CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES ISSUE BRIEF No 94 March 2017

Pakistan’s Response to Cold Start Doctrine

Meenakshi Sood is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies

n January 2017, Gen Bipin Rawat publicly same time, considers CSD as a highly acknowledged for the first time the existence of destabilizing development for the region as it ICold Start Doctrine (CSD), though it has been reverses the strategic stability established in 2002. operational since 2004. Despite much speculation Further, the de-hyphenation of US policy towards in India and anxiety in Pakistan, India had kept its Pakistan and India and its growing bonhomie with cards close to its chest, until now. In an interview the latter has increased pressure on Pakistan- at the with India Today, India’s new COAS said ‘the conventional level, in the form of failed deals on Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military weapons transfer, and at the nuclear level, heat to operation.’ On the nature of future wars, he said reverse development of tactical nuclear weapons ‘wars will be intense and short because there’ll as well as halt fissile material production. This always be international pressure in wars between has led to even closer ties between Islamabad and two nations’1. Born out of the failure of Operation Beijing that view developments in the South Asian Parakram in the aftermath of the December 13, continent are to its disadvantage. 2001 terrorist attack on Indian parliament, the In this article I look at Pakistan’s response to India’s strategy’s existence and specifics have been kept Cold Start Doctrine. The first section spells out the need deliberately ambiguous. This ambiguity has been for the doctrine and its details as it stands today. The used by Pakistan to disregard the doctrine as a second section looks at Pakistan’s perception of the paper tiger- an unviable Indian plan meant to deter doctrine. In the last section, Pakistan’s response to CSD Pakistan and keep its Generals guessing. At the is analyzed at both the conventional and nuclear level.

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an autonomous think tank dealing with national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflict and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic and outlook and policy-oriented in approach.

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India’s Cold Start Doctrine Learning its lesson from Operation Parakram, the Indian army devised a more proactive strategy to In its quest for finding space for a limited ready major formations to mount a quick and swift conventional war under the nuclear umbrella, the surprise attack. Instead of deep penetration along a Indian army articulated the Cold Start doctrine narrow front to sever Pakistan in half, it aimed for in 2004. India aims to dominate escalation while shallow penetration across a wider front. keeping the war limited and below the nuclear It was envisaged that India’s conventional superiority threshold. It is instructive to make a distinction could be used to counter Pakistan’s conventional forces between ‘limited war’ and ‘Cold Start’. While as well as its use of sub-conventional warfare in Jammu the former is the larger category within which and Kashmir and the rest of India, without either of the CSD falls, the latter’s effectiveness lies in the country going nuclear. In case of grave provocation, like alacrity with which the army can be mobilized for a 26/11 type terrorist attack, Indian military can mount action1. Interestingly, ‘Cold Start’ is a colloquial a response to Pakistan within 48 hours. According to term and was not officially used in the 2004 Gurmeet Kanwal, the doctrine has two major elements- publication Indian Army Doctrine2. The doctrinal ‘pivot corps’ (defensive or holding corps) were shift away from a defensive posture adopted since configured to give them offensive capability, allowing independence was brought about by the events them to launch an offensive operation from a ‘cold that unfolded after the nuclear tests in 1998. start’, thereby denying Pakistan a chance to respond The 1999 and the 2001 attack on the adequately; Strike Corps were moved to cantonments Indian parliament had shown that nuclear weapons closer to the border for faster forward deployment3. could not stabilize the subcontinent. Strategic A number of division-sized ‘integrated battle groups’ stability in the sub-continent did not preclude (IBGs) with offensive capability would launch ‘bite tactical instability at the lower end of the conflict and hold operations’ along the international border with spectrum2. The wisdom of the then existing Pakistan. In contrast with the mechanized strike corps military doctrine, known as the Sundarji doctrine, that took time to make the long journey to the border, was tested when it took a month for the Indian 8-10 IBGs would use the armor and reserve infantry army to mobilize its strike corps after the terrorist available along the border. The Strike Corps would then attack at the heart of Indian democracy. The three build on the success achieved by IBGs and the captured mechanized strike corps were situated deep inside territory would be used as a bargaining chip. Pakistan’s Indian territory and took time to cover the long war-waging potential will be destroyed through the journey to the border. This gave Pakistan time to application of ground-based and aerially supported counter-mobilize and for the world community asymmetric firepower. At the conventional level, the and major powers to intervene. Even the Indian doctrine is premised on the belief that multiple attacks leadership dithered under international pressure. at lightning speed along the border would give no 1. For example, Kargil war was a ‘limited war’, but not time to Pakistan to calibrate a response and throw its the kind CSD envisions. See ‘From ‘cold start’ to ‘limited war’, many unanswered questions’, N. Sathiya Moorthy, leadership in disarray. At the non-conventional/nuclear 26th January 2015, The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/books/ level, the doctrine presupposes that the attack would not from-cold-start-to-limited-war-many-unanswered-questions/ be deep enough to pose an existential threat to Pakistan article6824105.ece 2. See ‘The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and and hence provide no justification to escalate conflict to Escalation Control in South Asia’ by Michael Krepon the nuclear level. Indian defense analysts believe that https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/ stability-instability-paradox-south-asia.pdf Cold Start doctrine is India’s response to Pakistan’s CLAWS 3

asymmetric warfare and its use of terrorism as a tool occupied, without actually being implementable. of state policy, and functions by increasing the cost of In their understanding, India lacks the capability continuing its present (supposedly) low-cost strategy4. to mount such attacks. Naveed Ahmad argues that ‘the doctrine has never been tested except for on- Pakistan’s perception of Cold Start paper war-games in India’s military schools’6. Doctrine- a real or paper tiger? Commenting on the perceived psychological shortcomings of Indian army, Lt Col (Retd) Khalid Pakistan views Cold Start doctrine as impractical, Masood Khan argues that the doctrine is ‘not in inherently escalatory and destabilizing for the consonance with the psyche of Indian Army’, as the sub-continent. Gen Kidwai, the man who steered doctrine requires ‘swift, aggressive and proactive Pakistan’s nuclear strategy for over 15 years and actions’, whereas the Indian army lacks initiative was the director-general of the Strategic Plans and in slow in responding7.They are joined in this Division, marvels at Indian ‘naivety of finding space analysis by strategic analysts like Vipin Narang for limited conventional war, despite the nuclear and Walter C Ladwig III, who believe that ‘[Indian] capabilities of both sides’5. Even Indian military army simply lacks the material and organization to analysts, along with some western analysts, are implement the more aggressive versions of Cold sensitive to the destabilizing effect of the doctrine Start’8. At the same time, Pakistan views CSD as for India-Pakistan equation3. Pakistan would have a real threat to its security9 as well as the stability us believe that it treats CSD the way Mao treated of the region. It accuses India of fuelling an arms US nuclear weapons- as a paper tiger- while at race in South Asia by creating a Guns or Butter the same time asserting it poses a serious threat dilemma that is detrimental for the general welfare to Pakistan in particular and strategic stability in of the two countries where vast populations still the sub-continent in general. Its criticism is two- live in abject poverty,10. fold: on the one hand, it cannot be implemented given the lack of capability and initiative on the part of India; on the other hand, it threatens Developments at the Conventional and fuelling an arms race between the two neighbors. Nuclear Level As per Pakistani military analysts, the doctrine a. Conventional response is meant to deter Pakistan and keep its Generals In response to CSD, Pakistan asserts it is prepared

3. Gurmeet Kanwal points out that Cold Start ‘is a good for ‘dealing with all types of internal and doctrine from India’s point of view, but one that could external threats, may it be conventional or sub- adversely impact strategic stability since Pakistan’s nuclear 11 strategy is premised on countering India’s conventional conventional; whether it is cold start or start’ . military superiority with a nuclear shield’. http://www.idsa. While Pakistan’s development of TNWs has in/idsacomments/IndiasColdStartDoctrineandStrategicStability_ gkanwal_010610 See also ‘India’s Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting dominated the narrative, the steps it has taken to War in South Asia’ by Ali Ahmed, 2014, Routledge; ‘A bolster its conventional response are worth taking Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine, Walter C. Ladwig III, International Security, note. The Pakistani media has been abuzz with the Vol. 32 No. 3, pg 158-190; ‘Taking ‘Cold Start’ out of the idea of Pakistan’s ‘new concept of war fighting’ freezer?’, Vipin Narang, Walter C. Ladwig III, 11th January 2017, The Hindu http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/ (NCWF). As per news reports, ‘Pakistan’s military Taking-%E2%80%98Cold-Start%E2%80%99-out-of-the-freezer/ is all set to adopt a “new concept” of war for article17019025.ece fighting future conventional threats, specifically pre-empting India’s cold-start military doctrine’ 4 CLAWS

and ‘after the implementation of the new war . The Air Force’s major air exercise, High Mark fighting strategy, the would be able (discussed below), was fully integrated. As per to mobilize its forces faster than India’12. In an reports, it was the biggest exercise conducted by article available on the official website of ISPR, the army since Zarb-e-Momin in 198916. In 2013, media wing of Pakistani army, Muhammad Latif the forth chapter of the exercise was conducted lionized military’s preparedness on the occasion of at its National Defense University in Islamabad Defense Day thus, ‘Through a series of War Games to test the preparedness of armed forces. It aims Pakistan evolved and matured New Concept of at ‘validation and crystallization of operational War Fighting to counter Indian Pro Active Strategy plans prepared in view of the emerging threat further narrowing the space for Limited War’13. To environment’. In its updated ‘Army Doctrine’, achieve this, Pakistan has been modernizing its the military recognized ‘religious extremists and conventional forces with the help of an array of insurgents’ as the greatest national threat17. defense partners, prime among them being China and the United States. Pakistani Army has also High Mark been conducting military exercises close to the After a ten year hiatus, the border in strategic locations in the province, conducted an air war exercise titled High Mark in along with relocating its defensive formations 2005, a year after CSD was announced. High Mark forward, moving closer to the border with India. is Pakistan Air Force’s most comprehensive military The Pakistani armed forces- Army, Air Force and exercise which has been held every five years since. Navy-conduct regular exercises and war games The 2005 exercise was spread over a period of a to validate their military doctrines and operational month and conducted in three phases18. The high- preparedness, as well as to display their firepower decibel demonstration comprised of 60 sorties by its and military might to the world. The objective is to various combat aircrafts, including Mirage, F-7 and come up with ‘comprehensive response to all threats A-5 aircraft and Cobra helicopters19. In 2010, the … both the internal challenge from terror groups exercise was held between 15th March and 23rd April, of various shades and the conventional threat of covering a vast area from Skardu in the North till external aggression’14. Azm-i-Nau of the Army and Arabian Sea in the South20. In the 45-day exercise, High Mark of the Air Force are the most important the PAF conducted joint operations with Pakistan exercises conducted by Pakistan on its eastern front. Army and with the aim to further operational preparedness and coordination. For the Azm-i-Nau (New Resolve) first time, newly inducted JF-17 Thunder aircraft, It is a major field exercise conducted by the army. Saab-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control Started in 2009, the exercise has been an integral (AEW&C) aircraft and Air-to-Air Refueller aircraft part of Army’s NCWF. The third exercise took were made part of the drill. As already mentioned, it place in 2010 and saw participation of troops from took place alongside Army’s exercise code-named all arms and services, along with engagement Azm-i-Nau. The latest edition of the exercise was of the PAF15. Between 10th April and 15th May, held in a charged atmosphere in the aftermath of over 20,000 soldiers engaged in pre-assigned the Uri attack. As part of the 40-day exercise, PAF missions in areas of Southern Punjab, and practiced landing jets on the -Islamabad (M- Sindh, along Pakistan’s eastern border with India 2) motorway21. CLAWS 5

Other exercises include Saffron Bandit, Wide Awake behavior26. Pakistan is believed to possess between and Flat Out by the Air Force and Sea Spark, Shamsheer- 130–140 nuclear weapons27 in its ever expanding e-Behr and Tahaffuz-e-Sahil by the Navy. The latest is nuclear arsenal28. It is working towards developing Exercise Raad ul Barq (Strike of Thunder) in which a full triad –land, air and sea capability- while JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, helicopter gunships and Al- inducting Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)29. In Khalid tanks took part, hitting designated targets22. this regard, the India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement Pakistan is acutely aware of India’s superior of 2005 has made Pakistan even more insecure. conventional capability and does not completely rely on Zafar Iqbal Cheema highlights Pakistan’s fear that its own conventional forces. In its view, the conventional the Agreement and the NSG exemption granted to military balance that was already in favour of India India would allow India access to nuclear material has progressively become unfavourable for Pakistan. for civil use, freeing up its own sources of uranium It notes with concern that India is the world’s largest for its weapons program30. weapons importer; and is undergoing rapid military Pakistan has had to rethink its nuclear doctrine in modernization and inducting sophisticated offensive the light of India’s offensive conventional doctrine. It land, air and sea weapons systems23. Further, given the has changed its original stance of ‘minimum credible internal security situation Pakistan is grappling with, its deterrence’ to ‘full-spectrum deterrence’. As per forces are dispersed and spread thin. As Munir Akram official statements by Pakistan’s National Command points out, ‘Pakistan has had to deploy over 150,000 Authority (NCA) and Strategic Plans Division (SPD), troops on the western border due to its involvement the ‘purpose of Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) is to in the cross-border counterterrorism campaign in plug the gap created by Indian conventional advantage Afghanistan, reducing its conventional defense capacity in the deterrence stability in South Asia’31. In essence against India’24. By its own admission, its most potent Pakistan has taken steps to deter India along the response to CSD has been the development of short- strategic, operational and tactical spectrum of threat. At range, low-yield, theatre or tactical nuclear weapons25. the lower end, tactical nuclear weapons are meant to make India think thrice before launching an ‘offensive b. Nuclear response defense’ attack as Pakistan can quickly escalate the Knowing full well that it cannot match India in conflict to a nuclear level. It has developed Hatf-9 () terms of conventional capability, Pakistan has that has an estimated range of 60 kilometers, with the expanded the size and range of its nuclear weapons. aim of using it against advancing Indian armed forces According to Pakistan, the adoption of a more in the battlefield. These low-yield, short-range nuclear proactive doctrine by India and the inability of weapons give Pakistan ‘flexible deterrence option’, Pakistan to counter it with conventional capability giving decision-makers more alternatives in case of ‘obliged’ it to develop TNWs. A more realistic an Indian offensive. It is supposed to be Pakistan’s assessment reveals that this developed is in keeping antidote to India’s CSD by making any military with Pakistan’s views on nuclear weapons. Unlike action against Pakistani army on its territory nuclear- India, for whom nuclear weapons are to deter threat risky. As a consequence, Pakistan’s nuclear threshold or use of nuclear weapons, Pakistan aims to deter is believed to be much lower today. By redrawing its even conventional attacks with its nuclear weapons. red-lines, Pakistan aims to achieves the twin objective Nuclear capability is central to Pakistan’s defense of denying India any space for a conventional attack policy as it gives the country a sense of strategic and, in case conflict actually breaks out, compelling the parity while allowing it to engage in risk-taking major powers to intervene to prevent further escalation. 6 CLAWS

They are smug in their belief that the world community Endnotes would be forced to hold India back. While Pakistan accuses India of walking a path fraught with danger, it is 1. ‘We will cross again’, Sandeep Unnithan, 4th January negligent of the consequences of its own actions. TNWs 2017, India Today http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/lt-general-bipin-rawat- pose the problem accruing from the changes in command surgical-strikes-indian-army/1/849662.html and control that their induction entails. Given their short 2. ‘India’s Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor’, Ali Ahmed, IDSA Monograph Series No. 10 December 2012 range, they will be placed with Forward Commanders. http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Monograph10.pdf The de-centralization of command and control makes 3. ‘India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Strategic Stability’, st 32 Gurmeet Kanwal, 1 June 2010, IDSA them vulnerable to unauthorized use or theft . http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ Pakistan has also developed long-range in IndiasColdStartDoctrineandStrategicStability_ the form of Shaheen III to deny second-strike capability gkanwal_010610 4. ‘India’s Strategic Shift: From Restraint to Proactivism’, to India. With a range of 2750 km it can reach targets Ali Ahmed, 26th November 2016, Economic & Political as far as Andaman and Nicobar Islands where India Weekly, Vol LI No 48, pg 10-12 5. ‘A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai’, 23rd March has an important tri-service base. In the words of Gen. 2015, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Kidwai, ‘Pakistan cannot afford to let any landmass, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03- whether it’s an island, or it’s a mainland, to be out of 230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf 6. ‘India’s elusive ‘Cold Start’ doctrine and Pakistan’s its range … there have been reports of the Nicobar, military preparedness’, Naveed Ahmad, 20th January and the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, being 2017, The Express Tribune https://tribune.com.pk/story/1300686/indias-elusive- developed as bases … if those bases are not covered cold-start-doctrine--military-preparedness/ the inadvertently Pakistan will be allowing … second 7. ‘Cold Start Doctrine- An Analytical Study’, Lt Col th 33 Khalid Masood Khan (retd), 19 September 2015, The strike capability to India’ . Pakistan has also developed Nation the mobile ground-launched , or http://nation.com.pk/columns/19-Sep-2015/cold-start- Hatf-7, that has a range of 750 km and the air-launched doctrine-an-analytical-study 8. ‘Taking ‘Cold Start’ out of the freezer?’, Vipin Narang Ra’ad (thunder) or Hatf-8 cruise missile that has a and Walter C Ladwig III, 11th January 2017, The Hindu range of 350 km. Both can travel on subsonic speeds. In http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Taking- %E2%80%98Cold-Start%E2%80%99-out-of-the- terms of sea-based capability, Pakistan claims to have freezer/article17019025.ece tested Babur-3, a Submarine Launched Cruise Missile 9. ‘Cold start doctrine a real threat, warn experts’, 12th April (SLCM) fired from an underwater, mobile platform34. 2016, DAWN http://www.dawn.com/news/1251527 10. ‘Poverty in nuclear South Asia’, 11th September 2015, Conclusion DAWN https://www.dawn.com/news/1206172 India adopted Cold Start Doctrine in 2004 to 11. ‘Cold or hot start, army ready for anything: COAS’, Baqir Sajjad Syed, 7th September 2015, DAWN find space for limited conventional actions in the http://www.dawn.com/news/1205403 backdrop of nuclear weapons, in part to counter 12. ‘Countering cold start: Military to adopt new war concept’, Kamran Yousaf, 4th June 2013, The Express Pakistan’s use of sub-conventional warfare and Tribune support for terrorism. Pakistan views the doctrine https://tribune.com.pk/story/558604/countering-cold- as adventurous, destabilizing and antithetical to its start-military-to-adopt-new-war-concept/ 13. ‘Spirit of Defence Day Celebrations’, Muhammad Latif, security and stability of the region. In response, ISPR Pakistan is modernizing its conventional forces https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/t-article. asp?id=126&print=1 while also beefing-up its nuclear capability, 14. ‘Army opens war games ‘Azm-i-Nau IV’, 4th July 2013, especially by developing tactical nuclear weapons. DAWN https://www.dawn.com/news/1015885 CLAWS 7

15. ‘Azm-e-Nau 3 kicks off today’, 10th April 2010, The Indian aggression’’, Anwar Iqbal, 20th October 2015, Express Tribune DAWN https://tribune.com.pk/story/4675/azm-e-nau-3-kicks- https://www.dawn.com/news/1214157 off-today/ 26. ‘Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War’, 16. ‘Pakistan’s Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises C. Christine Fair, pg 218, 2014, Oxford University Press Define Strategic Priorities’, Arif Jamal,th 7 May 2010, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8. Issue. 18 27. SIPRI https://jamestown.org/program/pakistans-ongoing-azm- https://www.sipri.org/research/armaments-and- e-nau-3-military-exercises-define-strategic-priorities/ disarmament/nuclear-weapons/world-nuclear-forces/ 17. ‘Army opens war games ‘Azm-i-Nau IV’, 4th July 2013, pakistan DAWN 28. ‘Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016’, Hans M. Kristensen, https://www.dawn.com/news/1015885 Robert S. Norris, 1st November 2016, Bulletin of the 18. ‘PAF strategic exercise High Mark-2005 started’, 5th Atomic Scientists September 2005, Pak Tribune http://thebulletin.org/2016/november/pakistani-nuclear- http://paktribune.com/news/PAF-strategic-exercise- forces-201610118 High-Mark-2005-started-118027.html 29. ‘Pakistan’s military modernization: an overview’, Alex 19. ‘PAF tests high-tech weaponry’, 16th September 2005, Calov, The Eurasian Studies Society of Great Britain & DAWN Europe Journal’, Vol. 5 No. 1, March 2016 https://www.dawn.com/news/156867/paf-tests-high- 30. ‘Pakistan’s Posture of Minimum Credible Deterrence: tech-weaponry Current Challenges and Future Efficacy’ in Nuclear 20. ‘PAF starts High Mark-2010 exercise’, 16th March 2010, Pakistan: Strategic Dimensions, ed. Zulfiqar Khan, 43- The Nation 84, : Oxford University Press http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/16-Mar-2010/PAF- 31. ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence: Pakistan’s Strategic starts-High-Mark2010-exercise Compulsion’, Farzana Siddique, CISS Insight: Quarterly 21. ‘Lahore-Islamabad motorway closed for ‘routine’ PAF News and Views drill amid India tension’, 22nd September 2016, The http://ciss.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/P-1-I.- Express Tribune 1-V.-2.pdf https://tribune.com.pk/story/1186574/lahore-islamabad- 32. ‘Why General Bipin Rawat Acknowledged the Cold motorway-closed-routine-paf-drill-amid-india-tension/ Start Doctrine’, Ajai Shukla, 20th January 2017, The Wire 22. ‘Pakistan conducts military exercise close to Indian https://thewire.in/101586/cold-start-pakistan-doctrine/ border’, 17th November 2016, The Indian Express 33. ‘A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai’, 23rd March http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/ 2015, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pakistan-military-conducts-military-exercise-close-to- http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03- indian-border-4379118/ 230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf 23. ‘Gambling against Armageddon’, Munir Akram, 26th 34. ‘Pakistan: Test of Submarine Launched Cruise Missile’, October 2014, DAWN Brig Kuldip Singh (Retd.), Issue Brief # 57, January http://www.dawn.com/news/1140381 2017, CLAWS 24. ibid http://www.claws.in/images/publication_ 25. ‘‘Pakistan has built low-yield nuclear weapons to counter pdf/77566068_03IssueBrief(final)(06Feb2017).pdf

The contents of this Issue Brief are based on the analysis of material accessed from open sources and are the personal views of the author. It may not be quoted as representing the views or policy of the Government of India or Integrated Headquarters of MoD (Army).

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