The effect of popular initiative and recall mechanisms on tax reforms: Lessons from the Carbon Tax and the Harmonized in and

By Geneviève Tellier, professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa

Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, University of , May 31 – June 2, 2016

*please do not cite without permission from the author

Abstract

More and more, popular consultations and participation mechanisms are been viewed as an effective way to develop and implement better public policies. By seeking input and support from citizens, policymakers are able to design policies that are more responsive to the needs and desire of the population. However popular consultations can also lead to some undesired consequences. For instance, they afford new veto-power to some players that may be tempted to use them to further their own interests, which do not necessarily coincide with the general public interest. This was the case in B.C., when the government attempted to reform its sales tax by implementing a (HST), a value-added tax (VAT) that would be collected by the federal government simultaneously with its own VAT, the good and service tax (GST). Praise by tax experts and most businesses, the HST was nonetheless severely attack by some groups and high profile individuals that questioned its fairness. By examining the circumstances that led to the adoption and later the dismissal of the B.C. HST and comparing them to the adoption of other tax reforms in the country (namely the B.C. carbon tax and the Ontarian HST) we will show that partisan politics took over public participation mechanisms. Therefore, public participation mechanisms do not automatically lead to better public engagement and subsequently better public policies. This is particularly noteworthy in the case of tax reforms.

The effect of popular initiative and recall mechanisms on tax reforms: lessons from the Carbon Tax and the Harmonized Sales Tax in British Columbia and Ontario

1. Introduction The declining rates of participation that have been observed at elections during the last decades (in and elsewhere) seem to indicate that citizens feel less engaged, less involved in public affairs. This dissatisfaction with our current political system (often labelled “democratic deficit”) has triggered some questioning about how to improve our institutions. One concern relates to our elected representatives and how they can become more responsive and more accountable to their constituents. More generally, many are worried about the increasing centralization of power within the executive power (and even more among a handful of decision-makers) which diminished the role of the legislative branch. One mechanism that has received attention in recent years to counterbalance the power of the executive and empowered citizens is the recall initiative, a procedure that allows voters to remove their elected representative from office before the end of their mandate. By given some decision-making powers to citizens in between elections, decision-makers will be forced to listen more carefully to the concerns of local communities.

Although not widespread, recall mechanisms exist in several countries1. In Canada, only one province, British Columbia (B.C.), has enacted legislation that allows recalls of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA). However, several private bills establishing recall mechanisms have been tabled in various legislatures across the country lately2.

The recall mechanism exists in B.C. since 1994. It has been used on a few instances over the years, but not with a lot of success. Only one MLA has been removed from office because of a recall initiative3. For this reason, many believed the B.C. recall mechanism is ineffective. Yet before reaching this conclusion, we believe that we should examine more closely recent events that have occurred in . In 2009, the provincial government decided to adopt a harmonized sales tax (HST), as did several other provinces over the years. Contrary to these other provinces, however, the B.C. government was unable to successfully implement its HST, because of vigorous unpopular support. Yet, the same government was able to establish the first carbon tax in

1 Such as Argentina, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Japan, Belarus, Germany, Switzerland, and in 18 American States (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2016). 2 For instance in Québec by Coalition avenir Québec MNA Eric Caire in 2011 (bill 493); in Ontario by Progressive Conservative MPP Randy Hillier in 2013 (Bill 124); in the House of Commons by independent MP Brent Rathgeber in 2015 (C-697); in by Progressive Conservative MLA Steven Myers in 2014 (bill 100); in Alberta by Wildrose MLA Mark Smith in 2016 (bill-201). 3 In fact, this MLA resigned before he was officially “recalled”. 2 the country, just a year ago, and to secure re-election afterward. Moreover, another province, Ontario, facing an equally popular resistance, did implement its own HST the same year. Our research will try to explain this failure, by comparing the three cases, namely the B.C. HST, the Ontarian HST, and the B.C. carbon tax. These cases are interesting because they share many common elements. They are all related to tax reforms; they occurred at about the same time; and the governments that presented the initiatives faced many similar challenges. Yet, the faith of one tax initiative was clearly different from the two others.

We will examine the circumstances that have led to the adoption (and subsequently the revocation of the B.C. HST) of these three tax reforms. Our study will draw on documentary evidences to establish comparisons between the three cases. Our analysis starts with a brief discussion about taxation and its fundamental role in our modern society. Democratic states need popular consent to taxation. The following section presents the direct democracy mechanisms that exist in B.C. Then each case will be examined by looking closely at the link between the tax reform and the support and opposition it draws. Our analysis concludes with a comparison of the three cases and the formulation of some lessons about the use and consequences of direct democracy, at least in the field of taxation.

2. Taxation and Direct Democracy Without a doubt, taxes play an important role in modern states. Not only do they afford important financial resources to governments to fund public services, but they also provide the legitimacy states need to act on behalf of their citizenry. Because citizens agree to pay taxes, they implicitly support the activities performed by the state. In other words, there would simply be no democratic state without public consent to taxation (Barilari 2000, Delalande 2011).

The idea that taxes are a social contract between the ruled and their rulers is not a novelty. Many founders of modern political thoughts have examined this relationship (Locke, de Tocqueville, Weber, Schumpeter to name a few4). However, although the linkage between popular consent and taxation seems hard to contest, implementing tax policies remains a challenge in modern societies. Overall, taxes have a bad press. Because they are mandatory and are levied without direct compensations, it is difficult for most taxpayers to see a clear relationship between taxes and the public programs they help fund. Consequently, taxpayers usually have a natural propensity do dislike taxes, and some will even try to avoid them, more or less legally (Leroy 2003, Tremblay 2012)5.

4 For a detailed presentation about the founders of fiscal sociology, see Leroy (2011). 5 Through tax avoidance and strategies. The former is legal (for instance, working less or moving to another jurisdiction to pay less taxes), while the latter is illegal (selling goods and services on the black market for instance). 3

On the other hand, governments will seek to create a “fiscal illusion” by using various sources of indirect taxes (such as consumption taxes) to hide the true value of taxes, knowing they are unpopular among voters.

Another issue that is linked to taxation relates to the question of fairness and equity. Not everyone is taxed equally in our modern welfare state. Yet this situation is not fundamentally problematic, as it is widely accepted that the wealthiest should be taxed more, so that the State can help those that are the most vulnerable. Therefore, the progressive nature of our tax system is usually not questioned. On the other hand, however, taxpayers expect that all be threatened fairly and equitably. People in a similar position should be taxed similarly (horizontal equity) and those who are wealthier should be taxed more (vertical equity). The recent events on tax evasion (such as the “Panama Papers”) and tax revolt movements (“Occupy Wall Street”, and popular protests in Greece and Portugal after the 2008 global financial crisis) just showed how tax policies and tax reforms can stir vigorous debates, if people believe they are not treated fairly.

The implicit contract between the state and its people through taxation should therefore incite governments to seek the support of the population if they want to adopt tax reforms. However, citizens are given very few opportunities to participate actively in the formulation of tax reforms and public policies in general. In addition, most participation mechanisms involve consultations, instead of an active engagement in the decision- making process (deliberative democracy). Although public consultations afford the opportunity for citizens and interest group representatives to convey their views to governments, they do not give them the possibility to participate actively in the formulation of policies. In other words, citizens are rarely veto-players in the policy process (Tsebelis 1995). This is especially so in Canada where governments enjoyed extensive executive powers, particularly if they are elected with a majority of seats in the House.

Elections remain the principal mechanism that citizens can rely on to voice and shape public policies (Young and Everitt 2004). Furthermore, the effect of election outcomes on tax policies is real (Tellier 2005). A change of government often leads to the implementation of new tax policies, since political parties frequently make explicit promises regarding tax issues during electoral campaigns. Left-wing parties are usually more inclined to increase spending and therefore taxes (especially taxes for the wealthiest) while right-wing parties are more inclined to reduce taxes and favour a smaller state (Tellier 2009). However, there exist very few mechanisms of direct democracy, such a referendum and direct binding consultations that give citizens the power to compel governments to act accordingly to their preferences (or preferences of the majority) between elections.

4

Yet, a few Canadian governments have started to open up the policy process to involve more directly citizens, concerning budgetary decisions. For instance, some legislative assemblies (B.C., Ontario, and the House of Commons) have been empowered to conduct annual pre-budget consultations to allow citizens and other stakeholders to provide their opinion and formulate recommendations about the coming budget6. However, the governments are under no obligation to adopt these recommendations. A few provinces have enacted legislation to force governments to hold binding referendum before some taxes can be levied or specific source of revenues be used (Alberta, B.C. Manitoba, , , and Ontario). However, many legal provisions have been either repealed (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia) or suspended (Manitoba, Ontario) in recent years. Finally, one province, B.C., has implemented a distinctive mechanism of direct democracy (which is not limited to budgetary policies). The Recall and Initiative Act allows citizens to participate actively in the formulation of public policies by petitioning the government to introduce a bill in the legislature. The same act allows voters to recall their MLA in between elections. This legislation is probably the closest form of direct democracy that has been enacted by a provincial and federal government in Canada in recent years.

3. The Recall and Initiative Act in B.C. Direct democracy reforms are not a novelty in B.C. Several initiatives have been proposed and discussed over the years to increase direct popular involvement in public affairs7. According to many, this interest in direct democracy stems from a strong provincial populism view of politics (Abbott 2015, Marquis 1993). Populism is usually defined as the manifestation of distrusts toward elites and the belief that better policies can be made with the direct involvement of people and grassroots movements in the decision-making process (Blake 1996, Erickson 2010). Supporters of populist views can be found equally in left and right-wing political parties. What distinguishes different ideological stances, however, are the elites that are targeted (Barney and Laycock 1999, Howlett and Brownsey 2001). For left-leaning groups, such as labour, urban and some farmers’ organizations, direct democracy is the countervailing force to economic elites (“big businesses”). The objective is to bring more equality in society. Right-wing parties, on the other hand, denounce the power of political elites (government, bureaucrats, dominant political parties). They promote a leaner, less interventionist state.

It is therefore not surprising that the two latest initiatives that implemented new direct democratic mechanisms, the Referendum Act and the Recall and Initiative Act were

6 See Tellier (2015) for a detailed discussion of the influence of these consultations. 7 The first initiative was the Direct Legislation Act, which allowed voter initiation and approval of legislation in 1919. The act was never proclaimed, however. For a detail presentation direct democratic reforms in B.C., see Ruff (1993), and for Canada, Marquis (1993). 5 enacted respectively by the Social Credit (in 1990) and the NDP (in 1994). For many, however, these laws did not really enhance citizen power and grassroots movements. They were enacted by governments how sought to “exploit the rhetoric of populist renewal and manipulate the symbols of direct democracy for their own interests. In British Columbia at least, this brand of populism long remained what it always was, populist discourse rather than a real commitment to populist institutionalism” (Ruff 1993, 31)8.

On the eve of calling the provincial general election of 1991, Premier Rita Johnson announced she would use the Referendum Act provisions to ask voters if they would approve legislation on recall and popular initiatives. A clear majority of registered voters (74 percent) gave their support for both initiatives. The outgoing Social Credit government was not as fortunate, however, as it was defeated that same night. Consequently, the legislation was formulated by the new NDP governing party. A special all-party Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct, Standings Orders and Private Bills was mandated to examine issues arising from the referendum outcome. The Recall and Initiative Act was enacted in 1994 and contained most of the committee’s recommendations.

The law contains two major provisions. First it allows B.C. citizens to propose legislation or amendments to existing ones by using an “initiative procedure”. If an initiative petition obtains the support of 10 percent of the province’s registered voters in two thirds of the electoral districts, the Select Standing Committee on Legislative Initiatives must decide whether a change will be initiated by tabling a bill in the House or put to a province-wide initiative vote. Second, the legislation affords voters the authority to destitute a Member of the Legislative Assembly with a recall procedure. To be successful the recall petition must receive the support of 40 percent of voters registered in an electoral district. If this threshold is met, a by-election is automatically launched. A recall petition cannot be initiated during the 18 months after a MLA is elected and it can only target individual MLAs (not parties). Up to this date, B.C. remains the only Canadian Province to have adopted such legislation.

Many have criticized the stringency of the legal requirements needed to launch a successful initiative or recall petition in B.C. (Delaney 2010, Gibson 2001). For instance, initiative petitions must be approved by a majority of registered voters not by individuals that voted. Registered voters that do not vote are therefore automatically accounted for as opponents to the initiative. In addition, the 40 percent threshold, which was established to “ensure that there is a broad based support for the recall” 9 makes it difficult to start a

8 Ruff assessment did not change when he revisited briefly the question in 2010 (Ruff 2010). 9 The Committee initially recommended setting the minimal requirement at 50 percent of registered voters, a percentage that was lowered to 40 percent by the government. 6 recall process. The rule can also be seen as unfair, since a MLA can be elected with less than 40 percent of the support of registered voters10.

Until now, few petitions have been initiated and even fewer have succeeded in launching an initiative process or a by-election. Since 1995, eight of the nine initiative petition applications submitted to the Chief Electoral Officer failed to receive the required signature from eligible citizens (see table 1 for more details). Recall petition applications were not more successful (see table 2). All 26 applications failed, although in one instance the procedure was terminated after the MLA resigned (in all likelihood the recall would have succeeded). Most recall procedures were launched for political motives (Phillips 2010). During the 1990s recall procedures were initiated against the NDP for partisan interests. The B.C. branch of the Canadian Taxpayers Federation launched a recall procedure in three electoral districts after the NDP won narrowly the 1996 general election, with a three-seat majority in the House. A second wave of recalls was launched by the Concerned Citizens of BC group, chaired by a supporter of the Liberal Party in 1999. The partisan use of recalls continued under the Liberal government. The campaigns, sponsored by NDP supporters, targeted districts where Liberals won by very small margins. Again, the recall initiatives were not successful.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

4. Empirical evidences The B.C. Harmonized Sales Tax Premier announced the province initiated discussions with the federal government to harmonize its current sales tax with the federal good and service tax (GST), on July 23, 2009. B.C. would thus become the sixth province to implement a harmonized sales tax after Quebec (in 1992), New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland-and-Labrador (1999) and Ontario (expected for 2010). The B.C. HST would combine the existing 7% B.C. provincial sales tax (PST) with the 5% federal GST. This 12% rate will be lower than the 13% HST rate applied elsewhere in the country, and will come into force in a year, on July 1, 2010.

The current PST is viewed by many as ineffective and unfair. It exempts many goods and most services from being taxed while it imposes a higher tax burden on other goods. The HST would help B.C. businesses to be more competitive, within the province as well as nationally and on foreign markets, as B.C. exports would be exempted from the HST, while imports would be taxed similarly as domestic goods and services. Like all provinces, British Columbia was suddenly hit by the 2008 world financial crisis. The first

10 “The member for Bulkley Valley-Stikine was elected with 3,744 votes, but it would take 6,424 signatures on a petition in order to recall that member” (Weisgerber, Hansard, July 7, 1994). 7 months of 2009 brought new challenges for the provincial government as economic conditions were deteriorating rapidly. Forecast surpluses were disappearing as public revenues plumped. The sales tax reform would provide needed additional financial resources as the federal government offered $1.6 billion to help the province make the transition to the HST. Furthermore, the B.C. government estimated it would save $30 million annually in administrative costs by having the federal government collect the HST on its behalf. Lastly, it is estimated that the HST would lower costs for B.C. businesses by $2 billion.

The HST is a value-added tax (VAT) applied uniformly to all goods and services sold to consumers, with, however, a few exemptions for some necessity goods. Products subject to the newly established provincial carbon tax as well as new homes priced up to $400,000 would also be exempted. It was estimated that 83 percent of all goods and services currently sold in the province would be unaffected by the sales tax reform. To mitigate the impact of the HST on less fortunate residents, however, the government also announced that a refundable sales tax credit would be given to low income individuals.

The government plan to implement the HST caught everyone by surprise. Although businesses have asked for many years that the province adopt an HST, the budget announcement was not foreseen by the business community (Hunter 2009). Furthermore, they were not direct mention of establishing an HST during the 2009 spring electoral campaign. They were debates, however, on taxation as the NDP vigorously attacked the Liberal’s new carbon tax and pledged it would eliminate it if elected. The Liberals, on the other hand, promised they would not increase taxes. In the end, the Liberals won a third consecutive mandate, even though the carbon tax might have been a liability for them during the campaign (Etchell and Hoberg 2009a). For a majority of voters, however, economic issues were more important than the carbon tax (Ipsos Reid 2009).

Reactions to the government announcement were quick. Overall, the business community applauded the decision. The B.C. Business Council for instance indicated the reform would help increase the productivity and competitiveness of B.C. business (Hunter 2009). Some industries that were exempted from the PST opposed the tax reform, however. Homebuilders and restaurant owner representatives were among the most vocal opponents to the HST, arguing that the tax would significantly increase prices paid by consumers. The Canadian Taxpayer Federation, an advocacy group that lobbies for lower tax in Canada, did not condemn the principle of an HST, but asked that individual income tax be reduced to offset the effect of the HST on consumers (Bader 2009).

The strongest opposition came, however, from B.C. residents. An Ipsos Reid opinion poll released shortly after the HST was announced indicated that 85 percent of British Columbians were opposed to the HST (Morton 2009). Several months later, the opposition remained the same, with 82% of residents stating they were against the new

8 tax. Most of the anger was fuelled by the apparent lack of transparency of the government who did not indicate it intended to implement an HST during the electoral campaign.

The debate rapidly entered the political arena. The NDP, the only opposition party in the Legislative Assembly, denounced the unfairness of the new tax for middle and lower families. Opposition also came from the right as , former premier and ex-leader of the Social Credit Party, publicly condemned the HST, labelling it a “$2- billion tax grab”, and calling for nothing less than a tax revolt: “The HST is a cruel tax. It takes from the people, the consumers, particularly the seniors, the students, the people that can least afford to pay yet another tax and it’s giving to the big corporations” (Vander Zalm, cited by CBC News (2009)). The Social Credit Party has nearly vanished from the provincial political scene and so, Vander Zalm’s public stance was unexpected. Many viewed Vander Zalm’s opposition to the HST as a strategy to revitalize right-of- centre movements and offer an alternative to the Liberal Party to disenfranchised voters (Hunter 2010).

Both the NDP and Vander Zalm launched their own anti-HST campaign and asked British Columbian to support them. The campaigns were effective. In a month, a Facebook page called No BC HST, set up by a newspaper columnist and former NDP adviser, attracted more than 100 000 followers, while an NDP petition collected more than 40 000 signatures (Matas 2009).

Notwithstanding the protest, the government remained committed to implement its HST. However, it agreed to make some minor changes in response to the pre-budget consultation report tabled by the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services in the fall 2009. Each year, this legislative committee conducts public hearings across the province to receive proposals and recommendations regarding the content of the next provincial budget and makes its report to the House. Although the government did not specifically ask for input on the HST, many individuals and groups presented their views, either positive or negative, about the new tax policy. The main change was to increase the threshold for HST rebates for new homes to $525,000. The HST legislation was enacted on April 29, 2010, with the NDP voting against the bill.

On the same month, opposition to the HST took another turn. Vander Zalm officially launched a formal initiative petition campaign under the provisions of the Recall and Initiative Act. The deadline for the petition campaign was August 5, therefore after the introduction of the HST on July 1st. Notwithstanding the initiative petition campaign, the government remained committed to implement its HST. In June, all members of the Cabinet were sent across the province to campaign for the new tax. The government also released a report that concluded the HST would benefit the province, by increasing capital investments by $14.4 billion and creating 141,000 new jobs over the next ten years (Mintz 2010).

9

In August, the initiative petition had been signed by more than 700,000 individuals, well above the 10 percent required threshold. Opponents to the HST of all political stripes had actively sought the support of voters for the Vander Zalm initiative. The petition met all legal requirements and was therefore submitted to the Legislative Assembly. The NDP wanted legislation to be introduced as soon as possible, while Liberals were pondering about the advantages of buying more time to explain the benefits of their HST to the population. A referendum would give them the opportunity to do so. In the end, the legislative committee responsible to determine the course of action, dominated by the Liberals, opted for a referendum.

The referendum option provided a significant advantage to the government. First, the legal requirements are demanding. The initiative must receive the support of 50 percent of all registered voters and not current voters, province-wide and in two thirds of the province’s electoral districts. While the petition initiative collected about 15% of support on average in each riding, it is less certain the opponents would be able to find the required additional support. Second, the referendum outcome is non-binding. If opponents to the HST are successful, the government’s only legal obligation is to introduce a bill to the legislative Assembly that would cancel the HST. The Assembly, dominated by the Liberals, would then be able to adopt or reject the bill. However, Premier Campbell made a surprising announcement, stating that the HST would be abolished if a simple majority of voters participating in the referendum rejected the HST.

Face with the prospect of a long referendum campaign, the anti-HST movement envisioned a new strategy. They would initiate recall procedures to target individual liberal MLAs directly. Several liberal MLAs faced a real prospect of being forced out of office. Premier Campbell counterattacked by launching an active pro-HST information strategy, and announcing a new personal income tax cut. These measures were insufficient to curb the anti-HST sentiment, however. Facing a caucus rebellion, Campbell resigned as Premier on November 17, 2010.

B.C. new Premier Christy Clarke was committed to seek popular support for the HST via a referendum. Surveys indicated that most voters were uninformed about the changes brought by the HST. The government therefore launched an active communication policy. Ads, flyers, town hall meetings, an online survey, and a government web site were used to provide more information on all aspects of the HST. Citizens seemed inclined to seek information. Eleven telephone town hall meetings were attended by more than 275,000 residents11. The government also announced that the HST would be reduced

11 Of the near 420,000 individual who answered the telephone call, 275,000 stay on the phone, for 17 minutes on average (GVT 16-5-2011). 10 to 10% over the next three years. The revenue losses would be compensated by an increase of corporate incomes.

Public support increased during the weeks that lead to the referendum. Moreover, recall procedures did not produce anticipated success by their supporters. This was not enough, however, and the option to repeal the HST was supported by 55 percent of voters. The participation rate was 52 percent as 1.6 million voters cast their ballot. The government reinstalled the PST, which came in effect July 1, 2011, and refunded the $1.6 billion federal aid for the HST transition. Despite the unpopularity of the HST, the Liberals under the leadership of were re-elected in 2015.

The Ontario Harmonized Sales Tax The Ontarian government presented its plan to implement a provincial HST in its March 2009 budget speech. The HST would to come in force in about one year, on July 1, 2010, and would be applied on all goods and services sold in the province, save a few exceptions. The government justified its decision to reform the consumption sales tax on economic grounds, as the province was facing rapidly deteriorating economic conditions caused by the 2008 global financial crisis. The proposed HST

“would bring Ontario into line with what is viewed as the most efficient form of sales taxation around the world. The single sales tax would reduce the cost of Ontario’s exports, making the province more competitive and boosting a sector of the economy that has been particularly hard hit by the economic downturn. With the added efficiency of a single sales tax, Ontario would be well positioned as the global economy recovers.” (Budget Plan 2009: 22)

The implementation of a HST is a significant shift from the stance the liberal government has adopted until now toward consumption taxes. In 2007, weeks only after being re- elected, Premier Dalton McGuinty expressed its concerns over the negative impact an HST would have on consumers, as many goods and services excluded from the current PST would be taxed with the HST (Gordon 2007). Since then, however, the federal government has tried to convince provinces that have not yet harmonized their respective sales tax with the federal GST to do so. Furthermore, it would offer financial compensation to provinces that would implement a HST. Ontario would receive $4.6 billion.

Similar to the B.C. HST, the Ontarian HST is a VAT consumption tax that combines the current provincial sales tax with the federal GST. The Ontarian HST rate was set up at 13% (by adding the 8% PST to the 5% GST). To mitigate the negative impacts the HST might have on consumers and on lower-income families, the government offered various tax reliefs. For instance, some basic goods are exempted from the HST. New houses costing less than $400,000 are also exempted from the tax (and partially exempted if their

11 selling price is between $400,000 and $500,000). Furthermore, the government announced it would provide several financial help, including a one-time monetary compensation of $1,000 to families earning less than $160,000 (less for individuals), cuts to personal income tax, of the magnitude of 10 percent for families earning $80,000 or less (overall, the tax cuts would benefit 93 percent of all Ontarians) as well as cuts on corporate taxes. The government estimates the HST will save businesses $500 million annually in compliance costs.

Few people knew the 2009 budget would present the government’s plan to implement a HST. The initiative was only discussed among a handful of political aides and bureaucrats (Benzie 2010)12. Representatives of the business community, many of which have lobbied the government for such a reform over the years, generally applauded the initiative (Benzie and Ferguson 2009). They also welcomed the timing of the decision, as many Ontarian industries were struggling with an economic decline. The support for the business community was not unanimous, however. The Home Builder Association, for instance, was strongly opposed to the HST, arguing it would increase the price of new houses up to 8%. Restaurant owners were equally opposed. This opposition was also shared by two advocacy groups, the National Citizens Coalition and Canadian Taxpayer Federation. Both groups argued that the HST would increase the tax burden of individuals and small businesses. Other organizations publicly expressed their support for the HST, such as the Conference Board and the C.D Howe Institute. Some support was not expected, such as the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternative, a left-leaning organization, which indicated it endorsed the government tax reform because it would only increase the tax burden for the most affluent (The 2009).

Overall the HST was not well-received among Ontarian residents. An opinion poll conducted in May indicated that two thirds (67%) of Ontarian respondents were against the HST and half (51%) believed it would impact negatively the economy of the province (Nanos Research 2009).

On the political scene, the tax was denounced by both the and the Progressive Conservative Party as a “tax grab”. NDP leader Andrea Horwath expressed her angriness over the tax reform: “People needed relief and instead they got a tax hike.” (Greenberg 2009). The intern PCC leader (the party was in the midst of a leadership race) as well as other party members also publicly opposed the HST. For Christine Elliott, a leadership candidate, the HST is “the wrong tax at the wrong moment” (Ferguson 2009). Tim Hudak, who won the leadership contest, urged Ontarian voters to rebel against the

12 Federal Finance Minister Jim Flaherty reported that he was approached by the Ontarian government to talk about harmonizing both sales taxes in February 2009. 12

HST (Benzie 2009). However, no PCC leadership candidates promised they would eliminate the HST if elected.

Both opposition parties launched petitions and web sites dedicated to fight the HST (NDP's “unfairgrab.com” and the Conservative's “daltonsalestax.com”). Within a few months 200,000 Ontarians had signed the NDP petition and 110,000 the PCC’s (Carmichael 2009, Maurino 2009).

The fight against the HST also occurred within the Legislative Assembly when the government tabled legislation to implement its HST. Heated debate and delay tactics from opposition parties led the way to political drama. The entire PCC caucus walked out of the Assembly to protest against the HST. Three PCC MPPs were subsequently expelled from the Legislature for staging a two-day occupation of the Legislature and using improper language13. Both opposition parties asked the government to hold public hearings on the HST across the province. While the government rejected the idea, it agreed, after strong pressure from the NDP, to allocate more time for public hearings within the House. The Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs heard testimonies from both supporters and opponents to the HST for two days. The legislation was enacted a few days later without amendment, however. Both the PCC and the NDP voted against it. At the same time, Premier McGuinty approval rating reached an all-time low at 18 percent (Coyle 2009). An Ipsos Reid survey showed that 70 percent of Ontarians indicated their opinion of the government has worsened due to the HST (Ferguson and Benzie 2009). The HST came to force as planned on July 1, 2010. The liberal party won a third consecutive electoral victory two years later, yet losing its majority in the Legislative Assembly.

B.C. Carbon Tax The B.C. government announced the implementation of a carbon tax in its 2008 Budget. The tax would come in effect on July 1, 2008, and would apply to virtually all fossil fuels purchase by individuals and businesses in the province. The carbon tax is the government answer to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Premier Campbell has made a commitment the previous year that the province would cut its emission by one third by 2020 from their current level (2007 Throne Speech). The carbon tax is part of a broader Climate Action Plan strategy to stimulate low-carbon economic development (Ministry of Environment 2008). Concerns about climate changes has grown among residents in the province and across Canada (Harrison 2012). Premier Campbell reported he was personally persuaded to fight global warming while visiting shrouding Chinese cities during a 2006 business trip (Cernetig 2007).

13 Incidentally, one expelled MPP was Randy Hillier who would later table a private bill to allow recall of elected representatives in Ontario (see footnote 1 above). 13

Various policies can be adopted to curb greenhouse gas emissions (Etchell and Hoberg 2009b, Harrison 2012). A carbon tax is a policy instrument that is strongly advocated by environmental groups because it can fairly and effectively target and change undesirable behaviour: By paying higher taxes, bigger polluters are asked to contribute more to the fight on global warming. Businesses, on the other hand, are generally more inclined to favour cap-and-trade systems, which allow firms to trade pollution rights among them. Therefore, a cap-and-trade system relies more on market-based mechanisms. Outcomes, however, are less certain. The B.C. government clearly opted for a carbon tax that would be revenue-neutral: “all of the carbon tax revenue will be returned to taxpayers through tax reductions. The money will not be used to fund government programs.” (Ministry of Finance 2008)

The carbon tax would be implemented gradually between 2008 and 2012. Since different categories of fossil fuel (gasoline, diesel, natural gas, coal, propane, home heating fuel, etc.) produce different types and quantities of carbon emissions, distinct tax rates will apply to distinct products14. For instance, the tax will be 2.41 cents a litre for gasoline and 2.76 cents a litre for diesel and home heating oil in 200815. To offset the additional cost of fuel the government has adopted a variety of compensatory measures. Two thirds of the expected revenues from the carbon tax will be directed toward individuals and one third to businesses and industries. Starting in 2008, lower-income families will receive a $100 annual tax credit per individual ($30 per child). The two bottom individual tax rates will be reduced by 2 percent. The general corporate income tax will be reduced from 12 to 11 percent. Additional tax cuts are expected in the following years. Finally, a one-time $100 payment will be sent to all British Columbians to help the transition to the new tax regime (called the “Climate Action Dividend”).

Although the new interest of Gordon Campbell toward climate changes was a surprise for many observers, they were hints that the government was heading toward implementing a carbon tax a few months before the 2009 budget presentation. For instance, the government asked the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services (or Finance Committee) to explore various tax changes proposal that could discourage activities that contribute to greenhouse gas emissions during the committee fall pre- budget consultations. To that effect, a copy of the budget 2008 consultation paper was sent to all households across the province and residents were encouraged to submit their views to the committee16. The committee reported that it “received numerous

14 Initial prices are based on a $10 per tonne CO2-equivalent emissions for 2008 and will increase by $5 during each of the following years to reach $30 per tonne in 2012. 15The tax will increase to 7.24 and 8.27 cents respectively in 2012. 16 The consultation paper (a short 4-page flyer) asked three specific questions related to climate changes: 1) What budget choices would you make to help reduce B.C.’s greenhouse gases by at least 33 percent below current levels by 2020? 14 submissions calling for the creation of a carbon tax” (Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services 2007, 27).

Overall, initial support for a carbon tax was positive. Environmentalist groups praised the government policy as a “landmark, a turning point”, a “very well-crafted” tax (Vanderklippe 2008). Most businesses displayed a pragmatic stance, acknowledging that a carbon tax was inevitable and welcoming the government decision to cut taxes to offset the effect of the carbon tax. They nonetheless warned the new carbon tax would undermine the competitiveness of the province and drive investments away (Hunter 2008b). In addition, the carbon tax will impact more negatively some industries than others, such as energy-intensive manufacturers and small retailers (Brethour 2008). The Canadian Taxpayer Federation denounced the carbon tax, and more generally the government’s agenda on global-warming as political nonsense, noting that the initiative was not part of their electoral platform (Hunter 2008c). The carbon tax will only be revenue-neutral province-wide, and will affect all individual they argued (Fong 2008). As for the Selected Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services, although it acknowledges the wide support for a carbon tax, it nonetheless recommended the government to consider alternatives, namely participating in a carbon trading system (recommendation 14). Taxes should be second choice instruments to incentive-based programs (recommendation 15). Furthermore, the committee raised some concerns about the equity of a carbon tax: the government should take measures to mitigate the impacts of such a tax on lower and middle-income families (recommendation 17) and recognize there is a clear urban/rural divide with respect to increases to transportation-related taxation (recommendation 18).

Initial support for the new carbon was split among B.C. residents. An opinion poll conducted after the budget presentation found that 54 percent of British Columbian supported the carbon tax (Harrison 2012). However, this support diminished during the following months. In July 2008, 64 percent of residents were opposed to the carbon tax (Mehler Paperny 2008).

As anticipated by members of the legislative committee, support for the carbon tax was not evenly distributed across the province. Several northern and rural communities condemned the initiative alleging it was unfair and inequitable (Bailey 2008b), since their residents face higher heating and transportation costs and do not have access to public transit systems. Rural and northern representatives also denounced the lack of public consultations and discussions about the carbon tax (Peet and Harrison 2012, 116). One mayor of a rural community planned to launch a tax revolt by withholding the carbon tax

2) What tax changes would you make to encourage environmentally responsible choices? 3) What tax changes would you make to discourage British Columbians from activities that contribute to greenhouse gas emissions? 15 receipts on municipal fuel bills until the province develops a solution to address northern and rural communities’ needs (Bailey 2008d). The mayor, a liberal supporter, withdrew its proposal after discussing the issues with the Finance minister and realizing the government would not back away from its initiative (Bailey 2008c). Local government representatives raised again the issues of the tax fairness a few months later, arguing that it is not revenue-neutral for municipalities. This time, the government offered some compensation, in the form of conditional grants to municipalities that sign the province Climate Action Charter (Hunter 2008a).

The Carbon Tax Act of 2008 was enacted by the Legislative Assembly in the spring 200817. The NDP, which was the only opposition party to hold seats in the Assembly, voted against the bill arguing the policy was developed without proper public consultations and that it was unfair, inequitable, and that in the end would not work (Hunter 2008d). The party launched its “axe-the-tax” campaign and promised to repeal the carbon tax if elected in the coming general elections, due May 2009. It also indicated that its preference was for the adoption of a cap-and-trade system. In the meanwhile, the government, under the direct leadership of the Premier, began selling the carbon tax to British Columbians. Experts were also called in to support the government policy (Bailey 2008a).

The NDP stance came as a shock for many. It was strongly decried by environmentalist groups, who have traditionally been strong supporters of the party (Hunter 2008d). A coalition of 16 environmental organizations demonstrated support for the bill. Nonetheless, the NDP reiterated its commitment to eliminate the carbon tax during the 2009 provincial elections. Environmental leader David Suzuki would denounce the populist NDP position that sought to exploit short-term voter anger, and urge voters to vote for the Green party. Although the NDP gain some supporters with their stance against the carbon tax, mostly in rural communities, it lost the support of other (Etchell and Hoberg 2009a). On May 19, 2009, the Liberals under the leadership of Premier Campbell won a third consecutive mandate.

5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks The comparison of the three cases presented here provides some interesting insights for the study of tax reforms and popular consent to taxation. One major characteristic that can be noted are the many similarities observed across the three cases. However, there was one major difference between the implementation of the HST in B.C. and the two

17 Bill 37, the Carbon Tax Act, was tabled on April 28, and enacted May 29, 2008. They were no committee report. 16 other tax initiatives. This difference is the main reason the B.C. HST was unsuccessfully implemented in the province.

Relating to the similarities, four observations can be formulated. First, taxes are unpopular, across the country. It is often assumed that the populist sentiment found in western Canada would make taxes more unpopular than elsewhere in Canada. We do not find evidence of this distinctiveness. The HST was equally unpopular in B.C. and in Ontario. On the other hand, the carbon tax enjoyed more support, even though a majority of citizens did not approve it. In fact, this tax became more unpopular as the initiative was discussed publicly. Nonetheless, the higher support toward the carbon tax probably results from the neutrality of the tax reform: the government did not implement the carbon tax to generate more public revenues, contrary to the HST (rapidly labelled a “grab tax” both in B.C. and Ontario by opponents). Accordingly, fairness influences how citizens assess the merit of tax reforms; fairness between citizens and businesses, among different groups of citizens (rural/urban divide), and between voters and the state.

Second, the issues of fairness cannot be counterbalanced by the inherent merits of an initiative. Both the carbon tax and the HST were perceived as good policy by policy experts (either environmental or economic experts). Furthermore, all governments took great care to clearly demonstrate the evidence-based benefits of the tax reform for each province. They also adopted various fiscal measures to alleviate the negative effects of the reforms on the well-being of the most vulnerable individuals. However, the benefits of good policies were not sufficient to overcome public skepticism.

Third, the presentation of all three tax policies was not carefully planned. All tax reforms were initiated quickly, in response to a crisis, either environmental or economic. Therefore, the government did not take advantage of time, such as using an electoral campaign to inform and explain to the population its own position on these specific issues. This characteristic demonstrates how difficult it can be for a government to react to unforeseen events. The fight against global warming (which was also an important issue on the federal scene at the same time) as well as the 2008 world financial crisis could not have been anticipated. Some argue, however, that tax reforms are easier to implement during time of crisis, as popular resistance to taxation diminishes because of the urgency of the matter and therefore the necessity to act (Peacock and Wiseman 1961). This was not the case concerning the carbon tax and the HST. The solution to this problem might be to involve more directly the population in the formulation and implementation of policies. The aversion shown by both the B.C. and the Ontarian governments in the three cases toward popular consultations is somewhat puzzling. It could be that they did not believe that citizens ought to play a significant role in the policy process, especially when unpopular tax reforms are involved. Yet, the report tabled by the B.C. Finance committee about the acceptability of carbon tax is illustrative of the benefits of conducting public consultations. If the government had given more 17 thoughts to the concerns of the committee about the urban/rural divide, it would probably have adopted some additional measures to mitigating the effect of the carbon tax. In fact, it did a year later, when it introduced a new “Northern and Rural Homeowner benefits” up to $200 as part of its “Revenue Neutral Carbon Tax Olan (Ministry of Finance 2009). Nonetheless, citizens are usually not considered to be relevant veto-players in our parliamentary system.

Fourth, the opposition to the tax reforms was not motivated by ideological preferences. It was primarily dictated by electoral calculations. The natural political “allies” of the government on the specific issues (environment and sales taxes) vigorously attacked the reform. The NDP should have supported the carbon tax (as environmentalists did) while the PCC in Ontario and former Social Credit sympathizers, the HST (which was supported by the business community). This incoherence was particularly noteworthy when federal conservatives voted in favour of the HST in the House of Commons, while their provincial counterparts voted against in Ontario. The three cases demonstrate that political opponents will use the general unpopularity of taxes to further their own interests, even if such a strategy contradicts their ideological stance.

Yet there is one important factor that distinguished the process that led to the implementation and subsequently the repeal of the B.C. HST from the two other cases. This factor was the treat of recall that targeted many MLAs. However, the recall mechanism was a necessary, yet not a sufficient condition to explain the demise of the B.C. HST. During the early stages of the protest to the HST, opponents and especially their leaders launched a vigorous appeal to voters to recall their respective MLA. Although the recall petitions were not initiated at that time, they were perceived as a serious threat by several MLAs. The possibility of losing their seat led these MLAs to put pressure on the Premier to address the unpopularity of the tax. In the end, Campbell chose to resign.

Several lessons can be drawn from this case. First, the main factor that leads to the repeal of the HST was the threat of recalls. It was not the subsequent referendum on the HST or the formal launch of recall petitions. Technically, the popular opposition did not meet the legal requirements, as only 29 percent of registered voters voted against the HST. Premier Campbell made the decision to lower the threshold (to 50 percent of current voters18). However, he was under no legal obligation to do so.

Second, a strong leadership is needed to launch a recall or a popular initiative petition. This leadership existed with the HST, yet lacked a few years before, with the carbon tax.

18 Technically, the initiative vote conducted under the Initiative and Recall Act was changed to a referendum conducted under the Referendum Act. 18

Some leaders did take a stance against the carbon tax in northern and rural communities but the government was able to convince them to agree to the reform.

Third, the warning made by some about the possible politicization of recalls and popular initiatives seem justified. The petitions were initiated for strategic electoral reasons, not because of they were some genius concerns about the nature of the policy (its fairness, legitimacy, etc.). In fact, it is somewhat surprising that recalls were not discussed (at least publicly) in some norther and rural communities when the carbon tax was initiated. Direct consultation mechanisms are usually praised precisely because they give more power to communities to voice their concerns about policies. This did not happen in B.C.

Overall, the B.C. government and more broadly political leaders of all ideological stances failed to recognize the true intent of direct democracy. Direct democracy is about giving more power to citizens to participate in the public policy process. It is also about empowering community representatives (namely MLAs) in the formulation and adoption of policies by making them more accountable to their own constituency. This was not the case in B.C. about tax reforms.

19

Table 1 Initiative Petition Applications submitted and approved by the B.C. Chief Electoral Officer

Title Number of signatures Status of Petition Year Required Returned Valid Failed – insufficient 2013 An Initiative to Amend the Police Act 317,454 202,037 signatures 2012 An Initiative to Amend the Police Act 312,534 Failed – withdrawn An Initiative to End the Harmonized Sales Tax 2010 299,611 713,883 557,383 Passed (HST) Initiative to Establish a Proportional Representation Failed – insufficient 2002 212,473 98,165 Electoral System signatures An Initiative to Establish the Child Services Equality Failed – insufficient 2000 202,984 4,325 Act signatures Failed – insufficient 1996 An Act to Prohibit the Hunting of Bears 222,272 88,357 signatures An Act Regarding Pensions for Members of the 1995 Failed – withdrawn Legislative Assembly An Act to Remove School Tax Levies from 1995 Failed – not submitted Residential Properties An Act to Balance the Budget and Retire Provincial 1995 Failed – not submitted Debt Source: BC Elections, Summary of Initiative Petitions, available online, http://www.elections.bc.ca/index.php/referendum-plebiscite- recall-initiative/initiative/

20

Table 2 Recall Petition Applications submitted and approved by the B.C. Chief Electoral Officer

Number of signatures Year MLA (affiliation) Status of Petition Required Returned Valid 2015 Richard T. Lee (BC Liberal Party) 16,494 1,551 Failed - not submitted 2015 Marc Dalton (Independent) 15,410 930 Failed - withdrawn 2011 Marc Dalton (BC Liberal Party) 14,082 Failed - withdrawn 2011 Dr. (BC Liberal Party) 15,299 Failed - not submitted 2011 Don McRae (BC Liberal Party) 19,348 5,181 Failed - insufficient signatures 2010 (BC Liberal Party) 15,368 8,870 Failed - insufficient signatures 2003 Lorne Mayencourt (BC Liberal Party) 14,961 Failed - not submitted 2003 Gordon Campbell (BC Liberal Party) 14,623 Failed - not submitted 2003 Jeff Bray (BC Liberal Party) 14,711 Failed - not submitted 2003 Blair Suffredine (BC Liberal Party) 11,695 Failed - not submitted 2003 Wendy McMahon (BC Liberal Party) 8,068 Failed - not submitted 2003 Gillian Trumper (BC Liberal Party) 13,215 Failed - not submitted 2003 Mike Hunter (BC Liberal Party) 12,566 Failed - not submitted 2003 (BC Liberal Party) 14,857 Failed - not submitted 2002 Val Roddick (BC Liberal Party) 11,949 13,168 9,999 Failed - insufficient valid signatures 1999 Michael Farnworth (BC NDP) 17,417 Failed - not submitted 1998 Paul Ramsey (BC NDP) 8,908 Failed - not submitted 1998 Evelyn Gillespie (BC NDP) 17,048 Failed - not submitted 1998 Paul Reitsma (BC Liberal Party) 17,020 25,430 Failed * 1998 Evelyn Gillespie (BC NDP) 17,048 Failed - not submitted 1998 (BC Liberal Party) 13,409 Failed - not submitted 1998 Paul Ramsey (BC NDP) 8,908 Failed - not submitted 1998 Gordon Campbell (BC Liberal Party) 14,643 Failed - not submitted 1997 Helmut Giesbrecht (BC NDP) 7,558 Failed - not submitted 1997 Helmut Giesbrecht (BC NDP) 7,558 Failed - not submitted 1997 Paul Ramsey (BC NDP) 8,908 8,323 Failed - insufficient signatures * failed as a result of the MLA's resignation during petition verification. Source: BC Elections, Summary of Recall Petitions, available online, http://www.elections.bc.ca/index.php/referendum-plebiscite-recall- initiative/initiative/

21

References

Abbott, George Malcolm. 2015. "The Precarious Politics of Shifting Direction: The Introduction of a Harmonized Sales Tax in British Columbia and Ontario." BC Studies (186):125-48. Bader, Maureen. 2009. "Cutting Personal Income Taxes Could Lessen the Sting of HST." The Sun, A11, Issues & Ideas. Bailey, Ian. 2008a. "Carbon Tax Could Be Reversed, Special Adviser to Campbell Fears." , 28 June, S2. --. 2008b. "Carbon Tax Riles Northern B.C. Innovative Tax Has Some Fuming, Saying It Penalizes Rural Drivers Who Do Not Have Access to Public Transit." The Globe and Mail, 28 March, A4. --. 2008c. "Northern Mayor Quashes Carbon-Tax Protest Plan: Motion to Withhold Levy on Fuel Bills Dropped as Finance Minister Persuades William Lake Leader Victoria Won't Budge on Tax." The Globe and Mail, 26 May, S1. --. 2008d. "Northern Towns Consider Carbon Tax Revolt." The Globe and Mail, 17 May, S2. Barilari, André. 2000. Le Consentement à l'impôt, coll. La Bibliothèque du Citoyen. Paris: Presse de Sciences Po. Barney, Darin David, and David Laycock. 1999. "Right-Populists and Plebiscitary Politics in Canada." Party Politics 5 (3):317-39. Benzie, Robert. 2009. "Hudak Urges HST Rebellion; New Tory Leader Says McGuinty Will Retreat If Ontarians Push Back against Harmonized Tax." Toronto Star, 3 July, A21. --. 2010. "Why Ottawa and Queen's Parl Embraced the HST." Toronto Star, 30 June, A6. Benzie, Robert, and Rob Ferguson. 2009. "Blended Sales Tax a Reality Next Year." Toronto Star, 26 March, A01. Blake, Donald E. 1996. "Value Conflicts in Lotusland: British Columbia Political Culture." In Politics, Policy, and Government in British Columbia, edited by R.K. Carty, 3-17. Vancouver: UBC Press. Brethour, Patrick. 2008. "Carbon Tax Has Groups Gasping for Air." The Globe and Mail, 20 February, S1. Carmichael, Harold. 2009. "HST Will Hit North Hard: NDP Leader." Sudbury Star, 14 December. http://www.thesudburystar.com/2009/12/12/hst-will-hit-north-hard- ndp. CBC News. 2009. "Thousands Rally against HST." CBC News Online, 19 September. Cernetig, Miro. 2007. "West Squares Off on Emissions: B.C. Vows to Implement Agressive Measures." , 14 February. Coyle, Jim. 2009. "Premier Too Low on Gas for This Political U-Turn." Toronto Star:A17. Delalande, Nicolas. 2011. Les batailles de l'impôt. Consentement et résistances de 1789 à nos jours, coll. L'univers historique. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Delaney, Chris. 2010. "Amend the Recall and Initiative Law." The Globe and Mail, 12 August.

22

Erickson, Lynda. 2010. "Electoral Behaviour in British Columbia." In British Columbia Politics and Government, edited by Michael Howlett, Dennis Pilon and Tracy Summerville, 131-50. Toronto: Emond Montgomery. Etchell, Alex, and George Hoberg. 2009a. British Columbia Election 2009: The Role of the Carbon Tax, GreenPolicyProf, 13 May. http://greenpolicyprof.org/wordpress/?p=199. --. 2009b. It’s Time to Rally around Cap and Trade, GreenPolicyProf, 19 May. http://greenpolicyprof.org/wordpress/?p=199. Ferguson, Rob. 2009. "Klees Would Cut Sales Tax but Won't Say How Much." Toronto Star, 22 May, A17. Ferguson, Rob, and Robert Benzie. 2009. "HST: Hated Sales Tax; Poll Shows Liberals Have 'a Lot of Work Ahead' Selling 13% Solution, Finance Minister Admits." Toronto Star, December 4, A06. Fong, Petti. 2008. "B.C. Unveils Carbon Tax Plan; Increased Fuel Costs of 2.4 Cents a Litre Will Be Offset by $100-a-Person Payout." Toronto Star, 20 February, A11. Gibson, Gordon. 2001. "Chapter 1: The Fundamentals of Democratic Reform." Fixing Canadian Democracy, Conference proceedings, Vancouver, Fraser Institute, 22 November. Gordon, Sean. 2007. "Pressure on to Harmonize Sales Taxes; Ontario Reluctant to Extend Its Tax to All Items Subject to Gst." Toronto Star:A12. Greenberg, Lee. 2009. "Ontario budgets for Six Years of Deficits." Canwest News Service, 26 March. Harrison, Kathryn. 2012. "A Tale of Two Taxes: The Fate of Environmental Tax Reform in Canada." Review of Policy Research 29 (3):383-407. Howlett, Michael, and Keith Brownsey. 2001. "British Columbia: Politics in a Post- Staples Political Economy." In The Provincial State in Canada: Politics in the Provinces and Territories, edited by Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett, 309- 33. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Hunter, Justine. 2008a. "Campbell Offers Cities, Schools Carbon-Tax Rebate." The Globe and Mail, 25 September, A6. --. 2008b. "Ceos Confront Campbell on Green Agenda." The Globe and Mail, 4 February, S1. --. 2008c. "Curiouser and Curiouser; Expectations for Today's "Green Budget" Throw Businesses, Environmental Groups and the NDP into Unusual Roles." The Globe and Mail, 19 February, S1. --. 2008d. "NDP Vote against Carbon Tax." The Globe and Mail, 30 September, S1. --. 2010. "Vander Zalm Launches Fight to Repeal HST in B.C. Former Premier May Be First to Successfully Foist Citizen-Shaped Public Policy on Province under Decades-Old Law " The Globe and Mail, 7 April, S3. Hunter, Stuart. 2009. "Federal-Provincial Duet; Harmonization of Gst with BC Set for July 1, 2010 " The Province, 24 July, A33. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2016. Direct Democracy Database. Online Dataset, Stockholm, International IDEA,, http://www.idea.int/elections/dd/search.cfm, (accessed 12 May). Ipsos Reid. 2009. For the Record: Ipsos Reid and the May 12, 2009 B.C. Election. Vancouver

23

Leroy, Marc. 2003. "Sociologie du contribuable et évitement de l'impôt." European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie 44 (02):213-44. --. 2011. Taxation, the State and Society. The Fiscal Sociology of Interventionist Democracy. Series Edited by Peter Lang. Bruxelles. Marquis, Pierre 1993. Referendum in Canada: The Effect of Populist Decision-Making on Representative Democracy. BP-328-E, Ottawa: Library of Parliament. Matas, Robert. 2009. "A Question of Credibility; Finance Minister Colin Insists the Liberals First Considered Tax Harmonization Only after Last Spring's Provincial Election." The Globe and Mail, 22 August, S3. Maurino, Romina. 2009. "McGuinty Welcomes HST Protesters but Hopes They'll See He's Right in the End." The Canadian Press, 28 October. Mehler Paperny, Anna 2008. "Government Not Trusted on Carbon Tax, Poll Says." The Globe and Mail, 30 July, S3. Ministry of Environment (British Columbia). 2008. Climate Action Plan. June, Victoria: British Columbia. Ministry of Finance (British Columbia). 2008. Budget and Fiscal Plan, 2008/09 – 2010/11. 19 February, Victoria: -- (British Columbia). 2009. Budget and Fiscal Plan, 2009/10 to 2011/12. Victoria: Mintz, Jack. 2010. British Columbia's Harmonized Sales Tax: A Giant Leap in the Province's Competitiveness. SPP Briefing Papers, Calgary Morton, Brian. 2009. "British Columbian Overwhelmingly Reject Harmonized Tax." The , 6 August, A5. Nanos Research. 2009. Nanos Report: Canadians Wary of Sales Tax Harmonization; Ontarians Especially So. Nanos National Poll, Ottawa Peacock, Alan T., and Jack Wiseman. 1961. The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Peet, Chelsea, and Kathryn Harrison. 2012. "Historical Legacies and Policy Reform." BC Studies (173):97-122. Phillips, Stephen. 2010. "Party Politics in British Columbia: The Persistence of Polarization." In British Columbia Politics and Government, edited by Michael Howlett, Dennis Pilon and Tracy Summerville, 109-29. Toronto: Emond Montgomery. Ruff, Norman. 1993. "Institutionalizing Populism in British Columbia." Canadian Parliamentary Review 16 (4):24-32. Ruff, Norman J. 2010. "New Era, Old Reality: The BC Legislature and Accountable Government." In British Columbia Politics and Government, edited by Michael Howlett, Dennis Pilon and Tracy Summerville, 191-203. Toronto: Emond Montgomery. Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services (British Columbia). 2007. Report on the 2008 Budget Consultation Process. 3rd session, 38th Parliament, Victoria: Legislative Assembly,. Tellier, Geneviève. 2005. Les dépenses des gouvernements provinciaux : l'influence des partis politiques, des élections et de l'opinion publique sur la variation des budgets publics. Sainte-Foy: Presses de l'Université Laval.

24

--. 2009. "Les déterminants des recettes fiscales des gouvernements provinciaux canadiens : une étude empirique." Canadian Public Administration / Administration publique du Canada 52 (4):591-612. --. 2015. "Improving the Relevance of Parliamentary Institutions: An Examination of Legislative Pre-Budget Consultations in British Columbia." Journal of Legislative Studies 21 (2):192-212. The Toronto Star. 2009. "No Grab Tax Here." Toronto Star, 15 December, A18, Editorial. Tremblay, Pierre P. 2012. L'argent de l'État : Pourquoi et comment. Tome 1, Le Revenu. Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec. Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism." British Journal of Political Science 25 (3):289-325. Vanderklippe, Nathan. 2008. "B.C. Unveils Carbon Tax: Money Will Go Back to Taxpayers, Minister Says." National Post, 20 February, A1. Young, Lisa, and Joanna Everitt. 2004. Advocacy Groups, coll. The Canadian Democratic Audit. Vancouver: UBC Press.

25