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1987

The legacies of King Philip's War in the Bay Colony

Michael J. Puglisi College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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Recommended Citation Puglisi, Michael J., "The legacies of King Philip's War in the Colony" (1987). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539623769. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-f5eh-p644

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The legacies of King Philip’s War in the

Puglisi, Michael Joseph, Ph.D. THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY, 1987

Copyright ©1987 by Puglisi, Michael Joseph. All rights reserved.

U MI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. THE LEGACIES OF KING PHILIP'S WAR

IN THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY COLONY

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History

The College of William and Mary in

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Michael J. Puglisi

1987

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Michael J. Puglisi

Approved, May 1987

Axlutl_____ James Axtell, Chairman

Michael McGiffert

/ames Whittenburg

Neal Salisbury, Smith College

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Copyright by Michael J. Puglisi, 1987 All rights reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To Claudia, who keeps it all together, and to Michael and Tony, the two bundles of energy who keep me going.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......

LIST OF TABLES ...... vii

ABSTRACT ...... viii

INTRODUCTION ...... 2

CHAPTER I. PUNISHMENT AND REPENTANCE ..... 7

CHAPTER II. THE VICTORS AND THE VANQUISHED.... 38

CHAPTER III. THE HIGH COST OF W A R ...... 76

CHAPTER IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNITY ...... 113

CHAPTER V. POLITICS: STABILITY AMID ADVERSITY . . 192

CHAPTER VI. THE BATTLE W I T H I N ...... , . 258

CONCLUSION...... 319

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 326

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When a doctoral candidate finally completes his dissertation, he experiences a feeling of extreme satisfaction and exhilaration. Along with this sense of accomplishment comes a feeling of relief and a realization that others deserve a mention of gratitude for their contribution to the work. First, I would like to thank my advisor and director, Dr. James Axtell, for initially suggesting the to* ic to me and for his scrupulous reading and editing of the preliminary drafts. Reflecting on my years as a graduate student, Mr. Axtell1s instructions in the art of writing may well be the most valuable lessons I will take with me from Williamsburg. I would also like to thank my other readers, Dr. Neal Salisbury of Smith College, Dr. Michael McGiffert of the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Dr. James Whittenburg, and Dr. John Selby for the time and attention they expended on my dissertation.

In a more general sense, I must thank the Department of History of the College of William and Mary for the fellowship which carried me through the bulk of my graduate work. The support of the department, financial and otherwise, has proved invaluable.

Outside the immediate department, I owe debts cf gratitude to a number of individuals, some of whose names I know; others I do not. I would like to thank the staff of the Interlibrary Loan Department of Swem Library for getting me numerous obscure publications and records, thus saving me valuable time and travel money. I would also like to thank Don Hayward of the William and Mary Computer Center, who on more than one occasion bailed me out of near-tragic self-inflicted errors in the preparation of my manuscript. Without his help, I would still be typing and retyping, endlessly. In addition, I need to thank the staff of the both for their prompt attention to numerous long-distance inquiries and for their help during the week I occupied their reading room in . Lastly, I want to cite the staff of the Mormon Genealogical Library in Newport News for their help.

A number of fellow graduate students have provided both moral and logistical support while I was writing this v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dissertation. I would like to thank John Coski and Tim Silver for their critical ideas, their thoughtful listening, their encouragement, and especially the professional example they set. Two others, Emerson "Tad” Baker and Lisa Broberg, deserve special mention for tracking down footnote citations which I, true to form, neglected to copy down.

Finally, the greatest thanks of all must go to my family for their patience, understanding, and support. To my brothers and sisters, Tom, Mary, and Gina— along with their respective families— and to my wife's parents, William and Margaret Furlow, thank you for the encouragement and for the weekends away which provided welcome and necessary relaxation. To my parents, John and Angela Puglisi, goes the greatest gratitude for their support, which has come in various forms and without which I could not have even attempted to achieve this degree. And, of course, I have saved the best for last; I cannot even put into words the amount of thanks I owe to Claudia, Michael, and Tony. I apologize for all the times that this dissertation took me away from their company, and I thank them for putting up with me these past few years. You deserve as much credit for this degree as I do.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES

Page

4.1 SPRINGFIELD VITAL RECORDS ...... 127

4.2 NORTHAMPTON VITAL RECORDS ...... 140

4.3 DEERFIELD VITAL RECORDS ...... 150

4.4 GROTON VITAL RECORDS ...... 162

4.5 LANCASTER VITAL RECORDS ...... 167

5.1 SPRINGFIELD SELECTMEN ...... 197

5.2 WESTFIELD SELECTMEN ...... 199

5.3 NORTHAMPTON SELECTMEN ...... 202

5.4 DEERFIELD SELECTMEN ...... 204

5.5 GROTON S E L E C T M E N ...... 208

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT

When King Philip's War erupted in the summer of 1675, the colonies entered a quarter-century of almost constant trial and tension. Colonial leaders consistently interpreted each successive crisis and the lingering legacies as warnings from God against backsliding and sin. Interpreting the causes of the colonies' troubles was just the beginning of the struggle, however; understanding, solving, and learning from the trials of the period represented the ongoing challenge for the future of the New England mission.

The most obvious victims of King Philip's War were the natives of the colony. Even the Praying Indians who lived under English jurisdiction became targets of the colonists' anxiety and prejudice. The persistence of any bands in the region, friendly or hostile, provided a source of continuing tension for the colonists.

Economically, demographically, even politically, the effects of King Philip's War lingered throughout the ensuing decades. The colony's effort to recoup the costs of the war led to a persistent struggle as citizens and towns attempted to avoid the increased tax rates. The need to secure the frontier communities either threatened or actually abandoned during the conflict represented an ongoing campaign in the region. In the area of politics, the war made the colonists more sensitive and more assertive, and this new spirit appeared in town politics as well as in the constitutional upheaval in Boston.

The uneasiness resulting from the accumulated tensions led to a period of self-examination among New Englanders. Puritan clergy exhorted their followers to reform in order to ward off the forces of evil which threatened the mission. The jeremiads of the period bemoaned the spiritual decline in the region, but in the end, their message remained optimistic. The errand would continue, but with a new sense of secular interest incorporated into the New England mentality. Although King Philip's War was not the sole, direct cause of ail of the problems that plagued Massachusetts during the troubled decades of the late seventeenth century, it was the first in a series of crises and the event which set the tone for the whole period.

viii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE LEGACIES OF KING PHILIP'S WAR

IN THE MASSACHUSETS BAY COLONY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION

Samuel Eliot Morison hailed Dougals Leach's Flintlock

and Tomahawk (1958) as "the first comprehensive history of

King Philip's War to appear since the seventeenth century."

Morison characterized the book as "not only a military but a

political and social history" of "an intensely dramatic

struggle, decisive for the survival of the English race in

New England, and the eventual disappearance of the Algonkian

Indians." Leach himself called King Philip's War "the first

major test for the budding civilization which had been

planted in New England." He claimed that the conflict

represented "a crisis of staggering proportions" which

threatened "to undo much of the careful work that had been

accomplished. No society," he surmised, "can pass through

such a crisis without experiencing deep and abiding

changes."1

For all of the recognition of the long-range importance

of King Philip's War to the New England mission and of the

"deep and abiding changes" that the conflict brought,

Leach's much-acclaimed work focused overwhelmingly on the

fifteen-month-long period of open hostilities rather than on

the continuing significance of the struggle. This narrow

approach toward the war has been the norm in histories of

2

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the topic from the time that contemporaries such as William

Hubbard and penned their accounts all the way

to the twentieth century. Actually, some of these early

chroniclers, in an attempt to exhort their readers to

reform, came closer to fitting the war into a larger context

than have many modern historians. Still, the common

portrayal of the victory over the Indians has remained an

image of ultimate challenge and heroic accomplishment.

Thus, King Philip's War has generally been viewed as a

solution to the problem of how the native and English

cultures would coexist in New England. Leach and Morison,

in fact, saw English domination as inevitable and therefore

viewed the war as the conclusive means to that end.

Far from being a climax, however, King Philip's War

represented an important transition, and in many ways, the

beginning of a new phase in New England history. This study

therefore portrays the conflict as the focal point in the

ensuing quarter century of tension and crisis rather than as

the conclusion of a half-century of development. The

colonists defeated the natives in 1676, but the fears,

tensions, and doubts of the war years did not end with

Metacom's death. The lasting significance of King Philip's

War rested not merely in the colonists' ability to meet the

military challenge but more importantly in their responses

to the legacies which continued to affect them.

King Philip's War erupted in a period of relative

tranquility in New England. Not since the late had

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the natives of the region caused serious alarm; religious

uniformity was still required in the colony, in spite of the

initially controversial Half-Way Covenant; the

effort had finally begun to bring significant numbers of

natives under colonial jurisdiction; Massachusetts'

political autonomy went virtually unquestioned; and English

settlement was thriving and expanding. New Englanders may

not have been completely confident of success— the clergy

regularly delivered jeremiads against degeneracy— but they

certainly were not prepared for a crisis of the magnitude of

King Philip's War. Therefore, the war could not end as an

isolated incident. Rather, it left lingering problems and

generated nagging questions for years to come. Recovery

from the conflict was not quick; responding to the

unprecedented challenges represented an ongoing struggle.

On both the local and provincial level, King Philip's

War left deep marks in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Leach

was correct in his assertion that the conflict posed "a

major test" for the English provinces, but the long-term

significance of the trial was not a matter of "the survival

of the English race in New England" versus "the eventual

disappearance of the Algonkian Indians," as Morison

suggested. In the long run, the real challenges revolved

around the ways in which the colonists solved the various

problems caused by the conflict and reacted to the new

tensions generated during the postwar period. This study

attempts to analyze the legacies of King Philip's War in a

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number of areas and thereby to determine how the conflict

affected the future of the English errand into the

wilderness.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Douglas Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk (: MacMillan Publishers, 1958), viii-x.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1

PUNISHMENT AND REPENTANCE

In June 1675, King Philip's War erupted in

colony, and though the colonists could not have known it at

the time, the conflict initiated a long period of persistent

and far-reaching adversity in the region. Although the war

was not the only cause of the changes that occurred during

this crucial period, the fifteen-month-long struggle with

the natives under Metacom's leadership came to represent a

focal point for viewing the troubles of the ensuing decades.

Few New Englanders were prepared for the economic, social,

political, and intellectual upheaval that followed. In the

beginning, very few colonists were prepared for the trauma

of aggressive Indian warfare. Misunderstanding the causes

and nature of the conflict, the white residents could not

immediately cope with the stunning initial setbacks or with

their apparent inability to bring the natives to bay.

Throughout the war, Puritan leaders ignored the physical

realities, concentrating instead on spiritual causes, cures,

and lessons. Thus, the war could not be an isolated episode

which ended with Metacom's death, but rather represented a

lingering shadow which loomed over New England during the

troubled decades of the late seventeenth century. 7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. On January 29, 1675, , a member of

Metacom's tribe, was murdered shortly after

warning English authorities of a native conspiracy against

the colonies. Five months later, in early June, three

Wampanoags were brought up on dubious charges, summarily

tried, and executed for the .1 Within three weeks, on

June 24, a Wampanoag war party attacked the town of Swansea,

killing nine people; King Philip's War had begun.

Obviously, though the events surrounding the murder of

John Sassamon and the ensuing trial provided the spark which

ignited the conflict, they were not the sole sources of

tension which led the natives to initiate hostilities

against the colonists. In general, Metacom and his people

were troubled by the growth of the English population in New

England, the expansion of colonial settlement, and

increasing efforts to bring the natives under provincial

authority. During the half century since his father

Massasoit concluded a mutual peace treaty with the Plymouth

Pilgrims, Metacom watched New England grow from a small

settlement on the coast to a thriving complex composed of

four separate colonies which contained English settlement

not only around Massachusetts Bay and Cape Cod, but along

Narragansett Bay and the River as well.

The did not idly watch this expansion

progress, and during the two decades before the war,

colonial officials maintained a wary vigil against any hint

of native opposition. The troubles basically arose because

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Englishmen— and Europeans in general— displayed an inability 2 to understand native values and needs. The of

New England, as did their brethren in other colonies,

believed that they dealt fairly with the Indians in matters

such as land purchases and legal proceedings. But in all

cases, colonial leaders measured the exchanges strictly

according to their own standards, not those of the Indians.

This dichotomy of attitudes compounded the outrage felt

by resistant tribes such as the Wampanoags over the physical

incursions on their domains. But their feelings of loss

undoubtedly went much deeper; as members of a close, proud

group imbued with traditional values and beliefs, Metacom's

people could trust in their moral superiority and resent the

insults cast upon them by a contending, yet seemingly

inferior culture.3 Feeling their position unfairly

threatened, lashing out at the aggressor represented a

perfectly rational response in the Wampanoags' frame of

mind. So in addition to the struggle for land and political

sovereignty, the conflict known as King Philip's War also

contained an ideological core, not only on the part of the

well-publicized English mission but also for the natives 4 involved.

The colonists, of course, considered none of the

psychological bruises suffered by their native adversaries,

instead taking every opportunity to tighten the pressure on

the recalcitrant Wampanoags. From the time Metacom

succeeded his brother Alexander (Wamsutta) to the sachemship

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in 1664, Plymouth officials demanded assurances from him

that he would not sell or in any way alienate any Wampanoag

lands without their consent. But by the end of the decade,

Plymouth authorized the town of Swansea to purchase and

annex land from the natives for the expansion of the

community. Feeling their sovereignty threatened, Metacom's

Wampanoags became restless, and the Plymouth General Court

responded by calling the sachem to account for a rumored

conspiracy against the colony. On April 10, 1671, colonial

officials ordered Metacom to turn in all of his people's

weapons, fined him for his actions, and forced him to affirm

that he and his people had always been subjects of the

Plymouth colony. This strong-armed tactic most directly

affected the natives, though at least one historian

maintains that the Taunton Treaty, as this agreement was

called, was intended as much as a tool in the land squabbles

between Plymouth and Massachusetts as a device to control 5 the Wampanoags.

Not to be outdone, the Bay Colony called Metacom to

Boston and made him agree to a similar treaty, acknowledging

himself "Subject to his Majesty the King of England, and the

Government of New-Plimouth, and to their Laws." At the same

time, the authorities of both colonies forced the sachem to

take full responsibility for any tensions felt between the

two cultures. "I having of late through my Indiscretion,

and the Naughtiness of my Heart," grovelled Metacom,

"violated and broken this my Covenant with my Friends, by

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taking up Arms, with evil intent against them, and that

groundlessly . . . The key idea expressed was that the

natives acted maliciously with "nothing of any Provocation

from the English."6 Thus, colonial officials could claim

innocence in the event of hostilities and could voice horror

at any "unprovoked" attacks.

Prevalent English opinion, according to the Reverend

William Hubbard, a contemporary historian, contradicted any

notion that the troubles sprang from "some Irregularities

and Miscarriages in our Transactions and Dealings with the

Indians themselves." To the contrary, the United Colonies

"endeavoured by the sharpest and severest Laws imaginable to

prevent any Miscarriages of such a Nature." In reality, it

was the natives who felt the sharpness and severity of

colonial laws. Further, Hubbard asserted, if Metacom and

his people had any reason for complaint, the offenses came

"only from such Places and Persons as border upon us round

about," but certainly not from the .7

Although not all New Englanders were caught so blindly

unaware when the war broke out, the majority of colonists

held the view that the natives had no just reason to harbor

animosity against the English.

To the contrary, the Indians of Metacom's Wampanoag

band complained about many key points in their relations

with the English colonists. In a parley with the native

chief just before the actual initiation of hostilities, a

group of magistrates heard a list of grievances

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from the powerful chieftain himself. In the most general

terms, he claimed that the Indians "had dun no rong, [but]

the English ronged them." The troubles dated back to the

early days of the colony, Metacom said, when his father,

Massasoit, "was a great man and the English as a litell

Child"; the Wampanoags at the time "Constraened other

indians from ronging the English and gave them Coren and

shewed them how to plant." Since then, the tables had

turned. Most of the chief's complaints centered on the

colonists' land dealings. They often claimed more land than

was originally agreed upon. The "English made [petty

chiefs] drunk and then cheted them in bargens." When chiefs

resisted colonial land grabs, the English found or created

"a nother king that wold give or seell them there land."

With colonial settlement spreading so rapidly, the natives

found "thay Could not kepe ther coren from being spoyled" by

English livestock, "thay never being iused to fence."

Whatever the issue, Metacom felt that the Indians could not

get a fair hearing from colonial courts or authorities, "all

English [being] agred against them, and so by arbetration

they had had much rong."8 The natives' grievances and the

underlying warnings contained therein went unanswered by

Massachusetts and Plymouth officials, and hostilities began.

Since the colonists viewed the initial attacks on the

southwestern towns of as unprovoked and

unjustifiable, the other New England colonies, particularly

Massachusetts, leaped into the fray. Massachusetts

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officials acted on the belief that "He that will not help to

quench the Fire in his Neighbours House, may justly fear to

lose his own."9 Residents of other colonies, however, were

dubious about the Bay Colony's intentions. , a

Rhode Islander, left an account of the early stages of the

conflict which reflected as much a fear of Massachusetts'

encroachments as of Indian depredations. These fears came

true when, in 1675, Massachusetts troops came first to

negotiate with the powerful Narragansett tribe "without

[Rhode Island's] Consent" and then attacked the natives

"without proclemation." From the Rhode Island point of

view, the desire of the Massachusetts and Plymouth colonies

for the Indians' lands "was the greatest Case of the war

against them."10 Massachusetts authorities, of course,

disagreed.

The myopic view that the English were innocent of any

affront against the natives allowed Puritan leaders to

attribute the war to God's punishment of the colonists' own

sins. Warnings from the clergy about backsliding preceded

the war, but the violent eruption by the unconverted

Indians, the targets of the New England mission, brought a

virtual flood of literature condemning the colonists'

wrongdoings. The belief that God's displeasure might be

unleashed in an Indian war was well established in Puritan

thought. The "sins of men provoke the justice of Almighty

God both to visit and chastise" His people, wrote an

anonymous author in 1642; it was certainly conceivable that

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the visitations could take the form of Indian attacks.11

This tradition mirrored the covenant agreement which

comprised the Puritan relationship with the Creator; He

would never punish them arbitrarily or maliciously, but in

response to inconstancy, Puritan backsliders could expect

just retribution.

Expressions of this sentiment, both written and oral,

abounded throughout the conflict. Mary Pray, appropriately

named, wrote from Providence in January 1676 that "sin is

the cause of our sorrow." Searching for a positive motive

for the affliction, she expressed hope that "the lord in

much mercy [would] make us as sencabl of the caus as we are 12 of the punishment." Colonial officials also hoped to

make the people sensible of their sins and omissions.

During the fall of 1675, the 's Council of

Massachusetts publicized a catalogue of offenses prevalent

among the supposedly godly population. The Council began by

pointing out that "God, for severall yeares past, hath not

only warned us by his word, but chastized us with his rods,"

all to no avail. Among New England's sins, the Council

cited "a neglect of discipline in the churches"; an "evill

of pride in apparrell" and hairstyles; toleration of

Quakers and their "damnable haeresies, [and] abominable

idolatrys"; "much disorder & rudenes in [the] youth";

prophanity "by common swearing and cursing in ordinary

communication"; "contempt for authority"; and "idlenes."

Possibly most "shamefull and scandelous" of all, the Council

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condemned the "loose & sinfull custome of going or riding

from towne to towne, . . . oft times men & weomen together,

upon pretence of going to lecture," when the true purpose

was "meerely to drincke & revell in ordinarys & 13 tavernes." These various offenses seemed to reflect a

growing sense of worldliness. According to both civil and

religious authorities, Massachusetts congregations reeked

with corruption.

Colonial officials also warned that simple recognition

was insufficient; true repentence had to follow. The

Council noted that the people needed "to be effectually

humbled for our sinns, to repent of them, reforme, and amend

our wayes." In doing so, New England Puritans would "turne

againe unto the Lord our God, from whom wee have departed

with a great backsliding."14 All of these calls for

repentence— and they came from individuals as well as from

legislative bodies— suggest that the Puritans saw both the

causes and the progress of the conflict in spiritual terms.

The path to victory involved not only military campaigns

against Metacom; in fact, military success was only

secondary, a result of the more important spiritual

. The true struggle was between good and evil,

personified by the English and native forces, but New

Englanders were constantly reminded that each of them also

had to fight the same battle within themselves.

By 1675 the Puritans had devised a plan for dealing

with such a struggle in times of trouble. To purge their

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souls and congregations of sin, secular and religious

leaders alike advised recurrent days of humiliation and

fast, as well as regular individual self-examination.15 In

the early stages of the war especially, Massachusetts

officials seemed at least as concerned with preparing for

days of public humiliation as with planning expeditions

against the natives. In fact, one of the Council's major

worries was a fear that many people were "so selfe wise &

improvident" that they would not take repentence seriously

until it was too late.16 Such a scenario would surely

prove damaging to New England's cause.

Of special concern to the Council was the behavior of

the Massachusetts militiamen. Since they embodied the

outward signs of the battle against the forces of evil,

colonial soldiers had to display representative attributes

of the good. Therefore, the Council ordered commanders to

set for their soldiers "a good example in piety & vertue"

and to make their camps places of "holynes to the Lord."17

All of Puritan society had to repent in order to regain

God's favor, but the requirement that the maintain a

high moral standard was essential to victory over the

natives.

Early in the war, however, no segment of New England

society reformed itself adequately, at least in the eyes of

the Massachusetts leadership. The colonies would not taste

relief or victory, according to the orthodox view, until

individual and communal repentance righted their wrongs.

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Both civil and ecclesiastical leaders publicized this point.

In the winter of 1675-76, when the colonies feared the

return of spring and Indian attacks, warned

that "people are not [yet] Humbled and Reformed." The

powerful cleric exhibited some partisan bias in accusing the

magistrates and especially Governor of having

"no Heart to doe what they might in order to

Reformation.1,18 Later, in contemporary histories of the

war, both Mather and Hubbard agreed that in 1675, "although

[the] Wound was not incurable, yet much more Blood must be

taken away before it could be healed." "All humane

endeavours shall arrive at no other Success," added Hubbard,

"than the Counsel of God hath preordained."19

That the clergy expressed such exhortations should

surprise no one; perhaps more revealing are examples of

almost identical sentiments from a layman, albeit a highly

placed one, like Maj . John Pynchon. On September 8, 1675,

the major wrote to Governor Leverett, "The Lord effectually

humble us; the little success of our forces speaks we are 20 not yet truly humbled . . . ." Such examples reflect the

degree to which devout New Englanders from various walks of

life saw the hand of God in every aspect of their existence.

The recurring defeats indicated to Puritans the need for

continued repentance in order to regain favor in the divine

plan.

Not only did God deny the colonies military success;

He also seemed to aid their enemies. "He is not going forth

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with our Armies as in former times,11 lamented Increase

Mather, "but giving up many of our Brethen to the mouth of

the devouring Sword . . . . »21 , a

minister's wife captured from Lancaster along with her three

children on February 10, 1676, expanded on the cleric's

amazement at "the strange providence of God in preserving

the heathen." Correcting herself from questioning the

Creator's "strange providence," she later noted "admiration"

at how "the Lord preserve[d] [the natives] for his Holy

ends," which for the time involved "further affliction to 22 our poor country." New Englanders saw no contradiction

in their insistence that Indians constantly portrayed as

heathens and devil-worshippers were enjoying direct aid from

God. The Book of Job gave adequate precedent for such

punishment. Since the Puritan belief system attributed

every event to divine providence, the colonists' setbacks

could not be viewed as merely military defeats; the natives

could nor possibly gain such success without direction from

above. Consistent with their failure to recognize their

enemies' motivations in the conflict, New Englanders never

considered that Metacom's followers were guided by their own

strategy and expertise.

Despite the conviction that the war represented an

expression of God's anger, the same leaders who pointed to

the colonists' shortcomings also predicted an ultimate good

resulting from the troubled times. The Lord would not

punish His chosen people without a purpose, and when they

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had been sufficiently humbled and reformed, the mission

would continue as intended. Carrying the inconsistency one

step further, predicted one ironic benefit of

the war. The heathen Indians, who were temporarily serving

the Almighty in the punishment of New England, would

eventually face destruction due to their evil role in the

conflict.23

In addition to the removal of the recalcitrant tribes,

other Massachusetts residents foresaw regeneration within.

Twenty years earlier, Pynchon wrote to ,

Jr. that when the Lord lays His people low, "he knows how to

raise [them] up again in his due time." He carried that

trust with him through New England's ultimate trial. "These

are trying times," he confided to his son Joseph in 1675,

"and it is good knowing in whom we have believed and

treasured in heaven is abiding when the greatest earthly

enjoyment may soon fail us and come to nothing."24

Proclaiming the wisdom of the divine plan, one chronicler

exhorted the devout "to wait upon Gods Will, and attend his

Work in this thing." Then, in the end, the Puritans would

recognize the saving grace of the Lord and have cause to

sing "How great is his Goodness! and how great is his

Beauty!"25 Before any such joyous salvation could be

celebrated, however, New Englanders had to come to terms

with the natives who constantly reminded them of their sins.

The largest problem for most New Englanders was that

they simply could not view the Indians as rational beings

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driven by human needs and desires. At best, during tranquil

times, the natives might be regarded as ignorant pagans

worthy of conversion and possible salvation. But in periods

of conflict such as King Philip's War, English writers

characterized their enemies as irredeemable members of the

animal kingdom. In 1676 likened

native warriors to "Wolves and other Beasts of Prey, that

commonly do their Mischiefs in the Night, or by

Stealth."26 Such accusations reflected the colonists'

frustrations in being unable to comprehend or counteract

Indian warfare.

Englishmen could not understand native warfare because

it was totally alien to their idea of civilized,

institutionalized military action. They denigrated native

strategy because it seemed to lack organization and purpose.

Since New Englanders viewed the war solely as God's

punishment for their own backsliding, they could not

recognize that the natives had a secular motive for their

actions. Throughout history, war has served as an outlet

for suppressed tensions within or between contending

nations. The Wampanoags and other tribes in the region

certainly felt enough agitation due to the encroaching

colonies to warrant a hostile response, according to their

cultural perception of the situation.

Further, by assuming that the Wampanoags had no real

tactics or strategy, Englishmen denied that native societies

took any care to train, prepare, or plan for their military

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operations. Quite to the contrary, virtually every attack

made by Metacom or his allies corresponded to

well-established patterns common among American Indian

groups and actually among tribal peoples throughout the

world. Mobility and surprise attacks, especially at dawn,

were basic elements of aboriginal warfare. American natives

combined quick offensive action and overwhelming initial

fire power to make debilitating shock work to their

advantage. Such tactics were ordinarily employed by the

Indians during King Philip's War. Attacks did not acquire

or display these characteristics randomly; the fact that

the same successful practices recurred with such regularity

indicated that the natives gave conscious thought to their

methods. In claiming that this brand of warfare, including

the frequent use of ambushes, represented barbarism,

Englishmen judged native actions by European standards that

did not necessarily apply in North America.27 To the

Indians, their actions were not formless, purposeless, or

barbaric— they were proven effective tactics.

New Englanders seemed to take offense even at the

suggestion that the natives could proceed in a rational

manner on their own initiative. According to the prevalent

opinion, "when sent by God in way of Judgment, [the Indians]

act as if they were under Military Conduct," but in no way

could such an appearance result from their own training or

expertise.28 "Military Conduct" was not a virtue which

Englishmen generally attributed to native Americans, instead

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crediting their martial successes more to "perfidious

Subtlety and Falsehood, or to the Advantage of Season,

Place, and Number than any Valour or Courage."29 Civilized

Europeans refused to admit that their supposedly savage

counterparts could best them without divine aid, guile, or

luck.

Massachusetts chroniclers noted that New England

natives preferred and benefitted from action in rough

terrain. The swamps of Plymouth and Rhode Island presented

special advantages to the Indians while compounding the

confusion and frustration of colonial troops. The swamps,

which Hubbard characterized as "Habitations of Darkness,"

were "so full of Bushes and Trees, that a Parcel of Indians

may be within the Length of a Pike of a Man," said Nathaniel

Saltonstall, "and he cannot discover them." In addition,

the natives, "being so light of Foot," travelled easily

through bogs where the English "could by no Means pursue

them."30 Admittedly, New Englanders displayed definite

shortcomings in wilderness combat, and they were no match

for the natives in tracking through heavy cover, but the

troopers and most of their leaders seemed to develop a

debilitating sense of pessimism about fighting the Indians.

Perhaps they believed that the ability to maneuver in swamps

was less than civilized, but the colonists decided, at least

while the war was going badly, that they simply could not

follow the natives through the bogs.

Massachusetts authorities were disappointed that their

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forces failed to defeat Metacom during the summer of 1675,

before the war got out of hand. According to John Pynchon,

the English were "somewhat awk[ward] and fearful in scouting 31 and spy mg . " In one case, related by Capt. Benjamin

Church, English soldiers hesitated to enter an area

reportedly infested with rattlesnakes, "which the little

company seem'd more to be afraid of than the black Serpents

they were in quest of." In other cases, troopers lacked a

healthy degree of caution. Maj. Daniel Gookin recalled a

soldier who wore "a new pair of shoes that made a creaking

noise as [he] travelled" on a campaign. The company's

Mohegan guide refused to continue "until he had persuaded

the fellow with the creaking shoes to take his moccasins and

wear them, and the Indian carried the Englishman's shoes at

his back, and went himself barefoot." Another soldier wore

"a pair of leather breeches, which being dry made a rustling

noise"; again, the Mohegan halted "until he had persuaded

the man to take off his breeches, or else to wet them in

water to prevent their rustling."32

These instances represent somewhat humorous examples of

English incompetence in combating hostile natives in a

wilderness environment. English ineptitude, however,

sometimes proved fatal. Mather related an incident in which

English soldiers were so disconcerted by the thick cover

that they fired at each other rather than at their enemies.

Certainly, Mather's account was full of symbolism— the

English blinded by evil forces and becoming their own

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enemy— but unfortunately for the colonists, this event and

others like it actually occurred. Indian warfare definitely

had colonial militiamen spooked. Early in the war they

continually overestimated native strength and shrank away

from opportunities to attack. In November 1675, Capt. David

Henchman's company came upon a wigwam full of Indians, but

because of the "cowardice of most of his men, [the

opportunity] followed not to [the natives1] capture."33

During an attack near Springfield the following March, a

small band of Indians scared off the militia detachment

assigned to escort a group of civilians to church. The

Massachusetts Council denounced the incident "as a matter of

great shame, humbling to us." Even more humiliating, a

contemporary poet mocked the soldiers with the lines, "Seven

Indians, and one without a Gun,/ Caused Capt. Nixon, and 40 34 men to run." The inability to defeat the natives early

in the war definitely caused a great deal of consternation

among colonial authorities; it also caused a great deal of

debate over the best tactics to employ.

These references seem to contradict Hubbard's

suggestion that many English defeats "proceeded from our too

much Confidence in our own Weapons, Courage and Martial

Discipline."35 The natives certainly had enough firearms

by 1675, a fact Hubbard admitted, and examples abound which

indicate that the English had no edge in courage. Only in

the area of "Martial Discipline" could the colonial forces

claim superiority, and it must be a matter of debate whether

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that attribute represented an advantage in wilderness

combat. A widely held opinion after the defeats, however,

was that the militia should not attempt "to deal with the

Indians in their own Way." Hubbard blamed the loss of

nearly all of Capt. Thomas Lathrop's Essex Company near

Deerfield in September 1675 on "a wrong Notion" that the

colonists could defeat the natives "by skulking behind

Trees, and taking their Aim at single Persons." The

companies would have been more successful, he maintained,

"if they had kept together in a Body, and fought marching."

Pynchon went even further; he advocated the garrisoning of

vulnerable towns in preparation for attacks, pointing out

the uselessness of sending roving bands of militia to track

the Indians down on their own terrain.36 Pynchon and other

military officials came to realize that the struggle against

the native warriors required a serious commitment and a

cohesive strategy.

Benjamin Church was one of the few New Englander

writers who consistently advised and presented a secular

approach to the war. If colonial authorities really

"intended to make an end of the War," he warned, "they must

make a business of the War, as the Enemy did."37

Practically the only colonial leader who openly admitted to

appreciating native martial skills, Church felt that New

Englanders had to lay aside all other concerns and fully

commit themselves to a realistic struggle against an

imposing opponent. Obstacles appeared, however, not only in

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convincing the Puritan leadership to adopt a practical view

of the conflict or in formulating an effective strategy;

Massachusetts experienced difficulty merely getting men into

the ranks. When "the Country calls for their service," the

Council lamented in late 1675, "sundry persons are found

absent." Some engaged in the "hainous" practice of running

away from service, even after being "Impressed or Commanded

by Lawfull Authority." In an attempt to prevent such

irresponsibility, Massachusetts passed an act making it

unlawful for any "Listed Soldier . . . to Conceale or hide

himselfe or Armes from the Country service at any time."38

While the colonies had trouble actually fighting the

war, they had no trouble justifying their involvement in it.

Aside from the immediate assurance that the conflict

resulted from God's punishment of their backsliding, Puritan

leaders could draw on numerous precedents in both scripture

and Judeo-Christian thought as sanctions for their battle

against the forces of evil in New England. The Old

Testament, of course, is replete with examples of the

Hebrews engaging in religious wars, ordained and aided by

God, against the pagans. At a later date, Martin

Luther— echoing the thoughts of Thomas Acquinus— laid out

his ideas on just wars as a means of doing God's work.

Arguing against the misguided opinion that soldiers "engaged

in a very unchristian work and one entirely contrary to

Christian love," Luther maintained that they performed a

"precious and godly" service in protecting their families,

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communities, homes, and property. "Self-protection is

certainly a sound reason for war . . . and he who kills

another in self-defense," according to the author, "is

innocent in everyone's eyes." Further, Luther assured his

readers that "the losers were almost always those who

started the war." He concluded with the phrase "The Lord

scatters those who desire war"(Psalm 68:l).39 New England

Puritans could not have found a better justification for

their struggle to destroy the hostile natives. They

believed that they acted in self-defense against unprovoked

attacks by an evil force. They definitely accepted none of

the blame for causing or starting the conflict, so they

could trust that in the final outcome the Lord would scatter

the culpable Indians.

In the end, of course, the New England colonies finally

defeated Metacom and his allied bands during the summer of

1676. Virtually all New England writers, consistent with

their earlier view of the war itself, attributed the victory

to the will of God, who allowed them to "find some Way to

cut off the bloody and deceitful Enemies of his People."40

Just as they had preached throughout the conflict, the

Puritan leadership viewed the outcome as a sign that the New

England congregations had reformed their ways sufficiently.

After the colonies suffered setback upon setback due to

their lack of repentance, signs of God's returning favor

finally appeared in 1676. "God himself hath sent from

Heaven and saved us," wrote an anonymous New Englander, "by

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want of Provisions, Leaving them to their own Divisions,

Taking away their Spirits, putting the Dread of us upon

them, [and] cutting off their Principal men, Sachems and 41 others." Indeed, after the poor performance of the

colonial militia in 1675, there was something almost

miraculous about the quick demise of the natives. As the

chronicler suggested, the ultimate victory resulted at least

as much from disease, starvation, and attrition as from

English military exploits, and probably more so. Even the

secular-minded Church attested that his troopers "had

[their] Lives for the most part, wonderfully preserved, by

the over-ruling Hand of the Almighty, from first to 42 last." Coming from a person like Church, such a

statement may seem surprising. Perhaps he realized that for

his work to be acceptable and popular in New England he

needed to give credit to God, but more likely his

acknowledgment exemplifies how deeply the Puritan message

reached, even among the reputedly less devout.

"It appears thus by the Sequel of things . . ," wrote

Hubbard after Metacom's death on August 12, 1676, "that

[God] is beginning to call his Enemies to an Account, and

punish them for the Pride of their Hearts and for all their 43 Treachery and Cruelty against his Servants." The

Puritans saw no inconsistency in this notion. Just as they

had explained that God employed a supposedly heathen and

satanic people to punish their backsliding, the New England

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faithful had no trouble believing that their loving God

would turn on the natives who carried out His plan. In this

view, the Almighty used the Indians as pawns to accomplish

His ends and then cast them aside when they were of no more

use to Him. This God sounds little like the one who called

for the natives' conversion and salvation, but throughout

the seventeenth century the Puritans saw themselves as the

center of the Lord's attention. They believed with

confidence that He would employ any means available to teach

His people a lesson and ensure their repentance.

The immediate lesson to be learned was that New

Englanders had to reform their ways, but more important

perhaps, the lesson they drew from the whole experience was

that God intended the mission— the errand into the

wilderness— to continue. Increase Mather found deliverance

from the Indians "a token for [the] good." No matter much

they suffered "through Oppression, Affliction, and Sorrow,"

he pointed out, "yet our God will have compassion on us, and

this his People shall not utterly perish."44 What reason

would God have to spare "his People" if not as a mandate to

carry forward their holy mission? This perception did not

suddenly appear in 1676 out of the ashes of the

Massachusetts frontier; it had precedents in both Puritan

experience and Christian tradition. "This is not the first

Time," wrote Hubbard, "that Christian People have been

exposed to many Outrages, and barbarous Calamities from

their Pagan Neighbors," and yet Christianity survived and

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flourished. In the recent New England past, in reference to

an illness, John Pynchon reflected the Puritan view of

providential punishment, in praying that "The Lord help me

to make a right profitable use of this and all other his

visitations that they may indeed turn to my spiritual

advantage . . . ." Pynchon expressed a desire "to lie at

his foot and to submit to his good pleasure that I may not

be found to despise his chastening nor yet to be weary of 45 his correction." New England Puritans viewed their

errand as an ongoing commission. God's servants, throughout

history, suffered setbacks and, because of their human

nature, needed correction at times; but as long as they

experienced the return of God's favor in the form of victory

over their enemies, the faithful could believe in a

continuing sanction for the City upon a Hill.

One danger of such assurance among New Englanders was

overconfidence in their position as God's chosen people.

Hubbard proclaimed, for instance, "though the Righteous fall

seven Times, let not their Enemies rejoice; for the

Righteous shall rise again, but their wicked Enemies shall

fall into Mischief, and rise no more." He exhibited no

doubt that the Lord would, in due time, "bring down their

Enemies to lick the Dust before them."46 Hubbard seemed to

forget, in this statement at least, that it was the Puritans

who needed to learn humility from the conflict. If God had

made anyone "lick the Dust," He should have forced all of

New England to prostrate itself before Him. In the view

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expressed by Hubbard, the chosen few could not lose because

the Almighty would always rescue them and humiliate their

enemies. Such self-righteous gloating represented a

complete antithesis to the repentance and reformation which

the Puritan clergy tried to inspire. Trust in God was one

thing; the expectation that New England inherently deserved

His succor was quite another.

Perhaps if New Englanders had been able to recognize

the real issues which drove Metacom's Wampanoags to

hostilities, the trauma of the Indian war might have

affected them less seriously. They could have made "a

Business of the War," defeated the natives, healed their own

wounds, and put the whole affair behind them. The beliefs

of Puritanism were so ingrained in the region, however, that

colonial authorities saw the hand of God controlling all

events which affected His people. Far more than merely an

attempt by the natives to repel the incursions of English

culture, New Englanders perceived the conflict as the Lord's

punishment for backsliders, as a call for repentance, and

finally as a message for the continuation of the assigned

errand. Therefore, although King Philip's War officially

ended in 1676, its legacies lingered on as the colonists

struggled to rebuild their estates, their communities, their

institutions, and their mission during the troubled decades

which followed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Plymouth officials were quick to point out that four Indians were included on the jury which convicted the suspects. Actually these natives were only consultants to the twelve man white jury; further, they came from among the Praying Indians and were in no way associated with the Wampanoags. Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: University of Press, 1975), 295-296.

2. Stanton A. Coblentz, From Arrow to Atom Bomb (New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1967), 286; For a discussion of the English view of the level of native civilization, see, James Axtell, The European and the Indian; Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 45-49, 266.

3. Gordon W. Allport, "The Role of Expectancy," in Leon Bramson and George W. Goethals, eds., War: Studies From Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), 183; Axtell, The European and the Indian, 304.

4. Robert E. Park, "The Social Function of War," in Bramson and Geothals, eds., War, 243.

5. Jennings, Invasion of America, 293-294.

6. William Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England from the First Settlement to the Termination of the War with King Philip, in 1677, from the Original Work by the Rev. William Hubbard (1677) Ed. Samuel G. Drake, 2 vols., rpt:1865, (New York: Burt Franklin, 1971), I, 53-54, II, 66-67.

7. Ibid., II, 255.

8. John Easton, "A Relacion of the Indyan Warre, (1675)," in Charles H. Lincoln, ed., Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 9-11; The residents of the Connecticut Valley had more subtle indications of discontent among the natives and of impending hostilities. Rev. Solomon Stoddard of Northampton wrote to Increase Mather on September 15, 1675 that the local Indians acted suspiciously early in the spring by neglecting their planting. One native named Wappaye reportedly told Deacon Goodman of Hadley about the conspiracy. Looking back, Stoddard remembered the natives generally acting "surly and insolent." Cited in Sylvester 32

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Judd, History of Hadley (Springfield: H.R. Hutting & Co., 1905), 133-134; See also, Carl Bridenbaugh, ed., The Pynchon Papers, Letters of John Pynchon, 1654-1700 (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1982), 149.

9. Hubbard, History, II, 268.

10. Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," 5, 13, 16-17.

11. Anonymous, "A Declaration and Manifestation of the Proceedings of Both Armies" (, 1642), cited in Morrison Sharp, "Leadership and Democracy in the Early New England System of Defense," American Historical Review 50(1944-1945):246; See also, Perry Miller, Nature's Nation (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1967), 20.

12. Mary Pray to Captain James Oliver, January, 1676. Further Letters on King Philip's War (Providence: Society of Colonial Wars, 1923), 24; An associate wrote to Increase Mather, "It would be a dreadfull Token of the Displeasure of God, if these afflictions pass away without much spiritual advantage." Increase Mather, "A Brief History of the War with the Indians in New England," in Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, Puritan Responses to King Philip's War, 1676-1677 (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1978), 98.

13. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 5 vols., (Boston: William White, 1854), V, 59-63; William Whitmore, ed., The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts, 1672-1686 (Boston: 1887), 232-235; See also, Mather, "Brief History," 102-103; Edward Randolph wrote to England on October 12, 1676 relating the same list of causes cited by Massachusetts authorities. W.N. Sainsbury, ed., Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series rpt:1893 (Vaduz: Kraus Reprint, Ltd., 1964), IX, 466. (Hereafter cited as CSP, Col. Ser.).

14. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 59; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 232; Mary Pray believed that the strokes against New England would continue until "the lord make us Able to meet him by true Repentenc [and] Reformation of life." Letters on King Philip's War, 24.

15. Miller, Nature's Nation, 16; Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 64; See Increase Mather, "The Diary of Increase Mather, 1675-1676," Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings 2nd ser., XIII(1899-1900), 343. (Hereafter cited as MHSP).

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16. Council to Major Simon Willard, September 30, 1675. Massachusetts Archives, 67:272. (Hereafter cited as MA) .

17. Instructions to Captain Joseph Syll, November 2, 1675. MA, 68:40; See also, George M. Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War (Leominster, Mass.: Privately Printed, 1896), 267; [Nathaniel Saltonstall], "A New and Further Narrative of the State of New-Englana, 1676," in Lincoln, ed., Indian Wars, 94.

18. Mather, "Diary," 359.

19. Mather, "Brief History," 90; Hubbard, History, I, 91.

20. John Pynchon to Governor John Leverett, September 8, 1675. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 152; See also, John Pynchon to Joseph Pynchon, October 20, 1675. Ibid., 164.

21. Mather, "Brief History," 103.

22. Mary Rowlandson, "Narrative of the Captivity and Restauration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson," in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadful! a Judgment, 333-334, 358-360.

23. Daniel Gookin, An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677 rpt:1836 (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 437-440.

24. John Pynchon to John Winthrop, Jr., October 20, 1654. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 9-10; John Pynchon to Joseph Pynchon, October 20, 1675. Ibid., 165; Again writing to Winthrop, Pynchon expressed that "The Lord direct us in right ways. I trust he will not leave us to be a reproach to the heathen." John Pynchon to John Winthrop, Jr., July 2, 1675. Ibid., 137.

25. "A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences that Have Hapned in the Warre Betweene the English and the Indians in New-England, (1676)," in King Philip's War Narratives (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1966), 9.

26. [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 89; See also, James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 133.

27. See Neal E. Salisbury, "Conquest of the 'Savage':

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Puritans, Puritan , and Indians, 1620-1680," (PhD Dissertation: University of California at Los Angeles, 1972), 79-80; Harry H. Turney-High, Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts 2nd ed., (Columbia: University of Press, 1971), 24, 93, 100, 103, 112, 114-115, 128, 141-142; Axtell, The European and the Indian, 53-54; For an in-depth examination of native warfare, see, Jennings, Invasion of America, 146-170.

28. Samuel Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 282; Many New Englanders doubtless believed "The Desperate heathens . studied nothing but Massacres, outrages, and treacherous hostilitie . . . ." Samuel Drake, ed., News From New England rpt:1676 (Boston: Coolidge and Wiley, 1850), 11.

29. Hubbard, History, II, 261.

30. Ibid., I, 252; [Nathaniel Saltonstall], "The Present State of New-England with Respect to the Indian War, (1675)," in Lincoln, ed., Indian Wars, 31; [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 89; Saltonstall defined a swamp as "a Moorish Place, overgrown with Woods and Bushes, but soft like a Quagmire or Irish Bogg, over which Horse cannot at all, nor English foot (without great Difficulty) passe." Ibid., 77; Further, the English valued the winter season "because [the Indians] have no Woods or Bushes to shelter in . for they will not bide any pitch Battel." [Nathaniel Saltonstall], "A Continuation of the State of New-England, (1676)," in Lincoln, ed., Indian Wars, 73.

31. John Pynchon to Council, September 30, 1675. Cited in Judd, Hadley, 142; For a discussion of English difficulty in dealing with the natives militarily, see, James Axtell, "The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 29(1972):342-343, 347.

32. , "Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip's War Which Began in the Year 1675," in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 405; Gookin, Historical Account, 442.

33. Mather, "Brief History," 90; Council to Captain Samuel Appleton, November 1675. MA, 68:57; See also, [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 85.

34. Cited in George Sheldon, A History of Deerfield, Massachusetts 2 vols., (Deerfield: Pocumtuck Valley Memorial Association, 1895), I, 135; [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 85.

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35. Hubbard, History, II, 260.

36. Ibid., I, 113-115; Joseph H. Smith, ed., Colonial Justice in (1639-1702) ; The Pychon Court Records (Cambridge; Press, 1961), 39-41.

37. Church, "Entertaining Passages," 419.

38. MA, 68:64.

39. Cited in Abbott A. Brayton and Stephen J. Landwehr, eds., The Politics of War and Peace: A Survey of Thought (: University Press of America, Inc,, 1981), 74-75; See also, Ibid., 61-63, 69-70.

40. Hubbard, History, II, 182.

41. "A True Account," 5; See also, [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 78; Cook estimated total native battle casualties of 1,250 killed out of a total belligerent population of 11,600 (2,900 warriors) . He estimated that about 3,000 Indians died of exposure or disease, 1,000 were sold into , and 2,000 went into permanent exile. Battle casualties amounted to 10.8 percent of the total population; other causes accounted for 57.1 percent of the population. Sherburne F. Cook, "Interracial Warfare and Population Decline Among the New England Indians," Ethnohistory 20(1973):1-24; See also, Sherburne F. Cook, "The Significance of Disease in the Extinction of the New England Indians," Human Biology 45(1973):485-508.

42. Church, "Entertaining Passages," 395.

43. Hubbard, History, I, 273; Another writer maintained that the Indians could not have been defeated "if God had not fought against them, by sending the by sending the Evil Arrows of Famine, and Mortal Diseases among them. "A Brief Relation of the State of New England from the Beginning of the Plantation to this Present Year, 1689," in Peter Force, Tracts and Other Papers Relating Principally to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress of the Colonies in North America From the Discovery of the Country to the Year 1776 4 vols., rpt: 1847 (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1963), IV, 11:5.

44. Mather, "Brief History," 92.

45. Hubbard, History, II, 249; John Pynchon to John Winthrop, Jr., May 28, 1655. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 14.

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46. HUbbard., Hubbard, History, I, 201.

Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. CHAPTER 2

THE VICTORS AND THE VANQUISHED

If King Philip's War represented the focal point of a

transitional phase for the white residents of New England,

it did so in an even more poignant way for the native

inhabitants of the region. Before the war, two basic types

of Indians existed in the colonies, at least in English

eyes— those who submitted to Puritan missionaries and civil

authorities, and those who remained unconverted and

recalcitrant. The one patterned their lives according to

English norms; the other attempted to resist imposed

restrictions. The distinction hardly made life any easier

for the conformists, however. Praying Indians, so called,

were caught between two cultures, alienated from aboriginal

society but never fully accepted by white New Englanders.

When King Philip's War erupted in 1675, the hatred focused

particularly on the hostile Wampanoags and their allies;

but the underlying malice toward and distrust of the

converted natives also became manifest in ugly expressions

of racial animosity. In many instances, New Englanders

seemed to abandon their cherished standards of civility in

combating the Indian threat, and in the process virtually

destroyed the refractory tribes. Thus, the conflict 38

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directly affected all of the natives in the region in

varying degrees. King Philip's War also transformed most

New Englanders' attitudes toward the Indians and allowed

them to complete the domination aimed at since 1620.

William Hubbard probably reflected the hard feelings

held against Indians in general better than did any other

contemporary writer. They could not be trusted, he

maintained, for "though their Words were smoother than Oil,

yet were they drawn Swords." Of course, the natives could

have said the same about English trustworthiness on many

occasions, but no matter. The Wampanoags and their allies

clearly did not adhere to the civilized standards by which

writers such as Hubbard attempted to judge them. Describing

an attack on an Indian camp near Sudbury in March 1676, he

stated, "it was so dark that an Indian could hardly be

discerned from a better Man."1 In the eyes of most New

Englanders, their own moral superiority over the natives was

unquestionable and, for all practical purposes, permanent.

Tribes that initiated hostilities against the colonists

deserved relentless retribution; those allied with the

colonies merited little more than thinly veiled suspicion

and prejudice.

One powerful group of Indians apparently straddled the

fence, at least early in the conflict, and colonial

authorities originally sought to ensure the cooperation of

the Narragansett tribe. Soon after the initial attacks by

Philip's warriors, Massachusetts commanders entered Rhode

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Island, without that colony's consent, and, by treaty, made

the Narragansetts pledge complete allegiance to the English.

Although elements of the tribe almost certainly sympathized

with the Wampanoag warriors at the time, the colonists as

yet had no reason to doubt Narragansett neutrality. In

formulating the treaty, and very likely at least hinting to

the natives of the repercussions should they reject it,

authorities entirely ignored the sovereignty of the tribe.

Political scientists have argued that in such situations

belligerent forces often attempt to influence neutrals with

threats of invasion and by pointing out the "loftiness" of

their own aims and the "sordidness" of the actions of their

enemies.2 Certainly these stratagems must have played a

part in the negotiations of July 1675. Very few New

Englanders probably believed that the treaty would hold up,

but even when it collapsed and Narragansett warriors under

Canonchet joined Metacom's bands, the pact worked to the

colonists' advantage. When it became apparent that the

reluctant allies were abetting New England's enemies,

colonial officials could lay aside "all Scruples as to the

Justness and Necessity of the War"; the only question

remaining was "whether it were Feasible and Expedient [to 3 attack] in the Winter?" While the treaty did not succeed

in drawing the Narragansett tribe into the English fold, its

failure allowed colonial forces to eliminate one more

recalcitrant band. Either way, colonial ends were served.

Although later events justified the colonists'

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uneasiness about the Narragansett's intentions, the English

had no cause for their wholesale distrust of the Praying

Indians, the converted natives who lived under colonial

authority in organized towns. Both to reflect and to

enhance their missionary success, evangelists such as John

Eliot encouraged the organization of these Praying Towns

within the English sphere of control. Daniel Gookin, a

long-time friend of the cooperative converts, said that the

main reason for the move was "to secure places of habitation

for them" in which "they [could] cohabit together compactly

for good of religion & civility." Thus, Praying Towns

contributed not only to the proselytization of the natives

but also to the extension of English hegemony over them. In

addition, Gookin noted that the arrangement would "prevent

differences and contention among the English and

Indians . . . about the propriety of land."4 Despite all

good intentions— and there were many— New Englanders could

not have missed the point that placing Indians in towns with

circumscribed boundaries would free thousands of acres for

their own expansion.

If the Praying Towns were designed to provide the

Indians secure places of habitation and to prevent

contention about the propriety of land, cases arose early in

their history which contradicted these intentions. For

instance, the most famous Indian town in Massachusetts,

Natick, experienced a series of land disputes with the

neighboring English settlement of Dedham. The Dedham

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residents resented the presence of the natives from the

inception of Natick in the early . In 1653 Dedham

requested of the Council and received a "drake" cannon,

ostensibly for protection against dangerous Indians.

Between 1655 and 1663 the two towns engaged in a judicial

contest over several thousand acres of land claimed by both.

In the end, the natives kept the disputed territory, but the

Dedhamites received a grant of 8,000 acres on the

Connecticut River as compensation.5

Similar disagreements occurred between natives and

whites in other towns, such as Sudbury and Marlborough. In

each case, while the grants may have provided the Indians

with places to live, they clearly failed to relieve tensions

over land. More important, the resentment of the native

residents could not have fostered an optimal environment for

their civil or religious tutelage. As Eliot attested,

though the converted Indians generally "esteem[ed]" the

English, "the business about land giveth them no small

matter of stumbling."6

Although Gookin claimed that by 1674 approximately

1,100 Indians in Massachusetts alone lived "subject to the

gospel," the success of the missionary effort was always

exaggerated. The population of Praying Indians probably

exceeded 2,000 in all of southern New England at the time;

of that number at least 168 received full church membership

and 350 were baptized. The Bay Colony boasted seven

established Praying Towns on the eve of King Philip's War:

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Okammakamesit (10), Wamesit (15), Nashobah (10), and

Maqunkaquog (11). Of these, only Natick and Hassanamesitt

had organized churches. All of the natives in these towns

came from the tribes around the bay, but the colony was in

the process of forming seven new towns, totalling as many as

one hundred and thirty families among the Nipmuck Indians of

the interior. Unfortunately, the conflict put an end to the

plan because most of the Nipmucks, "being but raw and lately

initiated into the Christian profession, fell off from the

English and joined the enemy."7 Still, despite the

shortcomings, criticisms, and difficulties associated with

the effort, the missionaries were proud of their charges.

Writing specifically of the natives at Okammakamesit, near

Marlborough, but probably referring to all of the converts,

Eliot stated in 1670, "our godly Indians do obtain a good

report of the godly English, which is an argument that

bringeth light and evidence to my heart, that our Indians

are really godly."8 Unfortunately, the bulk of the

colonial population did not share "the Apostle's"

conviction.

Had the colonists shown less bias and suspicion toward

their converted neighbors, the natives' martial expertise

might have been employed to the colonies' advantage against

Metacom. Gookin, superintendent of the Praying Indians

since 1656, suggested that the Massachusetts government

should have fortified the established Praying Towns "as a

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wall of defence" and as bases for combined Indian-white

scouting parties. They "were greatly ambitious to give

demonstration to the English of their fidelity and good

affection," he stated, and a cooperative effort possibly

could have helped secure the colonial frontier. But it was

not to be; "the most holy God for the chastisement of the

English and Indians disposed otherwise.1,9 Somehow, New

Englanders attributed their distrust of the friendly natives

to God's program of correction.

Examples of the converts turning on their English

neighbors were greatly exaggerated, if not entirely

fabricated. Most of the reports reflect more a bias against

Indians in general— and against the vulnerable Praying

Indians in particular— than any firm evidence of treachery.

"They that wear the Name of Praying Indians," claimed

Nathaniel Saltonstall, "have made Preys of much English

Blood." Likewise, Mary Pray charged that "those Indians

that are caled praying Indians never [shoot] at the other

Indians, but up into the tops of the trees or into the

ground" in an attempt to warn New England's enemies. Later,

Mary Rowlandson reported that during her captivity she heard

of supposed English allies cooperating with King Philip

"without any scruple, but that they should prosper, and gain

the victory."10 These citations have at least one common

characteristic; all three are based on hearsay or

suspicion, without presenting any clear evidence.

Certainly, some Praying Indians turned against the English

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in response to individual experience, and even Gookin

admitted as much.11 But as a whole, the native residents

of the anglicized towns did not deserve the accusations

leveled against them at the beginning of King Philip's War.

The first insult involved an attempt to restrict the

free movement of the Praying Indians. In August 1675, the

Massachusetts Council ordered that "all those Indians that

are desirous to Approve themselves Faithfull to the English,

be confined to their several Plantations" of Natick,

Punkapaog, Nashobah, Wamesit, and Hassanamesitt. Further,

the act prohibited them from travelling "above one mile from

the center of such of their dwellings unless in [the]

company of some English . . . on peril of being taken as our

enemies, or their abettors." Massachusetts officials put

the burden of obedience squarely on the natives; the

Council declared itself "wholly Innocent" of any injuries

inflicted on Indians who defied the restrictions,

proclaiming "their Blood or other dammage . . . will be upon

their own heads."12 This act indicated that, at least in

time of war, the colonists really saw no distinction between

recalcitrant natives and those who lived under English

authority. The Praying Indians were to be confined and

supervised closely, and anyone who violated the letter of

the law for whatever reasons— innocent or otherwise— merited

summary judgment.

With popular feeling against all natives so widespread,

it became increasingly dangerous for any New Englanders to

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defend the Praying Indians. Gookin clearly sympathized with

"the poor Christian Indians, who [were] much weakened or

diminished by the conflict."13 Feelings ran so strongly

against persons such as Eliot, Gookin, and

that they were openly accused of treason and even threatened

with violence. Gookin was defeated in his bid for

reelection as an Assistant in 1676. At one point, he

recorded that "he was affraid to go along the Streets; the

Answer was made," by his overzealous detractors, "you may

thank yourself."14 Magistrates and missionaries were not

the only ones subject to such criticism. Capt. Daniel

Henchman, for instance, became unpopular with some of his

men due to his moderate view toward the natives. The

soldiers blamed Henchman's approach for his lack of success,

and when they refused to fight for him, the General Court

gave in and replaced him.15

Despite the criticism he suffered, Gookin suggested

that the colonists had ample cause for their bias, even if

he did not condone their actions. He did not blame them

directly but rather "the malice of Satan against Christ's

work among those Indians" designed "to hinder their progress

in religion.1,16 Just as they denied playing any role in

antagonizing the Wampanoags to the point of hostility and

saw the war as God's punishment for their backsliding, the

colonists rationalized away any sense of guilt they may have

felt due to their prejudice against the Praying Indians by

blaming "the malice of Satan." Another New Englander cited

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the behavior of "some few of the praying Indians." "I say

it is not to be wondered at," he argued, "that they were

under a Jealousie by us. . . .1,17 For a people who

believed that the sole cause of the war was their own

sinfulness, the Puritans certainly claimed an inordinant

amount of innocence in all areas of actual contact with the

natives.

New Englanders did not stop at confining the Praying

Indians to their settlements. During the late summer and

fall of 1675, white neighbors of the Praying Towns wrongly

accused the natives of a series of transgressions against

their lives and property. In spite of the absence of any

proof of native guilt, group after group faced indictments

and eventual deportation to wind-swept islands in Boston

Harbor. For instance, eleven Indians from Hassanamesitt

were implicated in the August 22 attack on Lancaster by

Capt. Samuel Mosely, who "found much Suspicion

against . . . them, for Singing and Dancing, and having

Bullets and Slugs, and much Powder hid in their Baskets."

Despite their acquittal in Boston, most of them were sent to

the harbor "for better Security, and for preventing future

Trouble in the like kind."18 Since the English were more

guilty of wrongs against the natives than were the

Hassanamesitts of injury to the residents of Lancaster, it

is difficult to determine just whose "better Security" was

served by the removal. In any case, the General Court

sought to ease the peoples* minds by punishing a scapegoat;

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the real enemy continued as elusive as ever.

Even the residents of the colony's oldest

did not escape suspicion; the long history of contention

between them and the white inhabitants of Dedham stood as a

backdrop to the events of 1675. On October 13, the

Massachusetts Council, upon an unspecified suspicion of the

Naticks having "some designe against the English," ordered

that "all the Naticke Indians be forth with sent for, &

disposed of to Deare Island" in the harbor. The Council

proclaimed that "none of the said Indians shall presume to

goe off the said islands voluntarily, upon paine of death,"

making it lawfull for any Englishman "to destroy those that

they shall finde stragling off from the said places of

theire confinement." Again, colonial officials claimed that

the incarceration of the natives served "their own & the

countreys security.1,19 Admittedly, innocent Praying

Indians could and did suffer from violence by prejudicial

colonists, but this concern could not have been primary in

the legislators' minds. Their actions clearly answered the

fears and biases of their constituents, who doubted the

fidelity of the Praying Indians.

The natives on Deer Island fared poorly, uprooted from

their homes and placed on desolate spurs of land in the

middle of Boston Harbor. In the Council's defense,

Massachusetts legislators initially instructed the

provincial treasurer to provide for the Indians on the

islands. With approximately five hundred detainees confined

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by the end of 1675, however, the resources proved

insufficient. According to Gookin, during that winter they

"endured inexpressible hardships," but did so "patiently,

humbly, and piously, without murmuring or complaining

against the English for their sufferings." All the while,

the oppressed natives exhibited "much practical Christianity

in this time of their trials," a trait which unfortunately

their English counterparts failed to display.20 Eventually

the Council took notice of the natives* "present distressed

condition, . . . they being ready to perish for want of

bread, & incapacitated to make provission for the future."

In response, the government ordered that someone be hired to

catch fish for them and authorized that some of the natives

could be hired out as scouts or laborers to augment the

sustenance of those left on the islands.21 Such small

gestures, though made with good intentions, did little to

remedy the wrongs already perpetrated against the natives.

With the colony "full of murmurings, and unreasonable

Rage against the enemy,"22 the Praying Indians were not

entirely secured in their exile even by the expanse of water

which separated them from the Massachusetts mainland. In

February 1676, Thomas Sheppard of Charlestown testified to

the Council that he had been approached by certain

individuals about a plan to attack Deer Island. The

motivation for the plot apparently resulted from recent

raids on Medfield and Lancaster. The revenge-minded

conspirators "could not come at the enemy Indians, for they

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were too crafty and subtle for the English," mocked Gookin,

"therefore they would have wreaked their rage upon the poor

unarmed Indians our friends."23 While not many New

Englanders at that specific juncture considered even the

Praying Indians their "friends,"— and certainly did not

treat them as such— enough consciences fortunately were

awakened in time to prevent such a cowardly act. The

General Court received information on the plan and squelched

it; the legislators could not give in to public sentiment

to the extent of allowing indiscriminate violence against

the natives. But the Indians remained in the harbor.

The Indians on Deer Island faced a serious lack of

provisions and the occasional threat of attack by angry

whites. Those peaceful natives who were permitted to remain

on the mainland faced the latter, in addition to

depradations by New England's enemies. Hostile Indians,

especially the Nipmucks of central Massachusetts, attacked

Praying Towns directly, but more importantly, they attempted

to damage the already tenuous reputations of their converted

brethren with their white neighbors. The most serious and

long-lasting case involved the Wamesit Indians and the

inhabitants of Chelmsford. The white residents were alarmed

during the fall of 1675 by a series of burnings, generally

haystacks and barns, in the town, and they immediately

suspected the Wamesits, several of whom subsequently stood

trial in Boston. Evidence, however, indicated that the real

culprits were Nipmucks, whose motive was to drive a wedge

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between the Praying Indians and the townspeople, thereby

forcing the Wamesits to join Metacom's resistance.

When the fires continued, two Chelmsford residents took

matters into their own hands, killing one twelve-year-old

Wamesit boy and wounding five women and children. The

murderers were arrested and tried for the crime, but the

white jury "pretended want of clear evidence," and released

them, "to the great grief and trouble generally of the

magistracy and ministry and other wise and godly men." As

Gookin correctly lamented, there was no lack of evidence but

"rather a mist of temptation and prejudice against these

poor Indians that darkened [the jury's] way."24 In

December, while Chelmsford petitioned the General Court to

remove the "Dangerous" Wamesits, the Council formed a

committee composed of Maj. Simon Willard, Gookin, Eliot, and

Danforth "to examine those Indians there . . . [and] to

settle them" either at Wamesit or Deer Island "so that they

who are friends [of] the English may be secured & the

English m those parts also secured." 25 Sensing they were

involved in a situation they could not win, caught between

hostile enemies and not-so-friendly allies, most of the

Wamesits fled during the winter and joined the neutral

Penacooks under the sachem Wannalancet on the upper

Merrimack River. "We are not sorry for what we leave

behind," wrote the refugee chief Numphow to Captain

Henchman, "but we are sorry the English have driven us from

our praying to God and from our teachers."26 Whether or

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not this simple yet eloquent statement caused Massachusetts

residents any guilt is difficult to determine, but it does

clearly indicate that English actions, as well as those of

the enemy during King Philip's War, damaged the progress of

the mission to convert the natives of the region.

Had the Massachusetts government made effective use of

their resident Indians instead of confining or alienating

them, the war effort would have proceeded much more

efficiently. Despite early admonitions from military

figures like John Pynchon that it was "absolutely necessary

to engage some Indians with us, whereby we may understand

the motions of Philip," the colonies took few steps in that 27 direction in 1675. The Council did authorize the use of

fifty-two Praying Indians under Maj. Thomas Savage during

the first Mount Hope campaign of July 1675; although "most

of them acquitted themselves courageously and faithfully,"

their terms of service ended within a month, and apparently

most of them went home to face eventual exile on Deer

Island.28 The General Court must have recognized the

natives' clear superiority in scouting because finally in

December 1675 it ordered Gookin to "ingage two of the

trustyest & fittest of the Indians at Deare Island to goe

forthe as spyes to gaine Intelligence of the enimy." The

two chosen, James Quanapaug and Job Kattenamit, brought back

valuable information concerning impending assaults on

Lancaster, Groton, Marlborough, Sudbury, and Medfield. For

some reason, however, their intelligence "was not then

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credited as it should have been," and the attacks proceeded

when English action could have deflected them.29

Massachusetts had a golden opportunity to spring a trap of

their own on their enemies and to save valuable English

lives and property, but in failing to respond to the

warnings provided, they paid a high price for their

distrust.

Not before the following spring did the colony again

arm a body of Praying Indians. In April 1676, the Council

authorized Gookin to help raise a company of Naticks to

serve with other colonial troops. The next month

Massachusetts created "a flyeing or Moving Army" of three

hundred soldiers, including one hundred Indians, to

"discover & Annoy the enemy upon their approach towards any

of our plantations.1,30 Of all the colonial commanders,

Benjamin Church made by far the most extensive and effective

use of native troops. He did so not out of any special

feeling for them but rather out of a recognition of their

proficiency in wilderness warfare. Church, however, did not

employ Praying Indians so much as he did enemies captured by

his company. He approached captive warriors with the

promise that "if any would behave themselves well, he would

do well by them, and they should be his men."31

Church definitely valued his Indian soldiers, and

Gookin predictably credited the Praying Indians with

faithful service. He claimed that once Massachusetts began

employing native companies, "the balance turned [to] the

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English side." Of probably greater significance was the

praise given by various colonial military commanders.

Capt. Samuel Hunting, who commanded a company of Natick

warriors, wrote that "the said Indians behaved themselves

courageously and faithfully to the English interest." Major

Savage echoed these same sentiments, while Captain Henchman

cited "the sobriety, courage, and fidelty of the generality

of those Indians."32 Furthermore, the natives believed

that they provided a positive force for the colonies in the

war. "We have . . . been sundry times in your service to

the hazzard of our lives, both as spyes, messengers, scouts,

and souldiers," wrote four Natick leaders, "and have through

God's favor acquitted ourselves faithfully. . . . »33

Unfortunately, most New Englanders did not share that

opinion.

Despite the good showing that the natives displayed in

battle and on campaigns, "the vulgar spared not to load them

with reproaches." Even the white soldiers "conceived much

animosity against" their Indian allies. Contradicting the

good reports of the commanding officers, colonial troopers

alleged "that [the natives] were cowards and skulked behind

trees in a fight, and that they shot over the enemies'

heads." Such slanderous statements, Gookin surmised,

reflected "the rude temper of those times."34 If the

Praying Indians could get no better reviews from the popular

sort, the hopes of people like Eliot and Gookin that service

in the war would improve New Englanders' feelings about the

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natives seemed remote. In fact, even when the colonial

government felt secure enough to release the refugees from

Deer Island, the Council sent them back to assigned towns

under restrictions only slightly less stringent than those

enforced early in the war. Ironically, Gookin felt that

this action indicated a softening of English hearts toward

the natives, "by little and little." The distrust

continued, however, as the government appointed white

guardians to oversee them and report on their behavior. Two

men assigned to observe the Naticks testified soon after the

war how their charges "behaved themselves both religiously

toward God, and respectively, obediently, and faithfully to 35 the English." Had this image penetrated deeper into New

England society, white prejudice against the Praying Indians

would have decreased and native assimilation would have

increased in the long run.

Prejudice against the enemy Indians was understandably

widespread during the war, and a marked double standard

appeared in English judgment of their actions as compared to

those of the colonial militia. Members of the two forces

practiced some of the same extracurricular activities

against their enemies, but colonial chroniclers

characterized the natives' actions as barbaric atrocities

while giving little or no adverse notice to white excesses.

If the ambushes of Capt. Thomas Lathrop's detachment at

Bloody Brook and of Capt. Richard Beer's company near

Northfield in September 1675 were "massacres," so too were

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English attacks at the Narragansett Swamp in December 1675

and at Turner's Falls in May 1676. In fact, in the former

instances, the English casualties all were militiamen or

their support units. Native casualties at the Swamp and

Falls fights, conversely, consisted overwhelmingly of old

men, women, and children, with only a small percentage of

fighting men involved.36

Of course, Metacom's forces did attack New England

towns, and women and children were victims of such assaults.

But the Indians seemed more interested in taking

noncombatants as hostages rather than in killing them. The

English, on the other hand, seemed to make no "separation

betwene the gilty and the inosent," while contemporary

international law advised that belligerents should do so.

Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist, wrote,

"it is the bidding of mercy, if not justice, that, except

for reasons that are weighty and will affect the safety of

many, no action should be attempted whereby innocent persons

may be threatened with destruction."37 The key disclaimer,

however, was that New Englanders viewed all of Indian

society as guilty, or at least suspect, and believed that

native atrocities broke and voided rules of military

justice. Indians, regardless of sex or age, were all

"Serpents of the same Brood."38 The survival of any

hostile elements was, to the colonists, a "weighty" matter

which did "affect the safety of many," so native society,

including noncombatants, had to be purged.

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Since New Englanders felt so strongly about their

enemies, and since they saw the struggle as a test of their

religious commitment, the colonies readily justified using

any means available to gain victory. The "Lord calls alowd

to a speedy & vigorous prosecution of the warr," maintained

the Massachusetts Council in December 1675.39 This

assurance in virtually a blanket sanction, combined with

criticism and misrepresentation of the natives'

"uncivilized" practices, produced the dichotomy in English

minds regarding the behavior of the contending forces. For

instance, Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote in reference to female

captives in the hands of their enemies, that "they first

forced them to satisfie their filthy Lusts and then murdered

them." This citation reflects the depth of contemporary

English fears, but the evidence contradicts Saltonstall

entirely. No New England women, including Mary Rowlandson,

recorded any instances of their Indian masters threatening

their virtue. Fortunately, some writers, notably William

Hubbard, reported of "those poor captive Women and Children,

that they found so much Favour in the Sight of their

Enemies, that they offered no Wrong to any of their Persons,

save what they could not help, being in many Wants 40 themselves." Regrettably, native women and children did

not get the same consideration from their English enemies,

either in combat or afterwards in captivity.

The native practice which seemed to incense the

colonists the most was the mutilation of their victims,

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especially by beheading. Hubbard accused the enemy of

"insolent Rage and Cruelty" in the case of some of Captain

Beer's soldiers having their heads "fix[ed] upon Poles near 41 the Highway." Actually, instances of the colonists

committing the same atrocities date all the way back to the

Wessagusset incident of 1623. In 1671, the son of the

Nipmuck sachem Matoonas was executed in Boston for murdering

an Englishman, and his head was placed on a pole, "where it

long remained, as the terrific memorial of justice."

Fittingly, as frequent executions became commonplace on

Boston Commons during 1676, Matoonas, described by Hubbard

as an "old malicious Villian," himself faced the same fate,

his head placed "upon a Pole near the Gibbet where he was

hanged up." In perhaps an even more extreme case, when

colonial soldiers found the drowned corpse of Metacom's ally

Weetamoo, the Queen of Pocasset, they cut her head off and 42 set it on display m Taunton. The chieftain himself had

a bounty of L50 placed on his head by the Massachusetts

Council, and when he was killed by an Indian in the English

service, the successful marksman demanded the right to

mutilate the body. Captain Church definitely did not

object. In fact, he authorized that after Metacom was

quartered and beheaded, in retribution for his causing "many

an English mans body to lye unburied and rot above 43 [ground], . . . not one of his bones should be buried."

New Englanders did not stop at beheading in their

search for satiating revenge. Early in the war, for

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example, proposals came before the Council suggesting the

use of dogs to hunt down Indians. On October 16, 1675,

Captain Mosely wrote to Governor Leverett relating the fate

of an old squaw captured near Springfield. "This aforesaid

Indian, . . . was ordered to be torn in peeces by Doggs," he

stated rather matter-of-factly, "and she was soe dealt with 44 all." In another instance, some English sailors decided

to test the rumor that all Indian children could swim

instinctively, like animals, and so overturned a canoe

carrying a woman and child. The sailors got their answer;

the child, offspring of an important sagamore in ,

drowned. It was no wonder that a particular group of native

hostages escaped from the colonists holding them, according

to Hubbard, "trusting more to the Celerity of their own Feet

than to the Civility of their English Friends." And yet,

despite this long history of colonial excesses, Hubbard

criticized the Mohegan allies for torturing a captive turned

over to them by the English. "Instances of this Nature

should be Incentive unto us," he sermonized, "to bless the

Father of Lights, who hath called us out of the dark Places 45 of the Earth, full of the Habitations of Cruelty." He

offered no criticism of the colonists who knowingly provided

the torture victim nor regret at comparable English

practices against their captives.

While the natives tortured and mutilated their enemies,

they did so for far different reasons than did their English

counterparts. The colonists seemed to be driven by no other

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motives than intense racial hatred and a desire to punish

their enemies with vengeful finality. North American

natives, conversely, did not mistreat their captives' bodies

merely to inflict punishment; rather, these practices

represented highly ritualized acculturation tools, designed

to teach bravery through the example of the victim and to

transfer that spirit through his body parts to the

executioners.46 In native societies, torture and

mutilation held deep spiritual meaning for both the captive

and his captors.

Perhaps, in the long run, the Indians who faced summary

execution by New England authorities were actually more

fortunate in their fate than were their compatriots who

survived. Unwilling to let any hostile elements remain free

in the region, the colonial governments sold away into

slavery or bonded servitude those captives who escaped

death. While no record of the exact numbers of Indians

transported as a result of King Philip's War exists, New

Englanders were well accustomed to the practice, which dated

back to the . The only relevant Massachusetts law

concerning the sale of prisoners was a 1641 statute which

prohibited "Bondslavery, Villenage or Captivity . . . unless

it be lawful Captives taken in just Wars. ...” Colonial

officials, of course, viewed the struggle as a just war, and

as a result, hundreds of Wampanoag, Narragansett, and

Nipmuck Indians found themselves sold as slaves in such

diverse places as Spain, Portugal, , the West Indies,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 47 the Azores, and Virginia.

The immediate impetus for pressing captives into

servitude was embodied in various Council orders and

commissions. Early in the war, the Council directed Captain

Mosely to "kill none that he took alive, but secure them in

Order to a Transportation." Likewise, after the victory

over the Narragansetts in December 1675, Gen.

received orders from the Massachusetts government

"Concerning the disposall of the Indian prisoners." "Our

Advice," wrote Secretary Edward Rawson, "is that if any

[are] present to buy them, they may be sould there &

delivered by your Orders. ..." Even Captain Church, who

employed native captives, had the stipulation in his

commission that "it shall be lawfull, and is hereby

warrantable for him and [his soldiers] to make Sale of such

Prisoners as their perpetual Slaves."48 From the start of

the war, and even before, the colonial governments had

established a policy of disposing of Indian captives by

selling them out of the region as slaves, but not all

company commanders, including those who received the above

orders, implemented the policy consistently.

In July 1675, shortly after the assault on the Plymouth

town of Dartmouth, 160 natives who played no part in the

attack agreed to surrender to local military authorities

under a promise of protection and amnesty. The response of

the provincial government, however, was to sell all except

six of them out of the country and into slavery. In a

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similar case, a group of about 200 Maine Indians fled to

Cocheco (Dover, New ) under a promise of protection

from the local garrison commander, Maj. , but

they were captured by Massachusetts troops and marched to

Boston. Of the group, seven or eight of the men faced 49 execution, and the rest were transported. Whether

attributable to human inconsistency, lack of communication,

or merely insensitivity, the broken promises undoubtedly

hurt the colonial war effort. "Had their promises to the

Indians been kept, and the Indians farely treated," Church

wrote, '"tis probable that most if not all the Indians in

those Parts, had soon followed the Example of those that

had . . . surrendered themselves; which would have been a

good step towards finishing the War."50

Of course, not all captives faced a life of servitude.

The criterion employed to judge their fate involved their

behavior during the war, whether proven or suspected.

Regarding "Indian ennemyes seized," the Massachusetts

Council on September 16, 1676 proclaimed that "such of them

as shall appeare to have imbrued their hands in English

blood should suffer death here" and not receive the

favorable treatment of transportation "into forreigne

parts."51 None of the surviving records states just how

authorities decided which captured enemies had "English

blood" on their hands, but since New Englanders considered

all of Indian society guilty, at least by implication,

perhaps the distinction was not really significant to those

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 sitting in judgment. The most dangerous captives— warriors

and their leaders— deserved death, while noncombatants

needed to be secured for the safety of New England society.

Either way, the ultimate goal of eliminating any potentially

hostile elements was accomplished.

While the majority of colonists approved of Indian

slavery, a small number of men, generally the same ones who

also defended the Praying Indians, spoke out against the

policy of transportation. John Eliot began a 1675 petition

to the General Court with the warning that "the terror of

selling away such Indians, unto the Islands for perpetual

slaves . . . may produce, we know not what evil

consequences, upon all the land. Christ hath saide, blessed

are the mercyfull, for they shall obteine mercy." Eliot

reminded the legislators, "when we came, we declared to the

world . . . the indeavour of the Indians conversion, not

theire exstirpation." "My humble request is," he pleaded,

"that you would follow Christ his designe, in this matter,

to promote the free passage of Religion among them, & not to

destroy them." The evangelist did not advocate total

amnesty; those who deserved death should face it. But as

for the rest, he declared, transportation was "worse than

death." Eliot warned the court that "to sell soules for

money seemeth to me a dangerous merchandize," which would

result in untold evils to the mission in the long run.52

Far preferable in the view of people such as Eliot and

Gookin, especially in cases involving children, was to place

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harmless captives with Christian families in the colony as

servants. The General Court concurred and in May 1677

regulated the system to insure that native youth bonded as

servants "be instructed in civility & Christian religion" by

their masters. The court also decreed that these children

remain in servitude until the age of twenty four.53 After

that period of tutelage, the former enemies would apparently

be ready for assimilation into the Praying Towns, but

certainly not acceptance into the mainstream of New England

society.

Eliot's fear that a result of the war would be an

"exstirpation" of the region's native population did not

come true, at least physically. Studies have suggested that

in most wars the victorious society does not completely

destroy its defeated enemy, but rather subjects the remnants

and imposes its own brand of culture upon them.54 Such was

the case in New England. At the close of the war, any

natives not residing in English houses as servants or

apprentices were assigned to live at Natick, Punkapaog,

Hassanamesitt, or Wamesit, "where they may be continually

inspected." At least once each year, authorities were to

compile a list of all the residents of each town, so that

the provincial government could keep close watch on its

native residents. By the early 1680s, the Council saw fit

to punish natives who violated the imposed restrictions by

placing them in their local "House of Correction.1,55 Such

qualifications hardly classified the natives, whether

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previously Praying Indians or captives who finished their

period of servitude, as free and equal members of New

England society. The outcome of King Philip's War did not

eliminate Indians from the region; it just made those

remaining strictly subject to colonial authority.

Hubbard credited "the special Hand of God" with shaping

the post-war situation, clearing the former recalcitrant

tribes from their lands and "making way to settle a better

People in their Rooms and in their Stead."56 Although New

Englanders felt superior to the natives throughout the

seventeenth century, the war hardened English attitudes of

themselves as the "better People." The colonists seemed to

feel truly secure only when they could hold all proximate

natives in a subordinate position. And when authorities had

the remaining natives restricted to the existing Praying

Towns, New Englanders seemed to lose interest in the mission

to Christianize them. Of course, the question of just how

widespread the commitment had ever been is a matter of

debate. But by effectively placing the Indians under

English authority, the colonists attained the ultimate goal

of making their counterparts dependent and controllable. In

the end, secular power played more of a role than did

religious conversion, but the result was the same.57 New

England's native population was no longer a force to be

feared or proselytized but rather a collection of weakening

bands to be impounded and dominated.

However, the rhetoric of missionary responsibility

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survived among the more zealous clergy after 1676. "There

are many [Indians], which maintain a Christian

conversation. ..." wrote Cotton Mather in 1710. He

expressed optimism about the future of the mission, noting

the natives' own desire "to preserve and improve the

Christianity already professed among them, and prevent the

loss of a noble work by some degeneracies," such as

alcohol.58 Mather and others were quick to publish tallies

of the numbers of native congregations, Indian teachers, and

Praying Indians, but by all accounts, the majority of the

figures came from , Martha's Vineyard, and

Plymouth, where the missionary efforts had always proven

more successful. Missionary activities never seemed to 59 revive in Massachusetts. Four Praying Towns there

survived, but the spread of Christianity stagnated, at least

at the end of the seventeenth century, and many New

Englanders who had participated in the missionary effort

recognized the damage done by the war. Gookin openly

lamented the "ill conceit" and unjust prejudice against the

natives, which greatly increased after the conflict, and

Increase Mather rhetorically questioned "how hath the Indian

work, I mean the work of Christ among them . . . been

slighted, scorned, [and] vilified?"60 John Eliot provided

the answer for all of New England to hear. "There is a

cloud," said the Apostle at the point of his death in 1690,

"a dark cloud upon the work of the gospel among the poor

Indians." His last prayer was that "The Lord revive and

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prosper that work, and grant it may live when I am

dead."61 Unfortunately, the missionary effort in

Massachusetts reached a state of ill health, for all intents

and purposes, almost as serious as that of its founder.

King Philip's War resulted in the end of the

ambivalence with which New Englanders approached their

Indian neighbors. The rhetoric of missionary responsibility

was at the heart of the colonial experiment from the start,

but the promises always outweighed the results. Even those

Indians who accepted Christianity and English authority in

the Praying Towns faced the ever-present ambiguity. The war

deepened the distrust already held against the Praying

Indians and transformed any mixed feelings concerning

resistant tribes to unqualified malevolence. After 1676,

Massachusetts authorities brought cooperative natives under

strict supervision and virtually eliminated the rest;

either way, life could never be the same again for New

England's native element. For the English, their handling

of the Indians represented a satisfactory solution to at

least one of the many problems facing the colony during the

post-war years. The colonists, however, were not so

fortunate in resolving other matters of contention.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Hubbard, History, I, 123, 208; See also, Leach, Flintlock and Tomahavk, 6-7.

2. Quincy Wright, A Study of War 2 vols., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), II, 1096; Hubbard wrote "it was then resolved that they should so to make a Peace with a Sword in their Hands." Hubbard, History, I, 75; See also, Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 127.

3. Hubbard, History, I, 136; As early as September 1675, John Pynchon doubted the fidelity of the Narragansetts, due to their "having formerly held more correspondence with the Upriver Indians." John Pynchon to Governor John Leverett, September 8, 1675. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 152; Francis Jennings suggests that the real significance of the treaty may not have been so much the cooperation of the Narragansetts as it was a justification for claiming their lands once they broke it. Jennings, Invasion of America, 306.

4. Daniel Gookin, "Historical Collections of the Indians in New England, (1674)," Massachusetts Historical Society Collections 1(1792):179. (Hereafter cited as MHSC); Neal Salisbury pointed out that in placing natives in Praying Towns, English authorities virtually outlawed Indian culture. "In countless subtle ways the Indians' distance from their past was reinforced while they were as far as ever from being accepted as members of 'civilized' society." Neal Salisbury, "Red Puritans: The 'Praying Indians' of Massachusetts Bay and John Eliot." William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 31(1974):28-29, 34; See also, Axtell, Invasion Within, 139, 273.

5. Shurtleff, ed., Records, III, 246, 301, 385, IV (pt. 2), 49; MA, 30:117-118; See also, Bodge, Soldiers, 207-208, 295.

6. John Eliot, "An Account of Indian Churches in New England, (1673)," MHSC 10(1809):128.

7. Gookin, Historical Account, 436; Gookin, "Historical Collections," 180-189; Eliot, "Account of Indian Churches," 124; Jennings, Invasion of America, 250-251; For the numbers of Praying Indians, see, Axtell, Invasion Within, 227, 240, 243; For a discussion of the processes and difficulties involved in native conversion, see, Ibid., 222, 224, 232, 238; See also, John Eliot, "A Brief Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel Among the

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Indians in New England, in the Year 1670," in Charles W. Eliot, ed., American Historical Documents, 1000-1904 (New York: P.F. Collier and Son Corp., 1938), 142-146; Bodge, Soldiers, 392-393; William Kellaway, The New England Company, 1649-1776 (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1961), 116; Jennings claims the fact that the Nipmucks joined Philip represents proof against the success of Eilot's missions. Jennings, Invasion of America, 309.

8. Eliot, "Brief Narrative," 144.

9. Gookin, Historical Account, 436, 443; Samuel Eliot Morison, Builders of the Bay Colony (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 304-305; For a discussion of the use of friendly native soldiers, see, Richard R. Johnson, "The Search for a Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England," Journal of American History 64(1977-78):626-627.

10. [Saltonstall], "Present State of New-England," 49; Mary Pray to Captain James Oliver, October 20, 1675. "Winthrop Papers," MHSC 41(1871):106; Rowlandson, "Captivity and Restauration," 353.

11. Gookin, Historical Account, 515, 523.

12. Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 223; Gookin, Historical Account, 450-451; Bodge, Soldiers, 396.

13. Daniel Gookin to the Hon. Robert Boyle, December 18, 1677. Gookin, Historical Account, 429.

14. [Saltonstall], "Present State of New-England," 41; At one time a move was made "to certify those traytors to their King and countrey, Guggins and Danford." MA, 30:193; See also, "A Short Account of Daniel Gookin," MHSC 1(1792):228-229; While Gookin was defeated in 1676, others like Danforth received fewer votes than previously. Salisbury, "Conquest of the 'Savage'," 264; For annual Assistant election lists, see Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, passim; Despite this temporary unpopularity, "during the latter part of his active career, Gookin enjoyed a full return of public favor and confidence." Gookin, Historical Account, 427; See also, Bodge, Soldiers, 175; Axtell, Invasion Within, 331.

15. Bodge, Soldiers, 52-53; Sharp, "New England System of Defense," 259.

16. Gookin, Historical Account, 454.

17. "A True Account," 3; Gookin agreed that due to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 the unstable situation many "would admit no distinction between one Indian and other." Gookin, Historical Account, 454; See also, Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 192.

18. Hubbard, History, I, 96; See also, Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692 3 vols., (Boston: County of Suffolk, 1901), I, 52-54.

19. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 56-57, 64; MA, 30:185c; On the same day that the Council ordered the Naticks to Deer Island, it allowed the "Puncapouge Indians" to "remoove their stuffe and provissions to the place assigned them . . . neare Braintry & Milton" and authorized soldiers to help them scout and defend the area. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 53; See also, Gookin, Historical Account, 468, 470, 473; Such a response clearly fit a pattern suggested by Quincy Wright. One common characteristic of war is a change in the laws dealing with the enemy culture, including its members not actively involved in the conflict. "Resident alien enemies are interned or placed under supervision. . . ." Wright, Study of War, II, 694.

20. Gookin, Historical Account, 485-486; "Short Account of Daniel Gookin," 228-229; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 64; See also, William Biglow, History of the Town of Natick, Mass. (Boston: Marsh, Capen and Lyon, 1830), 36.

21. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 84.

22. Mather, "Diary," 359.

23. Gookin, Historical Account, 494; MA, 68:136b; See also, Bodge, Soldiers, 401.

24. Gookin, Historical Account, 482-483; See also, Ibid., 462-471; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 57; Bodge, Soldiers, 301, 397-399.

25. MA, 30:186-187, 190.

26. Gookin, Historical Account, 483; See also, MA, 30:191; Bert Salwen, "Indians of Southern New England and Long Island: Ealy Peiod," in William C. Sturtevant, ed., Handbook of North American Indians 20 vols., (Wasington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), XV, 170; In other related incidents, hostile Indians "surprised and carried away or [killed] about 150 men women & children" from Hassanamesitt in November 1675. MA, 68:57; In early 1676, Capain Samuel Mosely seized fifty-eight Nashobah Indians from their homes

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near Concord without warrant or order and inarched them to Boston. Although the Council objected, "yet notwithstanding, the Captain. . . met with not rebuke for this high irregularity and arbitrary action. To conclude this matter, those poor Indians . . . were sent down to Deer Island," leaving all their belongings at Concord to be plundered in their absence. Gookin, Historical Account, 496-497; Bodge, Soldiers, 401.

27. John Pynchon to John Winthrop, Jr., July 2, 1675. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 137; See also, John Pynchon to the Governor and Magistrates of Connecticut, August 4, 1675. Ibid., 138; John Pynchon to Governor Leverett, September 8, 1675. Ibid., 152; Gookin lamented tht New England did not employ Indian troops early in the war because "God darkened that counsel from us at that time. ." Gookin, Historical Account, 445, 447.

28. Gookin, Historical Account, 442-443; Bodge, Soldiers, 95.

29. Henry S. Nourse, ed., The Early Records of Lancaster, Massachusetts, 1643-1725 (Lancaster: W.J. Coulter, 1884), 100-101; MA, 69:105a.

30. MA, 68:251; Gookin, Historical Account, 509; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 85; Bodge, Soldiers, 290.

31. Church, "Entertaining Passages," 441; Church tried to convince his Indian soldiers that good service represented a way to "prove themselves" and to dispel some of the malicious talk about them in the colonies. Ibid., 437; See also, Slotkin and Folsom, ed., So Dreadful a Judgment, 374, 381.

32. Gookin, Historical Account, 512-513, 524-525; Hubbard also noted that "many of them have given notable Proof of their sincerity, by fighting against their, and our Enemies, and have been very successful in their Endeavours." Hubbard, History, II, 270.

33. Gookin, Historical Account, 527-528; See also, Ibid., 522.

34. Ibid., 444, 491; See also, Ibid., 448; Bodge, Soldiers, 395-396.

35. Gookin, Historical Account, 452, 517; See also, Ibid., 518, 532-533; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 86; Bodge, Soldiers, 404; Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 245.

36. At the , the Narragansetts

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reportedly lost forty fighting men plus approximately three hundred old men, women, and children in their wigwams. Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay rpt:1765, Lawrence S. Mayo, ed., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 254; Thomas Reede, a freed captive, testified that at Turner's Falls most of the native casualties were "old men and women" and that there were not "above 60 or 70 fighting-men" on the scene. Bodge, Soldiers, 244.

37. Cited in Wright, Study of War, I, 308; Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," 15.

38. Hubbard, History, I, 244; Saltonstall claimed that among the natives, even "the most milde and gentle Sex delight in Cruelties, and have utterly abandoned at once the two proper Virtues of Womankind, Pity and Modesty." [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 82-83.

39. MA, 68:105.

40. [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 98; Hubbard, History, I, 166-167.

41. Hubbard, History, I, 111; Judd, Hadley, 135.

42. Salisbury, "Conquest of the 'Savage'," 85-86; William Lincoln, History of Worcester, Massachusetts (Worcester: Charles Hersey, 1862), 21, 31; Hubbard, History, I, 260, 264-265; Colonial mutilation practices had their roots in England. See, Axtell, "Scholastic Philosophy," 346.

43. Church, "Entertaining Passages," 451; Nourse, Records of Lancaster, 106-107; MA, 69:43; Henry Trumbull, History of the Indian Wars (Boston: Phillips and Sampson, 1846), 92; Bodge, Soldiers, 388.

44. Cited in Bodge, Soldiers, 69; Judd, Hadley, 146; See also, MA, 68:24-26, 214-215; A later historian noted of the incident, "Such a fate by order of the English seems incredible. If the squaw returned to her own people and suffered death for serving the English, that story might be accepted as plausible." The truth is often difficult to face. Clifton Johnson, Hampden County, 1636-1936 2 vols., (New York: American Historical Society, Inc. , 1936), I, 148.

45. Hubbard, History, II, 64, 99-100; Bodge, Soldiers, 301.

46. Turney-High, Primitive War, 190-191, 201; John G.

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Kennedy, "Ritual and Intergroup Murder: Comments on War, Primitive and Modern," in Maurice N. Walsh, ed., War and the Human Race (New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1971), 47; Jennings, Invasion of America, 160-163; In July 1676, a Hezekiah Willet was slain and beheaded by the Narragansetts. Some enemy Wampanoags, or "Mount Hope Indians" recognized Willet, "were sorry for his death, mourned, kombed his head, and hung peag in his hair." This example shows that the ritual reasons for mutilation overrode any feelings of pure hatred or enmity. , "Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674-1729," MHSC 45(1878):14; Conversely, Thomas Hutchinson wrote that the "cruelties which had been exercised upon the English were urged in excuse for the treatment which the Indians received, who were made prisoners or surrendered themselves." Hutchinson, , 260.

47. Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 10; Almon W. Lauber, Indian Slavery in Colonial Times Within the Present Limits of the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1913), 109, 125-127; See also, Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 224-228.

48. [Saltonstall], "Present State of New-England," 30; MA, 68:102a; Church, "Entertaining Passages," 463; See also, Bodge, Soldiers, 193, 295-296; Church, "Entertaining Passages," 434; MA, 67:241; Lauber, Indian Slavery, 142; Jennings, Invasion of America, 311.

49. Lauber, Indian Slavery, 147; Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," 13-14; Church, "Entertaining Passages," 411-412; Easton related an incident in which after the Narragansett fight colonial troops gathered the native captives to be sold, "but one old man . . . [who] was so decriped [he] Could not go and . . . sum wold have had him devoured by doges but the tendernes of sum of them prevailed to Cut ofe his head. . . ." Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre." 15-16.

50. Church, "Entertaining Passages," 411-412; Admittedly, not all captives who escaped execution faced transportation out of the colony. The General Court issued several orders for colonists, especially Gookin and Danforth, to care for Indian women and children entrusted to them. MA, 30:177a, 207, 207a, 220.

51. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 115; See also, "A True Account," 7; Bodge, Soldiers, 305.

52. MA, 30:173; David Pulsifer, ed., Records of the Colony of New Plymouth 12 vols., (Boston: William White, 1859), X, 451-452; See also, Charles M. Segal and David C.

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Stineback, Puritans, Indians, and Manifest Destiny (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977), 204-205? Eliot and the Reverend James Keith of Bridgewater even fought against the transportation of Philip's own wife and son, to no avail. George W. Ellis and John E. Morris, King Philip's War (New York: Grafton Press, 1906), 267-268; George Sheldon, who wrote the town history of Deerfield, stated of the practice, "No savage had yet mastered the art of a torture equal to this." Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 142.

53. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 136; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 252; "Indian CHildren Put to Service, 1676," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 8(1854):271-273. (Hereafter cited as NEHGR); In some towns, at least, residents needed a special warrant to keep Indian servants in their homes. See, MA, 30:234; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 277.

54. Gaetano Mosca, Elementi di Scienza Politica (1896), cited in Park, "Social Function of War," 239.

55. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 136, 327-328; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 289; See also, Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 245.

56. Hubbard, History, II, 262.

57. Salisbury, "Conquest of the 'Savage'," ix, 204; Salisbury, "Red Puritans," 53-54; Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860 (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 82, 118; Gary B. Nash, Red, White and Black (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 127; Morison, Builders of the Bay Colony, 317; Yasu Kawashima contends that the extension of colonial jurisdiction over the natives "was only one phase of a colonial policy of eventual assimilation of the natives into the colonial society." But his evidence suggests that Praying Indians received less trust and more supervision in their judicial administration in the early eighteenth century than they had in the seventeenth. Yasu Kawashima, "Jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts Over the Indians in Massachusetts, 1689-1763," New England Quarterly 42(1969):549-550; Lyle Koehler pointed out that court decisions and sentences revealed a marked increase of racial prejudice during the late seventeenth century. Lyle Koehler, "Red-White Power Relationships and Justice in the Courts of Seventeenth-Century New England," American Indian Cultural and Research Journal 3:4(1979), 13, 19-20.

58. Cotton Mather, Bonfacius: An Essay Upon the Good David Levin, ed., rpt:1710 (Cambridge: Belknap Press,

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1966), 156-157; All that remain under the English influences in the Massachusetts Province," he wrote, "are generally recovered out of their , to some sense of the Christian religion." The reader must remember that by law, all free Indians had to reside in official Praying Towns. Ibid., 154; Vaughan notes that when the United Colonies disbanded in 1685, a special commission was named to administer the missionary program. Alden T. Vaughan, New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675 Rev. ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1979), 307.

59. Mather, Bonifacius, 154-155; Grindall Rawson, "Account of an Indian Visitation, 1698," MHSC 10(1809):129; Gookin, "Historical Collections,11 195; "Brief Relation of the State of New England," 15-16; See also, Salisbury, "Conquest of the 'Savage'," 265; Jennings, Invasion of America, 252-253; Kellaway, New England Company, 117; Axtell, Invasion Within, 240.

60. Increase Mather, "An Earnest Exhortation to the Inhabitants of New England," in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 186; Gookin, Historical Account, 472-473, 514.

61. Cited in Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana 2 vols., (Hartford: Silus Andrus and Son, 1855), I, 577; Even Hubbard admitted that the missionary effort was "like to be not a little obstructed" by the war. "What Harvest is like to be of the Body of them, in the present, or in the future Time, is not for any of us to speak. . . ." Hubbard, History, II, 269, 271; "Since the death of Mr. Eliot (that American Apostle)," wrote Increase Mather in 1697, "there has bin a signal blast of Heaven on ye Indian work, very many of the most pious Indians (both professors and preachers) being dead also; & others of equal worth not appearing to succeed them." Cited in Kellaway, New England Company, 228.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3

THE HIGH COST OF WAR

King Philip's War cost Massachusetts and the other New

England colonies dearly. Especially hard hit were the

frontier areas of the Bay Colony, such as the Connecticut

River Valley towns. Since most of the fighting occurred

there, the Hampshire County settlements suffered the

greatest numbers of casualties, both military and civilian.

Because of the vulnerable position of frontier communities,

many towns had to be abandoned, and other settlements had to

bear the burden of absorbing the refugees.

The problems were not all local in nature, however.

Provincial treasuries were also strained by the conflict,

and colonial officials had to pass the deficits on to the

citizenry in the form of unprecedented levels of taxation.

Much attention during the decades following King Philip's

War necessarily focused on recovering the vast expenditures

of the conflict. But the colonial treasury was not alone in

its search for reimbursement. While their government

demanded multiple levies, countless Massachusetts

individuals and numerous towns petitioned for direct

payments or tax exemptions as recompense for their wartime

losses. The wounds left by the war were deep. 76

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Massachusetts colonists faced constant reminders of the high

price of the war, both in memories of their dead comrades

and in the persistent economic legacies. The effort to

regain material stability represented a nagging and

troublesome problem in the postwar years.

In any war, the human cost is the most closely felt,

and the most difficult to recoup. At a time when the total

white population of New England reached only perhaps 52,000,

the colonies lost over six hundred men— or close to

one-tenth of all adult males— in the fighting. This figure

does not even include the countless noncombatants who

perished in isolated raids or who never returned from Indian

captivity.1 Naturally, such a traumatic loss had a lasting

effect on the surviving population.

The trauma was especially severe in the frontier areas.

At least 145 persons lost their lives in Hampshire County

alone in 1675? another 64 died the next year and 16 more

were slain in 1677, for a three-year total of 225. Many of

these victims were soldiers brought from other parts of the

colony to protect the frontier, but more than 80 of the

total lived in the county prior to the conflict.2 The two

bloodiest days of the war for the English occurred on

September 18, 1675, at Bloody Brook in Deerfield, when 74

men under the command of Capt. Thomas Lathrop lost their

lives, and May 19, 1676, at Turner's Falls, when the natives

reversed an apparent English victory, killing 38 troopers.

Included among the 74 casualties at Bloody Brook were 14 of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 Deerfield men employed by Lathrop as wagon drivers.

These 14 men, who ranged in age from 15 to 58, left 9 widows

and at least 40 fatherless children. Since the victims

represented over one-third of the town's adult male

population at the time, the remaining residents

understandably agreed to abandon their exposed community

indefinitely.3 At the Falls Fight, where most of the

soldiers came from the Connecticut Valley towns of

Springfield, Northampton, Hadley, and Hatfield, 26 of the 33

casualties whose places of residence are listed in the

records resided in Hampshire County. The largest number of

dead— 12— were from Northampton, with 6 from Hadley, 4 from

Hatfield, 3 from Springfield, and 1 from Deerfield.’ These

two engagements alone accounted for the deaths of 39

Hampshire residents, with Deerfield and Northampton

suffering most heavily. Such examples support Thomas

Hutchinson's claim that "Every person, almost, [in the

colony] lost a relation or near friend, and the people in 5 general were exasperated."

Naturally, one of the main concerns both of the

individual towns and of the provincial government was

finding a way to defend the vulnerable communities.

Relatively new and undeveloped plantations like Deerfield,

Northfield, and Westfield obviously could not supply all

their own needs and at the same time defend themselves from

the elusive natives. Therefore, towns throughout the

province were protected by resident garrisons apportioned

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from the militia regiments. The fact that "sundry persons"

sought to avoid service by absenting themselves when local

militia committees issued calls to fill their quotas must

have frustrated efforts to secure the frontier.6 Requests

for help kept coming from frightened colonists, and the

Massachusetts government did its best to meet the increasing

demands on its meager resources.

Raising troops to serve on the frontier was one matter;

paying and supporting them was another. Part of the

soldiers' salaries was paid by the Massachusetts treasurer,

at least early in the war, but the bulk came from the towns.

The families of soldiers on campaign or garrison duty

received payment from their local treasurers, and as

recompense, the towns were granted an equal credit toward

their provincial tax rates.7 The responsibility for

supplying garrison troops with provisions and other

necessities fell to "the families in the several

fortifications where they [were] placed." When Capt. Joshua

Scottow requested supplies for his soldiers in November

1675, the Council replied that according to practice, "the

country soldiers are provided for with victualls by the

people they secure."8 Even this requirement represented a

heavy burden for many frontier towns. The residents of

Northampton, for instance, while expressing reluctance "to

burden the country, whose expenses have been great already,"

related their inability to support a garrison unassisted,

since "the losses & expenses by reason of the war have been

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. such, as renders us uncapable of such a thing.”9 From the

start, the war drained the resources of the Massachusetts

colony; individual towns could not afford the costs of

their own defense, and the resources of the provincial

government were far too limited to assure the complete

protection of all the exposed frontier communities.

As a result, many frontier residents had to abandon

their plantations and flee to safer areas. In addition to

the obvious trauma felt by the refugees themselves, the

unsettled situation placed pressure on the towns which

received the frightened fugitives. In an attempt to staunch

the flow of colonists from the frontier— both for the better

defense of the colony and for the relief of the towns which

strained under the weight of the evacuees— Capt. Samuel

Appleton issued an order on November 12, 1675, to the

soldiers and inhabitants of Springfield, Northampton,

Hadley, Westfield, and Hatfield forbidding anyone to abandon

those towns without his permission.10 This order affected

only the most secure settlements in the Connecticut Valley;

Deerfield and Northfield, the two most exposed areas, had

already been abandoned in September. The residents of these

northernmost towns naturally followed the river south in

their retreat, returning in many cases to the communities

from which they had originally emigrated.

Regardless of ties of affinity or even simple sympathy,

towns along the escape route must have felt adverse effects

from the sudden influx, as evidenced by attempts of the

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colonial government to compensate for the situation. On

November 3, 1675, the Council declared that "such

persons . . . who are so forced from theire habitations &

repaire to other plantations for reliefe, shall not, by

virtue of theire residenc in said plantations they repaire

unto" become burdens to the communities, "according to law,

title Poore." In cases of extreme need, the Council allowed

their care to "be supplied out of the publicke

treasury."11 Whether it was supplying exiled Indians on

Deer Island, outfitting garrison troops on the frontier, or

providing for the refugees of abandoned towns, the colonial

government lacked the resources to meet the immediate and

increasing demands caused by the war. As a result,

authorities had to become more selective and stringent in

allowing stragglers to impose themselves on the already

encumbered localities.

In the spring of 1676 the Massachusetts Council

authorized town selectmen "to take a particular account of

all Persons and Families so coming unto them," inquiring

specifically into their means of support. The order further

required selectmen "to take effectual care that the

Incomers . . . settle themselves, or be by them settled in

some orderly and diligent way of Imployment and Government."

The concern evidently focused "especially [upon] single and

younger persons," the unattached element which traditionally

represented an internal threat to New England's communal

cohesion.12 To justify their presence in the safe havens,

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refugees had to provide some positive contribution to their

protectors. The most obvious service involved participation

in the defense of their adopted localities. In May 1676 the

Council countered those "forced to remoove to other places,

[who] doe account themselves free from duty in those

places," by ordering "that all such persons . . . shall

stand, in respect of charges and duty to the publicke, in

the same capacitie wth the propper inhabitants amongst whom

they make their aboade or residence.1,13 There were no free

lunches in seventeenth-century Massachusetts.

While such reluctance to welcome their brethen

unconditionally in their time of need may seem callous, the

tradition of tightly guarded community conformity was as old

as the colony itself. The restrictions were no less

apparent in frontier plantations than in established towns.

As early as 1642, for instance, Springfield forbade its

inhabitants "under the Coulour of friendship or otherwise,

[to] Intertayne" any strangers "for longer tyme then one

month . . . without the generall consent and alowance" of

the other residents. This ordinance was no mere formality;

the selectmen used the law to evict outsiders who "Thrust

themselves" into the town and to punish citizens guilty of 14 encouraging unwelcome strangers to linger. Springfield

was not alone in "warning out" undesirable interlopers; on

the eve of King Philip's War, for example, Lancaster evicted

a William Lincoln "in his majesties name," "utterly

disclaim[ed]" his right to live within the town, and ordered

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him and his family to depart immediately. In doing so, the

selectmen took the opportunity to repeat their injunction

against "any that should com to inhabit without [their]

consent."15 Some writers, notably Douglas Leach, maintain

that the experience of King Philip's War lessened the

restrictions imposed by communities against strangers, but

town studies suggest that if any liberalization occurred

during the conflict, the results were temporary at best.

During the early 1680s, Springfield continued to warn out

persons of questionable motives or means and to require

established residents to post bond for newcomers admitted

into the town. Likewise, in 1680 a committee assigned to

oversee the selectmen of Groton— ironically a town which

itself was abandoned in 1676— implored them to keep a

constant watch against any transient persons who might

"becom a charg to the towne" by their prolonged

presence.16 Even after the shared upheaval of King

Philip's War, New England towns still did not want to be

burdened by outsiders who would interrupt the tranquility

and prosperity of the majority.

Against this backdrop of Puritan tribalism, New England

also possessed a tradition of charity and communal concern,

dating back to 1630, when John Winthrop reminded his

compatriots, "wee must be knitt together in this worke as

one man." In times of trouble, "wee must be willing to

abridge our selves of superfluities, for the supply of

others necessities," he warned. Winthrop reasoned that God

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had a purpose in causing some people to be wealthy and some

poor, or in allowing some to suffer while others flourished.

The result of such a configuration, as interpreted by the

governor, was that "every man might have need of other[s],

and from hence they might be all knitt more nearly together

in the Bond of brotherly affeccion." In theory, all New

England Puritans were united parts of the "one body in

Christ"; they were "made soe contiguous in a speciall

relacion as they must needes partake of each others strength

and infirmity, joy and sorrowe, weale and woe."17

Admittedly, New England had become a much more complex and

diversified milieu between the establishment of

Massachusetts Bay in 1630 and King Philip's War in 1675.

But the summons to Christian charity never faded, at least

in the sermons of the orthodox clergy. Over a decade after

the conflict, Cotton Mather still reminded his fellow

colonists that "every Christian should Readily and

Chearfully Venture his All to serve the people of God, when

a Time of Distress and Danger calleth for it."18 Such

exhortations, at least at first glance, seem to indict New

England townsmen for serious transgressions in their

reluctance to unconditionally welcome their needy brethren.

Puritans saw no shame in poverty, as long as it

resulted from ill fortune or divine providence rather than

from personal negligence, and they did not question why God

would present some members of His flock with such adversity.

"The only reason why God sets his love on one man and not

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upon another," said the Reverend Solomon Stoddard, "is 19 because he pleases." New Englanders were not entirely

devoid of sympathy for their less fortunate brethren, but

they showed a marked preference for aiding members of their

own local community. Before the war, poor relief came

almost entirely through the town meeting and the selectmen.

For instance, in early 1667 Springfield residents voted to

allow their selectmen to provide "4 or 5£ to help a little

against the want of some familyes." The meeting also voted,

in consideration "of the poore estate of Some in the

Plantation, who it is thought by Some need releife," to

empower a committee to study the overall degree of privation

in the community and to report on the most "convenient"

solutions.20

Relief for familiar neighbors naturally continued

during the war, but the emphasis shifted from solving simple

cash poverty to replacing material estates destroyed by the

Indians. The effectiveness of these efforts varied from

town to town. In response to petitions from people like

Preserved Clapp, who had his home and barn burned,

Northampton formed a committee "to view what other Land may

be found to Suite other Persons in the like Condition & to

Accomodate them as far as may be." By the end of 1673, the

committee had "laid out Sundry Small Parcels of land to

Several persons on Condition they build on it & live on it

three years." The good intentions of this plan were not

entirely realized in all cases, however; William Smead, who

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had lived in Northampton since 1660, asked for relief after

his home, barn, and crops were destroyed in 1675. Two years

later, the town awarded him a half-acre house lot in the

town. Apparently frustrated by this slight allowance, Smead

packed up and moved to Deerfield, where land was more

obtainable, even if security was not.21 Other towns made

efforts to acquire title to parcels of land vacated by local

Indians during the war and to confirm those tracts to

townspeople who sustained losses in the conflict, still,

most of these efforts were designed to aid established

residents and generally excluded recent arrivals.22

With provincial resources insufficient to completely

meet the new needs and with towns unwilling to encourage

refugees to seek aid from them, the answer had to come from

private sources or church collections. During specified

fast days, congregations collected voluntary donations "for

the distressed Families Relief." On three days in August

1676 alone, for example, the "Old Church" (First Church) in

Boston procured f.69, the "North Church" (Second Church) ii68,

and the Charlestown congregation i/78 for the needy.23 This

represents a shift in relief measures from a system of

direct aid granted to specific persons who were well

acquainted with the donors to a more general system in which

strangers contributed to the maintenance of persons in need

throughout the colony. When the residents of Brookfield had

to leave their plantation in September 1675, they fled to

Boston, "where they were plentifully relieved out of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Church Stock there."24 This sort of aid corresponded

closely to the spirit of charity and "brotherly affeccion"

Winthrop had outlined in 1630. Expressions of generosity

even came from England, in the form of money, provisions,

and clothing. On December 13, 1677, the Massachusetts

Council drafted a letter of thanks for "the Charity of those

many Pious Christians" in England, describing how their

contributions helped "thousands of persons in great Distress

without Habitation or Succor & Many familyes consisting only

of weomen & children utterly uncapable to subsist 25 themselves."

Among the most publicized and widely renowned

charitable efforts involved raising the funds needed to

ransom captives taken by the Indians. Mary Rowlandson,

captured from Lancaster on February 10, 1676, benefitted

from -£20 "raised by some Boston gentlemen," and the ransom

of in paid for her son was raised by the people of

Portsmouth. Upon their release, unable to return to

Lancaster, the Rowlandson family lived in a house rented for

them by the South Church of Boston. Their trials were eased

considerably because, in the former captive's words, "the

Lord so moved the hearts of these and those [i.e. diverse

strangers] towards us, that we wanted neither food, nor

raiment for ourselves or ours."26 Similarly, public

contributions played a large role in securing the return of

hostages captured from Deerfield and Hatfield by a raiding

party of Canadian natives in 1677. In that instance, on May

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designated the proceeds for the support of the redeemed

captives and their families, who incurred significant

expenses in tracking them down.27 Such signal examples of

need naturally brought benevolence from total strangers who

sought to help specific, dramatic causes.

When New England's charity toward the victims of King

Philip's War is viewed as a whole, town orders to strictly

regulate unattached intruders do not indicate any real

stinginess or callousness. New Englanders, either

individually or collectively through their churches,

responded with an outpouring of contributions to meet

specific solicitations as well as the general needs of the

masses who suffered materially during the conflict. The

traditional means of providing aid through the town

governments could not meet the unprecedented demands created

by the great Indian war because they were never designed to

do so. Charity had to come from larger and more general

efforts. Towns in vulnerable positions had to maintain

their standards in order to keep their own resources from

becoming overburdened and to hope that outside sources could

compensate for the new exigency. Not surprisingly, the bulk

of the private contributions to the cause came from the more

secure towns which were most able to share their wealth.

One asset which the New England provinces gained from

the conflict was the vast amount of land vacated by the

defeated natives. In March 1679 the Commissioners of the

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United Colonies "agree[d] that the severall Collonies shall

fully posesse and freely dispose to theire owne advantage

all such lands as lye within theire owne precincts

Respectively.1,28 The largest expanse of real estate which

fell to Massachusetts was the interior frontier, or the

Nipmuck Territory— the largely unsettled land between the

coastal towns and the Valley communities.

One of the major postwar expenses facing the government

involved compensating soldiers and other persons who had

provided services to the colony, and therein rested the

value of the Nipmuck Territory.

The years after 1675 witnessed numerous petitions for

land reimbursements. Joseph Sill, for example, eloquently

requested from the General Court in 1685 "a small number of

acres of that land which hath bin recovered from the enimy,

that so a little part of what he hath seen with his eyes and

trod with his feet, in your service, may be committed into

his hands, and that so he may the more comfortably share in

the blessings of these peaceful days wherein men may beat

theyr swords into plow shares." The deputies saw fit to

grant Sill a parcel of land within a new plantation

established in the Nipmuck country "for the Accommodating

such as were souldiers in the Late Warr."29 Countless

individuals wanted pieces of the newly secured land.

The colonies began promising land to their soldiers

even before the war ended and before they removed the

natives. Before the campaign against the Narragansetts in

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December 1675, for instance, officials assured the troopers

that "if they played the man, took the Fort, & Drove the

Enemy out of the Narragansett Country . . . they should have

a gratuity in Land, besides their Wages."30 Despite this

pledge and the success of the expedition, however, dividends

did not follow immediately. In fact, veterans of the battle

petitioned nearly a decade later for "some good Tract of

Land" with which to maintain their families, reminding the

General Court that during the war the "Petitioners left what

was Dear to them & preferred the publique weal above their

own private enjoyments.1,31 In the end, it took over fifty

years for the soldiers or their descendants to secure the

promised land from the Massachusetts government. Not until

1728 did the Council authorize the selection of "two Tracts

of lands for Townships of the contents of six miles square"

for "all such Officers and Soldiers now surviving, and the

legal representatives of those that are deceased."

Massachusetts eventually chartered seven new townships for

the Narragansett veterans or their heirs; the bulk of the

claimants resided in the eastern sections of the colony, but

Township Number IV (Greenwich) included grants to residents

of Northampton, Hadley, Deerfield, Worcester, and

Brookfield, while Township Number VI (Templeton) contained 32 claimants from Groton and Lancaster. Naturally, by the

1730s, when the Narragansett Townships were formally

assigned, very few of the original soldiers were still alive

to enjoy their long overdue reward.

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The inordinate delay in providing these soldiers their

land pensions reflected not so much a lack of concern on the

part of Massachusetts legislators as an inability to

effectively manage the enormous flood of petitions for

various sorts for compensation from King Philip's War

veterans. Long before the war ended, the Council began to

receive requests for aid from wounded soldiers and from the

survivors of the deceased, and the petitions poured in for

many years after the conflict. Countless requests arrived

from soldiers like John Barnes, wounded at Brookfield, who

in January 1676 reported that "he yet remains under the

Chirurgions hand: and is altogether unable to doo any

business." He was awarded 40s as compensation. Entreaties

also came from widows, such as Ruth Upham, who was left with

seven children. She received L10 for the loss of her 33 husband. The numbers of such petitions and the costs to

the colonial government compounded during the years

immediately following the war.

To cope with the worsening situation, colonial

officials attempted to handle the requests in an organized

fashion. On October 17, 1678, the Council, in response to

the many soldiers who "Lost the use of their limbs and Are

becom uncapable of Labor: or maintaining themselves,"

ordered an "annuall Alowance or pention paid by the

Country . . . for the relief of Such as Are soe Reduced into

distress." The order provided for "the orderly Regulating

of this matter, [that] the Court of Each County Concider the

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cases of such as make Application to them," and report

worthy petitioners to the provincial treasurer. To further

regularize the system of compensation, the General Court set

up a committee the following year to hear the cases of all

those "men wounded in the late warr, who moove for

releife."34 Later, in 1684, the Court authorized anyone

owed money by the colony "for salleries or

otherwise, . . . to receive their pay in the Towns where

they lived out of the Country Rates."35

Soldiers and their dependents were not the only persons

requesting compensation from Boston. Civilians who had

provided services to the colony or its soldiers also swelled

the ranks of those seeking financial satisfaction. These

petitions for reimbursement covered a wide range of services

rendered, including supplying garrisons, boarding wounded

soldiers, operating ferries, making shoes, and repairing

firearms, and the amounts requested varied from only a few

to hundreds of pounds.36 Although the requests

came from all over the colony, a good number of them came

from the frontier areas, where most of the war-time activity

took place.

Estimates of the charges of the people of Hampshire

County alone suggest an amount over 4.5,000. The Connecticut

Valley was experiencing economic decline even before the

war. Many of the towns were relatively young and had as yet

no economic base beyond subsistence agriculture. In the

more established communities, men who had relied on the fur

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trade as the major entrepreneurial venture in the region

suffered a decline in that traffic. The Valley fur trade

peaked during the 1650s; thereafter, commerce deteriorated

due to competition from the Dutch and Mohawk attacks on the

tribes of western New England. Even so wealthy and

influential a person as John Pynchon of Springfield

reflected despair when he wrote to his son Joseph in 1671,

"I am altogether out of trade, wampum being fallen . . . and

besides there is no trade at all by reason of the Indian

wars.” Four years later, just after the beginning of King

Philip's War, he expressed further frustration, "having been

wholly out of trade." We "are now reduced to our best

contrivance for our comfortable living," he confided to

Joseph, "and much ado to make things hold out."37

Admittedly, Pynchon had diversified investments and economic

interests; he was by no means left destitute. But if even

he felt the adverse effects of commercial decline and Indian

hostilities, less fortunate residents of the frontier must

have been affected far more acutely. On October 20, 1675,

Pynchon recounted his losses from attacks in the area and

added that "my farmers [are] also undone, and many in town

that were in my debt utterly disabled; so that I am really

reduced to great straits."38 The whole fabric of the

frontier economy, therefore, was racked by the war, which

erupted on the heels of a period of economic decline.

Not surprisingly, many Connecticut Valley residents

sought recompense for their wartime expenses. For instance,

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prominent Northampton residents David Wilton, Lt. William

Clark, and Medad Pomeroy all applied for reimbursement,

ranging from £20 to £40, for quartering or supplying

garrison soldiers.39 Similar claims came from all over the

colony. Such individual expenses, multiplied by hundreds of

cases, inevitably compounded the strain on the colonial

treasury and forced the provincial government to initiate

drastic measures to recover the financial losses.

In September 1678 the United Colonies claimed total

expenditures resulting from the war of over £80,000, with

Massachusetts alone reporting an outlay of £46,292.40 Such

a huge deficit proved as long-lasting as it was

unprecedented. So great were the demands on the colony's

finances that in 1678 the Council had to inform its agents

in England, "in very trueth the whole country is now .

greatly impoverished by our late trouble wth the Indians,

sicknesses, & mortallity, &tc." Due to this situation, the

Council reported "that wee are not able to procure any more

money to be sent over to yow, our treasury being not only

empty, but many thousands of pounds indebted to merchants

here and in England." Early the next year, the General

Court ordered the treasurer to send the agents, William

Stoughton and Peter Bulkeley, £150 each as "an expression of

our good affection to them" and "a personall gratuity," but

this action does not necessarily indicate that the colony's

financial problems disappeared so quickly.41 More than a

decade after the conflict had ended, the deficits continued.

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By 1690 Massachusetts still counted a debt of £40,000, with

"not a penny in the treasury to pay it withal."42 King

William's War, which began in 1689, compounded the problem

and sustained the chronic indebtedness which began in 1675.

To compensate for the unprecedented demand on its

funds, Massachusetts had to resort to greatly increased

taxation, in the form of multiple tax rates. Colonists in

seventeenth-century New England generally paid two types of

taxes: town levies, assessed by the selectmen to meet

normal operating expenses, and a "country rate" for the

support of the provincial government, assessed on towns by a

quota of one penny per pound of estate value plus ls/8d per

poll. Town constables had responsibility for collecting the

tax and presenting it to the country treasurer, either in

cash if a "rate in money" was demanded or in bushels of

grain at values set by the General Court.43 During the

years preceding King Philip's War, the burden on

Massachusetts colonists was fairly light; the bulk of the

levies came from the towns and the provincial treasury

generally survived on a single rate per year. But on July

9, 1675, the Court instituted a policy of multiple rates,

ordering three rates, and it followed up on October 12 with

an additional "seven single country rates . . . three of

the said rates to be payed at or before the last of November

next, & the other fower rates at or before the last of March

next." The Court allowed payments in kind, with wheat

valued at 6s per bushel, rye at 4s/6d, barley and peas at

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4s, Indian corn at 3s/6d, and oats at 2s. Those who paid in

cash received a twenty-five percent abatement. A single

rate for the whole colony amounted to iil553/5s/4d, sc this

initial levy of ten rates for the year must have come as a

shock to the colonists. Boston, naturally, paid the highest

amount— L300 in a single rate— but even the oppressed

frontier towns received warrants from the treasurer.

Springfield, for instance, was assessed i.26/5s/5d per rate,

Northampton fi22/2s/10d, Hadley il8/10s/9d, Lancaster

■L11/16S, Westfield iill/16s, Groton ill/10s, and Hatfield

■L8/12S.44 Multiplied by ten, this burden brought immediate

hardship, especially to frontier towns where other anxieties

also mounted.

The multiple taxation did not end in 1675. In fact,

the General Court issued sixteen country rates in 1676 and

nine more in 1677. Fortunately, in its May 1676 levy, and

again the following October, the Court "provided that such

of the frontier townes as are considerably weakned . . . be

allowed a meet abatement of their proportions in the 45 rates." This allowance must have saved the beleaguered

settlements invaluable resources both in cash and in taxable

provisions. On the other hand, rates represented an

advantage to those owed money by the colonial government, as

they received either direct payments out of the funds

collected or credits in their assessments to cover their

claims. To those who did not receive such allowances,

however, the multiple rates must have seemed exorbitant, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. any subsidence in the levies was gradual at best. Between

1675 and 1680 Massachusetts colonists suffered through

47-1/2 separate rates, and throughout the early 1680s the

Court continued to assess at least two or three rates per

year.46

All the while, the towns continued to levy their own

rates for local projects and expenses. These assessments

usually did not fluctuate in direct response to the war, the

largest and most constant charges being the minister's

salary and local capital expenses such as the upkeep of the

meeting house. In Springfield, for instance, both before

and after the war, annual town debts generally fell between

£.120 and £.150; the major charge was invariably the

minister's salary, which by the late reached £.100.47

The constancy of town rates, however, did not mean that

residents felt no inconvenience at the cumulative demands.

Despite noting "the Townes Poverty by reason of the

warr," on August 24, 1676, the Springfield town meeting

voted to go ahead with plans to build both a new meeting

house and a suitable residence for the minister.

Undertaking such ambitious projects at a time when people

like John Pynchon were complaining of financial strictures

may seem improvident. Indeed, in January 1677 the selectmen

were instructed "to take care from time to time for the

making & Collecting of Such Rates [as necessary] for the

Carying on of the worke," and the building project resulted

in an inordinately high town debt of over £.400 as of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. February 1683.48 Perhaps Springfield bit off more than it

could chew, because by early 1685 the town meeting enacted a

restrictive economic policy. "For the satisfaction & ease

of the Town respecting Charges," the residents voted that

"the Select men shal contract no bargain or engage any sum

above Twenty pounds for the Inhabitants to pay by Rate,

without first advising with & consulting the Town, & having

their approbation concerning the same."49 The residents of

Springfield obviously wanted to keep an eye on the

expenditure of their tax money.

They were not alone in this concern. In 1682 some

inhabitants of Groton petitioned "that the reats mad by

[the] salackt men be Justly proporshaned to every man his

Just dew to pay and no more." As in other towns, the poor

of Groton especially felt the strain of increased taxation,

and since many found themselves unable to meet their

obligations, the town meeting authorized the selectmen to

search for some way of easing the demand.50 Unfortunately,

no such practical plan presented itself, and many New

Englanders found no recourse to the high rates short of

simply refusing payment.

Not surprisingly, some colonists chose just that

option, to the chagrin of many town constables charged with

the increasingly difficult task of collecting the rates.

Whether out of inability or unwillingness to pay their

taxes, recalcitrant colonists made the post of constable an

undesirable one in some towns because constables were

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responsible not only for collecting the assessments but also

for turning over the collection to the provincial treasurer,

regardless of any delinquency by their fellow townsmen.

Some shortcomings were unavoidable. As late as 1681

Constable Samuel Reade of Mendon testified to the General

Court that a L13/12S discrepancy in his payment of the 1675

town rates resulted from an Indian attack which interrupted

his collection and caused the deaths of some of the town's

taxpayers. In response, the Court finally remitted his 51 obligation.

In a similar case a decade later, however, Cyprian

Stevens of Lancaster defended a shortcoming of iil/19s/7d in

his town's country rate with the claim that the number of

people moving from the town or dying had upset the

assessment, and he had the support of the selectmen in the

matter. Stevens also noted the continuing difficulty of

collecting both grain and money; "the scarcity of the [one]

& not haveing the other, the Loss in a great meashur became

the Constabls," he feared. The Court agreed; the constable

was still responsible for the sum, and either he or the

selectmen had to provide the balance due.52 With the

provincial treasury in such a depressed state, the General

Court could allow very little leniency in tax collection.

At times, constables found themselves caught in an

uncomfortable position between their town meeting or

selectmen who chose to resist specific levies en masse and

the colonial authorities who demanded payment of the

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assigned quotas. Two such cases occurred in Hampshire

County during the decades after the war. In 1685, the

Springfield town meeting voted, "after serious debate," not

to pay a certain money rate in cash, but rather in corn.

The residents agreed to remit extra grain in the hope of

keeping constable Samuel Bliss out of trouble, but Bliss

could not have felt comfortable with the responsibility of

presenting to the provincial treasurer the product of his

town's arbitrary decision.53 In an even more extreme case,

Northampton authorized its "Selectmen not to deliver [a

1692] rate to the Constable & did also engage to Secure the

Select[men] from any Damage for their not delivering the 54 Same." Again, the constable, whether or not he agreed

with the actions of the residents, had to fear confrontation

with a colonial government which was desperate to clear its

war-related debts.

Complaints against constables delinquent in their

accounts also occurred on the town level. In 1684 the

selectmen of Springfield complained to the Hampshire County

Court that Thomas Merick, Sr., was short £2/9s/3d from an

authorized town rate of £35. The court ordered Merick to

pay the amount "out of his owne estate" if he could not

raise it from the appropriate taxpayers.55 Not

surprisingly, constables also heard from their neighbors

when townsmen suspected any discrepancy in the opposite

direction. Therefore, in 1681 Springfield created a

committee to "make inquisition and search After the overplus

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[i.e. surplus collected] off all the severall Country rates

in the severall yeares past since the unhappy Indean war &

to endevour the recovery of it out of the hands of the

severall Constables or any other person or persons in whose

hands they shall find the sayd Monies." The town vowed its

willingness to take legal action if necessary, and no amount

proved too small for scrutiny.56 Given such examples, it

comes as no surprise that filling the office of constable

often was not an easy task in the years following King

Philip's War.

Not all towns had to resort to obstinacy to escape

their rates. In 1676 the General Court granted certain

frontier towns special abatements; of the Hampshire County

settlements, Springfield was allowed L150, Northampton

i,18/12s/6d, and Hadley -£9/3s/4d.57 These liberal

allowances helped meet immediate needs at the end of the

war, but just as multiple taxation and indebtedness

continued for years, so too did municipal attempts to avoid

the increased burdens. In 1679 Groton inhabitants led the

way with an eloquent petition to the General Court,

presenting themselves as a people "who have been great

Sufferers, by the hand of God, in the late wars by our

heathenish enemyes, as is well knowne to all."

"Apprehending it our duty, to addresse ourselves; not onely

to our heavenly father; but earthly fathers also, in this

time of need," the selectmen "humbly begg[ed] our case may

be seriously considered, & weighed, & that some direction,

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and releife may be affoarded unto us." Groton's desired

solution was that the Court release them from the country

charges until order returned to the town. The magistrates

and deputies concurred, in part, abating Groton residents

one rate per year for the ensuing three years.58

Ironically, Springfield proved to be one of the most

vocal and persistent communities involved in the effort to

seek relief from the country rates, at the very time when

the town undertook two major capital projects. On May 2,

1677, less than one year after receiving the generous

abatement of -L150 from their rates, Springfield residents

instructed their deputy in the General Court "to get a

settlement of [our] accounts," taking care that every

allowable credit from the war be applied to the town's

ledger.59 By 1684 Springfield took the initiative in

trying to convince the General Court that conditions on the

frontier still prevented those towns from paying rates in

money. The town meeting petitioned instead for the

privilege of paying all their rates in produce, even when

the Court requested cash, and voted to seek "the concurrence

of the Neighbor Townes of [Hampshire] County therein."60

The General Court found fault with sections of the

Springfield petition, judging "sundry expressions therein

doe deserve sharpe reprooffe," and apparently the

magistrates initially refused to grant the blanket request.

In the end, however, the Court took into consideration "the

difficulty of procuring money in those places" and allowed

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the residents to pay their rates "in good merchantable

corne," in lieu of money, "at one third part lesse price

then is set in the country rate," provided they "deliver the

same to the Treasurer, at Boston, at their owne charge."61

Springfield residents received their wish, but it cost them

extra grain. Apparently, the shortage of hard cash in the

region made such an arrangement worthwhile.

Paying rates in grain instead of money did not relieve

the financial strain, however. As the colony's economic

dilemmas persisted, along with lingering Indian threats,

especially in Maine, frontier communities continued to

experience difficulties in meeting their assigned rates.

The outbreak of King William's War exacerbated the problem;

the colonial treasury had not yet recovered completely from

the last conflict and neither had individual frontier town

economies, at least by their own appraisals. Again,

Springfield was in the forefront, petitioning the General

Court on May 26, 1690, "that [our] want of Corn to live on

[necessitated] some abatement and that what we must pay may

be accepted in cattle, or may be forborne til we are able."

Less than a month later, Springfield residents again

addressed the Court about their extreme lack of provisions,

due to which "many of the Petitioners have not their daily

bread, but what they procure by their daily labors." The

multiple tax rates had long ago become "an insupportable

burden."62

Northampton echoed Springfield's resistance to the tax

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burden. In fact, in 1690 Northampton hosted a meeting of

commissioners from other Hampshire County towns whose

mission was to choose special representatives to send to

Boston with the message that the frontier towns simply could

not pay their money rates in specie. Further, by 1692

Northampton had to claim an inability to meet its

obligations for the year lfin money or Provisions.1,63 The

same types of complaints resounded all over the frontier

during the ; Springfield, Northampton, Deerfield,

Lancaster, and Groton residents, among others, complained

about the rates, drove their constables to distraction, and

repeatedly petitioned the General Court for relief.64

Frontier residents seemed to have reached their practical

limit in providing support for the overextended colonial

economy.

The price which the Massachusetts frontier particularly

had to pay as a result of King Philip's War certainly placed

a strain on the relationship between individuals, local

governments, and the provincial administration. Colonists

faced the immediate shock of physical casualties and burned

property, and frontier residents felt constant reminders of

the high price they paid in the form of unprecedented

multiple tax rates. No colonial records specifically

document opposition to the government's overall handling of

the war and its legacies, but indications of dissatisfaction

surface in colonists' reactions to aspects of Boston's

policies. The difficulties which the colony experienced in

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drafting men for the militia certainly revealed that

willingness to fight was not universal. Even more revealing

of discontent were the stratagems and devices employed by

individuals and communities to lessen or escape entirely

their financial obligations to the colony. Constables could

make neither their fellow citizens nor, on occasion, their

town selectmen comply with the provincial treasurer’s

levies. Mere inability to pay the taxes was accompanied by

obstinacy evident in many of the petitions for abatement.

King Philip's War started a pattern of chronic economic

shortcomings in the Massachusetts treasury and thus a period

of sustained financial burden on the towns of the colony, a

burden which weighed especially heavily on the disrupted

frontier communities. The war left many legacies in the

Massachusetts Bay Colony, but perhaps the most durable,

widely felt, and difficult problem proved to be recovering

the many and varied costs of the conflict.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 243-244; Jennings, Invasion of America, 324; Richard I. Melvoin, "New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Frontier Deerfield, Massachusetts," (PhD Dissertation: University of Michigan, 1983), 159; Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 3-4.

2. Judd, Hadley, 149-150, 180; MA, 68:33; Henry M. Burt, ed., The First Century of the History of Springfield; The Official Records from 1636 to 1736 2 vols., (Springfield: Privately Published, 1898), I, 134; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 183; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 174-175.

3. Lathrop's troopers came from Essex County. Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 171-175, 612; Judd, Hadley, 141; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 106-109.

4. Bodge, Soldiers, 247; For a list of the soldiers involved, see, Ibid., 250-251; Since residences of only thirty-three of the thirty-eight English victims at Turner's Falls are recorded, the twenty-six Hampshire residents represented a minimum of 68 percent or a maximum of 81 percent of the total.

5. Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, 260; The vital records of other frontier towns also reflect the inordinately high numbers of deaths for the years 1675 and 1676. These figures will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4. See, for example, Henry S. Nourse, ed., The Birth, Marriage, and Death Register, Church Records and Epitaphs of Lancaster, Massachusetts, 1643-1850 (Lancaster: W.J. Coulter, 1890), passim; Northampton Births, Deaths, and Marriages, 1654-1853 (Forbes Library Microfilm, Reel 16), passim.

6. MA, 68:64; Albert Bushnell Hart, Commonwealth History of Massachusetts 5 vols., (New York: States History Co., 1927), I, 549; For an organizational chart of the Massachusetts militia at the outset of King Philip's War, see, Bodge, Soldiers, 473-476; For examples of garrison soldiers provided to Connecticut Valley towns, see, James R. Trumbull, History of Northampton, Massachusetts (Northampton: Press of Gazette Printing Co., 1898), 259, 264, 272. 7. Bodge, Soldiers, 58, 367; In response to Captain Joshua Scottow's request for supplies in November 1675, the 106

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Council maintained "it is enough for ye Country to pay wages & find ammunition." MA,68:59; Bodge, Soldiers, 328.

8. MA, 67:277, 68:59; Bodge, Soldiers, 328; Apparently the towns' obligations extended only to feeding the garrison. On November 20, 1675, Captain Samuel Appleton requested that the provincial suppliers "Lett ye Commissaryes of Springfield, Westfield, Northampton, Hadley & Hatfield, or Major Pynchon have what cloathing for ye soldiers that are keeping Garrison in ye above said Townes: that they shall se meet & charge ye same to ye Countreys account." MA, 68:66; In an irregular case, according to Captain Moseley's commission, his soldiers' wages were to be raised by popular subscription, in addition to the profits they received from the sale of plunder or captives. Bodge, Soldiers, 77.

9. MA, 68:48; On May 5, 1676, the Council ordered supplies for the Brookfield garrison to be sent "from those townes upon the [Connecticut] river, which willbe more easily effected then to be sent from [Boston]." This recommendation contrasts to reports of extreme hardship from the Valley. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 84.

10. MA, 68:54; The demographics of frontier removal will be discussed in Chapter 4.

11. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 64; See also, Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 238.

12. Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 337.

13. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 79; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 246.

14. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 169, 264, 269-270, II, 56; The law authorized a fine of 20s on each offending party.

15. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 89-90.

16. Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 187; Samuel A. Green, ed., The Early Records of Groton, Massachusetts, 1662-1707 (Groton: Privately Published, 1880), 60; Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 434-436, II, 168; Young found that in Salem, the selectmen during and after the war clearly sought to close the town to religious dissenters and persons of questionable financial status. Christine A. Young, From "Good Order” to : Salem, Massachusetts, 1628-1689 (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980), 152; Innes noted that a constant theme in the history of Springfield was individualism, and open concern

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for others in need was never a chief concern of its townspeople. Stephen Innes, Labor in a New Land; Economy and Society in Seventeenth-Century Springfield (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 123.

17. John Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity (1630)," in Edmund S. Morgan, ed., Puritan Political Ideas, 1558-1794 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), 76-77, 85, 92.

18. Cotton Mather, The Present State of New England (Boston: Samuel Green, 1690), 9.

19. Cited in Perry Miller, The New England Mind, From Colony to Province (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 233; See also, Ibid., 34, 40-41.

20. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 47, 85.

21. Northampton Town Records (Forbes Library Microfilm, Reel 56), 97, 99; Russell W. Mank, Jr., "Family Structure in Northampton, Massachusetts, 1654-1729," (PhD Dissertation: University of Denver, 1975), 33.

22. See, MA, 69:124a, 223; In one notable case, the town of Hadley apparently built a house— called the "town house"— for needy refugees because the first inhabitants of the structure, the Thomas Webster family, reportedly "returned to Northfield in 1684." (my emphasis). Judd, Hadley, 234.

23. [Nathaniel Saltonstall], "Present State of New England," 38, 41.

24. Ibid., 36; See also, Young, "Good Order" to Glorious Revolution, 148; Leach points out the certain fact that "There was no adequate organization ready and able to channel the efforts of all who wanted to help." Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 189.

25. MA, 69:180; Increase Mather, "The Autobiography of Increase Mather," M. G. Hall, ed., Proceedings of the American Antiguarian Society 71(1961):302.

26. Rowlandson, "Captivity and Restauration," 362-364.

27. MA, 69:206; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 181-187; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 253; See also, MA, 69:48.

28. Pulsifer, ed., Records of New Plymouth, 10:367.

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29. MA, 70:148; Bodge, Soldiers, 275? See also, Shurtleff, ed., Records. V, 341-342, 361-371.

30. Bodge, Soldiers, 180, 406.

31. MA, 112:398; See also, Bodge, Soldiers, 407; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 487, 506.

32. MA, 72:367; For a complete listing of the Massachusetts claimants, see Bodge, Soldiers, 413-441; On January 19, 1731, the Massachusetts House of Representatives wrote to the Council, "It is hoped that the neglect of these petitioners so long or the provinces having disposed of the Nipmug Country to others . . . will not be thought to wear out any more than it rewards their merit. The Grant seems to be made in acknowledgment both of their promise & of their fulfilling the Condition and being well entitled to it, & there is great Reason to fear that publick Guilt would ly upon the Country if we should neglect and continue in the breach of the promise after it has been made & omitted for above fifty years." Ibid., 411; See also, Ibid., 407-408, 410? The Plymouth and Connecticut colonies settled their obligations to their Narragansett claimants comparatively quickly, in 1676 and 1701, respectively. Bodge, Soldiers, 463, 441-446; Richard L. Bowen, Early Rehoboth: Documented Historical Studies of Families and Events in This Plymouth Colony Township 4 vols., (Rehoboth: Privately Published, 1945), II, 52.

33. MA, 68:113? Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 122? See also, for examples of petitions, MA, 68:123a, 125a, 127a, 247, 250, 69:237; Leach maintains that "King Philip's War produced the first great veteran problem in American history, including the formation of the first active veterans' organizations and pressure groups." Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 247.

34. MA, 69:220, 236a; Shurtleff, ed., Records. V, 226-227.

35. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 453; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 325.

36. See, MA, 69:14, 17b, 36-38, 58, 58a, 81-83, 85a, 106a, 107, 111, 124, 128, 175, 179, 184, 191, 197, 248a; See also, Pulsifer, ed., Records of New Plymouth, 10:368, 394-395, 410.

37. John Pynchon to Joseph Pynchon, November 14, 1671. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 100? John Pynchon to Joseph Pynchon, June 30, 1675. Ibid., 135; See also, Ibid., xxxviii; Smith, Pynchon Court Record, 44-45, 48?

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Judd, Hadley, 199; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 141, 343.

38. John Pynchon to Jospeh Pynchon, October 20, 1675. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 164? Actually, the Hampshire County Court records do not reveal any significant changes in the quantity or degree of cases involving debt after the war. Smith, Pynchon Court Record, passim.

39. Trumbull, History of Northampton, 279, 283, 288? MA, 69:175, 184? Even into the early 1690s, John Pynchon had to petition the Massachusetts government to reimburse expenses for military supplies "which (having none by me) I was at that time forced to borrow of several neighbors (not finding it to be had of any one man) promising them it should be set off in their country rates to the constable who calls for them." This letter attests to the continuing shortage of ready cash on the frontier. John Pynchon to Sir William Phipps, January 2, 1692/93. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 260? See also, John Pynchon to Secretary , February 20, 1692/93. Ibid., 264.

40. Pulsifer, ed., Records of New Plymouth, 10:397? See also, Ibid., 392; Judd, Hadley, 181.

41. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 203, 263; See also, Increase Mather, "A Brief Account Concerning Several Agents of New England," in Charles M. Andrews, ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), 293.

42. Mather, Magnalia, I, 190-191? See also, Judd, Hadley, 258-259? In 1693, according to Mather, the Eastern Indians began to sue for peace, "And the English, being so involved in Debts, that they Scarce knew how to prosecute the War any further, took some Notice of their Suit." Cotton Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," in Lincoln, ed., Indian Wars, 249.

43. County taxes were also occasionally levied by county commissioners for special county expenses. Ruth Crandall, Tax and Valuation Lists of Massachusetts Towns Before 1776: Finding List for the Microfilm Edition (Cambridge: Charles Waren Center for Studies in American History, 1971), xii-xiii? Judd, Hadley, 182? Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., IX, 466.

44. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 45, 55-56; MA, 68:29a; See also, Theodore B. Lewis, Jr., "Massahusetts and the Glorious Revolution, 1660-1692," (PhD Dissertation: University of Wisconsin, 1967), 55; Judd, Hadley, 182, 198-199; For a discussion of taxation during the post-war

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period, see, Timothy H. Breen, Puritans and Adventurers: Change and Persistence in Early America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 81-105.

45. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 81, 120-121, 124-125, 138-139, 156; See also, Trumbull, History of Northampton, 289; In May 1676, the General Court appointed a committee "to propose what way may be Expedient for Raysing of Money for Defraying the publique charges & paying debts Arising by the Warrs, &c." Of course, the only answer was increased taxation. MA, 68:252.

46. See, Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 156, 195, 219-220, 245, 296, 324, 341, 376, 398, 417, 426, 443, 454, 505; In October 1677, the General Court listed the reasons for the increased taxation as "to augment the publicke treasury, [and] that due satisfaction may be made to such as to whom the country is indebted." Ibid., V, 156; See also, Judd, Hadley, 199; Bowen, Early Rehoboth, II, 3.

47. For examples of Springfield town records, see Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 218, 255, 410, 416-418, 421-422, 427-428, 432-433, 437-440, and passim; See also, Green, Early Records of Groton, 20, 39; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 198, 202-203.

48. Burt, ed., Springfield Records. II, 127-128, 162-163.

49. Ibid., II, 171; See also, Ibid., II, 194, 203-204, 209; Springfield records suggest some difficulty in collecting "Arreares" owed for the minister's rate in 1677/78, but this problem may reflect more a concurrent controversy between Rev. Pelatiah Glover and his

ongregation. In fact, well into the 1690s, the selectmen were unable to force all Springfield residents to meet their obligations to Glover. Ibid., II, 133-135, 150, 212, 341.

50. Green, ed., Early Records of Groton, 71.

51. MA, 70:38; See also, Young, "Good Order" to Glorious Revolution, 144-146.

52. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 127-128; MA, 101:33; See also, Ibid., 69:258.

53. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 170; The promise "that the Town wil beare him harmless [from] ye Treasurers warrant" had little bearing on the constable's responsibility to report to the treasurer. Ibid., II,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112

166-167.

54. Northampton Town Records, 159.

55. Smith, Pynchon Court Record, 317-318.

56. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 146, 148-150.

57. Others receiving allowances were, Medfield L87-10s, Weymouth 46s-8p, Hingham L10, Sudbury L44-10s, Concord L50, Chelmsford L53-7s-lp, and Andover L4-10s. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 124-125; See also, Ibid., V, 81.

58. MA, 69:224, 229a; Proceedings of the Centennial Celebration at Groton, Massachusetts (Groton: 1876), 26, 62-64; In March 1681/82, the inhabitants of Lancaster made a similar request, and the General Court granted an exemption for two years. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 341; For a petition from Hadley and Hatfield, see, MA, 70:14-15.

59. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 131.

60. Ibid., II, 166-167, 170.

61. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 483-484; MA, 100:366, 112:400, 402; Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 73.

62. MA, 36:106; Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 200.

63. Northampton Town Records, 133, 139; Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 201.

64. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 131; MA, 70:199, 100:466, 113:57, 89, 97; Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 331, 335; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 199; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 419-422.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4

THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNITY

When Metacom's warriors surged along the Massachusetts

frontiers in 1675 and 1676, they left behind scenes of death

and destruction in numerous towns. Throughout the

Connecticut Valley, the Merrimac region, and even the

interior frontier, communities suffered from Indian attacks.

While the government expressed concern that the "out towns"

hold firm against the assaults, some of the more exposed

plantations succumbed, and their residents retreated to

safer areas. After the war, when colonists began to show

interest in returning to their ruined homes, provincial and

local authorities advocated caution. Even in the towns

which survived the conflict, an emphasis on compactness and

increased defense appeared in instructions for the ordering

of settlement. Recovery from the trauma of King Philip's

War often proved to be difficult. In no area was this

difficulty more apparent than in reestablishing order in the

frontier communities. In most cases, the task would have

proceeded much more smoothly had not the fear of native

hostilities continued into the 1680s, culminating finally in

King William's War. In some places, the search for a

stable, settled community configuration never really ended. 113

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From the start of King Philip's War, the Massachusetts

government showed concern for the safety of individuals

subject to native attacks, but authorities also enunciated a

policy of maintaining the frontier towns and defenses at all

reasonable costs. On October 13, 1675, the General Court

ordered the militia committees of towns throughout the

colony to organize garrisons and otherwise look to their own

defense. Further, the court required "all persons in the

severall townes, upon poenalty of five shillings per

day, . . . to labour in and provide such fortiffication or

fortiffications as they shall agree upon." While

emphasizing the protection of the frontier, the order

reflected the legislators' concern for their fellow citizens

in providing that "the severall smale frontier townes which

are judged not able of themselves to bear the distress of

the warr shall have theire weomen and

children . . . remooved" to the closest secure position.1

By October, however, Deerfield and Northfield, the most

exposed plantations on the Connecticut River, and

Brookfield, isolated in the interior, had already been

abandoned, and the frontier was reeling from the initial

assaults. Thus the General Court attempted to stabilize the

situation by compelling the remaining settlements to

maintain a military presence, if not complete community

order.

In a further effort to prevent a stampede from the

frontier, Capt. Samuel Appleton issued an order on November

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12, 1675, to the residents of the upper Connecticut Valley

towns prohibiting their withdrawal "without liberty under

the hand of the Commander in chiefe." In "this time of

trouble & danger," he proclaimed, "noe person shall remove

from or desert any of these townes soe longe as forces are

continued heer for their defence." Appleton even made it

unlawful for anyone to "goe out of the Townes without a 2 pass" from him. On May 3, 1676, the General Court

sustained Appleton's injunction, noting "the great

inconveniency that will ensue, if persons be left at liberty

to wthdraw from the frontier townes . . . thereby enfeebling

the remote parts of the country, and tending to the dammage

of the whole." This ordinance required that each militia

committee arrange and execute daily scouting expeditions to

secure their towns and that neighboring communities commit

themselves to aid each other against attacks.3 Frontier

settlements began to take on the appearance of besieged

outposts, with soldiers and refugees swelling their

populations, plans implemented for quick removal to

fortified garrison houses, and all of the residents'

activities regulated by virtual martial rule. Such measures

were central to the government's efforts to prevent the

frontier from crumbling entirely.

All around the relatively secure garrison sites in the

spring of 1676 lay the ruins of communities and homesteads

which had been destroyed by the natives. The colonists who

left these exposed plantations generally followed

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predictable patterns of retreat— in many cases the same

paths previously travelled to reach the ill-fated towns.

For instance, during the 1650s through the early 1670s,

settlement advanced steadily northward up the Connecticut

Valley from the older villages; substantially the same

route was traversed in reverse in 1675. Likewise, residents

of the Merrimac and interior regions tended to flee to the

towns around Boston Harbor, whence they originated.4 The

actions of the frightened refugees reflected common sense

and the human drive for survival; they retired to the most

accessible secure sites. In addition, however, they

revealed a preference for familiar communities where they

had either personal experience or the benefits of close

relatives, or in many instances both.

Frontier residents generally did not race headlong back

to the deserted plantations, nor would the provincial

government have permitted such a precipitous action.

Instead, Boston prescribed a cautious, orderly approach. On

October 22, 1677, the General Court addressed the towns in

Hampshire County, in particular, as "being in more hazard of

the incursions of the heathen ennemy then some others."

Because New Englanders still feared further incursions, the

court ordered that "each towne there doe endeavor the new

moddelling the scittuation of their houses, so as to be more

compact & live neerer together, for theire better deffence

against the Indians." To oversee resettlement and to ensure

that the instructions concerning compactness were followed,

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colonial authorities formed a committee for Hampshire County

composed of Maj. John Pynchon of Springfield, Lt. John

Mosely and Ens. Samuel Loomis of Westfield, Lt. William

Clarke of Northampton, Peter Tilton of Hadley, and

Lt. William Allis of Hatfield.5 Nearly two years later, in

May 1679, the court reiterated that "for the greater comfort

& safety of all people who are intended to resetle the

villages deserted in the late warr, or the planting any new

plantation wthin this jurisdiction . . . no deserted towne

or new plantation shallbe inhabitted untill the people first

make applycation unto the Governor & council, or to the

County Courts wthin whose jurisdiction such plantation is."

This new order again required "a principall respect to

neerenes & conveniency of habitation for security against

ennemyes, and more comfort for [Christian] communion and

enjoyment of God's worship, & education of children in

schooles, & civility, with other good ends."6 Doubtless,

the Indian assaults on the frontier towns and the fact that

a number of the exposed plantations had to be abandoned

during the war inspired the General Court to recommend an

orderly pattern of settlement, but there was nothing new in

such an emphasis.

From the inception of the colony, Massachusetts leaders

stressed the importance of tight community structure and

cohesion. When expansion began to draw groups of colonists

away from the established harbor towns and into the

wilderness, concern over the maintenance of communal

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organization increased. In 1645, for instance, when

granting a charter for the town of Nashaway, the General

Court enjoined the new planters to "sett not their howses

to[o] farr asunder."7 The motivations behind this policy

were not entirely linked to military defense, as the order

of May 1679 suggests. In large part, Puritan New Englanders

insisted on community cohesion as both a support and a

reflection of their congregational religious orientation;

community and congregation went hand in hand. As John Eliot

stated of frontier planters, "it is necessary that they have

the Ministry of Gods Word, and some other godly persons with

them, who may carry on Church-work among them."8 New

Englanders were thus strongly discouraged from setting out

on their own, in solitary or isolated enterprises, without

the benefits of the traditional close communal and religious

structure.

Contemporaries and historians alike have cited the

emphasis on community bonds as a major support in helping

New Englanders to survive troubled times such as King 9 Philip's War. Certainly, the admonitions for compact

settlement after the conflict reflected a recognition that

the most healthy and defensible pattern involved close,

communal relationships. But in contrast to the announced,

official position, colonists continually branched off into

smaller and more dispersed settlements in the wilderness as

land became crowded or social conditions became

uncomfortable in the established towns. Cotton Mather,

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among others, recognized the paradox between the commitment

to expand and conquer the wilderness and the insistence on

community cohesion. In a 1690 election sermon he pondered

the problem of "how at once we may Advance our Husbandry,

and yet Forbear our Dispersion; and moreover at the same

time fill the Countrey with a Liberal Education" as well as

a strict congregational structure.10

This problem presented itself during the decades

following King Philip's War. While provincial authorities

advised a cautious approach to resettlement and future town

ordering, especially in the Connecticut Valley, within a

decade after the return of peace Hampshire County residents

began petitioning for expansion of their town grants or even

for entirely new satellite communities. Naturally, such

requests came from established and relatively populous towns

like Springfield and Hadley, which survived the war

substantially intact, but even so isolated and vulnerable a

plantation as Deerfield showed a tendency toward expansion

within a short time of its reestablishment. Not all of

these efforts proved successful, and continuing Indian

threats, especially with the outbreak of King William's War

in 1689, discouraged and dispersed many of the potential

settlers.

The trend reflected a common pattern apparent in

seventeenth-century New England. In times of extreme

danger, colonial officials loudly emphasized the doctrine of

compact community cohesion, and the affected colonists at

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least gave lip service to the requirements. As soon as even

the semblance of safety returned, however, some colonists

sought more elbow room and personal latitude in new

communities. Such was definitely the case after King

Philip's War. Seventeenth-century New Englanders certainly

were not the hearty, individualistic pioneers of American

legend; they almost invariably moved in prearranged groups

with an eye toward establishing communities.11 Still,

significant elements of the population, for a variety of

reasons, either were not content or were not permitted to

become sedentary but moved on to cast their lots elsewhere.

The task for the provincial government was to see that

distant frontier settlements were defensible and adhered to

established models of communal and congregational

responsibility. Such concerns were apparent in the postwar

experiences of towns across the Massachusetts frontier.

Springfield

Springfield was the social anchor of the Connecticut

Valley. Settled in 1635 by a group from Roxbury led by

William Pynchon, it was the first and, throughout the

century, the largest Massachusetts town in the region.

Largely through the efforts of Pynchon and his son John,

probably the most influential man in the history of

Hampshire County, it spawned every successive plantation in

the Valley. Evidence of this involvement was clearly

apparent in both the origins and the subsequent struggles of

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the other Hampshire plantations.

By 1675, Springfield consisted of four distinct

villages: the original town center; a suburb opposite on

the west bank of the Connecticut River; Longmeadow, four

miles south of the town center; and Skepnuck, three miles

northeast. Maj. John Pynchon viewed this settlement pattern

as a liability after the start of hostilities with the

natives. "We are very raw," he informed Connecticut

authorities in August 1675, "and our people of this town 12 extremely scattered." He clearly believed that the

situation invited disaster.

The major noted a "desire to rely on all sufficient

God," fearing an imminent Indian assault in early August.

On August 7, Pynchon wrote to Connecticut Governor John

Winthrop, Jr., informing him of the growing apprehension

among Springfield's residents. The townspeople reportedly

were "so extremely frighted that, in the very heart of the

town, people remove from their own houses to any next that

they judge more strong." Pynchon himself had neighbors

flocking to his house, "all our people being in fear of a

sudden surprisal at home."13 As the eminent authority

figure in the region, he understandably inspired confidence

in the local people, who looked to him for protection.

The anticipated attack came on October 5, 1675, and

cost the community some thirty houses, twenty-five barns,

and John Pynchon's mills. Reportedly, only thirteen houses

were left standing in the town center after the attack. On

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Russell of Hadley, informing him of the destruction. "I

believe 40 families are utterly destitute of subsistence,"

he claimed, and "I see not how it is possible for us to live

here this winter." With grain stores and mills ruined, "the 14 sooner we were holpen off the Better." By October 8,

however, Pynchon had moderated his opinion. In a report to

Governor John Leverett in Boston, he stated that "I would

not have the place deserted nor give such advantage to the

Indians if possible." He admitted that many residents had

"nothing at all left" and therefore were "discouraged

exceedingly." Although opposed to abandoning Springfield,

Pynchon warned Leverett of the difficulty of "holding the

place" and of reassuring the people "without many

soldiers."15

The governor referred the matter to Captain Appleton,

the newly appointed commander of the Connecticut Valley

forces. "If there should be a necessity of deserting

Springfield as Major Pinchon intimates it will be very awful

but," Leverett conceded, "the conclusion thereof must be

left with you on the place." In response, Appleton

acknowledged that "the people are full of fear & Hazzarding

in their thoughts as to their Leaping or Leaving of the

place. Those whose houses & provisions are Consumed," he

wrote, "incline to leave the place as thinking they can

better labor for a living in places of lesser danger than

that where now they are." Despite the apprehension of the

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least as an "incouragement and help to others." Abandoning

the town would result in "great discouragement to others and

hazzard to [our] passage from one place to another."16

This continuing debate over the fate of Springfield

reflected the important role it filled in the Connecticut

Valley. The decision to hold or leave the town affected not

only the residents of the community but also the security of

the other plantations in the Valley. Obviously, quitting

Springfield would have adverse effects on the defenses of

the other river towns, but as the oldest and most stable

community in Hampshire County, Springfield also supported

the upriver settlements psychologically. In fact, the

decision to prohibit townspeople from leaving important

centers such as Springfield reflected concern more for the

overall defensive scheme of the region than for the

sentiment of the residents themselves. The panic among the

Springfield colonists eventually subsided, and the town

resumed its position as the linch pin of the Connecticut

Valley defenses.

The ties between Springfield and the neighboring

plantations cannot be emphasized too strongly. Aside from

the fact that newer communities were composed largely of

emigrants from the others, the Hampshire settlements shared

a prominent bond in the person of John Pynchon. The

influential son of Springfield's founder served on the

organizing committees for virtually all of the subsequently

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founded river towns, beginning with Northampton in 1653, and

he played an important role in financing and securing land

for them. In recompense, Pynchon received land grants in

each, giving him a continuing interest and influence which

lasted after the period of initial settlement.17 The

mutual relationships which existed between Springfield and

the communities it helped to produce were evident in the

defensive plan outlined for the Connecticut Valley by

Massachusetts authorities.

By March 1676, the Council ordered frontier commanders

to put "themselves in to such a Posture as may best

accommodate their security & provision." The safest plan,

as judged by the councillors, involved "their gathering

together in such places & numbers as that they may be able

to defend themselves." Springfield and Hadley were judged

the most secure positions, and officials in Boston advised

that ‘‘the lesser Townes must gather to the greater." "To

remayne in such a scattered manner," warned the Council, "is

to expose lives & estates to the merciless cruelty of the

enemy [and] is no less than tempting Divine providence.1,18

The plan called for Westfield residents to retire to

Springfield, while colonists from Northampton and Hatfield

were to gather at Hadley. From the start, opponents

resisted the advice, and the councillors noted "somethinge

working towards a frustration & disappointment of that good

end aimed at."19 They feared the worst if Hampshire

residents persisted in their "scattered manner" of

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settlement. The colony could not muster enough troops to

defend each individual town, and the provincial government

hoped the towns would agree to concentrate in order to ease

the strain on available resources. Also in March 1676, the

General Court informed Pynchon that he and his fellow

residents of Springfield "must ride it out as best you 20 can." The defense of the entire frontier depended on the

ability of key points like Springfield to stand their ground

and to protect the smaller communities surrounding them.

The population of Springfield, reflecting the town's

age and settled condition, remained relatively stable during

the war and the decades which followed, especially in

comparison with other towns in the region. The Indian

attack of October 5, 1675, of course, sent the residents of

the community scrambling to fortified garrison houses and

inspired thoughts of leaving the town. Although Springfield

survived the war without a period of abandonment, its

population was touched directly by the conflict. Twelve

Springfield residents, for instance, lost their lives at the

hands of the natives in 1675 and 1676; in addition to

citizens killed in or near the town, three Springfield

soldiers died at Turner's Falls and two others in the

vicinity of Westfield.21 John Keepe and his wife were

among those "slaine by the Indians." They left three small

children, whom the Hampshire County Probate Court bound over

to relatives.22 In these examples, Springfield shared the

experiences of towns throughout the colony, as residents

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were killed and families torn apart by the war; but in the

overall picture, Springfield's inhabitants were able to

weather the storm more smoothly than were their fellows in

many other frontier communities.

The stability and relative security of the town were

clearly portrayed in the vital statistics of the late

seventeenth century. In each of the three major

categories— births, marriages, and deaths— the general

trends of the period were uninterrupted by the war. Except

for a slight decline in births for 1676 compared to the

surrounding years, the numbers of babies born to Springfield

citizens remained constant or increased noticeably

throughout the war period. Likewise, the war had no

apparent effect on the general pattern of marriages in the

community, despite the fact that men of marriageable age

served in the militia and lost their lives in the conflict.

Mortality figures were understandably high in 1675 and 1676,

but the twelve deaths attributed to native attacks accounted

for only about one-fourth of the total; disease must have

played a particularly virulent role in Springfield during

the period, as deaths jumped sharply again in 1683, 1684,

1689, and 1690, reaching two to three times the average 23 annual level.

One notable characteristic revealed by the town's vital

records was the web of associations which inhabitants of

Springfield had with other communities in the region.

Throughout the period, Springfield residents or their close

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TABLE 4.1

SPRINGFIELD VITAL RECORDS

Springfield Births

1660-64: 99 1675-79: 160 1665-69: 105 1680-84: 192 1670-74: 153 1685-89: 191

Springfield Marriages

1660-64: 24 1675-79: 45 1665-69: 14 1680-84: 45 1670-74: 24 1685-89: 37

Springfield Deaths

1660-64: 26 1675-79: 66 Indians: 1665-69: 14 1680-84: 86 1675: 8, 1670-74: 22 1685-89: 89 1675: 4)

Source: Warren, "Births, Marriages and Deaths." See note 24

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relatives lived, married, and died in virtually every other

town in the Connecticut Valley. Even more notable,

Springfield's connections with towns further south,

especially Suffield and Enfield, increased significantly

after the war, indicating perhaps that although Springfield

represented the anchor of the western frontier in

Massachusetts, a small portion of its inhabitants reacted to

the conflict and chose safer areas.24 Still, the

demographic trends reflected the permanence and continuity

which characterized the reaction of the majority of

Springfield residents to King Philip's War.

Aside from the effort to recover wartime expenses and

to avoid the multiple rates which followed, the residents of

Springfield seemingly experienced few long-term effects from

King Philip's War, at least according to evidence left in

the town proceedings. Other than taxes, the official

documents for the period 1675 to 1680 reveal at least as

much interest in wolves, swine, fences, and highways as in

war-related issues. In February 1678 the town meeting

"voted & concluded . . . that something should be done for

the fortification of the new meeting house," but rather than

indicating a sense of urgency, the issue of strengthening

the town hall was overshadowed by the attention given to

other capital projects adopted concurrently. Plans to build

the town's first school (£14) and a new meeting house

(£400—5s) attracted more money and more attention than did

any effort to fortify the village center.25

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A main concern of Springfield residents after the war

was that all landowners pay their just share of the

increased tax burden. For instance, when the General Court

abated the community -L150 in its 1676 rates, the loyal

residents insisted that "they who have deserted the towne, &

not runn the hazard with their neighbors [should] not [be]

allowed any share in the abovesaid abatement."26 Those

residents who weathered the storm wanted their less resolute

brethren to pay for their lack of fortitude. Absentee

landowners, speculators, and the like upset the cohesion of

New England communities, but they also complicated tax

collection procedures. In February 1677 the town adopted a

resolution requiring new grantees to remain a minimum of

"five yeers in the Town after the Land granted is

measured."27 Given Springfield's record, this policy

likely was designed less to foster communal cooperation than

to ensure that the recipients' actions did not interfere

with the interests of established residents. Irony

permeated such a design, since Springfield's most

influential citizen, John Pynchon, was undoubtedly the

largest absentee landowner in the other towns of the region.

Population growth in Springfield led to further

dispersal by the 1680s. In 1679 the selectmen advised the

county court of their "intent to setle a small Town or

village out of their Towns Lands at a place called

freshwater brook." The court appointed a committee of

Pynchon, George Colton, Benjamin Cooley, and Samuel

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Marshfield to oversee the move, instructing the new settlers

"to Live nere togeather" for security "& other Good Ends."

Within four years, however, the residents of the Freshwater

Brook section of the town petitioned for and received

permission to form a new township, organized as Enfield, now

within the bounds of Connecticut.28

In 1688, as the threat of King William's War began to

take shape on the frontier, John Pynchon complained that

Springfield "consists much of out-farms and a few houses

together." In a letter to Governor on August

21 he noted that "above half our people are abroad and at a

distance from the town three or four miles each way,"

referring to the communities at Longmeadow and Skepnuck.

The next day Pynchon wrote to John Allyn of Connecticut

reiterating the perils of the scattered settlement but

assuring him that the town center was "in a tolerable secure

way by fortifying." Further, town authorities saw to

"calling in some people in out [isolated] houses that were

alone, . . . ordering them together where there were any

likelihood of self defense in case of a shock."29 But

Springfield residents persisted in their scattered brand of

settlement, coming together only when necessity pulled them.

Even during periods of peril they apparently tired of

their communal responsibilities. By late 1694, in the

middle of King William's War, Pynchon had to admit that the

town was "not in any good posture." "Fortifications gone to

decay, and for repairing or making new," he reported,

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"people a little willful, inclined to do what and how they

please or not at all." He perceived that only an "order

from authority" would "enforce . . . what is meet

and . . . strengthen the hands of those here who would have

something done but find obstructions to their

discouragement.1,30 Pynchon's observations support a later

appraisal that Springfield residents generally tended toward

individualism and only cooperated with their neighbors in

times of extreme need.31

Westfield

One of the towns in Springfield's geographic orb was

Westfield, originally settled during the ; as was

common in the region, John Pynchon played a part in

organizing the outpost, and he continued his influence as a

major landholder. Despite this persisting relationship and

their exposed position ten miles west of Springfield,

Westfield residents resisted drawing off during King

Philip's War and especially opposed the suggestion that they

retire to Pynchon's garrisons. On April 5, a committee

composed of the Reverend , Isaac Phelps, Thomas

Dewey, Josiah Dewey, and David Ashley related the desires of

their fellow townsmen on the matter to the Connecticut

Council. "If we must be gone from hence many of us have

estates and friends calling us elsewhere," they wrote, "and

thereupon most of us incline, in case we remove, to come

downwards."32 This statement reflected the fact that of

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the original settlers, more came from Windsor, Connecticut,

than from any other location.

Although feeling affinity to the Connecticut

settlements, Westfield was under the administration of

Massachusetts. Noting the hardships occasioned by the war,

the town committee proclaimed to the General Court a desire

to "carey on Some thing together for the good of the whol

that so by Gods blessing and our labors wee may be in a way

of geting food for our familyes." In the hope that the

"Counsel See not cause [to] draw us off," Westfield

residents pledged "to plowe and sow and cary on the

imp[rove]ment of this land in general."33 This statement

represented one of the clearest expressions of community

feeling to be found anywhere on the Massachusetts frontier

during or after King Philip's War. Westfield residents

assured the provincial government that they could best

weather the threat by banding together and maintaining their

group identity.

Town authorities employed a variety of arguments to

dissuade the Council from ordering their withdrawal. On

April 3, 1676, they produced their most effusive entreaty.

"To remove from habitations to none, from fortifications to

none, from a compact place to a scattered one, from a place

of less danger in the field to one of more, from a place

under the ordinary blessing upon our labors to one usually

blasted," the committee members judged, "seems to us such a

strange thing that we find not a man amongst us inclining

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 thereto.”34 Westfield residents, by and large, opposed any

plan to make them leave their homes.

Instead, they chose to strengthen their own

fortifications and to ask the Massachusetts government for

garrison troops. The townspeople agreed "to contract their

fortifications so as to be but about 70 rods in length and

20 broad." This compacted stronghold was "to be strongly

and closely fortified" by the residents in proportion to

their rateable estates. On May 8, 1676, the town meeting

ordered the work "dun with al speed."35 Whether the

advised urgency was designed to thwart a feared Indian

attack or to convince the provincial legislature of the

town's viability, the decision to draw within the

fortifications rather than scatter represented a conscious

emphasis on community cohesion and continuity.

The willingness of Westfield residents to gather into a

close community did not end with the defeat of Metacom's

warriors. Although the town was never abandoned, and the

residents therefore did not have to undertake a major

rebuilding or reordering operation, they did give proper

attention to the patterns of compactness ordered by the

General Court. The Hampshire County committee composed of

Pynchon, Clark, Tilton, Allis, and Loomis ordered in

November 1677 "that the Inhabietance [of Westfield] Doe all

posses and setell Together," in a central location near the

town meeting house. This directive may not have been

universally popular; some residents had to leave tracts of

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land situated too far from the town center, and others lost

shares out of the commons land reapportioned to those forced

to relocate. As a result, Taylor wrote to Boston on May 15,

1679, asking the General Court to "Confirm in Law those

little bits of [unassigned] land unto those, who, in

obedience unto your Authority have them in actual 1

possession for which they have that, & only that to

Show."36 The court responded favorably to the request,

"particularly appoynting a tract of land for the inhabitants

of Westfield, to build on nearer together, at or by their

meeting house." Since the inhabitants "by a gennerall vote,

consented to the setling thereon," the provincial officials

authorized that those proprietors who "parted with" land in

the transaction be repaid "two acres for [each] one [lost],

out of the townes adjacent lands intended for home

lotts."37 Westfield seemed intent on establishing a tight

community during the years immediately following King

Philip's War.

In fact, for some two years the residents of the town

reportedly lived in virtually an enclosed village as a

result of the enhanced fortifications and the active plans

for compact settlement. Thirty-four families containing

some two hundred people occupied an area roughly two miles

in circumference. By 1679, however, fifteen landowners felt

secure enough to return to their outlying holdings.38 In

that year, the aforementioned "Comity for Ordering compact

Dwelling together for beter Defence & safety," noted the

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recent defectors and approved their move with the provision

that they take proper steps toward defense. But for the

remainder of Westfield inhabitants, the committee ordered

"their Removeing & setling" within the stated bounds as well

as the completion of the required labor on the

fortifications according to the assigned proportions.39 At

the end of the tumultuous decade, the officially stated

policy still adhered to the ideal design of a compact local

society, but already the seeds of its disruption were

beginning to sprout.

Perhaps inevitably, demographic progress spelled the

end of geographic compactness; the community could not grow

in numbers and at the same time resist expansion. Between

1679 and 1689, the population of Westfield increased fifty

percent, and the increase also reflected a significant

turnover among the residents. Of 54 heads of households

present in 1679, only 37 remained a decade later.

Thirty-three new householders appeared by 1689; 20 were

adult sons of established residents and, 13 were newcomers

to the community. To accommodate the petitioners, the town

authorized a division of the commons amounting to 617 40 acres. Significantly, the selectmen ordered the new

grants issued in 1687 "to be taken up without 2 mile of the

Meting house unles they have liberty otherwise to some

perticler plase," more proximate.41 Within a decade of the

county committee's order requiring residents to live within

the meeting house environs, town authorities prohibited new

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landowners from crowding the town center. With population

growth, the initially genuine emphasis on compact settlement

could not survive for any great length of time, but

adherence to the scheme began to break down by the late

1670s and apparently disappeared by the end of the 1680s.

Northampton

Twenty miles upriver from Springfield was Northampton,

the second oldest town on the Connecticut River frontier.

It was created in 1653 when John Pynchon, Elizur Holyoke,

and , "Inhabitants of Springfield,11 petitioned

the General Court for liberty to plant a settlement at

Nonotuck (Northampton). The petitioners assured the court

that a sufficient number of families in the area showed "a

desire to remove thither"; more important, the committee

reported, "many of them are of considerable Quality for

Estates and fit matter for a Church."42 Although

Springfield residents initiated the plans for a new town,

well over half of the early settlers moved north from

Connecticut, the largest numbers coming from Windsor and

Hartford. Barely fifteen percent of the colonists admitted

to Northampton during the first five years of its existence

migrated from the Springfield area, with the remainder

representing communities around Boston.43 Like other

Connecticut Valley towns which followed, Northampton from

the start felt common ties to Springfield political leaders,

especially John Pynchon, but the initial inhabitants of the

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new town also shared bonds with widely dispersed communities

throughout the region.

Following the October 5, 1675 attack on Springfield,

the residents of the Northampton area expected their turn to

come at any time. Rev. John Russell of neighboring Hadley

believed the vicinity was "likely to drink next . . . of 44 this bitter cup." The anticipated assault came within a

month; on October 28 natives burned four Northampton houses

and a number of barns, prompting the residents to erect

fortifications around the town center. During the fall and

the ensuing winter, Northampton built "a Kind of

Barricado . . . by setting up Pallisadoes of Cleft-wood

about eight Foot long." The planners realized a wooden wall

would not necessarily keep the Indians from storming the

town, but they correctly judged that it would slow them down

enough to eliminate the element of sudden surprise. The

palisade had another advantage. On March 14, 1676, warriors

again attacked Northampton and succeeded in breaking through

the barrier but were trapped inside by the garrison's

counterattack. Their backs literally against the wall, the

Indians "saw themselves like Wolves in a Pound," according

to William Hubbard, and "they could not fly away at their

Pleasure."45 Not only did the fortification allow

Northampton to repulse this attack, it also provided a

long-term deterrent. Metacom's warriors did not again

attack Northampton or any other palisaded town during the

war.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138 The successful defense of March 14 gave the colonists

added vigor in their resistance to the General Court's

suggestion that they concentrate at Hadley for security.

Two weeks later, a group of Northampton's leaders led by the

Reverend Solomon Stoddard imformed the General Court, "we

dare not entertain any thoughts of deserting this

plantation," for fear of appearing ungrateful to the God who

protected them. Further, removing would "discourage other

plantations, as may prove no small prejudice unto the

Country." Northampton residents thus employed the same

arguments for holding their town as the court had used

earlier in prohibiting Springfield inhabitants from

abandoning that community. In asking for more soldiers, the

"generality of the Town" consented "at [their] own cost,

[to] bear the charge of a sufficient garrison." The

residents preferred to pay the soldiers' expenses, "rather

then want them."46 Although the government decried the

town's unwillingness "to attend our advice to draw into a

narrow compass whereby wee conceved they would have been

able to deffend themselves better," provincial authorities

approved extra garrison soldiers from Maj. Thomas Savage's 47 company for Northampton on April 1, 1676. As a result of

the town's initiative in building fortifications, refusal to

retreat, and maintenance of extra garrison soldiers,

Northampton, too, was able to survive the war despite its

exposed position on the frontier.

On the eve of King Philip's War, Northampton had a

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population of approximately five-hundred people. No records

exist to indicate how many residents left the town due to

the hostilities; some undoubtedly did, but the majority

chose to stay. Rather than leave the area completely, some

landowners who lived in remote parts of the township

petitioned for lots near or within the fortifications. Town

authorities complied with as many of these requests as

possible, issuing grants "wherever unapportioned land could

be found." In all, eight Northampton landowners received

new town lots as a result of King Philip’s War. Many of

them apparently never returned to their dispersed holdings,

but at least one recipient, William Smead, became so

discouraged by the smallness of his new plot that he soon

left the town altogether and moved to Deerfield.48 By and

large, however, most of Northampton's residents seem to have

been satisfied with the measures taken by their town in

reaction to the conflict.

King Philip's War affected the population of the town

in other ways as well. Of 31 Northampton residents engaged

at the Falls Fight, for instance, 12 were killed.49 Town

records revealed inordinately high numbers of deaths for

1675 and 1676— 14 and 29 respectively— and the records noted

that many of them were "slain by the Indians." Mortality

figures had never reached such heights in any year before

the war and did not again in the years after 1676 until the

outbreak of King William's War in 1689. In spite of the

sharp increase in Northampton deaths, however, the war seems

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TABLE 4.2

NORTHAMPTON VITAL RECORDS

Northampton Births

1660-64: 74 1675-79: 130 1665-69: 106 1680-84: 154 1670-74: 109 1685-89: 131

Northampton Marriages

1660-64: 25 1675-79: 27 1665-69: 15 1680-84: 21 1670-74: 17 1685-89: 18

Northampton Deaths

1660-64: 20 1675-79: 46 1665-69: 24 1680-84: 38 1670-74: 31 1685-89: 43

Source: Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 101, 107. Northampton Births, Deaths and Marriages. See note 51.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141 to have had no adverse effects on births or marriages among

the town's residents, as both either increased steadily or

remained fairly constant during and after the war. The

ratio of births to marriages fell slightly during the period

1675 through 1679 but rebounded to reach an unprecedented

level for the entire decade of the 1680s. In fact, births

in Northampton outnumbered deaths in every year during the

last three decades of the seventeenth century, except 1689,

and the population of the town more than doubled during the

period, from 450 persons in 1670 to 937 in 1700.50 This

demographic progress seems all the more remarkable given the

fact that the bulk of the wartime victims presumably were

soldiers and therefore males of marriageable age.

Northampton residents approached the postwar period

with the caution advised by the provincial government. At a

January 1678 meeting, "The Town being Sensible that it was

their duty to [prepare] in a prudent way for their own

Safety did . . . vote & Agree to make & maintain their

fortification till a more Settled peace appear." The

inhabitants of Northampton stipulated "that every man Should

make & maintain that particular part of [the] fortification

which is Already laid out to him." Where gaps of

unapportioned land crossed the pallisade, the townsmen

provided for its maintenance "in a general way."51

Northampton took seriously the concerns of compact defense

even after Metacom's defeat.

Town authorities expressed the same concerns with

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regard to postwar settlement. Although people continued to

live, and the town continued to grant land, "without the

present Fortification," officials overseeing settlement in

Northampton during the 1680s emphasized a nuclear town plan.

In February 1680 they instructed that new house lots "be

taken up as near the Town as may be" and preferably

adjoining land already occupied or laid out. The order also

required the new grantees to improve their lots within one

year and to clear the land within four years.52 Unlike

similar orders issued in Springfield at the same time, the

motivations behind these instructions seem to have been

community defense and cohesion.

This did not mean that Northampton was not changing

during the period; the town experienced an impressive

population increase, as noted, between 1675 and 1700. The

composition of the population was remained fairly constant,

however, and most of the growth resulted from natural

reproduction. Migration into the town was slight after the

war. The proprietors decided to divide the commons for the

first time in 1684, reflecting the population growth, but

apparently most of the recipients were sons of established 53 townsmen. Therefore, the town possessed a great degree

of continuity, both in population and in experience.

The "danger they were in of being Assaulted by an

Enemy" did not end during the 1680s, of course, and the

residents' concerns naturally intensified at the end of the

decade, with reports of renewed hostilities on the frontier.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. On March 5, 1690, the town meeting voted to re-fortify the

town, a project which consisted basically of restoring the

old palisade and enlarging it in some places to accommodate

a decade of community growth. All householders living

within the fortification, as well as those from outside who

chose to seek refuge there in times of danger, were to help

build and maintain the structure.54 Although these

instructions appeared in a period of renewed warfare, they

still indicated ongoing recognition of the advantages of

compact settlement. John Pynchon, on more than one

occasion, reported that Northampton being, "pretty compact

and together," was probably the best equipped of any of the

Connecticut Valley towns to meet the new Indian threat.55

Such sound preparation did not occur overnight;

Northampton's attention to compactness and community order

evidently benefitted the town in the years after King

Philip's War.

Deerfield

The Northampton area represented the last bastion of

relative safety in the upper Connecticut Valley. Deerfield,

fifteen miles upriver, was a wilderness outpost in every

sense of the term throughout the period. The roots of

Deerfield, or Pocumtuck as the settlement was originally

known, went back to Dedham and the dispute between the

residents there with the neighboring Praying Indians at

Natick. In response to a petition from the Dedham

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plaintiffs concerning a large tract of contested land

between the two towns, the General Court in 1663 granted the

claimants 8,000 acres "in any Convenient place . . . where

it can bee found free from former Grants."56 The

recipients then dealt through John Pynchon to purchase a

tract from the Pocumtuck Indians, but most of the Dedham

proprietors never moved to the remote plantation. Only

approximately one-third of Deerfield's original settlers

migrated from the Dedham area, while the remaining

two-thirds came from Northampton, Hadley, or Hatfield,

following the path of settlement progressively up the

Connecticut River.57 Settlers began to arrive on the site

of Deerfield by 1669, and the town was still very much in

its formative period on the eve of King Philip's War.

In 1675, 125 persons, including approximately 25 to 30

adult males, lived in Deerfield, and the town took the

precaution of fortifying three houses with palisades to

guard against Indian attacks. When the assault came on

September 1, the residents apparently all made it safely to

the blockhouses, but their scattered houses and barns

suffered heavy damage. This event prompted the women and

children of the community to seek refuge in safer

plantations while the men of the town and the militia

garrison remained to defend the remnants of the outpost.58

The darkest day for Deerfield occurred on September 18, when

14 of 16 men employed as wagon drivers by Capt. Thomas

Lathrop perished in an Indian ambush at Muddy Brook while

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attempting to harvest the town's grain. Among the victims

were at least 9 married men who left at least 40 fatherless

children, and 4 more men approaching marriageable age. This

debacle must have had a devastating effect on the remaining

citizens of Deerfield; in one instant, over half of the

town's adult males and over ten percent of its entire

population perished.59 Not surprisingly, United Colonies

officials wrote to Pynchon three days later concerning the

"sense about quitting the Pocumtuck garrison," and the town,

garrison and all, was abandoned. According to the Reverend

John Russell of Hadley, Philip was free "to make his

planting place and fort this year [1676] at Deerfield," once

the English settlers had left the place.60

Of 24 individual proprietors or families who fled from

Deerfield and whose places of destination are known, 18

retired to Northampton, Hatfield, or Hadley. Three others

proceeded farther down the valley, and 3 returned to the

Boston area.61 These figures correspond roughly to the

pattern of immigration to the town in the years before the

war, further indicating that as the bulk of settlement

progressed generally northward up the valley, so too did

withdrawal recede along the same routes.

The fear that caused Deerfield's inhabitants to flee

from their plantation apparently did not last long, for by

the spring and summer of 1677 a handful of the former

residents returned to rebuild their homes. At least four

optimistic proprietors and one boy were on the scene by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146 September 19, 1677, when a group of natives from Canada,

which also included at least some Pocumtuck and Narragansett

refugees, descended on the encampment and took all five into

captivity. Three of the colonists, Sgt. John Plympton, John

Root, and the boy Samuel Russell perished in captivity,

while the others, Benoni Stebbins and Quinton Stockwell,

eventually regained their freedom.62 With the advantage of

hindsight, William Hubbard judged that the Deerfield

captives "had unadvisedly too soon returned" to their

exposed plantation. The frontier residents, hoping to set

their lives back in order, "were a little too secure, and

too ready to say the bitterness of Death was past," he

declared, "because they had neither seen nor heard of any

Enemy in those Parts for half a year before."63 From the

safety of Boston, Hubbard could editorialize about these

events, but the refugees who attempted to return to their

settlements were simply responding to an apparent cessation

of hostilities and a human impulse to resume their lives.

The tragic incident in September 1677 apparently did

not daunt the inhabitants* desire to resurrect their

community nor did it deter the provincial government from

advising them to return quickly, albeit cautiously and

prudently. Less than a month later, on October 22, 1677,

the General Court ordered a garrison established at

Deerfield and instructed the inhabitants to "repaire thither

this winter (if the [Hampshire County] committee doe judge

it safe)." The court authorized "the setling thereof in the

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spring, . . . in a compact way."64 Few if any of the

residents took steps toward returning to Deerfield at that

time, but neither did they give up their sense of belonging

to the community. On April 30, 1678, a group submitted a

petition to the General Court, referring to themselves as

"the small Remnant that are Left of Deerfield's poor

Inhabitants." Despite noting that their plantation had

"become a wildernesse, a dwelling for owles and a pasture

for flocks" and that the inhabitants were "separated into

severall townes," the petitioners expressed a desire to

"Returne and plant that place Againe . . . for the advancing

the Cause & kingdome of Jesus; and for [our] owne safetie &

comfort. . . ."65 Even in their dispersed exile, the

Deerfield proprietors retained a feeling of community.

On March 30, 1680, the Hampshire County Court created a

committee composed of Lt. William Clark, Peter Tilton,

Lt. Philip Smith, Medad Pomeroy, and John Aliys to oversee

the reestablishment of Deerfield, and the refugee

proprietors met in Northampton nine months later to plan

their return to the town. The committee and the proprietors

set one basic rule for land distribution during the

resettlement period: any person who possessed or received a

grant of land was required to "come and settle in Deerfield

and Inhabit there three years" before they gained "liberty

to Allianate or sell the same."66 The proprietors realized

that because of the exposed position of the plantation, they

had to strive to assure a stable community structure. In

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order to have any chance for survival, the town had to be

able to depend on its members' commitment to each other.

This residency requirement aimed at a problem the

optimistic proprietors encountered in drawing the community

back together. Although the return to Deerfield was

encouraged by an ardent group of the refugees, not all

landowners who had fled in 1675 displayed a willingness to

risk their lives there again so soon. In the April 30, 1678

petition, the town committee expressed concern that a goodly

portion of the land in the village "belongs unto eight or 9

proprietors, each and every of which are never Like to come

to a settlement amongst us." The "Plantation will be

spoiled if thes proprietors may not be begged, or will not

be bought (up on very easy termes) outt of their Right," the

petitioners lamented. They asked the General Court to help

"Remove that Impediment that is soo great a Lett and

hinderance to the plantation's growth and the planters'

outward happiness." The court replied by leaving the matter

to the townsmen and the county committee to settle among

themselves.67 Again, the petitioners showed a genuine

concern for cohesion within their town. Proprietors who

refused to return to their land in Deerfield could only

damage community morale, growth, and defense. In the spring

of 1682, the planters finally convinced some of the

obstinate refugees to "give up every tenth acre or

otherwise, as they shall see cause, it being a very probable

way to gaine more usefull inhabitants for planting & setling

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said place." The General Court urged the rest of the

absentee proprietors to follow this "good example.1,68 The

residents who initiated and participated in the resettlement

of Deerfield left consistent and repeated references to the

importance of community order and stability.

The Deerfield vital records reveal little about the

demographic effects of the war, mostly because the town

itself was so young in 1675, having been planted only six

years earlier. Demographic trends had not even had a chance

to become established before the war interrupted their

progress. During the 1680s, however, Deerfield apparently

experienced significant growth, the population reaching well

over 200 by the end of the decade. Most of this increase

resulted from the arrival of newcomers to the town after

resettlement; of 54 male landowners present in 1688, only 8

of them owned land in the town in 1675. Another 3 were sons

of deceased pre-war proprietors. Of the 40 new immigrants

whose previous residences were recorded, 24 came from the

Northampton area, while 10 moved north from Springfield or

Connecticut. Only 6 migrated from towns in eastern

Massachusetts. The figures are similar for women who came

to reside in Deerfield during the 1680s.69

This population influx reflected two facts about the

nature of Deerfield's postwar population. First, the new

residents for the most part made their way to the town from

older communities farther south in the valley, where land

had become scarce. Step by step, settlement had made its

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TABLE 4.3

DEERFIELD VITAL RECORDS

Deerfield Births

1003-0 ? 33 1675-79: 2 1690-94 35 1680-84: 6 1695-99 51

Deerfield Marriages

1685-89 1690-94 3 1695-99 16 (None recorded before 1689).

Deerfield Deaths

1680-84: 1 1690-94: 11 1685-89: 9 1695-99: 22 (None recorded before 1681).

Source: Baldwin, comp., Vital Records of Deerfield. See note 70.

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way almost the entire length of the Massachusetts frontier

along the Connecticut River in approximately half a century.

Second, in its new formative phase, Deerfield was still very

much an open community in accepting new residents. But many

of them either migrated from the same locality or had

pre-existing ties to the frontier plantation, and thus

Deerfield possessed a sound basis for community cohesion

from the start.

Like the residents of Westfield, however, the Deerfield

planters soon found that demographic growth precluded

physical compactness. By the late 1680s, most of the choice

homelots in the village center were either occupied or owned

by absentee proprietors, and new landowners began

establishing suburbs at Green River, two miles north of the

town, and at Wapping, two miles south. Neither hamlet ever

amounted to more than about twenty homelots during the

period. With the renewal of hostilities in 1689, many of

the outliers retired to the safety of the Deerfield

fortification on the meeting house hill, and the suburbs

languished.70 On February 26, 1690, the town meeting

ordered the fortification strengthened and provided a plan

whereby persons from outside the village center could

receive shelter within. For "all prsons whose familyes

canot conveniently and comfortably be [taken] into the

houses that are already upon the meeting-hous hill," the

townsmen authorized a special committee of Sgt. John

Sheldon, Benoni Stebbins, and Edward Allyn to grant them

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small tracts of land at an unstated charge, wherever

available.71 As did their neighbors in Northampton,

Deerfield residents seem to have accepted the necessity of

enlarging their settlement due to increased population but

still had faith in the benefits of community consciousness.

By all accounts, Massachusetts authorities considered

Deerfield a key to frontier defense during King William's

War, apparently in reaction to the destruction of the

northernmost plantations fifteen years earlier. But the

selectmen reminded the Council that since 1680 the residents

had "Been much Exercised and at great Expenses in purchasing

And setlinge [the] place Anew," and that with the resumption

of hostilities, they were "Exposed to many

straits, . . . Brought very Low & in a likely way to Come to

Extremity." Town leaders warned that without substantial1

aid, "we must of necessity forsake [our] habitations, and

draw off to some Neighbouring towns."72 As in 1675, the

provincial government's resources were limited, but the

General Court did all it could to help. In fact, noting the

"very Considerable Sums of money [which] have been Expended

in the defense and for [the] preservation of the out Towns

and Frontiers," the court in 1695 passed an "Act to prevent

the deserting of the Frontiers." The act ordered that no

frontier town, including Deerfield, "shall be broken up, or

voluntarily deserted," without government approval and

prohibited individuals, especially adult males, from leaving

their plantations prematurely.73 So despite weathering

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. seven attacks during the decade and having twelve persons

killed and five captured by the natives, the residents of

Deerfield had to hold out.74 They had their fortification

to fall back on, but their insistence on community cohesion

and the bonds which predated the new threat also must have

contributed to their resolve.

Northfield

By far the most exposed position on the Massachusetts

frontier during the late seventeenth century was that of

Squakeag, or Northfield, fifteen miles above Deerfield and

fifty miles west of the interior settlements. A group of

colonists from "Northampton & other townes" in the region

began to petition for a grant above Deerfield in 1670, and

two years later the General Court approved "a convenient

quantity of land at Squakeag for a village," provided that

"twenty able & honest persons, householders" pledged to John

Pynchon a willingness to "setle upon the place . . . within

eighteene months." Also in 1672, the court appointed a

committee of Lt. William Clarke, William Holton, Lt. Samuel

Smith, Cornet William Aliys, and Isaac Graves to lay out the

plantation, grant town lots, and "order all the prudentiall

affaires of the said village."75 The committee required

the proprietors to occupy their land and build on it within

four years or risk forfeiting their claims.

Residents of the new town had barely begun to settle in

when King Philip's War broke out. On September 2, 1675, the

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natives attacked a group of inhabitants and garrison

soldiers outside the town and killed eight, including

Sgt. Samuel Wright, age 45, Ebenezer Janes, 16, and Jonathan

Janes, 14, all of Northfield. The others who perished were

Ebenezer Parsons and Nathaniel Curtis of Northampton, John

Peck of Hadley, and Thomas Scott and Benjamin Dunwich, of

undetermined origins. Two days later, when Capt. Richard

Beers and his company attempted to rescue the remaining

residents, natives ambushed the party. Among the twenty-one

victims was Joseph Dickinson, from the distressed

settlement.76 These losses and the threat of more led the

survivors to leave Northfield as soon as possible.

On September 7, the refugees were escorted from the

town by a strong military detachment. Although most of the

promoters and original proprietors of Northfield resided in

Northampton, many of them apparently did not actually move

to the new outpost before 1675. Rather, they remained in

more secure towns as absentee proprietors and sent sons or

other representatives to establish their claims. When the

young plantation was abandoned, the inhabitants naturally

retraced their steps, many, of course, returning to

Northampton.77 So stood the status of Northfield for

nearly ten years.

Not until May 27, 1682, did either the General Court or

the proprietors take any steps toward reorganizing the town.

On that date, the court revived the committee to oversee the

settlement of Northfield, and in 1683 the committee set the

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conditions for the resettlement. The instructions

stipulated that a minimum of forty families settle on the

tract, that the proprietors reside in the town by May 10,

1686, and that every person possessing "sixty acres of

interval land" set up "two persons on it."78 By 1685,

however, fewer than twenty families had returned to the

exposed town, and even they reportedly did not insist on

compact settlement. Despite this slow trickle, in June of

that year the proprietors of Northfield petitioned the court

to extend the town's boundaries 2-1/2 miles, claiming a

shortage of land and seeking to "encourage those that are to 79 setle there." Although the residents authorized the

building of fortifications in the town center, they seem to

have sought physical expansion before they had even come

close to attaining the forty families authorized by the

resettlement committee in 1683.

In fact, Northfield continued to have trouble filling

its ranks. "Honored Sir," reported the committee to

Governor Edmund Andros in 1688, "wee have had a great deal

of care and trouble in the Resettling of this plantation.

Many have had grants and have forfeited them again," causing

discouragement among the residents and "fear [that] the

place will be defeated."80 The cause of their urgency, of

course, was the outbreak of King William's War. Natives

struck Northfield on August 16, 1688, killing six residents

and sending over half of the population from the plantation.

Five days after the attack, John Pynchon wrote to the

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governor regarding the "great hazard" in Northfield. With a

maximum of twenty-six able men available to the town,

drawing off appeared to be a matter that many of the

inhabitants "incline to."81 Thus the others who wished to

avoid losing their plantation to the natives for the second

time in fifteen years expressed their concerns to Governor

Andros.

By all accounts, Northfield was in no position to

defend itself. "Have pity on us!" pleaded the remaining

residents to the General Court in June 1689. "Our place

[is] burnt, and laid desolate," they reported, "our people

slain, and the rest all driven away." "If you see meet to

order us to throw up all, and leave it wholly to the

enemies," the petitioners admitted, "Tho its hard (we feel

it) we would submit." They preferred to persevere, however,

and asked the court to take some action against the

proprietors who had quit the plantation. Provincial

authorities ordered the deserters to return "or provide

sufficient men to bear arms and do service in their rooms";

by that time, though, "but nine or ten families" remained in

the town.82 Northfield could not endure much longer.

Pynchon advised "that some speedy care must be taken to cull

them off from Northfield or to send up some men to secure

them there." Pynchon favored the latter, but on June 25,

1690, the General Court authorized "all the inhabitants of

Northfield that have any corn or other provisions, viz.

hogs, horses, cattle, etc. [to] transport it down within

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the space of 6 or 8 days."83 The refugees once more made

their way back down the valley to their former areas of

residence, and no effort was made to resettle the town for

more than two decades.

The most obvious explanation for Northfield's inability

to withstand the successive Indian attacks was its naked

position. But other towns, such as Westfield and Deerfield,

suffered from similar exposure and managed to persist more

successfully. More telling about Northfield's problems was

the town's short history at the outbreak of both King

Philip's War and King William's War, having been planted

only in 1672 and resettled in 1685. The townspeople had

never had the opportunity to nurture any lasting community

bonds before 1675, and the reluctance of proprietors to

return even during the mid-1680s left the town in the same

underdeveloped condition on the eve of the next crisis.

Neighboring Deerfield prudently emphasized community

compactness and cohesion after King Philip's War, even when

demographic growth necessitated expanded settlement, and the

town evidently profited by this adherence in meeting the

trials of the 1690s. In seventeenth-century Northfield,

bonds which might have helped the community through troubled

times had neither the time nor perhaps the encouragement to

develop.

Groton

The Connecticut Valley was not the only Massachusetts

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frontier area affected by King Philip's War and its

legacies. Towns on the northern fringe also fell victim to

native attacks. Residents of Groton, settled in 1655, for

instance, by August 25, 1675, felt "very much discouraged in

their spirits." Capt. James Parker reported to Governor

Leverett that the townspeople were "in a very great strait"

and "in a very weak capacity to defend" themselves, lacking

both guns and ammunition.84 The war had not yet touched

the Middlesex County town directly, but with hostilities

breaking out all around them, the inhabitants began to

examine their situation with trepidation.

Such was the state of affairs, though perhaps

intensified with the passage of time, when Parker and

Maj. Simon Willard wrote to the General Court in February

1676 concerning the colony's "day of Calamity & distress."

The two town leaders related the troubled condition of

Groton's residents, "brought into a narrow compasse" in

anticipation of an Indian attack, their "provision neere

consumed," and their "wives & children, some removed, others

removing." "These things portend to us a famine, &

poverty," stated Parker and Willard, "Coming upon us with as

great fury on the one hand, as the enemy on the other." The

townsmen "humbly, & upon [our] knees," requested the court's

"direction & assistance in this case, as the Lord shall

direct whither wee shall goe or stay, or what way we may be

set in."85 This anxiety and indecision continued until the

town experienced its first assault by the natives on March

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2.

In fact, Groton suffered three attacks during the first

two weeks of March 1676. Its population consisted of "about

sixty Familiesand the residents who had not previously

retreated "gathered into five Garrisons," four of them

clustered in the town center plus another "near a Mile

Distant from the rest."86 By the end of the month, the

Council conceded that the remaining residents could "abide

no longer than untill carts bee sent to bring them" away,

and the government authorized Capt. Joseph Sills' company to

escort the retreat.87 "Things looked with a pritty sad

face about those parts at this time," concluded William

Hubbard. The refugees from Groton reportedly "scattered in

different directions among their friends and kindred."

Seeking to avoid a panicked rush from the northern

frontier, the General Court had ordered on March 28 that the

residents of Middlesex County towns "that are forced to

remove; and have not some advantage of settlement

(peculiar) to the bay" should "settle at the frontire townes

that remain for their strengthening." As the additional

population was supposed to be an advantage to the threatened

settlements, the order instructed "the people of the said

townes to which [the evacuees] are appointed are to see to

their accommodations.1,88 Although Groton had been settled

for twenty years at the time of its abandonment, the

residents probably still felt ties of affinity, at least, to

communities in the Concord area, from whence many of the

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original settlers had migrated. Many of the refugees

retired to Concord in 1676, and the town leaders apparently

adopted that town as their temporary headquarters in exile.

On February 10, 1678, Capt. James Parker, Lt. William

Lakin, Ens. John Lawrence, and •'Goodman" John Morse called

"a generall town metting of the inhabitants of

groaton . . . assembled at Concord." This improvised town

meeting agreed and vowed "that if the providence of god

prevent not by death or sicknes or by the enimy . . . then

we will go up in the spring follooing and begin to Repayer

our habitations againe." Further, the proprietors who set

their signatures to the agreement pledged to "ingeage the

forfiture of [their] wholle Right in groaton unto those that

doo goe up and cary on the work."89 This document revealed

some significant characteristics of the Groton population.

Even in their exile, the town proprietors and their

established municipal leaders retained a strong sense of

community.

Admittedly, the relatively long history of the town, in

comparison to other abandoned frontier plantations,

represented a definite advantage to Groton's inhabitants.

They had had two decades in which to establish community

ties and thus were undoubtedly more dependent upon each

other than could have been the case among residents who

settled frontier outposts only in the early 1670s. This

interdependence was clearly exhibited in the 1678 agreement,

whereby the residents pledged fidelity to their town and to

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their neighbors in advance of resettlement. A similar

pledge existed among Deerfield's proprietors before their

successful return to the plantation, but in Northfield,

where strong community bonds had obviously not developed by

1675, no such unity appeared between the refugee landowners.

In both Deerfield and in Groton, community cohesion and

accord, even under trying circumstances, seem to have

benefitted the resettlement process, while in plantations

lacking an evident sense of community responsibility,

resettlement generally proceeded awkwardly and imperfectly.

The Groton population apparently survived the war

without any traumatic devastation, though the existing vital

records reflect some demographic interruption during the

period. For instance, the records reveal no deaths at all

between 1676 and 1679. This gap unquestionably represented

the period of exile, when no town records were kept;

persons who died away from the town and were buried

elsewhere would not necessarily appear in either municipal

or church records. More noticeable is the sharp decline in

births registered for the late 1670s. After Groton's

residents welcomed 57 infant arrivals for the five-year

period from 1670 to 1674, the vital records reveal only 20

births between 1675 and 1679, with 13 of those coming in

1675 and only 7 during the remaining four years. Again, the

fact that Groton was abandoned during this time contributed

to shortcomings in the records, but the deficiencies could

have been made up partially through retrospective notations

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TABLE 4.4

GROTON VITAL RECORDS

Groton Births

1660-64 6 1680-84 26 1665-69 45 1685-89 41 1670-74 57 1690-94 36 1675-79 20 1695-99 72

Groton Marriages

1660-64: 2 1680-84: 1 1665-69: 7 1685-89: 7 1670-74: 5 1690-94: 3 1675-79: 2 1695-99: 5

Groton Deaths

1660-64 1680-84 1665-69 1685-89 9 1670-74 1690-94 6 1675-79 1695-99 10 (1676-79

Source: Vital Records of Groton. See notes 91 and 92.

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of baptisms in the local church records. The number of

births recorded rebounded slightly during the first half of

the 1680s and regained pre-1675 levels during the second

half of that decade.90 Still, although the unsettled

conditions caused by the Indian attacks and removal may have

resulted in some decline in the number of conceptions and

births among Groton's residents, the severe discontinuity in

the town's corresponding vital records must reflect more an

absence of accurate registration than a breakdown in the

reproductive process of the population.

New marriages continued during the period, though

apparently fewer in number; town records revealed only

three unions between 1675 and 1684, and all three occurred

in Chelmsford. Marriages sealed in neighboring towns were

not unheard of before the war, but they became much more

common after the conflict. Of 16 marriages noted in the

Groton records between 1660 and 1674, only 3 took place

outside the town, all in Chelmsford. During the last

quarter of the century, 14 of 18 weddings involving at least

one Groton participant occurred elsewhere, most commonly in

Chelmsford or Concord.91 This trend probably reflected

bonds of affection, either direct or indirect, formed during

the period of exile.

The refugees began returning to Groton in 1678 and

apparently had the work of reorganizing their community well

underway by the 1680s. Town records indicated no

obstruction to the process before the opening hostilities of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. King William's War. On August 31, 1688, Capt. Francis

Nicholson, the lieutenant-governor of the of New

England, reported that the people of Groton and Lancaster

"were very much affraid (being out towns)."92 Indeed, the

town records reveal the same sense of anxiety from the

residents themselves over their "present unsetled and almost

destracted condition." In July 1689 they wrote to

provincial authorities in Boston, "craving youer advice and

asistanc if it may be obtained, that we may go on with ouer

bisnes: to gat in our harvest and do other nessary worke."

The General Court apparently never considered abandoning

Groton during the 1690s, and in fact ordered a military

presence maintained there for "the Deffence of the

Frontiers."93 But this time, the residents did not show

any insistence to leave either. The 1689 petition was not a

plea for permission to withdraw but rather a matter-of-fact

request for instructions so that the inhabitants could "go

on with [their] bisnes." The degree of community cohesion

which existed among Groton's residents apparently

contributed to their ability to reorganize and reform the

settlement in a secure manner before the next trial during

the 1690s.

The Interior Frontier

In addition to the western and northern fringes, the

Massachusetts colony also had another frontier area in the

sparsely inhabited region between the harbor towns and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 Connecticut Valley. This interior frontier included such

communities as Brookfield and Worcester, both settled during

the late 1660s, and Lancaster, established in 1643. These

plantations shared similar circumstances during the late

seventeenth century, but in each case, records for the

period are scarce. Of the three, Lancaster probably had the

most illustrative, or at least the best documented,

experience.

The residents of Worcester and Brookfield fled their

plantations early in the war and "removed safely with what

they had left to several places, either where they had lived

before their planting or sitting down there; or where they

had Relations to receive and entertain them." The first

stop for at least some of the refugees retiring toward the

east was Boston, "where they were plentifully relieved out 94 of the Church Stock." Lancaster managed to hold out

through the winter, benefitting from a Council order for

Lt. Thomas Henchman to provide garrisons for the remaining

towns of the region. Indians attacked the place in force,

however, on February 10, 1676, causing the residents to

petition the General Court on March 11 concerning the "sad &

dismall havocke" inflicted upon them. The "poor destressed

people of Lancaster" claimed an "Incapasity to subsist,"

many of them lacking "bread to last . . . [one] month."

"We are sorowful to Leave the place, but hopelesse to keep

it . . ." pleaded the petitioners, noting a reluctance "to

give any Incuridgmt to the enemy, or leave any thing for

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them to promot their wicked designe." Still, in the final

analysis, Lancaster's remaining residents concluded it

"better [to] save our Lives then lose Life & Estat

both."95

Officials in Boston had ordered carts from Concord and

Sudbury to carry off the Lancaster residents who were

"disenabled from continuing there" on February 24, 1676, but

apparently the help "nevr came for want of a small gard of

men." The townsmen repeated their request for help in

removing in the March 11 petition, and by the end of that

month Lancaster was abandoned. Like their neighbors in

Groton, the Lancaster refugees who had no "peculiar" place

to flee "in the bay" were ordered by the General Court "to

settle at the frontire townes that remain for their

strengthening.1,96 The desertion of the interior

plantations further compounded the plight of threatened

areas on the other Massachusetts frontiers.

Lancaster's vital records are more revealing of the

immediate postwar years than any previously discussed. Most

strikingly, of 40 deaths recorded in 1675 and 1676, 38

resulted from Indian attacks. Thirty-six of these victims

were Lancaster residents. Thus the town's population

directly and sharply felt the effects of the hostilities.

Of even more significance, in the long run, the records

reveal to some extent where the residents fled during their

period of exile from the abandoned town. The deaths of 16

Lancaster residents were recorded between 1677 and 1681. Of

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TABLE 4.5

LANCASTER VITAL RECORDS

Lancaster Births

1660-64: 35 1680-84: 30 1665-69: 50 1685-89: 14 1670-74: 54 1690-94: 10 1675-79: 17 1695-99: 3

Lancaster Marriages

1660-64: 5 1680-84: 6 1665-69: 9 1685-89: 5 1670-74: 15 1690-94: 4 1675-79: 8 1695-99: 9

Lancaster Deaths

1660-64: 12 1680-84: 8 1665-69: 13 1685-89: 4 1670-74: 15 1690-94: 9 (Killed by Indians: 1675-79: 53 1695-99: 28 1692: 4, 1697: 21) (Killed by Indians: 1675: 8, 1676: 30)

Source: Nourse, ed., Birth, Marriage and Death Register of Lancaster. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 313-326. See notes 98 and 99.

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that number, 15 succumbed away from Lancaster; 4 died in

Dorchester, 4 in Charlestown, and 2 in Concord.97 By and

large, Lancaster's death registers indicate that the

residents retired to the towns surrounding Boston when the

natives forced them from their frontier homes.

The town's birth records disclose the same pattern.

The number of births declined sharply during the period,

from 54 between 1670 and 1674 to only 17 for the remainder

of the decade and 30 between 1680 and 1684. Again, this

decline may have resulted as much from a disruption in

record-keeping during the years of abandonment and

reorganization as from any disruption in the population's

reproductive process. But the Lancaster registries noted 20

births which occurred elsewhere within two decades of King

Philip's War. Eight additions to two Lancaster families

arrived in Sudbury; 6 babies among three families were born

at Concord; and 4 children came into the world at

Charlestown.98 These births reasserted the continuing ties

between Lancaster in the interior and the coastal towns

around the bay. Only thirty-five miles from the relative

safety of Boston, Lancaster residents understandably felt an

affinity to the more secure towns in which many of them

originated.

Just when the refugees began to return to Lancaster or

any of the other interior towns is difficult to determine,

due to the sparsity of surviving documents. Some residents

apparently made their way back to Lancaster by 1679, and

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more sought to do so. On October 7, 1679, "the Inhabitants

of Lancaster" petitioned the Middlesex County Court for a

committee to oversee the resettlement of the place, in

accordance with the General Court order that no abandoned

towns be planted anew without proper permission from county

or provincial authorities. The proprietors expressed an

earnest desire "to returne to Lancaster from whence wee have

beene scattered," and the court appointed a committee of

Capt. Thomas Prentice, Deacon John Stone, and Corp. William

Bond to supervise the effort." By early 1682, as many as

eighteen families had returned to the town "with a desire to

build the plantation againe," despite the "many

difficulties" occasioned by their "povertie." The returning

colonists set "about building and fencing that soe they may

provid bread for their families, and not be troublesom and

burdensom to other townes, which of nesesitie must have been

If we had Continued where we were" as refugees.100

Most Lancaster proprietors during the late 1670s thus

exhibited not only a desire to live in their own town but

also to exist independent of the charity and good works

which supported them in exile. Apparently, however, not all

of the landowners returned to the town promptly; as late as

1684 the residents petitioned the General Court about

absentee proprietors and asked that they "may be assessed in

proportion to the value of their Estates as the Inhabitants

are."101 The difficulties and poverty of which the

proprietors complained in 1682 carried over further into the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 period of reorganization, and those residents who desired to

make a commitment to their community evidently resented the

intransigence of their fellow proprietors who refused to

contribute to the resettlement of the town.

Worcester experienced an even more difficult period of

adjustment. In March 1679, sixteen persons interested in

returning to Worcester met in Concord under the direction of

a committee which included Daniel Gookin, Thomas Prentice,

and Daniel Henchman. They agreed that "if God spare life,

and peace continue, to endevor, either by their [persons],

or by their Relations, or by their purses, to Setle the Said

plantation" by the summer of 1680. The proprietors also

pledged "to build in a way of a towne" with such priorities

in mind as "Security from the enimys," "the beter Convenicy

of atending God's worship," "[the] Better Educatio[n] of

their Children in Scooles," "the better Accomodation of

Trades men," "Better Helps to [civility]," and "more

convenient Helps in case of Sicknes, fyre or other

Casualty.1,102 The optimistic Worcester refugees planned a

close, interdependent community but one which could also

accommodate commercial growth through the encouragement of

"Trades men." Despite this agreement, however, 1680 came

and went, "but there was no goeing by an[y] of them, or hope

that they would So doe, for divers of them importu[ned to]

goe, would not." Impatience evidently spread to Boston, for

in October 1682 the General Court gave notice "that if

Something was not [done] to begin the Said place it would

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bee Lost” and the charter forfeited.103 Time was running

out for the Worcester proprietors who sought to reorganize

their community.

The court's warning had the desired effect. On May 16,

1683, the court renewed the town charter under the

supervision of the county committee, and some of the

residents began to return. One year later, in April 1684,

the town planners ordered anyone who had taken a lot in

Worcester to settle on it within a year's time or lose their

claim. The committee also laid out rules for the

arrangement of the resettlement. Land for houselots was

resurveyed in the town center "to the end the inhabitants

may Setle in a way of defence as injoyned by law." From the

start, the organizers realized that not all of the eventual

residents could or would live in the concentrated plat.

"And those who will not Setle in the Said cittadel but [on]

therre plan[ting] or farme lotts," provided the committee

order, "shal So build as to have 2 or morre houses within

musket Sh[ot] of each other, that soe they may be in a way 104 of Defense." Worcester residents were slow in returning

to their plantation, but once they did, they sought to order

the resettlement in a prudent way, giving proper attention

to the General Court's instructions concerning compact

settlement.

As with other towns in the region, the old proprietors

and the new settlers of Worcester had barely planted

themselves before they were once more shaken by news of

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Indian hostilities. In July 1689, Lancaster residents spoke

for all of their neighbors in the "out towns" of the exposed

interior when they admitted harboring "som fears of being

surprissed by the Indians, we being by foremer experience

sencsible of theire mallice and crueltie."105 Lancaster

managed to hold out, but Brookfield, whose recent

resettlement was far from complete, and Worcester once again

had to be abandoned during the 1690s.106 In spite of the

emphasis Worcester's proprietors placed on compact

settlement, community cohesion, and defense, the town could

not pull together sufficiently to resist the native attacks.

Lancaster, the closest of the interior settlements to

the more settled areas of the colony, probably benefitted

from an extended security network. After an optimistic

resettlement effort and with knowledge gained from

experience that they had survived the Indian onslaught,

Lancaster residents could return to their town with at least

some small degree of confidence that the communities of the

Concord River region were near. Worcester and Brookfield,

conversely, were literally miles from anywhere, as close to

the Connecticut River frontier towns as they were to the

haven of Boston. This fact could have proven little comfort

to the refugees who faced a return to their isolated homes.

They had no proximate support system upon which to lean,

only miles of open wilderness in any direction. At least

the Connecticut Valley plantations had a familiar and

regular elongated security network which stretched the

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length of the region; each town had another relatively

close by down the valley to fall back on. No such comfort

existed for the isolated interior outposts. No wonder the

residents of Brookfield and Worcester were so reluctant to

return and so quick to scatter again.

While towns and plantations across Massachusetts1

frontiers shared many experiences during King Philip's War,

the paths followed by each in the crucial postwar period of

recovery were sufficiently varied as to make generalizations

risky. All of the towns felt the effects of the Indian

hostilities in 1675 and 1676, either directly in the form of

native attacks or indirectly in the form of an overall

regional fear of enemy depredations. Three of these

communities— Westfield, Springfield, and

Northampton— survived the war intact, while the other

six— Deerfield, Northfield, Groton, Lancaster, Worcester,

and Brookfield— suffered periods of complete abandonment

ranging from under three years to over ten years.

Surprisingly, no patterns directly relevant to the towns'

specific experiences during the war carried over into the

recovery period.

Of the three which survived, for instance, Westfield

and Northampton benefitted from community cohesion after

1675, while Springfield, undoubtedly the most physically

secure of the towns, was not blessed with strong communal

bonds either before or after the war. Conversely, of the

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abandoned plantations, Deerfield and Groton residents

developed and expressed a vibrant sense of social

responsibility during their respective resettlement efforts,

and this cooperation paid off in meeting the next crisis.

Residents of the other deserted towns either never had ample

opportunity to develop lasting commitments with their

neighbors or never voiced such assurances as confidently as

did the proprietors who led the resettlement of Deerfield or

Groton. Wartime experiences thus give no sure indication

about postwar community development.

Of only slightly more significance in explaining

community patterning during the years after King Philip's

War in these towns was their age. The oldest were

Springfield and Lancaster, settled in 1636 and 1643

respectively; neither exhibited an impressive record of

communal cooperation during the last quarter of the

seventeenth century, but both managed to survive King

William's War intact. Northampton, Groton, Westfield,

Brookfield, Worcester, and Deerfield all were established

between 1654 and 1669, so each had time to develop

neighborly bonds and commitments before 1675. The most

successful towns in community rebuilding or reorganization

after the war came from this group; only Worcester and

Brookfield residents failed to arrange their resettlement

quickly enough or efficiently enough to weather the next

war. The case which lends itself most clearly to analysis

in the category of town age is that of Northfield. Settled

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only in 1672, the isolated fledgling outpost had developed

by 1675 neither the community strength to withstand King

Philip's War nor the community commitment necessary for a

speedy and effective return. Therefore, Northfield's tender

age hurt the plantation both in 1675 and in 1690.

The most successful formula for community development

during the postwar years involved a combination of town age

and geographic location. Longevity did not necessarily

ensure community order. In the case of Springfield, in

fact, the long history of the town contributed to a sense of

individualism and noncommunalism uncharacteristic of

frontier plantations. Other towns, which had existed for

approximately a decade or two, seem to have been still new

enough that some degree of interdependence remained among

the residents, yet settled enough that they either survived

the war or initiated a positive return effort fairly

quickly. Such was the case in Westfield, Northampton,

Deerfield, and Groton.

Worcester and Brookfield, of course, were the

exceptions among this group. As such, they reflected the

importance of the second component of geographic location.

These two interior settlements were geographically isolated,

whereas those of the Connecticut Valley were links in a

chain which stretched nearly fifty miles. This chain

provided an extended security system which in the long run

supplemented the community stability of the individual

members. Northfield, unfortunately, could not benefit fully

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from the support of its neighbors because it had not had the

opportunity to formulate its own base of communal

interdependence. Groton and Lancaster both had fairly

direct contact with Boston via the secure and proximate

towns of the Concord River region. Of the two, the former

displayed a more apparent sense of postwar community

commitment. A combination of factors thus served to

strengthen commxmity order in certain frontier plantations

directly affected by King Philip's War and thereby aided

their residents in banding together during the difficult

decades which followed. But in towns like Northfield,

Worcester, and Brookfield, which lacked the existence of

either a firm pre-war community structure or an extended

support system, the problems of resettlement and

reorganization were never really resolved satisfactorily in

the years following King Philip's War.

Nearly all of the towns discussed had at least one

characteristic in common during the last quarter of the

seventeenth century. In spite of General Court admonitions

for compact settlement and local committee instructions to

the same effect, community leaders across the frontier had

to face and regulate the phenomenon of expansion and

dispersal of settlement away from their town centers. Even

in frontier plantations such as Westfield and Deerfield,

where the residents seem sincerely to have espoused the

doctrine of compact settlement, newcomers and even

established landowners or their sons began to branch off to

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detached farmsteads or, more commonly, satellite

communities.

This concern was not new to Massachusetts authorities;

their predecessors had attempted to enforce compactness

throughout the colony's history. Likewise, other town

studies have indicated the extent to which communities

throughout the colony experienced geographic diffusion

during the seventeenth century. For instance, Philip

Greven, for Andover, and Kenneth Lockridge for Dedham found

towns which originated as close, compact, communal entities.

In both, population growth and land divisions led

inhabitants to move away from the village center.107 So,

similar instances in the frontier towns were by no means

unique; only their timing lent them any degree of novelty,

coming as they did in such an unsettled time.

Expanding and dispersing when a continuing Indian

threat existed may have represented a gamble. But in a

larger sense, perhaps the attraction toward expansion was a

healthy sign in the postwar frontier communities. By

branching off, residents who had been forced to flee into

garrison houses or to abandon their communities altogether

just a few years earlier reflected a confidence in their

ability to weather the threats encountered on the frontier

and in the belief that they could rely on the support of

their neighbors without necessarily having to live in

immediate physical contact with them. The idea of community

thus remained vibrant, even while its form was changing.

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Had frontier residents chosen to remain huddled in their

fortified houses or, worse yet, refused to return to their

houses at all, the Massachusetts frontier would have been in

peril.

Each town on the Massachusetts frontier underwent

different experiences during King Philip's War and each one

dealt with the problems of recovering from the conflict in

its own way. The General Court provided guidelines, and

county committees supervised resettlement efforts to

encourage prudent procedures, but in the end it was left to

individual towns and their residents to determine the exact

course their communities would follow during the postwar

decades. Resolving the problems of resettlement and

reorganization remained one of the most difficult tasks of

the period. The physical scars on the frontier provided

lasting reminders of the conflict. Some communities met the

challenge and started over or even expanded; others could

not regenerate quickly or sufficiently enough to heal the

wounds. Therefore, all of the Massachusetts frontier

communities were affected, directly or indirectly, by the

longterm legacies of King Philip's War in the region.

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1. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 48; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 223; See also, Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 187.

2. MA, 68:54; Bodge, Soldiers. 151.

3. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 79, 81; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 247; See also, Robert E. Moody, ed., The Saltonstall Papers, 1607-1815 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1972), 199.

4. Douglas Leach, The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 34; Specific instances will be discussed below in reference to particular towns. An exception to the general rule suggested occurred in the town of Plymouth and Rhode Island, around the northern fringes of . Although many of the residents had their roots in Plymouth or even Massachusetts, in 1675 they generally took "a timely Flight into Rhode Island . . . the common Zoar, or Place of Refuge for the Distressed." Such a pattern was understandable since these towns had earlier births and had undoubtedly developed ties to neighboring towns in the region. [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 86-87; Hubbard, History, I, 189; Bowen, Early Rehoboth, III, 19.

5. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 170-171; See also, Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 187; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 355; Plymouth likewise emphasized the value of compact settlement after the war. See, Sharp, "New England System of Defense," 247; Leach maintains that the "tendency to insist upon compactness in the planning of postwar communities" resulted "directly from the hard lessons of combat." Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 246-247.

6. Shurtleff, ed., Records, 213-214; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 267-268; MA, 69:238; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 191.

7. Shurtleff, ed., Records, III, 45; See also, Salisbury, "Conquest of the 'Savage,’" 33-34.

8. Cited in, Peter N. Carroll, Puritanism and The Wilderness: The Intellectual Significance of the New England Frontier, 1629-1700 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 205; See also, Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 88; The most common town pattern in seventeenth-century New England was fairly compact, with 179

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houses lined close together on both sides of a central street or along intersecting streets. In newer frontier settlements, however, especially in the Connecticut Valley, houses were often more "scattered along a crooked path" due to the riverine topography, in what McManis call an "arterial" pattern. Douglas R. McManis, Colonial New England; A Historical Geography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 57; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 89.

9. Salisbury, "Conquest of the 'Savage,'" 258; Carroll, Puritanism and The Wilderness, 150.

10. Cited in, Carroll, Puritanism and The Wilderness, 221-222.

11. See, for instance, Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 88; Innes contends that from the start, Connecticut Valley towns tended to be less communal and more individualistic than the "typical" New England town or ideal. Innes, Labor in a New Land, xvi-xvii.

12. John Pynchon to the Governor and Magistrates of Connecticut, August 4, 1675. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 138; See also, Innes, Labor in a New Land, 125; McManis, Colonial New England, 58.

13. John Punchon to John Winthrop, Jr., August 6, 1675. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 140; John Pynchon to John Winthrop, Jr., Ibid., 141-142.

14. John Pynchon to Rev. John Russell, October 5, 1675. Ibid., 150-157; MA, 67:282-283; George Sheldon, "Three Letters Written by Gov. Leverett in 1675— Newly Brought to Light," NEHGR 48(1894):317; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 115; See also, Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 129-133; Bodge, Soldiers, 145; Judd, Hadley, 144.

15. John Pynchon to Governor John Leverett, October 8, 1675. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 158-159; MA, 67:290; Pynchon again petitioned the governor for more soldiers to hold Springfield on October 12, 1675, stating "through mercy here is Indian Corne enough only we want a Mill: & yt is a [great] strait to us but I thing we shall hold ye Place yf we have some soldiers." John Pynchon to Governor John Leverett, October 12, 1675. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 163-164; MA, 68:6a.

16. Governor John Leverett to Captain Samuel Appleton, October 9, 1675. Sheldon, Leverett Letters, 320; Captain Samuel Appleton to Governor "hn Leverett, Oct", r 14, 1675.

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MA, 68:2.

17. See, Innes, Labor in a New Land, 17-18, 25; Smith, ed., Pynchon Court Record, 34-36; McManis, Colonial New England, 45; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 249.

18. MA, 68:166; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 134; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 315-316; J.H. Temple and George Sheldon, A History of the Town of Northfield, Massachusetts (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1875), 88.

19. The Councillors felt that concentrating increased the likelihood of successful defense, "the Lord Smiling upon [our] indeavors," while remaining scattered "exposed [the towns] to manifest hazzard of ruine." MA, 68:181a.

20. In claiming a lack of troops for the frontier, the General Court maintained "our present work is to secure the principal towns upon the sea coast." Cited in, Trumbull, History of Northampton, 316.

21. MA, 68:33; Bodge, Soldiers, 247, 250-251; Thomas B. Warren, "Births, Marriages and Deaths in Springfield, 1639-1843" (Manuscript copy, 1897), passim.

22. Hampshire Probate, 172.

23. Total deaths in Springfield between 1660 and 1664 numbered 25, between 1665 and 1669 numbered 14, and between 1670 and 1674 numbered 22. For the period 1675 to 1679, the figure jumped to 66, but 41 (nearly two-thirds) of those deaths occurred in 1675 and 1676 alone. Likewise, between 1680 and 1684, 86 Springfield residents died, but 61 (over two-thirds) did so in 1683 and 1684. For the next five year period, 1685 to 1689, 89 perished, with 44 (one-half) dying in one year, 1689. Warren, "Births, Marriages and Deaths," passim; Although births increased during each five year period between 1660 and 1689 inclusive, the number in 1676 fell to a relative low of 20. The figures for the five individual years previous were 26, 29, 39, 32, and 32 respectively; for the five following years births numbered 37, 37, 34, 47, and 36. Still, the decline in 1676 had no effect on the long-term trend of births in Springfield during the period, although the increase for the period 1675 to 1679 was smaller than for surrounding periods. Births between 1660 and 1664 numbered 99, between 1665 and 1669 numbered 105, between 1670 and 1674 numbered 153, between 1675 and 1679 numbered 160, between 1680 and 1684 numbered 192, and between 1685 and 1689 numbered 191 (the last figure perhaps reflecting the apparent presence of disease in Springfield during the mid-1680s). Warren, "Births, Marriages and Deaths," passim.

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24. Ibid.; Innes noted a very low level of out-migration from Springfield throughout the second half of the seventeenth century. Innes, Labor in a New Land, 148.

25. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 137-138, 149-150, II, 127-128, 136, 162-163, and passim.

26. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 125.

27. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 251; See also, Perry Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1956), 143.

28. Hampshire Probate, 203; MA, 112:338; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 410-411; A committee of Major John Pynchon, Lieutenant Thomas Stebbins, Samuel Marshfield, Deacon Jonathon Burt, and Deacon Benjamin Parsons was appointed to oversee the settlement of Enfield.

29. John Pynchon to Governor Edmund Andros, August 21, 1688. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 186; John Pynchon to John Allyn, August 22, 1688. Ibid., 188-189; In February 1690 Pynchon notified Allyn and Samuel Wyllys, "We are extreme naked and open and can't agree upon fortification . . . so that I fear we shall lie to the mercy of the enemy. . . ." John Pynchon to John Allyn and Samuel Wyllys, February 24, 1690. Ibid., 222; See also, John Pynchon to Governor , May 12, 1690. Ibid., 224; Innes, Labor in a New Land, 126.

30. John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, December 3, 1694. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 287.

31. "The residents would cooperate with their neighbors when they had to, work in concert when it was necessary, or band together against outsiders when attacks came," Innes claimed, "but otherwise they concentrated on securing exclusively individual goals." Innes, Labor in a New Land, 123.

32. Walter L. Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield: An Edition of the Westfield 'Town Records,'" (PhD Dissertation: Kent State University, 1982), 22; The largest number of original Westfield settlers came from Windsor, Connecticut, with others from Northampton, Springfield, Hartford, and Farmington. See also, Ibid., 39-41.

33. Reflecting the seriousness of the situation, the committee stated "now wee can not Cary on our Ocasons for a lively hood as formerly and considering] that it is not a time now to advans our estates but to deny ourselves of our former advantages," the townspeople pledged to band together

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34. Cited in, Judd, Hadley, 160; Taylor reportedly even claimed that the prevailing illness of the time made it too dangerous for many of the residents to leave their homes. John L. Sibley, Biographical Sketches of Graduates of Harvard University 17 vols., (Cambridge; University Press, 1873), II, 403.

35. Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield," 179; Sibley, Graduates of Harvard, II, 403; See also, Trumbull, History of Northampton, 320.

36. Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield," 27-30, 190; Some observers have judged that the general plan for compact settlement after 1675 was not effectively implemented on a long-term basis anywhere except Westfield. See, Judd, Hadley, 179.

37. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 238-239.

38. Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield," 33; Grant, ed., Anniversary of Westfield, 56.

39. The committee advised that the fortifications "be made strong and substanchall." Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield," 423-424.

40. Ibid., 55, 61-62, 401-409; Westfield had only one resident, a Moses Cook, killed during the war. Judd, Hadley, 157.

41. Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield," 201.

42. Shurtleff, ed., Records, IV, pt. 1, 136; Northampton Town Records, 117-118.

43. Between 1654 and 1660, seventeen Northampton settlers came from Windsor, twelve from Hartford, eight from Springfield, seven from Dorchester, one each from Westfield, Lynn, Wethersfield, Boston, New Haven, and Roxbury, and seven from undetermined origins. Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 44-45; See also, Ibid., 11; Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 40-45.

44. Cited in, Judd, Hadley, 145.

45. Hubbard, History, I, 131-132; Trumbull, History

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of Northampton, 269, 275, 307-308; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 132.

46. MA, 68:182; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 318.

47. MA, 68:191; Bodge, Soldiers, 98.

48. The eight recipients of new town lots as a direct result of the war were Enos Kingsley, Ralph Hutchinson, Preserved Clapp, William Smead, Alexander Alvord, John Alexander, Samuel Allen, Matthew Clesson, and William Holton. Trumbull, History of Northampton, 270, 278, 311-312; Northampton Town Records, 97, 99; Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 33.

49. Bodge, Soldiers, 247, 250-251.

50. Northampton Births, Deaths and Marriages, passim; Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 13, 101, 133-134, 147; During the first half of the 1670s, the highest single annual mortality figure was 7, in 1674. After the traumatic years of 1675 and 1676, the death rate again fell to consistent levels, of 10 or under per year, until 1689 and 1690, when Northampton experienced 23 and 38 deaths respectively. Northampton Births, Deaths and Marriages, passim; Although births in 1676 and 1677 declined slightly from the demographic trend, births for the five-year period between 1675 and 1679 actually increased over the previous five years by a figure of 130 compared to 109 for 1670 to 1674. Thus, the slight decrease in births per marriage (4.8 for 1675 to 1679 compared to 6.4 for 1670 to 1674) seems to have resulted more from a sharp increase in marriages (27 for 1675 to 1679 compared to 17 for 1670 to 1674) rather than from a decline in births. Births per marriage rose again to 7.3 for the entire decade of the 1680s. Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 147; Northampton Births, Deaths and Marriages, passim.

51. Northampton Town Records, 100; On March 8, 1677, the town voted to "fortify the meeting house." Ibid., 99; Neighboring Hadley took similar steps at the same time. Celebration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of the Settlement of Hadley, Massachusetts (Northampton: Bridgman & Childs, 1859), 35.

52. Northampton Town Records, 103; For examples of grants made outside the fortification, see, Ibid., 99; Mank described Northampton's original layout as similar to English nuclear open-field villages and to such New England towns as Andover and Sudbury, with houselots lined up side-by-side along set streets. Mank, "Family Structure in

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Northampton,11 49.

53. Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 7, 98-99, 133; Of the 242 people who moved into Northampton between 1655 and 1670, only 19 left. Counting their offspring and residents who arrived after 1670, 110 left the town, while only 50 new residents arrived. Ibid., 99, 133.

54. Northampton Town Records, 134.

55. John Pynchon to Governor Edmund Andros, August 21, 1688. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 186; John Pynchon to Governor Simon Bradstreet, May 12, 1690. Ibid., 224.

56. MA, 30:117-118; See also, Shurtleff, ed., Records, III, 385, IV, pt. 2, 49; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 47-52.

57. Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 60, 90, 119, 610.

58. Sheldon, History of Deerfield. I, 92; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 168; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 254, 262; The list of those killed in Hampshire County in 1675 lists two men killed at Deerfield. James Eggleston of Windsor, Connecticut, a garrison soldier, was killed in the September 1 attack. Nathaniel Cornberry was also listed, but he may have been killed at a later date. MA, 68:33; Bodge, Soldiers, 130.

59. MA, 68:33; Judd, Hadley, 141; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 171-172, 612; The dead were John Allen (age 37/3 children), Joshua Carter (37/4 children), Joseph Gillett (34/7 children), Robert Hinsdale (58/8 children), Samuel Hinsdale (33/5 children), Barnabas Hinsdale (36/5 children), John Hinsdale (27/6 children), Zebediah Williams (26/2 children), Philip Barsham (married, age and children unknown), John Barnard (19, unmarried), Jonathan Plympton (18, unmarried), William Smead, Jr. (15, unmarried), Thomas Weller (22, unmarried), and James Tuffts (no personal information). Ibid., 612.

60. Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 111, 133; Bodge, Soldiers, 68.

61. Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 178; Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, 114-115.

62. Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 179-181; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 349-350; Quinton Stockwell, "The Captivity of Quinton Stockwell," in Samuel G. Drake, ed., Indian Captivities or Life in the Wigwam (Auburn: Derby & Miller, 1852), 60-61; On the same day,

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natives killed 12 persons and captured 17 at Hatfield. Sheldon, History of Deerfield. I, 181.

63. Hubbard, History, II, 239-240.

64. Shurtleff, ed., Records. V, 171; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 187-188; The court also ordered "stuff for fortiffication to be provided" by the next spring, but there is no evidence that anything along those lines was done at the time. Ibid.

65. MA, 69:200; Sheldon, History of Deerfield. I, 189; See also, Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 225, 230; The petition also pointed out the value of resettling Deerfield, to serve "as a bulwark to the other townes," to dishearten the natives, and to "mightily Incourage and Raise the harts of us the Inhabitants, yr poor & Impoverished servants." MA, 69:200a, Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 190.

66. Deerfield Town Book, 1670-1729 2 vols., Ed. Richard I. Melvoin, (Unpublished typescript from original records, 1981-1983), I, 5, 23; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 191-193; See also, Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 321.

67. MA, 69:200-201; Sheldon, History of Deerfield. I, 190.

68. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 360; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 193.

69. Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 231, 237, 240, 606-607, 621-622; Of the forty newcomers, 11 came from Northampton, 8 from Hadley, 5 from Hatfield, 3 each from Spingfield, Suffield, and Hartford, 1 from New Haven, and 2 each from Boston, Roxbury, and Watertown. Ibid., 624; Apparently, many newcomers after 1680 were soldiers in the Valley during the war. Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 178; Deerfield’s vital records reveal no deaths before 1681, no marriages before 1689, and only three births before 1680. The vital records began to take shape only well after resettlement. Vital Records of Deerfield, Massachusetts to the Year 1850 Comp. Thomas W. Baldwin, (Boston: Wright and Potter, 1920), passim.

70. Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 264, 349, 619-620; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 215-218.

71. Deerfield Town Book, I, 17; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 220; By 1693, the town had a strong fort, whose "mesure or whole Compass . . . is two-hundred and

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two rods." Ibid., 241; MA, 70:200.

72. MA, 112:436-436a; Sheldon, History of Deerfield. I, 228, 241-242; See also, John Pynchon to Samuel Wyllys and Colonel John Allyn, February 24, 1690. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 221; John Pynchon to Governor William Stoughton, September 13, 1695. Ibid., 297; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 411.

73. MA, 70:240-242.

74. Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 386, 418-419; Among other Valley towns, the natives attacked Hatfield twice and Hadley once. Total losses in the region during the 1690s were 41 dead, 6 wounded, and 10 captured out of a population of about 3,000. Ibid.; See also, Vital Records of Deerfield, passim; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 220-264.

75. Shurtleff, ed., Records, IV, pt. 2, 528-529, 542; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 50-53, 63.

76. Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 73-76; MA, 68:33.

77. Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 65-66; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 82-83.

78. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 360; Herbert C. Parsons, Puritan Outpost: A History of the Town and People of Northfield, Massachusetts (New York: MacMillan Co., 1937), 54, 56.

79. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 482; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 94, 98; See also, Parsons, Puritan Outpost, 58, 61-62, 66; John Pynchon to Governor Edmund Andros, August 21, 1688. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 184.

80. MA, 129:306; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 119-120; Of 35 homelots assigned on the town plot of 1686, 15 landowners were classified as newcomers, 8 as heirs or sons, and 12 as returning proprietors. But of these 12 proprietors, at least five never actually returned to Northfield themselves. Ibid., 104-108; See also, Ibid., 64-65, 67-69; One settler who apparently did return to Northfield was Thomas Webster, who fled to Hadley in 1675 and lived in a house built by that town. In 1684, however, he reportedly "returned to Northfield." (emphasis added). Judd, Hadley, 234.

81. John Pynchon to Governor Edmund Andros, August 21,

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1688. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 185-186; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 115; Parsons, Puritan Outpost, 75.

82. Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 121-122, 124; John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, July 5, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 195; See also, John Pynchon to John Allyn, August 22, 1688. Ibid., 188.

83. John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, July 30, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 202-204] ; MA, 107:239; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 124.

84. MA, 67:247; Centennial Celebration at Groton, 17-18.

85. Cited in. Centennial Celebration at Groton,r 79.

86. Hubbard, History, I, 194-196, II, 48.

87. MA, 68:192; Bodce, Soldiers, 99, 125.

88. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 119; Hubbard, History, I, 199, 201; Samuel A. Green, An Historical Sketch of Groton, Massachusetts, 1655-1890 (Groton; Privately Published, 1894), 33; See also, Leach, Colonial Frontier, 34.

89. Green, ed., Early Records of Groton, 52-53; Samuel A. Green, ed., The Town Records of Groton, Massachusetts, 1662-1678 (Groton: Privately Published, 1879), 45; In 1679 the General Court upheld the residency pledge, ordering "those that have lands there, & are not resident upon the place, shall pay rates for their lands as those doe that are resident, and the inhabitants these resident be abated one single rate per annum to the country." Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 237.

90. Vital Records of Groton, Massachusetts, to . 1849 2 vols., (Salem: Essex Institute, 1926), passim; Hubbard recorded at least three deaths in Groton during the March 1676 attacks, 2 men and 1 infant. Hubbard, History, I, 194-196; Recorded births in Groton numbered 45 between 1665 and 1669, 57 between 1670 and 1674, 20 between 1675 and 1679, 26 between 1680 and 1684, 41 between 1685 and 1689, 36 between 1690 and 1694, and 72 between 1695 and 1699. Vital Records of Groton, passim.

91. Vital Records of Groton, passim; Of the 14 weddings away from Groton between 1675 and 1699, 9 took place at Chelmsford, 3 at Concord, and 1 each at Woburn and

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Charlestown. Ibid.

92. Nicholson left the frontier inhabitants with the empty assurance, "that they had the happinesse of being subjects of a victorious King, who could protect them from all their enemies." Cited in, Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 125; Centennial Celebration at Groton, 28.

93. Green, ed., Early Records of Groton, 197; MA, 70:184, 261; See also, Centennial Celebration at Groton. 28-29.

94. Brookfield was the scene of Nipmuck activity by the beginning of August 1675, and the residents could hold out only until early September. Thomas Wheeler, "A Thankefull Remembrance of God's Mercy to Several Persons at Quabaug or Brookfield," in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadful1 a Judgment, 254; [Saltonstall], "Present State of New-England," 36; Bodge, Soldiers, 115-116; Lincoln, History of Worcester, 21; Even though no residents remained, the Council ordered a garrison at Brookfield in early 1676. MA, 68:173; Bodge, Soldiers, 116-117.

95. This petition of March 11, 1676 reported that "the Towns people are Genrally gon who felt the Judgmt but light," yet the same document also claimed an inability "to Remove away" because "the enemy has so Incompased us." MA, 68:156; Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 107-108; See also, MA, 67:239, 241, 252; Bodge, Soldiers, 123; Duane H. Hurd, ed., History of Worcester County, Massachusetts 2 vols., (Boston: C.F. Jewett and Co., 1879), I, 599.

96. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 107-108, 119; MA, 68:142, 156.

97. Nourse, ed., Birth, Marriage and Death Register of Lancaster, passim; Six Lancaster residents died at the hands of the natives in 1675, along with 2 garrison soldiers, and 30 were killed the following year. Four Lancaster residents died in Dorchester in 1678, 3 of them belonging to the Rogers family. In addition to the 4 who perished in Charlestown and the 2 who died in Concord, Lancaster refugees also died in Boston, Billerica, Woburn, Sudbury, and Wethersfield, Connecticut. Ibid.; See also, Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 313-326.

98. Nourse, ed., Birth, Marriage and Death Register of Lancaster, passim; Jonas and Mary Prescott had one child in Sudbury in 1678; Nathaniel and Mary Wilder had 7 children there between 1677 and 1694. John and Sarah Prescott had one child in Concord in 1678; John and Hannah Rugg had 2 children there in 1678 and 1680; and Ephraim and Hannah

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Roper had 3 Concord births between 1679 and 1683. John and Hannah Wilder had 4 children in Charlestown between 1676 and 1690. In addition, one birth was recorded in Boston in 1677 and one in Marlborough in 1680. Ibid.; See also, Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 313-326.

99. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 119-120; See also, Abijah P. Marvin, History of the Town of Lancaster, Massachusetts, (Lancaster: Solon Wilder, 1879), 118; Hurd, ed., History of Worcester County, I, 603.

100. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 120-121; MA, 107:330; See also, Marvin, History of Lancaster, 118-119.

101. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 123; MA, 107:366; The court approved the request "provided that all persons & estates be assessed by a due proportion to said Rates." Ibid.

102. Franklin P. Rice, ed., Records of the Proprietors of Worcester, Massachusetts (Worcester: Worcester Society of Antiquity, 1881), 31; Lincoln, History of Worcester, 33.

103. Rice, ed., Worcester Proprietors, 33; Lincoln, History of Worcester, 32-33.

104. Rice, ed., Worcester Proprietors, 34, 36-37; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 413.

105. Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 125; MA, 107:171.

106. Brookfield, which was resettled only during the late 1680s, was desperate by the summer of 1693. Pynchon reported to Governor Sir that "drawing off will be ruinous to what they have; staying may be hazardous and ruinous to their persons. . . . I understand the inhabitants are willing to be ordered one way or other. ." John Pynchon to Governor Sir William Phips, July 29, 1693, Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 278-279; See also, Bodge, Soldiers, 118; When some Worcester residents were ordered in 1692 to repair to a Captain Wing's garrison, they refused and built a garrison of their own. Eventually, however, the town was again abandoned. MA, 112:423-423a; See also, Rice, ed., Worcester Proprietors, 55.

107. See, Philip J. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 42-43, 52-57; Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town, The First Hundred Years Expanded edition (New York: W.W.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191 Norton Company, 1985),1.985), s, 5, 94.

Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. CHAPTER 5

POLITICS: STABILITY AMID ADVERSITY

In addition to the physical, economic, and demographic

legacies left by King Philip's War, political issues also

became prominent in the last quarter of the seventeenth

century. From the local to the provincial level, colonists

became increasingly sensitive to the governmental climate in

the colony, but the political problems themselves had no

direct relationship to the war. On all levels of

government, Massachusetts residents looked to familiar

leaders for guidance throughout the period. The preference

for continuity was most apparent in town politics on the

frontier. At the same time, townspeople became more

assertive in their approach to political issues. This

assertiveness resulted from the trials faced during King

Philip's War and its aftermath. In reaction to the physical

threats they faced, Massachusetts colonists became more wary

of the varied forces they encountered in the world around

them. So while citizens across the colony called on trusted

leaders to see them through troubled times, they did so with

a new sense of watchfulness, warning both town and

provincial officials that public assent no longer came

without public scrutiny. The Indian conflict did not cause 192

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the political problems which existed during the postwar

years, but it did influence the ways in which colonists

responded to the perceived challenges of the period.

The "Indian war set off a chain of events that

profoundly altered the colony's political culture," argued

Douglas Leach. Economic troubles resulting from the war, he

found, made colonists more politically sensitive and

skeptical, and "transformed colonial authorities from

trusted agents into outsiders whom villagers increasingly

identified with interests beyond the local community." The

financial legacies of King Philip's War "inevitably

stimulated popular participation in government affairs," and

"as the economy weakened, local people challenged

traditional authority."1 Other writers have echoed Leach's

connection between war, taxes, and popular political

upheaval. Christine Young, for instance, claimed that

strains between the established leaders and a rising

generation existed in Salem by the 1670s and that the

legacies of King Philip's War, particularly the economic

costs, exacerbated the tensions.2 New England communities

stressed local autonomy in their political administration as

well as in their Congregational churches. Any forces that

threatened local self-determination and control, whether

Indians attacking the outposts in the wilderness or crown

officials challenging the cherished charter, sparked

Massachusetts residents to the defense of their accustomed

order.3

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Echoing Leach's general statements, numerous studies of

town politics have emphasized the importance that colonists

placed on the value of local autonomy. In the years

following the Indian war, the increased taxation represented

an intrusion to many colonists and led them to reevaluate

their relationship with both local and provincial

authorities. Young found this to be the case in Salem,

where resistance to tax rates authorized in Boston affected

relationships between residents and their elected selectmen.

Whereas before the late 1670s the selectmen had acted with a

fairly free hand, even in financial transactions, by the

1680s the town began to require greater public

accountability in matters of taxation and expenditure.

Young even found a breakdown in the previous consensus over

the selection of selectmen, as a larger number of nominees

attracted the votes of Salem residents.4

Kenneth Lockridge and Allan Kreider discovered much the

same situation in Dedham and Watertown. As serious

issues— such as increased taxation— arose which directly

affected the townsmen, the colonists became more politically

active. During the late seventeenth century, residents of

both towns took back powers which had gravitated to the

selectmen earlier in the century. The authors theorized

that the town meetings' reassertiveness resulted from either

a new degree of self-confidence on the part of the citizens

or a lack of confidence in the ability of their

selectmen.5 Either way, issues of local importance which

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arose during the years following King Philip's War led

colonists in both Dedham and Watertown to take a harder look

at local administration.

Both communities also experienced a marked increase in

turnover among the selectmen. Before the 1680s, most

selectmen served for long periods of time; after that time,

more residents received nominations and those elected

generally served fewer and shorter terms. In fact, Dedham

voters chose an entirely new slate of town leaders in 1689.

Leach went so far as to say that the tendency to drop

established "local civil and military" leaders— "village

brokers"— was widespread across the colony.6 Some of these

same patterns appeared in Massachusetts frontier towns which

faced reorganization after the traumas of the Indian war,

though the extensive repudiation of the political leadership

suggested by Leach and evident in Dedham never materialized

in any of the towns studied.

In Springfield, the cornerstone of the Connecticut

Valley, demographic stability was accompanied by political

stability, at least in the election of selectmen. The town

elected five men to that office annually. Of nine residents

who served at least twice between 1670 and 1674, three died

during the mid-1670s, but the remaining six each served at

least two more terms during the next five-year period.

Indeed, John Dumberton and Henry Chapin continued to be

elected regularly— generally every other year, as was the

common pattern in Springfield— into the early 1690s, while

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Benjamin Parsons, George Colton, and Samuel Marshfield

remained politically prominent into the middle or late

1680s.7 Neither did a large turnover occur after 1689.

Twelve men in all served two or more terms during the 1680s.

Dumberton, Chapin, Parsons, Colton, and Marshfield were at

or nearing the end of long political careers by that time,

each spanning at least twenty years of regular service. Of

the seven remaining, only one, Samuel Ball, failed to be

reelected, while the other six, Jonathan Burt, John

Hitchcock, Japhet Chapin, John Holyoke, John Warriner, and

Thomas Stebbins, each served at least one more time during

the early 1690s. New names did appear on the selectman

lists of Springfield between the end of King Philip's War

and the Revolution of 1689, but of fourteen men elected for

the first time during those years, eight bore the same

surnames as previous selectmen. Similarly, of ten new men

chosen as selectmen during the five years after 1689, six

had relatives who had previously held the position.8

Persistence was definitely a characteristic of Springfield's

leaders during the last quarter of the seventeenth century.

While Springfield residents remained fairly consistent

in the men they chose to order the affairs of their town,

they did not give them an entirely free hand during the

postwar period. On July 17, 1678, the town meeting took

notice of ''some scruple made concerning the Select mens

Acts, because the Major part of them are not freemen

according to order." The matter caused no political

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TABLE 5.1: SPRINGFIELD SELECTMEN 198

upheaval because Nathaniel Burt, one of the selectmen,

resigned his seat to his brother Jonathan Burt, thus

creating the desired majority of confirmed freemen on the

panel.9 By demanding this simple adjustment, the town

meeting gave notice that it was keeping an eye on the

actions of the elected town leaders.

In a more noteworthy incident, the residents of

Springfield tightened the reins on selectman powers in a

manner similar to that described by Young, Lockridge, and

Kreider. The townsmen authorized the selectmen "to take

care from time to time for the making & Collecting of Such

Rates" as necessary for the building of a new meetinghouse

in January 1677. With building costs mounting and

provincial taxation remaining high, however, eight years

later, in 1685, the residents withdrew such discretionary

authority from the selectmen, ordering them to "contract no

bargain or engage any sum above Twenty pounds for the

Inhabitants to pay by Rate, without first advising with &

consulting the Town, & having their approbation concerning

the same."10 Springfield residents voiced confidence in

their selectmen during the last quarter of the seventeenth

century by generally reelecting them at regular intervals,

but the town meeting also followed a pattern apparently

prevalent in the colony by reasserting its authority,

particularly in burdensome financial matters.

Persistence was also notable among Westfield's

selectmen after King Philip's War, though a paucity of town

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199 X 1695 X X X XX 1693 1694 1692 1691 X XXX 1690 X XXXXX and and 1691. x^ X x i-z x i-2 X1-4 Two elections were held in 1688. X X 1682- XXX XX 1681 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 XXX X X X X X^ X X^ 1679 1680 X X X 1678 X X 1677 Samuel Root John Sacket, Jr. Thomas Bancroft X David Ashley X Jedediah Dewey Lt. Madsley John Sacket, Sr. John Roote John Ingersoll Ens. Loomis X Josiah Dewey X Source: Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield" No records exist for the year9 1682-1685 Thomas Gun Nathaniel Welar Isaac Phelps X George Phelps

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200 records makes the patterns less readily apparent than in

Springfield. Still, taking into account a complete absence

of records between 1682 and 1685, certain names stick out

among the fifteen men who served as selectmen during the two

decades following King Philip's War. Of that number, nine

were chosen at least twice in a town which elected only

three selectmen per year. Josiah Dewey served at least six

terms between 1677 and 1695, David Ashley five, and Jedediah

Dewey, Nathaniel Weller, and Samuel Root four each. By far

the most prominent Westfield selectman was Isaac Phelps,

elected eleven times, exclusive of the period 1682 to 1685.

Phelps never missed more than one year at a time between

terms and in fact was reelected five years in a row from

1688 through 1693.11 Clearly, Westfield residents did not

repudiate their established leaders. Unfortunately, the

sparse town records provide no further indications of the

political climate in Westfield.

Politics in Northampton followed the same patterns.

The same men who led the town through King Philip's War

continued to exert their influence during the postwar

decades. At the time of the conflict, William Clark

dominated the town's politics; his career as a selectman

stretched from 1661 to 1684, and he served twenty terms in

twenty-three years. Six of the other eight selectmen

elected in 1675 and 1676 finished their careers by the end

of the decade, but the other two, Jonathan Hunt and Medad

Pomeroy, became two of the most persistent town leaders for

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the next fifteen years. In addition, all four of the

subsequent selectmen who first appeared during the late

1670s went on to serve the town repeatedly. John King and

Jonathan Hawley particularly gained the favor of Northampton

voters, but Aaron Cooke and Judadiah Wright also served at

least three terms each.12 Ten new men became selectmen

during the 1680s. Six of them served only one or two terms

each, but the other four, Ebenezer Strong, Joseph Parsons,

Samuel Wright, and Preserved Clapp, were fixtures in the

town leadership well into the 1690s. Strong, Parsons,

Wright, and Clapp, together with Hunt, Pomeroy, King, and

Hawley, dominated elections between the mid-1680s and the

mid-1690s. These eight men held thirty-six of the fifty

seats during that period, and in the ten years, 1685 to

1694, they occupied three or more of the five annual

selectman positions eight times; in two straight years all

of the seats were distributed among the entrenched

leaders.13 No political backlash occurred against the

traditional leadership in Northampton after either King

Philip's War or the Revolution of 1689.

As in the other towns studied, the Northampton town

meeting made an effort to control the power of the

selectmen, but it had done so before the war as well.

Ostensibly to relieve their leaders of the obligations and

burdens incurred in holding the office repeatedly, the

residents in 1674 prohibited their selectmen from serving 14 consecutive terms. Whatever the intent of this order, it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to O X 1695 X XX X X X XX X 1693 1694 XX X X X X 1692 X X X x 1691 X X X XXX X X X X XX X XX X XXX x X X XXXX X X X X XXX X XX 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 X X X X XXX 1681 XXXXX X X X 1679 1680 X 1678 XXXXX XXXXX X X XXX X XXX XXX XX 1675 1676 1677 TABLE 5.3: NORTHAMPTON SELECTMEN Preserved Clapp Preserved S. Allen S. Samuel Wright Samuel Samuel Bartlet Samuel Source: Source: Records Town Northampton Ebenezer Strong Ebenezer Joseph ParsonsJoseph X Deacon Phelps Deacon Parsons John William Holton. Jr. Holton. William Joseph Hawley Joseph Baker Timothy Deacon (William Holton (William Deacon Woodward Henrv Wilton David Thomas StrongThomas Judd Thomas Wright James X. John Clark John T. Lvman JU dadiah Wright dadiah JU Aaron CookeAaron X X John Kina John Cooke Noah Medad Medad Pomeroy John Lyman John John Stebblns Sr. Root. Thomas Hunt John John Bridgman John William Clark William

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 203 clearly did not loosen the hold of the chosen few on the

prominent positions. Each of the powerful selectmen

regularly served terms consecutively or even in strings of

three years at a time, and the voters of Northampton who

consistently returned their leaders to office apparently saw

no need to restrain their terms of service.15 Political

cohesion and continuity reigned in Northampton during the

decades after the Indian war and during the colony's most

politically disruptive period of the seventeenth century.

The towns which were abandoned during the war naturally

had their political processes interrupted. Deerfield, for

instance, was so young in 1675 that no significant degree of

continuity could have developed before the inhabitants fled

down the Connecticut Valley. Furthermore, even while

residents and newcomers began to return to the town during

the 1680s, a court-appointed committee composed of men from

throughout Hampshire County controlled most administrative

matters in Deerfield. Not until 1687 did Deerfield

residents elect a board of local selectmen, who were

assigned to "continue in office until others be Chosen and

they discharged,11 and not until 1689 did the town begin to

hold regular annual elections.16 Six selectmen— William

Smead, Joshua Pomeroy, John Sheldon, Benoni Stebbins,

Benjamin Hastings, and Thomas French— served that first

extended term, but none of them was reelected in 1689, when

Thomas Wells, John Catlin, Jonathan Wells, Samuel Northam,

and Joseph Barnard took over. Although six of these ten

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 204 X X X 1694

X X X 1693* 1689. X XX 1693* X X X 1692 X XX XX 1691 1693. X X X 1690 X X 1689 X X X X X X 1687 1688 the town changed from a pattern of December selectmen served until the next election in 1693 1687 separate elections for the year elections to March elections, thus the occurrence of two The TABLE 5.4: DEERFIELD SELECTMEN *In M arch Simon Beamon X X Source: Melvoin, ed., Deerfield Town Book Samuel NorthamSamson Frary X Henry WhiteJohn Porter X X Edward Allvn Godfrey Nims Joseph Barnard John Allvn David HoytDaniel Beldin Eleazur Hawk X Joshua Pumry John Sheldon Beniamin Hastings Thomas French John Catlin Jonathan Wells X X X Benoni Stebbins Thomas Wells X William Smead

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205

original selectmen served at least one more term during the

early 1690s, the position was not characterized by the

persistence evident in other Connecticut Valley towns. In

fact, in 1692 an entirely new group came into office.17

Deerfield at the time was still building its political

foundations.

A problem inherent in the politics of any town similar

in size and age to Deerfield was the number of necessary

elected municipal offices relative to the number of eligible

adult male residents. In Deerfield, for instance, the

inhabitants annually elected about twenty officeholders out

of some sixty adult men living in the town during the late

seventeenth century. The town meeting in June 1689 claimed

that elections of selectmen could not be carried out

regularly "without greatly burthening some particularr

persons." To ease the burdens incumbent on their town

leaders, the residents agreed to "bind themselves to stand

by them in said office and to obey all such acts and orders

as said Selectmen shall doe and put forth for the good and

benefit of the town provided such acts and orders shal not

be repugnant to the Laws of this Jurisdiction."18

Deerfield townspeople pledged to do their utmost to preserve

political harmony in the town so as to make their

selectmen's tasks as light as possible. The frontier

residents there were too concerned with establishing their

own political order to be influenced by the political

atmosphere of the province at the time. The degree of

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continuity present in town elections elsewhere did not

appear in Deerfield because no basis for cohesion existed

yet, not because the residents of the outpost were

dissatisfied with their leaders. Far from exhibiting

dissatisfaction, Deerfield's inhabitants entered into

sincere agreements, during both resettlement and the initial

stages of redevelopment, to make the administrative

functions of the community run as smoothly as possible.

The only other town included in this study which had

either adequate records or a tenure of existence long enough

to provide any relevant information about a political system

is Groton. Groton's administrative functions, like

Deerfield's, were interrupted by a period of abandonment,

but unlike the Connecticut Valley outpost, Groton residents

had over a full decade of previous political experience to

build on when they returned in 1678. An established and

vital leadership structure developed between 1662 and 1675;

when the town was resettled, and even while they were

scattered, the inhabitants looked to these same leaders for

guidance.

Although Groton residents generally elected between

five and seven selectmen per year, during the period from

1662 to 1676, a total of only sixteen men held the office.

Half of them— John Morse, James Knop, William Longley, John

Page, William Lakin, John Fiske, William Martin, and James

Parker— served five or more terms apiece; Parker won a seat 19 in thirteen of the fifteen years. Most of these men

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resumed positions of sustained leadership during the 1680s.

Parker, Lakin, Morse, and John Lawrence played important

roles in keeping the residents united when they fled Groton

and in organizing the return to the town in 1678. Of the

eight men who predominated during the 1660s and early 1670s,

all except Martin and Fiske went on to serve repeatedly

after the town was resettled, with Parker holding the office

eight times between 1679 and 1689, William Lakin seven

times, Page six, and Knop five.20

These established leaders were joined by ten new

selectmen during the 1680s, but persistence continued to be

a trait among the members of the governing board. Jonas

Prescott and Jonathan Morse, who made their first appearance

in 1680, served seven and five years, respectively, while

Josiah Parker, elected in 1682, held office six times during

the remainder of the decade. The same patterns of

leadership continued into the 1690s, as both persistent

selectmen from the pre-war period and newcomers from the

1680s continued to serve the town. Such familiar names as

James Parker, William Lakin, James Knop, Jonas Prescott, and

Josiah Parker all appeared on Groton selectmen boards in the 21 early 1690s. The length of the careers of some of these

selectmen and the regularity with which they won reelection

suggest no dissatisfaction among Groton's residents with

their established leaders, even during the troubled times of

the late seventeenth century.

Harmony did not always reign supreme in Groton,

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Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. 209 however, and the town meeting took an extreme measure to

ensure that the selectmen served the best interests of the

residents. In December 1680 the meeting created a committee

"to view and to give Instructions to the sellect men to act

in town affaires." The initial committee included James

Parker, Richard Blood, William Lakin, John Lakin, and John

Page; all the them except Page had just completed terms in

office. Some tension arose in the town over the building of

a new meeting house, so the residents instructed the

committee members to help the selectmen "doe what they can

to healle the differences." By the end of the month the

disagreements apparently were settled because the contesting

factions agreed to "forgive each other wheirin we have been

Instrumintall of greiving each other in word or deed" and

"to promote and increase lov and doe nothing to break the 22 peace now mad[e]."

Still, the Groton town meeting continued the practice

of appointing advisory committees composed of former

selectmen to ensure that the current leaders "doe mak and

maintain [peace] and love [one] with another in the 23 town." Groton voters showed their trust m the

established local leaders by reelecting them regularly, but

the townspeople also reacted to potentially divisive issues

by creating a panel to consult with the selectmen prior to

major decisions. This appointive committee structure really

did not take power away from the elected officials because

its members were drawn from the same group which regularly

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served as selectmen. But the presence of these auxiliary

advisors probably made Groton residents feel more certain

that weighty issues would receive greater consideration from

the men in authority.

In spite of the efforts of town meetings across the

colony to reassert their power over their selectmen,

residents remained constant in the local leaders they chose.

With various issues, especially financial matters, magnified

in the aftermath of King Philip's War, townspeople naturally

wanted to have more control over, or at least knowledge of,

decisions which directly affected them. All the while,

however, they repeatedly put their trust in the same men to

order town affairs. In the uneasy years which followed the

conflict, Massachusetts colonists generally looked to

familiar leadership, and they did so on the provincial level

as well as on the town level.

In addition to the legacies left by King Philip's War,

another crisis arose during the 1680s, as the crown

initiated proceedings to revoke the .

The two conflicts, coming as they did, one on the heels of

the other, laid the foundation for political upheaval in the

colony. People were understandably agitated by events of

the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The resulting

tensions became most apparent in the political sphere in

Boston, where the constitutional showdown threatened to

wound the Massachusetts Bay colony gravely.

The internal troubles of the postwar years cannot be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211 separated from the charter controversy, which became a major

concern to Massachusetts residents by the late 1670s. Royal

plans to revoke the charter, which had been removed from

England to the colony in 1630, began early in the

Restoration period at which time the colonial leaders

expressed the belief that "the pattent (under God) [was] the

first and maine foundation of our civil politye here." The

General Court in 1661 maintained that the charter provided

"full power and authoritie, both legislative and execcutive"

for the government of the colony, "without appeale,

excepting lawe or lawes repugnant to the lawes of England."

As long as they stayed within the laws of the realm,

Massachusetts legislators proclaimed "any imposition

prejudiciall to the country . . . to be an infringement of 24 our right." From an early date, Massachusetts residents

considered the rights laid out in the charter to be supreme

in the colony.

Complaints sounded from various offices in the imperial

system about the colony's presumption, and most of the

objections revolved ultimately around the subject of trade.

Governor Lord Vaughan of Jamaica, for example, suggested to

the Committee for Trade and Plantations in September 1675

that perhaps the time was ripe for the king to take action

against Massachusetts' refusal to obey trade restrictions,

"the Indians being in rebellion . . . and not like to be

reduced" in the near future. The committee concurred. "The

present laws of the Massachusetts are so different from the

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laws of England, and the government so arbitrary," noted the

lords, "that it occasions murmuring among all sorts of

people." They further charged that the provincial leaders

hoarded power and that the people had no real voice in the 25 annual elections. The colony's most ardent and perhaps

most dangerous enemy was Edward Randolph, an agent for the

crown who came to Boston in the mid-1670s to report on the

merits of the allegations. One month after Metacom's death,

Randolph reported to the king that Governor Leverett

considered crown and parliamentary directives meaningless if

they contradicted the colony's interests and accused him of

stating "that all matters in difference are to be concluded

by their final1 determination, without appeal to your

Majestie."26 So the charter controversy began, as

Massachusetts' enemies took the opportunity provided by the

confusion surrounding King Philip's War to compile evidence

against the colony.

The General Court recognized the danger, and as soon as

the Indian threat was extinguished, the Massachusetts

government turned to counter the royal challenge, not with

force as against the natives but rather with an act of

courtesy. In October 1677, the court sent King Charles a

gift of ten barrels of cranberries, two hogsheads of

"speciall good sampe," and three thousand codfish. Leverett

petitioned the king to accept the native commodities of the

region as a sign of Massachusetts's good faith and earnest

desire "to repell those false clamours which have been layd

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213

before your majesty against us by some that have not binn

well affected to us, nor to your majesties service with us."

He assured the crown that the colony remained "at all times

religiously observant of our duty to God, and [loyal] to 27 your majesty, our king." The wording of Leverett's

assurance may have contained some underlying significance;

orthodox Puritans placed their loyalty to God above their

loyalty to the king and viewed the charter in almost

religious terms, as the sanction for their errand into the

wilderness. With a battle over their charter brewing,

Leverett and the members of the General Court attempted to

mollify the king's suspicions while subtly affirming the

order of their priorities.

One year after sending the gifts to England, the

General Court took an even more conciliatory tone in

addressing the king. Massachusetts authorities expressed a

hope that the crown would "receve no impressions from any

that, for their own evill ends, shall endeavor (by false &

mistaken reports) to represent us as affecting & aspiring to

a greatnes independent [of] your majestie's soveraignty over

us, or incompatable with the duty of good & loyall subjects

to a most gratious king, in whose prosperity wee most

heartily rejoyce, & for which wee dayly pray."28 Clearly

on the retreat, at least in the image they hoped to present

in England, the court also wrote to its agents in London

approving a "declaration of our readiness to amend any thing

which, through ignorance or neglect in any kinde, wee have

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transgressed the rules given us by his majesty in our

charter, and to begg his pardon for the same." Apparently

this propitiatory approach proved successful, at least for a

time, for by early 1682 the General Court reported to its

agents and John Richards that the king had

"gratiously intimated . . . that he hath no intention to

violate or infringe our charter." Therefore, Dudley and

Richards were to cooperate with the Privy Council, thereby

assuring "the continuance of his majesty's grace and favour

toward us, who have alwayes endeavoured to approove

ourselves his majesty's most loyall subjects, & promoters of

his Crowne & dignitie."29

While the provincial government worked to mend fences

with royal authorities, however, well-known and outspoken

colonists continued to make inflammatory statements. "By

our Pattent," wrote the Reverend Samuel Nowell in 1683, for

instance, "we have full and absolute power to rule and

governe, pardon and punish, etc."30 With the likes of

Edward Randolph lurking around Boston, reports of such

sentiments certainly found their way across the Atlantic and

hurt the colony's attempts to save the charter from royal

abrogation.

In June 1683 the Lords of Trade received from Randolph

a list of seventeen "Articles against the Government of

Boston." The list contained a wide variety of indictments,

from the matter of the colony setting up its own "Publick

mint" to "imprison[ing] his Majesties Officers for doing

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their Dutyes." Among the offenses cited was a complaint

against the license supposedly afforded to the

Congregational churches by the charter. "They impose upon

the Consciencyes of his Majesties Subjects in matters of

Religion," Randolph accused, "by their Lawes Ecclesiasticall

being repugnant to the Lawes of England."31 On July 20,

1683, the lords issued a writ of against the

Massachusetts charter, noting "some and misdemeanors"

committed by the elected officials in the colony. However,

if the colony made "a full submission and entire resignation

to our pleasure," the lords offered to preserve the charter

and only "regulate [it] in such manner as shall be for our

service and the good of that our colony, without any other

alterations then such as wee shall find necessary for the

better support of our government there."32 Massachusetts

officials were faced with the choice of submitting to the

crown's proceedings and hoping for the best or of fighting

the challenge and risking the complete loss of the charter.

A debate ensued among the leaders of the colony in

Boston in January 1684. The most forceful voices in the

debate were those of the orthodox leaders, particularly

Increase Mather, who likened the struggle over the charter

to the battle against the Indians; both the hostile natives

and the royal challengers represented forces of evil

threatening the holy mission in New England. Thus, just as

the effort to withstand the Indian attacks came to represent

a reflection of the Puritans' spiritual worthiness, the

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colonial clergy portrayed resistance to the suit against the

charter as another test of their religious fortitude. The

two challenges were twin prongs in the campaign between good

and evil. In reference to the advice of the Lords of Trade

that Massachusetts surrender its charter voluntarily for

alteration, Mather warned the freemen of the colony that

"wee shall sin against God if wee vote an affirmative to

it." Just as numerous lay and religious leaders exhorted

their followers to place their complete faith in the

Almighty during King Philip's War, Mather advised his fellow

colonists in 1684 to "keep ourselves still in the hands of

God, and Trust ourselves with his providence."33

While refusing to relinquish their charter, colonial

officials continued to maintain their innocence against

accusations of political and administrative improprieties.

"Not being conscious to ourselves that wee have wittingly

donn anything to the just offence of your majesty thro our

weakness and ignorance," the General Court wrote to the king

in October 1684, "we beleive £ readily acknowledge wee may

have committed some unwilling errors or mistakes." To show

remorse, the members of the court pledged, "wee prostrate

ourselves at your majesty's feet, humbly begging and

imploring your majesties free pardon & forgiveness, with the

continuance of our charter & priviledges therein conteyned.11

In a subsequent letter they asked royal authorities to

disregard "the many ill representations & informations that

lye against us" and to believe that "we are true lovers of

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Such deferential and conciliatory missives fell on deaf

ears; on October 23, 1684, the crown officially revoked the

Massachusetts charter.

The battle over the charter was not merely fought

between contending forces separated by the Atlantic Ocean.

Even within Massachusetts influential colonists differed in

their approach to the problem, and political factionalism

became a hallmark of the postwar period. In fact, the most

conservative group, consisting of orthodox Puritans who

adhered to the old, established order in politics as well as

religion, became known simply as "the faction." Men such as

Increase Mather, Leverett, and Thomas Danforth led the

opposition to any alteration in the charter. The colony

also contained a group of "moderates," also generally well

known and pious, who believed that they represented a more

realistic position than that of the intransigent faction.

Simon Bradstreet, Peter Bulkeley, and William Stoughton,

among others, saw the futility in complete opposition to the

crown and preferred to compromise in order to gain as

advantageous a settlement as possible, both for themselves

and for the colony. Finally, a small but powerful group of

"prerogative men" stood ready to carry the crown's cause

against the conservative elements in the colony. This

group, consisting largely of royal appointees and other

recent immigrants, was led by Edmund Randolph and Joseph

Dudley.35 These three parties vied to influence the crown

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during the proceedings over the charter's fate and during

the subsequent establishment of the .

Randolph and his royalist party blamed the orthodox

clergy for all of the opposition to the crown. He claimed

that the elected government of the colony was composed of

"inconsiderable mechanics packed by the prevailing party of

factious ministry," whom he found "generally inclined to

sedition, being proud, ignorant, and imperious." Governor

Edward Cranfield of echoed Randolph's opinion

of the Massachusetts clergy and described as

a breeding ground for "pernicious and rebellious

principles." "From this source all the towns . . . are

supplied with factious and seditious preachers," Cranfield

reported, "who stir up the people to dislike of the King, of

his Government and of the ."36 The clergy

seemed to be most influential in the lower house of the

assembly, among the deputies; in December 1683, a group of

magistrates wrote to Sir Leoline Jenkins in England that the

"major part of the [upper house] have for weeks contended

and voted to submit to the King's pleasure rather than

contest with him in a court of law" but could "by no means

prevail with the Deputies." The signers of the letter

included such moderates as Bulkeley, Bradstreet, Nathaniel

Saltonstall, , James Russell, Stoughton,

and William Brown. Randolph related the same state of

affairs to the king. A majority of the magistrates, "men of

the best estates, were for an entire submission." Those of

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the upper house who opposed alteration of the charter he

described as men "of inconsiderable fortunes but factious

spirits;" likewise, he characterized the deputies as

"mostly an inferior sort of planters."37

According to Randolph, at least, the economic as well

as religious positions of political leaders influenced the

way they aligned themselves on the charter issue. Perhaps

this observation had some merit. Magistrates, more than

deputies, tended to be socially and financially prominent in

the colony, reflecting their more distinguished political

position, and therefore they had more to gain from a smooth

transition from the old charter government to royal

administration. Moderates saw the triumph of the crown's

will as inevitable. They wanted to minimize the trauma to

the colonial system and to their position within it.

Deputies, on the other hand, relied more closely on the

local nature of their prominence and were more directly

responsible to the neighbors who chose them. Their actions

therefore were more likely to reflect popular sentiments.

By the mid-1680s, this factionalism and the ultimate

fate of the charter gave the voters a new perspective on

some of the magistrates they had regularly elected in

previous years. In the spring of 1684, Randolph reported

that the citizenry was dissatisfied with the views expressed

by some of the more prominent moderates, and indeed, in the

May elections that year, Dudley, Brown, and Gedney lost

their seats in the upper house. Bulkeley and Stoughton, in

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reaction and as a show of sympathy for their fellow

magistrates, resigned their positions and "refused to

serve."38 These election results represented by far the

largest turnover in the upper house during the decades

immediately preceding or following King Philip's War and

distinctly reflected the political dissatisfaction stemming

from the charter controversy.

If the behavior of the moderate magistrates

dissatisfied Massachusetts voters, the establishment of the

Dominion of New England under Sir Edmund Andros caused them

unparalleled consternation. While division existed within

the colony over the charter question, the residents were

more unified, at least eventually, in their opposition to

the newly imposed government. When Andros arrived in 1686,

he delivered his royal commission requiring "all officers &

ministers civill and Millitary and all other inhabitants of

our said Territory and Dominion to be obedient Aiding and

Assisting unto" him.39 The wording and intent of the

commission offended New Englanders, especially those of the

"faction." "It would require a long summer's-day to relate

the miseries which were come, and coming in upon poor

New-England, by reason of the arbitrary government then 40 imposed on" the colony, wrote Cotton Mather. Indeed, the

lists of complaints against the Andros regime were many and

protracted, but they all revolved around a set of basic

offenses.

Among his administrative abuses, members of both the

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"faction" and the moderate group complained that the

governor neglected the advice of his councillors who knew

the country and relied instead upon "the advice only of a

few others, the principal of them Strangers to the Countrey,

without Estates or Interest therein." Furthermore, many of

these close advisors were "persons of known and declared

Prejudice against [the colony], and that had plainly laid

their chiefest Designs and Hopes to make unreasonable

profit" from their involvement in the Dominion. To prevent

the citizenry from voicing opposition to this arbitrary

method of administering the government, Andros limited the

number of town meetings to one per year. In addition, under

the Andros regime, "the publick Ministry of the Gospel, and

all Schools of Learning, were discountenanced unto the 41 Utmost." The colonists had already lost their cherished

charter and then the new royal governor came in and attacked

two of their most honored institutions, popular government,

including the town meeting, and the influential clergy.

Probably the most serious scenes of opposition arose,

however, when the Dominion government began to threaten

their estates.

Andros and his favorites, at least in the opinion of

many colonists, "for the enriching themselves on the ruins

of New England, did invade the property as well as liberty"

of the inhabitants. With the charter legally revoked, the

governor declared Massachusetts land patents defective,

"under the pretence of [the property] belonging to king

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James," regardless of what the landowners considered "honest

and just and true titles to [their] land."42 The granting

of land under the old charter probably was inconsistent with

royal policy, but New Englanders reacted strongly to fears

that they would have their land taken from them or that they

would have to pay exhorbitant processing fees and quitrents

to keep it. Samuel Sewall expressed the disquietude of the

people over threats to their landholdings in a 1688 letter

to Increase Mather, who was in London at the time. "The

generality of People are very averse from complying with any

thing that may alter the Tenure of their lands," he stated,

reflecting that Massachusetts colonists were not prepared to

give up their property to the regime which had already

robbed them of their political institutions.43

The attack on land titles combined with increased

taxation under Andros to raise the popular voice against the

Dominion. High taxes resulting from King Philip’s War still

burdened the colony when Andros arrived, so his seemingly

arbitrary levies, demanded without consulting an assembly,

further alarmed the colonists. The governor ordered new

taxes based on rates of one penny per pound of estate value

plus twenty pence per poll, in addition to stricter import

and excise duties. The manner in which these taxes were

levied, "without the consent of the people either by

themselves or by an assembly," led many towns and their

selectmen to resist collecting the authorized rates.

One such town was , in Essex County. Although

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not alone in its refusal, Ipswich was singled out by the

Andros regime as an example to the others. The proceedings,

however, did more to raise hard feelings against the

governor than to compel compliance to his orders. When the

Ipswich selectmen argued that taxes levied without the

approval of an elected assembly violated English law, John

West, one of Andros's imported councillors, scornfully

answered that the colonists "must not think the Lawes of

England follow [them] to the Ends of the Earth." As

disobedient subjects who refused the instructions of a royal

governor, "you have no more priviledges Left you than not to

be sould for slaves," West informed the defendents in a

pre-trial hearing.

The selectmen, , John Appleton, John Andrews,

Robert Kinsman, William Goodhow, and Thomas French, were

then tried by a panel of judges composed of Joseph Dudley,

William Stoughton, Edward Randolph, John Usher, and George

Farewell. Chief judge Dudley, in a ploy "that pleased

himself . . . more than the people," harangued the jury on

their duty to convict the defendents. "I am glad (says he)

ther be so many worthie Gentlemen of the Jury so Capable to

do the King service, and we Expect a good verdict from you,

seeing the matter hath been so sufficiently proved against

the CriminalIs." 44 The jury fulfilled its charge,

convicting the defendents, fining them, barring them from

holding office, and requiring them to post bond for their

good behavior.

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While opposition to the revocation of the charter and

the Dominion government was often expressed in religious

terms, attacks on the colonists' property and purses were

the real issues which spurred hard feelings against

Andros.45 Citizens and selectmen had resisted the multiple

tax rates which resulted from King Philip's War, but they

had always based their actions on financial hardship and

inability— real or contrived— to meet the unprecedented

demands. These protests generally took place in hopes of

winning abatements from the General Court until conditions

improved. Financial difficulties still prevented full

compliance with tax levies during the late 1680s, at least

in the view of many town selectmen across the colony, but

Andros provided further basis for opposition by employing

means which the colonists considered illegal.46 The manner

in which his councillors flaunted their power in the faces

of the Ipswich defendents could only have the effect of

exacerbating a people already disgruntled over issues of

taxation.

Massachusetts residents also doubted the governor's

intentions for the good of New England, especially in his

dealings with the enemies of the colonies and of the errand.

Fear that Andros might deal with the natives of the region,

even to the point of encouraging them to attack the colonies

anew, gave the colonists another reason to believe that the

political difficulties which afflicted them during the 1680s

were just a continuation of their time of trials which began

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with King Philip's War. In fact, suspicion that Andros

favored the Indians over the colonists dated back at least

to the closing stages of the war, when he was the governor

of New York; in fact, Massachusetts suspicions of Andros

and his manipulation of the Indian situation were accurate.

On August 15, 1676, John Pynchon warned Governor Leverett

that most of the surviving natives from the Massachusetts

frontier had "drawn off toward Albany, where they are

harbored under Andros, his government." "We shall be in

danger to be continually disturbed," warned Pynchon, as long 47 as Andros chose to "harbor our enemies." Thus, distrust

of the governor's Indian policies preceded him to Boston.

When serious hostilities broke out in Maine in 1688,

many colonists complained that Andros "delayed and neglected

all that was necessary for the publick defence." In doing

so, he reportedly "manifested a most furious displeasure

against those of the council, and all others" who showed

concern "for the security of the inhabitants." The force he

finally sent to the Maine frontier proved ineffective;

"there were more of the poor people [colonists] killed than

they had enemies there alive," Cotton Mather wrote later,

and yet the governor's forces, led by royal officers, could

not track down the hostile natives. Quite understandably,

"this added not a little to the dissatisfaction of the

people."48 Not only did Andros seem to sympathize with the

natives, but accusations also surfaced, after the fact, that

the governor even fraternized with the enemy. At least one

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colonist testified that on one occasion Andros got drunk

with four Indian women in Maine, allegedly enemies, and gave 49 them powder and shot.

Drinking with Indians was bad enough, but Massachusetts

colonists came to suspect that Andros had formulated "a Plot

to bring in the Indians upon us." Keeping in mind the

upheaval caused by King Philip's War, certain Massachusetts

leaders found "it was easy unto us to conceive, How

serviceable another Indian War might have been to the

Designs" of those working for the Dominion. According to

the various indictments, Andros "hired . . . Indians to kill

the English," released enemy Indians captured in the

colonies, and negotiated with French Canadians and Mohawks

"to take the Country in possession for the King of

France."50 Although some of these accusations, including

reports of his revelry with Indian maidens, may have

represented exaggerations or even fabrications used to

support the successful revolution in retrospect, they

nonetheless exhibited how deeply Massachusetts residents

distrusted Andros's Indian dealings and thus how the

colonists connected his political regime to the native

threat they thought they had defeated a decade earlier.

Although Metacom had been killed in 1676, some colonists saw

in Andros his political successor in the work against the

New England mission living in Boston in 1686.

Just as New Englanders eliminated the Indian opposition

of the 1670s, they saw both a duty and a necessity in

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removing the threat posed by Sir Edmund Andros and his

regime. By the spring of 1689, revolution brewed in the

region, especially as reports of the Glorious Revolution

spread through the colonies, in spite of the governor's

efforts to suppress the news.51 Neither Andros nor anyone

else could stop the momentum once it began. In fact, by

April 18, five moderate members of the governor's Council

were moved to the point of taking part in the revolt, as

some "principal gentlemen in Boston," described by Cotton

Mather as "Considerate Persons," took charge of the mob

agitating for Andros' overthrow. These veterans of

Massachusetts politics saw trouble approaching, and they

decided to head off violence and bloodshed by taking charge

"with a Declaration accordingly prepared."52 As moderates

they reacted to a potentially chaotic political situation in

1689 with the same pragmatism they exhibited during the

charter crisis earlier in the decade. In both instances,

the moderates saw changes coming and wanted to guide affairs

toward the smoothest solution possible.

Fifteen men signed the declaration demanding Andros's

surrender of the government. The presence of such moderate

leaders as , William Stoughton, Samuel

Shrimpton, Bartholemew Gedney, and William Brown gave a

solid foundation to a group which also included such New

England traditionalists as Simon Bradstreet and Thomas

Danforth. Their declaration of grievances contained a

warning to Andros that although they were "surprized with

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the Peoples sudden taking of Arms . . . whereof we were

wholly ignorant," the popular leaders expected him to

cooperate in order to prevent bloodshed. As justification,

they cited the "Illegal . . . Malicious and Unreasonable"

nature of the colony's treatment by royal officials from the

time the crown vacated the Massachusetts charter. In

addition to reciting and describing in detail the list of

specific grievances held against the regime, the declaration

expressed a strong resentment about "Strangers" and "Haters

of the People" being given a virtual license to exploit the

colonists. "Accordingly," the signers declared, "we have

been treated with multiplied Contradictions to Magna Charta,

the Rights of which we laid claim unto."53 Therefore, they

felt justified in abolishing the illegitimate and arbitrary

regime.

Furthermore, New Englanders could point to King

William's invasion as justification for their actions. The

news from England finally spurred the colonists to action,

according to one apologist, and they naturally associated

Andros with King James, "who had invaded both the liberty

and property of English protestants." 5 4 To the extreme

members of the "faction" and even to many moderates who

originally cooperated with the governor, the Dominion of New

England had come to represent an annoying extension of King

James's unpopular rule. Edward Randolph blamed the

political upheaval of the times on "a violent and bloudy

zeal stir'd up in the Rabble acted and managed by the

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preachers," but members of the governor's own council also

played leading roles in the revolts and in the

twenty-six-member Council of Safety established on April 20

to administer the government of Massachusetts until

instructions for a settlement arrived from England.55

A great deal of political tension existed on the

provincial level during the 1680s, and the fulcrum of the

dissent was an effort to remove an overbearing royal

presence in Boston. Although factionalism existed within

the colony, especially over the fate of the charter, the

real enemy resided across the Atlantic. Still, the

disquietude was connected to other internal concerns because

many colonists, especially orthodox Puritans, viewed the

Dominion as a continuation of attacks unleashed by the

forces of evil against the New England mission. First in

the series, of course, was the tumult of King Philip's War.

The Indian conflict was connected to the Revolution of 1689

in that both occurrences alerted New Englanders to outside

threats, but not in the sense that the tension which

resulted from the war necessarily led New Englanders to

challenge their traditional political order. In fact, the

colonists showed a preference to maintain or return to

familiar patterns of leadership throughout the period, on

the provincial level as well as in local politics.

Although colonists in distant frontier communities for

the most part played no direct role in the Boston revolt of

April 18, 1689, they largely gave their assent to the action

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in retrospect. On May 2, the Council of Safety requested

that the towns in the colony give "farther consultation and

Advice" on the current political situation, and the replies

came back overwhelmingly in favor not only of Andros'

repudiation but also of resuming the former charter

government. Fifty-four towns sent representatives to Boston

by May 22 to signify their approval of the rebellion; forty

of them carried instructions to call for the return of the

governor and assistants elected in May 1686, according to

the old charter rights. Such optimistic declarations came

from all over the colony, and the frontier towns were no

exception. The town meetings of Springfield, Westfield,

Deerfield, and Lancaster all echoed the sentiments of

Northampton's residents that the government officials of

1686 "should be Continued in or Reassume their former Power

for the year ensuying unlesse orders Come from England to

the Contrary."56

The Council of Safety reacted cautiously to the

recommendations; the councillors apparently had no

opposition to turning the reins of government over to the

deputies of 1686, and many of them served on both bodies,

but they also recognized the potential danger in arbitrarily

declaring the charter revived. Even though James II no

longer sat on the throne, the councillors prudently

acknowledged that the charter had been legally revoked, at

least in the eyes of royal authorities. To assuage their

own citizens without offending the crown, the Council in May

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1689 agreed to reinstate the officials "chosen and Sworn

in . . . according to our Charter Rights . . . Hoping that

all People will rest Satisfied till we have Confirmation

from the Crown of England which we daily hope for."57

Simon Bradstreet, the elected governor of 1686 and the

president of the new provisional government of 1689, wrote

to King William for the whole Massachusetts legislature,

assuring him that the actions taken were only temporary and

employed as expedients because of familiarity, "until

further directions should arrive from England."58 Most

colonists probably wished that no further directions would

appear and that the crown would leave them alone to enjoy

their preferred mode of administration.

Just as colonists exhibited a marked preference for the

familiar in the leaders they chose on the town level and in

the charter government/ Massachusetts voters also largely

elected trusted men to the provincial offices after 1689.

This trend was somewhat difficult to distinguish on the

deputy level, since many towns, both before and after the

revolution, sent representatives irregularly, if at all.

New and relatively new frontier towns especially often could

not afford the expense of sending deputies to the General

Court sessions which met at various times throughout the

year, and many colonists had personal concerns at home which

made service in Boston burdensome. While larger,

established towns like Springfield and Northampton could

generally support a deputy each year, other towns like

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Groton, Westfield, and Lancaster did so only 59 sporadically. Outposts so recently established as

Deerfield or Northfield were not represented in the Chamber

of Deputies.

The same patterns continued during the last decade of

the seventeenth century. Frontier outposts still elected

representatives irregularly, if at all; between 1689 and

1699, for instance, Deerfield sent members to the General

Court only three times and Lancaster did so only five times.

In towns which did choose deputies annually, traditional

leaders surfaced in the provincial elections. During the

decade between King Philip's War and the establishment of

the Dominion of New England, Springfield voters most

consistently elected Elizur Holyoke, Samuel Marshfield, and

Joseph Pynchon. Marshfield and Holyoke had long careers as

town selectmen. In addition, Holyoke was a brother-in-law

of the powerful John Pynchon, while Joseph was the major's

son. During the decade after the revolution, Springfield

representatives included Henry Chapin, whose career as a

selectman began in 1670, John Holyoke, Elizur's son, John

Hitchcock, another long-time selectman, and John Pynchon

III.60 The Springfield deputy elections represented an

example of the colonists' preference for familiar leaders on

the provincial level.

The provisional government created in 1689 continued

until 1692 when the new royal governor, Sir William Phips,

arrived in Boston with his commission. The old charter was

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dead, and Massachusetts colonists finally had to admit it.

"It was not in the King's Power to Reverse the Judgment

against the Old Charter," admitted Increase Mather;

"nevertheless, his Majesty had Power to Re-incorporate his

Subjects, thereby granting them a New Charter, which should

contain all the Old, with New and more Ample Priviledges."

Actually, the new charter placed certain restrictions on the

colony. The crown approved Massachusetts's representative

legislature, for instance, but with a governor appointed in

London instead of elected in Boston. In addition, the

franchise became based entirely on property requirements

rather than upon church membership, and after 1692, final

approval of colonial laws clearly rested with crown

officials. Massachusetts residents could no longer claim to

possess their own Magna Charta. Even Increase Mather

realistically came to agree with certain Privy Councillors

who advised "that it was not only Lawfull, but, all

Circumstances considered, a Duty to submit to what was now

offered."61 Although this charter did not provide all that

some colonists had hoped, they were pleased to have

confirmation of their removal of the arbitrary Dominion

government.

Twenty-eight men served on the first appointed colonial

council named under the new charter; thereafter councillors

stood for election every year. Between 1692 and 1695, a

total of forty-five men held the office, and even though the

reconstructed body contained members from the former

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Plymouth Colony, Maine, and the northeastern coast, sixteen

of that number had served as Assistants in the Bay Colony

before 1686. Furthermore, thirteen of them won reelection

repeatedly after 1692, serving an average of nearly fifteen

years apiece. Samuel Sewall, an Assistant from 1684 to

1686, went on to hold a seat on the Council for thirty-four

years. Other former magistrates, including John Hawthorne,

Elisha Hutchinson, Isaac Addington, and William Browne,

served terms of twenty years or more.62 Increase Mather

expressed confidence in the councillors of the 1690s,

proclaiming ‘'every man of them is a Friend to New England,

and to the Churches and Interest of Christ therein."

Regardless of the merits of his appraisal, Increase's son

Cotton accurately commended Massachusetts voters because

"they wisely made few Alterations in their Annual Elections;

and they thereby shew'd their Satisfaction in the wise and

good Conduct of those whom they had Elected."63 Other

councillors, who had served under Andros, were not as

fortunate. Actually, ten of the council members who sat

during the early 1690s also sat during the Dominion period,

but four of them came from Plymouth. Of the six from the

Bay Colony, five redeemed themselves by participating in the

revolutionary group which demanded Andros' surrender in

1689. John Pynchon, who served under Andros and did not

take part in the revolt, went on to hold a council seat

during the 1690s, but his case was atypical. Most of his

colleagues who did not come out publicly against the

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Dominion regime did not again hold a provincial public

office.64 Thus, even on the highest elective level after

1689, Massachusetts colonists showed a preference for

familiar, trusted leaders.

The political upheaval of the late seventeenth century

in Massachusetts was connected to the upheaval of King

Philip's War in that both represented efforts to eliminate

outside threats to the colony's accustomed and cherished

mode of existence. The Indians supposedly attempted to

destroy the Puritan errand into the wilderness while the

Dominion of New England served as the means of abolishing

the charter upon which the mission was based. Therefore,

the colonists faced a constant struggle between 1675 and

1689 to restore order as they knew it.65 But the

accumulated chaos of the postwar years did not make

Massachusetts residents repudiate their established

political leaders; instead, in the effort to deal with the

legacies of the period, colonists turned to selectmen,

deputies, and councillors they knew they could trust.

If any repudiation of established leadership occurred

during the postwar years, it did so in the militia.

Indiscipline within the colonial military appeared during

the war, as Massachusetts officials expressed concern over

their inability to recruit sufficient numbers of troopers.

Even during the war, many colonists denied the necessity of

serving in the militia and their duty of contributing to the

military goals of the colony. Fighting Indians became

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unpopular in some areas even before Metacom's defeat; when

the necessity of defense continued after 1676, unpopularity

in some cases turned into open insubordination.

As early as September 1675, Secretary Edward Rawson

reported "much dampened . . . spirits for the war. Some men

escape away from the press," he wrote, "and others hide away

after they are impressed." Such aversion to military

service lowered morale in the ranks, as "plaine Contempt"

resulted in "the Publicke Service and safety [being]

neglected in such a perilous day."66 The end of the war

against King Philip did not bring an end to the threat to

the colonial frontier, and it certainly did not end the

efforts of colonists to evade military service. While

hostile natives remained on the eastern frontier in Maine

throughout the late 1670s and 1680s, many Massachusetts men

showed their displeasure at having to defend what they

considered a distant and desolate region by devising new

ways of dodging conscription. In 1679, for instance, to

combat the practice of potential soldiers who constantly

travelled back and forth between two or more towns to avoid

militia calls, the General Court prohibited men from moving

without first obtaining registration certificates from the

corresponding local officers.67 Colonial authorities thus

had to engage in a virtual cat-and-mouse game to commandeer

troopers for the frontier defenses after King Philip's War.

Discontent within the ranks deepened during the 1680s,

especially under the Andros regime. Militiamen in Maine

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complained of unfamiliar British regular army officers

forced upon them by the governor, and rumors ran rampant

through the ranks that Andros would "Sacrifice 'em" to their

combined native and French enemies. As soon as the

opportunity arose, in April 1689, the soldiers "seized their

officers and sent them home prisoners." Dissatisfaction

centered on Lt. John Jordan, one of Andros' imported

officers, who admitted to striking several militiamen for

their indiscipline and disrespect toward him and other

appointees. Although Jordan claimed that the "charges of

cruelty [against him] are malicious lies," his soldiers

seized him, further complaining that he "intended to go to

New France."68

After the rebellion in Boston toppled the Andros

regime, the troopers already in Maine generally abandoned

their posts, and the provisional government could not

recruit other soldiers to replace them. "Some questioned

their pay, some the authority for the press," a contemporary

reported, "and few or none went." Even after the removal of

Jordan and the other regular army officers, problems with

discipline continued in the region. In October 1689, John

Swayne complained that the soldiers on duty in Maine were "a

company of prayerless people" who constantly absented

themselves and regularly disregarded orders. He asked that

the General Court take "a Speedy & Severe course . . . with

Such persons."69 Severe punishment, however, was not the

solution to the long-term problem. Discontent in the

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militia erupted most notably on the Maine frontier in 1689,

but throughout the colony the system suffered from the

dissatisfaction which began during King Philip’s War.

During the war, the colonial government attempted to

establish firm control over the militia. In October 1675,

the General Court issued a set of "Lawes and ordinances of

war . . . for the better regulating their forces, and

keeping theire souldiers to theire duty." These

instructions prohibited such abuses as negligence of duty,

disobedience to superior officers, or unexcused absence on

pain of corporal punishment or even death.70 Civil and

military officials attempted to stem the problems which

existed in the ranks through the threat or use of strict

discipline, but religious leaders also exhorted militiamen

to recognize their obligations.

Rev. Samuel Nowell, for example, reminded citizens that

military training was "a commendable practice, yea of Duty

of Great Consequence." He pointed out that only through

"Frequent Trainings" and the establishment of "military

Discipline" could soldiers "be ready and expert for

War, . . . a Duty," according to Nowell, "which God

expecteth" of His followers. Furthermore, he indicted those

who took their responsibilities lightly; "they are greatly

to blame that do neglect it, or slight over it, [or] do not

make conscience of it."71 Nowell, and other clergymen,

reminded eligible men that they had not only a legal

obligation to answer the calls of their militia committees,

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crusade against the physical forces of evil in the world.

The orthodox clergy continued its perceived function of

guiding and directing the citizenry into proper channels of

unified, responsible, communal activity, and preachers like

Nowell and the Mathers expected the colonists to fall into

line.

One problem which plagued colonial militia companies

was that the soldiers, in the words of John Pynchon, "much

desire & Insist upon it, to have Commission officers of

their owne, . . . such as they know."72 Just as in the

area of taxation, Massachusetts colonists turned against any

hint of outside authority which appeared to threaten local

autonomy in militia affairs. Although only the General

Court could actually appoint commissioned officers,

provincial law permitted active militiamen and militia

committees to choose nominees for the positions, and the

soldiers guarded this privilege closely. Traditionally,

colonial officials dared not reject the soldiers'

nominations.73 But in the decades after King Philip's War

a high degree of turnover occurred in the local officers

corps, for various reasons, and many of the elections of the

period attracted unusual attention.

Admittedly, much of the turnover resulted from natural

attrition. Across the colony, in towns from the coast to

the Connecticut Valley, local militia officers asked to be

relieved of their positions after the war. In Springfield,

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for instance, Ens. Benjamin Cooley petitioned the General

Court, in May 1679, for permission "to lay downe his place,

being aged & deafe." Likewise, about the same time,

Lt. Samuel Smith of Hadley complained of "being very aged &

weake, & not . . . so well able to dischardge [his] military 74 trust as heeretofore." The Court granted these and

similar requests.

Many incidents of local tension and dissension,

however, interrupted the flow of militia affairs during the

period. Hingham militiamen, for example, elected Lt. John

Smith their captain and Ens. Jeremiah Coall their lieutenant

on October 11, 1682, but the selection of an ensign caused

contention among the voters. The older members of the

company supported Sgt. Thomas Andrews, who had a good record

of service, while the younger men voted for James Hawk, who

"never was in any office, but a privatt souldier." Hawk won

a small majority, but Andrews’s supporters petitioned the

General Court to overturn this election. Finally, on March

17, 1683, was chosen ensign, apparently as a 75 compromise. A similar incident occurred m Topsfield.

Sometime during the late 1670s, Ens. John Gould lost his

commission due to "some uncomfortable misunderstandings

amongst" members of the company, but in March 1679 his

comrades reported that the troubles had been solved and

asked the General Court to reinstate him "to his former

Commission or an higher." The court agreed. By 1686 Gould,

by then a lieutenant, again fell into trouble, leading "a

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Riotous Muster" against service to the Dudley regime. He

was arrested, fined £50, and released on bond for good

behavior.76 In Enfield, "the next place to Springfield,"

the soldiers elected a lieutenant for their company in 1689,

although the small size of the band did not entitle them to

a full complement of commissioned officers. When Maj. John

Pynchon challenged the election, the ringleaders, or "at

least one that was the mouth," answered that "they had

chosen commissioned officers and them they would obey."

Pynchon, the commander of the Hampshire County regiment,

asked the government in Boston to support him in putting

down this insurgency.77 All three of these incidents, and

others like them, indicated the existence of dissension and

disdain for authority within the militia ranks after King

Philip's War. Many of the soldiers involved were openly

defiant of the status quo, and the older, established

leaders naturally became alarmed at this development.

The most serious upheaval occurred in the town of

Northampton, one of the most secure towns in the Connecticut

Valley. In 1689, when the provincial government attempted

to turn the clock back by reinstating or reaffirming

officeholders of 1686 across the colony, certain members of

the Northampton militia company turned against their former

elected officers in favor of a new generation of leaders.

"At Northampton Sergeant [John] King cavilled about my

Power," Pynchon complained to the governor and Council, and

the disruption quickly reached mutinous proportions. King,

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with his allies, Medad Pomeroy and Preserved Clapp,

attempted to convince their comrades to reject the board

which consisted of Capt. Aaron Cooke, Lt. Joseph Hawley, and

Ens. Timothy Baker, and in general, the dissidents "bid

defiance to the old Commission[ed] officers." The two

ringleaders displayed "such a height of Pride," said

Pynchon, "that nothing would or could be done by or from my

orders & direction."78 The major reported that "on many

accounts" militia affairs were "in no good posture," because

King's insubordination in Northampton had spread to other

towns in the region; the upheaval "disquieted some others

that were quiet before" and filled the plotters with

confidence that "they have now liberty to do what they

please."79 At least the General Court sided with Pynchon

in the controversy and responded by confirming the officers

of 1686.

Still, King kept up the effort in the hope that

eventually "he might be Captaine" of the company. Pynchon

feared that the ambitious troublemaker might gain enough

popular support to carry the day, "having so many

Relations . . . who have holpen it on & are the Faction in

that Busyness." Captain Cooke sought to influence the

General Court to take strong action against the

conspirators, describing King and his followers as enemies

of authority, lawbreakers, and known heavy drinkers.80

Such descriptions were probably exaggerated but not entirely

wide of the truth. In the eyes of the traditional leaders,

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at least, the trouble in Northampton resulted from lack of

respect on the part of unqualified newcomers who wanted to

propel themselves into positions of undeserved power.

King's supporters, however, obviously felt justified in

seizing leadership positions from the representatives of an

older generation.

The "Disorders & Irregularetys" which plagued the

Northampton company continued into 1690, when Cooke died,

opening the way for King and his associates. Pynchon wrote

to Lieutenant Hawley, the ranking officer, on December 5,

1690, recommending that he encourage the soldiers to lay

"aside al headyness, prjudice, commotion . . . & misguided

affection" in the upcoming election. The major implored the

men "to act Judiciously with respect to the Publicke good &

advantage," and to "make noe alteration but what may be safe

& beneficial to the Company & Publicke." Throughout the

whole affair, he advised Hawley to "Consider & not overlooke

the way & mode of Military discipline.1,81

Three days later the lieutenant wrote to the General

Court complaining about the outcome of the election. Clapp

won the contest for captain, but Hawley expressed doubt that

"a Competent Number" of voters participated in the election.

Further, he claimed that the newly elected officers

continued their contrary practices which interrupted the

progress of militia affairs in the town. Given the

difficulties he faced as one of the holdovers from 1686,

Hawley petitioned the court to relieve him of his

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commission, assuring the legislators that his request

resulted "not from a Backward spririt to serve . . . the

Country," but rather from the animosity he experienced from

within the company. He concluded his letter by calling on

the provincial government to intervene so "that [our] poor

Divided town may once again be setled." The General Court

responded by confirming Clapp's election, accepting Hawley's

resignation, and approving the choice of King as

lieutenant.82 Officials in Boston thus took the course

which appeared to offer the least resistance in restoring

peace and order to Northampton, but the whole incident

reflected Pynchon's observation by the 1690s that "the

People [had become] a litle wilful, inclined to do what and

how they pleased or not at all."83

Ironically, the ringleaders of the militia unrest in

Northampton did not represent a new generation of men trying

to break into positions of influence in the town; they had

already attained public prominence by 1689. John King and

Medad Pomeroy both served the town as selectmen on a regular

basis during the years immediately following King Philip's

War. Likewise, Preserved Clapp began his career as a

selectman during the mid-1680s.84 These three men, who

played such prominent roles in the disruption of the town's

militia company, did not need to speak out in order to gain

the attention of their fellow townspeople. Why, then, did

they practice such stratagems to subvert the established

officers of the company? Personality factors must have

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played some part in the controversy; Cooke's repudiation of

the conspirators' characters betrayed personal animosity.

In addition, however, advancement through the militia

represented another way for ambitious men like King to

cement their own power. They were not only turning against

established officers but also trying to assure for

themselves places in the town's leadership structure.

The disruption which occurred in the militia system was

difficult to reconcile with the trend toward continuity in

both local and provincial politics. The turnover in many

militia companies had no parallel on the selectman boards of

the period. Controversy in the selection of officers,

however, was not a new phenomenon after King Philip's War.

As long as the institution existed, local companies

periodically experienced disruptive elections.85 Perhaps

as a result of the war the colonial military passed through

a state of increased flux and transition, but no one

involved in the turmoil challenged the traditional political

structure. Instead, more men sought to elbow their way into

it.

Massachusetts colonists came to feel that the end of

King Philip's War did not represent the end of their trials

at the hands of the forces of evil. The relief they felt at

the defeat of the Indians was shortlived, as a crisis of

leadership ensued within the colony during the 1680s. The

charter controversy of that decade created a chaotic and

disruptive period in colonial politics, but in their

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resolution of the situation, New Englanders turned to

trusted and established leaders for stability. In

individual towns, however, where royal officials did not

directly control day-to-day administrative matters,

colonists for the most part never turned away from their

familiar officials. Even on the frontier, where Indian

attacks had caused the greatest disruption, selectmen

elections revealed a marked degree of continuity. Colonists

clearly sought a return to the old order in the face of new

opposition, whether from native assaults or royal policies.

If King Philip's War left any political legacy in the

Massachusetts Bay colony, it did so in making colonists wary

of perceived threats to their integrity and existence.

First the natives and then the crown represented challenges

to the orderly, accustomed progress of the colony. In

reaction, colonists during the later decades of the

seventeenth century became more watchful, even within their

own ranks, for forces acting against their own best

interests, and this vigilance made them more assertive in

questioning authority. Their initiative was apparent not

only in the opposition to the Dominion of New England but

also in individual community affairs. Although there was no

notable disruption in local politics— townspeople continued

to elect established selectmen— colonists throughout the

region began to reassert more power for themselves and their

town meetings, while imposing restraints on the assumed

powers of their elected officials. The accumulated

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challenges of the period, beginning with King Philip's War,

led New Englanders to become less passive in accepting their

world at face value and more willing to question political

affairs as well as other, less tangible, aspects of life.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 87, 90-91, 93; Leach claimed that "the Glorious Revolution in Massachusetts Bay also involved socio-economic tensions that had been building for at least a decade before [Andros1] arrival in New England." Ibid., 82.

2. Young, "Good Order" to Glorious Revolution, 140, 165, 189; See also, Slotkin and Folsom, ed., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 15.

3. Timothy H. Breen, "Persistent Localism: English Social Change and the Shaping of New England Institutions," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 32 (1975):18, 22-24; Timothy H. Breen, "The Character of the Good Ruler: A Study of Puritan Political Ideas in New England, 1630-1730," (PhD Dissertation: Yale University, 1968), 135, 139; Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, 41, 82; Lovejoy maintains that King Philip's War actually contributed to the colonists' perceptions of independence from crown control. They had not asked the king for help in the conflict, which they saw as a matter between themselves and the Indians, God's emissaries for their punishment. And in the end, the colonies had weathered the storm, without royal assistance. David S. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 134; Andrews termed the age "one when men were not content to let sleeping dogs lie. Colonial society at this time was in a ferment and quick to respond to outside forces. . . ." Andrews, ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 4; See also, Breen, Puritans and Adventurers, 81-105.

4. Young, "Good Order" to Glorious Revolution, 156, 164, 170, 172; See also, David Grayson Allen, In English Ways (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 221-222; Leach also asserted that colonists "aggressively reassumed power that earlier generations had delegated to town selectmen." Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 90.

5. Kenneth A. Lockridge and Alan Kreider, "Evolution of Massachusetts Town Government, 1640 to 1740," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 23(1966):550-552, 556-557, 559-560, 572; Lockridge, A New England Town, 79, 85, 88-89, 120, 136.

6. The new Dedham selectmen came from the same social level as did the men they replaced, so the turnover in 1689 did not represent a class upheaval in any way. Lockridge 248

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and Kreider, "Evolution of Massachusetts Town Government," 561-562, 566-567, 569; Lockridge, A New England Town. 42-43, 88; Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 104.

7. The three Springfield selectmen who died were Thomas Cooper and in 1675 and Eliazur Holyoke in 1676. The one man of the survivors of the 1670 to 1674 selectman group who did not serve regularly for an extended period was Benjamin Cooley, elected again in 1676 and 1680, who died in 1684. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 28-29, and passim.

8. Ibid.; Between 1670 and 1689, eight men, Rowland Thomas, John Horton, John Dorchester, Nathaniel Burt, Daniel Denton, John Parsons, Thomas Day, and Lawrence Hitchcock, served only one term apiece. Ibid.; See also, Innes, Labor in a New Land, 151.

9. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, II, 137.

10. Ibid., II, 162-163, 171.

11. Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield," 43, 181-215; Powell made a reference to "political turmoil" during the late 1680s, but town records revealed no such turmoil, at least on the local level. Ibid., 64; During his entire thirty-seven year political career, which spanned from 1677 to 1714, Isaac Phelps served as a selectman twenty-one times. In addition, he served at times as the town's clerk, treasurer, and schoolmaster. Ibid., 43; A high percentage of Westfield's adult maled held office during the period. During the 1670s, 29 out of 57 (51 percent) held some office; during the 1680s, 29 out of 77 (37 percent) held some office; and during the 1690s, 55 out of 99 (55 percent) adult males held office. Ibid., 405, 409, 415.

12. Northampton Town Records, 96-144; Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 22; Pomeroy had probably the most successful political career in seventeenth-century Northampton. In thirty-five years he was chosen a selectman twenty-seven times, in addition to other town offices. Northampton Town Records, 96-144; Mank, "Family Structure in Northampton," 29; The six war-time selectmen who did not survive politically past the end of the decade were Deacon William Holton, John Lyman, Henry Woodward, John Stebbins, David Wilton, and Thomas Root, Sr. Northampton Town Records, 96.

13. Northampton Town Records, 96-144; Thomas Strong, Thomas Judd, James Wright, John Bridgeman, and John Clark each served only one term during the 1680s; Samuel Bartlet served only twice. Ibid.

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14. See, Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 326.

15. Northampton Town Records, 96-144.

16. Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 259-260, 307.

17. Deerfield Town Book, passim; The new selectmen in 1692 were Eleazur Hawks, Edward Allyn, Samson Frary, Godfrey Nims, and Henry White. Ibid.; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 222; Sheldon suggested that the selection of an entirely new board in 1689 represented a town policy, though election records show that Deerfield selectmen during the period did occasionally serve consecutive terms. Ibid., I, 212-213.

18. Deerfield Town Book, I, 20; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 210-211; Between 1689 and 1704, 61 out of the 62 adult men who lived in Deerfield during those years held some sort of elected office. Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 317-318, 324-325, 353-354.

19. Green, ed., Early Records of Groton, passim; The eight men who served less than five terms between 1662 and 1675 were John Lawrence, Richard Blood, John Nuttin, John Lakin, Benjamin Crispe, Elis Barron, Simon Willard, and Matthias Farnsworth. Ibid.

20. Ibid.; See also, Ibid., 52-53.

21. Ibid., passim; Joshua Whitney and John Parish each served three times during the 1680s, William Greene, Peleg Lawrence, and Jonathan Sawtall twice each, and James Parker, Jr. and Samuell Woods once. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 59-61; The residents agreed "That the wholl towne shall goe on joyntly to gether to finish the meeting hous with all convenient speed without any regret or reflexion one upon another in the place wheir now it standeth." Ibid., 61.

23. Ibid., 65, 71, 108.

24. Shurtleff, ed., Records, IV, pt. 2, 24-26; Michael G. Hall, Lawrence H. Leder, and Michael G. Kammen, ed., The Glorious Revolution in America; Documents on the Colonial Crisis of 1689 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 12-13; Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 10, 18.

25. Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., IX, 282, 307, 361-362; Viola F. Barnes, The Dominion of New England; A Study in British Colonial Policy (New York: Frederick Ungar

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Publishing Co., I960), 8-15; For Andros's intentions against Massachusetts, see, Jennings, Invasion of America, 317-318.

26. Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 19; See also, Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, 125; Michael G. Hall, Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676-1703 (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 23-24; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 16-17; One Captain Breedon reported in 1678 that "They look upon themselves as a free State" without "any dependence on England. . . ."He even claimed that Massachusetts had "a law punishing any attempt to subvert their frame of government with death, and if any speak for the King's interest they are esteemed as against the frame of government and as mutineers. . . .» Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., X, 297.

27. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 156-157; Hall, Edward Randolph, 34-35.

28. Ibid., V, 197; Earlier in 1678, the General Court formed a committee to investigate reports of "some person or persons as yet unknowne, that hath either, by word or writting, uttered such things as tends much to the reproaching of our present honor'd Governor & government." Ibid., V, 185.

29. Ibid., V, 201, 349; Similar correspondence between Massachusetts officials, their agents, and the crown continued into 1683. Ibid., V, 385-386, 391.

30. Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 22-23.

31. Ibid., 24-25; Hall, Edward Randolph, 33-36, 79.

32. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 422-423.

33. Mather, "Autobiography," 308; Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 23-24; See also, Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, 122, 154-155; With Mather, Samuel Nowell also drew links between King Philip's War and the charter controversy as facets of the struggle of good against evil. Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 75, 268.

34. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 457, 466-467; See, Hall, Edward Randolph, 83; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 23, 25-26.

35. Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, 147; Cotton Mather,

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Magnalia Christi Americana Ed. Kenneth B. Murdock (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977), 6. (All references to the text of Magnalia come from the 1855 edition.); Hart, Commonwealth History, I, 569-570; Theodore Lewis cited as contributing factors to the factionalism; the lower house struggle to increase its relative power in the colony, a growing antagonism between the backcountry and the sea coast, and the development of a local aristocracy based on wealth. Lewis, "Massachusetts and the Glorious Revolution," 40-41; Hall, Edward Randolph, 21, 29, 98-99.

36. Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., IX, 408, XI, 449.

37. Ibid., XI, 563, 599, 600, 610.

38. Sibley, Graduates of Harvard, I, 198; Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser.. XI, 606-607, 669; Lewis, "Massachusetts and the Glorious Revolution," 89; Between 1660 and 1684, only one magistrate failed to gain reelection; in 1676 Daniel Gookin lost his seat for one year, due to his lenient Indian sentiments. Ibid., 44-45; Hall, Edward Randolph, 84-85; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 22-23.

39. "Commission of King James the Second to Sir Edmund Andros, June 3, 1686," in Force, Tracts, IV, 8:13.

40. Mather, Magnalia, II, 176; See, Hall, Edward Randolph, 110; For a discussion of the religious nature of opposition to Andros, see, Barnes, Dominion of New England, 51-53.

41. Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 31; Mather, Magnalia, II, 176-177; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 72-77, 95-96.

42. "The Revolution in New England Justified and the People there Vindicated from the Aspersions Cast upon them by Mr. John Palmer (1691)," in Force, Tracts, IV, 9:17, 22-23; Mather, Magnalia, II, 176-177.

43. Hall, Leder, and Kammen, ed., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 28-29; See also, Hart, Commonwealth History, I, 586-587, 589.

44. MA, 35:139; "Revolution Justified," 9:14-16; Mather, Magnalia, II, 176-177; Lewis, "Massachusetts and the Glorious Revolution," 235; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 397; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 83-90; One unfortunate colonist, a Francis Wainwright, had to petition Andros' forgiveness for the offense of being "so imprudent and unadvised as to receive and repeat any such

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Report or expressions" as the testimony of John Wise concerning West's statements about the colonists' rights. MA, 127:162.

45. See, Breen, "Character of the Good Ruler," 204, 213, 227.

46. See Chapter 3 for a discussion cf post-war taxation in Massachusetts.

47. John Pynchon to Governor John Leverett, August 15, 1676. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 167; Jennings, Invasion of America, 314-318; See also, Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 211; Lewis, "Massachusetts and the Glorious Revolution," 274.

48. Mather, Magnalia, II, 178-179; Mather reported, to the sure consternation of Puritan New Englanders, that on the campaign in Maine, "some of the chief commanders were Papists." These forces roamed the frontier "without the killing of one Indian." Ibid., 179.

49. "Revolution Justified," 9:28.

50. Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 49, 58; "Revolution Justified," 9:29; Andros' Indian policies were certainly among the offenses which Cotton Mather classified as "abominable things, too notorious to be denied." Mather, Magnalia, II, 177.

51. Andros arrested John Winslow without bail on April 4, 1689 for bringing King William's declaration, which the governor called "a treasonable paper," into Massachusetts. "Revolution Justified," 9:9-11.

52. Mather, Magnalia, II, 180; Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 39-40; Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 194-195; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 96-99.

53. Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 42-46; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 238-244, 250-253; Of the fifteen signers of the declaration, eight had served on elected councils before the revocation of the charter. William H. Whitmore, ed., The Massachusetts Civil List for the Colonial and Provincial Periods, 1630-1774 rpt:1870 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1969), 30-31; Shurtleff, ed., Records. V, passim.

54. "Revolution Justified," 9:7; See, Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, 228; Hart, Commonwealth History, 600;

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Barnes, Dominion of New England, 234-235, 237-238.

55. Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 63; For lists of the members of the Committee of Safety, see, Whitmore, ed., Civil List, 31; Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, 324.

56. MA, 107:14-54; Northampton Town Records, 132; Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 126; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 212; See also, Massachusetts Court Records (MA), VI, 11-12. (Hereafter cited as MCR).

57. MCR, VI, 17.

58. Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., XIII, 61-62; See also, Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, 327; Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 205; Breen, "Character of the Good Ruler," 248-249; In spite of the prudent course followed by their leaders, some colonists still clung to the view that "the people can as well authorise civil as military Government, and meanwhile are not tied to any laws but what agree with present necessity. The Charter of Massachusetts is accounted our Magna Charta; without it we are wholly without law, the laws of England being made for England only. ..." Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., XIII, 40-41; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 245-246.

59. Westfield sent a deputy only twice between 1675 and 1686, Groton only once, and Lancaster three times. See, Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, passim; Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 333; See also, Lewis, "Massachusetts and the Glorious Revolution," 46.

60. Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 28-29, 37-38; Smith, ed., Pynchon Court Record, 282; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, passim; See also, Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 314; Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 333.

61. Mather, "Agents of New England," 279, 286; Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 56, 76-79; See also, The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay 21 vols., (Boston: Wright and Potter, 1863-1922), I, 40-41; Barnes, Dominion of New England, 267-275.

62. Whitmore, ed., Civil List, 45-53; 24-26, 30-31; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, passim; MA, 48:172, 174, 193, 210. 63. Mather, "Agents of New England," 294; Mather, Magnalia, II, 243.

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64. The four Plymouth councillors were , William Bradford, John Walley, and Barnabas Lothrop. The five who served under Andros, on the revolutionary committee, and in later councils were Wait Winthrop, Bartholomew Gedney, William Stoughton, William Browne, and Samuel Shrimpton. Whitmore, ed., Civil List, 30-31, 45-46; See also, Bodge, Soldiers, 169-170.

65. "The Glorious Revolution in the colonies was less an attempt to kick over the traces and strive for a brave new world in America,11 according to David Lovejoy, "than it was a return to acceptable conceptions of empire which colonists either had lived or had lived for in the past." Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, 272.

66. Judd, Hadley, 142; Smith, ed., Pynchon Court Record, 283; In a conflicting report, the Rev. John Russell wrote in April 1676 that "It is strange to see how much spirit (more than formerly), appears in our men to be out against the enemy." See, Judd, Hadley, 161.

67. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 242.

68. Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 194; Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., XIII, 46, 71-72; See also, Lewis, "Massachusetts and the Glorious Revolution," 297; Opposition in the militia also existed against the Dudley regime. Barnes, Dominion of New England, 55.

69. MA, 35:55-56; Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., XIII, 111; Hall, Leder, and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution, 55; Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, 351-352; Towns across the colony also petitioned Boston to return their men from the Maine frontier. See, for example, Moody, ed., Saltonstall Papers, 192-193.

70. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 49-50.

71. Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," 277, 284-285; See also, Sharp, "New England System of Defense," 245; In spite of such exhortations, the Massachusetts legislature had to continue its orders for increased discipline and preparation. See, MA, 37:306a, 70:28, 143, 206-214; Moody, ed., Saltonstall Papers, 169.

72. MA, 36:57; See also, Ibid., 35: 102; John Pynchon to Governor Simon Bradstreet, December 5, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 219-220.

73. Shurtleff, ed., Records, I, 188, V, 30; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 108, 221; See also, Breen, "Persistent Localism," 22-23; Sharp, "New England System of Defense,"

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244-245, 256-257; Moody, ed., Saltonstall Papers, 191; For examples of various militia elections, see, MA, 36:46a, 68:249, 107:170: Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 380.

74. MA, 69:225; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 236; See also, Ibid., V, 189, 306; MA, 69:186, 245a, 70:1

75. MA, 70:73, 86; Such dissension did not exist strictly after King Philip's War. In 1670, for instance, unrest existed within the Lancaster militia company. See, Nourse, ed., Records of Lancaster, 86-87.

76. MA, 69:221; "Case of John Gould, Charged With Treason (May 1686)," MHSC 27(1838):150-154; Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, 182.

77. John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, July 30, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 200-201; MA, 107:239; For examples of contemporary disputed elections in Boston and Haverhill, see respectively, MA, 70:105; Moody, ed., Saltonstall Papers, 192.

78. MA, 107:258; John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, August 10, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 191, 206; See also, Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 504; Smith, ed., Pynchon Court Record, 313; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 402-405; Innes, Labor in a New Land, 158-160; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 117-118.

79. John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, July 5, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 194-195; MA, 107:177; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 407-408; At one point, Pynchon asked the General Court to discharge him from the service, "Begging yor Pardon for yt wherein I have failed." MA, 107:259.

80. MA, 107:239; John Pynchon to Governor Simon Bradstreet, July 30, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 198; Cook leter cited in Trumbull, History of Northampton, 406.

81. MA, 36:242; See also, Ibid., 107:239; John Pynchon to Governor Simon Bradstreet, July 30, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 198; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 409-410; Innes, Labor in a New Land, 166-167.

82. MA, 36:243, 414.

83. Cited in, Innes, Labor in a New Land, 162.

84. Northampton Town Records, 96-144.

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85. Timothy Timothy H. Breen, H. Breen,11 The Covenanted "The Covenanted Militia Militia of of Massachusetts Bay: English Background and New World Development,"Development,11 in Breen, Puritans and Adventurers, 37-41.

Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. CHAPTER 6

THE BATTLE WITHIN

Massachusetts residents readily recognized the

economic, demographic, and political legacies of King

Philip's War. Less tangible but of greater magnitude in the

long run were the intellectual and attitudinal changes which

resulted from the conflict and continuing tensions. The

accumulated challenges they faced contributed to a sense of

uneasiness and even fear which led many colonists to

question the dogmas and practices of the New England way.

While New Englanders shared an apprehension about the

possibility of renewed native and even French hostilities on

the frontier, orthodox Puritans, especially the clergy,

pointed to a greater danger within the Massachusetts

communities. In an effort to save the errand into the

wilderness from destroying itself, Puritan ministers led a

crusade against the many manifestations of indiscipline and

ungodliness running rampant in the region during the late

seventeenth century. Men like Cotton Mather and Samuel

Nowell exhorted their congregations to resist the forces of

evil infiltrating Massachusetts towns and families, but the

excesses continued. King Philip's War fostered an unsettled

period in New England history, and the far-reaching 258

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intellectual repercussions were much more difficult to

accommodate than were the physical legacies.

This sense of disturbing change and unwelcome flux was

not unique to the New England experience nor was the

phenomenon, in its more generic forms, related inherently to

the Puritan character of the region's English inhabitants.

Societies throughout history have faced social change and

upheaval in the aftermath of warfare. In many ways, the

colonists exhibited typical reactions and behavioral

patterns in response to the war-time tensions imposed upon

them. For instance, Puritan New Englanders cited God's

displeasure combined with the malice of the supernatural

forces of evil as the orthodox explanation for King Philip's

War. They therefore portrayed the war itself as a necessary

struggle to rectify the situation and to reassert their own

spiritual worth, both to themselves and to God. Obviously,

Puritan theology contributed to this interpretation of the

conflict, but sociologists have noted such rationalization

as a common human characteristic.1 Human beings naturally

seek to explain misfortune or turmoil by blaming outside

forces. The colonists did just that in their evaluation of

native hostilities in 1676. Metacom and his followers

became associated with all of New England's problems. As

agents of the forces of evil in the world, the natives

became symbols of everything the Puritan mission stood

against. Thus the enemy represented the target at which New

Englanders could direct their fears, desires, guilt, and

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aggressions.2

War, therefore, served a valuable purpose to

Massachusetts communities, just as it has to countless

societies in the past. By focusing opposition against a

perceived threat, most notably a military enemy, leaders

have sought to solidify their own group unity. In facing an

easily distinguishable foe, people tend to pull together and

consolidate their efforts, thus augmenting their defensive

measures and further defining their collective identity.3

Civil and religious leaders constantly reminded

Massachusetts residents that the natives represented alien,

evil forces, and thus fostered a virtual fortress mentality

which portrayed a dichotomy between New England and all of

its enemies. In the moment of extremity, the threat of

Indian attack led a iuajoi'ity of New Eiiglanders to cooperate

with each other in opposition to the common enemy.

The clergy attempted to use the war to combat sin and

backsliding within their congregations. By explaining the

native attacks as signs of God's displeasure with His chosen

people and by correlating each English victory with

indications of the colonists' penitence, ministers sought to

regenerate a sense of spiritual vigor among their fellow

sinners. From John Pynchon in Springfield and Mary

Rowlandson in Lancaster to Increase Mather in Boston,

prominent figures across the colony proclaimed that

salvation and victory over the Indians could come only

through sincere repentance. Devout Puritans recognized the

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war as an opportunity and even a mandate to reinvigorate the

religious errand into the wilderness.4

While creating the possibility of increased unity as an

immediate reaction, wars have often resulted in internal

disorder and social change. On the most superficial level,

war creates an atmosphere in which normally forbidden

activities— such as killing— are permitted, thus opening the

way for challenges to other, more subtle, social

conventions. The high tension levels which lead to initial

group solidarity against the outside threat are also capable

of nurturing discord within. Therefore, the two forces work

in opposition. Although authorities attempt to use wartime

tensions to augment conformity, the inherent instability

leads some members to question accustomed practices and even

to adopt apparently deviant behavior. As a result, once

peace returns, periods of warfare often result in longer

campaigns against perceived degeneracy and backlashes

against any social change, positive or negative.5

Certainly New England witnessed this struggle between a

conservative reaction and the agents of change.

King Philip's War, of course, was not the only crisis

which New Englanders faced during the late seventeenth

century, nor was it the direct cause of all of the problems

and tensions which plagued the colonies at the time. The

war left lingering legacies, but the economic and

demographic costs of the conflict were compounded by new

political and spiritual challenges which appeared

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concurrently. Although the roots of some of these troubles

cannot be attributed specifically to the struggle against

Metacom, King Philip's War did represent a focal point to

the colonists who lived through the troubled period. In a

quarter-century characterized by a sense of continuing

crisis, the war that ended in 1676 was the one crisis to

which the colonists repeatedly referred. New England was

under attack throughout the period, and with the new

challenges imposed on top of the legacies of King Philip's

War, the colonists really never had an opportunity to

recover from the conflict. By the time King William's War

broke out in 1689, Massachusetts residents were already

anxious and uncertain, and King Philip's War was the signal

event which set the tone for the last quarter of the

seventeenth century.

According to Douglas Leach, victory over Metacom

brought "a great sense of relief and joy," tempered by a

realization of the destruction caused by the conflict.

Still, he found the postwar years "characterized not by

harmony, but by internal strains."6 The war presented New

Englanders with images of everything they came to America to

avoid or amend, both in the forms of their unregenerate

native enemies and their own sinfulness. Thus, when native

threats on the frontier continued and, more significantly,

when worldliness and indiscipline appeared to increase in

the years after King Philip's War, conservative Puritans

reacted with exhortations for further repentance. The

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struggle against the opponents of the errand did not end

with the defeat of the Massachusetts tribes. Rather, the

legacies of the conflict induced an intellectual shift among

many colonists, as they became more sensitive to the various

forces working against them in the region. An intellectual

battle persisted, and the campaign of attitudes was applied

to New England's native enemies as well as to its domestic

doctrinal challengers.

In fact, although the natives' physical assaults were

very real, in the long run the Indians made their deepest

marks on the New England psyche. They were always more than

just military or cultural enemies; the region's native

inhabitants represented everything alien to English

civilization and to Puritan spirituality. The colonists'

prejudices appeared in the images they painted of their

counterparts. William Hubbard disliked the way native

tribes supported each other against the English, "all

together, like Serpent's Eggs," the serpent, of

course, being the symbol of the devil and the tempter of

Eve. Likewise, Deacon Philip Walker poetically portrayed

Indians as "Incarnat divels sent from the infernall Lake,

[who] Like helish monsters make our harts to ake."7 Such

literary characterizations abounded in late

seventeenth-century New England, and by and large they

reflected the attitudes of the vast majority of colonists.

During King Philip's War the colonists projected all of the

ills affecting them on the natives, and many Englishmen

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adopted an immutable intellectual enmity against Indians in

general, including, to some extent, the Praying Indians. As

long as any hostile bands "remain unconquered," lamented

Increase Mather, "we cannot enjoy such perfect peace as in

the years which are past."8 Massachusetts residents

naturally feared renewed hostilities, but more

significantly, the persistence of any unconverted native

groups in their midst prevented the colonists from enjoying

true peace of mind.

Of course, the threat or actual continuation of

belligerent activities contributed to this mental agitation.

Even with Metacom dead, the colonists still saw apparently

unfriendly natives lurking at their frontiers, and so

naturally their elevated sense of fear and animosity

continued unabated. In the words of Thomas Hobbes, "as the '

nature of foul weather lies not in the shower or two of

rain, but in an inclination of many days together, so the

nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the

known disposition during all the time that there is no

assurance to the contrary."9 Even with Metacom gone and

his warriors scattered, New Englanders had no assurance

against further assaults from the natives, much less from

the demonic forces they supposedly represented. Leach

mistakenly called the attack on Deerfield and Hatfield in

September 1677 "a final afterclap of King Philip's War" and

claimed that the colonists themselves saw it as "an isolated

episode" which did not significantly hamper the resettlement

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of the frontier.10 Although frontier inhabitants returned

to their outlying towns shortly thereafter, they did so in

most cases with caution, and the general atmosphere in the

colony reflected nowhere near the level of confidence

asserted by Leach. As late as May 1679, for instance,

Edward Taylor in Westfield still referred to the Hatfield

incident in relating the anxiety felt by frontier

residents.11 Such lingering fears reflected more a

long-term "inclination" than "an isolated episode."

Understandably, New Englanders reacted to this tension

with increasingly belligerent rhetoric. In his Magnalia

Christi Americana (1702), Cotton Mather argued that as the

natives continued their hostile behavior, "the most

scrupulous persons in the world must own, that it must be

the most unexceptionable piece of justice in the world for

to extinguish them."12 All over the colony during the

1680s, Massachusetts authorities, both local and provincial,

took measures to protect the inhabitants from proximate

natives, thus attesting to the long-term effects of King

Philip's War on New Englanders' perceptions of their own

security and the potential threats which still lurked in

their midst. In 1681, the General Court reminded

Massachusetts citizens that selling guns, powder, or

ammunition to any Indian was illegal. Reacting to the

difficulty of distinguishing friendly natives from enemies,

the court in early 1690 issued the order confining "all the

Indians . . . in amity with us" to their assigned towns.

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Likewise, John Pynchon received authorization to "dispose"

all the native residents of Hampshire County in appropriate

places "with such limitations & directions as may be least

disquiet to the English."13 Actually, in the aftermath of

King Philip's War, the presence of any Indians near the

colonists proved disquieting.

So deep was the effect on New England attitudes that

some colonists entirely abandoned the cherished values of

civilized behavior which they had previously held up in

contrast to the natives' supposed barbarity. During King

Philip's War, for instance, a Massachusetts writer decried

native women for their "delight in Cruelties" inflicted upon

captives and for abandoning "the two proper Virtues of

Womanhood, Pity and Modesty." Over the next two decades,

with the continuation of anxiety over persistent Indian

threats and finally renewed warfare, animosity progressed to

such heights that colonists openly applauded acts of

violence and cruelty inflicted upon Indians. The most

poignant example occurred in April 1697, when Hannah Dustin

of Haverhill, who had earlier lost a child in the

hostilities, murdered and mutilated ten of her captors while

they slept, including two women and six Indian children.

Rather than any sort of censure for her actions, Dustin

received a reward of £50 from the Assembly and a great deal

of public acclaim.14 The experience not only of King

Philip's War but more importantly of the persistent

uneasiness which followed, caused New Englanders to react in

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ways which seemed completely alien to the principles for

which they had fought the natives in the first place. By

applauding Dustin's actions, the colonists were becoming

more like the image of the savage Indians they hoped to

destroy than they would ever admit. At the very least,

approval of such behavior revealed a clear decline in

popular optimism about the errand into the wilderness.

In its attempt to eliminate the existence of any

hostile threat, the colonial government attempted to

manipulate relations between contesting native groups, a

practice not entirely without precedent in New England, of

course. Even during the war, various English officials,

including Governor Andros, had attempted to control native

activities to their own advantage. The New England colonies

hoped to gain an alliance with the powerful Mohawks by

encouraging them to attack the renegades from the

Massachusetts frontier, who were also the Mohawk's

longstanding enemies. On October 5, 1677, John Pynchon,

acting on instructions from the Council, wrote to Captain

Sylvester Salisbury at Fort Albany advising him to employ

"Maqua" warriors to track down the Indians who had attacked

Deerfield and other Connecticut Valley towns the previous

month. "Let them know it will be a great demonstration of

their fidelity and friendship to us," he told Salisbury,

"and it is a very likely opportunity for them to kill and

catch Indians whom they so much hunt after."

Some New Englanders were openly uneasy at the plan,

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questioning the legality and morality of employing "Heathen"

warriors, "but the General Court and the most considerate of

the Country," according to Hubbard, "apprehended it lawful

to make use of any Advantage Providence put into their

Hands, whereby to weaken or abate the Force and Power of

their Enemies."15 Any weapons or allies which hastened the

demise of the native menace and thus helped to solve the

instability threatening New England security were seen as

justifiable.

The Mohawk alliance did not achieve the desired

results. From the start, Massachusetts officials accused

their native mercenaries of preying on English cattle and

friendly, converted Indians, especially around the town of

Natick. Connecticut Valley residents were particularly

disturbed by the free movement afforded the Iroquois

warriors, the colonists "not being able to distinguish

between . . . ennemy Indians & Macquas." Finally, in March

1679 the Commissioners of the United Colonies decided to

inform the Mohawks that "wee have no present need for them

to pursue any Indians in these parts or at the

Eastward."16 The colonists apparently believed that they

could ignite or extinguish hostilities between native groups

at a moment's notice or solely according to their own

desires; they failed to realize that the Indians of the

region were anything more than instruments of God's

providence or tools for their use.

Throughout the 1680s, the colonies, primarily through

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John Pynchon, attempted to enforce peace between the Mohawks

and the native groups effectively under English control, as

well as to bar the fierce warriors from undertaking

campaigns against the eastern Indians still in enmity with

the colonies. The authorities realized what a dangerous

weapon their allies could be. By 1689, however, Pynchon was

again suggesting to the Council in Boston that the colony

encourage "the Maguas and Senecas . . . to effect some

destruction on the Eastern Indians."17 In again

considering a dangerous policy which clearly had not worked

the previous decade, New Englanders seemed slow to learn

their lessons. After King Philip's War, however, they were

prepared to use any means at their disposal to eliminate the

native threat which continued to occupy their minds and

estates.

In addition to the presence of known hostile tribes and

invited warriors, Massachusetts residents from time to time

also became further unsettled by the appearance of wandering

groups of unidentified Indians on the frontier. For

example, in late 1691 approximately 150 native men, women,

and children on a hunting expedition from the Albany area

settled, without warning, about a mile from Deerfield.

Residents of that town as well as neighboring communities on

the Connecticut River frontier immediately agreed that

although the newcomers appeared peaceful, their mere

presence represented a potential threat. The local militia

committees in the region stepped up defensive preparations

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to give the natives notice, in Pynchon's words, that "we are

in a warlike Posture."18

Most town officials apparently favored sending the band

back to Albany immediately, but the General Court issued a

proclamation through Pynchon granting the refugee natives

temporary, conditional permission to remain in the area for

the winter of 1692. Although the major chastised them for

not seeking advance leave to set up camp within

Massachusetts's jurisdiction, he promised the natives that

the colonists would "for the present overlook their seeming

intruding upon us" and would let them stay until spring if

they behaved themselves, abstained from liquor, and abided

by certain restrictions on their movement.19 The natives

agreed to the requirements and left the area without

incident in May 1692. The importance of the incident rested

in the colonists' initial response to a potentially new

threat, particularly exemplified by Pynchon's advice that

colonial forces maintain "a warlike Posture." Even though

they let the strange band remain in 1692, the colonists

exhibited an acute sense of tension and mental agitation at

the appearance of the natives. One effect of King Philip's

War and related challenges was that, psychologically,

Massachusetts residents never really lost their "warlike

Posture"; in their lingering uneasiness they seemed

mentally ready to fight at the appearance of any perceived

challenge, whether Indians, crown officials, or evil forces

within their communities.

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During the late 1680s and into the 1690s, alarm after

alarm sounded from the Massachusetts frontier, and English

reactions turned toward eliminating any natives whose

behavior could not be controlled. In October 1691 Nathaniel

Saltonstall advised that a military force be dispatched to

pursue the Indians on the Maine frontier, "and so not to

give it over while an Indian can be heard of in the

Country." Similarly, Capt. Samuel Partridge of Deerfield

suggested in 1696 that "the pretended friendly Indians" who,

"proving enemies, being worse than open enemies," should be

rounded up and transported into slavery or exiled on

isolated islands near the colony. The General Court

apparently agreed, for the previous year it declared "all

Indians who shall be found within 5 miles of the Connecticut

River on the easterly side or within 20 miles on the

westerly side thereof, shall be deemed and accounted enemies

and treated as such."20 This mentality of regarding all

Indians as enemies until proven innocent— and in some cases

even after— persisted long after King Philip's War, as the

siege of New England continued.

By the last decade of the century, King William's War

added a new dimension to the threats facing the English

colonies, as the French in Canada became factors in the

hostilities on the Massachusetts frontier. The new enemies

furnished the same sources of tension as did the Indians;

New Englanders feared French opposition not only because of

military attacks but also because of far-reaching

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ideological differences. To orthodox Puritans, Catholic

Frenchmen represented as serious a threat as did heathen

Indians; the union of the two in a campaign against New

England therefore presented a paramount danger. Cotton

Mather, for one, took every opportunity to point out the

evils of Massachusetts's "Declared Enemies, . . . those

Pagan and Popish Neighbors." He characterized the alliance

as an unholy marriage between the "Half Indianized French,

and the Half Frenchified Indians."21

Mather was not alone in this antipathy toward French

Catholics. John Gyles was taken captive in Maine in 1689

and delivered to a Jesuit priest. When the Jesuit gave him

a biscuit to eat, the boy instead disposed of it "fearing he

had put something into it to make me love him." He

certainly took his mother's words to heart. "Oh my dear

child," she told him during their captivity, "if it were

God's will, I had rather follow you to your grave, or never

see you more in this world, than you should be sold to a

Jesuit; for a Jesuit will ruin you, body and soul!"22

Englishmen attributed supernatural evil powers to Catholic

priests, just as they did to Indian shamans, and therefore

viewed both as spiritual enemies bent on subverting the

Protestant mission in America. In retrospect, these types

of fears appear outlandish; to seventeenth-century

Puritans, they represented sharp prongs in the devil's

attack on New England.

The colonists had plenty of evidence to support their

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fear of French military malice. In the summer of 1688 a

band of "North Indians" terrorized the Connecticut Valley,

killing five friendly natives near Springfield and six

settlers at Northfield. Later testimony by other Indians in

the region revealed that the hostile group came "by ordre of

the Governor of Canida" with instructions to kill Englishmen

and Christianized Indians and to "bring noe prisoners, but

their Scalps."23 Massachusetts residents also found reason

to tie another of their archenemies into the plot;

following his overthrow in 1689, accusers levelled charges

at Governor Andros that he had plotted with both Indians and

Canadians to turn the New England colonies over to 24 France.

Not surprisingly, New Englanders cited Canada, along

with "Frenchified pagans" dispatched from there, as a major

source of their "Miseries." "There was the main strength of

the French; there the Indians were mostly supplied with

ammunition; thence issued parties of men, who, uniting with

the salvages, barbarously murdered many innocent New

Englanders, ..." wrote Cotton Mather. Therefore, the

general conclusion among colonists concerned with the safety

of the colony was that "'Canada must be reduced.1" Pynchon

reflected the same sentiment when he warned, "we shal never

be quiet as long as we have those II Neighbors the French at

Canida & at the Eastward."25 Again, the quiet which the

colonists desired but found so elusive during the postwar

years was as much a respite from the mental agitation of the

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period as it was a relief from military attack. Peace meant

nothing without peace of mind.

New England's enemies did not manifest themselves only

in the alien forms of Indian warriors or French soldiers.

In addition to these foes, Cotton Mather cited "the fatal

Enemies of this people, that shall go to Debauch and infect

the Rising Generation among us, and corrupt them with evil

manners; and learn them to Drink and Drab, and Game, and

profane the Sabbath, and Sin against the Hope of their

Fathers."26 After King Philip's War, pious Puritans became

increasingly sensitive to signs of degeneracy with their

communities and interpreted the apparent growth of

sinfulness as an indication of the devil's attack on the

very heart of the New England mission.

Reflections of worldliness in personal behavior were a

major concern of Massachusetts authorities after 1675.

Warnings against excesses in apparel— the most widespread

and commonplace "evil" present in the colony— were not new

after the war; concern over such symbols of personal pride

existed from the earliest days of the colony's history.

Judging by the attention spent on the problem during the

postwar years, however, worldliness— or at least sensitivity

to it— reached epidemic proportions.

In 1675 the General Court created the position of

tithingman to maintain a watch in Massachusetts communities

against such abuses as extravagant dress, abuse of liquor,

gambling, idleness, and sabbath-breaking. The court later

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elaborated on the order to include inspections over "the

manners of all disorderly persons," residents suspected of

"debauchery, irreligion, prophaness, & atheisme," parents

neglecting their duties of proper "family government," and

any "idlenes, profligat, uncivill, or rude practices of any

sort." The Hampshire County Court took these instructions

to heart, directing the tithingmen in the towns under its

jurisdiction "faithfully to act in their Inspecting of their

Neighbors, so as that Sin & Disorder may be prevented & 27 suppressed." Communal watchfulness was an established

tradition in Massachusetts, of course, justified by the

belief that the good of the whole took priority over the

rights of the individual. The creation of tithingmen added

one more weapon to the effort by civil authorities to

enforce Puritan morals on all Massachusetts residents.

Throughout the 1670s, both before and after King

Philip's War, county court dockets across the colony were

burdened with numerous cases of excessive worldliness. The

Hampshire court proclaimed such behavior as "not Becomeing a

Wilderness State" and alien to "the Proffession of

Christianity & Religion." Whether or not the problem of

"wearing silk Extravegently Contrary to Law" and generally

dressing "in a fflanteing [flaunting] manner" increased

significantly as a result of the war, local authorities took

a sterner stance against the continuing abuses, "Considering

of how unseemly a nature such things are in this Day of

Calamity, Wasting & Desolation." Men and women alike were

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charged with taking excessive pride in their personal

appearance, but other instances indicating an apparent

decline in public morality also flooded the court books.

Hampshire County magistrates dealt with more cases involving

"Heineous swearing, . . . lacivious & Wanton Carriages" in

public, , and illegitimacy.28 None of these

crimes were new during the 1670s, but the stern reaction to

them by public officials reflected the continuing anxiety

over the future of Massachusetts.

In March 1685, in response to the number of "evills as

are found amongst us," the Massachusetts General Court

required "selectmen, grand jury men, constables, &

tithingmen of all townes within this jurisdiction . . . to

doe their utmost to be faithfull in the discharge of their

respective duties as to Saboath breaking, typling, &

drincking, & towne dwellers mispending their time in publick

houses of entertainment."29 The sense of urgency expressed

by the legislators reflected the fervent messages delivered

from pulpits throughout the colony. Both Increase and

Cotton Mather spoke out against breaches of the Seventh

Commandment, loosely defined as "Light Behaviour"

occasioning "Provacations to Uncleanness," which were

allegedly rampant among the colonists. The elder Mather

warned his followers to abandon their "Revelling" and

"Rioting" in favor of a more appropriate "Gravity and

Sobriety." Such behavior, he stated, "at a Time when God

calls to mourn, is most certainly a provocation." In fact,

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he declared many of the "profane practices" to be "utterly

unlawful," and not to "be tollerated in such a place as

New-England, without great Sin."30

Countless ministers responded to the signs of

degeneracy with exhortations to their flocks. Samuel Nowell

predicted shortly after Metacom’s death that "we shall not

live quiet long, or at least we have no Reason to promise

ourselves that we shall," because the "sins of New-England

increase, iniquity doth abound, and the Love of many doth

wax cold." He preached that the repentance necessary to

completely defeat the Indians had not been forthcoming and

that, in fact, it seemed to be declining. Nowell set the

scenario which he found all too common in the colony,

reflecting the evils of progress and worldly complacency.

Regrettably, "every Farmers Son, when he goes to

Market-Town, must have money in his purse; and when he

meets with his Companions," the cleric warned, "they goe to

the Tavern or Ale-house, and seldome away before Drunk, or

well-tipled." "This makes Youth effeminate and wanton,"

maintained Nowell, and "doth make men not so bold; The

Righteous are bold as a Lion." With sin undermining the

future generations of Massachusetts and thus jeopardizing

the future of the errand, he "encourage[d] Rulers,

Governours and Parents to train & bring up their Children in

such manner that they may endure Hardness."31 Discipline

and discipline alone represented the path to true repentance

and ultimately to a cleansing of New England's collective

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conscience.

Cotton Mather was also outspoken on the issue, not only

of the continuing "Spiritual Plagues" which afflicted the

colony but the consequences thereof. "The World, The World,

it is truly a most Bewitching thing;" he warned, "and the

Love of it, will be a Root of all Evil to us. ..." No New

Englander had any excuse for missing the gravity of his

admonition, he maintained, but unfortunatley many colonists

had not learned any spiritual lessons from the experiences

of King Philips's War. Mather found that the passage of

time only made many men and women in the colony all too "apt

to forget the fears and sorrows which have been upon us."

Neglecting reformation in the years after the conflict

represented "the ready way to great Calamity.1,32 Such

pointed exhortations reflected a feeling that Massachusetts'

worst enemies were not the Indians or the French but rather

the cold hearts of the colonists themselves. Human enemies,

even if they acted as agents of the devil, could be defeated

militarily; purging New Englanders' own souls of Satan's

influence represented to fire-and-brimstone ministers like

Mather a much more serious and difficult struggle.

Increase Mather shared his son's antipathy toward "The

World," and he pinpointed the colonists' long-standing

appetite for real estate as a sign of the growth of

worldliness in New England. The record of expansion and

community development from the earliest days of the colony

attested to the desire for the acquisition of land. By

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1676, however, Increase Mather considered that this singular

attraction had reached unhealthy levels. "Land! land!" he

harangued, "hath been the Idol of many in New England."33

He and other clergymen feared that the victory over the

natives might prove counterproductive in a way; the

potential removal of the Indians as an effective barrier on

the frontier could have encouraged colonists to disperse

from central locations of provincial or even local

authority. Of course, as events transpired, unfriendly

Indians did not disappear from the frontiers of

Massachusetts, nor did hordes of colonists rush headlong to

scattered farmsteads out of the reach of civil or religious

authorities. Still, concerned clergymen saw a need to stem

the spread of worldly behavior, of which the attraction to

real estate was a blatant example.

Other clerics employed gentler means to influence their

followers. Versifying minister Benjamin Tompson harkened

back to better days in New England, "When honest sisters met

to pray not prate/About their own and not their neighbor's

state." Reacting to the problem of extravagant dress, he

reminded the colonists that "Deep-skirted doublets,

puritanic capes/Which now would render men like upright

apes/Was cornelier wear our wiser fathers thought/Than the 34 cast fashions from all Europe brought." Tompson appealed

to a sense of nostalgia and a longing for quieter, more

secure times, when New Englanders behaved in a more uniform

manner and had more confidence in their errand into the

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wilderness.

Even lay persons publicly urged their fellow colonists

to learn from their recent experiences and to seek

repentance. Mary Rowlandson warned that worldly goods and

amusements were only "a bait the devil lays to make men lose

their precious time." She took the opportunity of her

period of enforced exile among the natives for reflection

and self-evaluation. She found that "my conscience did not

accuse me of unrighteousness toward one or other: yet I saw

how in my walk with God I had been a careless creature."

Rowlandson's sins were obviously sins of omission and

unwitting neglect, a point driven home particularly when

during the first Sunday of her captivity she "remembered how

careless I had been of God's holy time, how many Sabbaths I

had lost or misspent, and how evilly I had walked in God's

sight.Her complacent adherence to the requirements of

the Puritan religion became most apparent to her when the

Indians tore her away from the practice completely; she

therefore wrote her narrative as a warning to other

colonists who were tearing themselves away from a spiritual

connection with the church by their inward apathy and

outward behavior.

Whether the exhortations took the form of fiery

sermons, nostalgic verse, or earnest narratives, the message

was the same. New England was still under attack; the

forces of evil already represented by Indians, French

militia, and crown officials now infiltrated Massachusetts

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destruction of the New England mission. The war itself

represented both a warning and a punishment from God,

revealing His displeasure with New England's sins. Rather

than defeating their enemies and repenting in order to avoid

retribution, the colonists faced new enemies in human form

while sin— the root of the problem— seemingly proliferated

in the communities of the Massachusetts Bay colony after the

war. King Philip's War provided the initial shock; the

continuing attacks and the manifestations of worldliness

around theii led the orthodox clergy and other pious

colonists to question just what the future held for

them.36 In their reflections on New England's experiences

and in their calls for reform, clergy as well as laymen

expresed decline in morale, approaching in some instances

despair.

The jeremiad was a dominant literary genre of

seventeenth-century New England. By definition, jeremiads

were sermons presented on official occasions, such as

election days or fast days. The clergy who delivered these

homilies concentrated on contemporary evils and

transgressions which prevented the colonists from fulfilling

their mission. Although the genre was not new in 1675 nor

unique to colonial New England, King Philip's War and the

uneasy decades which followed presented clergymen with ample

ammunition for their sermons. The jeremiads traditionally

played on a theme of crisis to spur the colonists toward

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experiences of the last quarter of the seventeenth century

inspired ample concern over New England's impending doom and

attention to the need for regeneration.

Increase Mather blamed the inconstancy of younger

colonists for the troubles, claiming that God had no reason

to punish New England with "so dreadfull a judgment, untill

the Body of the first Generation was removed, and another

Generation risen up which hath not so pursued, as ought to

have been, the blessed design of their Fathers, in following

the Lord into this Wilderness, whilst it was a land not

sown."38 Whoever was at fault, "the humbling, trying [and]

distressing providences" were a collective test, stated John

Higginson, to determine "whether, according to our

profession and [God's] expectation, we would keep his

commandments, or not." More and more the answer seemed to

be "no" during the period, leading the Reverend Solomon

Stoddard later to deliver a somber prophecy. In their

sinfulness, "men are wont to make many pretences and

excuses, and by them they mitigate the terror of their

consciences," he preached, "but this does not prevent the

displeasure of God: and if God be angry with his people, it 39 will before it be long, break out upon them." Stoddard's

1703 admonition succinctly summarized the messages of the

jeremiads during the uneasy decades of the late seventeenth

century. Mather delivered a blast in 1690, warning his

fellow colonists that if they persisted in their sinfulness

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and "if a Reformation be not Endeavoured, the Righteous God

will Punish us yet seven Times for our Iniquities."40 As

the epidemic of iniquity spread, chances of its cure seemed

to be slipping away. The jeremiads continued, but the

preachers wondered if anyone was listening.

Since the major theme among pious Puritans during the

last quarter of the seventeenth century revolved around the

unceasing battle between the forces of good and evil in New

England, the appearance of represented a focal

cause for alarm. Accusations and trials of supposed witches

predated King Philip's War, but the intellectual intolerance

which accompanied the tense postwar period increased

suspicion. New Englanders, feeling besieged by their

enemies and wary of any deviant behavior in their midst,

were more than ready to find and punish Satan's bedfellows,

even within settled communities. By doing so, fearful

colonists could take heart in at least continuing the

battle, if not entirely eradicating the forces of the devil

which threatened them.41 The witchcraft proceedings became

just another defensive action in the ongoing battle against

Indians, French Canadians, royal officials, and backsliding

colonists; English witches represented an additional branch

of the same familiar enemy.

In his Magnalia, Cotton Mather surmised that due to New

England's falling from its position as "a country devoted

unto the worship and service of the Lord JESUS CHRIST above

the rest of the world," God unleashed upon the degenerate

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colonists a series of unparalleled punishments. Trying to

make sense out of the sharp judgments, he reasoned that when

God's people refused to repent in the past, He had

"suffer[ed] Devils sometimes" to visit the sinners with

perplexing and grave punishments. Earlier, the Lord had

"permitt[ed] Satan and his Instruments [the Indians] to

molest His children . . . in their Estates;" as New

England's sins persisted, He allowed the devil to assault

"their Persons and their Posterity too." "Devils and

Witches" infiltrated "not only the wigwams of Indians, where

the pagan powaws often raise their masters, in the shapes of

bears and snakes and fires," he warned, "but also in the 42 homes of white English men and women." The clergy cited

biblical precedents of God employing the forces of Satan to

achieve His ends. reminded his readers that when

the Egyptians angered God with their worldly sins, in many

ways the same worldly sins prevalent in New England, He

expressed His displeasure "by sending Evil Angels among

them."43 The only means of salvation open to the

colonists, therefore, was to expel existing "Evil Angels"

from their presence and to eliminate the sins which invited

them.

Understandably, New Englanders associated witchcraft

with Indians, their most common, most persistent, and

perhaps most frightening opponent. The colonists certainly

feared their native enemies, and Europeans traditionally

characterized Indians as devil worshippers anyway. Increase

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Mather reminded the colonists, as if it were necessary to do

so, that "it is known from their own Confessions that

amongst the Indians . . . oftentimes at their Dances the 44 Devil appears in bodily shape." No doubt existed that

Satan and the natives worked hand-in-hand in plotting the

destruction of the New England mission. This perception was

not new in 1676; in 1652 Thomas Mayhew, Jr. wrote to John

Eliot, stating, "The Devil also with his Angels had his

Kingdom among them."45 The popular association between

Indians and witches, however, was enhanced in the years

following King Philip's War.

Many deponents in witchcraft proceedings who claimed to

have experienced contact with the devil noted the

connection. Mercy Short, herself a former captive whose

whole family perished in an Indian attack, in 1692 described

a specter which she claimed appeared to her as "a Short and

a Black Man; . . . he was not of a Negro," she said, "but of

a Tawney, or an Indian colour." Cotton Mather found that

this characteristic "tawny colour," exhibiting an

unmistakable resemblance to the natives, recurred frequently

in depositions.46

The association between witchcraft and the current

enemies afflicting New England did not stop with the

Indians. "One who was Executed at Salem for Witchcraft had

confessed That at their Cheef Witch-meetings, there had been

present some French Canadians," according to Mather, along

with "some Indian Sagamores, to concert the methods of

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ruining New England."47 Such testimony revealed how deeply

the experiences of the recent decades had affected the

psyche of the colonists. King Philip's War kindled popular

suspicion of the natives on a vast and unprecedented scale,

and the tensions which followed confirmed the perception, in

Englishmen's minds, that the Indians were in league with the

devil. Colonists came to believe and fear that their

military enemies were indeed pawns of the devil in plotting

the "ruining" of New England, and conceiving that Indians

and Canadians could transmit evil to supposedly pious

Englishmen became a part of the colonial mentality at the

time.

Few Massachusetts residents seemed to question that the

accumulated troubles heaped on the colony were the designs

of the devil to destroy the errand into the wilderness or

that the natives played an integral role in the campaign.

When in August 1676 a violent storm struck the colony,

"doing much Hurt to very many" and spoiling much property,

many colonists undoubtedly believed a boast shortly

thereafter by some Indians "that they had caused it by their

Pawwaw, (i.e. worshipping the Devil)." As a further boast,

the natives predicted "that as many Englishmen shall die, as

the Trees have by this Wind been blown down in the

Woods."48 In another incident, this time in 1692, colonists

around Gloucester were plagued by strange and elusive

figures who resembled Indians and Frenchmen lurking about

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the area, and by strange occurrences such as the

inexplicable misfiring of their guns. Rev. John Emerson

wrote that he trusted that "all Rational Persons" would

realize "that Glocester was not Alarumed . . . by real

French and Indians, but that the Devil and his Agents were

the cause of all the Molestation, which at this Time befel

the Town." With every confidence that Satan had it within

his power and his design to set ambushes for New England

"with Daemons, in the Shape of Armed Indians and Frenchmen,"

even "the most Considerate Gentlemen in that

Neighbourhood . . . Believe[d] this whole matter to have

been a Prodigious piece of the Strange Descent from the

Invisible World, then made upon other parts of the Country"

as well.49 The Indians received a double indictment in the

whole affair. John Hale concluded that "the Devil could not

assume the shape of an innocent person in doing mischief

unto mankind."50 Therefore, the natives were not only

guilty of hostile activities, but by their very nature

invited the forces of evil to assist them.

The clergy of the colony undertook a program to stem

the spread of sin during the late seventeenth century. On

May 28, 1679 some of the elders suggested a synod, "for the

revisall of the platforme of discipline agreed upon by the

schismes, haeresies, prophaness, & the establishment of the

churches in one faith & order of the gospell." The avowed

purpose of the conclave was "to enquire into the causes of

Gods displeasure against New England and scripture

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. expedients for Reformation."51 The elders met the

following September, and while they enumerated a lengthy

list of specific affronts, the most serious sin affecting

New England at the time appeared to be an overall decline in

godliness and religious zeal. This flaw was a coverall

which naturally opened the way for particular wrongs such as

drinking, swearing, and excessive dress.52 Identifying the

colonists' sins, of course, was the easy part; finding

effective "expedients for Reformation" was the more pressing

and difficult task.

The decline in godliness appeared most clearly in an

apparently growing failure "to sanctifie the Sabbath day,"

especially among the youth. In Springfield, as in other

communities across the colony, the selectmen heard

complaints of "great disorder in our assembly by many young

persons stealing out of the meeting house before the

blessing be pronounced." Cotton Mather warned "that more

care should be taken respecting the Rising Generation, then

formerly hath been, that they might be brought under the

discipline of Christ." 53 Clearly, he looked to the future

of the mission with a sense of trepidation as long as the

"Rising Generation" was allowed to become complacent or even

scornful of religious discipline. This potentially

dangerous decline in spiritual zeal represented a major part

of what the General Court cited as "a wofull breach of the

fifth commandment," composed of a widespread "contempt of

authority, civil, ecclesiasticall, and domesticall." The

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court declared "that [particular] sin is highly provoking to

the Lord" and ordered "all persons under this government to

reforme so great an evil" before its progress became

irreversible.54 A decline in self discipline and in proper

respect for the symbols of authority at all levels meant

inevitable social disorder.

Already in the years immediately after King Philip's

War, when they were more sensitive than ever to such abuses,

Massachusetts leaders saw disturbing manifestations of

public disrespect. The Hampshire County Court dealt with

many cases of "high Contempt of authority." The justices

called Plaxy Holton to answer for "her ungodlie speeches

agst the Reverend Mr. Solomon Stoddard." In September 1676,

John Lee of Westfield was presented for "willfully

resist[ing] the Constable" with "many Reviling & Curssing

speaches & Language;" likewise, Samuel Smith of Northampton

faced charges for his "most Heineous, wecked, Revileing

speeches" against town authorities. The most serious case

involved "an unlawfull and Rioteous Assembly" at Hadley in

February 1676, during which several persons "Resisted the

Constable . . . in the Execution of his office," thereby

"Stirring up and anemateing Sedition, Breakeing the Peace,

Contemning and affronteing Authority. ..." The offenders

were whipped or fined and forced to post bond for their

future good behavior. The court judged such disorder "not

becomeing of the gospell Especially at such a time of sore

Affliction & Callamity by Reason of the warr with the

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Indians." Even more disturbing, the presiding justices 55 noted "how much such Evils grow amongst us." They

believed that the problem was getting worse during the

postwar period.

The problem rested, however, not only in degenerate

colonists who slighted authories but also in civil officials

and clergymen who failed to demand or earn their followers'

respect. The younger Mather warned against ministers who

neglected to encourage or enforce religious piety and

conformity, teachers who did not insist on proper

discipline, and heads of households who ignored their duty

to educate their charges in proper respect for

ecclesiastical and civil authority. He entreated ministers

to take the lead in the crusade for reform and "to witness

against the more Spiritual Sins," which he collectively

described as "the Roots of Bitterness in the midst of

us."56

Complacency and lack of spiritual vigilance led to

worldly behavior, which stood as the outward sign of New

England's growing degeneracy. Increase Mather cited sins

resulting from religious indiscipline as things "pleasing to

the Devil, but highly provoking to the Holy God." He noted

that the spread of such behavior "hinder[ed] Religious

Exercises" and led the revellers to put "impudent

contempt . . . upon the Gospel." "The Devil thereby

catcheth away the good seed of the Word," he warned, "and

the former Religious Exercise is rendered ineffectual."57

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The prevalence of excesses of the flesh, therefore,

represented both signs of the declining spiritual zeal and

causes of further degeneracy to late seventeenth-century

Puritan clergymen.

During King Philip's War, colonial authorities

prescribed special days of public humiliation, as well as

days of thanksgiving, when the situation merited them, to

bring about the desired reformation. Even after the war and

Metacom's defeat, officials continued to order fast days to

exorcise evil. On such occasions, the General Court

proclaimed "all servile labour prohibited on that day, and

the Churches ministers and people enjoined to keep it

solemnly and seriously." The purpose of these days of

humiliation was to encourage colonists to "humble themselves

before the Lord and seek his face," in hopes that "he will

still please to dwell in the midst of, and not forsake us."

Officials of the United Colonies often coordinated these

holy days in an effort to present an image of unity and

universality in the reformation effort. Of special concern

was that the ritual and the graces gained might result in

"the powring out of his Spirit upon the rising generation,"

and thereby encourage a renewal of spiritual vigor among the

future heirs of New England leadership.58

The mere ritual, however, was only an outward sign and

a beginning of the true process of reformation. "Praying

without Reforming," Cotton Mather warned, "will not do."

Figuratively, the colonists had to "Ly mourning and weeping

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and wailing in Sackcloth and Ashes, before the Lord," in

order to humble themselves sufficiently to lay their worldly

pride aside and open their hearts to the proper methods of

correction.59 At the base of the process, Mather advised

"a due execution of wholsome Laws which are founded upon the

Word of God" and a "Solemn Renewal of [the] Covenant with

God in Jesus Christ." Puritan congregational identity was

embodied in individual church covenants, whereby members

both distinguished themselves as a select group and pledged

their dedication to the spiritual mission. Therefore,

although individuals had to make restitution in their own

hearts, the renewal had to take place on a communal level,

with whole communities and congregations reaffirming their

covenants with the Lord.

There was no need to point fingers at the towns which

had suffered most from New England's accumulated enemies.

No one, in the Puritan view, was innocent and "none .

so good but we may be better, we may (and should) grow in

Grace and make progress in the work of Mortification."60

Deacon Philip Walker reminded his readers that everyone was

guilty of sin and advised that to root out the ungodliness

the colonists should "serch owr selves Each man his Secrit

hart, And Search the temple in Each privat partt."61

Reformation had to begin inside each colonist and spread to

encompass the whole in order to bring about a complete cure

of the evils threatening New England during the last quarter

of the seventeenth century.

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The general message of the clergy in their jeremiads

was that New England was declining in spiritual worth and

that self-discipline was the necessary formula for turning

the tide. In reaction to the belief that colonists were

increasingly giving in to temptation, Increase Mather

demanded that "They ought to swim against the stream, and to

keep themselves pure from the sins of the Times." He

further commanded the churches of the colony to oversee

individual repentance and "to exercise the Discipline of

Christ towards such of their Members as shall offend in this

matter."62 Mather and others called their brethren to be

steadfast in the effort.

Samuel Nowell admonished the colonists to brace

themselves and remain ever-ready to defend themselves

against their attackers, both human and supernatural. "Put

on your spiritual Armour," he advised; "look to that

Breast-plate of Righteousness." Nowell, an outspoken

proponent of military discipline and preparedness, quite

clearly drew the link between the struggles faced by the

colonists in the wilderness of the frontier and that within

their own souls. He likened the physical rigor necessary

for a soldier in the ranks to the spiritual vigor required

of New England’s Puritans. He noted an "agreement between

the Spiritual and temporal Warfare" and claimed that every

attribute "belonging to a Souldier, is made use of to

resemble some Grace or Duty of a Christian." Nowell

complained of "a strange piece of dotage befallen this

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crazy-headed age, that men should not use the sword."63 Of

course the colonists had to fight, he maintained, both

physically and spiritually, to defeat their challengers.

Anything less than a total commitment to the struggle

represented to the orthodox clergy a sign of resignation and

apathy in the face of the mission's impending doom.

In advocating total commitment against New England's

enemies, Massachusetts leaders emphasized the necessity of

solidarity, which had to which extend from the family to the

province. Those who turned their backs on their duty to

foster unity and conformity were, according to Cotton

Mather, no better than heathens. "How many that although

they are Christians in name," he asked, "are no better than

Heathens in heart, and in Conversation?" He claimed that

"whole Plantations . . . have lived from year to year,

without any publick Invocation of the Name of God, and

without his Word. And in most places," Mather lamented,

"Instituted Worship (whereby Christians are distinguished

from Heathens) hath been too much neglected." Hubbard

observed in "many of these scattering Plantations in our

Borders, that many were contented to live without, yea,

desirous to shake off all Yoake of Government, both sacred

and civil, and so transforming themselves as much as well

they could into the Manners of the Indians they lived

amongst."64

These conditions represented certain paths to doom,

according to the clergy, and the danger could only be

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alleviated through a return to strict discipline, within

both families and congregations. New England's natural

enemies, the Indians, were pictured as living without

restraint, in the wilderness, without the towns and other

communal organizations which colonial authorities portrayed

as the outward signs of civilization and Christian order.

Any trend towards breaking the ties of these valuable

agencies signalled to pious colonists a reversal of what the

founders of the mission came to America to accomplish. "The

men of a Private Spirit are loosers," Mather stated, and

insisted that "Private Spirit tenders men Obnoxious to the

terrible Displeasure of an Holy and an Angry God." He cited

a scriptural example in which disunity appeared among "some

of the Provinces of Israel." "The man of God" warned the

Israelites, "Behold, yee have Sinned against the Lord; and

be sure your Sin will find you out."65

Numerous writers pointed to the example of one

Mr. Wakely who was killed in 1675 at , in Maine.

Mather claimed that Wakely "would sometimes say with tears,

that he believed God was angry with him, because although he

came into New-England for the Gospels sake, yet he had left

another place in this Country, where there was a Church of

Christ, which he once was in Communion with, and had lived

many years in a Plantation where was no Church, nor

Instituted Worship." Nathaniel Saltonstall cited another

"Man of a singular and sordid Humour; of Great Knowledge in

the Scripture, but of no particular professed Sect or

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Perswasion," who perished at Providence in March 1676. This

man reportedly denied the necessity of communal cooperation,

instead maintaining "a strange Confidence, or rather

Conceit, that whilst he held his Bible in his Hand, he

looked upon himself as secure from all kinde of Violence."

The natives evidently proved him wrong; they "ripped him

open," according to Saltonstall, "and put his Bible in his

Belly."66 These extreme examples were obviously employed

by Massachusetts authorities as lessons against solitary

existence and removal from the webs of community and

congregation. Isolation could only bring trouble.

Saltonstall's message was particularly poignant. Even

supreme faith proved worthless in the absence of a communal

existence. New Englanders had to band together and nurture

a firm commitment to fight their enemies as one body if they

were to have any hopes of winning the ultimate victory.

An important component of the necessary solidarity was

the removal of dissenters, such as Anglicans, , and

Quakers, from Massachusetts communities. The controversy

over the elevation of the Anglican church in Boston under

Andros reflected the Puritan opposition to the English

institution. Even more troublesome were Quakers, since the

1650s a perennial thorn in the side of pious New Englanders.

Mather considered the presence of Quakers a punishment from

God, "smiting them with Spiritual Plagues for their

Unfruitfulness and Unthankfulness." Still, he thanked the

Lord that the number of Friends in the region was no

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greater, "for if they should multiply, not only would

Christianity be utterly Extinguished, but Humanity it self

Exterminated.1,67 The elimination of dissenters from the

colony, therefore, was a task of unquestionable importance

to the orthodox clergy in the effort to present a unified

front against New England's enemies.

Dissenters came in different forms, however, and not

all challengers of the orthodox conformity appeared so

blatantly evil as did the members of strange sects. Even

within Massachusetts congregations, challenges to church

unity became serious matters of discussion during the last

quarter of the seventeenth century, and the most serious and

long-lasting controversy occurred in the Connecticut Valley.

Rev. Solomon Stoddard of Northampton caused a stir among the

orthodox hierarchy during the 1670s when he began openly

relaxing the traditional requirements for full church

membership.

In July 1677, he listed 222 persons as church members,

of whom at least 40 probably could not fulfill the

requirements of the Half-Way Covenant. After 1677, the

Northampton minister stopped making distinctions between

"half-way" members and those admitted to full communion. In

his "five Harvests" (1679, 1683, 1696, 1712, and 1718),

Stoddard shocked many fellow clergymen by espousing the

belief that individual conversion experiences were not a

necessary prerequisite for acceptance to full communion.68

The frontier minister did not come up with his theory

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publicized his developing views to members of his

congregation, causing some controversy within the

Northampton body. In any case, Stoddard felt by the end of

the decade that the matter deserved discussion at the

Reforming Synod of 1679, where his comparatively liberal

beliefs naturally met with stiff opposition.69

The controversy revolved around Stoddard's insistence

that communion should be opened to "All Such as do make a

Solemn Profession of Faith, & Repentance, & are of Godly

Conversation, having Knowledge to Examine themselves, &

discern the Lords Body." Persons of faith and moral

behavior deserved full membership, he stated, "without any

examination concerning a work of grace upon their souls."

The Northampton minister claimed that the church elders

imposed an artificial and erroneous dichotomy by making

communion only a sign of regeneration rather than a means to

that end. "The Lords Supper is appointed by Jesus Christ,"

said Stoddard, "for the begetting of Grace as Well as for

the Strengthening of Grace."70 He felt that excluding

pious Christians from full church membership represented a

frustration and an impediment to the spread of God's word

across the frontier.

More conservative clergymen like Edward Taylor,

Increase Mather, and Cotton Mather could not bring

themselves to support Stoddard's innovations. Each of these

eminent ministers argued that especially in a time of

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confusion and spiritual decline, the churches had to

maintain strict standards and thus guard against

complacency. Stoddard and his opponents both sought the

same ends— the rejuvenation of religious vigor in New

England— but they obviously differed on the best means. In

a 1677 election sermon, Increase Mather warned against

teachers in the region "that have espoused loose, large

Principles here, designing to bring all persons to the Lords

Supper, who have an Historical Faith, and are not scandalous

in life, although they never had Experience of a work of 71 Regeneration on their Souls."

Taylor, the minister of the Westfield congregation,

addressed Stoddard both publicly and privately on the

matter. In 1688 he wrote to Northampton that he felt

justified in "medling," "considering as well our

familiarity, as proximity." He chastised Stoddard for

taking it upon himself to institute such a radical extension

of the already controversial Half-Way Covenant. To support

his stand, Taylor cited the Bible: "Christ saith, let him

that hath an Eare to heare hear. But he saith not, let him

that hath a mouth, to eatt, etc., eat & drink here." Taylor

denied Stoddard's assertion that communion was a valid means

to regeneracy, claiming that the "Word" but not "the Lords

Supper" was "ordained for the Conversion of Sinners." He

warned Stoddard that relaxing the requirements represented

"the ready way to trample underfoot all Church Discipline, &

to fill the Churches with all sorts of Sinners & to destroy

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Doores."72 Aside from the theological arguments, Taylor

pointed out that the innovation threatened the unity of the

colony's churches in the critical period. He knew that the

controversy would not remain confined to the Northampton

congregation but would affect churches throughout the

colony, especially on the frontier.

Sensing that frontier congregations occupied a special

place in the errand into the wilderness, Taylor worried that

as a result of Stoddard's actions "a reflection unavoidably

is Cast upon our Churches." He feared the controversy would

cause discord in neighboring congregations and encourage

"malevolent persons" to take advantage of the unsettled

situation. Just as the frontier had to hold firm against

Indian attacks, frontier congregations had to maintain a

united front against spiritual decay. Relaxing standards

for church membership would pollute the existing

congregations, he argued, rather than renew and propagate

fervor, as Stoddard hoped. "And how grievous this may

prove," despaired Taylor, "who knows?" Still, he was

confident, as of the turn of the century anyway, that public

opinion ran "100 or 1000 against One" in opposition to the

reform.73

Taylor's warning that the matter would tear at the

unity of Stoddard's congregation and adversely affect other

communities in the long run seemed to be accurate during the

late seventeenth century. As for the immediate effects in

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Northampton, however, dissension existed among the

churchmembers even before the progressive minister's

arrival. The question of restrictive versus expanded

standards for full membership surfaced during the 1660s, and

as the discussion continued, Northampton became a center of

reform against traditional clerical authority, in favor of

lay initiative. Residents of the town were no strangers to

controversy when Stoddard began to announce his beliefs

during the 1670s, though it took nearly two decades for the

church to officially adopt his reforms. By the 1690s, with

the maturation of a new generation, the Northampton

congregation finally resolved the question by voting to

accept Stoddard's definition of church membership.74

Stoddard's brand of presbyterianism— a term applied to those

moderate views which advocated the loosened

standards— definitely caught on more in the frontier region

than it did in the more established eastern areas of the

colony. Congregations up and down the Connecticut Valley

opted for "Mr. Stoddard's Way" during the period, the

notable exception being Westfield, where the church under

Taylor's leadership maintained the traditional requirements

well into the eighteenth century.75

Much has been made of the fact that the liberalized

views first appeared and took root on the frontier; perhaps

in some cases, too much has been made of it. Still, a

parallel must be drawn between the social and demographic

nature of frontier communities and the desire for more lay

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control over church matters, including membership decisions.

Life on the Connecticut River, particularly during the

unsettled period of the late seventeenth century, required

an assertiveness on the part of the residents in defending

themselves and ordering their community affairs. This

outlook naturally would have carried over into

congregational matters as well. In addition, the growing

sense of worldliness, combined with the evident decline in

spiritual vigor among members of the second generation,

understandably produced an attitudinal change concerning

criteria for church participation. Whether this

transformation represented degeneracy or merely evolution,

conditions in such frontier areas as the Connecticut Valley

fostered demand for reform during the postwar decades.

In this and other ways, Massachusetts colonists were

affected by the experience of King Philip's War and its

legacies, as settlement continued to spread out onto the

frontier. While orthodox ministers continued to preach the

spiritual causes and lessons attributed to New England's

misfortunes at the time, a definite trend toward secular

interest and worldliness grew among the residents of the

region. They were not all necessarily the degenerate

backsliders of whom ministers complained, but King Philip's

War did make colonists more aware of the assorted forces

working against them and more willing to take action to

protect their interests. Of course, this assertiveness

disturbed the orthodox clergy who clung to the traditional

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 303 norms of communal and congregational discipline, but even

while delivering jeremiads against internal evils which

threatened the mission, they continued to hold hope for

ultimate salvation, through "the undeserved favours of God"

whose "mercy endureth for ever."76

Numerous New England writers cited scriptural

precedents to draw some positive encouragement from God's

"fatherly chastisements," during the last quarter of the

seventeenth century. Quoting Psalm 118, Mary Rowlandson

pondered how "the Lord hast chastened me sore, yet he hath

not given me over to death." Increase Mather even found

reason to rejoice in God's punishment of the colonists. "As

many as I love," he found the Lord proclaiming in the Book

of Revelation, "I rebuke and chasten."77 As long as they

continued to feel the effects of providential correction,

therefore, New Englanders could be confident of God's love.

Humans could never attain perfection, so divine rebukes were

good signs to Puritans who looked to the future, as long as

their fellow colonists reacted to the trials with the proper

spirit of humility and repentence.

John Higginson encouraged the effort by quoting the

Book of Chronicles, wherein the Lord promised, "If my

people, who are called by my name, shall humble themselves,

and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways,

then will I hear their prayers, forgive their sins, and heal

their land; and mine eyes, and mine heart, shall be upon

them perpetually for good!" Mather concurred; "when a

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Sinful People Humble themselves before the Almighty God, it

is an Hopeful And an Happy Sympton, that He will not utterly

Destroy such a People."78 On the other hand, he cited the

example of Sodom, where the people disregarded the Lord's

warnings and refused to reform, and therefore "God sent a

fire upon the town that made it an eternal desolation." The

Almighty did not want to destroy New England because, as

Mather pointed out, "The Great God is greatly Glorify'd by 79 the prosperity of His People." Still, sincere

reformation was necessary in order to regain redemption and

a return to favor.

In spite of the monumental task of spreading

reformation throughout the colony, Higginson had faith that

"there are as yet many signs of his gracious presence with

us," most significantly "in and with the hearts and souls of

a considerable number of his people in New-England." Samuel

Nowell, speaking in his usual militaristic tone, expressed

confidence that the colonists had "Spirit and Courage

enough" to meet the challenges and described them as "a

People bred up in this Country, that have the heart of

Lions." The major concern, of course, revolved around the

fortitude of the younger generation, an age-old theme.

While pointing out that "the body of the second Generation

be wofully degenerate," Cotton Mather admitted,

"nevertheless there are some of them (and through Grace

many) that are eminently faithfull to the Lord Jesus and his

interest, being of the same Principles & Spirit, that their

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blessed Fathers were of before them.”80 Hope was not lost.

Despite all the trials and hardships, not the least of which

was the slow progress toward true repentance, a glimmer of

optimism remained that the Lord still had work for the

colonists to accomplish in New England and that enough of

them would remain worthy to warrant His favor.

Realistically, even the clerical jeremiahs had to hold out

some promise of success; anything less would have

represented an acknowledgment of failure.

The postwar period was part of a learning process for

Puritan New Englanders. They had to learn many

lessons— some good, some bad; some willingly, others

reluctantly— about themselves and both the physical and

supernatural world around them. Like it or not, even

devout, orthodox Puritans had to realize that the nature of

their mission had to change, inevitably, in response to

forces affecting New England from within as well as from

outside. An important lesson appeared in the optimistic

outlook for God's continued favor; the errand could

persist, even if in an altered form. King Philip's War and

the troubled years that followed accentuated the changes

occurring in the region, and of course, this illumination

startled and disturbed conservatives. Still, they predicted

that enough of the original spirit, if not all of the

original conventions, remained by the end of the century to

keep the errand into the wilderness alive, if only the

colonists would learn their lessons from the trials of the

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period. According to Thomas Wheeler, the most significant

and long-lasting message which emerged for New Englanders

was the need "to trust and Rely upon [God] in the sorest

straits, and . . . to wait patiently for Deliverance in the

greatest danger that may befall them." They must never

forget the mercy and goodness of their Creator. The "Lord

hath made his wonderful works to be remembered," wrote

Wheeler, "and he would have his People to tell them to their

Children, that they might also declare them to their

Children."81 If New Englanders could extract this simple

lesson from their deliverances of the period, then hope

remained for the future.

In a symbolic conclusion to his narrative of King

Philip's War, Benjamin Church unwittingly summed up the

intellectual legacies of the post-war period. One of the

last bands of Indians captured by Church's company

supposedly included an old native man named "Conscience."

"Conscience said the Captain (smiling)," when he heard the

captive's name, "then the War is over, for that was what

they were searching for, it being much wanting. . . . »82

Church, not known for his strict piety, may have intended

the allegory as a slap at the more insistent orthodox

leaders, but he was more insightful than he intended.

Throughout the last quarter of the seventeenth century,

Massachusetts colonists were undergoing an examination of

conscience. Not all of them, of course, intended the

process as a cleansing or renewing endeavor in the spiritual

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 307 sense, as clergymen like the Mathers insisted. In a more

general way, New Englanders at the time were taking a new

look at themselves and how they fit into the world around

them. King Philip's War did not cause all of the changes

underway in the colonies during the period, but it made the

colonists more sensitive to them and thus influenced the

ways in which the settlers of the New England frontier

viewed the changing situation. They lived through a

traumatic period. The search for conscience did not end in

1676, as Church suggested. Rather, the whole postwar period

involved a process of trying to define or redefine the

collective conscience of the New England mission to cope

with present trials and to carry the experiment into the

future.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. E.F.M. Durbin and John Bowlby, "Personal Aggressiveness and War," in Bramson and Goethals, eds., War, 89; Allport, "Role of Expectancy," 181.

2. Wright, Study of War, I, 287-288; Durbin and Bowlby, "Personal Aggressiveness and War," 92; Salisbury, "Conquest of the 'Savage'," 18-19.

3. John G. Kennedy, "Ritual and Intergroup Murder: Comments on War, Primitive and Modern," in Walsh, ed., War and the Human Race, 41; Wright, Study of War, I, 253, 398, II, 1017; G.W.F. Hegel, "War is a Dynamic Necessity," in Brayton and Landwehr, Politics of War and Peace, 48.

4. Quincy Wright cites this effort to use war to reshape community attitudes and direction, even within churches, as a common quality of the phenomenon. Wright, Study of War, I, 396, II, 691-692, 1016, 1030-1031; Slotkin cites the as a key genre in the attempt to use wartime experiences to modify public behavior. See, Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, 94-95.

5. Kennedy, "Ritual and Intergroup Murder," 54-55; Quincy Wright, A Study of War Intro. Karl W. Deutsch, Abridged Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), xiv. (All citations from the text come from the unabridged edition.); Wright, Study of War, II, 1105-1105, 1110-1111; D.O. Hebb and W.R. Thompson, "Emotion and Society," in Bramson and Goethals, eds., War, 59-60; Harry Stack Sullivan, "Toward a Psychiatry of Peoples," in Bramson and Goethals, eds., War, 110; According to Wright, "Wars of large magnitude have been followed by anti-intellectual movements in art, literature, and philosophy; by waves of crime, sexual license, suicide, venereal disease, delinquent youth; by class, racial, and religious intolerance, persecution, refugees, social and political revolution; by abandonment of orderly processes for settling disputes and changing law, and by a decline in respect for international law and treaties." Although written in a generic sense, Wright's description fits the situation in late seventeenth-century Massachusetts in general, and in many particulars. Wright, Study of War, I, 246.

6. Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 243, 249; See also, Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, 15; Allport, "Role of Expectancy," 182.

7. Hubbard, History, I, 120; Deacon Philip Walker,

308

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"The First Smile of God in this Land," cited in, Bowen, Early Rehoboth, III, 45; See also, Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 65.

8. Mather, "Brief History," 141.

9. Thomas Hobbes, "War is an Extension of Emotions," in Brayton and Landwehr, Politics of War and Peace, 29; According to Allport, in situations similar to those experienced by New Englanders of the late seventeenth century, people "expect [war] to continue. And what people expect determines their behavior." Allport, "Role of Expectancy," 177.

10. Leach, Colonial Frontier, 60.

11. On May 15, 1679 Taylor and Thomas Noble wrote to the General Court "that it was a question whether we Should abide there, or no." Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield," 27.

12. Mather, Magnalia, I, 215.

13. MA, 30:256, 315a, 316, 316a; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 215; In Groton, the selectmen on January 31, 1682 declared "the Indanes shall be warned out of the Toune forth with and if [they] shall neiglect the warning and if any of them be taken drounke or in drinke or with drink Then these parsons ar to be sezed and brout be foure the select men." Green, Early Records of Groton, 69, 73, 100; Green, Historical Sketch of Groton, 34; Mendon inhabitants also expressed fear at the "great Intemperence" of the natives, which they feared put them "in noe small Danger from time to time" and asked the General Court to prevent local Indians from entering the town without "order from authority." MA, 30:304.

14. Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 266; James E. Kences, "Some Unexplored Relationships of Essex County Witchcraft to the Indian Wars of 1675 and 1689," Essex Institute Historical Collections 120(1984):183; [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 82-83; Earlier, in 1677, a mob of women in Marblehead fell upon two native captives and "very barbarously murdered them." After the attack with "stones [and] billets of wood," the native corpses were found "with their heads off and gone, and their flesh in a manner pulled from their bones." See, James Axtell, "The Vengeful Women of Marblehead: Robert Roules's Depositon of 1677," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 31(1974):647-652; For a discussion of the long-term effects of Indian hostilities on the colonists, see, James Axtell, The European and the Indian, 273-275, 300-315; See, Axtell,

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"Scholastic Philosophy," 344-345.

15. Hubbard, History, II, 228; John Pynchon to Captain Sylvester Salisbury, October 5, 1677. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 174-175; The colonies agreed to friendship with the Mohawks in April 1677 and sealed the pact with "2 belts and some seawant" [wampum]. John Pynchon and James Richards to the Mohawk Indians, April 24, 1677. Ibid., 172; For accounts of hostility between the Mohawks and the New England tribes, see, Gookin, "Historical Collections," 166-167; See also, Johnson, "Search for a Usable Indian," 623-651; Jennings, Invasion of America, 314-318.

16. MA, 69:222; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 165-166; The Massachusetts Council claimed that between 1677 and 1680, sixty friendly Indians in the colony lost their lives at the hands of the Mohawks, in addition to an intolerable amount of English livestock and other property destroyed. Ibid., 300; MA, 30:251-252; See also, Pulsifer, ed., Records of New Plymouth, X, 366; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 199-200.

17. John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, July 30, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 197; MA, 107:239; While Pynchon admitted that actually hiring the Iroquois in 1689 probably was not the correct course, "What is done underhand by advice to them is another thing." John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, August 10, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 206; See also, Pynchon's Speech to the Mohawks, November 9, 1683. Ibid., 179-181; John Pynchon to the Governor and Council, November 16, 1683. Ibid., 181-182; Propositions Made to the Five Nations, September 23, 1689. Ibid., 214.

18. John Pynchon to Governor Simon Bradstreet, December 2, 1691. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 237; John Pynchon to the Governor and Council, January 18, 1691/2. Ibid., 242; MA, 37:214; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 233.

19. MA, 37:246; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 224-226; See also, MA, 37:222a; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 223-224.

20. Cited in, Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 216; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 256; Moody, ed., Saltonstall Papers, 204-205; See also, MA, 2:223, 37:340.

21. Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 206; Cotton Mather, "The People of God," in Morgan, ed., Puritan

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Political Ideas, 243; He also warned that because of New Englanders' continuing sinfulness, God was punishing them "with an Ax, a French ax, accompanied with Indian Hatchets." Mather, Present State, 34; For an explanation of English attitudes toward Catholicism, see, Sister Mary Augustina Ray, B.V.M., American Opinion of Roman Catholicism in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), 28-29, and passim.

22. John Gyles, "Memoirs of Old Adventures, Strange Deliverances, etc., in the Captivity of John Gyles, Esq." in Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, 77-78; See also, Kences, "Witchcraft and the Indian Wars," 183.

23. MA, 30:310-311, 129:240-241; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 113-116; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, I, 214.

24. Hall, Leder and Kammen, eds., Documents on the Glorious Revolution. 49, 58; "Revolution Justified," 28; Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., XIII, 71-72.

25. John Pynchon to Governor Simon Bradstreet, December 5, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 219; MA, 35:102; Mather, Magnalia, I, 183-184; See also, MA, 70:274-276; In 1689, Pynchon suggested encouraging the Mohawks to turn against the French, and in fact he did so, attempting to manipulate their efforts for the good of the colony. John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, August 10, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 206; Propositions to the Five Nations, September 23, 1689. Ibid., 214.

26. Mather, "People of God," 243.

27. Shurtleff, ed., Records, IV, pt. 1, 201, V, 240-241; Hampshire County Court Records, March 26, 1678; Whitmore, ed., Colonial Laws, 5, 270, 339-340, 347; See also, Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., X, 137-138; For examples of early warnings against excessive dress, see, Darrett B. Rutman, Winthrop's Boston: A Portrait of a Puritan Town, 1620-1649 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 143, 253, 259.

28. Hampshire Court Records, March 26, 1678; Hampshire Probate, 170, 172, 177-178, 185-186, 192-195; See also, Judd, Hadley, 91-92; Trumbull, History of Northampton, 290-291; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 369-370; Young claimed that after the war, the Salem selectmen had to warn citizens against ungodly behavior much more often than previously. Young, "Good Order" to Glorious Revolution, 159-162.

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29. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 469-470.

30. Increase Mather, "An Arrow Against Profane and Promiscuous Dancing Drawn out of the Quiver of the Scriptures (1685)," in Joseph E. Marks, III, ed., The Mathers on Dancing (Brooklyn:Dance Horizons, 1975), 31-32, 34-35, 48; Cotton Mather, "A Cloud of Witnesses," in Ibid., 66; Mather, "Autobiography," 319.

31. Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," 286-290.

32. Mather, Present State, 29, 44; Cotton Mather, Humiliations Follow'd With Deliverances rpt:1697 (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1977), 34; Given the situation, Mather stated, "I am not altogether without fears, that there is yet another Storm hastening upon this Land, if Repentance avert it not. . . ." Mather, "Earnest Exhortation," 144, 171.

33. Cited in, Nash, Red, White and Black, 223; Miller, New England Mind, 37; See also, Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 71-72; For a discussion of concern over the spread of settlement, see, Axtell, "Scholastic Philosophy," 356-360; Richard Dunn cited Fitz John Winthrop and Wair Winthrop as prime examples of the sorts of "worldly" colonists that Mather complained about. In their "degeneracy" they really did nothing blatantly wrong, but lacked a "divine moral purpose" reflected in their attraction to land, fashion, and comfort. Richard S. Dunn, Puritans and : The Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 191.

34. Benjamin Tompson, "New England Crisis, or a Brief Narrative of New England's Lamentable Estate at Present," in Slotkin and Folsom, ed., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 216; Cotton Mather also reminded his readers of an earlier period, when "a prayerful, a watchful, a fruitful Christian, and a well-governed family, was a more common sight, than it is now in our days." Mather, Magnalia, I, 103.

35. Rowlandson, "Captivity and Restauration," 328, 337, 346, 366; Likewise, Mather wrote his Magnalia not only as a history to record and glorify past events but also to serve as a warning against the "fearful degeneracy . rushing in upon" New England congregations. Mather, Magnalia, Ed., Murdock, 26.

36. For discussions of this perception, see, William Hubbard, The Present State of New England, Being a Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians rpt:1677, Intro. Cecelia Tichi (Bainbridge: York Mail-Print, Inc., 1972), iv;

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Trumbull, Indian Wars, 117-118; Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 182; Slotkin and Folsom, ed., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 4, 7-8; Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, 41; For conflicting interpretations, see, Trumbull, History of Northampton, 349; Trumbull, Indian Wars, 117-118.

37. For differing views on the role and significance of jeremiads in American history, see, Miller, Errand, 1-15; Miller, Nature's Nation, 23, 32, 41-45; Miller, New England Mind, 29, 47-48; Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: University of Wisonsin Press, 1978), chapters 1-3.

38. Mather, "Brief History," 86.

39. Solomon Stoddard, "God's Frown in the Death of Usefull Men," 1702/3. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 314; John Higginson, "Attestation," in Mather, Magnalia, I, 16.

40. Mather, Present State, 28-29; See also, Segal and Stineback, Manifest Destiny, 185.

41. See, Sally Smith Booth, The Witches of Early America (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1975), 111; Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 180; William S. Simmons, "Cultural Bias in the New England Puritans' Perception of Indians,5' William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 38(1981):56-58; Kences, "Witchcraft and the Indian Wars," 204-208, 212; Citing witchcraft as a "social strain guage," Demos draws a pattern between times of high anxiety when New Englanders needed an outlet for their tensions and times of increased withcraft activity. John Demos, Entertaining Satan: Witchcraft and the Culture of Early New England (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 276, 369-370, 381-383.

42. Mather, Magnalia, I, 205; Cotton Mather, "Memorable Providences Relating to Witchcrafts and Possessions," in George L. Burr, ed., Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases, 1648-1706 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), 95-96, 99; Mather pledged to "set my self to Countermine the whole Plot of the Devil against New England. ." Cotton Mather, "The Wonders of the Invisible World," in Ibid., 211.

43. John Hale, "A Modest Inquiry into the Nature of Witchcraft (1702)," in Burr, ed., Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases, 429.

44. Mather, "Arrow Against Profane and Promiscuous

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Dancing," 50-51; For a discussion of beliefs and perceptions concerning witchcraft, see, Kences, "Witchcraft and the Indian Wars," 185-186; Simmons, "Puritans' Perception of Indians," 60; Booth, Witches of Early America, 31-32.

45. Cited in, Simmons, "Puritans' Perception of Indians," 62.

46. Cotton Mather, "A Brand Pluck'd Out of the Burning," in Burr, ed., Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases, 261; Mather, Magnalia, I, 206; Mather, "Wonders of the Invisible World," 220; See also, Booth, Witches of Early America, 26; Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 105.

47. Mather, "Brand Pluck'd Out of the Burning," 281-282; See also, Kences, "Witchcraft and the Indian Wars," 199; The incidences of deponents describing their afflictors as Indians seemed fewer before 1675, as French Canadians non-existent. See, for instance, Samuel A. Green, Groton in the Witchcraft Times (Groton: Privately Published, 1883), 7-14.

48. S[altonstall], "Present State of New-England," 44.

49. Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 243-247; See also, Gyles, "Captivity of John Gyles," 91-92; Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 75-76.

50. Hale, "A Modest Inquiry," 411; New Englanders assumed that people could come under the spell of witchcraft merely by association with Indians. For instance, in 1692, Captain was accused of witchcraft because he sold "powder and shot to the Indians and French, and [lay] with Indian squaws and had Indian papooses." Kences, "Witchcraft and the Indian Wars," 191, 207; See also, Mather, "Wonders of the Invisible World," 245; For a survey of seventeenth-century New.England witchcraft cases, see, Demos, Entertaining Satan, 402-409.

51. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 215; Mather, "Autobiography," 305; MA, 10:196-198; Despite the evident concern, Hutchinson judged in 1765 that "we have no evidence of any extraordinary degeneracy." Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, 274.

52. Mather, "Earnest Exhortation," 176-181; Mather, Humiliations, 7-11; See, Miller, Nature's Nation, 23-25; Miller, New England Mind, 36.

53. Mather, "Brief History," 105; Mather, Magnalia, I, 100-101; Burt, ed., Springfield Records, I, 429-430.

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54. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 62.

55. The Hadley defendents were charged with preventing the constable from "ye Execution of a Sentence." Hampshire Probate, 168-169, 177-180, 185, 197; Smith, ed., Pynchon Court Record, 285, 288.

56. Mather, Present State, 50; See also, Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 297-299; Mather, "Earnest Exhortation," 174; Breen claimed that by the 1670s and 1680s, religious leaders were losing confidence in their earlier trust of civil leaders to enforce laws as the clergy saw fit. He claimed that a rift was developing at the time between magistrates and orthodox ministers like the Mathers. Breen, "Character of the Good Ruler," 169, 175-176.

57. Mather, "Arrow Against Profane and Promiscuous Dancing," 37, 46-47; See also, Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 308.

58. Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 196, 462-463; Sainsbury, ed., CSP, Col. Ser., X, 164; Pulsifer, ed., Records of New Plymouth, X, 398; See also, Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 221, 388, 465-466, 509-510; Pulsifer, ed., Records of New Plymouth, X, 44; Cotton Mather cited as an important function of the fast days "to Implore the Grace of God for the Rising Generation, [which] would probably be of blessed consequence, for the Turning of our Young people unto the God of our Fathers. The more there is this way ascribed unto Grace, the more the Grace of God is like to be communicated; and there is in this way a natural and a plentiful Tendency to Awaken our Unconverted Youth unto a sense of their Everlasting Interests. . . ." Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 300.

59. Mather, "Brief History," 104; Mather, Present State, 9-10; The Governor and General Court proclaimed the post-war period "a Probation time," after which New England would perish "if a speedy Reformation of our Provoking Evils prevent it not." Cited in, Ibid., 47-48.

60. Mather, "Earnest Exhortation," 182-183; See also, Miller, New England Mind, 24; For a discussion of covenant renewals in the aftermath of King Philip's War, see, Robert G. Pope, The Half-Way Covenant; Church Membership in Puritan New England (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1969), 241-246.

61. Cited in, Bowen, Early Rehoboth, III, 41, 49.

62. Mather, "Arrow Against Profane and Promiscuous Dancing," 54-55; He also advised pious colonists to

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"withdraw your selves from every Brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the Tradition which he received from us." The unregenerate, he said, should be "removed out of Churches by Discipline, which is the Broom of Christ, whereby he keeps his Churches clean." Ibid., 55-56; For a discussion of the motivations and the values of the jeremiads, see, Miller, Nature's Nation, 41-45, 48; Miller, New England Mind, 47-48.

63. Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," 278, 285, 292; See also, Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 263; Increase Mather looked to another method of removing New England's enemies, in 1687, "wayting and praying for an earthquake, which shall issue in the downfall of the Lords enemies and the exaltation of Christs Kingdome and Interest." Mather, "Autobiography," 320.

64. Mather, "Earnest Exhortation," 174-175; Hubbard, History, II, 256-257; See also, Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, 81, 108-109, 153, 157; Simmons, "Puritans' Perception of Indians," 71; Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 15; Carroll, Puritanism and The Wilderness, 195; For a discussion on the colonists' attraction, or lack thereof, to living among the natives, see, Alden T. Vaughan and Daniel Richter, "Crossing the Cultural Divide; Indians and New Englanders, 1605-1763," Proceedings of the American Antiguarian Society 90(1980);71; James Axtell, "The White Indians of Colonial America," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 32(1975):55-88; Axtell, "Scholastic Philosophy," 356-366.

65. Mather, Present State, 23-24.

66. Mather, "Brief History," 99; [Saltonstall], "New and Further Narrative," 86; See also, Hubbard, History, II, 103-104; Ellis and Morris, King Philip's War, v; Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 371.

67. Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 292; Mather especially decried a Quaker named , who during the 1690s published books which claimed the Puritans were justly rewarded in 1675 and 1676 "for their Unrighteous Dealings, toward the Native Indians." Ibid., 278; For a discussion of the Anglican controversy between Andros and the Puritan leaders, see, Barnes, Dominion of New England, 60-61, 123-124, 128-130; Hall, Edward Randolph, 48, 115; Richard Hutchinson presented a minority opinion at the time, lamenting "how severe some of us have been to Dissenters, making Spoil without Pity." R[ichard] H[utchinson], "The Warr in New-England Visibly Ended (1677)," in Lincoln, ed., Indians Wars, 103.

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68. Sibley, Graduates of Harvard, II, 113-114; Miller, Errand, 160; Thomas M. Davis and Virginia L. Davis, Edward Taylor vs. Solomon Stoddard: The Nature of the Lord's Supper (Boston; Twayne Publishers, 1981), 4-5, 73-74; Miller, New England Mind. 227; Pope, Half-Way Covenant, 251-257; For a discussion of New England church membership in general, see, Ibid., 3-10.

69. See, Davis and Davis, Taylor vs. Stoddard, 2, 8-9, 17-18, 25-26.

70. Ibid., 15, 67-69, 131; Stoddard wrote to Taylor in 1688 that he believed the overly strict requirements for church membership had been "the occasion of the greate Prophaneness & Corruption that hath over spread the Land." Ibid., 66; See also, Sibley, Graduates of Harvard. II, 117; Pope points out that Northampton was not the only congregation in which the debate over full church membership took place. Pope, Half-Way Covenant, 247-251.

71. Davis and Davis, Taylor vs. Stoddard, 4; See also, Ibid., 10, 32; Miller, Nature's Nation, 26.

72. Davis and Davis, Taylor vs. Stoddard, 63, 93, 157, 210-211; In his initial correspondence, Taylor assured that he wrote "not to alienate [Stoddard], but the Contrary." Ibid., 65; Actually, during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the Half-Way Covenant became accepted in many areas as a relatively moderate view and as a means toward reformation, even by the likes of Taylor and the Mathers. Pope, Half-Way Covenant, 185-205.

73. Davis and Davis. Taylor vs. Stoddard, 64, 87, 209.

74. Paul R. Lucas, Valley of Discord; Church and Society Along the Connecticut River, 1636-1725 (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1976), 84-85, 114, 131-132.

75. Ibid., 60, 122-126, 145; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 346-348; Accompanying the move towards a Presbyterian orientation in the Valley was a feeling of anti-clericalism, a sentiment which the authoritative Stoddard definitely did not encourage. See, Lucas, Valley of Discord, 65, 131-132; According to Perry Miller, Presbyterianism became popular on the frontier because there, all men, of whatever status, worked and fought side-by-side, making the imposed stratification of official church membership less important. In addition, Stoddard "became a power because he spoke for the Valley, in a forthright, plain style such as a neurotic Cotton Mather could never emulate." Miller, New England Mind, 229-230,

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257-258, 283; See also, Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 17.

76. Mather, Magnalia, I, 91-93.

77. Higginson, "Attestation,11 in Mather, Magnalia, I, 14; Rowlandson, "Captivity and Restauration," 336; Mather, Magnalia, Ed., Murdock, 5; Rowlandson echoed Mather's sentiment, citing from Proverbs, "for to the hungry soul, every bitter thing is sweet." Rowlandson, "Captivity and Restauration," 335; See also, Mather, Present State, 5.

78. Higginson, "Attestation," in Mather, Magnalia, I, 14; Mather, Humiliations, 6-7; He further stated, "Were such an Humiliation once obtained, Then would our God say, I see, they have Humbled themselves, I will not utterly Destroy them!" Ibid., 16.

79. Mather, Magnalia, I, 99; Mather, Present State, 18-19; See also, MA, 107:239; John Pynchon to Secretary Isaac Addington, Julv 30, 1689. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 197; Shurtleff, ed., Records, V, 293-294, 377.

80. Higginson, "Attestation," in Mather, Magnalia, I, 14; Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," 290; Mather, "Earnest Exhortation," 192.

81. Wheeler, "A Thankefull Remembrance," 240; For a similar interpretation, see, Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 6-9, 12-17, 84.

82. Church, "Entertaining Passages," 463-464; See also, Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence, 177.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONCLUSION

In 1676, Increase Mather saw "good reason to hope that

this Day of Trouble is near to an end." Samuel Nowell

agreed two years later, stating, "Our own greatest tryals

seem to me to be behind."1 Such optimistic predictions

followed closely Metacom's death and the defeat of his

scattered bands. At the time, neither these clergymen nor

any other New Englanders could have foreseen that the recent

adversity would extend any farther than the immediate

aftermath of the conflict. But, the challenges to the

errand into the wilderness did not die with the native

warriors; rather, the legacies of King Philip's War

lingered throughout the ensuing decades, and new attacks

appeared on several fronts. King Philip's War was not the

sole or direct cause of all of New England's accumulated

trials during the last quarter of the seventeenth century,

It was, however, the first in a series of crises, and it was

the event to which contemporary Massachusetts colonists

continually referred. Some of the direct legacies of the

war persisted throughout the period, but more significantly,

the struggle against Metacom initiated an era of general

tension. As a result, New England underwent a number of

changes during the decades following King Philip's War. 319

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Ethnically, the period witnessed the virtual

elimination from the area of colonial settlement of any

Indian bands not under the direct control of the provincial

government. Nearly all of the tribes residing on the

Massachusetts frontiers, including the Nipmucks of the

interior, joined with Metacom's Wampanoags in open enmity

against the colonies, and the English undertook to erase any

hostile elements from the region. In the end, the depletion

of the native population attested to the success of the 2 colonists' campaigns. Even the Praying Indians who lived

within the province's jurisdiction suffered the effects of

the conflict. During the war they experienced distrust,

confinement, and violence from their white neighbors; after

1676, the Praying Indians still faced prejudice and physical

restrictions. Even the Apostle, John Eliot, expressed

concern by 1690 that "There is a cloud, a dark cloud upon

the work of the gospel among the poor Indians."3 Although

the missionary effort did go on, King Philip's War and the

continuing anxiety adversely affected the atmosphere of

cultural relations in the colonies.

Economically, New Englanders paid for King Philip's War

throughout the period, and in fact, the lingering deficits

still existed when King William's War erupted in 1689.

Actually, the solution to the problem proved as disruptive

as the expenditures themselves. The Massachusetts

government had to resort to unprecedented levels of taxation

to replenish the treasury, but towns as well as individuals

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did their best to avoid the multiple rates. Some colonists

attempted to gain formal abatements or deferments from

Boston, while others simply refused to pay their levies.

Therefore, recovering from the deficits of King Philip's War

represented an ongoing source of contention, on both the

local and the provincial level.

Demographically, the scars of King Philip's War did not

soon disappear from the Massachusetts frontier. Over 600

soldiers plus countless noncombatants lost their lives in

the conflict.4 Even more disruptive, in the long run, were

the effects of the war on the frontier settlements. The

more exposed plantations, such as Deerfield, Northfield,

Groton, and Lancaster experienced periods of complete

abandonment, while other frontier communities such as

Springfield, Westfield, and Northampton suffered from direct

native attacks and persistent fears thereof. In any case, a

major emphasis throughout Massachusetts after the war

involved government orders and clergymen's admonitions for

compact settlement. The effort was an ongoing struggle, and

with continued threats on the frontiers, the search for

stable, permanent community order was never accomplished in

some places before the outbreak of King William's War. The

physical wounds of King Philip's War did not heal quickly

because of the lingering uneasiness, and when the new

conflict erupted in 1689, some of the damaged areas

collapsed again. Although not completely stymied by the

initial conflict, the face of the Massachusetts frontier was

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definitely altered by the experiences of King Philip's War.

Political concerns further compounded the recovery

effort in New England. On the provincial level, the crown

revoked the cherished Massachusetts charter in 1684 and in

its place instituted the Dominion of New England. The

colonists viewed this development not only as an

infringement upon their civil privileges but also as a

spiritual challenge, just as serious as the Indian war,

since the charter represented the basis of the errand into

the wilderness. Massachusetts residents overcame this trial

with the Glorious Revolution of 1689, and throughout the

period, the colonists expressed a preference for familiar

trusted leaders. They displayed this same preference on the

local level, but the upheaval which occurred in Boston never

appeared in the scattered towns because residents

consistently reelected thier established selectmen without

interruption. This vote of confidence, however, was

accompanied by a new spirit of assertive’* ss by townspeople

all over the colony, as countless towns enacted restrictions

on the traditional powers of their local leaders. Only in

isolated militia affairs did notable local disruptions

occur. If the trials of the period, beginning with King

Philip's War, reminded colonists of their preference for the

old order, the accumulated challenges also taught them to

become more active in protecting their own interests.

The collective New England mind naturally underwent

changes in response to the unprecedented level of upheaval

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in the colonies during the last quarter of the seventeenth

century. The colonists faced new challenges, both

physically and intellectually, and coping with the tensions

left its mark on the colonial psyche. As noted, New

Englanders became ever watchful of potential, in any form,

and throughout the period they maintained 11 a warlike

Posture," ready to respond to the slightest threat.5

Ministers and laymen alike warned their brethren to stay

prepared against the forces of evil that attacked the

mission. The Reverend Samuel Nowell, in particular, advised

the colonists to "Put on your spiritual Armour" and "look to

that Breast-plate of Righteousness.1,6 The jeremiads of the

period blasted the apparent spiritual decline in the

colonies and warned of impending doom if the colonists

failed to dedicate themselves to reformation. But the

sermons also included the optimistic messages that God still

had work for the Englishmen to do in America and that enough

worthy colonists remained to merit His continued

approbation. New England had changed in the half-century

since John Winthrop and his followers inaugurated the

errand, and even the jeremiahs had to recognize that fact.

But the experiences of the last quarter of the seventeenth

century had provided the lesson that the mission could

survive through periods of turmoil and adversity. The

colonies had survived King Philip's War; they could

persevere through any challenge, according to the orthodox

clergy, if only the residents would place their ultimate

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faith in God.

King Philip's War proved to be the focal point of a

period of trial for the New England colonies. The conflict

was the first crisis in a quarter-century of almost constant

tension. Even after Metacom's defeat, the lingering

legacies and the appearance of new challenges kept the

colonists from truly recovering any sense of physical or

mental tranquility before the next wave of warfare broke out

in 1689. But the troubled times also provided valuable

lessons for the future of the errand into the wilderness.

The colonists learned that despite facing overwhelming

obstacles— including the destruction of frontier towns, the

loss of their charter, huge economic deficits, and the

alarming spread of worldliness— the New England colonies

would survive. Further, the crucial decades represented a

period of maturation and helped to redefine the mission.

The colonists were confronted with both worldly and

spiritual problems on an unprecedented scale, and the

experiences had to be incorporated into the New England way.

The errand was originally founded on idealistic visions;

King Philip's War and the related legacies forced New

Englanders to adapt and respond with greater flexibility and

practicality to assure the future of the mission.

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1. Mather, "Brief History,"142; Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," 286.

2. See, Cook, "Interracial Warfare and Population Decline," 1-24; Cook, "Disease and the Extinction of the New England Indians," 485-508.

3. Cited in, Mather, Magnalia. I, 577.

4. Jennings, Invasion of America, 324; Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 243-244; Melvoin, "New England Outpost," 159.

5. John Pynchon to the Governor and Council, January 18, 1691/2. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 242; MA, 37:214.

6. Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," 278, 285, 293.

325

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Michael Joseph Puglisi

The author was born in Arlington, Virginia, October 2, 1958. He graduated from Bishop Denis J. O'Connell High School in Arlington, in June 1977. The author next attended James Madison Univeristy, graduating in May 1981, Summa Cum Laude, with Distinction in History. In August 1981 he entered the graduate program at the College of William and Mary, received the M.A. degree in 1982, and attained the A.B.D. level in April 1984.

The author has served as a Teaching Fellow at the College of William and Mary, and is currently employed in the Department of Historical Research of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.