exclusively; training for all SC Departments 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF- 19-series enlisted soldiers; and information 2 Contacts concerning the training, logistics, history, and 3 Letters leadership of armor and armored cavalry units 5 Commander’s Hatch at the brigade/regiment level and below, to 7 Driver’s Seat include Threat units at those levels. 50 Reviews Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. USPS 467-970 July-August 2001, Vol. CX, No. 4

DSN prefix – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) MAJ Dave Daigle 4087 MG B. B. Bell 2121 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Please Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Jon T. Clemens Note New 4582 BG Terry Tucker 7555 E-Mail: [email protected] Phone E-Mail: [email protected] Numbers Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Editor for ARMOR COL George Edwards 1101 Vivian Oertle Staff 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Staff Illustrator CSM Carl E. Christian 4952 Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) COL Joe Hughes 5050 E-Mail: [email protected] Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in COL Dennis J. Szydloski 7809 editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed E-Mail: [email protected] or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) Word, WordPerfect, WordStar, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please Aubrey Henley 1272 indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 5155 captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at: Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Randal Milling 1315 [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] When sending articles via email, please include a complete mailing TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) address and daytime phone number. COL James H. Nunn 7955 SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per E-Mail: [email protected] issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit COL Timothy D. Cherry 4009 your article to only one Army journal at a time. E-Mail: [email protected] GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, Assistant TRADOC System Manager but will accept electronic graphic and photo files. If you use Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) PowerPoint, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and LTC J. B. Iddins 3519 shading. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint.) If E-Mail: [email protected] you have any questions concerning electronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) TBA 8247 CHANGE OF ADDRESS-PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS AND ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription ser- vice, address changes, and delivery problems, or for awards in- formation, contact Connie Stiggers or Darlene Kennedy, United States Armor Association, P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; U.S. Army Armor School E-Mail: [email protected]; phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) website at www.usarmor-assn.org. COL Robert T. Gahagan 1050 E-Mail: [email protected] UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, phone DSN 464-2249; com- Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) mercial: (502) 624-2249. Requests to be added to the free dis- CSM Terrance McWilliams 7091 tribution list should be in the form of a letter or email to the Editor- E-Mail: [email protected] in-Chief. NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK- CSM James E. Dale 5150 ARM, Bldg 1109A Sixth Avenue, Room 371, Fort Knox, KY E-Mail: [email protected] 40121-5210. 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine COL John Antal 7848 website at www.knox.army.mil/armormag. E-Mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning COL John L. Ballantyne 8736 doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force. E-Mail: [email protected]

2 ARMOR — July-August 2001

LAV III Fails to Meet The third prime requirement that the LAV III peacekeeping and wartime missions and The Army’s Own Requirements selection did not meet is C-130 aircraft survive. transport. The LAV III was initially developed for the Canadian Army, which had no re- I would like to hear some comments and Dear Sir: quirement for C-130 aircraft transport. After opinions on the LAV III from the guys that selection of the LAV III as the IAV, a review are really going to use it, not the managers Cheers to Mr. Stanley C. Crist. He is the of the IAV program and not the high-level first ARMOR magazine contributor that I’ve of the Army’s Transportation Agency’s web site showed that the LAV III was not capable staff officers who merely executed the Army seen who has had the guts to report the true Chief of Staff’s desires, most of who will be facts about the LAV III. His discussion of the of transport in C-130 aircraft. Why then was it selected? Is it because that part of that long gone when the LAV III rubber finally hits LAV III’s deficiencies and his alternate solu- the road. tion for the Interim Armor Vehicle (IAV) in the engineering effort associated with that “off- May-June 2001 issue hit the nail right on the the-shelf vehicle” is also planned to redesign A. WILLIAM CRISWELL head. The selected IAV, the LAV III, manu- its configuration to meet the C-130 aircraft via email factured by the contractor team of GDLS and transport requirement? This seems ex- tremely bizarre and wasteful, that the Army GM of Canada, does not meet three prime Defining Victory and Defeat requirements established by the Army for the should pay for this effort when one considers IAV program. the facts that both the M113 and the M8 In Korea and Vietnam tracked vehicles proposed by United De- The first prime requirement is that GEN fense for the IAV are fully qualified for air Dear Sir: Shinseki said in October 1999 that the Army transport in all USAF transport aircraft. Both needs a light armored vehicle that will permit have been tested by the Army to validate it. The United States of America (with some rapid deployment by C-130 transports. He’s Also, everyone knows there are a lot of other credit to Britain and our NATO allies) won offering to solve a problem that doesn’t exist: worthwhile things in the Army wish list that the war that encompassed Korea and Viet- The Army has had such a capability since the 2-billion dollar saving the UDLP bid pro- nam. In a recent book review in ARMOR, the 1960, the M113 armored personnel carrier, vided could be used for and, on top of this, critic indicated the USA “lost” in Korea. This and the Army has approximately 13,000 of the IAVs would be fielded much sooner. is so sadly mistaken and wrong-spirited that it must be loudly and repeatedly corrected. all models, all fully deployable by C-130 In addition to the selected LAV III not meet- transport aircraft. It can do better anything If war is the advancement of political ends ing detail IAV requirements, the basis for the the LAV III can do, except for high road by military means (or any other related defi- IAV program was highly flawed from its be- speeds, and with a good band track it may nition) then the war in Korea was a resound- ginnings. The white paper entitled “Wheels be able to greatly improve on that. ing victory for the United States and allies. vs. Tracks,” written by Mr. Don Loughlin and The political goal was to reestablish a free available at www.defensedaily.com/reports/ The second prime requirement is that the South Korea. Our Army, Air Force, Marines, wheelsvtracks.htm presents a clear and de- selected IAV was required to be an off-the- and Navy performed heroically to accomplish tailed explanation of why the IAV program is shelf vehicle. The LAV III does not meet this. Today, our South Korean ally is one of ill-founded. Mr. Loughlin is a world-recog- this requirement. Extensive engineering is the world’s advanced nations, compared to nized contributor to ARMOR Magazine and planned by the contractor team, particularly the international basket case of North Korea. other defense publications. His paper clearly for the mobile gun variant, to obtain the vehi- The U.S. and our allies in that war led the notes the numerous omissions and errors cle configurations and capabilities required advance of freedom and economic prosper- contained in the Army War College report by the Army. This engineering effort is ity in the world today, compared to the re- that possibly led to the selection of a probably reflected in the fact that the winning tarded, repressive, and backward China. The contractor’s price was twice that of the run- wheeled vehicle to meet the IAV require- ments. political ends of Korea were met and the war ner-up’s, 4 billion dollars vs. 2 billion dollars, was won, even if you consider Korea an and that their scheduled fielding dates are In the process of guiding the IAV Program isolated war unto itself. over one year later than the fielding dates to reach the selection of a wheeled vehicle, requested by the Army. the Army has disregarded all those hard If you consider Vietnam an isolated war learned facts about wheeled combat vehicles unto itself, I would suggest that people look The LAV III Mobile Gun variant is a rehash hard at the facts (pushing aside the smoke of of the Teledyne Continental Motors turret, in their previous combat operations — the mobility and survivability problems of ar- the peace movement). Our nation entered now owned by GDLS, that lost out in the into another north/south fray with no political Armored Gun System (AGS) program. It is mored cars of WWII and the hard lessons we learned in Vietnam when we tried to use goal in mind. When the political goal was highly unlikely that this turret-LAV III combi- finally established to hand over the battle to nation will ever match the firing performance wheeled armored vehicles as convoy sup- port in a guerrilla war environment. an enhanced and militarily strong South of the United Defense’s winning AGS, the Vietnam, the U.S. military had won every tracked M8. Just think about the soldier who tries to battle, seized every objective, defeated the Another armament feature of the LAV III traverse a city street roadblock of rubble and enemy at every turn. The conditions of the that appears questionable is the use of the abandoned cars with an LAV III and fails hand-over were a defeated and demoralized externally mounted .50-cal. machine gun on because of its suspension vulnerability and North Vietnam and a well-armed and pre- the squad carrier variant. This type of weap- poor traction. He will then spend a long time pared South Vietnam. We left on our own on mount was probably selected because it in the kill zone, trying to back up and turn terms. That South Vietnam’s politicians blew saves weight and space over a normal turret. around to find a new route. A tracked IAV’s it and their army crumbled does not change However its external mounting, with little or pivot-steer feature and its rugged track sys- the fact that our political system set goals no armor, makes it highly vulnerable to artil- tem with superior traction would sure sound and the military of the United States of Amer- lery fragments and small arms fire. Reload- good then. Ask the Rangers and Special ica met every goal. The political ends of ing and clearing a stoppage under fire would Forces what they thought about the wheeled Vietnam were met and the war was won, also appear to be quite dangerous for the armored cars sent to rescue them in Soma- even if you consider Vietnam an isolated war crew. One would also question whether its lia. unto itself. elevation capability is adequate for engaging In my opinion, the selection of the LAV III Yet I do not consider either of them to be targets in the upper floors of buildings. Its as the IAV is a decision that will prove to be isolated wars. I believe and will teach my mounting location and limited depression not only shortsighted and costly but one that, children that these long and painful events travel will also produce a large dead fire in the future, will give our soldiers in harm’s were major campaigns in the much longer zone around the vehicle’s perimeter. way a poor way to accomplish both their and more wide-reaching Cold War. The Cold ARMOR — July-August 2001 3

War began before WWII even ended with the tile, adding fins from the 120mm HEAT pro- alone, the platoon must be able to cover 360 Russian and Chinese incursions into previ- jectile, and using a standard 120mm shell degrees, and this is only realistic with four ously Japanese territories and holdings. The case. In addition, a new electronic fuze re- tanks, or even five. Cold War included Korea, Vietnam, Gre- placed the earlier fuze, which had always nada, perhaps Panama, and smaller events been a weak point of the 105mm round. The If operating with dismounts, the force must like the Libyan bombings and support of IDF accepted the round and uses it in the be mixed: one panzer grenadier platoon (-) Israel against Soviet-supplied opponents. 120mm Merkava tank. with a section of two tanks. The mech infan- try can cover the flanks and rear of the tanks The total collapse of the Soviet Union and In 1997, IMI offered the production round to the inability of China to do anything except during the approach within urban terrain. But the U.S. Army for test. In its subsequent one tank is not enough. With two, the section saber-rattle are proofs of the victory of free- evaluation, as noted in LTC Price’s article, dom and democracy over totalitarianism. is capable of providing mutual fire-support Army tankers concluded that the round was and one tank can recover the other if neces- Don’t buy into the liberal spew of the “wars “too heavy, awkward to fuze, and difficult to sary. we lost.” Our military men and women ac- quickly load during engagements.” As a con- The authors note that, “With three tanks, complished the missions and won the cam- sequence, the Korea requirement has re- the platoon leader can better control move- paigns in the theaters assigned them, and mained unfulfilled while awaiting the U.S. Ar- ment and fire of his unit.” No doubt, this is a the result was ultimate victory over the War- my’s canister development and production. fact. But I think with good TTP standards, it saw Pact and the aimless flopping around of IDF urban terrain experience, much of doesn’t matter one tank more or less, as the Chinese. To suggest anything less dis- which is probably similar to what the U.S. long as the platoon leader leads by example. honors those warriors living and dead who Army can expect to face in the future, has If someone thinks a tank platoon leader fought and won their nation’s wars and is resulted in further ammunition requirements. should lead his platoon by not directly dishonest to history. Perhaps yet in our life- A unique Israeli development, now in pro- engaging with his tank during the fight, then time, a good historian will write coherently duction by IMI for the IDF, is the 105mm we should consider having five tanks in a about the 20th Century War (like the 30-Year APAM (Anti-Personnel/Anti-Materiel) round. platoon instead of three. and 100-Year Wars of earlier centuries) that The APAM is a multipurpose round that can the United States of America and its allies function as an air burst munition against I agree that the digitization of command won. dismounted troops in the open or dug in, or and control will be used mainly before the MAJ ROGER T. AESCHLIMAN as a unitary HE round against point targets direct fire fight. It will allow operation without Cdr, 105th Public Affairs Detachment such as bunkers, light armored vehicles, and visual contact within the platoon. This would Kansas Army National Guard other materiel targets. As an APERS round, be a great advantage during MOUT or within the electronic fuze receives range informa- restricted terrain. Again, the future of opera- tions at platoon level will be in sections. Some Background About tion from the fire control computer and ex- “Beehive” Tank Rounds pels its controlled fragmentation submuni- Another questionable area is the availability tions at optimal height over a long, wide of tanks. If only one tank of the three-tank lethal area. As an anti-materiel round, the Dear Sir: platoon is out of order, the platoon cannot be APAM acts as a rigid HE round, capable of considered as operational. The subject of canister rounds for tank blowing holes in structures and destroying main armament discussed in the Nov-Dec point targets. The Swiss Army XXI will be transforming its combat organization back to a tank company 2000 issue and expanded in the “Letters” Combat-proven, the APAM seems to offer column in the Mar-Apr 2001 issue deserves with 14 Leopard IIs and with four tanks per the Interim Brigade Combat Teams’ Mobile platoon. further discussion. Protected Gun an excellent solution to the HANNES M. HAURI First, a bit of history. The requirement that APERS requirement, while providing a unique flexibility to the ammunition stowage MAJ (GS) resulted in the 105mm M494 APERS round, S2, Pz Br 11, known as the Beehive, was generated when challenge. The design appears to have the potential for a similar round for the M1A1 Swiss Armed Forces the firm developing a flechette 105mm [email protected] APERS artillery round for the Army ap- tank, as well. proached the Armor Board in the early PHILIP L. BOLTÉ 1960s, suggesting that there might be a tank BG, USA, Ret. Soviets Adopted Three-Tank Platoons gun application for their projectile. The com- pany adapted its artillery projectiles to the As a Desperation Measure 105mm tank gun and demonstrated its per- The Swiss Experience Dear Sir: formance at Fort Knox. The result against With Three-Tank Platoons both direct and indirect fire silhouette targets I must strongly disagree with the article, was awesome. This demonstration was the Dear Sir: “The Three Tank Platoon, A Consideration genesis of the 105mm tank gun Beehive For Army XXI,” in the March-April issue of I wish to contribute a few personal thoughts round, as well as the requirement for a simi- ARMOR. The authors’ proposal to reduce to the article, “The Three Tank Platoon,” by lar 152mm round. (Life was simpler in those combat capability in order to reduce training, MAJ Stringer and MAJ Hall. I am a graduate days!) manpower, and logistic shortcomings is sim- of ACCC at Ft. Knox and am now a tank ply a plan for defeat. As noted in the LTC Pride’s article, there instructor at the OCS of the Swiss Armed was concern in Korea when the arrival of the Forces. Contrary to the authors’ claim, there is M1A1 tank cost the tankers their main gun nothing revolutionary about the three-tank APERS capability. The first response to the Regarding their comment, “The tank pla- platoon. The Soviet Red Army adopted it at developing requirements for a 120mm toon is organized to fight as one maneuver the beginning of WWII due to its tremendous APERS round came from Israel. The IDF element, not as two separate sections,” I shortages of trained leaders, radios, and had expressed an urgent requirement for would say that this doctrinal definition is effective tanks. They likewise fielded many such a round during its 1983 Lebanon opera- correct as long as we are talking about a two-company battalions (21 tanks) and, for tions. Responding quickly, Israel Military classic tank battle. But if we are talking about critical equipment like their JS-series heavy Industries (IMI) adapted the existing 105mm MOUT, a concentration of armor is no longer APERS (Beehive) round for use in the possible. Either a tank platoon is operating 120mm gun. The adaptation consisted of alone, or it is organized with panzer grena- placing a “sleeve” around the 105mm projec- diers (mechanized infantry). If operating Continued on Page 47 4 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Armor Branch’s “Way Ahead” Advances on Four Thrust Lines

by Major General B. B. Bell, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

Our branch is decisive and healthy, • Operate with ultra reliability each platoon containing three mobile and remains at the core of America’s The Objective Force’s primary close guns, there will be a total of 27 mobile ability to fight and win wars. In this, gun platforms in each IBCT. The MGS my final “Commander’s Hatch” article, combat formation will be the FCS Bat- vehicles will be fought by 19K armor talion, the unit of action for future I want to give you a quick rundown on Army operations. All of the Battlefield crewmen with an appropriate ASI. the state of our branch as it integrates with the Army’s other branches to pro- Functional Areas will be represented Providing the eyes and ears for each across FCS common platforms and will IBCT is a Reconnaissance, Surveil- vide a decisive, combined arms war- be found in the combined arms FCS fighting capability. Armor Branch is lance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) advancing along four major axes: the Battalion. The Army and TRADOC are Squadron of over 400 troops, domi- in pursuit of a prime directive to estab- nated by the 19D cavalry scout. This Objective Force, the Interim Force, the lish responsibilities and proponencies Legacy Force, and manning the Armor squadron has NBC reconnaissance ca- Force. All four avenues are extremely for the FCS Battalion. As always, Fort pability, organic mortars, unmanned Knox and Armor Branch stand ready to important to the Army and each of us. aerial vehicles, inter-netted sensors, and take on any role in the combat devel- GSR capability. These systems, com- The Objective Force opments process for the FCS battalion. bined with the LRAS3 systems onboard the recce platforms, allow this unit to The Army is moving out in achieving The Interim Force conduct sustained R&S operations over its vision, and at the spear point is the Armor Branch has two major pursuits extended areas. Objective Force. Armor branch is, and will remain, deeply engaged in the Ob- within the Interim Force: the Initial Clearly, Armor and Cavalry soldiers Brigade Combat Team and the Interim bring key competencies to the IBCTs jective Force development process. The Cavalry Regiment. First is the IBCT. Objective Force represents a holistic and an assignment to one of these units approach to our future combat capabil- The IBCT is an infantry-centric com- is going to be an exciting and reward- bined arms organization supported by ing opportunity. We will be leading the ity, and at the center of this effort will direct fire from 105mm Mobile Gun be the fielding of the Future Combat way in these outfits and providing the System (FCS). While we pursue sci- Systems (MGS). heavy firepower and reconnaissance to ence and technology solutions for the The IBCT is optimized for small-scale ensure their success — the Armor FCS, we already know the Objective contingencies in complex and urban community has reason to look at the Force’s key operational concepts and terrain, but possesses the ability for full emergence of these units with pride and we know the defining characteristics of spectrum early entry force operations. anticipation. These organizations are the FCS. This system will: All of the vehicles in this organization good for our Army and our branch. are built on the LAV III interim ar- • Be rapidly deployable One initiative that we are continuing mored vehicle (IAV) common plat- to work is the development of an In- • Be combat capable off the ramp form, and all possess superior situ- ational awareness and understanding terim Cavalry Regiment which we hope • Have a decided stand-off advan- will result in the near-term reorganiza- tage (SA/SU) capability. The IBCT is light tion and re-equipping of the 2ACR. We enough to be strategically deployable • Possess lethal overmatch against and battlefield mobile, yet heavy refer to the design as the Second In- terim Cavalry Regiment — 2ICR. future advanced armors enough to bring battlespace dominance While the Army has yet to give its final into an austere theater. • Possess an advanced survivability blessing to the 2ICR, through a blue suite that includes active and pas- The IBCT is built around the Com- ribbon panel process and in coordina- sive protection systems, networked bined Arms Company. The company tion with FORSCOM and XVIII Corps, lethality overmatch, signature contains three infantry platoons and an we have constructed an operational and management, dominant situation MGS platoon. This MGS platoon pro- organizational plan for the organiza- awareness, and that will leverage vides the close supporting assault gun tion. We are continuing to develop the unmanned systems capabilities fires needed to defeat enemy personnel, framework for an organization that will • bunkers, weapon emplacements and be able to provide the full range of Achieve unsurpassed tactical and medium armored vehicles. When corps cavalry requirements. We see this operational mobility needed, the mobile guns will punch organization as the harbinger for Ob- • Enable dominant situational un- structures open to support infantry op- jective Force cavalry. The 2ICR will be derstanding erations in urban environments. With optimized for reconnaissance but will ARMOR — July-August 2001 5

include sufficient firepower to conduct reinforcing forces with M1A1Ds and 12. Procure adequate battlefield re- security and economy of force opera- M2A3s to ensure their lethal overmatch covery capability (Hercules) to outfit tions. We envision that this unit will capability. III Corps counterattack force. have a strong air and ground team that Manning the Armor Force is capable of operating over a 90km by We are aggressively pursuing other enhancements for our armor forces. We 60km battlespace. This unit will have need items like the 120mm canister By far the most important axis for our embedded engineer, signal, MI, UAV branch is the maintenance of our high and CSS support. It will employ In- round and the Tank Extended Range soldier quality. The greatest techno- Munition (TERM). The 120mm canis- terim Armored Vehicles with a basic ter round is funded in the POM and will logical innovations and the best equip- cavalry capability provided by a mix of ment are useless without skilled sol- recce and MGS platforms. You’ll see be essential in combat in close/complex diers, competent leaders, and cohe- and urban terrain. The TERM round is more on this initiative over the next proceeding through the approval proc- sive/motivated teams. The DCX (Phase several months. I) was just the latest demonstration of ess and we will continue to work this the quality and dedication found in the The Legacy Force issue. I cannot list every project that we are pursuing to make our force better soldiers of our branch. Fort Knox is Our current armor force provides the moving forward on its main training nation with a strong and decisive war- prepared to support the nation’s objec- and leader development mission by tives, but let me list our priorities for winning capability. This force will con- the future: pioneering some unique changes in the tinue to provide the bulk of our war- way we train soldiers. We have imple- fighting capability for at least the next 1. Recapitalize through upgrade III mented Gauntlet training here at Knox 15 to 20 years, while we bring FCS Corps, three mechanized/armored divi- that teams soldiers from different offi- battalions into the force. We will sus- sions and 3d ACR with M1A2 SEP and cer and NCO grades and skill levels tain our current force through selective M2A3 Bradleys. into experiential-based virtual, con- upgrade and recapitalization. In this structive, and live training events. Our ARMOR Magazine is an article on the 2. Fully digitize III Corps with three Armor and Cavalry OSUT programs recently completed Division Capstone divisions and 3d ACR. are superb, and are improving almost Exercise (Phase I) that highlights the 3. Develop and procure munitions daily. enormous enhancements made to the that dominate the expanded close com- 4th Infantry Division (see Page 44). The We continue to pursue distance learn- bat “red zone.” ing which allows soldiers away from Ironhorse Division is the first step in the institutional base to reach back into the move to create a Counterattack a. 120mm TERM Corps that will serve as the nation’s b. M829E3 the school house for the most current c. 120mm Canister training and information. We are lead- decisive counterattack force for any ing the way in providing training sup- major theater war. As the Counterattack d. Maintenance of TOW II inventory Corps, III Corps will be modernized by e. TOW fire-and-forget port packages and assisting field units in reaching their training and leader FY05 and 3ID will be modernized by 4. Recapitalize through rebuild development goals. The Armor School FY09. These forces will serve as the nation’s premier counteroffensive defeat (M1A1D/M2A2ODS-D) the remaining remains committed to serving the field mechanized Containment/Reinforcing commander; we want your input and mechanism for the next 15-20 years. Force (AC/RC). we need you to help drive the training Other formations within our current 5. Match APS with appropriate early here at the Center. Our soldiers and force are the Contingency/Containment leaders are and will remain the center- and Reinforcing Forces. The elements entry containment force equipment. piece of our formations and we are of the Contingency/Containment forces 6. Invest in adequate institutional, dedicated to their training excellence. will be linked to Army Prepositioned home station, and CTC training up- Stocks (APS) and serve as first deploy- grades to ensure mechanized force Conclusion ers. The reinforcing forces consist of readiness. Our branch is as decisive, healthy, and our Enhanced Separate Brigades and our ARNG mechanized divisions. 7. Ensure adequate obstacle reduction relevant today as it has ever been in its (Grizzly) and gap crossing (Wolverine) proud history. Armor soldiers and cav- These forces are absolutely critical for capability in III Corps. alry troopers have a bright future at the any sustained combat scenario. 8. Develop and procure long-range lead of the Army’s warfighting forma- While I have laid out the Mechanized tions, both today and with our future Force Modernization Plan for you in indirect fire system (Crusader) and mu- Objective Force. As I turn over the nitions to enhance non-line of sight the July/August 2000 “Commander’s effects. reigns of the Armor Center to the very Hatch” article, I want to highlight some capable hands of MG Steve Whitcomb, key areas again. First, we are upgrading 9. Study acquisition of recce platform I want you to know that I have been the Counterattack Corps units with to provide III Corps with inter-netted honored to serve as your Chief of Ar- M1A2 SEPs and M2A3 Bradleys. Ad- ISR/target acquisition capability. mor and to represent you and the ditionally, we are going to rebuild our branch in the training and combat de- 10. Invest in operation and sustain- Contingency/Containment force’s vehi- ment cost reducers (e.g. common en- velopments part of the Army. I thank cles, giving them M1A1Ds and M2A3 each of you for contributing so much to ODS. Both forces will have state of the gine, built-in diagnostics, reliability the Armored Force, to the Army, and to improvements). art equipment. Both forces will remain the Nation. extremely lethal and will retain over- 11. Transform 2ICR to empower match capability against any force in XVIII Corps with appropriate RSS FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT the world. We also intend to outfit our cavalry capability. AND STRIKE FIRST! 6 ARMOR — July-August 2001

CSM Carl E. Christian Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

Some Things Should Never Change

The DCX I is complete. The new tech- ership which was, no kidding, taking new technology while showing soldiers nologies and equipment have proven to care of the centerpiece of this transfor- the tricks of the trade. be as good as we imagined they could mation, the soldiers. Our Army is the best, not just because be. There was a tough battle on the desert floor at the NTC. The BLUFOR of the awesome power and lethality of All the great new devices that have the equipment, not just due to the abil- did a really good job against the tradi- made us even more flexible, sustain- ity to field the equipment across the tionally tough OPFOR. I watched as able, survivable, and lethal cannot hold M1A2SEP tanks identified and en- force, and not even just because of the a candle to competent leadership. capability to continue to develop new gaged OPFOR vehicles at ranges never There have been many articles written technologies from our technology labo- heard of, much less thought of, at the about this, but I feel it bears hearing NTC. Formations maneuvered with ratories. Our ability to be the best is one more time as we search for the due to our leadership. The leadership “visualization” of the operational area right way to bring new technologies that will protect, serve, and care for the unprecedented before now. The BLU- into our formations. When I see a unit centerpiece, the soldier. FOR units, from battalions down to really clicking, one of the most obvious individual platforms, were very suc- reasons is because of great communi- Effective and productive units have cessful. But this success cannot be at- cation going on at all levels. As our leaders who also recognize that soldiers tributed solely to modern technology. If environment changes, communication is are not on the field of battle all the time. you have read or heard any senior the one thing that keeps everyone mov- In these units, the soldiers believe their leader in the Army talk about transfor- ing forward towards the same objective leaders know the families and will do mation, you know the focal point for in an organized fashion. Soldiers need what they can to watch out for those the revolution of the future. It is the leaders to tell them the whats, hows, families. The soldiers know they have soldier who is the centerpiece of the whens, wheres and even the whys. Ef- leaders who are willing to get involved transformation. fective communication builds trust up and discuss personal issues like finances I went to an AAR shortly after a battle and down the chain of command and with them. Great units are the ones support channels. where leaders create an environment and, instead of seeing a lot of soldiers that is saturated with dignity and re- “kicked back” and enjoying the thrill of spect victory, I saw a staff sergeant checking At the NTC, and everywhere else I see for all soldiers and families. the maintenance being pulled by his successful units, the small unit leaders So, what is the “SO WHAT” of all tank crew. I saw a platoon sergeant go- who take the time to teach, coach, and this? The future of this Army is going ing around and making corrections on mentor create the units that act and to be exciting, challenging, and well the uniforms that his warriors were operate as a synchronized team. New worth being a part of. The new tech- wearing — or not wearing, I should technical enablers may provide the abil- nologies will provide us exponential say. The company commander moved ity to see first, understand first, and act gains on and off the battlefield. Our from platoon to platoon, inspecting first, but we, now more than ever, need soldiers will be prepared to execute items from the SOP. The 1SG was leaders to share some of the “old ways” their missions anytime, anywhere be- chasing down the LOGPAC, and even because they still work. If fact, some of cause leadership is a paramount ingre- the battalion commander came pulling these new technologies become ex- dient in making them the centerpiece of up to “see” his troops. I saw what I tremely potent force multipliers when the future. Leadership is what makes knew to be true, that leadership was the used with tried and proven methods of “TODAY the BEST DAY to be a real key to success for this unit — lead- operation. Leaders need to embrace SOLDIER.” ARMOR — July-August 2001 7

The Cavalry Paradigm “We Aren’t Training as We Intend to Fight” by Captain William E. Benson

Introduction discussed in detail in FM 17-95 and regimental cavalry squadron. However, FM 17-97. These are the missions for “recon in force” is not listed in the The cavalry is in a struggle for legiti- macy and recognition in today’s transi- which most cavalry units train most of regimental cavalry squadron’s MTP the time. The purpose of cavalry units (ARTEP 17-485-MTP) and is not a term tioning Army. This struggle is high- is defined in FM 17-95 as “to perform used in the lexicon of any modern cav- lighted by inadequacies and inconsis- FM 17-95 tencies in cavalry doctrine, TO&Es, reconnaissance and to provide security alryman. also lists the gen- for close operations.” It also clarifies eral mission “attack” under the broad and training opportunities throughout the use of cavalry units in an economy umbrella of missions associated with the force. Even the word “cavalry” connotes different meanings across the of force role during offensive and de- economy of force. While it goes on to fensive operations, but does not refer to say that cavalry units seldom perform Army. In many, if not most, aviation economy of force as a mission unto deliberate attacks, it does not rule them units, the term cavalry is synonymous with aviation. Battalion scout platoons itself. The primary role of cavalry units out. This is a mistake. The deliberate is to: attack mission does not appear in any consider themselves cavalry organiza- of the related cavalry MTPs and should tions. The OPFOR regiment at the NTC • Provide fresh information calls itself cavalry, as does an armored not be considered a viable mission for • Provide reaction time and maneuver cavalry units. The hasty attack section division in central Texas. These seem- space of the FM is slightly more extensive ingly innocuous designations tend to dilute and confuse the real and signifi- • Preserve combat power but does not make it clear why hasty attack is considered a mission con- cant role of cavalry organizations. • Restore command and control ducted in an economy of force role. The fact is that designated cavalry • Facilitate movement This is a potentially dangerous associa- units (ACRs, LCRs, armor- and avia- tion if not clearly defined and articu- tion-based division cav squadrons, and • Perform rear operations lated. the new brigade reconnaissance troops) Cavalry FM 17-95 The missions outlined in the do represent a myriad of TO&Es and While does a decent job Troop FM 17-97 capabilities that are misunderstood by outlining the fundamental role of cav- are also not in step with related doctrinal manuals. For many in today’s Army, as is apparent alry, there are several omissions and example, FM 17-97 discusses a raid by their misuse. The Army, as well as inconsistencies that need to be ad- the armor and aviation communities, dressed. Some omissions from the mis- mission for heavy and light cavalry troops, but the Regimental Armored promulgate these misunderstandings sion profile include tank platoons, the Cavalry Troop MTP (ARTEP 17-487- through lack of branch recognition, tank companies, aviation scout pla- 30-MTP lack of coordinated and detailed doc- toons, and attack companies. (The mis- ) does not list raid as one of the troop collective tasks. In practical trinal development and understanding, sion profile is outlined in Figure 1-4 of FM 17-95 terms, a raid is a type of attack, I would lack of appropriate TO&Es, and lack of and cross-references cavalry FM adequate training opportunities. These units with their respective missions. argue a type of deliberate attack; 100-5 refers to it as a limited-objective issues will be discussed below, setting Missions are listed as doctrinal, non- attack. Regardless, without support in aside the issue of branch recognition. doctrinal but capable, and doctrinal with additional assets.) Every cavalry- the MTP and without a more in-depth Doctrine discussion of raid execution in FM 17- man knows that these elements are as 95, not to mention dedicated training FM 100-5 much a part of their respective cavalry lists cavalry as a separate organizations as the scout platoons, resources, this task does not accurately tactical unit. Unlike the five types of reflect current cavalry capabilities (with infantry forces (light, airborne, air as- ground cavalry troops (GCT), and air the possible exception of air cavalry cavalry troops (ACT). As the weighted FM sault, Ranger, and mechanized) that are edge of the cavalry saber, tanks and units). At the scout platoon level, listed as subparagraphs to the tactical 17-98 gives paltry reference to platoon unit infantry, cavalry is not listed as a attack helicopters are essential to the defensive operations despite the fact accomplishment of security operations subparagraph under armor or aviation. and to the success of economy of force that “conduct a platoon defense” is a Army doctrine recognizes the unique platoon collective task listed in the role of cavalry as separate from armor missions (e.g., hasty attack, defend in scout platoon MTP (ARTEP 17-57-10- sector), particularly in a heavy envi- MTP and aviation units because of its unique ronment. The omission of these units ). In fact, heavy scout platoons are missions. FM 100-5 goes on to state routinely given the mission to defend a that “the basic missions of cavalry units from the cavalry mission profile is a battle position and I would argue may glaring oversight. are reconnaissance, security, and econ- even be asked to conduct a defense in omy of force.” The missions (the terms Another problem with 17-95 is its in- sector in restrictive terrain as an econ- mission and operation seem to be used consistency with the MTP manuals it omy of force. Retrograde or delay mis- interchangeably throughout these man- supports. FM 17-95 lists “recon in sions are identified as METT-T de- uals) of reconnaissance and security are force” as an appropriate mission for a pendent for all scout platoons in FM 8 ARMOR — July-August 2001 “While I agree that neither the M3 CFV nor the HMMWV are ideal recon- naissance vehi- cles, I don’t agree that there exists or will ever exist a vehicle that an- swers the compet- ing cavalry mission requirements of re- connaissance and security.”

Photos by Robert L. Stevenson

17-95, but again, FM 17-98 as well as trying to develop the ultimate cavalry need for integration of vehicle types in the scout platoon MTP are deficient in vehicle to meet these competing mis- the “Army After Next,” this future so- addressing these missions. sions, it may be wiser to integrate vari- lution does not meet the mission re- ous platforms that accent their inherent quirements of today’s cavalry organiza- These are just a few of the readily strengths while minimizing their weak- tions. identifiable doctrinal deficiencies that cloud the already murky waters of cav- nesses. An existing example of this The most apparent and potentially type of cavalry organization is the alry operations. Tank, scout, and air heavy cavalry troop mixture of CFVs, show-stopping shortfall in today’s cav- cav platoon leaders need to have a doc- alry TO&Es is the lack of dismounts. trinal reference for all appropriate mis- M1s, and mortars. In fact, tanks were Ask any ground scout platoon leader or reintroduced to heavy division cavalry sions. Troop commanders must have squadrons during the Gulf War to make platoon sergeant what he wants more the references to train their platoon of, and the answer, 8 out of 10 times leaders and to find a logical progression up for the limitations of the CFV-pure (unscientific survey), is more 19Ds to cavalry troops. of tasks to properly develop their put on the ground. This would immedi- METL. Cavalry leaders at all levels The old ACT mixture of OH-58s and ately improve the mission capability must have a congruous set of doctrinal AH-1s also took advantage of this ap- and sustainability of all cavalry units in manuals that simply define the roles proach. At a more macro level, the their security, reconnaissance, and eco- and missions of cavalry organizations mixture of air and ground assets in the nomy of force roles. It would also pro- across the spectrum of the Army. Our ACR/LCR and divisional cavalry vide the necessary soldiers to do the non-cavalry brethren need to have an squadrons also represent a good inte- ancillary work that was not taken into accurate understanding of the real ca- gration of complementary vehicles. account by the MTOE gods. Work like pabilities and limitations of cavalry Unfortunately, this mixture of vehicles processing EPWs, evacuation of casu- units throughout the Army as well as an is not carried over to the brigade recon- alties, digging fighting positions, main- understanding of the doctrinal terms naissance troops (BRT), the LCR tenance and laying wire, not to mention associated with cavalry missions. ground troops, or to the battalion scout manning long-duration OPs and con- platoons. The fact that the HMMWV is ducting dismounted patrols. Equipment not a good platform to conduct security operations in a heavy environment is The basic load of ammunition for the There has been much discussion in CFV also prevents an addition of ARMOR Magazine and other publica- beyond argument and its use as a re- ground scouts to the heavy scout pla- connaissance platform is limited in all tions on the deficiencies of the various environments. Again, these issues have toon. This basic load was developed for cavalry MTOEs. One continuing ob- the economy of force missions associ- servation is the lack of a dedicated been discussed on numerous occasions ated with the defense of the Fulda Gap in this and other publications and need ground reconnaissance vehicle in both not be addressed here. The fix to these and the German plains. As a scout pla- the light and heavy cavalry forces. toon leader, I would gladly have traded While I agree that neither the M3 CFV deficiencies is a mix of vehicles with eight to ten TOW missiles for an addi- complementing attributes. Planners nor the HMMWV are ideal reconnais- need to consider the integration of tional two 19Ds per CFV. At a mini- sance vehicles, I don’t agree that there mum, platoons could be equipped with exists or will ever exist a vehicle that HMMWVs, M113s, LAVs, and M3s in only two or three M3s, with the re- any number of combinations to meet answers the competing cavalry mission operational requirements. With the ex- mainder made up of M2s. requirements of reconnaissance and security. In fact, I believe it is danger- ception of the LAV, today’s scouts are Heavy scout platoons are not the already expected to be cross-trained on ous to discuss the development of a this equipment. only units with a dismount shortage. pure reconnaissance vehicle without HMMWV platoons, for all their ma- taking into account the security aspect The doctrinal and TTP changes neuverability and flexibility, can read- of cavalry operations. As previously needed to execute under these configu- ily dismount only one soldier per vehi- discussed, cavalry units are supposed to rations are negligible. While reconnais- cle. It becomes virtually impossible to be able to conduct the basic missions of sance and security platforms mounted consolidate enough dismounted person- reconnaissance and security. Instead of on a common chassis may diminish the nel to sustain long-term, dismounted ARMOR — July-August 2001 9

OPs or foot patrols. At the regimental in zone,” give it a movement to contact The relationship and battle handover level, we find another drastic shortage mission. Security operations are dis- between the BRTs and the division cav- of dismounted soldiers. Dismounts are cussed as offensive and defensive, as alry squadrons have really only been the only way to secure, defend, and opposed to stationary or moving discussed in theory. The TTP of how a recon restricted terrain, but the Army’s screens, guards, and covers. Units are heavy squadron delaying in contact regiments do not have a consolidated asked to guard “in order defeat the en- conducts a battle handover with a light dismounted force to perform these mis- emy” in a specific EA rather than to cav troop (the BRT) escapes me. The sions. Assembling such a force from protect (secure) a given friendly unit. BRT was created as a result of a need internal regimental assets while de- These types of mission statements and for brigade-level reconnaissance to ployed is difficult at best. Once these doctrinal miscues taint the learning fight at the NTC. It was not created out dismounts are assembled, there would process and the effectiveness of exter- of a need identified in the Gulf War or be serious C2 and training issues if they nally evaluated events at places like the in any series of division training exer- were expected to perform a mission. CTCs. Those writing the orders must cises. (In the past decade, the 3rd ACR The obvious answer to this shortfall is understand that there is a difference has repeatedly formed and then abol- to equip the regiments with a 19D or, between asking a unit to conduct a sta- ished HMMWV-equipped regimental better yet, an 11-series company. This tionary guard and asking it to defend. reconnaissance platoons in a similar would provide the regiments with the These problems are sometimes per- attempt to win the deep reconnaissance dedicated, trained, and consolidated petuated by officers from within the fight at the NTC.) dismounted force it needs to defend the armor community who have no prior “iron triangle,” secure or recon a built- cavalry experience or training and do I am not arguing that brigades don’t need reconnaissance. I would argue that up area, or seize a constricted defile. not fully grasp the nuances of cavalry brigades probably need a robust recon- doctrine and TTP. The fact that there is The legacies of both the 3rd ACR no school devoted to teaching and de- naissance and security unit, especially (“Regiment of Mounted Rifleman”) if we finally dismantle the division and 2nd ACR (“Dragoons”) attest to veloping this doctrine also perpetuates monolith and continue to deploy bri- the problem. (The Cavalry Leaders the fact that the infantry do have a Course and Scout Leaders Course are gade-size elements to conduct real place in a cavalry regiment’s force world missions. An example of this structure. Of course another option is to excellent, but are not resourced to fully type of brigade cavalry organization is address these shortcomings.) cross-attach an infantry company or the proposed RSTA squadron of the battalion task force to a regiment in Most company and field grade offi- medium brigades. Under its current order to meet specific operational re- cers who are placed in cavalry units TOE, however, it is particularly unable quirements. This eventuality is even without any cavalry experience or to conduct security operations beyond a mentioned in FM 17-95, p. 4-33. Un- training are not capable of “growing” limited screen, and it seems that the fortunately, today’s regiments are not junior cavalry leaders effectively. Even Army has forgotten or dispensed with prepared to integrate the infantry into worse, they are often a detriment to the the notion of fighting for reconnais- their operations because they do not growth of the unit. The warrior studs of sance. train with the infantry — ever! This the Army will always excel, but the rest brings me to my third area of discus- of us are limited by our training and Will a more robust brigade cavalry sion. experience. The old adage among the organization make the heavy div cav armor community is that it is important squadron obsolete? Maybe. Unfortu- Training for cavalry officers to be cross-trained nately, we can only speculate until the in battalion task force operations to Army conducts training at a level that With the possible exception of the bat- make them well rounded and keep them allows for an accurate assessment. The talion scout platoons, cavalry organiza- competitive for ranks above O5. This same arguments can be made for the tions are often short-changed during trend belies the need for highly trained need for training the regiments in sup- externally evaluated training events. leaders who understand the nuances of port of their respective corps. (The last The reason behind this is simple; the their units and their missions. This need time the Army changed its operational majority of the Army’s officers (armor may be greater today than at any other paradigm was when it transitioned into officers included) have no cavalry ex- time as the rapid introduction of tech- a primarily mechanized force. This perience and do not understand the nology complicates the battlefield. development only came about after capabilities and limitations of cavalry extensive maneuver training and testing organizations. Reconnaissance and security missions just prior to WWII in what became make up the primary battle tasks of While cavalry officers receive institu- squadrons and regiments and are nor- known as the “Louisiana Maneuvers.” The current round of testing and train- tional training in battalion task force mally the focus of training. Unfortu- ing involving a BCT(-) at the NTC falls operations, the average armor or infan- nately, squadrons and regiments rarely try officer receives no institutional get to train as they are intended to fight. far short of this standard.) training in cavalry operations. The re- Heavy division cavalry squadrons are Poor training opportunities for cavalry sult becomes apparent during collective normally deployed to the CTCs as part organizations extends to real world training events at all levels. For exam- of brigade combat teams instead of as a deployments as well. Cavalry units at ple, GCTs and squadrons are repeatedly division asset. Heavy division cavalry all levels are repeatedly bastardized for given the mission to conduct a zone squadrons never train in their primary significant training events and missions reconnaissance in order to “clear all role of conducting reconnaissance and that prevent them from optimizing their enemy in zone.” Reconnaissance mis- security for the division they support, complementary weapons systems. For sions should be focused on finding the because divisions do not deploy to the enemy or evaluating terrain. If you field for training exercises. (Warfight- want a cavalry unit to “clear all enemy ers are not field exercises!) Continued on Page 15 10 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Airborne Light Cavalry Gunnery The Army's only airborne ground cavalry troop deploys to Fort Knox by First Lieutenant Brian W. Oertel and Captain Francis J. H. Park

While many believe that Air Force to outload and Armor’s presence at Fort deploy the troop. The Air Bragg, North Carolina end- Force allows Army units to ed with the inactivation of use Air Mobility Command the 3d Battalion (Airborne), aircraft under the Joint 73d Armor in July 1997, Army/Air Transportability there is still a ground cav- Training (JA/ATT) pro- alry troop within the 82d gram. Indeed, JA/ATT is Airborne Division. In Feb- the primary method by ruary, these 66 paratroopers which the 82d Airborne of Troop A, 1st Squadron, Division resources its air- 17th Cavalry, the Army’s borne operations. It allows only airborne ground cav- Army units to request Air alry troop, jumped into Fort Force cargo aircraft to con- Knox, Kentucky, where duct unit movements and they conducted their light airborne operations, with cavalry gunnery. transportation costs at Air Soldiers of Troop A, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry parachute into Fort Force expense. The benefit The troop’s primary mis- Knox’s Godman Army Airfield. The Fort Knox visit took advantage of to the Air Force is collat- sion is to execute forced the post’s multi-purpose ranges with computerized target arrays. eral training on landing and entry, reconnaissance, and drop zones. JA/ATT mis- security missions in support sions are typically sched- of the division (air) cavalry squadron, One of the limitations of training at uled three months out from the re- or as part of its habitual infantry regi- Fort Bragg is a lack of adequate multi- quested date, and are dependent on mental combat team. The troop consists purpose ranges. While the range com- aircraft availability. Sometimes, real- of three scout platoons with a head- plex at Fort Bragg supports dismounted world missions have preempted JA/ quarters platoon. Each scout platoon of training well, it is unsuited for anything ATT requests in the past, but the infre- six HMMWVs is armed with two beyond a Level II gunnery density. In quency of such missions means that Mk19 grenade launchers, two M2HB addition, because of the lack of avail- JA/ATT is the airborne division’s usual heavy machine guns, and two M41 able ranges, the troop becomes ex- method of deploying units to an off- TOW Improved Target Acquisition tremely familiar with the existing target post training event, to include CTC System launchers. Each Mk19 and array, which greatly decreases the train- rotations. TOW system in the platoon also has a ing value of home station gunnery. The secondary M240B medium machine other option available to the troop is to The usual timeline for an airborne op- conduct gunnery off-post. Last year, eration on Fort Bragg is measured in gun which can engage close-in targets, hours. However, for an off-post de- essential in the light and dismounted the troop conducted an off-post gun- environments where the troop usually nery at Fort Pickett, Virginia, but the ployment, particularly one involving transportation of vehicles, the timeline fights. range facilities at Fort Pickett are so primitive that the troop itself had to increases significantly. February 2, the Every weapon in the troop also has a establish and run the ranges on which it day prior to the actual deployment, saw night vision capability. The machine shot, diminishing the training value of the troop line-hauling six of the 12 ve- guns are equipped with AN/PVS-4 and gunnery there. hicles it would take to Fort Knox from AN/TVS-5 night vision sights, and Fort Bragg’s Central Receiving Point. there is an AN/PAQ-4C aiming light One answer to this lack of range facili- In addition, a Tactical Airlift Control for every rifle in the troop. ties was to fire gunnery at Fort Knox, Element (TALCE) from Pope Air which has true multipurpose ranges Most significantly, the entire troop is Force Base conducted a joint inspection with a computerized target array. In of the other six vehicles to ensure that capable of airborne assault. All 65 addition, the movement to Fort Knox they met the shipping and preparation troopers, 23 vehicles, and mission- would provide outload and deployment essential equipment can be loaded on requirements required for air move- training to the troop. Finally, it pro- ment. an aircraft for parachute drop within 18 vided the opportunity to conduct an hours of notification. Coming in FY airborne assault onto unfamiliar terrain. The troop, under direction of its own 2002, the troop will also field an 81mm jumpmasters, also conducted personnel mortar section with the same airborne This off-post gunnery would not have manifest and sustained airborne train- assault capability. been possible without the support of the ing the day prior to flight. ARMOR — July-August 2001 11 Troopers fired the machine gun tables at Baum Range and later at Cedar Creek MPRC. Moving to a different range ensured a more realistic assess- ment of the gun- ners’ and truck commanders’ tar- get acquisition and engagement skills.

Photos by Robert L. Stevenson

The troop’s advance party deployed to Godman AAF. From marshalling, the toon sergeant, devised an alternate Fort Knox by a 15-passenger rental troop conducted onward movement to qualification table for both day and van. That group included the drop zone the Fort Knox garrison area. Life sup- night fires. During the day, grenade support team, required for the troop’s port in garrison was generously pro- launcher crews conducted a brief fa- airborne assault into Roszov South vided us by 5-15 Cav. This arrange- miliarization fire, then conducted un- Drop Zone, located on Godman Army ment was made through direct liaison timed and timed target designation and Airfield. from the troop’s reconnaissance party engagements during the day. The crews On the morning of 3 March, the and 5-15 Cav itself. In addition, the then filled out a range card as an un- troop had the support of other senior graded task. After nightfall, the crews troop’s 54 jumpers conducted mock NCOs at 5-15 Cav and 1/16 Cav who then returned to their day battle posi- door training and jumpmaster personnel inspection. Then the jumpers and their had been former members of the troop tion and conducted two graded en- or 3-73 AR, and their assistance was gagements based on the data on the vehicles loaded onto a C-17 Globemas- priceless. range card. ter III aircraft for the short flight to Fort Knox. Part of the collateral training for The troop deployed to Baum Tank One of the biggest restrictions on the Air Force included low-level flight Range to conduct Light Cavalry Tables 40mm grenade fire is the lack of 40mm into Fort Knox starting approximately I and VII for its machine gun crews. grenade ammunition. In addition, the 30 minutes from drop, which may be The troop’s gunners zeroed and fired light cavalry tables for the Mk19 gre- necessary in actual combat if the troop their M2HB and M240 machine guns nade launcher are written under such jumps an assault zone defended by hos- on Light Cavalry Table I, which is restrictive time standards that the like- tile air defense systems. against 10m paster targets from the lihood of qualifying first run is slight. FM 17-12-8, Light Cavalry Gunnery, One of our major concerns was the range’s baseline. Upon completion of LCT I, LCT VII trained the crews on dictates that “All basic gunnery tables small size of Roszov South DZ. Com- engagements from moving and station- for the Mk19 must be device-based pared to the large drop zones at Fort Bragg, which offer some 30-60 seconds ary vehicles on stationary and moving (i.e., without expending live ammuni- targets. Due its small size, the troop tion), due to ammunition constraints.” to exit a pass of jumpers, Roszov South was able to fire LCT VII within a day. Additionally, the lack of an Engage- is a small DZ that allows only a mere 1 seven seconds of “green light.” This Later, the troop moved to Cedar Creek ment Skills Trainer (EST) means that Multipurpose Range Complex. Such a most Mk19 crews are at a severe disad- meant that the troop would have been change of ranges, taken for granted at vantage to their counterparts firing exiting jumpers over the Armor Inn, Patton Museum, and Highway 31W, so most heavy installations, is rarely other machine guns. Consequently, available at Fort Bragg. Moving to a there is no way to adequately build the troop planned for four passes of 11 different range ensured a more realistic competency through basic tables if jumpers each. The other hazard at Fort Knox is the runway surface itself. In assessment of the gunners’ and truck there is no ammunition or simulations commanders’ target acquisition and for them. The absence of sufficient peacetime, most drops are made into a engagement skills. training aids or simulations to fire basic sandy area to reduce the possibility of injuries upon landing. Yet in combat, tables through LCT IV means that, at One of the limitations of this gunnery, best, crews can dry-fire those tables. all airborne assaults conducted since however, was the restrictions placed on Consequently, the first table that most 1983 have been onto hard-surface air- fields. The opportunity to train on a 40mm grenade fire. Due to limited Mk19 crews fire with any kind of am- range availability, the troop was limited munition is usually LCT VII. The realistic DZ is rare, particularly outside to firing 40mm grenades at Hackett scores of most crews shooting LCT of airborne or ranger infantry battalions. Range. Since the target array at Hackett VIII off that one table of practice are The troop took approximately 30 Range consists solely of stationary hard abysmally poor, and gunner confidence minutes to mass its five jumpmasters targets and there was no movement suffers as well. The alternate qualifica- and 49 jumpers in a textbook jump, allowed on the range, SSG David tion table that the troop used better re- which was followed by an airland of Henry, the troop’s master gunner, and flects what the troop would actually do the vehicles on part of the runway at SFC Leo Clark, the headquarters pla- in combat and gives gunners a far bet- 12 ARMOR — July-August 2001 The unit’s HMMWVs arrive at the MPRC for fire and maneu- ver exercises. Each section was able to perform a route re- connaissance on va- ried terrain, which was not pssible at home station. ter understanding of the mechanics of Leader Course or BNCOC, this is the exercised alert, marshalling, and de- the Mk19 grenade launcher and its only training our junior leaders nor- ployment for the entire troop, from Mk93 Mod 1 vehicle mount. mally can get in an environment that headquarters down to individual troop- The troop was able to fire LCT VIII requires them to work all the elements er. Given the 82d Airborne Division’s of a route reconnaissance. emphasis on deployability, the value of day and night runs within a day, largely such training is hard to overstate. due to the drive and leadership of the The troop spent approximately two troop’s NCOs. In most heavy units, days in recovery back at the Fort Knox gunnery normally peaks at Tank Table garrison area and prepared to conduct a Notes or Bradley Table VIII. Since the field jump back to Fort Bragg, with a similar 1FM 17-12-8, Appendix D, describes the EST. of competition in the airborne division sequential airland of six of its vehicles. is limited to the division’s lone ground Due to weather and low visibility at 2The antitank companies in the airborne divi- troop,2 the emphasis of gunnery within Godman AAF, the Air Force scratched sion, while similar in composition and equipment Troop A is on Light Cavalry Table X, the jump and the troop redeployed out to the light division ground cavalry troop, do not fire Light Cavalry Gunnery. Their heavy weap- which stresses tactics over marksman- of Standiford Field in Louisville. A ons marksmanship is primarily dismounted in ship. Kentucky Air National Guard TALCE nature. from the 123d Air Wing assisted us in At the end of LCT VIII, the platoon 3The TALCE served as a liaison between the leaders received a troop tactical coordinating with the C-17 that brought us back to Pope Air Force Base.3 control tower and the troop. OPORD. From there, they did their own troop leading procedures and Gunnery at Fort Knox was an out- briefed platoon OPORDs to their sec- standing training opportunity for the 1LT Brian W. Oertel is a 1999 grad- tion sergeants. LCT X was done in two troop, and one not often afforded light uate of the State University of New phases, a live-fire phase and maneuver cavalry units. Scouts in the troop re- York at Brockport with a Bachelor of phase. By design, the troop’s execution ceived quality training on ranges far Science Degree in Communications. of LCT X allowed the section sergeants better than anything they could get at He was commissioned in Armor the latitude to do their own intelligence Fort Bragg on a regular basis. In addi- and is currently serving as a scout preparation of the battlefield, to include tion, they were able to train IPB, field indirect fire targeting as well as posi- planning, and collective tasks at the platoon leader in Troop A, 1st tioning for a screen position. Each sec- section and scout team levels. Each Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 82d Air- tion conducted a dry-fire LCT IX at section sergeant was able to do a full borne Division. Cedar Creek before executing the live- MDMP drill, to include OPORD, brief- fire LCT X. Each section conducted a backs, and rehearsals in the conduct of CPT Francis J.H. Park is a 1994 screen at Cedar Creek Range, with ret- LCT X, as well as training direct fire Distinguished Military Graduate of rograde to subsequent screen positions. planning, distribution, and control at The Johns Hopkins University with On order, each section conducted a the section level. a BA in History and a 1999 gradu- route reconnaissance with forward pas- At the institutional level, the range as- ate of St. Mary’s University with a sage of lines, then established a hasty sets, support, and targetry at Fort Knox Master of Arts in International Rela- anti-armor blocking position at Hackett Range, where the section conducted far surpass anything remotely available tions. He was commissioned in Ar- at Fort Bragg. The availability of mul- TOW and Mk19 fires. mor and served as a tank platoon tiple ranges prevented the gunnery leader, scout platoon, assistant S3, One of the fringe benefits of training from becoming stale, which is a hazard and troop XO in the 1st Squadron, at Fort Knox is its terrain. There is very due to the presence of only two MPRCs 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division little terrain at Fort Bragg that fits the at Fort Bragg. The extremely hilly ter- minimum required reporting proce- rain at Fort Knox allowed the troop to and as an assistant G3 Plans, 82d dures for a route reconnaissance, and train tasks difficult to train at home Airborne Division. He currently com- route reconnaissance skills are notori- station (e.g., route reconnaissance). mands Troop A, 1st Squadron, 17th ously perishable. Short of the Scout Most notably, this off-post deployment Cavalry, 82d Airborne Division. ARMOR — July-August 2001 13

Train As You Fight Light cavalry gunnery in the 82d Airborne Division by Staff Sergeant Jack Tripp and Sergeant First Class Leo Clark

Troop A, 1-17th Cavalry, the 82nd Airborne Division’s ground cavalry troop, is a unique cavalry organization. The troop trains its gunnery program in accordance with FM 17-12-8, Light Cavalry Gunnery, but for the last two Troop A was one of years, the troop has made numerous the first units in the adjustments to its gunnery training. Army to receive the TOW ITAS (Improved These adjustments have helped this Target Acquisition training become more battle-focused System). The TV im- while still providing the evaluation age presented by the required by the current manual. gunner’s sight can be remoted to the Anyone who has spent time in both vehicle commander heavy and light cavalry assignments for greater fire con- recognizes that the current manual is trol supervision. adapted from current Bradley and Abrams gunnery manuals. While this is Photo by fine for evaluation purposes, it does not Robert L. Stevenson provide the light scout platoon realistic battle-focused training. The changes that were developed by Troop A’s pla- ing environment. We have also manu- adjusted its gunnery program to reflect toon sergeants and master gunner im- factured a secondary mount on the this. The troop no longer does berm prove the marksmanship training of its MK19 HMMWVs to give these crews drills while firing in the defense. When crews and the combat focus of its gun- the same ability. a crew occupies its BP, it is exposed to nery. the enemy. This does away with the Troop A was the first unit in the Army defilade time of FM 17-12-8. In other Troop A is unique in the variety of its equipped with the TOW ITAS (Im- night vision equipment. The troop is proved Target Acquisition System), words, as soon as the target or targets equipped with the AN/PVS-7D, the are presented, target engagement time which gives the scout platoons some begins, as the crew is already exposed. AN/PVS-14, the TOW ITAS with 2nd- unique capabilities. The ITAS gunner’s generation FLIR, the AN/PVS-4, the sight is a video image. This has allowed This forces the crew to improve target AN/TVS-5, and the AN/TAS-4B ther- acquisition skills and to be quick with the crews to tap into the system and manipulation of the traversing and ele- mal sight. The troop’s gunners also pipe a video feed to a small monitor utilize the AN/PAQ-4C for target lay located in the truck commander’s posi- vation unit of their respective weapon system. and the M145 Machine Gun Optic for tion, which allows the commander to daytime firing of the M240B machine confirm targets prior to his execution The troop has also added com- gun. The troop’s gunnery program does command. It also aids the vehicle mander’s engagements for all primary not require the gunner to utilize any commander in training a new gunner on weapon systems, and we also qualify specific item of equipment. The troop’s thermal images. all personnel on TOW tracking and leadership feels that when the bullets both TOW Gunnery Skills Testing are flying the crews will utilize the Another training tool for the TOW ITAS is the Training Monitor Unit (GST) and machine gun GST. The equipment with which they are com- troop qualifies alternate crews when- fortable. For example, some M2HB (TMU), a VHS-C recorder and monitor ever possible. Due to Troop A’s mis- gunners utilize the AN/TVS-5 on their that can tape crews when they conduct either live fire or tracking exercises. A sion of forced entry, the troop could be MG; however, others choose to utilize air-dropped anywhere in the world with the PAQ-4C and their AN-PVS-14 with Troop videotapes all firing crews dur- very little notice, and this cross-training an image intensifier. ing gunnery exercises to provide after- action feedback on target engagements. addresses this. When the troop con- Troop A has also made several equip- ducts an airborne assault and their ve- Many a boastful crew has been hum- hicles are airdropped into an objective, ment modifications to improve its bled when they viewed themselves dur- warfighting ability. For instance, all its ing debrief. the troop’s personnel assemble on the TOW ITAS vehicles are equipped with vehicles. As soon as three troopers an M240B, mounted to the left side of Current doctrine of FM 17-98, Scout reach a vehicle, they begin derigging it. the turret, independent from the TOW Platoon calls for the crew of a These three become the crew of that system. It allows the crew to defend HMMWV to occupy battle positions vehicle, regardless of rank or duty posi- itself in the kind of close-in fight that is with the rear of the vehicle, or back tion. They will fight that vehicle onto so frequent in the light-fighter’s operat- hatch, facing the threat. Troop A has its primary objective until the troop has 14 ARMOR — July-August 2001

time to consolidate and reorganize. By plywood board on which scale targets make it more battle-focused while bet- training all personnel on as many are painted. The targets are 1:30 and ter preparing the troopers of Troop A weapon systems as possible, troopers 1:60 scale depicting frontal and flank for their wartime mission. have the confidence to fight all avail- target exposures. Then a laser borelight able weapons, not just the ones they are device is mounted on the weapon sys- assigned. tem. The borelight device allows the SSG Jack Tripp is an experienced vehicle commander to see where the In addition to qualifying TOW track- gunner is laying the weapon for initial Master Gunner, one of only a hand- ing, Troop A’s gunners also qualify ful of 19Ds to graduate from the modified machine gun tables. Essen- target burst. The vehicle commander can then issue the gunner a correction Fort Knox Master Gunners Course. tially, the TOW crews fire their M240Bs and ensure the gunner makes the proper He was a Bradley gunner in the 2nd and are graded on the same tables as ACR during the Battle of 73 East- the M2HB crews, only modifying the adjustment. ing, served as a tank commander in tables when ranges to targets are too During the entire exercise, the gunner great. Troop A also fires Table I in a 3-73 Armor, and as a section ser- is gaining hands-on experience with the geant and platoon sergeant in different manner than called for in the T&E. The vehicle commander can also FM. Rather than firing from the tripod, have the gunner “engage” multiple tar- Troop A. He is currently serving as the troop fires Table I, which is 10M gets to train him in target transition. a drill sergeant. paster targets, from the top of the truck. During all this training the gunner is The troop feels that this is more com- concentrating on his sights and only SFC Leo Clark has served in task bat-focused; we will not generally turns on the laser borelight device when force scout platoons on both M113s shoot from the ground-mounted tripod. he has laid on the target. Also on the and HMMWVs and served in lead- This exercise also allows the Mk19 board is a “worm track,” used by TOW ership positions on M3 BCVs in 3-4 crews to fire their secondary weapon gunners to manipulate their system Cav and 5-17 Cav. A graduate of system. One of the biggest problems along an uneven track. All of the tar- new gunners have is manipulating the ANCOC, the Scout Leader Course, gets on the board, to include the worm Ranger Course, and NTC O/C traversing and elevation mechanism. track, are visible in thermal mode. Troop A has designed a training tool to Academy, he recently completed an aid in improving this performance, a In conclusion, Troop A has taken FM assignment as a platoon sergeant T&E manipulation board. This is a 17-12-8 and modified its training to in Troop A.

Cavalry Paradigm from Page 10 tently told that the winner of the recon- CPT (P) William E. Benson re- naissance and security fight wins the ceived a Regular Army commis- battle, little more than lip service is example, division cavalry squadrons paid to properly developing the forces sion from the University of New deployed for Intrinsic Action go minus charged with executing these missions. Hampshire in 1990 with a Bache- their helicopters. Conversely, the heli- lor of Arts in political science. He copters often get stripped from their Some will argue that the advent of the attended the Armor Officer Basic squadrons to get used in places like UAV, satellite, and EW reconnaissance Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Bosnia while the ground component makes cavalry organizations anach- remains at home station. It was many ronistic. This line of thinking is fraudu- Course, the Infantry Officer Ad- years and several real-world deploy- lent because it only takes the reconnais- vanced Course, and the Cavalry ments before the aviation squadron of sance aspects of cavalry organizations Leaders Course. He has also the 2nd ACR was finally stationed at into account. A UAV cannot delay in graduated from Airborne, Air As- Fort Polk with its parent regiment. The contact, and a satellite cannot conduct sault and Ranger Schools. He bottom line is that, when it comes to the three-fold mission during a moving has served as a tank, scout, and cavalry organizations, we aren’t train- flank guard. support platoon leader as well as ing as we intend to fight. The “Army After Next” may address squadron motor officer with 1st Conclusion these concerns sometime in 2020, but Squadron, 3rd ACR, (Ft. Bliss) until then, today’s “transitional” Army and as an S4 and troop com- The misuse and misunderstanding of needs to recognize the unique roles and mander with 1st Squadron, 7th cavalry doctrine, the inadequate TOE, missions cavalry units are expected to and the lack of the ability to train as we Cavalry (Fort Hood). Currently perform. It can do this by providing serving with 2-409th TSBn as a fight are great liabilities within the cav- better doctrine, appropriate MTOEs, alry community. squadron and troop trainer in sup- and better training opportunities. A port of 3rd Squadron, 278th ACR return to a cavalry branch or, at a These liabilities are emphasized by (ARNG) in Cookeville, Tenn., he the fact that there is no cavalry branch minimum, the creation of a distinct devoted to focusing development of cavalry division within Armor branch, is also studying to receive a Mas- doctrine and TO&Es, or fighting for headed by an O6 or above (Chief of ter of Arts in Instructional Lead- appropriate training opportunities. De- Cavalry), would go a long way toward ership at Tennessee Technolog- spite the fact that leaders are consis- remedying these problems. ical University. ARMOR — July-August 2001 15

Mountain Cavalry Recon in Built-Up Areas by Captain Rich Rouleau

The mounted scouts moved forward into Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division (LI) be the only solution, but to illustrate the edge of the town in what was sup- at Fort Drum, New York. It is one of how one troop gets the job done. posed to be a reconnaissance mission. four divisional light ground cavalry In addition to Apache Troop, the Aero-scouts overhead probed forward of troops in the active Army and National the ground elements, two recon platoons Guard today. The National Guard also squadron has a headquarters troop, two moving along independent routes, trailed OH-58D air cavalry troops, and an has several separate light ground cav- aviation maintenance troop. In its pri- by the squadron headquarters. The right alry troops. In addition, there is the flank platoon entered the killing zone of a active duty 2nd Armored Cavalry Reg- mary role, 3-17th serves as the divi- near ambush that eliminated half of the sion’s “eyes and ears.” If required, the iment. Each of these light, ground cav- squadron can be task-organized to sup- unit in the initial blast and fires. The re- alry forces has its own specific mainder of the platoon was pinned, some MTOE. port an infantry brigade in the division jammed up in their vehicles, others with additional corps or division avia- caught in the open. Their sister recon Because of its unique MTOE, tion lift and aero-medical assets, in- platoon could not offer any support and “Apache” troop has developed its own cluding UH-1s, UH-60s and CH-47s. the aero-scouts were not armed for that tactics, techniques, and procedures precise a mission. The platoon soon died (TTPs) for movement and reconnais- Because of these diverse require- in the street. sance in built-up areas (BUAs). The ments, Apache Troop must be a multi- TTPs that will be discussed in this arti- functional troop capable of operating as “Apache” Troop is the ground cav- cle can be adopted or modified by other part of the squadron or in independent alry troop of the 3rd Squadron, 17th cavalrymen. They are not intended to missions down to platoon level. Apache

Fig. 1. Room-Clearing SOP Fig. 2. Room-Clearing SOP

The #3 man will also enter simultaneously as the #1 man and #2 man. His immediate TASK: Utilizing a 4-man stack team, enter, threat will be enemy on the far wall. He will move to the left corner on the near wall. If clear and defend a room. 1 the room is a left door room and the left near corner is in the fatal funnel, he will move PURPOSE: To establish a defensive position to the right 1/2 way down the near wall. He will continue to scan and engage targets in in a building when moderate to his sector. heavy enemy fires force scouts 1 off of route.

1 LL The #1 man will enter the room and start 1 clearing to the left. He will clear his RL immediate threat corner first, continue traveling along the near wall until he 1 reaches the deep left corner on that side PD 2 of the room. He scans and engages 3 targets in his sector the entire time. PD= POINT OF DOMINATION 4 3 PD= POINT OF DOMINATION

The #2 man will enter the room and begin clearing to the right. He will enter the room simultaneously as the #1 man. He will clear his immediate threat corner first, continue 1 LL RL traveling along the near wall until he reaches the near right corner (his PD). If he can’t move along the near wall because the door is in a corner, he will move into the room just far enough to get out of the fatal funnel. He scans and engages targets in his sector the entire time. (Note: #1 and #2 man may alter side of room they enter in order to take the path of least resistance) 3 PD 2

3 4 1 LL RL The #4 man as the automatic rifleman will stay in the hallway or at the foot of the door to pull security. He does need to be prepared to enter the room if the first three encounter heavy resistance or if one has a malfunction. PD 2 1 4 3 2 PD= POINT OF DOMINATION INTERSECTING FIRES

1 LL RL

3 PD 4 2 2 LL PD RL

4 3 2

16 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Fig. 3. Stacking support without congesting the extrac- Stack: A unit, usually four men, in a posture ready to tion route. This platoon sergeant leads enter and clear a room, move down a hallway, EVAC. His vehicle is armed with a up a stairwell, etc. MK-19 that can deliver devastating firepower. By acting in concert with the STACK: LEFT SIDE lead support vehicle, the platoon ser- geant can EVAC the entire platoon and/ or casualties to the casualty collection point or platoon rally point. Many rehearsals show that OH-58Ds best support the troop by scouting in 4 3 2 1 the BUA one phase line ahead of the lead platoon. They should only engage STACK: RIGHT SIDE those targets clearly marked with an AIM-1 laser or colored smoke. Using the OH-58D’s weapons in MOUT is dangerous and requires great care; col- lateral damage is often excessive. On the other hand, OH-58Ds are great at 1 2 3 4 identifying potential hazards and assist- ing platoons maneuvering through the BUA. They also can assist with the The #1 man’s weapon is always oriented on the point of entry. cordon, and when the ROE permits, isolate targets. Coordinate with follow-on forces. In Troop currently has four scout platoons vision’s standard. It also updates them any reconnaissance mission, the scout and a headquarters section. The scout on the newest TTPs and technology. platoons must coordinate battle hand- platoons each have three M1025A2 All four platoon leaders and senior over with their follow-on forces. But in HMMWVs with two M2 HBs, one scouts attend this course. Their training urban areas, they must maintain con- MK-19, and three M240s. There are serves as the foundation of the troop tinuous coverage on any urban area also two M966 TOW HMMWVs with SOP. they have just cleared. The reason is simple; the cover and concealment of- two TOW II Bs, two M240s, and 15 Avoid a fight, but be capable of scouts. The headquarters section has an fered in a BUA makes contact more room clearance. Reconnaissance nor- likely. It is also easier for the enemy to M1025A2 with an M2 HB for the troop mally means avoiding fights, especially commander, and two M998s with one blend with the locals. People will be M240 for the 1SG and supply sergeant. decisive engagements. Regardless of moving along the cleared route in an the type of reconnaissance being con- urban setting. That makes it much The troop also habitually gets a main- ducted, the scouts understand that they tenance contact team, communication harder to spot enemy soldiers who team chief, and medics with vehicles should always be ready for room clear- might be laying a minefield, for exam- ance operations to gain and maintain ple. Therefore, a BUA requires more from headquarters troop. Scouts can contact, or bypass the enemy. If neces- conduct all required tactical operations. constant surveillance than a semi- They can operate mounted, sling load sary, the scouts break contact and get deserted rural area. off the streets to await relief. The intent vehicles into their area of operation on is to take rooms for security, not seize Urban areas are usually NAIs or at a CH-47, or be inserted on foot by UH- buildings (see Figs. 1, 2, & 3). least key terrain. An infantry squad or 60 with OH-58Ds in support. platoon should accompany the scouts No more than nine scouts dis- Since its activation in 1988, Apache whenever possible. That will allow the mounted and one vehicle in support cavalry to continue with its reconnais- Troop, as part of 10th Mountain Divi- per platoon. This requirement supports sion (LI), has conducted real-world sance while the infantry holds the MOUT in Somalia and Haiti. Selected existing division SOPs, allowing easy ground and establishes security. Such integration with infantry battalion task task organization benefits all. The cav- leaders have also deployed to Bosnia forces and the basic stack formations and Macedonia. Using this in-house alry leader has a combined arms team, experience, and lessons from the Moun- trained in the MLC4 (see Figs. 4 and adding flexibility in dealing with obsta- 5). Restricting vehicles in the area to cles and direct fire contact. It also al- tain Leaders Close Combat Certifica- one per platoon provides mobility and tion Course (MLC4), Apache Troop de- lows the cavalry to continue with its veloped a scout SOP for reconnais- increased firepower without the mission and not wait for follow-on congestion normally associated with sance in BUAs. forces. By participating in the BUA BUAs. This tactic allows the troop to clearance, the infantry is much more The SOP was developed with the fol- bound and move across danger areas or aware of its surroundings when setting lowing guidance: streets yet maintain basic stack forma- up security on the key terrain. tion and rear security. Operate within published Division Troop organization. During a route MOUT SOPs. Twice a year, the 10th Maintain an EVAC/QRF team with reconnaissance of a BUA, the troop is Mountain Division (LI) conducts a OH-58Ds in support. This allows the organized into five elements. Two hands-on, three-week MOUT leaders platoon, if compromised, to extract scout platoons (RECON 1 & 2 respec- course to “train the trainers” to the di- with adequate firepower and vehicles in tively) stagger on opposite sides of the ARMOR — July-August 2001 17 Fig. 4. Plt BUA Movement SOP Fig. 5. Trp BUA Movement SOP

LEGEND LEGEND TROOPER TROOPER

HMMWV PLT PLT W/.50cal HMMWV R W/.50cal R

R RIFLEMAN R R BLDG R RIFLEMAN TL TEAM LDR TL TL TL TEAM LDR BLDG AR .240 DIS/ AR AR .240 DIS/ TROOPER AR PL TROOPER

PL PL DIRECTION OF DIRECTION TRAVEL OF TRAVEL PLT HMMWV W/MK19 R HMMWV R W/MK19 R

R R R BUILDINGS BUILDINGS TL TL TL + 996 HMMWV/ AID & LITER AR AR AR SUPPORT BY PL FIRE

ARTL R R

+ QRF QRF

street with an aero-scout section in should move into place without aero- then establish an SBF position to allow overwatch. The cordon platoon, with an scout support to avoid compromise. displacement, EVAC, or bypass opera- aero-scout section, maintains a semi- Once they are in place, aero-scout sec- tions. Once the route reconnaissance is cordon of the main avenues of ap- tions move into position. Team 1 sup- complete, the troop consolidates and proach to prevent anyone from leaving ports the cordon on that platoon’s in- reorganizes outside the built-up area. If and entering the built-up area. A pla- ternal net. Team 2 supports RECON 1 required, the cordon element maintains toon with medics is designated as the and 2’s movement. They operate ini- continuous coverage of the BUA until troop EVAC/QRF. It cordons the troop’s tially on troop command net but drop to handoff is complete to the follow-on entrance and displacement route. The the appropriate platoon net when con- battalion scouts, military police, or a QRF is also prepared to occupy a sup- tact is made. convoy moving through the BUA. port-by-fire position that would allow RECON 1 and 2 move offset from Refinements. All operations can be RECON 1 and 2 to break contact and displace. The cache element under con- each other by one phase line (see Fig. improved. Equipment shortages, or lack 6). This allows mutual support without of the proper tools, is not new. It hap- trol of the 1SG secures all the remain- committing the entire element. They pens in the Army today. Those needs ing troop vehicles under the protection of the troop trains (see Fig. 6). can bypass without compromise or loss often stimulate force development. For of momentum. It does not congest the example, sniper rifles would add great- The mission. There are many tech- area. Their positions along the build- ly to the success of such operations. niques for planning, marking, quarter- ings may mask the size of the RECON They provide excellent overwatch with ing, and executing reconnaissance of a element to the enemy. As each platoon minimal risk of collateral damage. An- built-up area. I will focus here on moves forward, the platoon sergeant other shortfall is marking systems for movement techniques and the incorpo- trails a phase line behind to avoid being ground to air assets. The AIM-1 laser ration of aviation assets into the mis- drawn into a fight. Yet his drag position provides a higher density light than the sion, rather than the MDMP, TLPs, or allows him to establish a SBF with his AN/PAC-4C and can be distinguished IPB. The first stage is the earliest pos- MK-19 and to support EVAC. Should with the trained eye. It, however, is not sible placement of the cordon element the lead teams come under contact and the cure for all lasing tasks. and a section from the QRF to watch become decisively engaged, they are the BUA’s avenues. They identify any equipped and trained to knock down a patterns or key areas of concern. They door and clear a room. The QRF would Continued on Page 43 18 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Modifying the Abrams Tank For Fighting in Urban Areas by Sergeant First Class Ira L. Partridge

The regimental commander was dis- herent features — a large caliber preci- Grozny before the latest battle cussing the problems tanks might en- sion cannon, several machine guns and the utter destruction after- counter in urban situations: “If we mounted in stable cradles carrying wards could not be more pro- found ourselves in action in Bosnia, or more ammunition than two squads of nounced. The literal leveling of in a new Somalia or Chechen-like sce- infantry, and a moveable protective the city points to lessons that the nario, how fast could we deploy a few barrier — would be an undeniable asset Russian Armed Forces learned M1 tanks that were specially modified to this combined arms team. from their earlier battles for for MOUT? A few of the right vehicles Grozny.”3 Fighting in MOUT is slow and delib- could make a big difference....” erate, regardless of the care given to By removing the urban from urban- He then suggested some features that protecting the force or civilian popula- environment, Russian forces reduced would not cost much to add to the M1- tion. MOUT fighting also presents the tactical problem presented and cre- series: many tactical problems. The Israeli ated a more favorable battlefield. • A precision mounted .50 caliber ca- Defense Force (IDF) and the Russian Israeli forces, on the other hand, dem- Army are forces that have both recently pable of taking out a sniper at long conducted combat in MOUT environ- onstrated in the 1982 Lebanon cam- range paign that MOUT operations are able to ments, with each using fundamentally achieve tactical success without indis- • Grenade launchers that fire high ex- different tactics. plosive rounds criminate destruction or civilian casual- At one end of the spectrum are the ties. They learned that, in MOUT, in- • Fiber-optic cameras to provide a but- tactics used by the Russians in Chech- fantry must advance dismounted as part toned-up crew a full range of view nya. During combat operations between of a combined arms team, and opera- 1994 and 1996, the Russians suffered tional timetables cannot be set to keep • An automatic 7.62mm gun turret for devastating losses in city fighting due pace with mounted maneuver forces.4 the TC or loader’s hatch, capable of being aimed and fired from under to badly defined strategy, poor tactical By surrounding and isolating large ur- maneuver, and inadequately protected ban areas, the IDF took a slow, deliber- armor vehicles. Their tactical solution, how- ate, and systematic approach to suc- • Additional spaced armor on the tur- ever, came at a price that would appall cessfully clear cities. Dividing and sub- ret roof most Western powers. Russian forces, dividing the MOUT into areas that towards the end of the first Chechen were subsequently reduced using direct • A new canister round in the basic load war, adopted a scorched earth policy and indirect coordinated fires spared similar to tactics used during World unnecessary collateral damage to prop- “These improvements could be ac- War II. Air power and artillery were erty and the civilian population. If complished fast in an emergency de- liberally used to reduce urban environ- faced with a similar tactical fight in ployment,” he said. “If we work on the ments to rubble before maneuver forces MOUT, the U.S. Army would likely prototype now, and put some ideas to would enter to mop things up. use similar tactics. work, we can make this a real option if The Russian weapon of choice for ur- But tactics and training are not the it is needed.” ban warfare in Chechnya seems to be only areas the Army will have to mas- Armor leaders have long acknowl- the TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system, ter to succeed in MOUT as part of the edged that the Abrams main battle tank designed to defeat targets with the ef- combined arms team. Systems and (MBT) may have to fight in an urban fects of high temperature and extreme components — preferably “off the environment, a mission commonly re- pressure by firing 30 incendiary rockets shelf”— will be needed to improve the ferred to as Military Operations in Ur- singularly or in salvo.1 TOS-1s and fightability and survivability of the ban Terrain (MOUT). But it took until massed artillery became a way for the Abrams tank in a MOUT environment. May of 2000 for the Army to open the Russians to achieve a “bloodless” vic- first MOUT city specifically designed tory — for them. This combination of The most effective combat technique in MOUT fighting is for tanks and in- to train mounted warriors with Abrams TOS-1s and artillery is capable of re- fantry to work together as part of a tanks, along with the other members of leasing large clouds of flammable gas the combined arms team. and creating massive blasts that incin- combined arms team. MOUT is not just 2 an infantry problem, and effective use erate buildings and people. In the sec- of armor in MOUT quickly becomes an Two Ways to Approach MOUT ond Chechen war, Russian tactics have Tactics been similar. The following excerpt issue when bullets are flying. Accord- ing to published doctrine, armored ve- A combined arms team should always describes the outcome: hicles will face a variety of tactical be the primary maneuver force in “Today, Grozny is no more. The problems and possibilities in MOUT MOUT environments. The tank’s in- contrast between the damaged environments.5 Issues like restricted ARMOR — July-August 2001 19

At right, two Israeli installations of the .50 caliber M2HB machine gun on the gun mantlets of, top, an M60, and below, a Merkava. Originally a train- ing device, this modification allows precision single-shot fire at snipers and lightly armored targets.

movement, complicated and confused command and control, and the canal- izing effects presented by buildings will be unlike maneuvering in open terrain. Additionally, the Abrams tank has limitations imposed by its design — the first being its sheer size. Most tankers know first-hand the challenges of trying to negotiate a street or town with a behemoth 70 times larger than the typical vehicle. In addition, the main gun’s limits of elevation and de- pression — and the traversing restric- tions imposed by narrow streets — will hamper its effectiveness against targets in tall buildings and basements. A third problem is the dead space in the area immediately surrounding the tank. This dead space falls between the sides and ond was the weight differential at the applications when trying to kill targets. rear of the tank and the closest point back of the cannon. Not that the added The IDF still uses this adaptation in that can be seen through the vision weight of the machine gun and a de- both operational and training situations, blocks. Another problem in the MOUT fined volume of ammunition could not on several different weapons platforms. environment is the tank’s exposure to be balanced. But the issue of a several (See photos above.) hundred pound difference in weight attack from above, which is an area that With a few modifications to stabilize is not as heavily armored as the tank’s that occurred before and after firing the the mount, and the addition of a tray to frontal armor. ammunition, creating a transitory situa- tion of going from back-of-the-gun- carry ammunition cans, the existing Each of these problems can be over- Telfare device could be used in a simi- heavy to back-of-the-gun-light, was a lar manner by the Abrams tank, espe- come by technological solutions cur- difference in balance that could not be rently available that would make the adequately resolved. cially if SLAP-T (Saboted Light Armor Abrams better suited to fighting in a Piercing with Tracer) ammunition was MOUT environment. What follows are A better idea is to use a single shot .50 used instead of the API-T (Armor ways that the Abrams could be im- caliber mounted on a Telfare device. Piercing Incendiary with Tracer) usu- proved to better protect the crew and The device is already in the inventory ally used in the Telfare device. Higher enhance its lethality in MOUT. and the fire control system already has velocity SLAP-T ammunition travels a SUBDES7 for firing it. (Editor’s on a flatter trajectory, making it more Precision .50-Caliber Machine Gun Note: The Telfare device mounted a .50 accurate at longer ranges. This system caliber M2 MG on the M60 tank’s gun would allow the Abrams to accurately In order to achieve the precision nec- barrel so it could be used in gunnery engage snipers and other lightly ar- essary to kill a point target at an ex- practice in lieu of shooting more ex- mored targets using an M2 machine tended range using a .50-caliber ma- pensive main gun rounds. The flight gun, set on single shot, as a precision chine gun, the weapon must be ballistics of the .50 and the main gun direct fire weapon. mounted to take advantage of the tank’s round were close enough to be compa- fire control system. This can be accom- rable.) Additionally, the concept of Grenade Launchers plished in two ways. You can mount using a .50 caliber for this reason has the weapon as a coax or attach it to the There are three ways that grenade 6 long been effectively utilized in the gun mantle using a Telfare device with tactical doctrine of the IDF. When the launchers could be employed to im- an M2 .50-caliber machine gun set for prove the Abrams’ capabilities in Telfare device was developed in the MOUT: by replacing one of the turret single shot. ’70s, the IDF took the idea and refined the mount so that the .50 caliber would machine guns with a Mk 19 grenade Mounting the weapon as a coax may launcher, by adding additional grenade sound like a good idea at first, but the be more stable and could be used as a launchers that fire HE grenades, or by concept was studied and rejected when precision direct fire weapon. They learned early on that the original Tel- adding a grenade launcher that could be the Abrams was first being developed aimed. in the ’70s. There were two primary fare device had problems in maintain- reasons for rejecting the concept. First ing a stable mount due to flexibility in Simply switching the loader’s ma- was the volume of brass produced its design. Though this may have been chine gun with a Mk 19 grenade when the weapon fired: how do you acceptable in training situations, it is launcher is an immediate solution, ena- remove the brass from the turret? Sec- not accurate enough for operational bling the Abrams to engage targets with 20 ARMOR — July-August 2001

angles. The device is tank vulnerable to additional threats loaded from within the like the “sticky bombs” seen in the vehicle using a small movie Saving Private Ryan, and other hatch and has a safety types of explosive devices delivered by interlock that prevents an unseen dismounted soldier. To firing if the hatch is not counter this threat, a MOUT-modified properly closed. An Abrams should have the capability of indicator on the mount- independently monitoring this critical ing turntable indicates area, so that if supporting infantry are the direction of fire and unavailable, the tank can still maintain The French Galix grenade launching system. — Giat Photo grenades are fired elec- security in the tank’s visibility dead trically from inside the space. vehicle. Grenade types grenades in a 180-degree arc while made for the launcher include smoke, One solution is a variation of the maintaining the tank commander’s abil- Krauss-Maffei Wegmann driver’s back- tear gas, and HE. Having this device ward driving system. This system is ity to engage targets with a .50-caliber would enable the Abrams to lob gre- machine gun. However, the limitation nades in the area surrounding the tank currently being fitted onto Leopard 2A5 and 2A6 tanks and enables the of this solution is the fact that the with the hatches closed. loader could only fire the weapon while driver to drive the tank backwards exposing himself to small arms and The second device is a 60mm breech without assistance from the other loaded mortar, made by Soltam De- crewmembers. It’s a modular system sniper fire — a significant threat in 10 MOUT. So, while the Mk 19 might fense Limited of Israel, which can be consisting of a black and white monitor offer a valuable asset, it is not the total aimed and fired by the loader from a screen, video control unit, controlling solution. closed hatch and is currently used on elements and power supply mounted in the Israeli Merkava tank. The loader the driver’s compartment. The camera Additional grenade launchers could be inserts the mortar into a ball type firing is housed in an armored box welded to added along the bustle rack and spon- port and aims and adjusts fire with the the rear of the back deck, comprised of son boxes using a system like the Galix loader’s periscope. To incorporate this a black and white CCD camera with combat vehicle protection system, pro- device on the Abrams, duced by Etienne Lacroix and Giat one could again mod- 8 Industries of France. The Galix protec- ify a loader’s hatch by tion system is currently mounted on the installing the ball type French Leclerc and Swedish Leopard firing port, thus allow- The Krauss-Maffei 2A6 tanks. The system is comprised of ing the tank to engage Wegmann rear-looking the immediate area TV system allows the three components, the firing unit, tank driver to move in launcher, and ammunition. The firing with 60mm mortar reverse without assis- unit is located inside the vehicle and rounds. tance. The tiny camera, the tank commander can select the Each of these gre- mounted in an ar- number of grenades to be fired either nade/mortar devices mored box on the edge singularly or in salvo. The launchers would require the mod- of the rear deck (see have a bayonet-type locking device that top photo), transmits a ification of a predeter- black-and-white image makes them insensitive to water and mined number of humidity by maintaining a seal, and to a monitor in the loader’s hatches that driver’s compartment. holds the grenade securely in the tube. could be stockpiled for - Photos: Jan deBoer Launch tubes can accommodate an quick change onto ve- extended range of ammunition so that hicles deploying. Mod- defense can be adapted to operational ifying only the loader’s requirements. Grenades are fired on a hatch would limit the flat trajectory to provide an almost im- money required for the modification to high sensitivity and resolution, and mediate target effect. Grenades avail- the predetermined number selected as includes an automatic cleaning device. able for the Galix system are catego- the cache size. The door of the camera box opens rized as protective, flare, tear gas, de- automatically as soon as the driver coy, stun effect, and smoke. Fiber Optic Cameras and Dead places the tank in Reverse, with the Space Security driver’s controls configured so that he There are two grenade/mortar systems does not move them any differently available that could be aimed. The first, The tanker’s best friend in a MOUT than when driving forward. The camera produced by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann environment is infantry running along- has a 54° x 72° viewing angle, allowing of Germany, is a 76mm adjustable gre- side and hiding behind the tank. Joined 9 the driver to drive as fast backwards as nade launcher system. It could be in- as a combined arms team, this com- he does forward. For purposes of corporated into a redesigned loader’s plementary situation provides immedi- MOUT, the system should be modified hatch that, if needed for a deployment, ate security in the tank’s dead space. In to allow the driver to independently could be quickly changed. This launch- MOUT, more than any other environ- open the door to overwatch this area of er can be rotated 360 degrees, has a ment, the tank crew is vulnerable to dead space. single launcher barrel that is breech sniper fire and grenades being tossed loaded, and is normally set at a 45- into open hatches and will normally If this system were expanded and degree angle but is capable of other always be buttoned up. This makes the modified to mount cameras on the four ARMOR — July-August 2001 21

cardinal aspects of the turret, the TC could view the area normally dead space when buttoned up, regardless of the positioning of the turret. The sys- tem should be set up to independently control the camera doors and view one or all cameras at once. Along similar lines, a parallel system of microphones and speakers could be installed to both hear and talk to personnel in the vicin- AAI Corporation’s Projectile Detection and Cueing system tells the crew where incom- ity of the tank, bringing to fruition a ing fire is coming from. The sensors, seen above left on the bumper of a HMMWV, feed situation like the car alarm that tells information to the monitoring screen, at right. In this case, fire is coming from the right front. - AAI Photos someone to “Step away from the vehi- cle.” Another area of observation that is would enable a tank crew to effectively ring, which is found on all M1A1s but sometimes overlooked, but critical in monitor the dead space around the tank. covered by an armored plate. MOUT, is looking straight up. Tanks Once detection of a threat in this area is may find themselves next to buildings achieved, then weapons can be brought The Rafa’el Ordnance Systems Divi- or other structures that require viewing to bear to destroy the threat or the tank sion offers two OWSs that would fit the area directly above the tank. This can simply move away from the threat. this purpose, the OWS 12.7DI and can be accomplished by mounting a OWS 7.62mm.11 (See photos below.) fiber optic camera — preferably ther- Overhead Weapons Systems Each features a day and night sight, mal with a controllable pan/tilt mecha- (OWS) weapon cocking from within the vehi- nism — onto the bustle rack so that the An OWS is one way to enhance le- cle, internal (to the vehicle) ammuni- TC can view this area. tion feed, last round indication for in- thality and provide a way to accurately ternal reloading, closed hatch and head- One system that would also be invalu- load and fire a machine gun while the tank is buttoned up. By assuming that out operating capability, electrically able in providing security in the tank’s fired with mechanical backup, and an dead space and against snipers is a the deploying tank is an M1A1, an option on the 12.7DI that also allows OWS is easy to incorporate. Companies variation of the Projectile Detection & for conversion to 7.62mm machine TM like Rafa’el from Israel, Krauss-Maffei Cueing (PDCue ) Counter Sniper Sys- gun. Each system is a simple point and tem available from the AAI Corpora- Wegmann from Germany, and Oto- shoot device that enables loading and breda from Italy have all developed tion of Maryland. (See photos above.) firing while the tank is buttoned up. The PDCue system as designed will OWSs for integration into a variety of provide rapid real time data to locate armored vehicles. An OWS of the cor- Krauss-Maffei Wegmann offers the and classify multiple firing situations rect size could be mounted in the CITV Type 1865 remote-controlled gun mount directed at the tank. Detecting the sonic disturbance created by super sonic projectiles, it provides a com- pound defense and zonal monitoring in multiple configurations. PDCue dis- plays this information on a screen that provides a visual display of attack di- rection in relation to the tank. De- signed to provide real time output of azimuth, elevation, range, the caliber, miss distance, and GPS coordinates of the origin of fire, it gives a tank crew the ability to locate enemy snipers fir- ing in the area of the tank. The system could also be integrated with a turreted weapon system to automatically trav- erse onto a sniper’s location and re- main stabilized to that location, mak- ing adjustments for vehicle movement. It could also be modified to incorpo- rate other sensors that would allow monitoring of the tank’s dead space with the addition of sonic or motion type sensors. Israel’s Rafa’el is one of several firms manufacturing overhead weapons systems that Cameras, microphones, and a speaker can be fired accurately from within a vehicle. At left is their 7.62 MG system, and at right system in conjunction with an auto- is the .50 caliber version. matic monitoring system like PDCue - Rafa’el Photos 22 ARMOR — July-August 2001

system12 that could be mounted on the cluding the advantage of loading the situations led to modular add-on armor side of the TC’s cupola, similar to the weapon without exposing the crew. packages for the Merkava and also led way it mounts on a French AMX-30B2 to Israeli development of heavy APCs. tank. This powered gun mount can be Add-on Armor fitted with a Type LZP 2050 sighting One ERA system currently available Add-on armor will be needed to en- is from Giat Industries of France. They system that has a 1.5X to 7.5X power hance the armor protection of an have developed the Brenus ERA block zoom sight, and ammunition for the weapon is fed from inside the vehicle. Abrams in MOUT from top attack. that can be easily fitted on all types of Packages can be added to the tank in vehicles, giving them a high level of This system, though adaptable for the one of two ways. One can either use protection against HEAT projectiles.14 concept under discussion, may require modification of the M1A1’s current modular passive type armor that molds The French Army has retrofitted its and conforms to the vehicle’s existing AMX-30B2 tank fleet with Brenus un- cupola. However, like modifying load- shape or a system of Explosive Reac- til those units can be fielded the Le- ers hatches to incorporate a grenade launcher, this would only require modi- tive Armor (ERA) “bricks” can be clerc. mounted to the vehicle. fication of a predetermined number of Rafa’el Ordnance Systems of Israel cupolas that could be inserted into the For years, the Russians have added has three different types of add-on ar- cupola rings of deploying tanks. ERA to upgrade the armor protection mor, including ERA.15 Passive armor The Italian company, Otobreda, offers on main battle tanks. Israel has also like the Enhanced Appliqué Armor Kit fielded ERA and add-on armor pack- (EAAK) has been designed and fielded a power operated, remotely controlled, ages for the last 20 years on a variety of on M113s and other APCs and was light turret13 capable of mounting a caliber .50 machine gun. This two axis vehicles to configure them for specific selected by the Marine Corps for the threat conditions. Israel has also been AAV-7. This passive armor is based on stabilized turret traverses via a joystick very tenacious in modifying, upgrad- a special spaced armor technology, control system that is contained com- pletely inside the vehicle. The control ing, and integrating captured armored highly efficient against KE projectiles vehicles through the use of ERA and and able to suppress the residual pene- system protrudes into the turret and is add-on armor. American vehicles have tration of shaped charge munitions. independent from the movements of the gun in azimuth and elevation, remain- used ERA to upgrade armor protection Composite ceramic armor has also been too, on the M60A1 for the Marines and developed and can be mounted as ing stationary. Sighting is performed by some Bradley variants. removable armor tiles. Reactive armor a special aiming telescope, which ro- tates with the turret and moves in ele- Either approach has its bad points, from Rafa’el began with the first gen- eration of Blazer ERA in 1974, and was vation parallel to the gun. Weapon and like the additional weight added to the adopted for retrofitting the entire Israeli turret movements are imparted by elec- vehicle, or the fact that ERA — once tric servomotors fed, together with the hit — becomes ineffective. Good points tank fleet at the time. First generation Blazer was also the ERA seen on Ma- firing solenoid signals, through a slip include the ability to upgrade a vehi- rine M60A1 upgrades in the late ’80s, ring — mounted coaxially with the cle’s protection without redesigning the aiming periscope. The weapon can be base vehicle, and the ability to config- which was meant to upgrade the armor protection on the M60A1 until the Ma- cocked from inside the vehicle and ure a vehicle’s armor protection to a rines could field the Abrams tank. The ammunition is fed through a flexible specific threat level. duct from boxes inside the vehicle. latest generation, called Super Blazer, In a hostile MOUT environment, the can be custom tailored as add-on armor This system is also available with a Abrams will likely face situations like for any type MBT, allowing for com- low-light TV camera or thermal imager camera, with or without a laser range what the Israelis encountered in south- patibility and operational requirements ern Lebanon, where attack from above with all tank subsystems including op- finder (LRF). or from the side by RPGs and AT mis- tics, fire control systems, and guns. Each of these systems has merits and siles posed a substantial threat. These Super Blazer provides enhanced protec- faults in its own right. The Rafa’el sys- tem would be simplest to install and easy to train a loader on its operation. The Krauss-Maffei Wegmann system may be cost prohibitive due to modifi- cations required for the cupola, but deploying tanks could still be upgraded quickly with modified cupolas. The Otobreda system is the most techno- logical system, with complexity akin to operating the turret. Regardless of complexity or cost, an OWS would provide an invaluable asset to a tank in a MOUT environment, bringing to bear a second weapon system, with the Oto- breda and Rafa’el systems, able to en- gage targets above the maximum eleva- Rafa’el and Lockheed-Martin have developed a Super Blazer tion of the tanks main armament, in- reactive armor package for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. - Rafa’el Photo

ARMOR — July-August 2001 23

tion against shaped-charge munitions crew to see, hear, and talk to any- Notes (like HEAT rounds and ATGMs) and one close to the tank. 1Yuri Babushkin, “Russia’s Arms 2000,” (Mili- increased efficiency against KE rounds. • Mount AAI’s PDCue system. Rafa’el, together with Lockheed-Mar- tary Parade, 2000), p. 238. tin, also provides the latest reactive • Mount either the Rafa’el 7.62mm or 2“Russia is using Chemical Weapons in Chech- armor package for the Bradley Fighting .50 caliber OWS in the CITV ring. nya,” (Kavkaz-Tsentr, 6 Dec 99), http://www.fas.org Vehicle. (A rapidly deploying force will have /man/dod-101/ops/war/1999/12/991206-chechen- little time to train a complex OWS.) news.htm. For the Abrams to be upgraded with add-on armor, a system using ERA • Mount a modular add-on armor 3Timothy L. Thomas, “Grozny 2000: Urban blocks is not the answer. ERA blocks package to the turret roof and on the Combat Lessons Learned,” (Military Review, Jul- would involve the welding of mounting hull above the driver station. Aug 2000). bolts to all the areas where the blocks • Add canister to the ammunition up- 4CPT James D. Leaf, “MOUT and the 1982 are required. So the concept would not load. Lebanon Campaign: The Israeli Approach,” be uniformly applicable to the Abrams (ARMOR, Jul-Aug 2000), pp. 8-11. fleet. However, a modular — configur- These features would enable Abrams able — add-on armor package like that tankers to adequately protect them- 5FM 71-1, Appendix I – MOUT. found on the Merkava could be custom selves while delivering precise, deadly, 6M179 Subcaliber Training Device Telfare, fitted and tailored to specific threat and accurate fires to the enemy, thus (FM 17-12-7, Tank Combat Training Devices, 11 levels. This modular package could be avoiding casualties in the civilian popu- Mar 92) p. 4-1. mounted with a slight modification to lation. M1A1s as they are being deployed. 7The ammunition sub-designation is used to tell The Russian tactical solution to the tank’s fire control system the particular ballis- Canister Ammunition MOUT is not a politically acceptable tic coefficient for the ammunition being fired. solution and is not one that Americans A 120mm canister round has been de- would embrace in situations short of all 8Tony Cullen and Christopher F. Foss, (Jane’s signed to meet requirements set forth out war. Americans would also never Armour and Artillery Upgrades, Twelfth Edition, 1999-2000), pp. 149-150, hereafter referenced as by U.S. Forces Korea for an anti-per- accept the level of losses sustained by Jane’s. sonnel round that is muzzle action and the Russians in the first Chechen war. effective against massed troops 200- A more tactful solution is through the 9Jane’s, p. 152.

500 meters from the tank. Using tung- deployment of technically superior 10 sten steel balls or cubes, it could be fighting platforms like a MOUT-mod- Soltam Systems Ltd., http://www.army- used against a dismounted attack in ified Abrams tank. technology.com/contractors/artillery/soltam/. 11 numbers greater than could be effec- In open terrain, few dismounted sol- http://www.Rafael.co.il. tively suppressed by the tank’s machine 12 guns. This round is not currently diers or lightly armored vehicles will Jane’s, p. 289. brazenly approach or attack a tank. 13 funded for production but would not Though tanks have a tendency to be- Jane’s, p. 300. take long to produce in numbers large 14 enough to support forces that are de- come “bullet magnets” on the battle- Giat Industries website, http://www.giat- field, not many want to get into a slug- industries.fr/ukgiat/prod/proa5a.htm. ploying. fest with an Abrams. 15Rafa’el Ordinance Systems website, Conclusion War and battlefields are destructive http://www.rafael.co.il. Having discussed the many available and chaotic environments unlike any other human endeavor. American ar- systems, here are the recommended mor must face the reality of preparing features to improve the Abrams tank SFC Ira L. Partridge has written for MOUT operations. to fight in MOUT. To think that American forces will not have to face several articles for ARMOR since • M2 .50 caliber mounted on an im- combat in a MOUT environment with being assigned to the Master Gun- proved Telfare device firing SLAP- the Abrams tank is akin to the ostrich ner Branch at Fort Knox. He re- T. sticking its head in the sand. If adopted, ceived his initial Armor training at this proposed concept would enable the • Switch out loader’s M-240 for a Mk Fort Knox, Ky., in 1985. He gradu- 19. Abrams tank to maintain a technologi- ated the Master Gunner Course in cal edge, even in the restricted confines • 1993 with an A8 ASI. His assign- Mount the Galix system, with a se- of MOUT. “If we work on the proto- ments as a Master Gunner include ries of launchers attached to the type now, and put some ideas to work, one year as a company master rails along each sponson box and on we can make this a real option if it is the bustle rack rails. needed.” gunner and three years as battalion master gunner for 5-77 AR, 1st AD, • Modify a cache of loader’s hatches The time is now for this concept to Mannheim, Germany, moving with to accommodate either the Krauss- materialize and a future Armor Confer- the unit in 1994 and redesignating Maffei Wegmann 76mm grenade ence is the opportunity to exhibit these to 1-32 AR, 2nd ID, Fort Lewis, launcher or Soltam 60mm mortar. improvements to Armor leaders. An Wash. He is currently serving as • Install a backward driving system. Abrams modified for MOUT would be the best answer to reinforcing an em- the newsletter editor, webmaster, • Install cameras, speakers, and mi- battled rapid deployment force that and operations sergeant for the crophones on the four cardinal as- needs the combat power of a tank in a Master Gunner School at Fort pects of the turret to enable the MOUT environment. Knox, Ky. 24 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Some Russian Tankers’ Experiences In the Second Chechen War by Adam Geibel

At the twilight of the 20th century, sniper from Kursk, told the Boston return fire from four sides by grenade Russian tankers once again found Globe how one tank in his unit had to launchers hit the tank several times and themselves crossing into Chechnya. be towed into battles. “They’d drag it the engine died. The driver-mechanic The Kremlin committed over 400 in, then drag it back out again, then tried to start it, but the engine wouldn’t MBTs to their second campaign in the they’d put it there on the front line as a turn over until several tense minutes North Caucasus; Nizhniy Novgorod’s prop, for looks. This is how we go to had passed. 3rd Motorized Rifle Division deployed war — with tanks as props, to fight. 251 MBTs (mostly T-80s), Volgo- The Chechens have better weapons The Russians were convinced that the tank survived the battle only because of grad’s 20th Motorized Rifle Division’s than we do.” the reactive armor blocks. The shaped 93 T-72s, the 205th Independent Mo- torized Rifle Brigade’s 50 T-72s and The Nomad Tank and other T-72s charge grenades burned through several layers of the turret armor, split the side, the 136th Independent Motorized Rifle Before the war broke out in Dagestan, and completely removed the sights. The Brigade’s 32 tanks. Some T-55s and a handful of PT-76s were apparently as- the Russian Army had a small T-72 crew came out of the battle bruised and group in the 136th Brigade, while the officer acting as vehicle command- signed to Interior Ministry units as fire MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] er was only wounded.3 support weapons. troops units were using T-55 tanks. For the rest of the T-72 crews, life This time, the Russians lost fewer When the Chechens first crossed over tanks to Chechen action than during the into Dagestan in August, 1999, there was full of interesting problems. One T-72 driver-mechanic, contract service First Chechen War. In September 2000, was a minor curiosity in one of the Warrant Officer Protsenko, noted in a Colonel-General Sergey Mayev, the Russians’ tank sheds at Boktiah — a T- Chief of the Main Armor Directorate of 72 fitted with ERA set up “for export” May 2000 interview that, “In the moun- tains, the engines overheated. There the Russian Federation Ministry of De- to India. Rumor had it that the deploy- was not enough power; in fact, it was fense, said that only ten tanks were lost ment of a battalion of these to the 138th in the Second Chechen War, compared MR Brigade was stopped when it was necessary to stop at 1200 meters. The tracks did not reliably grip the stony to around 200 vehicles in the first war. discovered that soldiers had been sell- soil, especially if there was ice. And it (Presumably, Mayev meant ten unsal- ing the explosive from their tanks’ re- was cold in the tanks. If heat was main- vageable write-offs, since both Russian active armor.2 tained in the combat compartment, then and Chechen sources make mention of When the Russians struck back, this there was none in the control [driver’s] more than ten MBTs knocked out (spe- cifically, the mujihadeen claimed a T-72BM was put at the head of a com- compartment.” pany column along the route to Buy- total of 400 AFVs destroyed by 20 naksk. It was soon nicknamed the The crews were able to overcome March 2000). some of these problems. Claws were “Nomad Tank.” The crew would re- fitted to the tracks to improve traction. Major Tsimbalyuk, a former tank pla- ceive information from either an artil- toon leader and currently the chief of lery forward observer or even a local In the mountains or in low temperatures and humidity, the reloading mecha- staff of one motorized rifle brigade’s resident, then drive covertly, but at high nism’s control unit sometimes failed, so tank battalion, as well as a holder of speed, into the area indicated. The tank two Orders of Courage, said simply would move independently, without the crews would warm them up over a campfire until they ran normally. Some that, “We learned some serious lessons accompanying infantry. Moving off- problems were endemic to the T-72’s from the last campaign.” road along mountain ravines, the tank remained unnoticeable to observers design. The installation and removal of While the Chechens had around 100 the tank’s AKB storage batteries was until it reached a suitable firing posi- tanks and armored personnel carriers1 difficult even under ordinary condi- tion, where the crew would fire four to (including a couple of dozen T-62s and five rounds at the target indicated and tions. The batteries ran down quickly T-72s in varying mechanical states), during the winter, and in order to there were no known tank vs. tank con- then disappear back into the ravines. change them, the 70 kg driver-mechan- frontations. At an 11 March 2001 brief- Over several days, the Russians ic’s seat had to be removed and the ing at the unified federal headquarters claimed that a mujihadeen weapons equally heavy AKBs raised vertically in Khankala, there were claims that caravan, three mortar teams, and two through a hatch. nine Chechen tanks and 32 APCs had munitions dumps were destroyed by The mujihadeen took advantage of been destroyed during the war, but it this method. was not specified how this was done. another of the T-72’s weaknesses: after During the battle for Rakhata, the firing, the main gun stops on the hydro- One of the worst problems for Russian Nomad rejoined the company. Gunner stop for reloading, giving the Chechens tankers was the sheer age of their armor Sergeant Aleksey R. was employing the an opportunity to attack the tank. Ser- fleet, which led to many cases of me- main gun to suppress Chechen assault geant Petelnik, a T-72 tank commander chanical unreliability. Yury Toichkin, a riflemen firing from windows, when and contract serviceman, noted that, ARMOR — July-August 2001 25

“The rebels tried to attack the left side Ironically, the private’s tank was at- of the turret and the space beneath the tached to an infantry platoon and at a turret, trying first of all to knock the position two kilometers from Samash- sights out of operation. Sometimes they ki, it was hit by Chechen mortar fire.4 were successful.” Even though Perekest had jumped into the tank’s hatch, the explosion tore off After five or six hours of continuous firing, the sabot ejection rack in some his hand, temporarily blinded him, and riddled his chest with shrapnel. He re- T-72s became unserviceable and the gained his sight after three days in the magazine lifting mechanism failed. In that case, the ammunition stowage hospital. Perekrest considered his T-72 obsolete, but noted that “there were location in the tanks’ fighting compart- even older ones — there were T-62s.” ments made it difficult for crews to load the gun from the manual ammuni- T-62s and “Ilich’s Eyebrows” tion stowage racks. In September, 1999, the chief of ar- After the basic load of ammunition maments for the Russian Federation was expended, the tank had to leave its position in order to reload a container. armed forces, Anatoliy Sitnov, said there were T-62 and T-55 tanks operat- Valuable time was lost and in leaving ing in Chechnya because they were the position, the crew exposed its posi- tion and was also forced to leave the lighter and better able to function on narrow mountain trails. This might vehicle, thereby subjecting themselves have been considered rationalization by to small arms fire. Russian tankers said The regiment was reunited at the be- they wished for an armored transport- the Russian tankers forced to man those relics. While true that they were lighter ginning of December for the battle of reloading vehicle like those supplied to and functioned better in certain situa- Urus-Martan, where once again the T- the missile troops. tions, some T-62s’ diesels also had 62s were used for direct fire support Others complained about the T-72’s power and overheating problems at while facing return fire from ATGMs, fire suppression equipment (PPO), the higher elevations. The T-62s, lacking “Schmel” flamethrowers, and air de- difficulties detecting the enemy in ERA boxes, were only fitted with fense weapons. “complex” conditions with the current “Ilich’s eyebrows” — the BDD hollow After Urus-Martan, the regiment was vision devices, and the need for secure armored boxes developed during the divided again and two tank companies communications equipment (updated Afghanistan War that were welded to were sent to Grozny. The rest went into R-174 tank inter-phone systems were the turret front. the mountains. mentioned). The mujihadeen had a nasty habit of eavesdropping, some- The Siberian Military District Guards On 29 December 1999, the Siberian times even interjecting bogus com- Tank Regiment was one such unit re- tankers reached Duba-Yurt, near the mands on unsecure Russian radio traf- equipped with T-62s. The crews northern entrance to Argun Gorge and a fic. This occurred even down to com- claimed to be glad for the extra room major choke-point for Chechen fighters pany and platoon level. Combat opera- left by the lack of an autoloader and infiltrating down from the southern tions also illustrated the necessity of noted that ATGMs wouldn’t create mountains. Three tanks and armored equipping all crew members with as- over-pressure if the hatches were left infantry vehicles had reached the vil- sault rifles. open. Apparently, the Siberians didn’t lage’s southern outskirts, but the higher want to get too close to the Chechens. command did not appreciate the Sibe- At the beginning of October 1999, rian’s initiative and ordered them to Private Aleksandr Pavlovich Perekrest, In one engagement, the deputy regi- mental commander took out an ATGM withdraw. a tank driver-mechanic, found himself that was firing at them at a range of in Chechnya. Having served for 18 Two days later, a reconnaissance bat- months, he was only six months short 3,900 meters. talion traveled along that same route and the mujihadeen were waiting for of being demobilized. Perekrest de- The regiment was initially split up to scribed being under fire: them. The tankers, sent to extract the reinforce other units. After crossing the reconnaissance battalion, found them- “The most horrible thing is when they Terek Mountain Range, serious en- selves under a crossfire from the hills. fire at you for the first time. At first, I gagements began. The Siberians’ first let go of the control levers while under taste of Chechen ATGM fire was near Three T-62s rushed to the outskirts of fire. The first time was horrifying and Kerla-Yurt, then Achkhoy-Martan and Duba-Yurt and expended their entire later it was nothing, you think: ‘I’m Alkhan-Yurt, where one tank company basic ammunition load into the forested sitting in an armored vehicle — nothing fired 1,000 rounds in support of the slopes and were then replaced by an- will happen.” attacking infantry.5 other three “loaded” tanks. The recon- 26 ARMOR — July-August 2001 naissance battalion withdrew under this Days later in the battle, Interior Minis- and collective skills. One of the most tank “umbrella” after destroying three try troops attacking mujihadeen posi- basic mistakes, repeated from the First of their own heavily-damaged armored tions were pinned down. A T-62 and a Chechen War, was that crews were infantry vehicles so that the Chechens T-72, along with a “Shilka” ZSU-23-4, hurriedly thrown together as units wouldn’t get their hands on them. moved through a narrow side street and slated to go to the front were brought There were other battlefield tales on after barely getting past three burning up to something resembling full Interior Ministry BMPs, began to work strength. The most distressing and re- imaginative armor use. During initial over some houses in which the muji- peated rumor was that many AFV stages of the siege of Komsomolskoye, a mountain village, on 5 March 2000, a hadeen had settled. The battalion com- crewmen met for the first time as they mander, sitting in the tank command- were shipped to the front, which left Russian reconnaissance group and a er’s seat, spotted a rebel with a “muk- zero time to build cohesion within the tank rushing to the village fell into an ambush. The tank was knocked out by ha” PG-18. The Chechen got off the vehicle crew, let alone at the platoon or first shot; two officers were wounded company level. an RPG and lost traction, and the muji- and the tank disabled. hadeen forced back the scouting party, Where once the Russians could afford wounding five of them. For four hours, The Russians got their revenge in the to send draftees who were graduates of the bandits tried to force the tank crew days to follow, using their tanks at professional technical schools and to surrender (including barrages of point-blank range to blast mujihadeen polytechnical institutes with three to RPG-18s). The crew wouldn’t surren- out of Komsomolskoye’s basements. four years of special training, they now der, but neither could they be rescued. Going Home - Lessons Learned? had to rely on a dwindling number of Mortar fire drove the bandits back from what they called “yesterday’s school the tank while another T-72 and scout- The first Russian unit to complete its youths.” Major General Vladimir Fe- ing party moved forward. They also fell tour of duty was the 131st Motor Rifle dota, chief of Siberian Military Dis- into an ambush when the tank hit a land Brigade’s tank battalion. It was with- trict’s Armor-Tank Service, remarked mine. The scouts were unable to liber- drawn from Chechnya on 20 February that draftees with only six months to a ate the first tank’s crew. 2000 and sent to its home base in Mai- year or training could not be turned into kop. Two tank regiments were part of a fully qualified tank operator who When the infantry finally did fight the nine withdrawn from Chechnya by knew a number of closely-related com- their way through to the tank, it was too late. Lieutenant Aleksandr Lutsenko 15 June 2000. In the three months bat duties. He also knew the Kremlin prior, a total of 167 tanks had been couldn’t continue relying on the eternal had called artillery fire in on himself, withdrawn, leaving 202 still in Chech- Russian luck. but the mujihadeen were able to get to the tank and blow open the hatches. nya. He candidly pointed out the sloppi- Aleksandr and his gunner-operator The Second Chechen War showed the ness of some Russian tankers, discard- were killed, while the mechanic-driver Russians that tank crewman training ing engine access hatches in the warm was captured. had suffered in a number of individual climate of Baykal made maintenance ARMOR — July-August 2001 27

there easier, but that missing hatch vulnerable to some of the lighter direct-fire command did make an attempt to reduce ‘collat- could bring the tank to a screeching weapons. eral damage’ when the war started. halt in a Chechen mudhole. Most Russian observers agreed that the BTR-80 References Major General Vladimir Fedota was at the end of its capabilities. But in late No- stressed their low technical competence vember 2000, Alexander Yegorov, the R&D “Armored Vehicles Storming the Mountains,” Institute of Steel’s deputy director general for Igor Korotchenko, Nezavisimoye and the need for additional training, science, announced that his firm had finished particularly relating to combat situa- development of technical documentation for the Voyennoye Obozreniye, No, 36, 17 Sep 99 tions and dealing with mechanical production of composite “grill” shields for the “When Enemy Surrenders, He Is Not To Be breakdowns. He specifically mentioned BTR-80. Killed. Chechen Civilian Life Proceeds in At- lessons in operating the stabilization, 2One former and three Russians soldiers were mosphere of Combat Alert,” Sergey Dyupin, using night-vision devices, and servic- arrested in St. Petersburg at the beginning of Kommersant, 18 Nov 99 ing lubrication lifters and fuel supply February 2000 for stealing the explosives out of “Federal Troops’ Weapons Needs ‘Fully Met’,” systems under special conditions. T-80 ERA blocks. An investigation by North- ITAR-TASS, 25 Nov 99 western RUBOP [Rayon Administration for Russian tankers will have to learn to Combating Organized Crime] and Leningrad “Wounded soldiers tell of Russian ineptitude,” work with what they have for the fore- Military District military counterintelligence David Filipov and Dmitry Shalganov, Boston seeable future. In November 1999, the started on 24 September 1999 caught former Globe, 27 Nov 99 Russian Army was promised 30 tanks soldier Aleksey Kapralov, his brother, and two “What are our soldiers up against?”, Aleksandr and 130 armored transports. At a Sep- unnamed companions fencing plastic explosives Kondrashov, Argumenty i Fakty, 1 Feb 00 tember 2000 meeting in Kubinka, four times more powerful than TNT. Colonel-General Mayev noted that no “‘Hollow Plates’ Instead of Armor; Lives of They had been looting 270 grams of VVV-5a Comrades May Be on Conscience of Soldiers provision for new tanks was planned from ERA blocks taken off of decommissioned for that year. Funding will cover no Who Traded in Stolen Plastic Explosive,” Vadim T-80s; 16.7 kg of the explosive were found in Nesvizhskiy, Segodnya, 02 Feb 00 more than 100 new BTRs and the re- various stashes, with 350 plates holding 94.5 kg pair of damaged or worn-out tanks. of plastic explosive moved aside at one ware- “The Siberians’ Weighty Arguments: The Ter- house for eventual dismantling. Apparently, the rorists Are Experiencing Them in Full Measure,” Another indicator that older-genera- ERA blocks were part of a supply slated to be Vadim Koval, Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 Feb 00 tion Russian MBTs will be around for a sent to Russian Forces in Chechnya as replace- while longer is the modernization of the ments. How many blocks shipped empty was Official list of casualties, Kavkaz Center, 7 Mar 9M117M ATGM. This laser-guided unknown. 00 “To Survive and Return Home: Young Soldiers round can be fired from both the T-55 This may be a very likely reason why the Che- Think About That in the Thick of Battle,” Vadim and T-62 tanks, as well as the BMP-3 chens were able to knock out at least 13 T- Udmantsev, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Oboz- IFV and MT-12 antitank gun. The Tu- 72BMs (“T-90 or T-72BM? Did the Rebels Mis- reniye, 31 Mar 00 lamashzavod company and the Design identify Knocked-Out Tanks?”, ARMOR, Nov- Bureau of Device Building told the Dec 2000). The Russians consider “dynamic “Don’t Feel Sorry for Us: A Tank Regiment’s press in early December 2000 that they protection” to increase the level of a tank’s resis- Chechen Chronicle,” Konstantin Rashchepkin, would update the tandem-warhead tance to shaped charges by a factor of two. Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 Apr 00 round designed for taking out AFVs 3Russian military scientists were shown one T- “Lessons of the Mountains; Not Only the protected with ERA and fortifications 72BM tank which received nine direct hits from Troops Are Learning Them from the Events in that present small target profiles. antitank weapons in a four-hour long battle. The the Caucasus,” Col. Vladimir Matyash, Krasnaya tank lost its mobility but was able to continue Zvezda, 17 May 00 firing. Crew members received no wounds or “Russia Withdraws Nine Regiments from Notes contusions, due to its dynamic defense (ERA blocks). The Russians claimed that if the tank had Chechnya,” Interfax, 15 Jun 00 1Rumor also had it that the Chechens had BTR- been equipped with the Arena defensive system, ERRONEOUS FIRE, Alan Kachmazov, Izves- 90s, of which the Russian have only five in the neither antitank missile systems nor grenade tia, 17 Jul 00 president’s bodyguard service. The BTR-90 had launchers would have been able to touch it. (See “The Lesson of Experience,” Mayev: No New increased firepower, armor, all-terrain capability “Russia’s ARENA Active Protection System,” ARMOR, Sep-Oct 1996) Tanks in 2000, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Oboz- and maneuverability. It was armed with a 30mm reniye, in Russian, No. 33, 8-14 Sep 00 automatic cannon, a 7.62mm machine gun, an 4Russian tankers also became targets for their AG-17 grenade launcher and a “Konkurs” own forces. When Federal artillery executed a Papers presented at scientific-technical confer- ATGM. fire mission against the command center at ence on weapons and military equipment mainte- Khankala in mid-July 2000, one tank was hit; two nance in Chechnya, Armeyskiy Sbornik, 01 Oct Prior to the 1999-2000 war, the Russians had crewmen were wounded, and another received a 00 been quite proud of their 1970’s vintage work- slight concussion. horse BTR-80 APC. However, all the services Tulamashzavod, Device-Building R&D Mod- equipped with BTR-80s experienced excessive 5In November 1999, one enthusiastic but un- ernize Anti-Tank Missile, AVN, 8 Dec 00 mechanical breakdowns and most quickly bogged named Russian armor officer told Kommersant’s Feds Kill 10,720 Rebels in Anti-Guerrilla Cam- down in the mountains. The naval infantry re- Sergey Dyupin that the “soldiers jump out of the paign in Chechnya, AVN, 11 Mar 01 placed theirs with MTLBs and airborne units foxholes and rush straight under our tracks. It’s with BMDs. The BTRs were relegated to road- because with a single shot our T-62 can knock bound convoy-escort duty. out an entire battery in the mountains. The bat- tery that for three days has been preventing them CPT Adam Geibel is the S2, When the Chechens switched to mine warfare from so much as sticking their heads out of the 5/117th Cavalry, 42ID (NJARNG). as their primary method of attack, the BTRs were foxhole! But it is not all that easy to shoot from a In civilian life, he is the Associate the favored targets since they didn’t stand up well tank. A prosecutor follows every machine and to the 120mm mortar and 152mm HE shells used watches where the shell lands. God forbid we Editor of the Journal of Military as field-expedient mines. The BTR-80 was also make a mistake....” Apparently, the Russian Ordnance and a freelance writer. 28 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Evolving Army Armor Structure In the Late 1920s Above, Mark VIII tanks and a command vari- ant of the FT-17 light tank are seen at maneu- by Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr. vers in 1919. Dwight D. Eisenhower is the officer second from left. - Patton Museum Photo

As we ponder the future of the “Ar- war strength tables that are most fre- “square” division patterned after the mor/Mechanized Legacy Force” and quently needed in the study of situa- divisions of World War I.4 There was experiment with the new “middle- tions in which infantry and cavalry also a tentatively approved cavalry di- weight” integrated brigades, let us look divisions are concerned.”2 Although vision.5 In addition, it was the epoch of back at the Army’s thinking about mo- many of the tables were only tentative- the light and heavy tank regiments, the bile warfare at a time when there was ly approved, such as the armored car armored car squadron, and the infantry no Armor branch, and indeed, only the squadron of the cavalry division (as of division tank company. A closer look at Infantry branch had “tanks.” May 10, 1928),3 the force structure these last four organizations reveals the Much has been written about the de- published was that officially recognized U.S. Army’s thinking about mecha- as of the date of the Tables publication. nized warfare, as limited as it was, and velopment of armor in the United In general, they described in exacting on the integration of armored fighting States Army between the two world wars. The emphasis, however, has been detail how the Army was organized to vehicles into the established and pro- fight in future conflicts. As in similar posed combat formations. on armored fighting vehicles, branch documents today, the Tables were de- advocacy, employment concepts, effect of foreign influence, unit training, and signed as reference documents for the The Light Tank Company instruction of students at the then- optimum large formation organizations. Command and General Staff School, so In World War I, there were no infan- Little attention, however, has been given to the “nuts and bolts,” the force they reflect the thinking of the Army’s try or cavalry divisions. There were leadership at the time about how to only “divisions” and these consisted structure, the organization of the conduct combat operations at the divi- solely of infantrymen and their support- Army’s tank and motorized cavalry 6 formations at a time when, “... Euro- sion and corps level. This approved ing arms and services. (There were force structure also had an important cavalry regiments, but none fought as pean countries were conceptualizing impact on how units at the platoon, regiments even though some deployed armies that could trigger a war of greater velocity and intensity than any- company, battalion, and regimental to France.) By 1929, however, there 1 level were expected to do battle in the were two types of divisions — infantry thing previously known.” 1930s. and cavalry. As late as early 1940, In 1930, the Command and General there was only one active Regular cav- Staff School Press published Tables of The United States Army was still in alry division in the U.S. Army, the Organization which detailed, “... those the era of the two infantry brigade First.7 In 1930, there were, nevertheless, ARMOR — July-August 2001 29

National Guard and Army Reserve cav- guns.12 Given their light armament and were wondering about the other nine alry formations which were, on paper, lack of an overall commander, it is easy tanks in the company, this is where you combined into cavalry divisions, as well to conclude that the tanks were to be would find them. This section included as the Regular horse cavalry regiments. attached, most probably individually, to almost two entire platoons of tanks, The 7th Cavalry Brigade, composed of any infantry unit that required support, with their crews. The section leader the 1st and 13th Cavalry (Mechanized) and the infantry unit commander had was a first lieutenant, who was also the had not yet been formed.8 free rein to employ the tank as he saw company’s second in command, as- fit. He had to rely on a junior noncom- sisted by a section sergeant. Neither The square infantry division, with its four infantry, three artillery, one engi- missioned officer for tactical advice, if had an assigned vehicle. Four of the he indeed wanted it. The best that could tanks had 37mm guns and the other neer, medical, and quartermaster regi- really be expected from the tank com- five had machine guns. Corporals were ments, was still the standard combat formation. It was to be almost ten years mander was that he kept his machine tank commanders and privates were running. The tank platoon structure drivers. before the “triangular” or three-regi- thus reveals how restrictive the then- ment infantry division was adopted. current tank employment doctrine was. The replacement section reflects curi- Nevertheless, while the infantry divi- ous evidence of WWI thinking. The sion continued to look like its World There were four sections in the head- tanks in the line platoons were consid- quarters platoon. These were the head- ered expendable, and evidently ex- War I predecessor, there were some quarters, maintenance, replacement, innovations. One of these was the divi- pected to break down frequently or be sion tank company, although its tables and a combined maintenance and re- easily and quickly destroyed. Thus the placement section. Of these, the com- need for rapid replacement. Since tanks of organization still reflected World bined section had neither personnel nor War I thinking. In a division authorized operated frequently as individual enti- more than 24,000 men and 6,992 ani- equipment assigned to it. One explana- ties, tank team cooperation was not tion for this curious structure was that it considered imperative. And because mals, the tank company comprised only was intended that the headquarters pla- 160 officers and men with a total of 24 speed of movement was tied to that of toon, at some later time, would have tanks.9 the foot soldier, the accompanying tank only two sections — the headquarters needed to move neither quickly nor far. The number of tanks, vis-à-vis their and maintenance/replacement section. employment, however, is misleading. The organization table was apparently The replacement section also allevi- The company included one headquar- written to be able to accommodate a ated stress on the maintenance section. ters and three tank platoons. Each pla- proposed later change. Having a complete replacement readily at hand meant the unit mechanics were toon had five two-man tanks. A corpo- As it was, of the three manned sec- ral was the tank commander while a not so pressed to accomplish repairs private drove the tank. The tanks them- tions, the maintenance unit was perhaps quickly. Repair parts, too, were, not in the most conventional. It consisted of as much demand because there were selves were World War I-era, two-man 23 enlisted men, all of whom were M1917 light tanks, a close copy of the good possibilities for cannibalization of Renault FT model. (The French were transported in either the one repair tanks destroyed in action or by acci- truck or the vehicle carrying repair dent. still employing this tank as late as No- parts and tools. The tanks were well vember 1942 against the Anglo-Amer- served. A staff sergeant was the chief Finally, there was the headquarters ican landings in North Africa.)10 mechanic. He commanded five ser- section. Almost half (75 of 160) the The platoon was commanded by a geants and 17 privates. One of these company’s personnel were in this sec- second lieutenant assisted by a platoon privates had the occupational specialty tion. It also had the most vehicles. sergeant and two additional privates in of “chauffeur.” These included one light five-passenger addition to the 10 tank crewmen. How car, two motorcycles with side cars, In addition, there was a machinist, one ¾-ton cargo truck, a 750-gallon the officer and his three other men were four automobile mechanics, three gas to be transported was not revealed in gasoline tanker, and 33 tank transporter the platoon’s organization table, but engine mechanics, seven tank and trac- trucks. The transporters were employed tor mechanics, and an oxyacetylene to carry the 24 tanks into the combat they were not considered part of a tank welder. This strong supporting unit crew. Instead, in a footnote for the zone. If there were not enough of these “Truck, tank carrier,” it was specified allowed good coverage of each tank specialized trucks available, then 3- or platoon when the platoon was deployed 5-ton cargo trucks could be substituted. that of the 33 such trucks in the com- with an infantry unit. pany, four were, “...for personnel not In addition to the motor vehicles were a otherwise provided for.”11 So, it is pre- The variety of specialists also pro- “rolling kitchen” and a 300-gallon wa- sumed that the platoon’s leadership was vided broad-based support. This was ter trailer. to remain in the company trains during important because in the division’s combat, and that the lieutenant had no medium maintenance ordnance com- There is nothing unusual about these vehicles except the number of tank command function when his tanks were pany there were no mechanics specifi- transporters, all of which had assigned deployed. cally dedicated to work on tanks.13 Thus the tank company was expected to chauffeurs. Their presence again shows The armament of the tanks further re- how self-contained the company was veals their intended purpose, to accom- perform up to and including third eche- intended to be. In addition to transport- lon maintenance. pany the infantry. Two of the tanks ing the tanks, these heavy trucks trans- were equipped with 37mm cannon, the Of the three sections, the replacement ported the ammunition for the guns as other three vehicles only had machine section is the most intriguing. If you well as rations and other supplies. 30 ARMOR — July-August 2001

There were sufficient transporters or- Little was to be expected of the organi- mismatch here, most probably because ganic to the company to be roughly the zation except closely confined support it involved internal Army politics. equivalent of a present day tank trans- of foot infantry. There was no new doc- On the other hand, the armored car porter company. trine governing this company’s em- ployment. On the other hand, the com- squadron’s presence in the division is As to personnel in the headquarters more plausible, and armored cars “be- section, excluding the 36 drivers and pany was very self-sufficient. It had its longed” to the cavalry. One would own long-distance wheeled transport to the truckmaster, there was a wide vari- carry the tanks, a significant capability think the cavalry division now had, ety of occupation specialties, some of with its division aviation, a new, long- them particularly unique. Even though for maintenance, and a large degree of range reconnaissance capability. While service support. It was, however, very there were no animals in the unit (ex- inadequately equipped with radio com- in the past horse cavalry was intended cept for possibly the company dog), the to perform that function, it is apparent company had an assigned blacksmith. munication, reflecting the World War I that times were changing. dependence on motor messenger sup- Possibly he was intended to help repair- port. Its self-sufficiency can be attrib- The fact that the basic cavalry troop ing shoes, work done by the cobbler authorized in the unit. To complement uted to the fact that the division had no had been tentatively approved as a “ri- other tank transporter or high level fle troop” in 1928 led credence to the the cobbler, there was also the com- maintenance capability to accommo- concept that horse cavalry was to fulfill pany tailor. In addition, two buglers were authorized, part of a surfeit of date the company’s requirements. the role of mobile infantry mounted on horseback.17 Although the sabre was an soldiers which would surely not have issue weapon, the horse soldier also lasted long in combat. To complete this Mechanized/Motorized Cav Units unique assemblage was a topographic carried a pistol and rifle. Each cavalry The Tables of Organization displayed troop also had eight “machine” rifles. draftsman. How he fit into the opera- Table 401W showing that the cavalry The mounted trooper could still per- tional scheme is difficult to discern from the organization table. division’s organization was tentatively form reconnaissance missions and approved as of 10 May 1928.14 Only a charge with the saber, but it was clearly More conventionally there was the few of the other components of this intended that he also fight on foot. mess section, but a rather small one. A division, however, had been granted The armored car squadron consisted mess sergeant and three cooks hardly that status by that date, among them the of a headquarters and three troops. It seems a large enough group to feed a armored car squadron.15 Also approved was mounted in 36 armored cars, 14 company whose elements were spread was the organization of the division’s “cross-country” cars, and 13 trucks. out among many different units in the light tank company, the other mecha- division. It can be assumed, therefore, nized/motorized combat unit in the The headquarters of 11 officers and men had two cross-country cars and the that the units to which the individual cavalry division, which was the same only maintenance vehicle, a light repair tanks or platoons were attached would as the light tank company in the infan- provide the necessary mess facilities. try division. truck. Each troop of 89 officers and men had 12 armored cars, four cross The science of inter-vehicular com- The inclusion of a light tank company, country cars, three cargo trucks, and a munication was still in the experimen- organized exactly like the one in the refueling vehicle. tal stage, and an adequate field radio infantry division, is interesting. It was was yet to be had. There was only one equipped with the same, slow, infantry The small squadron headquarters had very limited capabilities. The com- radio operator in the signal section support tanks as the infantry division’s, mander was a major, the usual rank for headed by a staff sergeant. But there so it was hardly suited for fast-paced was also a telephone operator and a horse cavalry operations. While the a squadron or battalion commander of a combat formation. He had a two-officer signalman who employed wig-wag horse required little maintenance be- staff, a captain serving as adjutant, who flags. The largest element was the five yond good feeding and proper han- messengers and two motorcyclists who dling, the tank was ever prone to me- also developed plans and training, and served as intelligence officer. Also, drove the two cycles with sidecars. chanical failures, as attested by the size there was a first lieutenant as the sup- of the maintenance section and the Finally, in the command/administra- number of replacement tanks. It is dif- ply officer. tion element there was the company commander and another first lieutenant ficult to imagine how the tank company The number and occupational special- could be employed in the Army’s most ties of the enlisted personnel in the who commanded the company’s rear mobile command. It should be remem- headquarters provide a good picture of echelon or company trains. They were assisted by a first sergeant, a reconnais- bered, however, that tanks “belonged” how it was to function. The highest to the Infantry Branch, and doctrine for ranking noncommissioned officer was a sance sergeant, and a corporal company such vehicles was the responsibility of sergeant, the mess sergeant, but there clerk. the Infantry School.16 Just because the were no cooks allocated to the head- In sum, the division’s light tank com- tanks were in a cavalry formation did quarters. The headquarters, therefore, pany had little combat power forward not mean that the Infantry School relin- had to be assigned to one of the ar- with its 15 tanks only equipped with six quished its influence over the employ- mored car troops for subsistence. The 37mm guns and nine machine guns. ment of tanks. Clearly, there was a other noncommissioned officer was the ARMOR — July-August 2001 31

corporal clerk, who had a private as an equipped with a .30-caliber machine Of note, nevertheless, is that the pla- assistant. The maintenance section had gun. Each trooper carried a pistol and toon’s organization was the forerunner two mechanics and a driver for the light the armored car crewmen had either of the scout section in the 1950s “inte- repair (cargo) truck. Finally, there were rifles or submachine guns. grated armored cavalry platoon.”19 In two chauffeurs for the cross-country that platoon, the platoon leader had his Of interest was how the platoon was cars and a messenger. With this meager organized. The remarks for Table own radio-equipped quarter-ton truck. complement, it was clear that there was The “eyes and ears” of the platoon to be no command and control function 414W, which described the organiza- were a two-squad scout section consist- tion, states: for the squadron headquarters. The ing, as did the 1928 armored car pla- commander could be the division “Each platoon is divided into toon, of four vehicles with two in each commander’s armored car advisor, but two sections of two cars each, squad. The section and squad leaders there was no communications capabil- each section being commanded were both sergeants in the same manner ity in either the squadron headquarters by a section sergeant who also as the armored car platoon. Each vehi- or the troops, except for the one motor acts as commander and observer cle had a noncommissioned officer com- messenger. The headquarters, it ap- of his car, the other car being manding, with two additional crew pears, was intended only to be an ad- commanded by a corporal. Each members. Each quarter-ton truck had a ministrative element with a limited car has a crew of one sergeant (or radio and carried a .30-caliber machine maintenance capability. corporal) as commander and ob- gun. The difference between the two server, and three privates (driver, versions, of course, was the ability to From the squadron’s organization it is communicate with other elements. evident that the squadron was not to gunner, machine gun, and gun- operate independently. With no radio ner, sub-machine rifle).”18 As to employment, movement by capability, the squadron headquarters The platoon leader and platoon ser- bounds was preferred. In the armored would have been unable to control a car platoon, one car could cover the fast-moving battle or widely dispersed geant rode in the cross-country car (not movement of the other as they moved yet the well-known “jeep” or lesser- reconnaissance formation. There was known “peep”) from which they con- forward or to the rear. While one per- no way for the headquarters to act as an formed “overwatch,” the other moved. intermediary between troop and divi- trolled the movement of the two sec- The same mode of movement was tions. Control had to be executed sion headquarters for the transmission through flag, hand, or voice signals, standard operating procedure in the of information and intelligence. The armored cavalry platoon, and continues only officer charged with operations although voice could hardly have been today in the brigade cavalry troop’s effective. How the platoons would op- and intelligence also had an administra- erate together over extended distances platoons. tive function. Unlike in the light tank company, there was no reconnaissance appears not to have been considered. The Light Tank Regiment There is no indication that any of the sergeant. vehicles were radio equipped; there is The light tank regiment outlined in the The capability of the squadron, then, no mention of a radio operator in the Tables of Organization had, as its ba- armored cars. Thus it would be difficult sis, the light tank company to be found devolved on the armored car troop. It for the armored cars to perform long- in both the infantry and cavalry divi- was unclear from the tables, however, 20 just what the function of the troop was distance reconnaissance without an sions. That is, each platoon had five extended-range communication capa- light tanks with each of the five con- to be. It could operate independently. It bility. Motor messenger would have to sisting of a crew of two and a machine had its own mess, transportation, sup- ply, and maintenance section. It did not be the principal means of transmitting gun or 37mm cannon. The platoon information. leader and his platoon sergeant were have, however, a communications sec- not crew members. The replacement tion and no specially trained intelli- As for a combat role, the armored cars gence personnel. Any transmission of were too lightly armed to engage any section now became the “reserve” sec- tion, still under the command of a first messages would have had to be via tank. A .30-caliber machine gun had lieutenant, and equipped with nine motor messenger. In the armored car only very limited armor penetration platoons, one gets some sense of the capability. Mobility gave the platoon an fully-crewed tanks. This gave each platoon a back up of three tanks com- squadron’s intended purpose. Each advantage in skirting enemy positions, pletely prepared to take their place in platoon (there were three in the troop) but it was not intended for the platoon consisted of a second lieutenant, his to ride to the battle area and then dis- the line platoons if needed. platoon sergeant, two section sergeants, mount to fight. What the platoon could Looking at this organization, it is in- two corporals, and 12 armored car perform was to provide security for teresting to see how the triangular con- crewmen. An additional four “assistant vulnerable organizations, execute close- figuration was now creeping into the mechanics/gunners,” although assigned in reconnaissance and conduct delaying Army’s organization. This was to be to the troop headquarters, were meant actions. Its ability to “shoot and scoot,” seen particularly in the tank formations. to be employed in the platoon. For ve- for example, gave it the ability to stay There were the three platoons in the hicles, the platoon had one cross- behind and cover the withdrawal of a light tank company and three compa- country car and four armored cars, each supported organization. nies in the light tank battalion. The 32 ARMOR — July-August 2001

battalion headquarters company was cers, the warrant officer band leader, determining the decision to provide so heavy on administrative and logistics and 2,749 enlisted men, again including many replacements and the size of the personnel with the principal logistics the medical personnel. There were 135 maintenance section. element being a 17-man maintenance heavy tanks in the entire regiment.22 platoon. It was commanded by a first These vehicles were the ponderous, Why the crew which lost its tank lieutenant who was also the headquar- World War I-era Mark VIII tank which could not man a new vehicle is not ters company commander. The battal- were designed to work closely with the quite so evident. If a tank broke down, ion headquarters consisted of only infantry, operating at their pace.23 then the mechanic or mechanics in the seven officers, with a lieutenant colonel crew could be expected to remain with battalion commander, a major execu- This time, the triangular configuration the tank to repair it, but these were but tive officer, and a staff of five lieuten- was maintained even down to the pla- a fraction of the crew. The heavy tank ants. The organization thus reflected toons, which had three squads. Each of the time was not exactly a “user- the intended bias of being purely an squad consisted of one tank with a crew friendly” combat vehicle, so it may infantry support formation. of 11 men. Such was the “nature of the have been anticipated that if the tank beast” that the squad was commanded was hit, all or most of the crew would There were, further, three battalions in by a second lieutenant. The three-tank become casualties. If key personnel the regiment commanded by a full platoon had a first lieutenant com- were wounded or killed in the tank colonel. The other organizations in the mander, and there were three line pla- then, possibly for the sake of team- regiment were the headquarters and toons plus the headquarters in the com- work, it would have been easier to re- headquarters company, a 29-member pany. place the whole crew. In addition, a band, and a large maintenance com- fast-moving situation was not envi- pany. The latter company was a third- As with the light tank company, the sioned for the employment of the heavy echelon organization formed into four headquarters platoon was a large for- tank formations. Thus limited time to platoons and a company headquarters mation. It consisted of a big headquar- coordinate with the infantrymen ad- commanded by a captain. A “float” of ters section, designed to provide broad vancing mostly on foot was not a major four tanks was also provided within the administrative and logistics support and factor. The “set-piece” type of battle unit. reflecting the desire to make the com- envisioned for the employment of pany a self-contained organization. heavy tanks could be expected to yield The band was a standard formation for This could also be seen in the hefty a regiment at this time. There was no sufficient time for detailed briefing of maintenance section of 29 enlisted such a replacement crew. The tank division or brigade band, but the infan- men. try, artillery, engineer, and medical commander lieutenant could also be regiments all had organic bands. Mili- The most remarkable formation in the expected to quickly integrate his vehi- tary music had an important role in headquarters platoon was the reserve cle into the scheme of maneuver. maintaining regimental morale and section. It had a first lieutenant, six Whatever the reason for such a large esprit de corps. Emphasis was still on a second lieutenants, 60 enlisted person- reserve section, the company became a regimental structure and soldiers identi- nel, and six tanks. Thus, two-fifths of cumbersome organization for a captain fied most readily with their regiment. the entire tank company were held in to command. He had five first lieuten- There was no such feeling by soldiers reserve, with not just their vehicles but ants and 16 second lieutenants. There of attachment at brigade or division with their full crews ready for deploy- were 247 enlisted men for just 15 tanks. level. ment. When a tank became disabled, the whole system (which included the The tank battalion of which these The entire regiment consisted of 93 crew) was to be replaced. Evidently heavy tanks were components was also officers, the band leader warrant offi- expecting a high vehicle casualty rate, a cumbersome formation. It had over cer, and 1,733 enlisted men including either through enemy action or me- 900 officers and men to fight and sup- nine medical officers and 48 medical chanical failure, there was the very port 45 tanks. The battalion’s headquar- enlisted men. The most striking feature high ratio of replacement vehicles and ters company consisted of a 29-man of the regiment was the number of crews to line platoon elements. maintenance section (including a first tanks it was supposed to have. There lieutenant company commander) and a were 223 light tanks, just a few less There might have been other reasons 60 enlisted man company headquarters. tanks, both medium and light, than for this somewhat lopsided organiza- The preponderance of the battalion’s were to be found in the WWII armored tion. The heavy tank was even less reli- personnel were in the three line compa- division after the armored regiment able mechanically than the light tank. nies (again, a triangular formulation). organization was largely abandoned in This is reflected in the unit’s large 1943.21 maintenance organization. It must have The battalion headquarters was par- The Heavy Tank Regiment been expected that a large percentage ticularly light in assigned personnel, of a company’s tanks would be out of with no enlisted men and only seven If the light tank regiment was heavy commission at any one time, necessitat- officers, five of whom were lieutenants. on two-man tanks, the heavy tank ing immediate replacement. It appears There was only limited staff function- regiment was unique in the number of that tank employment experience in ing which reflects the lack of expecta- personnel in it. There were 237 offi- World War I still played a major role in tion that the battalion would engage as ARMOR — July-August 2001 33

a unit in independent action. The lieu- effective input into the conduct of op- mandate of preparing mid-level com- tenant colonel commanding the battal- erations. So, the tanks and armored cars manders for future combat. ion was in all probability best utilized became “tag-along” elements whose em- In 1930, there was no Armor School. as an armor advisor to a division or ployment was expected to be limited. corps commander. Indeed, there was no Armor branch, nor The huge infantry division literally armored force. Today, however, the Finally, the regiment itself consisted swallowed the light tank company. The Armor School has proponency for “... of three heavy tank battalions, a main- U.S. Army was saddled with a surfeit history of armor and armored cavalry tenance company, the regimental band, of obsolete World War I tanks which units at the brigade/regiment level and and a headquarters and headquarters gave little incentive to develop new, below...”26 The Command and General company. It appears that the employ- technologically advanced armored Staff School’s 1930 Tables of Organi- ment of the regiment called for either fighting vehicles. But with the armor zation for tank and motorized cavalry subordinate unit attachment or a break- tied to the slow-moving infantry tactics, are today part of that history. Although through accompanying infantry role. the lack of mobility became a moot not meant to be some stellar exposition, Given the state of vehicular radio point. One wonders how 15 light tanks the Tables are a concise revelation of communication, it is difficult to envi- in the line platoons were to give the the predominant thinking on mecha- sion anything for the regiment to be division anything but a tiny amount of nized/motorized force structure of the capable of beyond a limited accompa- armor-protected firepower and mobil- early interwar era. nying role. The staff was restricted to ity. Their limited capability suggests junior officers, which mitigated against that to the Army of the time, tanks were Notes the organizing of any independent op- simply a sop to the idea of mechanized 1John B. Wilson, “Influences on U.S. Army eration. The large maintenance com- warfare. Although the controversy as to Divisional Organization in the Twentieth Cen- pany of four platoons, each with 36 which combat arm, the cavalry or in- tury,” ARMY HISTORY (Washington, D.C., Fall men and an officer, on the other hand, fantry, was to ultimately control the 1996) p. 4. made it possible to provide effective successors to the World War I Tank 2The Command and General Staff School, Ta- support to a multitude of elements Corps was not yet full blown, there bles of Organization (The Command and General spread out among a number of sup- seems to be little doubt that, by 1930, Staff School Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., ported organizations. the future of an independent mecha- 1930) p. 1. Henceforth noted as “Tables.” nized/motorized combat arm was insig- It is obvious that the heavy tank regi- 3 nificant within the full context of the Tables, p. 75. ment, like its light tank regiment broth- manner in which battle was to be 4Wilson, p. 3. er, was to do battle as they had on the prosecuted as promulgated by the U.S. Western Front in World War I. Em- 5Tables, p. 68. Army’s leadership. ployment of independent mechanized 6See Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell and motorized combat formations had The independent tank regiments, seen Connor, Armor-Cavalry, Part I: Regular Army to be conducted using a methodology primarily as corps assets, were too and Army Reserve (U.S. Government Printing that saw the Army planning to fight the large and cumbersome to be little else Office, Washington, D.C., 1969) p. 40. One next war by preparing for the last one. but holding formations for numerous cavalry division was organized in Texas in De- cember 1917, the 15th, consisting of three bri- Conclusions small packets of tanks attached to in- fantry organizations. Attachment to the gades of three regiments each. A complete divi- The tentative institutional organiza- cavalry division operating in an inde- sion organization, however, was never formed tion of a cavalry division clearly pendent mode appears out of the ques- and the division was disbanded in May 1918. pointed the way towards using cavalry tion. If force structure was to reflect 7Russell, P. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants in exploitation and mobile warfare. The forward-thinking employment doctrine, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind., British experience with mounted troops then what was taught at the Command 1981) p. 1. The Regular Army’s 2d Cavalry in Palestine under General Allenby in and General Staff School in 1930 had Division, authorized under the 1920 National Defense Act, was inactive. See Stubbs and Con- 1917 and 1918 could also have served not progressed much in the ten years nor, p. 53. as a model, not only for horse-mounted after World War I.25 8Stubbs and Connor, p. 56. troops but for motorized formations as Not only was the inclusion of a lim- well.24 But it seems that the tanks and 9Tables, p. 13. armored cars in the division were ex- ited tank capability indicative of a “last war” mentality, so was the size of the 10 pected to yield small return. With the Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armour (Stevens & infantry division, the large number of Sons, London, 1960) p. 175. primitive state of mobile radio commu- horses, horse artillery, and horse trans- nications, it is difficult to see how these 11Tables, p. 13. port in the division, and the limited vehicles could be effectively controlled inclusion of aviation assets in both the 12Ogorkiewicz, p. 170. The French Renault FT, using signal flags and motor messen- cavalry and infantry divisions. with which the American light tank company was gers in a fluid situation. A significant equipped as a result of the tremendous number result was the fragmentation of com- Luckily, what was extant in 1930 was remaining in the U.S. Army’s inventory after mand and control. At the lowest levels, to be greatly altered in the next few World War I, carried either a 37mm gun or a there was a built-in bias against cohe- years. Ten years later, the entire land- machine gun in its turret. The two-man tank sive small unit leadership. At the levels scape had changed. It was impossible weighed about 6.5 tons, could attain a maximum of command where there were head- to not only ignore German and other speed of 4.8 miles per hour, and had an operating quarters elements, there was an excess foreign armored warfare developments, range of 25 to 30 miles. of overhead while the staffs were woe- but for the then-Command and General fully undermanned, thus denying them Staff School to stagnate in executing its Continued on Page 37 34 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Some Thoughts for Junior Officers On Making a Career Decision by Lieutenant Colonel James F. Pasquarette

If I were a junior officer today in the United States Army, I wouldn’t know what to think of my institution. Multi- ple sources (email, surveys, magazine articles, and newspaper stories) pro- claim that the Army is in trouble. Many of my peers are opting for civilian life. Separation time from my family con- tinues to rise due to increased opera- tional deployments. My equipment is aging with no plan to replace it. My pay is not commensurate with the re- quired commitment. The field grade officers in my battalion — my gauge to the future if I stay in the Army — work horrendous hours. The senior leaders are out of touch with the climate at the small unit level. On top of all this — there is not a clear explanation of how I fit into the grand Transformation plan. Most dis- Photo by Robert L. Stevenson concerting, however, is the gnawing feeling that my time and effort are not being applied toward a consequential consider myself an average officer rela- salary can meet most of your needs, but end. The nation is not at war. There is tive to my peers — many of whom will perhaps not meet all of your wants. possess more potential and ambition It certainly won’t make you a million- no Soviet Union to keep in check around the globe. Instead, the Army is than me. I explain this not for humil- aire by the time you are 30 years old. If relegated to preparing for an unlikely ity’s sake, but for credibility. I don’t you are incapable of meeting the physi- write this from the perspective of some- cal demands of the Army, you should war and keeping hate-filled areas of the world from becoming Third World one on the fast track to general officer. opt for civilian life. Officers must lead combat zones. In short, I feel a gravita- Rather, I explain my background to by example on the PT field. Being appeal to the junior officer who per- overweight, out of shape, or unable to tional pull to follow my peers out the door to the civilian world. ceives himself or herself to be on the go to the field are simply unacceptable. same glidepath that I have realized. It is There are other valid reasons to leave In fact, I am not a junior officer. I am most likely these officers who feel the Army based on the individual situa- — in civilian parlance — considered some pressure to leave the Army today. tion, but the reasons I have outlined “middle management,” a newly pro- apply to every officer and transcend moted lieutenant colonel. Before you Should you stay in or get out of the time. stop reading what I have to say, let me Army? It’s a good question — one that every officer should seriously ponder Why make the Army a career? There provide a few words on my background for reference. I did not go to West before making a career decision. I was are many reasons, more than most real- Point. I was not a distinguished ROTC not committed to the Army as a career ize. I’m thankful I stayed in the Army. for many years. Like today, the cons It’s the best decision — short of marry- graduate — I received an “other than RA” commission. I am not a combat seemed to outweigh the pros when I ing my wife — that I’ve ever made. veteran. I am not Ranger School quali- was considering the options. Outlined below are ten reasons junior officers today should consider making fied. I spent 18 months after the Ad- Why leave the Army? There are cer- vance Course at division G3 and bri- tainly some good reasons. Some offi- the United States Army a career. gade S4 shops prior to getting a com- cers discover as a lieutenant that they First, you should stay in the Army be- mand. I did not get a second company simply aren’t predisposed to be leaders. cause it needs you. You may not hear command. I watched countless num- There are places in the other services this from your chain of command, but it bers of my peers — good officers with for those without leadership ability. In is the truth. A majority of the Army’s great potential — take a financial in- the Army, there is not. If becoming reduction from 780,000 to 480,000 centive to leave the Army in the early independently wealthy is your driving soldiers took place while I was a junior 1990s. I was not selected for early pro- motivation in life, then the Army is not officer. In all honesty, the Army did not motion to major or lieutenant colonel. I the place for you. An Army officer’s require my service. In fact, it would ARMOR — July-August 2001 35

“Additionally, the quality of the people in the Army is extraordinary. Though I admit to knowing little about the civilian world, I believe the quality of people in the Army is second to none.” have been glad to do without me. The MWR trips, and Dining-Ins/Outs. The day. Soldiers need to see leaders that Army offered financial incentives to Army also ensures soldiers have time look like themselves succeeding in the my peer group to attain end strength for fun. Every federal three-day week- Army. It is intangibly healthy for the goals to avoid a painful Reduction-in- end is a four-day weekend in the Army. institution as a whole — and it’s what Force (RIF). Today, the drawdown is Soldiers receive compensation time makes the Army’s fiber so strong. complete. The Army has been at a after extended field duty and units take Sixth, the Army senior leadership is steady-state end strength for several block leaves once a year. committed to the good of the service. In years. Our Army is in the midst of transforming itself to address the reali- Not every day is fun. Combat readi- the civilian world, the senior executives ness is serious business that requires are often hired for their Ivy League ties of the new millennium. It needs soldiers to endure hardships that many education, ability to produce fiscal re- good officers to see Transformation through to fruition, especially on the civilians would deem unacceptable. sults, or to instill investor confidence. However, the Army realizes that sol- They quite often have no experience at execution end of the spectrum. Today’s diers need leisure activities and time for the lower levels in the business they’ve junior officers are needed as tomor- row’s middle managers and senior fun to compensate for the hardships been entrusted to lead. that training and readiness demand. leaders in the Objective Force Army. In Army senior leaders are grown from the interim, there will undoubtedly be Fourth, the Army is about people. The within — they’ve risen to the top of the periodic threats to the nation’s vital other services are about ships, aircraft, institution through meritorious service. interests. The National Command Au- or a mythical aura, while commercial However, there seems to be a concern thority will call upon the military to industry is about the fiscal bottom line. among junior officers today that Army conduct operations to protect these in- There are few institutions that go to the senior leaders are disconnected with terests, and soldiers will be sent into Army’s extreme to ensure the success reality at the company level. I had my harm’s way. Wars are human nature — of its individuals. A great example is doubts with the senior leaders mid- and the nation will continue to need a the Army’s emphasis on education: 1980s. I imagine a good portion of the combat-ready Army led by well-trained officer and NCO preparatory schools junior officers in World War I, World officers. for each leadership position, GED and War II, the Korean War, Vietnam — college programs for enlisted soldiers, and the times in between — had con- Second, the Army cares about your family. This was not always the case. degree completion for officers, and cerns with the direction of the Army various master and doctorate degree and the leadership provided at senior When I was a company commander, opportunities. Additionally, the quality levels. there was not a Family Support Group program. Army Family Team Building of the people in the Army is extraordi- I believe concern for the direction of nary. Though I admit to knowing little and awards/recognition for spouses did about the civilian world, I believe the the institution at the lowest levels is not exist. The Army in recent years has healthy if kept in context. I’ve had the come to understand that soldiers’ fami- quality of people in the Army is second unique opportunity to see our senior to none. Dedicated, hard working, self- lies are an important part of the Army less, physically fit, intelligent, and leadership in action over the last 15 team. A soldier must be confident that months. The experience has been re- his family will be taken care of if de- trustworthy are representative traits of freshing. The Army’s senior leaders are the average soldier. ployed away from home. Installation cognizant of the challenges today’s quality of life improvements are on the Fifth, the Army is a meritocracy. junior officers face. Since they are rise. They include Wellness Centers, Race, religion, ethnicity, and gender are products of the institution, they have Youth Centers, new hospitals, skate secondary to performance. If you per- experienced first-hand and are sympa- parks, new playgrounds, new schools, form, you are selected for promotion thetic to the dilemmas faced by junior privatized housing, and family fitness and positions of greater responsibility. I officers. They dedicate an inordinate centers. am not too naïve to think there are not amount of their time on initiatives in selection board racial and gender objec- support of the company commander. Third, the Army is fun. You are paid tives. But this is a form of affirmative Differences in opinion at the highest to do things that those in civilian life action as it was intended to be. There is level are not based on the desire for pay for: jumping out of airplanes, rid- not a quota system that elevates the ing in helicopters, four-wheeling in unqualified over the qualified. Rather, personal recognition or selfish designs but on heartfelt beliefs on what is best rough terrain, shooting all types of there are simple checks to ensure selec- for the Army. In short, I think junior weapons — from pistols to tanks, tion board results represent fully quali- “camping” in the woods, and playing fied individuals from across the racial officers would be surprised at senior leaders’ appreciation of life “on the “laser tag.” There are countless activi- and gender spectrum. As a white male, line” today. ties aimed at making life more enjoy- I fully support it. In fact, I’ve become able for soldiers that many take for proud of it. The Army set the standard Seventh, there are more opportunities granted: hails and farewells, free intra- on this front for the rest of society — than ever before for advancement. mural sports leagues, unit sponsored and continues to lead by example to- When I was a junior officer, battalion 36 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Evolving Army Structure

From Page 34 command was the overriding qualifica- pany command time. My only experi- tion for selection to the grade of colo- ences as a junior officer were on or 13Tables, p. 14. nel. Today, there are multiple avenues near Army installations. I had no refer- 14Tables, p. 68. to colonel — battalion command is no ence point to judge a soldier’s standing longer a prerequisite. The new career to those not in the Army. Since my 15Tables, p. 75. field personnel system will take a few company command, I’ve had several 16Stubbs and Connor, p. 50. years to solidify, but the end result will assignments that placed my family in 17 be more officers excelling in a field of non-military communities. At social Tables, p. 83. For how rifle troops fit into the cavalry regiment organization and how they were endeavor in which they both enjoy and gatherings, I was struck by the admira- organized, see Stubbs and Connor, p. 54. are best suited. tion and interest others had in me sim- ply because I am a soldier. In turn, their 18Tables, p. 76. Eighth, staying in the Army allows you to be a part of an altruistic en- lives seemed incredibly dull. Children 19Letter, U.S. Continental Army Command, 13 are sometimes the best judge of what is deavor. Service to country was a quaint January 1959, Subject: The Armored Cavalry important. My son, a fourth grader who Regiment (U). phrase as a junior officer. To be honest, attends an affluent Catholic school in it meant little to me. I was paying back 20Tables, p. 108. Atlanta, was asked by a friend what his my ROTC scholarship commitment. As father does for a living. Jay unassum- 21Stubbs and Connor, p. 61. The 1943 armored I’ve matured, I now appreciate the im- division had 263 tanks with medium M4 tanks portance in having a core of individuals ingly answered, “He’s in the Army.” The inquiring boy felt compelled to outnumbering the light tanks by a ratio of about that commit themselves to protecting hide the fact that his father was a law- two to one. our nation’s way of life. The eventual 22Tables, p. 109. realization that you are committed to yer, doctor, or some other well-com- pensated professional (I forget which). 23Ogorkiewicz, pp. 189-190. This tank was something more important than your- Instead, the boy told Jay his father was self is therapeutic in myriad ways: it based on the British designed heavy Mark VIII. becomes easier to get up in the morning “a policeman with a gun.” I’m sure the The rhomboidal heavy tank had overhead tracks other boy’s father makes much more and a main armament of two 57mm guns, one on for PT; there is a rationalization for the money than me, but Jay’s friend knows each side mounted in a sponson box. The tank did forced separations and long work “there’s something about a soldier.” not see action in World War I, with only a hun- hours; and you realize that the size of dred being constructed, the majority after the war the paycheck isn’t the measure of a I realize that my reasons for making had ended. The Americans employed the British person. the Army a career may sound ridicu- Mark V and Mark V Stars in the 301st Heavy lous to the average junior officer. I Tank Battalion during the war. See also Stubbs Ninth, the Army is a great institution. and Connor, pp. 46-47. It’s sometimes hard to recognize this know they would have sounded ridicu- lous to me ten or twelve years ago. The 24T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito fact as a junior officer. The Army for junior officer reading this probably me was initially more a job than a ca- eds., A Short Military History of World War I, reer; more a paycheck than a profes- envisions me awaking to the National (U.S.M.A.A.G. Printing Office, West Point, Anthem each morning, walking around N.Y., 1950) pp. 241-248. Allenby’s campaign in sion. Once I committed to a career in with a silly smile on my face all day, Palestine in 1917-1918 served as the basis for the Army, the worthy facets of the Major General John K. Herr’s lectures on mobile institution came into focus. Perhaps it and singing “The Army Song” with my family before bed each night. In reality, warfare at the Army War College in Washington, is human nature to accentuate the I think I am a fairly average person that D.C. during the 1920s. positive upon commitment to a career 25See James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg course of action. I started noticing that thoroughly enjoys what I do for a liv- ing. What I have outlined above is sim- (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan., Army Values are more than something ply how I feel — and how I think most 1992) pp. 92 and 190, for a scathing indictment worn on the dog tags. It is a standard — officers feel that make the Army a ca- of the instruction at the U.S. Army Command and an expectation for behavior — that I General Staff School between the two world reer. Not every day in the Army is nir- wars. have come to cherish. Many institutions vana — but on the whole, the good claim adherence to a set of values, but 26ARMOR, January-February 2001, Vol. CX, the Army lives it. Those that don’t meet dwarfs the bad. The Army is much more than “a great place to start.” It is a No.1, Contents Page. the standard leave the Army by various great place to enjoy an exceptionally means. Those that do meet the standard rewarding career. thrive in the Army. BG Raymond E. Bell Jr., USMA Finally, making the Army a career al- Class of 1957, served in the 3d Ar- lows you to continue being a soldier. LTC Jim Pasquarette is an armor mored Cavalry, 32d Armor, 15th There are few endeavors as honorable. officer who has served in tank bat- Armor in Korea, and 5th Cavalry in You will continue serving your country talions in various positions in Ger- Vietnam. He has been a member of alongside the national treasure — the all three components, last com- patriotic men and women that made a many, Korea, Fort Hood, and Fort decision to serve their country. I didn’t Stewart. He will take command of manding an Army Reserve MP bri- fully appreciate the privilege of serving 2-12 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division in gade. He attended both the Army with soldiers until the end of my com- July, 2001. and National War Colleges.

ARMOR — July-August 2001 37

The Poor Man’s GUARDFIST

by Captain Todd A. Scattini

When I took over as my battalion’s I can use two different methods of white target sketch paper. The observer scout platoon leader in March 1998, I execution, depending on the level of then places the “binos” back directly was fresh from the scout platoon lead- difficulty desired to train the soldier. over the target vehicle and begins the er’s course (SPLC), and confident that Using one method, I require the soldier adjustment process. The observer my scouts would be proficient in the to prompt me for all information neces- should be able to send the correct direc- skills necessary to detect, disrupt, and sary to request and adjust fire. The sol- tion to target and left/right and add/ destroy the enemy. At SPLC, I had been dier must ask for the location of the drop adjustment. The soldier discerns taught that indirect fire is the scout’s vehicle and the direction and distance the observer to target (OT) factor and main weapon. I had been told repeat- to the target. By prompting me for in- direction to target based upon the in- edly that a scout with a map, compass, formation, the soldier demonstrates his formation I previously gave him. I con- binoculars, and a radio could easily understanding of all necessary data for tinue to draw subsequent rounds as the sway the outcome of a battle through the call for fire. observer requests further adjustments. the use of his reports and indirect fire. Using the second method, I brief the Using this tool, you will be able to The platoon leader before me had soldier on the location of and direction train soldiers to call for and adjust indi- trained his men well. The platoon ser- and distance to the target vehicle. rect fires using any one of the three geant was exceptional, and the non- When I want the soldier to request a methods: grid, polar plot, or shift from commissioned officers were all ex- polar fire mission, I brief him on his a known point. This tool is an easily tremely skilled. However, after a few current grid location, as well. This does understandable visual aid that can be field exercises, I found a weakness in not have to be an exercise in map read- transported anywhere. I often use this the training of individual soldiers. Most ing, unless that is part of your intent. for opportunity training and rehearsals, of them, but not all, had difficulty call- As the trainer, I act as the fire support and have found it to be infinitely useful ing for and adjusting indirect fire, espe- officer (FSO), so I ensure the soldier — hopefully, you will, as well. cially those straight from advanced knows the call sign I will be using. SCOUTS OUT! individual training (AIT). Once the soldier has sufficient informa- tion to execute the call for fire, he per- Recognizing the deficiency was the easy part, but effectively training and forms the task using simulated radio CPT Todd A. Scattini has served transmissions. After the soldier sends as a tank platoon leader, 18 months testing the skill with no ammunition or the request for fire, to include the warn- time allotted in the call for fire simula- as an armor battalion scout platoon tor (CFFS) was the true challenge. I ing order, location, and description of leader in 2-70 Armor Battalion, and the target, I provide the message to 9 months as a brigade reconnais- needed a visual training aid that was observer (MTO). For example, “MTO, simple to use and explain, yet inexpen- sance troop leader in H Troop, 1st sive and easy to make. Investing a Gunner, 1 round, HE, target number AL4006.” Once the soldier correctly Cavalry. A recent graduate of small amount of time and a little repeats the MTO, I send “shot” and ACCC, he is currently working in imagination, I created a tool that is ef- the S3 shop, awaiting a troop com- fective, portable, and one that will re- “splash.” Five seconds after “splash,” I draw the impact of the round on the mand, in 1-4 Cav in Schweinfurt. main in my “kit bag” for quite a while. I took an 8½" x 11" sheet of clear plas- tic overlay material and used an office copier to print a binocular reticle onto it. When the binocular reticle overlay is placed over a sketch of a vehicle at long range, the effect is a simulated view as seen through binoculars. It took about five minutes to create the “binos.” I used PowerPoint to “draw” a binocular reticle that matched that of the M24 type binoculars used in my platoon. I printed that reticle out onto 5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 the overlay paper so that it was almost as large as the overlay (see diagram at right). On a second sheet of regular white paper, I sketched a target, a dug- in BMP or a T-80 in a wood line, for example. On this second sheet of paper, I draw the impact of rounds so that the Fig. 1. This is the binocular reticle to print out onto a clear sheet soldier can adjust them. of overlay paper. 38 ARMOR — July-August 2001 Information I provide the observer once prompted: Location of BMPs is NK861324 Distance to target: 2750m Direction to target: 1700 mils Observer location (optional): NK834322

5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5

Fig. 2. This is an example of a sketch to represent enemy BMPs Fig. 3. This is the view the observer will have after placing the as observed from an OP to generate the call for fire. “binos” over the sketch of the enemy.

5 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5

1 1

Fig. 4. After “splash” is given, draw the impact of the Fig. 5. Once the observer places the “binos” back over the tar- first round. get vehicles, he can see that the correction will be: “Direction 1700, left 150/add 400.”

3 3

2 1 2 1

Fig. 6. Continue to draw the impact of subsequent rounds as Fig. 7. After “fire for effect,” draw the destruction or displace- they are adjusted. Once the criteria is met, the observer can ment of the target vehicles which should generate the end of request “fire for effect.” mission and BDA report.

The PowerPoint file with larger graphics is available on our website at: www.knox.army.mil/armormag/ under the “Downloads” link.

ARMOR — July-August 2001 39

The Joint STARS Common Ground Station: A New Tool for the Maneuver Commander by Captain Mike Monnard

The last time COL Smith conducted a brigade-level training exercise with his unit, the intelligence infrastructure of his brigade combat team was limited to the organic assets of his direct support Military Intelligence company and the various scouts supporting his brigade. The unit is now preparing for deploy- ment, but this time COL Smith has a new tool in his kit bag: The Joint Sur- veillance and Target Attack Radar Sys- tem (Joint STARS) Common Ground Station. Before COL Smith can employ this piece of equipment, he and his staff must understand the system, its require- ments for employment, and the tech- niques for exploiting its capabilities. Mounted on a HMMWV, the Common Ground Station processes data from multiple sen- Upon completion of the Army’s Trans- sors, including the J-STARS E-8C aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other intelli- formation concept, each direct support gence platforms. –Motorola Photo MI company will possess a Joint STARS Common Ground Station (CGS) which will provide the Brigade Combat GRCA is normally 150 km by 150 km. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). MTI Team (BCT) with a rapidly deployable, The accompanying illustration puts this is the primary operating mode and is mobile, and responsive intelligence in perspective: the system could survey used to locate moving vehicles, rotating processing capability. However, tacti- a ground coverage area that incorpo- antennas, and slow moving aircraft. cal intelligence officers and maneuver rates most of New Jersey, plus the cit- SAR can provide a medium resolution commanders may not thoroughly un- ies of New York, Philadelphia, and photo-like radar image of a specified derstand the system, its requirements Trenton. area on the ground. Fixed Target Indi- for successful employment, or the tech- cator (FTI) is a sub-function of the niques for exploiting its phenomenal The radar has two operating modes, SAR mode, and is used to display sta- capabilities. Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and tionary targets. Joint STARS is comprised of two ma- jor components: the Joint STARS E-8C aircraft and the Common Ground Sta- tion. The Joint STARS E-8C, a modi- fied Boeing 707, is maintained and operated by the Air Force. The Com- mon Ground Station (AN/TSQ-179 mis- sion shelter), to include all sub- NEW YORK CITY systems, is maintained and operated by the Army. It consists of a ground data terminal, communications system, and operations system mounted on an M1097 HMMWV. The Joint STARS phased array radar can survey up to 62,000 square kilome- TRENTON ters every 60 to 90 seconds. This area is referred to as the Radar Reference Cov- erage Area (RRCA). The Ground Ref- erence Coverage Area (GRCA) is smaller than the RRCA and remains PHILADELPHIA under constant surveillance, regardless of the position of the E-8C aircraft. The Joint STARS Ground Reference Coverage Area (GRCA) 40 ARMOR — July-August 2001 The systems on the J-STARS E-8C provide a Synthetic Aperture Radar mode that can produce photo-like radar pictures of the battlefield and a Moving Target Indicator mode that tracks any- thing moving in the battlespace.

The radar cannot operate in both from the Intelligence Broadcast System tivity (i.e., assembly areas, battle posi- modes simultaneously, but can switch (IBS) via the Joint Tactical Terminal. tions, and disposition). modes so quickly that it is transparent to the users of Joint STARS data. Upon arrival in theater, COL Smith To exploit the capabilities of the CGS, and his BCT begin the RSOI process. He observes his unit conducting pre- the mission shelter must remain in COL Smith has just received the Exe- close proximity to the supported TOC. cute Order and is ready to move to the combat checks and inspections in as- However, the primary emplacement sembly areas within the seaport of Sea Port of Embarkation (SPOE). The departure (SPOD). COL Smith still criteria is line of sight from the data BCT will be among the first units into link antenna to the aircraft. Placing the country and the division commander does not fully understand what the CGS antenna on a three-meter mast attached will need in order to provide his BCT has told him that Joint STARS will be with a better intelligence picture. He to the shelter, or remoting it on a tripod available to support his operations. up to 100 meters away, often improves Prior to their departure, COL Smith grabs the S2 and MI company com- the line of sight, but if remoting the mander and asks for a brief regarding calls the brigade signal officer into his the unique requirements of the CGS. antenna does not provide line of sight office because he is concerned about to the aircraft, the unit must move. To spectrum management and what the The CGS is authorized six Imagery retain connectivity, Remote Work Sta- CGS will need to communicate with the Ground Station Operators (MOS 96H). tions (RWS) are often set up in the Joint STARS aircraft. The crew consists of one staff sergeant TOC while relocating the CGS up to (CGS team leader), one sergeant (assis- one kilometer away to gain line of sight Prior to establishing a secure data link, UHF voice communication is the tant team leader), and four ground sta- with the aircraft. tion operators. The crew is trained to primary means of contact between the operate the system, provide hard and Coordination and communication be- E-8C and the CGS. Once established, the Surveillance and Control Data Link soft copy products, establish interfaces tween the CGS and the E-8C is critical with all systems, and provide basic for efficient and effective operations. (SCDL) — a Joint STARS-unique, level analysis of Joint STARS imagery Communication between the BCT bat- jam-resistant, two-way up-and-down data link — provides for free text mes- products. The CGS team’s analysis is tle staff and the aircrew is done via the limited to determining if the moving data link or secure voice. To ensure saging as its primary means of commu- target indicator data represents moving success, units must develop an SOP nication. As many as 15 CGSs can es- tablish a secure, two-way data link with vehicles or is simply ground clutter, that includes procedures for dynamic and determining ground patterns which re-tasking and addressing the following the E-8C, while an unlimited number of may define certain types of enemy ac- coordination requirements: CGSs can receive data. All links re- quire line of sight between the CGS and the aircraft. The Surveillance and Control Data Link is used to broadcast E-8C data to the CGS, transmit radar service re- quests from the CGS to the aircraft, transmit digital free text messages be- tween the CGS and the aircraft, and transmit E-8C location and speed up- dates to the CGS. The CGS receives, stores, processes, correlates, dissemi- nates, and displays near-real-time radar imagery from the Joint STARS E-8C. It In Moving Target Indi- can also receive, display, and dissemi- cator Mode, the screen nate unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) highlights all vehicles video from a UAV ground control sta- on the move, like these tion and secondary imagery from thea- columns of tanks. ter and national sources. Additionally, signals intelligence data is received ARMOR — July-August 2001 41

From BCT to E-8C indicator and SIGINT overlays, along asks the MI company commander the with UAV information, and the battle status of Joint STARS, and he is told -Current OPORD and enemy front staff can formulate a more effective that the E-8C is on station and the CGS line trace attack plan. is receiving data. COL Smith tells his -Current PIR staff he wants to attrit the first echelon -Special requirements During the battle preparation phase, the ground station can provide targets by 50 percent before it comes into con- tact with the BCT defense. He then From the E-8C to BCT and also information as to how the en- turns to the S2, S3, and FSO and orders emy is reacting to preparatory fires. -On/off station times During the battle, the ground station them to begin the targeting process. -GRCA coordinates concentrates on any enemy movement The CGS contributes, in varying de- -Orbit locations and subsequent commitment of re- grees, to all phases of the targeting serves. Joint STARS MTI provides process. To disseminate its products, the CGS most of the combat information. As the connects directly to the Army’s digi- enemy moves to and from battle posi- Decide. The CGS provides informa- tized command and control systems. tions, the ground station cues the UAV tion on the disposition and location of These include ASAS, Maneuver Con- to confirm any activity, and when enemy forces. The CGS team leader trol System (MCS), and the Advanced movement of the reserve is detected, advises the battle staff on areas of Field Artillery Tactical Data System other intelligence sensors are notified masked terrain, as well as what targets (AFATDS). The ground station is con- or repositioned to identify and track the the E-8C can detect and track. nected to ASAS either by LAN or di- movement. rect hardwire and, if necessary, via the Detect. Joint STARS is ideally suited Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) The CGS supports defensive opera- tions by using all available sensor feeds to detect moving targets. By comparing Network. The CGS is connected to MTIs to criteria for targets, along with AFATDS the same way, or via the Sin- to determine the enemy’s main attack SIGINT cues and imagery, the CGS and follow-on forces. The Joint STARS gle Channel Ground and Airborne Ra- can identify specific tracks. dio System (SINCGARS) as an over- moving target indicator is the primary the-air data link. To communicate with sensor for detection of enemy forces as Track. The ground station is effective Army aviation, the ground station in- they depart assembly areas and move into combat formations. The CGS will at tracking moving targets and monitor- cludes an Improved Data Modem ing target areas for changes. The key (IDM) to forward freeze-frame MTI detect and track enemy movement, component to maintaining target conti- data and receive AH-64D Longbow allowing the commander to see how the enemy is arraying his forces. By using nuity is the moving target indicator Apache fire control radar images. capability. MTI to cue the UAV, the BCT com- The ground station can simultaneously mander can clarify the enemy disposi- display collateral level SIGINT reports, tion in sufficient time to reposition Deliver. The CGS continues to update video imagery from UAVs, imagery the target location, facilitating adjust- forces and set the conditions for de- ment of fires, until the attack is com- products from U2 and ARL, and fire struction of the enemy. control radar freeze-frame pictures plete. from Longbow Apaches The ground station supports stabiliza- tion and support operations (SASO) Assess. The CGS can provide a corre- The BCT is prepared for its first mis- with its ability to receive and display lated sensor product for limited battle- sion in theater. They have just received multiple sensor feeds. The CGS also field damage assessment (BDA). The the OPLAN brief from the joint task provides an electronic record that is fidelity of the assessment is based on force. As COL Smith sits down to pre- used for analysis. The CGS can track the ground station’s correlated moving pare his planning guidance to the bri- friendly convoys, determine traffic vol- target indicator, unmanned aerial vehi- gade staff, he wonders how the CGS ume and track movement on road net- cle, and signals intelligence data. can assist the BCT during the upcom- works, monitor military motor pools for Not only does the ground station pro- ing military decision-making process vehicle deployments, and back-track (MDMP) and impending battle. vehicle movement to determine point vide the brigade team with target in- formation, but its ability to correlate The ground station supports the BCT of origin. multiple sensor information on a single in the offense by providing enemy loca- In a SASO environment, HUMINT screen allows targeting cells to detect, tions, battle positions, large obstacles, and SIGINT might provide the cue to classify, and track potential targets, as and the location and movement of re- conduct analysis of archived CGS in- well as determine battlefield damage serve forces. With this information, the formation. For example, HUMINT following an attack. commander can shape the battlefield sources may reveal points and times of before crossing the line of departure. threat activity. With that information, The ground station provides Army For example, during mission analysis aviation the same targeting and battle- CGS records are reviewed by the battle field awareness support available to and COA development, the CGS might staff to determine originating locations be focused on where and how the en- and movement. other combat units. In addition, it is an emy is establishing defensive positions. important tool for planning cross-FLOT Using the SAR mode, the ground sta- COL Smith has been notified by his S2 operations. Specifically, the ground sta- tion provides supplemental imagery of that the enemy has penetrated the cov- tion can pass MTI data via the Im- defensive positions and large obstacles. ering force and a motorized rifle regi- proved Data Modem to Apache Long- Add to that Joint STARS moving target ment is attacking from the march. He bow aircraft. The only requirement is 42 ARMOR — July-August 2001

Mountain Cavalry from Page 18

Conclusion. The days of bypassing all David Spence Sales, 1LT Wade Bird- radio line of sight between the CGS built-up areas greater than 1 kilometer well, and 1LT Toby Austin. Without and the aircraft. are gone. Even in the Third World, input from my former platoon leaders urban sprawl and modernization has this article may still have been sitting The CGS also provides the com- made MOUT a fact of military life. on my hard drive. mander a means of improving the ef- Cavalry scouts will lead units into and fectiveness of CAS sorties. The CGS through those areas. Doing so requires MTI capability is the primary means of the careful application of DTLOMS by improving this effort. When moving CPT Richard R. Rouleau enlisted unit leaders. This brief article showed in the Army National Guard in 1982 targets are detected, the information is how one unit maintains its combat edge forwarded to the TACP and forward air by using all the available tools at hand. and transferred to active duty in controller, who acquire the targets and Apache Troop draws on the experience 1984 as an M60A1 armor crewman. direct the CAS aircraft. The command- of its combat veterans, seasoned in op- His previous enlisted assignments er determines the target and engage- erations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. include the 133d Engineer Battal- ment area. The TACP/FAC moves into Much of that experience has gone into ion; 2-6 Cav; 2-72 Armor; and HQ position. MTI are detected and the in- the creation of the MLC4 and the unit USAG, Fort Drum. In 1991, he was formation is passed to the TACP/FAC. leaders make sure that all troopers commissioned in Armor from Niag- The ALO continuously updates the benefit from that combat course train- ara University. He has served as a TACP/FAC. The TACP/FAC then pos- ing. Finally the unit never stops refin- itively identifies the target, and CAS tank platoon leader, company XO, ing its TTPs in combat drills that im- and BMO in 2-37 Armor, 3ID, and attacks it. prove the unit’s ability to meet the challenges of MOUT. A/S3, S4 and troop commander of “The primary mission of Joint STARS A/3-17 Cavalry, 10th Mountain Divi- is … to provide dedicated support to ground commanders.” (FM 34-25-1) The following troopers provided valu- sion. He is currently assigned to the able input and deserve the lion’s share Joint Readiness Training Center as Under the Army Transformation Con- of the credit: 1LT Kevin Scott, 1LT an observer/controller. cept, every BCT will possess a power- ful tool to support and focus its efforts. The CGS provides the BCT a surveil- lance platform with a wide variety of capabilities, to include a Near Real Fig. 6. TRP BUA Movement SOP Setup Time (NRT) picture of the battlefield. Not only will the CGS detect and track targets in combat and pre-combat formations, but when remoted into the TOC, it will assist the commander in BLD 8 battle management and increased situ- Cordon ational awareness. It is, therefore, criti- cal that both tactical intelligence offi- BLD 6 BLD 7 cers and maneuver commanders under- CP2 stand the Joint STARS CGS and its PL Four value added to the MDMP and the war- BLD 4 fighting capabilities of the BCT. BLD 5 PL Three

CPT Mike Monnard was commis- BLD 2 BLD 3 sioned in September 1992 following Cordon graduation from Officer Candidate PL Two School. He served with the 1-43 BLD 1 ADA Battalion as an air defense CP1 officer until 1996. Upon completion of the MI Transition and Advance PL One RECON Course, he served as a company commander in the 902nd MI Group at Fort Meade, Md. Following com- RECON mand, he served as the division CDR cavalry squadron S2 and 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment S2 at Fort Bragg, N.C. Recently complet- ing 10 rotations as the G2 opera- EVAC/QRF tions officer for Operations Group, NTC, he currently serves as the CACHE light infantry task force S2 trainer.

ARMOR — July-August 2001 43 - All Photos by Robert L. Stevenson

Division Capstone Exercise Verifies the Effectiveness Of Army’s Tactical Internet

(This article was prepared by the ARMOR the III Corps’ land campaign counterof- information systems improvements to staff from exercise reports. – Ed.) fensive capability, and that these Leg- the division’s formations. acy Force systems, especially as up- The Army’s search for enhanced com- dated with the latest technology, remain The outcomes of brigade and division bat capabilities through the application dominant battlefield killers. Advanced Warfighting Experiments in 1997 demonstrated that the Army was of advanced technologies — a process Over the past ten years, the Army has known as digitization — reached an- on the verge of achieving powerful other milestone this spring at the Na- searched for advanced technologies that enhancements to waging combat. As would empower its formations to dom- such, the goal was set to bring the 4th tional Training Center, where the first inate information as an element of fully digitized brigades demonstrated ID’s combat brigades to a go-to-war that they were fully capable of accom- combat power. The search for these ad- status employing advanced capabilities. vanced technologies and concepts came plishing their wartime missions. The Division Capstone Exercise, Phase to be known as “digitization,” and be- I, was the expression of this goal. In The Division Capstone Exercise (Phase gan in earnest in 1994 with the first October, a second phase of the DCX at 1) (DCX I), conducted against Fort advanced warfighting exercise, Desert Fort Hood, Texas, will continue the Irwin’s world class OPFOR, demon- Hammer, at the National Training Cen- assessment. strated the capabilities of the 2d Bri- ter. Soon after that, III Corps’ 4th In- gade Combat Team and 4th Aviation fantry Division (M) was designated as During Phase I of the Division Cap- Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division the Army’s experimental division for stone Exercise at the NTC, leaders ex- (Mechanized). The exercise confirmed the application of advanced warfighting pressed tremendous confidence in their that these “Ironhorse” Division units, concepts. Subsequent combat training, organizations and equipment, which equipped with the M1A2 SEP tank, the materiel developments, and further greatly improved a range of capabili- M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and field experimentation have led to the ties: “When fighting at night, these sys- the AH-64D Apache Longbow attack incorporation of a range of organiza- tems are unmatched. My Bradleys made helicopter, can contribute decisively to tional, doctrinal, combat platform, and direct fire kills routinely at 3700 meters 44 ARMOR — July-August 2001

and asymmetric strategies, and employ the full range of unpredictable and le- thal tactics expected on today’s and future battlefields. The range of modernized and recapi- talized combat systems, such as the M1A2 SEP Tank, AH-64D Longbow Apache and the M2A3 Bradley Fight- ing Vehicle, have significantly in- creased the lethality of the 4th Infantry Division. The 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infra-red Radar (FLIR), Com- mander’s Independent Thermal Viewer Bradley crewman enters enemy location data on the FBCB2 touch screen. (CITV), and enhanced mechanical reli- ability improved warfighting capability. and beyond. Additionally, the FBCB2 tion of our new technologies. They An upgraded and modernized informa- increased our situational awareness dra- conducted non-stop operations against tion network, linking these combat plat- matically. We were able to conduct a very adaptive enemy employing forms, empowered commanders to exe- bold maneuvers at night that we would asymmetric strategies, and validated cute precision maneuver and fires. “The normally only do during daylight,” said new Army tactics and strategies for DCX provided us with continuous op- CPT Dane Acord, commander of B Co, combat operations. erations in a tactical environment that 2-8 IN. challenged our systems — our commu- SFC Campos, platoon sergeant for nications systems, our digital systems, Phase I of the DCX focused on com- 2nd Platoon, A Co, 3-67 AR, provided and our warfighting systems — against bat brigade operations in an expanded one example of the demonstrated le- a very, very competent OPFOR,” said tactical battlespace, the ability to ex- thality of the 4th ID during the DCX. MG Ben Griffin, commander of the 4th ploit information, achieve dominant On 4 April, as the OPFOR attacked, ID. maneuver, execute fire and maneuver, SFC Campos destroyed 15 enemy ar- conduct tactical assault and sustain mored vehicles. With the powerful DCX I demonstrated that the soldier combat power. Phase II will focus on a sights of the M1A2 SEP, he identified remains the centerpiece of the Army division combat operation as part of a targets up to 8 kilometers away and and represents the core of the nation's III Corps fight in a robust Battle Com- destroyed them as they entered his en- ability to fight and win wars — deci- mand Training Program scenario, exer- gagement area. This ability to acquire, sively. DCX I provided an opportunity cising the full range of division com- identify, and destroy targets was the to enhance combat leader development mand and control capabilities at bri- result of several factors. First, SFC in a contemporary threat environment. gade and divisional level. Campos had the most lethal equipment Tough, field-wise soldiers and leaders currently available. Second, empow- in well-trained teams achieved a level “The new systems give soldiers great- ered by advanced technology, he had of situational awareness during DCX I er levels of understanding of where that empowered them to accomplish friendly forces are located, where sol- excellent situational awareness that maximized the potential of his direct their combat tasks under extremely de- diers are located themselves, and where fire weapon system. Third, SFC Cam- manding, continuous, and lethal condi- the enemy is located,” said SGT Robert tions. They were able to exploit the na- Munsey, B/1-67AR. “With the new sys- pos had a trained crew. His gunner has been with him for two years. They ture of their environment, apply their tems, we can virtually pick and choose knew their tank and they knew each competencies in field craft and tech- our fighting positions, giving us the other. nology, and relentlessly pursue their freedom to seize every opportunity.” tactical missions to fight and win en- DCX I was more than just a assess- The warfighting activities during DCX gagements and battles. Enhanced and ment, certification or experiment. It I were executed in force-on-force and enabled by the latest ground combat demonstrated the 4th ID’s ground ma- live-fire scenarios designed to replicate and information systems, the soldiers of neuver and aviation brigades’ combat likely deployment and contingency op- the “Ironhorse” Division proved their mission capability across a range of erations in a major theater of war. Ex- mettle against a wily and cunning foe attack and defend missions — enabled traordinary effort was expended to de- and came out better trained and pre- with battle command, organizational, velop a contemporary operational envi- pared to win on the battlefield. equipment, doctrinal, and C4ISR en- ronment that would challenge 4th ID “… It is clear at this point that these hancements. Tough, demanding, realis- units with a world class opposing force units are superior warfighting outfits tic training challenged the competence that operated continuously across the whose great soldiers are able to su- and character of every soldier and spectrum of conflict. The opposing perbly leverage information technology leader and the reliability and contribu- force was designed to execute adaptive to significantly enhance the combat ARMOR — July-August 2001 45 effectiveness of the Army,” said MG The unparalleled navigation capabili- provide proper resources at the critical B.B. Bell, Chief of Armor, who served ties and situational awareness provided place and time on the battlefield. as Exercise Director. by this electronic network gave 4th ID • Well-trained and well-led soldiers, the ability to know where its forces The Army’s investment in developing were, as well as the location of the en- equipped with appropriate technology, the Army Battle Command System remain central to effective combat op- (ABCS), along with doctrinal, organi- emy, even during periods of darkness, erations. sandstorms, and in difficult terrain. zational, and materiel system upgrades, Armed with this accurate information, • Improved intelligence, surveillance, powerfully enhanced the 4th ID (M)’s ability to fight. The observed units 4th ID demonstrated unprecedented syn- and reconnaissance systems (e.g., tank chronization, speed, and agility under 50-power FLIR, TUAV, JSTARS, etc.) were judged to have achieved their all battlefield conditions. The advan- dominated acquisition at extended training goals and possess a formidable go-to-war capability. Maneuver units tages also extended to the area of air- ranges. ground integration. The integration of • are more lethal than before. They pos- Air Force A-10s and F-16s into the 4th Artillery, while performing satisfac- sess and routinely employ an all- torily, requires improved range, rates of weather night and day combat capabil- ID’s tactical internet provided friendly fire, mobility, and survivability. Future locations on the pilots’ Head-Up Dis- ity. They are survivable, and can effec- plays (HUDs) and proved decisive in systems require simplified sensor-to- tively dominate the enemy in an ex- shooter links and quicker response panded, dispersed battlespace. During the close air support role. An Air Force times for accurate fires. JSTARS provided Moving Target Indi- DCX I, the training units, enhanced cators digitally to the cockpit of DCX I confirmed the course for the with ABCS, operated with greater ini- tiative, at faster tempo, and adapted Apache Longbows, significantly en- transformation of III Corps into the hancing the 4th ID’s ability to apply nation’s land campaign counteroffen- more quickly to changing battlefield decisive and overwhelming force on sive formation. While the Army pur- situations. the battlefield. sues solutions to Objective Force re- The 1-67 AR Scout Platoon demon- quirements, III Corps’ counteroffensive strated the significance of having a The exercise surfaced some solid con- capability will form the nucleus of the Common Operating Picture (COP) that clusions: nation’s ability to fight and decisively accurately portrayed both friendly and • conclude land campaigns over the next DCX I units have achieved a go-to- 15 to 20 years. enemy locations. The scout platoon, war capability. having completed the security zone • DCX I thrust the mechanized and avi- fight, experienced one of their most III Corps is postured today to de- ation brigade combat teams of the 4th challenging operations. Using advanced liver the legacy counteroffensive force, Infantry Division (M) into a complex technology to pinpoint their locations, with full-spectrum relevance, against a threat and terrain environment typical the platoon moved back on a moonless contemporary operational threat for the of what we expect on today’s battle- night, in the midst of a blowing sand- next 15-20 years. fields and those in the future. The bri- storm, and passed safely through desig- • Recapitalized and modernized leg- gades executed their warfighting doc- nated lanes in the mine/obstacle belt acy systems are more lethal than ever trine, learned to synchronize the ele- without delay or casualty. Equally im- ments of combat power, and employed portant, the battalion had an accurate and demonstrate significant overmatch against potential enemies. their full range of combined arms. Im- picture of the scout locations and accu- portantly, DCX I demonstrated the bri- rately tracked their rearward move- • The force significantly increased its gades’ ability to effectively employ in- ment. pace and tempo in continuous, day/night formation as an exponential element of operations. The new, networked Army Battle combat power. These units are fully ca- Command System (ABCS) empowered • Effective information technology pable of fighting and winning deci- soldiers to be responsive and dominant (ABCS) systems provided the same sively. across the full spectrum of military picture of the battlefield to all friendly “The process of digital transformation operations. The sharing of knowledge forces. isn’t just about new equipment. It is a between the primary killers on the bat- • process that involves developing lead- tlefield — the M1A2 SEP Tank, the Continued improvements in ad- ers who can see opportunities in time M2A3 Bradley, and the AH-64 Apache vanced technology will build an even more significant overmatch capability and space provided by information su- Longbow — enabled the division to periority, and be versatile and adaptive apply overwhelming combat power at for the future. enough to take full advantage of those the decisive point in order to defeat the • Information superiority significant- opportunities,” said LTC Damon Penn, enemy. ly improved the logistician’s ability to commander of 1-67 Armor. 46 ARMOR — July-August 2001

LETTERS from Page 4 tanks, five-tank companies assigned to four- with 16 soldiers, let alone 12. I led two pla- advantage offensively that I can see going to company regiments (21 tanks). toons, one in Korea and one at Fort Riley, a three-tank platoon. both with four tanks, and with the ebb and The authors misstate the doctrinal mission flow of personnel shortages. I had no prob- Finally, we’ve already begun to eliminate 14 of the tank platoon, which is NOT to act as a lem managing or focusing on the 8 to 15 tanks, 14 Bradleys and 2 M1064 mortar car- single element (i.e., fire or maneuver). Per soldiers and four tanks that I had, depending riers from every heavy battalion and the FM 17-15, Chapter 1, Section 1: “The tank on what time of year it was and what training challenges to the task force commanders platoon is the smallest maneuver element cycle we were in. So, I don’t understand the and their staffs trying to develop new tactics, within a tank company. Organized to fight as claim that we need to make a platoon techniques, and procedures is already pro- a unified element, the platoon consists of leader’s job easier by giving them one less ducing wild new concepts. The four-tank four main battle tanks organized into two tank and four fewer soldiers to lead. I would platoon works, the wingman concept works, sections, with two tanks in each section.” submit that by taking away those four sol- and if a platoon leader can’t handle four Though, admittedly, poorly worded, further diers the platoon leader’s life just got worse. tanks, how will he handle 14 as a captain? reading clearly emphasizes operating by CPT MIKE HENDERSON sections in order to fire and maneuver. A In addition to that, I’ve commanded an CMTC three-tank platoon lacks this flexibility. M1A2 company at Fort Hood where that

installation wrote the book on red cycles and The authors’ contention that the wider the Good Idea tasking. The M1A2 technol- frontages of digitized operations overtax the An Infantryman Speaks Out ogy is perishable. Unless the digital system platoon leader’s ability completely misses On the Challenges of His Branch is trained at least weekly and integrated into the point of digitized command and control, every single crew, platoon, and company and simplifying platoon collective training by Dear Sir: training period, we may as well fight the eliminating tasks (and capabilities) is just M1A1. My reply concerns one of the letters to the bad training. editor in the May-June 2001 ARMOR maga- Second, operating with four fewer soldiers zine, “No Badges Needed for Esprit: Armor- Having fewer tanks per platoon does not with the same OPTEMPO will not improve solve logistical problems unless you reduce Cav Is Elite Enough,” a letter from CPT our lethality, but will exacerbate the problem Robert Ricks, I offer the following response. the total numbers of tanks overall (massing with maintaining competent, lethal tank tanks by consolidating them into a single crews. I don’t think the authors can guaran- While I certainly agree in principle to some brigade, as suggested in the article, defeats tee that my prime time training will increase of CPT Ricks’ letter to the editor concerning the purpose). The suggested improvement in just because we have reduced the tank bat- the [proposed] Expert Armor Badge/Combat manpower is illusory, since shortages are a talion by another 9 to 12 tanks. Armor Badge (EAB/CAB), I take issue with percentage of authorized strength, and a several portions of his thought process. three-tank platoon can be at 75 percent My last counter-argument is with the claim strength just as readily as a four-tank pla- of operation over wider frontages. Okay, yes First, his statement that, “There is no glam- toon. at NTC, Kuwait, and Iraq, no argument. But our or élan inherent in the world’s oldest what about CMTC, Korea, and the Balkans? branch of arms.” Maybe in his opinion. How- Historically, the three-tank platoon was an I’ve OC’d six heavy rotations at CMTC. ever, I did not become an infantryman for the inefficient response to a desperate situation Fighting a platoon across a frontage that “glamour or élan.” I joined it for the tough, when all else failed. Rather than a new ap- stretches from the 15 Tango Bowl down to realistic, soldier-oriented roles and chal- proach, it is a last resort. Let’s not go there. the Hohenburg DZ does the platoon no good lenges it offered me as a leader, and the Let’s train to standard, instead. if the one T-80 in the CSOP is facing one-on- opportunity to tackle one of the toughest, CHESTER A. KOJRO one with “A11.” In restrictive terrain, you most undesired and unglamorous, yet criti- LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.) aren’t going to get three-and-a-half-kilometer cal, roles on the battlefield — that of the shots with the FLIR. If the platoon leader is combat infantryman. We do what others unable to mass his THREE tanks rapidly on could not accomplish, or would not dare to Three-Tank Platoon Poses that T-80 IAW FM 17-15, I don’t see how a attempt. CPT Ricks’ premise that Cav has Problems of Terrain, Training three-tank platoon is more lethal. At least the “toughest mission” in the Army is from with the four-tank platoon, the platoon leader his perspective. I know a lot of infantrymen has a wingman that provides the ability to who would beg to differ. Our roles are com- Dear Sir: fire and maneuver. plementary. Each has its “tough” portions. After reading Major Stringer’s and Major According to FM 17-15, page 1-2, the Second, don’t equate the cost of equipping, Hall’s article, I have to disagree with some of wingman concept is a doctrinal technique. maintaining, and/or sustaining with the qual- their arguments for reducing the size of the FM 17-15 states: “Under battlefield condi- ity of a soldier or unit. While historically this tank platoon. First of all, the truth in the ar- tions, the wingman concept facilitates control may have been the case, just because you gument is that money is the bottom line. If it of the platoon when it operates in sections.” “cost” more does not make you “better” or were not for budget constraints, we would Again, with the loss of a wingman, taking create or indicate “élan.” A discussion on not be discussing this topic at all. advantage of the technology by operating on élan with some 75th Rangers or some old extended frontages in restrictive terrain is infantrymen from the Big Red One, who The primary arguments in support of this nullified with the three-tank platoon. Although fought in every war in the last century, might change are that a second lieutenant can the IVIS will let me know exactly where my broaden his horizons and understanding of focus better on three tanks rather than four. platoon is dispersed in restrictive terrain, it “élan.” Again, we each have our role. Infantry [Other points are that] reduction of the num- won’t be able to magic move my vehicles to forces are better suited on some terrain, ber of tanks in the company will solve per- mass fires on the enemy if the enemy is against some enemies, and provide certain sonnel shortages, and that the M1A2 is ca- protected by a ridgeline. The CITV, I think, is capabilities. Likewise, mounted forces. The pable of operating over wider frontages be- cause of its advanced technology. the best improvement that the M1A2 has to point is combined arms and a “team” effort, offer (I have no experience on the SEP); not about “who’s better or cooler.” (Inciden- First, the authors are forgetting corps, divi- however, the CITV offensive engagement tally, élan has two definitions: 1) enthusiastic sion, brigade, and battalion red cycles. With (B1) on TT VIII is conducted on a smooth liveliness and vigor: ZEST; 2) flair:style. the J-Series MTOE, the platoon could possi- course road and is not performed on the Which part of élan is he equating the Cav bly salvage 50 percent of the crew during “washboard” at the NTC. Therefore, the with? Some would argue the latter, which battalion and brigade red cycles, but forget CITV pays the most dividends in a defensive does not necessarily equate to combat ca- trying to train during corps and division red or counter-recon scenario. Again, there is no pabilities.) ARMOR — July-August 2001 47

Third, his reference to “badge-happy” infan- gear. We were now separated from our ar- will move in to assist you when your backs trymen. Most honest to goodness infantry- mored brothers in the other armored corps are to the wall. Yes, you had better hope that men I know could give a rat’s butt about around the world. Now this may not mean a we, the other soldiers, meet and exceed the badges. It’s about competence AND demon- lot to young armor soldiers today, but very standards, just as you do. strated skills. All a badge shows (for the few of today’s soldiers were in the Army most part) is a demonstrated skill. I’ve known when tankers were allowed to wear this spe- I have been hearing how the black beret is several infantrymen with every badge the cial headgear. [Instead of berets,] we were the uniform item that shows your distinction Army can bestow who were not worth the ordered to wear the old baseball caps. We above others, but you’re wrong. You have a price of their AAFES uniform. Additionally, to did not agree, nor like being told we could no distinctive item, which I do not. You wear it imply that badges artificially “create élan” is a longer wear our berets, but because of the on all your uniforms. It’s called a tab, a tremendous leap, and one that demonstrates true professionalism of armored soldiers, we Ranger tab. All Special Forces type units a lack of understanding of the Infantry ethos. quietly folded our berets, never to be worn have a distinctive tab which designate them as being special and elite. again. We did as all good soldiers do: we I applaud his understanding of the Infantry’s followed the orders of our superiors without In closing, I would like to say thank you for “thankless and dirty chore,” but it’s a “chore” dispute. I’m not saying that we agreed — at allowing me to wear my black beret one last that in a lot of cases makes the difference least, I did not — but as a soldier, I obeyed. time and that all soldiers are elite in their between being decisive or just providing own right. I say to all soldiers, wear the black firepower and an ability to maneuver quickly. Now, 22 years later, on the day that I will beret with pride and distinction, for it has a Some of us may not have chosen to be In- leave the service, June 14th, this old first long, time-honored history and many great fantry, and likely so in his branch. But most sergeant can once again remove my old soldiers have worn it. choose to be an infantryman, tanker, or cav- black beret and wear it one more time with alryman, and thankfully so. honor and distinction. I can leave as I had 1SG BOBBY D. JONES come. With this, I thank the Chief of Staff for Company A, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor We all play for the same team. Be careful his decision. the slings and arrows you throw around. Fort Hood, Texas I would like to commend and salute the pro- DAVID S. POUND fessionalism of all the Rangers who are qui- LTC, IN etly following and obeying the orders of the An Observation from Kuwait: U.S. Army Infantry Center Chief of Staff. Even though you have a right All Soldiers Are the Same to be disappointed, your professionalism and dedication to perfection makes you the Dear Sir: Remembering the Black Beret: ELITE soldiers that you are. You will wear Time, Honor, and Distinction the tan beret with honor, as you did the black “All soldiers are not the same.” For years I beret, because you are true professionals. have be told this, and up to now, I believed it. I work as the Master Gunner/Brigade Ad- Dear Sir: As a first sergeant and a soldier for 23 years, I salute you and thank you, the Rangers, for visor for the Kuwait Land Forces 35th Ar- In late May of 1978, I was allowed to join your devotion and commitment to excel- mored Brigade, “The Martyrs,” which in- the ranks of a young volunteer Army. I re- lence. cludes the 7th Armor Battalion (K-SA M1A2). member how excited, but scared I was as I The 7th had recently completed crew-level rode the bus to the reception station at Fort To all the others making statements openly qualification gunnery and I was fortunate to Knox, Kentucky. I remember, as I got off the disrespecting other soldiers, statements have been invited to attend their post-gun- bus, seeing the old two-story wooden bar- such as, “They just barely meet the standard nery award ceremony. or just meet the minimum standard,” I say racks, the sounds of drill sergeants sounding When I arrived, the troops were just starting you truly dishonor your corps. You are dis- off commands, and two distinctive items of to form up. As they moved into formation, the playing your lack of true professionalism by headgear, the drill sergeants’ hats and the statement that “all soldiers are not the your whining, complaining, and unprofes- armor headgear, a black beret with the silver same,” came in to my mind, so I took the op- sional attitude. I further would like to say that ornamentation of the WWI tank. I remember portunity to observe them in order to see if you honestly believe that the black beret is my dreams of seeing myself as a member of what made them so different from American what makes you special, then you have one of the elite units of the U.S. Army, the soldiers. United States Armored Corps. Yes, we were missed the mark about what makes Rangers once thought of as elite also. I wanted so special. A true professional will understand As I watched, I noticed the Kuwaiti privates much to earn the honor of being able to wear what I am saying. laughing and joking with each other, the my black beret with my khaki uniform... To the Rangers who are crying and disre- Kuwaiti sergeants alternately barking orders specting fellow soldiers with your statements at the privates and talking amongst them- In September of that year, I graduated about how much more above the standard selves about the tank tables they had just OSUT and was allowed to purchase and they are, I give you this challenge: Come to finished firing. The officers walking around wear the black beret, as did my armored my range here at Fort Hood, climb down were loudly boasting about their own shoot- brethren. Yes, I had to purchase it then, but I inside one of my M1A2 (SEP) tanks with ing prowess, and who had the best platoon. was no less proud of it than the Rangers are minimal training and shoot 1000 points out of The longer I watched, the more they sounded of theirs. My beret symbolized and acknowl- 1000. Yes, we all understand that you are exactly like American soldiers. Soon, I began edged that I was part of one of the most elite good at what you are trained to do, but we to see the faces of my old company mem- military corps in all the world’s armies, a are good at what we are trained to do also. bers in the formation. I flashed back to my tanker. Today, in almost all the armor units in Yes, I understand that you may think you are last unit, A Company, 3-69 Armor, and could the world, you will find them in black berets, better than the rest of us lowly MOSs and see all of my old soldiers doing the very as we too once had. I was so proud of that you may not have a need for us, but you same things before our own post-gunnery beret and all I had accomplished to earn the may someday find you will need the pilots award ceremonies. right to wear it. No, I did not have to go to an and crew chiefs of the helicopters you use, As the ceremony started and the awards extra course to get it, nor did I have to train or the medics and doctors that treat your were handed out, the reactions of the Ku- to a different standard, but I did have to meet wounds, or the artillery that gives you fire waiti soldiers convinced me more and more and exceed the standard set before me. support, or the signal corps that give you that this could easily be an American cere- The following year, the U.S. Army decided your much needed communications that mony. The shouts and applause from the that we must give up our berets and that only allow you to call for evacuation or fire sup- formation, the reactions of the individual the Rangers could have this coveted head- port, and yes, even the armored forces that soldiers when they received an award, and 48 ARMOR — July-August 2001

the emotions of the 1st Company soldiers management thought they were in the rail- body who was involved in the fighting for the when they captured the high tank award road business when actually they were in the Siegfried Line. were the same emotions that my company transportation business. Likewise, the armor had displayed when we took the high tank branch is in the tank-busting business, not MR. N. SHORT trophy. the tank business. 12 Helston Road Nailsea, I watched as the 2d Company commander HARRY ROACH Bristol, BS48 2UA accepted the high tank company trophy from ex-Captain, USAR England the battalion commander and then walked Email: [email protected] over to his company and presented it to the youngest private. The company as a mass Changes in Washington then lifted the private on their shoulders and Unlikely to Bring Relief Further Reading Suggestions carried him around the formation as if he On Armored Train History were the winning quarterback at the Super Bowl. Dear Sir: Dear Sir: I was completely taken aback: the actions The latest news of DOD cuts (Washington of the Kuwait soldiers were definitely not Post) indicates that the Bush Administration The May-Jun 2001 article, “Forging the Red what I had been told to expect. I was most plans to take a big swipe at the Army’s force Thunderbolt,” about Russian armored trains, certainly stunned to see the same reactions structure. ARMOR readers with good memo- was an interesting introduction. If anyone is that I know so well displayed by a foreign ries may remember how many articles have interested in the subject, I suggest three army several thousands of miles away from been published (for years!) in ARMOR say- books published by Schiffer Books: the army that I call my home. So the next ing that the Army needed to ‘lighten up’ or be Armored Trains of the Soviet Union 1917- time that someone tells you “all soldiers are made irrelevant to future warfare. 1945 by Wilfried Kopenhagen, ISBN: not the same,” particularly when referring to The heavy force’s heavy hitters were trium- 0887409172 another country’s army, that person is only phant in keeping the heavy tanks, and in seeing the equipment, and not the people. killing the M8 Armored Gun System, among German Armored Trains of World War II SFC BILLY W. SMITH other victories (Yes, I know there’s more Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 by Wolfgang Sawodny, U.S. Army than one set of fingerprints on that knife.) ISBN: 0887401988 and 0887402887, re- Several authors said that the Armor force spectively.

was getting smaller and would put itself out CHESTER A. KOJRO Has the Tank Finally Reached of business. LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.) The End of a Historical Cycle? There is another old saying: “Be careful of what you wish for — you may get it.” Dear Sir: A Reader Wonders: Most of the military wished to see a Repub- Where Did All the Horses Go? ARMOR is one of the best military journals I lican Administration, and the heavy force receive. Your thoughtful articles and excel- guys wished to be rid of the M8. The victory lent graphics are a winning combination. party can soon be held in a telephone booth Dear Sir: — that’s all the space needed. I am particularly enjoying the intelligent de- I came across some figures indicating that bate between proponents of heavy armor vs. DON LOUGHLIN the U.S. Army had more than 12 million light. The contest may be moot, however, in Lynden, Wash. horses and 4½ million mules at the begin- that the day of the tank in any form may ning of World War II (U.S. Army Handbook soon be over. We’re all aware that a weapon 1939-1945 by George Forty, Barnes & Noble system grows in size and strength (and ex- Historian Seeks Veterans’ Books, 1998). And I have read elsewhere pense) until it is outmoded by something Accounts of Operation COBRA that the Army had its own stud farms and small, light, cheap, and entirely new. One that many Army horses were used by the example: fortifications start out as a wooden Coast Guard for coastal security patrols palisade on a hilltop and progress to a mas- Dear Sir: during World War II. sive stone castle taking millions of dollars I am looking for eyewitnesses of all ranks and twenty years to build. Eventually, the Apart from the 26th Philippine Scouts’ use (but the lower the better) who were in the of horses in combat, some provisional local castle is rendered useless by the new, small, various stages of Operation COBRA, includ- and relatively inexpensive cannon. Another: horse recon units, and pack animals, the ing the weeks before U.S. troops were trying Army didn’t use horses in combat. My ques- warships grow from Henry VIII’s Mary Rose to drive through the Bocage to reach a good to fleets of huge steel battleships, the con- tion is: What happened to all the horses, start line for COBRA. stud farms, and saddles/bridles/harnesses? struction of which nearly bankrupt many DR. KEN TOUT nations in the 20th century. The battleship is I’ve been a member of the Armor Associa- then made obsolete by aircraft. 136 Church End Lane Runwell, Wickford tion since 1970, but don’t recall any articles Does the 70-ton, multi-million dollar Abrams Essex, SS11 7DP on the subject. Might make an interesting represent the apogee of the historic cycle for England historical article. tanks? If so, what novelty will bring on its Email: [email protected] obsolescence? I don’t know — I’m an histo- GORDON J. DOUGLAS JR. rian, not an inventor — but perhaps the new Fullerton, Calif. weapon will be a handheld laser projector Author Seeks Accounts carried in every infantryman’s haversack, or From Siegfried Line Vets something similar. Whatever it may be, now 1/77th Armor to Hold Reunion would appear to be the time for the armor branch to start thinking small — thinking Dear Sir: outside the tank, so to speak. The 1/77th Armor is having their second I am currently writing a book on the Sieg- annual reunion in Louisville, Ky., July 11-15. The business schools like to teach that the fried Line, which is due to be published in For more details, contact Bruce Goldsmith at railroads went out of business because their March 2002... I would like to contact any- [email protected] or phone (636) 282-3302. ARMOR — July-August 2001 49

The Demise of the Tank: Another Analysis

The Tank Debate by John Stone, Har- vulnerable to new weapons. Top attack and Corps squadrons overhead, and detailed wood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, precision guided munitions are troublesome, orders of battle of all the divisions involved, 2000, 201 pages, $50.00. but he is confident that countermeasures can but the tanks’ part has pride of place. The and will be found to reduce their effective- text follows, as far as remaining sources John Stone, a British academician, has ness. However, Abrams and Challenger are allow, the actions of each individual tank produced a thoughtful and balanced book on products of development processes aimed at during those fateful days. The location of the future of the tank. Keeping in mind that producing centerpieces for attrition warfare each is recorded using a facsimile of the prognosticating the future of armored war- on the North German Plain. Changes in original operations map, suitable sections of fare has been something of a cottage indus- doctrine, beginning with AirLand Battle and which appear alongside the account of each try among British military intellectuals since continuing through present day theories of section of the battle. As a bonus, these are 1919, this particular volume should have a information warfare, have renewed emphasis combined as a loose map as well. Each tank longer shelf life than most, because Mr. on operational mobility. Both tanks are too is listed, noting its identification number, Stone has grounded his analysis firmly on heavy and require far too long a logistical tail nickname, and commander’s name. The the history of the tank and the endless de- to fulfill a meaningful role in maneuver-based accounts are illustrated using original pho- bate about its battlefield utility. warfare. Unfortunately, it is not possible to tos, while contemporary color images show Mr. Stone’s conclusion is that the modern simply lighten them in any meaningful way the ground as it appears now. This combina- battle tank — as represented by the Abrams without destroying their effectiveness. Thus, tion of accounts, photos, and maps, together and the Challenger — has reached an evolu- the balance between development, perform- with a brief suggested itinerary, make a tour tionary dead-end. Not because of technol- ance, and doctrine is irrevocably overthrown. of the battlefield an easy matter. Just as ogy, mind you, or any future antitank ‘silver In other words, tanks remain kings of the important are appendices which list awards bullet’ that may come along, but because battlefield — they just can’t get to the next made to those who took part, tank losses they are unfit for the new environment of one in time. While Mr. Stone foresees an and, more poignantly, the locations of the graves of those who gave their lives. information-based maneuver warfare. The eventual ‘tank-like platform’ entering service, heavy tank, in short, is akin to the dinosaur: he concludes that the conventionally config- ured tank has outlived its usefulness. This book, the culmination of many years of invulnerable, but unable to survive when the research, shows great attention to detail and swamps dried up and the weather turned Agree or disagree with Mr. Stone (and I betrays a love of subject which can only cold. have my doubts; maneuver warfare is a fine come from true enthusiasm. Not only have The author is almost apologetic for reach- concept, but evenly matched opponents both authors searched records and archives, ing this conclusion, as he spends much of invariably end up in a slugging match), he they have actually searched the battlefield to the book in explaining why past prophets of has written a fine book which both sides can locate the remains of several of the tanks doom were proved wrong, but his logic is draw upon for material to fuel the never- lost. As a result, it was possible to actually ending tank debate. compelling and refreshingly original. He recover one of them! D51 DEBORAH came begins by tracing the development of Anglo- STEVE EDEN back to the surface in November 1998 and American military thought (the weakest part LTC, Armor will be the focus of a memorial to the action and those who fought in it. of the book — as if there were such a thing Fort Knox, Ky. in the first place), but moves quickly to fol- Proceeds from this book will help preserve lowing the inter-relationships between battle- Following the Tanks — Cambrai 20th a truly unique piece of history which is well field performance, doctrine, and tank devel- November-7th December 1917 by Jean- recorded here in print. opment as they develop across the years. Luc Gibot and Phillippe Gorczynski. Eng- PETER BROWN He illustrates that the three have rarely been lish translation by Wendy McAdam. Pri- Dorset, England synchronized, providing ready ammunition for short-sighted critics, but western militar- vately published by Philippe Gorczynski, Béatus Hotel, 59400 Cambrai, France, The Delafield Commission and the ies have generally done an excellent job of American Military Profession by Mat- bringing the three back into balance when 1999, large format hardback, 192 pages, thew Moten. Texas A&M University one component has lagged behind the oth- fully illustrated, including loose map. ers. This has maintained the utility of the ISBN 2-9511696-1-2, UK price £29.95. Press, College Station, Texas, 2000; tank through Desert Storm. The book is also available through Naval 269 pages, $47.95, hardcover, ISBN 0-89096-925-6. He parallels this theme by following the and Military Press, www.naval-military- technical race between armor and bullet press.co.uk for $53.00. With the characteristic academic detail of a (whether kinetic or chemical), showing that doctoral dissertation, Matthew Moten’s new The Battle of Cambrai gave tanks their first book is a comprehensive study of the early every advance in killing power was quickly chance to operate on solid ground in the matched by improvements in protection. He development of the American Army’s military forefront of an attack. While the battle has professionalism, with particular emphasis on also points out that the tank has been made been the subject of several books, these considerably more efficient over the years. In the contribution of the little-known, but influ- tend to cover the broader picture of the battle ential Delafield Commission in 1855. This constant dollars, the Abrams is only twice as with the role of tanks included as part of the expensive as the Sherman, while its killing book is a recent addition to the Texas A&M whole. The approach here is very different, Military History Series. power and survivability have expanded ex- as the actions of each tank are traced from ponentially. It is, however, twice as heavy original reports and accounts of those who Moten is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. and far more constrained by terrain traffica- manned them. Weaving all sources together Army, and is a graduate and former history bility. allows this important battle to be described instructor at West Point. His book is really In his concluding chapters, Mr. Stone from the all-important point of view of the the combination of two academic require- brings together these historical and technical tanks. There is more than ample detail on ments. His analysis of the Delafield Com- threads. He dismisses the argument that the other arms involved, including numbers mission appears to be his master’s degree modern battle tanks are too expensive or and type of guns used, support, Royal Flying thesis, with the additional wrap-around hun- 50 ARMOR — July-August 2001

dred-page study of West Point and antebel- doctrinal texts, but, as Moten points out, they in the years ahead would bring both of them lum military thought comprising his doctoral lavished misguided praise on the Russian together into what can be described as one dissertation. The combined result is a thor- army, proscribing it as the new model for the of the most remarkable command relation- ough presentation of the early development U.S. Army to follow (despite the fact it was ships in the history of the U.S. Armed of American military thought (1815-1860), soundly defeated by the allies and desper- Forces. which profoundly influenced the military cul- ately needed reform itself). They focused on ture and society in the Civil War. tactics, not strategy, on weapons, not war- While General Marshall came from an in- fare, and on technical detail, not concepts. fantry background, and Eisenhower was one Half of this book tells the history of the U.S. of the earliest armor proponents, destiny and Military Academy at West Point and how it This is an important work on the history of history propelled both men’s careers inexpli- contributed to professional military develop- West Point, the U.S. Army, and the devel- cably toward the relationship that developed ment as primarily a school of military engi- opment of the American military profession. during World War II. Yet what is even more neering. Moten discusses the early philoso- The Delafield Commission was a fascinating important is the fact that the World War phical rivalry between Alexander Hamilton journey of discovery and misdirected intellec- (1917-18), and all of its technological and and Thomas Jefferson over the role of a tual thought, and it had a profound influence operational innovations had greatly affected professional, standing army, as well as the on the United States as it prepared itself for both Eisenhower’s and Marshall’s careers — controversial influences of militarism, elitism, civil war. particularly that of the former who, in his and Federalism. COL WILLIAM D. BUSHNELL assignment to the Tank Infantry School at Best are Moten’s excellent portrayals of USMC, Retired Fort Meade, and later at Camp Colt, Gettys- legendary West Point figures like Sylvanus Sebascodegan Island, Maine burg, Pa., under Brigadier General Samuel Thayer and Dennis Hart Mahan, men who D. Rockenbach, had the responsibility of devoted their lives to the ideals of profes- training new volunteers to the Tank Corps Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime and had come to the attention of his superi- sional military education. West Point may Letters to Marshall by Joseph P. Hobbs, have been the mecca of military education in ors as an outstanding young officer. It the first half of the 19th century, but it also Second Edition, Johns Hopkins Press, seemed that even at Camp Colt history itself fostered a restrictive culture of branch paro- Baltimore, 1999, 272 pages, $16.95. had destined Eisenhower to one day com- mand a large body of soldiers as he rose chialism and a stifling “system and habit of Undoubtedly, the U.S. Army has produced thought.” quickly during the wartime expansion to the some of the finest generals in the military temporary rank of lieutenant colonel to lead While Moten lays out the background of history of the United States, and possibly the an estimated 10,000 soldiers by war’s end in military thought well enough, it is his por- world. Among that distinguished list, two 1918. trayal of the Delafield Commission that is the names undoubtedly can be found at the very real value in this study. By 1855, Secretary top — Generals George C. Marshall and General Marshall’s career was just as me- of War Jefferson Davis, himself a West Point Dwight D. Eisenhower. Joseph P. Hobbs’ teoric, rising to become General John J. graduate, recognized the need for reform Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters Pershing’s Chief of Staff in France during the and an infusion of new ideas in the U.S. to Marshall is an intimate portrait of these World War, and the man responsible for the Army. two military leaders whose combined talents first American offensive at war’s end in the led Allied armies to victory over Nazi Ger- Meuse-Argonne. Indeed, the World War He ordered a trio of regular army officers, many beginning in North Africa (1942), in served not only to train the generation of headed by Major Richard Delafield, to travel Italy (1943), and finally in the Northwestern officers that won the first major conflict of the to the Crimea to observe the European-style European Theater of Operations, starting in United States in the twentieth century but war being fought by the British, French, and 1944 up through the end of that titanic strug- also the same generation that would lead the Turks against the Russians. The commission gle in May of 1945. Hobbs examines both U.S. Army to victory over both Germany and was also to travel in Europe, visiting Eng- men’s contribution to victory over the Axis Japan in 1945. It was not until the mid- land, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, forces through their wartime correspondence 1920s, though, that Eisenhower and Mar- to learn of European military organization that began in June 1942 and lasted up shall met, when the former had been ap- and innovation. through V-E day in Europe on 8 May 1945. pointed to the Battlefield Monuments Com- Delafield was to study fortifications and en- Throughout the letters Eisenhower wrote to mission in Washington, D.C. After a series of gineering. Major Alfred Mordecai was to General Marshall, one can sense not only staff assignments in Washington and in the study artillery and ordnance, and Captain the frustrations and many headaches asso- Philippines, Eisenhower had seemed to George B. McClellan (yes, that’s the one, of ciated with command of all American forces reach the pinnacle of his career. Marshall, Civil War infamy), was to study cavalry. in Europe but the respect that he had for the meanwhile, had gone on to make a name for These three men did not get along all that latter’s judgment and guidance in dealing himself at Fort Benning, where he imple- well, but they were professionals and dedi- with the multitude of problems in fighting a mented what became known in time as the cated to the heavy responsibility of this dip- coalition war, and in dealing with subordi- Fort Benning or Marshall Method of thinking, lomatic and military mission. nates (i.e., General George S. Patton, Jr.) whereby Army (and Marine) officers had and our British allies (Field Marshal Sir Ber- been trained to “think outside the box” of The commission’s year-long, 20,000-mile nard L. Montgomery, among others) who conventional military operational art. It was journey was only a partial success, due to oftentimes would’ve rather preferred to fight while teaching at Fort Benning that Lieuten- their own dithering, political delays, and each other than the Germans. ant Colonel Marshall noted the young offi- travel problems. Moten’s presentation, how- cers that he deemed the future leaders of the ever, is both entertaining and instructive, as Prior to his description of the wartime cor- U.S. Army in any future war. he describes the commission’s observations, respondence between the two men, the By July 1939, Marshall had become Chief misconceptions, complaints, praises, and author provides the reader with a brief, of Staff, and with war clouds gathering in conclusions. Interestingly enough, he ana- though concise, biographical sketch of both Europe it became his task to begin the slow lyzes their reports both for what they did Generals Marshall and Eisenhower to illus- but steady task of rebuilding the U.S. Army write and for what they did not include. trate the different career “paths” both men followed prior to their wartime relationship. that had slipped from the top ten at the end The Delafield Commission achieved most General Eisenhower, a Kansan who gradu- of the World War to that of seventeenth. In of what Secretary Davis intended, but be- ated from West Point (1915), and General fact, by the eve of the U.S. entrance into cause of West Point’s institutional “system Marshall, from the Virginia Military Institute World War II in December 1941, General and habit of thought,” they missed the most (1901), came from entirely different back- Marshall had become once again acquainted important opportunities. The reports became grounds, but each possessed strengths that with then-Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower, ARMOR — July-August 2001 51

who at the time had served as Major General Churchill squarely credited to the tenacity clusions, Ruggero presents multiple view- Walter Krueger’s Chief of Staff during the all- and skill of the American soldier. points on these issues from both cadets and important Louisiana Maneuvers of 1940. faculty members alike. Perhaps the most Marshall’s ever-increasing respect for Eisen- Dear General is an excellent book, though disconcerting thing about this book is the hower, coupled with his abilities as a planner at times one wishes that the author could’ve lack of commitment and apathy expressed (on General MacArthur’s staff), sent Briga- included a few maps to illustrate the theater by many of the cadets Ruggero interviews. dier General Eisenhower to head the Opera- of operations under discussion and the plans Nevertheless, Ruggero also portrays other tions Division in the War Department in De- that Eisenhower had been sent to Europe to cadets and most faculty members very fa- cember 1941, and later onto England where implement. Nonetheless, Hobbs’ includes vorably with respect to their leadership and the latter went on to command all U.S. forces Eisenhower’s many thoughts on armored commitment to the U.S. Army. In the aggre- in the European Theater of Operations. warfare, which one might add are excellent gate, one should still come away impressed and thought-provoking, particularly in his with the leadership development experience One of the most important themes stressed comparison of U.S. and German tanks, as cadets undergo at West Point after reading throughout Dear General is the close work- well as his thoughts on conducting amphibi- Duty First. ing relationship that developed between ous training and operations, and in handling Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, one that personnel — from privates up through gen- For the civilian interested in learning more was built on both loyalty and trust. Through- eral officers (i.e., Patton, Bradley, Hodges, about West Point, this work offers a vivid, out the different phases of the war, starting etc.). non-biased account of the daily lives and with both the initial build-up of U.S. forces in This is a book that has an appeal to every attitudes of today’s cadets. I would recom- England (Bolero) in 1942-3, and eventually interest. While it remains a story of two of the mend Duty First to anyone considering at- “Round Up,” which culminated in the Nor- greatest soldiers ever to wear U.S. Army tending West Point because of its rich depic- mandy landings on 6 June 1944, General khaki, it is a book about waging and fighting tion of cadet life. All readers will gain an Eisenhower’s letter to Marshall reflected the war on all levels, with the greater emphasis appreciation of the first summer of military frustrations and problems in waging war over on how that war was fought on the highest training and the cadets’ numerous activities, a broad front, and with subordinates and echelons of command, as well as how those as well as an understanding of the leader- allies who proved to be even more trouble- decisions affected the individual tanker, ri- ship development program the cadets ex- some at times than the Germans them- fleman, and logistician. It is a book that of- perience. This book, however, has only lim- selves. Of particular interest here is the rela- fers many lessons on combined and joint ited value to soldiers desiring to gain greater tionship between Eisenhower, Patton, and warfare through his use of Eisenhower’s insight into military leadership. Ruggero has Montgomery, and of the problems and diffi- letters to Marshall on tactical and operational demonstrated that he can point out leader- culties in waging a major war with allies who planning and warfighting, something biogra- ship lessons in his narratives of the cadets’ differed on strategy and even tactics as they phies oftentimes miss or purposely ignore. experiences, but his lessons are not new for most soldiers. both set out to defeat the same adversary. Soldiers and military historians alike need to One can see that General Marshall trusted read and reread this book, for it demon- LAWRENCE J. VERBIEST Eisenhower’s judgment on all matters so strates that the waging of war is more about much that he gave the latter much latitude in LTC, Armor personalities rather than abstract political Fort Knox, Ky. dealing with these and other problems as the ideas. time drew near for the Normandy landings in LEO J. DAUGHERTY III June of 1944. Indeed, it was Marshall’s trust Gysgt, USMCR In Rommel’s Backyard: A Memoir of in his subordinate that allowed Eisenhower Columbus, Ohio to deal with many of the problems of com- The Long Range Desert Group by mand, particularly over logistics, shipping, Alastair Timpson with Andrew Gibson- and over command in the different theaters. Duty First: West Point and the Making Watt, Leo Cooper, South Yorkshire, Eng- What makes this book perhaps one of the of American Leaders by Ed Ruggero, land, 2000, 182 pages, $36.95. best volumes on the problems of command Harper Collins Publishers, New York, New York, 2001, 342 pages, $27.50. In June 1940, the Western Desert Force during World War II is the fact that it reveals formed the Long Range Desert Group Eisenhower’s oftentimes stormy relationship What is the leader development program (LRDG) in North Africa. For the next three with the British and the differing approaches for cadets at the United States Military years, the men of the small LRDG kept to taking the fight to the Germans on the Academy at West Point? Ed Ruggero, a watch over Axis movements, harassed en- continent. Whereas the Americans preferred former infantry officer and a graduate of emy convoys and supply points, and es- the direct approach via a landing in France in West Point’s Class of 1980, attempts to ex- corted numerous parties of Special Air Ser- 1942 or 1943, the British, under the leader- plain it in this very readable book. Ruggero’s vice (SAS) commandos to and from their ship of Prime Minister Churchill, favored the work is the latest of a vast amount of litera- targets. In Rommel’s Backyard chronicles all too familiar indirect approach along Nazi ture about West Point over the years. This the exploits of one of those selected mem- Germany’s periphery. In the end, it was the book distances itself from others about West bers of the LRDG, Alastair Timpson and his former view that ultimately defeated German Point because it offers a current look at the small group of desert warriors. military power on the continent. Though as Academy’s leadership training as the U.S. Hobbs points out, it was Eisenhower, ever Army makes its transition into the next cen- In Rommel’s Backyard is a memoir of the politician, who was able to persuade, tury. Timpson’s exploits in the desert. He kept a cajole, and sometimes threaten the British, detailed journal of his operations, and like who seemed determined at times to push West Point’s administration allowed Rug- many members of his generation who fought their own politico-military strategy at the gero unfettered access to cadets and faculty in World War II, resisted publishing them expense of their American allies. Only with members for an entire year. Ruggero elected until well after the war. The editor, Andrew General Marshall’s firm support of General to follow the lives of several plebes, and the Gibson-Watt, does a creditable job of orga- Eisenhower were the British, most notably upperclassmen that train them, from the first nizing the book and putting the operations of Field Marshal Montgomery, forced to coop- day of Cadet Basic Training until the gradua- G Patrol into the context of the entire war in erate within an Allied strategy. This was tion ceremony the following spring. He brings the desert as a whole. Those who have most evident during the German Ardennes up some contentious issues with respect to served in the desert environment of South- offensive (16 December 1944 - January the changes in the Academy’s leadership west Asia and the desert of the National 1945), when Montgomery sought to claim development program and its honor code in Training Center will empathize with Timpson credit for a victory that even Prime Minister the past decade. Without drawing any con- and his men as they navigate the sand seas, 52 ARMOR — July-August 2001

rocky slopes, and generally inhospitable After reading the overviews of the war in He trained his division hard; took them to North African desert. North Africa, with their large-scale maps and the South Pacific, to New Georgia, Bougain- arrows showing the movements of divisions ville and Luzon; was a visible, up-front leader The Long Range Desert Group was small, and corps, take the time to read In Rommel’s who protected his troops’ lives by heavy with a group headquarters, and five separate Backyard, and discover the incredible efforts, artillery preparations; and made his Guard patrols of 36 men each, that normally oper- sacrifices, and accomplishments of a com- division one of the best and most respected ated in two groups. Each half of a patrol pany grade officer and his 35 men, and their units in the Pacific. comprised four 1.5-ton Chevrolet or Ford small but important contribution to victory in trucks, one jeep and 18 men. Then-Captain But through it all, he struggled for profes- World War II. There was no micromanage- sional recognition for himself and his division Timpson began his duty with “G” or Guards ment here, only the daily enervating tasks of Patrol in September 1941, serving until from the Regular Army generals, and he was command and decision by a young captain constantly sensitive to the hostility and con- January 1943 when he returned to his regi- and his soldiers in the unforgiving desert ment, the Scots Guards. descension accorded Guard officers. Yet he wastes of North Africa. In Rommel’s Back- tended to blow every perceived slight out of The soldiers of G Patrol are volunteers from yard is the timeless story of a soldier and his proportion: if he didn’t get his wishes met, he the 3d Battalion Coldstream Guards and 2d part as one of the world’s “Greatest Genera- believed it was only because he was a tion.” Battalion Scots Guards. All the men of the Guard general, even though other factors patrol get their experience on the job, learn- LTC BUCK CONNOR may have dictated differently. A case in ing from the veteran members how to navi- Grizzly 07, CMTC point: General MacArthur wanted desper- gate by sun compass, drive across sand Hohenfels, Germany ately to free Manila early, but the Sixth Army dunes, and avoid detection by the enemy. Commander, General Walter Krueger, tend- Timpson details clearly the training and op- ed to move more slowly. So MacArthur vis- erations of his patrol. The bulk of the narra- Minuteman: The Military Career of ited both the 37th Division and the 1st Cav- tive concerns the relentless monotony of the General Robert S. Beightler by John alry Division and encouraged their com- desert, interspersed with incredible moments Kennedy Ohl, Lynne Rienner Publishers, manders to race to Manila and win historic of sheer terror as German and Italian aircraft 2000, 291 pages, bibliography, extensive acclaim. The 37th had been fighting in Luzon strafe and harass their tiny columns; the notes and index, $59.95. for months; the 1st Cavalry was newly ar- weeks of “road watch,” lying only 300 meters rived, was mechanized and enjoyed better from the enemy’s main supply routes, ob- In his preface, Professor Ohl notes that the terrain. The Cavalry arrived in Manila at serving and carefully recording every Axis history of the U.S. Army “is the history of two 1900, February 3 and the 37th twelve hours vehicle and cargo traveling to and from the armies. One is the regular army consisting of later. Yet Beightler was convinced for the front; the occasional attempt to attack the professional, or career, soldiers. The other is rest of his life that obstacles had been put in soft rear of the Axis supply lines; and the the citizen army consisting of various com- his way deliberately so that a Regular Army inevitable, yet unwelcome, reality of the ponents, including militiamen, volunteers, division would win Manila instead of a Guard death of members of the patrol. National Guardsmen, draftees, and reserv- unit! ists who serve on a temporary basis in times It was true that General Krueger openly In Timpson’s private arena of war there are of emergency.” In a similar fashion, this book scorned senior Guard officers and probably many moments of incredible bravery, daring is two stories: one, the story of Robert had a hand in denying Beightler a corps escapes, and astonishing luck. One such Beightler who enlisted in the Ohio National command and a third star, even while admit- incident is of particular note, as it epitomizes Guard, served in World War I, rose to be- ting Beightler was one of his best generals. the bravery, daring, and ingenuity displayed come a major general and commanded the And it was true that Beightler watched sev- by the LRDG patrols. With the 8th Army 37th Infantry Division, Ohio National Guard, eral general officers who had less command defending along the Gazala Line in May of throughout World War II. The other is an time and less combat service receive promo- 1942, Timpson’s patrol was given the mis- essay that runs through the book on how tions and higher commands. Disillusioned sion of interrupting enemy maintenance Regular Army officers habitually viewed and embittered, he blamed it all on Regular traffic along the road from Tripoli to Ben- National Guardsmen as substandard sol- Army hostility toward the National Guard. ghazi. As the patrol approached the road diers and their officers as political hacks Then, after the war, he was one of three through a wadi at dusk, they noticed a large whose competence was mediocre at best. generals offered a Regular Army general pile of stones on the side of the road, left This theme is so persistent it detracts from officer commission by Eisenhower. He ac- there for repair work. Timpson formulated an the rest of the book, yet the primary source cepted, hoping for challenging assignments. simple plan: push the rocks out onto the road was Beightler himself in his letters to his Instead, he received lesser assignments, yet and create a temporary detour that looked family and friends! authentic, slowing enemy traffic long enough continued to win high praise — but no pro- for his patrol to place timed satchel charges Beightler was not just another National motion. In 1952, he suffered a heart attack in the back of each truck. The Italian drivers, Guard officer. He was committed to the con- and had to retire. however, did not cooperate, driving quickly cept of the Guard, but he recognized that Reading this book makes you reflect on just around the “detour” before Timpson or his most Guard units and officers fell far short of how you have looked at National Guard units men could climb out of the ditch alongside Regular Army standards. An intelligent, am- and their officers. My personal observations the road! After several frustrating attempts at bitious and energetic man, he determined to have been that they have been very, very this game, Timpson brought his own truck up win the approval of his RA peers and superi- good or very bad, with few in between. Gen- to the road, placed a soldier on the hood with ors. He trained his own troops to very high eral Beightler and his troops were definitely a satchel charge, and chased enemy trucks standards. He committed himself to the RA in the very good category. This book would down the road. Driving at high speed without career pattern by winning appointments to be good reading for each of us to alert us to lights, Timpson would close on the speeding both the Command and Staff College and any hidden bias in our own thinking, and it Italian truck as the soldier on the hood lofted the Army War College special sessions. He would be especially useful for young Na- the bomb into the back. The technique served on the General Staff so successfully tional Guard officers to show them that de- worked several times, but Timpson would that his six-month detail was extended to termination, professional standards, and never know the effects of his night’s work, as four years. When General Marshall weeded hard work can bring them the rewards of the patrol was discovered and chased away out all the old and physically unfit Guard higher command. the next morning. It was a small incident, in a officers in anticipation of combat, Beightler JOHN R. BYERS very big war, by a small group of dedicated was the obvious choice to command the COL, USA (Ret.) men. 37th Division. Alexandria, Va. ARMOR — July-August 2001 53

New TSM–Soldier Office Established at Fort Knox Bolsters Transformation Effort

The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) This capability will also allow the dismounted crewmemb- has recently established, at Fort Knox, the office of TRA- er, while at an observation post or conducting other dis- DOC System Manager–Soldier/Mounted Warfare, which mounted duties, to transmit and receive within the com- will be responsible for combat vehicle crewmen force mand and control structure of their platoon/company. Of modernization requirements. The new Knox team will greater importance, by using the cordless C2 link, the work together with the Armor Center and the Directorate mounted and dismounted soldier will now be fully capable of Force Development to shape the mounted force trans- of coordinating the fight while allowing the dismounted formation. soldier to direct fire and maneuver in response to the on- ground situation. ATSM–Soldier/Mounted Warrior supports all soldiers who serve as crewmembers on combat vehicle platforms The head-up display will provide the vehicle commander and is at the forefront of determining, articulating, prioritiz- the capability to view platform situational awareness in- ing, and validating mounted crewman requirements. The formation and command and control the platform during Mounted Warrior Soldier System (MWSS) is a “system of out-of-hatch operations. Platform lethality is increased systems” approach to equipping the mounted crewman to with the ability to expand situational awareness, to coor- fight, survive, and win. Soldier systems are analogous to dinate the fight between mounted and dismounted sol- any major platform system consisting of many component diers, and to extend target acquisition and fire control to parts that must work in harmony to be effective. This con- the vehicle commander. Mounted Warrior will operate cept recognizes the mounted soldier as the key element with other soldier systems initiatives and will ensure within the most sophisticated platform system and organi- commonality and interoperability. zational design. The address of this office, ATSM-Soldier/Mounted War- The system will be used by armor, cavalry, infantry, en- rior, is: gineers, artillery, air defense artillery, chemical, military police, and ordnance military occupational specialties. Initially, Mounted Warrior efforts will be focused on the Directorate of Force Development development, testing, and fielding of a cordless communi- ATTN: ATZK-ATS cations system and a head-up display. The cordless com- Building 1002 munication system will solve an age-old problem expe- Fort Knox, KY 40121 rienced by crewmembers: losing intercom and radio access when the spaghetti cord inadvertently becomes POC is LTC Iddins (502) 624-3519 or Mr. Larry Hasty disconnected from the vehicle’s communications system. (502) 624-3662. The DSN prefix is 464.

ARMOR The Professional Development Bulletin Periodicals Postage of the Armor Branch Paid at Louisville, KY U.S. Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-ARM Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210

PIN: 079030-000