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Emerging Risks and Opportunities in Sub-Saharan

BY JEFFREY HERBST AND GREG MILLS

his article examines the recent past and prospective developments (over a 2-3 year time- frame) for sub-Saharan African in three areas of major concern to American T foreign-policy makers: peace and security, democracy and governance, and and development. Each topic is discussed separately at the continental level to place sub-Saharan Africa in comparative perspective, at the regional level, and then at the -level. Attention is given to recent, specific country incidences to establish possible trends. Peace and Security

While in the 1960’s and 1970’s, was the with the most armed violence (as measured by number of casualties), Africa suffered from the most conflict in the following two decades. In the 2000’s, especially with the in Afghanistan and and a notable number of peace settle- ments in Africa, the ceded its role as the leading arena for conflict, although wars still continued, notably in Democratic of Congo (DRC) and . From 2000 to 2006, more wars ended, on average, in Africa each year than began. More recently, however, there have been fears that Africa will regain its position as the area where conflict is most heavily located. Part of this concern can be tied to U.S. pullbacks from Iraq and Afghanistan. However, recently, there has also been the breakout of conflict in a number of countries. The advent of civil in and the subsequent French intervention is particularly notable because Mali had been seen as a good performer and had received significant U.S. aid to professionalize its army. There has also been the emergence of less surprising conflict in (CAR) and South , both poor, divided and weak states. Finally, violence in has increased as the army seems unable to suppress Boko . There are also warning signs that the settlement in —site of one of the great successes in African conflict resolution—are coming undone, although we do not believe that political settle- ment will be challenged.

Jeffrey I. Herbst is the 16th president of Colgate University. Greg Mills is the Director of the -based Brenthurst Foundation.

PRISM 5, no. 2 FEATURES | 15 HERBST & MILLS

Average Number of Conflict Average Number of Conflict Decade Onsets per Year Terminations per Year 1950-1959 0.1 0.3 1960-1969 2.1 1.3 1970-1979 2.0 2.0 1980-1989 2.6 2.3 1990-1999 4.0 3.9 2000-2006 2.4 3.1 Table 1. Number of Conflict Onsets and Terminations in Sub-Saharan Africa (1950-2006)1

It is therefore not surprising that the Fund these schisms in the absence of massive further for Peace Failed Index for 2013,2 which reform by states. In particular, urban concen- includes a number of military, ethnic, political trations of large numbers of energetic yet and institutional variables designed to predict unskilled, unemployed and frustrated youth, state fragility, shows that overall many African is a cause for concern. states have lost ground over the past five years. The state institutions critical to suppress- As a result, African states remain dispropor- ing conflict—armies, police, intelligence ser- tionately represented globally amongst the vices—are weak. And the surrounding coun- states that are most vulnerable to conflict. The tries may export conflict (as happened to Mali) following table from the shows as there are more than enough guns for low- their estimation of the forty most vulnerable level conflict to emerge. The period of relative countries. African countries have seven of the peace in the 2000’s can better be understood ten lowest positions and, perhaps more strik- as a low point in the cycle that was natural ing, eight of the ten spots between 11 and 20. after the flare-up on the continent in the Africa, despite the gains that have been made, 1990’s when a number of wars began due to is still home to the most countries that are vul- the shuffling of cards that came with the end nerable to conflict. of the Cold War and the consequent end of Given the number of fragile states that external support for regimes in , continue to exist in Africa, it was probably , , and , among incorrectly assumed that the period of relative others. peace that Africa experienced in the 2000’s was Accordingly, there is probably no one a permanent condition. There are too many structural factor supporting the upsurge in the predictors of conflict present in Africa for con- number of countries experiencing conflict. flict to not re-emerge. The states are poor, the Rather, given the preconditions for conflict, it weak, and societies are divided was inevitable that the conflict curve would by ethnicity, , and . pick up after a period of relative peace. No one Population numbers and changing demo- could be particularly surprised about CAR and graphics (Africa’s population will increase , although the details will always from 949 million currently to 1.7 billion by be novel, but Mali holds out a warning that 2040 and to 3.5 billion by 2090 at current even those countries that have seemingly trends3) can only serve to further intensify

16 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 EMERGING RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1 Somalia 11 Iraq 21 31 2 Congo (D. R.) 12 Cote d’Ivoire 22 32 Timor-Leste 3 Sudan 13 Pakistan 23 N Korea 33 4 South Sudan 14 23 34 5 15 Guinea-B 25 35 6 16 Nigeria 26 Myanmar 36 Congo (Rep) 7 Afghanistan 17 27 37 Iran 8 18 28 38 Mali 9 CAR 19 29 38 10 20 30 Nepal 40 Table 2. Forty Most Vulnerable Countries

accomplished a great deal can disintegrate been there for some time (e.g., Somalia) and quite rapidly. are also the subject of significant policy atten- Trying to predict future violence is tion (e.g., South Sudan). In terms of potential extremely difficult. At the regional level, coun- downside and significance to American policy- tries in the different parts of Africa are all well makers, Kenya is the state that stands out as represented in the Fund for Peace Index with having the greatest potential for violence, and the exception of . Zimbabwe is that would be a new arena of immediate con- ranked 10th from the bottom by the Fund for cern for policymakers. In the Index’s five year Peace but it is the only Southern African coun- review between 2008 and 2013, Kenya is actu- try that seems currently at risk. We agree with ally the sub-Saharan African country that dete- the implied judgment that Mozambique is not riorated the most in the rankings, after currently at risk. and Mali (which both fell apart in that Certainly, Nigeria stands out as extremely period), , Guinea-, and Eritrea. vulnerable and is rated 16th by the Fund for While the source of the violence has been in Peace. Given its size and position in West part contained by the election pact between Africa, and its role as a global supplier of gas the two main ethnic protagonists as repre- and oil, anything that happens in Nigeria must sented by vice president William Ruto (a be of significant concern to American policy- Kalenjin) and president makers. As the chart below suggests4, violence (Kikuyu), there is no guarantee that the com- in Nigeria has been episodic but there is no pact will hold. Al-Shabab is another source of evidence that the has found a potential destabilization and is unlikely to dis- means of controlling the instability. Indeed, sipate so long as there is strife in Somalia, the Nigerian security forces are such a blunt Kenyan forces are in situ, and members of the instrument that their operations tend to antag- Somali population in Kenya can potentially be onize many populations who observe inno- mobilized against the government. cents being killed almost carelessly in the hunt The failed states model presupposes a for the terrorists. descent into violence, along the lines of Most of the other African states in the Somalia, Mali or the CAR. However, African “bottom twenty” of the failed state index have states exist on a spectrum of failure, where

PRISM 5, no. 2 FEATURES | 17 HERBST & MILLS state functions may be weak and fail to deliver International Responses to Upsurges in basic services and the state slowly atrophies. Violence There is no one, sudden violent moment. This is the arc that both Kenya and Nigeria may be The French intervention in Mali was a surprise proceeding down. These conditions may create and harkened back to a previous era of more insidious long-term challenges for European interventions in former . Western policy-makers, given both their Our view is that the French intervention in lengthy period of stagnation and decline with- Mali is probably not a harbinger of a new out external media or government attention. period of adventurism because the conditions The larger the state, almost by definition, in Mali were uniquely tied to the continuing the more severe the consequences of failure. evolution of Libya, where Paris had also been However, it is clear that sudden violence in the first-mover. In addition, the real atrophy almost any state can destabilize neighbors. For that ’s military has suffered in recent instance even a small amount of violence years will constrain its ability to act, even if its recently caused more than a thousand people leaders had a desire to be lead interveners else- to flee Mozambique for Malawi. Long-term where. Paris’s much more restrained response failure brings its own consequences. South to Central African Republic shows the limits to Africa, for instance, has borne the brunt of its actions. Zimbabwe’s slow collapse, having to absorb African countries have become more cen- perhaps two million Zimbabweans with the trally involved in in recent years, accompanying social dislocation. U.S. foreign reacting to the vacuum caused by western dis- policy makers cannot focus on every country interest in direct intervention, their own grow- equally and therefore it is only natural to grav- ing capabilities and ability to cooperate with itate to the larger countries. However, it should each other (often funded by western coun- not be a surprise that even a small country can tries), and the very real fear that violence could destabilize a neighborhood. spillover. In general, most African cannot operate far from their borders and have

Graph 1: Deaths Over Time

18 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 EMERGING RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA a difficult time pursuing sustained combat. they took some casualties, the guerrillas dis- The exceptions are a few militaries (e.g., persed before a final defeat, perhaps to fight , Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda) again another day or perhaps to simply melt that have, in general, become more capable in away. There is little evidence that the new force recent years. The Kenya intervention in has been able to secure stability in eastern Somalia was especially notable but perhaps Congo without a political settlement that pro- unique because Kenya was pursuing its own vides sufficient confidence for ethnic minori- interests in preventing further terrorist attacks ties and the regime in . launched from Somalia rather than having a Democracy and Governance pure peacekeeping motive. Certainly, despite all the work that has been done, African mili- Democracy (the selection of rulers by citizens) tary cooperation remains a relatively weak reed and governance (the appropriate economic upon which to base a conflict resolution strat- management of the ) are distinct top- egy. American foreign policy makers are prob- ics. In the long-term, the two are correlated. ably incorrect if they believe that demands for For instance, it is no coincidence that western intervention will be attenuated in the —the only continental African country to have near future by growing African military capa- regularly scheduled elections that have been bilities. conducted in a free and fair manner since the There probably are no other outside coun- 1960’s—also routinely has the highest gover- tries that have the capability to intervene to nance scores. However, given that most African fundamentally alter the course of an African democratic structures are young, weak, and ill conflict. Therefore, most conflicts in the near formed, the correlation between democracy future will follow the same arc as demands and governance can be nebulous in the short- begin for outside intervention, western coun- to-medium-term. For instance, Rwanda and tries mainly demur, and Africans are then Ethiopia have high governance scores but are drawn increasingly into the mix. Whether authoritarian regimes that tolerate little to no African countries intervene will depend criti- democratic opposition. , on the other cally on whether there is a lead country that hand, has had a series of successful elections cares enough and has the capability to affect but has suffered over many years from poor what is inevitably a confusing and dynamic economic management. battlefield. Democracy The Chapter Seven resolution that empowered African peacekeepers to fight in Freedom House provides a reasonable way to eastern Congo was a new development that evaluate the democratic performance of demonstrated the ability of the international and countries through its now famous community led by Africans to respond to a rankings.5 Countries conflict. However, the actual fighting followed ranked, as below, 1-2.5 are considered “free” a relatively old pattern. The intervening force while those ranked 5.5-7 are “not free” with was able to “defeat” M23 because the rebel those in between (3-5) labelled “partly free.” group really did not want to fight the 3,000 or As the table indicates, sub-Saharan Africa at so soldiers that were arrayed against it. While the continental level is now considerably freer

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than the but lags other developing failure. As with the conflict curve, the pendu- regions.6 lum is simply swinging the other way. As the next chart indicates, there has not What is perhaps most notable is that the been much change in comparative regional drift away from freedom has been mild and democratic performance over the last few that there has not been a more severe correc- years. Africa shows a slight drift toward author- tion. The vast majority of African countries still itarianism, from 4.2 to 4.5 between 2006 hold regularly scheduled elections, admittedly and 2014. Mali—one of countries listed for of widely varying quality. Political conversa- many years as “free” but now in the “partly tion, aided by the continent becoming increas- free” category — is a striking illustration of this ingly wired, has increased. There is, as of yet, shift. In the table below that lists freedom sta- no intellectual alternative to democracy in tus by country, the number of those catego- Africa. rized as “partly free” is now one less than Within Africa, there is significant variation those in the “not free” category. For many by region.7 The overall findings—with years, the “partly free” category had contained Southern Africa most free and the Horn least— the most African countries. However, Africa’s would not be a surprise to most observers. mild democratic deterioration over the last few More interesting is the fact that years did not change its position vis-à-vis other does not have that different a score from regions. Southern Africa despite the long-held percep- tion that Southern Africa has performed rela- Sub-Saharan Africa 4.5 tively well. The result comes about because both West and Southern Africa include a set of countries that are becoming arguably more South and 2.45 diverse. Thus, Botswana, , , and are listed as “free” but Angola, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe are in the Asia 3.37 “not free” category. West Africa has fewer coun- tries in the “free” category but is well-repre- sented in the “partly free” area.8 Middle East 5.5 At the same time, it is interesting to note that there have not been any recent instances Table 3. Freedom House score by area, 2014 of a country moving into the “free category.” All those listed have been recognized for their democratic achievements for some time. The A slight move back to pattern appears to be that African countries after the many transitions away from one-party made some impressive gains in the first five or military rule is hardly surprising given how years or so after the Berlin Wall fell as multi- hard it is to construct functioning democracies party electoral systems replaced the old one- and the fact that many democratic systems party or no party systems. In retrospect, it is only reach a stable point after learning from clear that these transitions came about because of the economic bankruptcy of the old regimes

20 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 EMERGING RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Free Partly Free Not Free consolidation is difficult, especially in the con- Burkina Faso Angola text of material deprivation. Never before in Botswana Burundi Cameroon have so many poor countries Cote d’Ivoire Central African attempted to both grow and democratize as in Republic today’s Africa. Consequently, failure or, even Guinea Chad more common, ambiguity of result is to be Lesotho Kenya Congo (Braz- expected. Whatever the overall benefits to the zaville) growth that Africa has recently experienced, Namibia Liberia Congo (Kin- shasa) there may have been too much optimism Senegal Equatorial about the ability of poor countries to quickly Guinea institute democracy. It remains the case that in South Africa Malawi Eritrea most African societies democratic institutions Mali Ethiopia are weak, skills are low, finances scarce, incen- Mozambique tives in favor of the private sector rare, and Niger Gambia, The identity and patronage remain operating prin- Nigeria Guinea-Bissau ciples of the political and economic system, Sierra Leone Mauritania while the capabilities of local civil society are Rwanda extremely limited. Somalia African leaders have also closely observed Uganda Sudan the now many dozens of elections that have Zambia Swaziland occurred across the continent in recent years. Zimbabwe They have adapted to the new democratic con- Table 4. Freedom House classifications, 2014 text by managing elections so that they win but remain in the good graces of the interna- rather than a groundswell of support for tional community by not ostentatiously violat- democracy. However, very few countries have ing the norms of free and fair contests to the been able to institutionalize democratic gains extent that monitors feel forced take the to the extent of being considered “free.” In par- unwanted (by all) decision of challenging the ticular, recently, the number of incumbents legitimacy of the vote. Apparently, donor activ- who lose power via elections has diminished ity has made little long-term impact on domes- significantly compared to the 1990-1995 tic processes, particularly on reforms that chal- period. As a result, countries enter in a difficult lenge the prevailing domestic political and hazy condition of having important dem- operating systems and economic orthodoxy, ocratic forms (notably multiparty elections focused as it largely is on extraction rather which have persisted in the vast majority of than popular inclusion and social investment. countries) but are unable to institutionalize Governance further gains. They are thus vulnerable to dem- ocratic backtracking, which appears to have It is probably even harder to measure gover- occurred in the last few years. nance than democracy because the former con- The retreat from democratization reminds cept covers such a large area. The Heritage us that the process of democratic Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom

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provides a reasonable overall measurement of What is more impressive is the record of East governance, rating countries for corruption, African countries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) protection of property rights, and regulation in that actually outperform Southern Africa, the a large number of areas. Clearly modelled on region that has traditionally had the best repu- the Freedom House work, the Index divides tation for economic management. Again, it is countries on a scale of 1-100 into “free (100- the diversity of the region that is most striking. 80),” “mostly free (79.9-70),” moderately free Botswana is categorized as “mostly free” with (69.9-60),” “mostly unfree (59.9-50),” and a world rank of 27 that puts it above, among “repressed (49-0).” others, South Korea. In contrast, DRC, Eritrea Given the Index’s scale, the areas of and Zimbabwe are ranked, respectively, 172, the world are actually bunched fairly close 174, and 176 out of 178, with only and together, reflecting diversity of performance in North Korea “beating out” Zimbabwe.10 every area. In terms of an absolute ranking, Attempts at reform have often collided Africa remains substantially lower than other with patronage political networks necessary for parts of the world. However, the next figure electoral success, and often distributed along makes clear that Africa as a continent in abso- ethnic, religious or regional lines. In the short- lute terms has improved since 2009 while the term, democratization and governance do not performance of the other regions is more likely go together, although in the longer-term ambiguous, with South and Central America the two historically coincide. The very need for experiencing an absolute decline in perfor- African leaders to stand for election on a regu- mance while the Middle East and lar basis puts pressure on them to both fund have been volatile.9 their parties and consolidate their support When Africa is disaggregated by region, bases. This is compounded by “big man” ten- there is, again, considerable diversity. Not sur- dencies to accumulate wealth through state prisingly, has performed poorly. contracts and contacts. The rise of has,

64

62

60 S. and Central America

58 Middle East & North Africa 56 Asia 54

52 Sub-Saharan Africa

50

48 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Graph 2. Index of Economic Freedom by Area

22 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 EMERGING RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA in this regard, diluted donor influence on gov- policy-makers that earn a “modestly free” gov- ernance, both directly (through contracting) ernance ranking but a political ranking of “not and indirectly (as source of alternative finance, free.” In particular, Rwanda, Ethiopia and and as a state-led economic development Cameroon seem to have had some economic model). success but reform of their political systems is The question of the timing and sequenc- lagging behind. The political economy these ing of political and economic reform is countries are developing raises the question of amongst the most interesting in Africa. The whether a new model is nascent in Africa that next chart combines the Index of Economic draws from the authoritarian political practices Freedom and the Freedom in the World rank- but liberalized economic models of East Asia. ings to understanding comparative progress in This is not so much a “ Consensus” as political and economic liberalization. was much-discussed a few years ago because Some of the populations in the cells are there is no evidence that China is driving the hardly a surprise. For instance, the grouping of ideological economic debate in Africa, aside countries that are considered both economi- from being a pretext for this type of state cally “repressed” and politically “not free’ is behavior. large. And it is no surprise that Botswana alone Rather, we may be observing the nascent scores an Index ranking of “mostly free’ and a stages of what eventually could become the Freedom House ranking of “free.” Most coun- “Kigali consensus” as more countries take note tries tend toward the middle of the table, hav- of the economic performance of Rwanda and ing modest success in both economic reform other authoritarian countries. Superficially, the and promoting freedom. Rwandan experience looks appealing. The What is perhaps most striking is the num- country has gone from utter destruction after ber of countries of interest to American foreign the in 1994 to a consistent economic

Mostly free Moderately free Mostly unfree Repressed Botswana Zambia Ethiopia Malawi Zimbabwe Swaziland Sierra Leone Mali Eritrea Madagascar Guinea-Bissau Benin DRC South Africa Burundi Kenya Congo, Republic of Ghana Liberia Côte d’Ivoire Rwanda Cameroon Tanzania Chad Mauritania Gabon Central African Republic Guinea Burkina Faso Angola Nigeria Namibia Lesotho Mozambique Gambia Togo Niger Uganda

Senegal

Table 5. Index of Economic Freedom categories, 2014

PRISM 5, no. 2 FEATURES | 23 HERBST & MILLS performer. Kigali is clean, it works, and the Kagame has consistently been able to manipu- country has great ambitions. It seems to be late Western countries in a way that is both able to focus on transformative projects, in obvious and appealing to other African contrast to many African countries whose - nations, notably his stated desire to wean his nomic systems are growing but not transform- country quickly off aid even as he receives ing. more of it. Kagame is seen in some circles as Appealing to African leaders, President the African equivalent of ’s Lee Kuan Paul Kagame has created a political system Yew, the gentle autocrat who can guide a coun- where he faces no credible political opposition try to a radically different future than had been and holds elections that he always wins. Yet, imagined. We have been impressed in the last he still passes muster with Western countries year how often the Rwandan experience is and is celebrated by many pundits who occa- mentioned (always in a positive light) in dis- sionally parachute into Africa. Despite the cussions with senior African leaders across the authoritarian of the regime, the donors continent. Whether the “Kigali Consensus” have showered Rwanda with aid, although becomes a long-term threat to the appeal of Freedom House, for one, is not fooled as it the democracy in Africa will be an important consistently rates Rwanda “Not Free.” Indeed, question to observe in the next few years.

Eco Mostly free Eco Moderately Free Eco Mostly Unfree Eco Repressed Pol Free Botswana South Africa Benin Lesotho Ghana Namibia Senegal Pol Partly Free Zambia Malawi Togo Sierra Leone Mali Burundi Kenya Liberia Cote d’Ivoire Guinea Tanzania Nigeria Burkina Faso Mozambique Uganda Niger Pol Not free Swaziland Gabon Zimbabwe Rwanda Gambia Eritrea Ethiopia DRC Guinea-Bissau Congo, Rep. Cameroon Eq. Guinea Mauritania Chad CAR Angola

Table 6. Comparative Progress in Political and Economic Liberalization

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There appear to be relatively few regional China coupled with an increased appetite for patterns in the chart that compares democra- returns by Western investors in riskier markets. tization and governance. It does stand out that Between 2005 and 2012, continental per the overwhelming number of countries con- capita income increased by roughly 15 percent. sidered politically “free” is in Southern Africa.

However, when it comes to economic regula- Region 2012 Per capita tion, the Southern African countries rated income highly by Freedom House can be found in East Asia & Pacific (developing $5,187 only) every column from Botswana in the economi- & Central Asia $6,939 cally “mostly free” classification to Lesotho in (developing only) the economically repressed. Within much of & $9,192 Southern Africa (Angola and Zimbabwe are (developing only) exceptions), there seems to be a consensus Middle East & North Africa $4,616 (developing only) about democracy but not about economic Sub-Saharan Africa $1,417 management. No other clear regional patterns (developing only) exist, especially given that African countries South Asia $1,386 mainly have middling performance in both Table 7. Regional Per Capita Economic Growth political and economic freedom. (2012) Economic Growth and Development That is an impressive accomplishment but not There has recently been considerable excite- yet transformational. African populations con- ment about Africa’s economic prospects. tinue to grow at a relatively high level, thereby Countries south of the have had, com- moderating the effects of the relatively high pared to their post-independence history, high growth rates recently achieved. and sustained growth since 2000, and near- By sub-region in Africa, there are signifi- term prospects of five percent growth at the cant variations. It is also hard to evaluate continental level seem reasonable. Still, it is regional per capita income because one coun- important to understand Africa’s actual posi- try in a region with an outsized income can tion and disaggregate recent experience. On a distort the figure for the entire group of coun- continental level, Africa is now the second- tries. The following chart shows per capita poorest region although, given the inevitable income for each region and what happens error in statistics, it can reasonably be said to when the average is recalculated by eliminating be tied with South Asia.11 the highest-ranked country. Southern Africa is Setting GDP per capita in 2005 to 100, it clearly the richest area, in good part because it is clear that Sub-Saharan Africa has done well is not dominated by one relatively rich coun- but so have all of the other regions (data for try. the Middle East for this period has not been The table is also a warning that, while collected). Indeed, it would have been notable Africa is certainly growing, some of the conti- if Africa had not grown, given the buoyant nental growth statistics routinely cited are dis- international economy characterized by the proportionately influenced by what is high commodity prices and investment from

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Graph 3. Growth in constant GDP per capita, 2005=100 happening in a few small countries (e.g., $1,165 to $1,908 (64 percent) that is derived Equatorial Guinea). by simply averaging the performance of coun- The chart below shows that when Africa’s tries together without regard to population. per capita income is weighted by the popula- In particular, the average per capita tion size of each country, so that, for instance incomes of the three largest African countries Ethiopia accounts for ten percent of the calcu- by population (DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria13 ) that lation rather than 1/48, average continental together account for approximately 35 percent income is lower and the curve somewhat flat- of all people on the continent are lower than ter.17 In particular, the “average African” has the continental average. Nigeria, as the chart seen her income rise over the last seventeen makes clear, has closed the gap in recent years years (in constant 2005 dollars) from $736 to largely on the back of relatively high oil prices $1,090, an increase of 48 percent. This is good but the other two are still very low by African but not as impressive as the increase from standards. Indeed, Congo’s per capita income has essentially been flat between 1995 and Region Average Average when recalculated without 2012—the time when many African countries highest ranked nation were experiencing significant growth—reflect- Central Africa 625 295 ing the cost of conflict and poor economic 495 444 policies. At the same time, some (but certainly Horn 430 227 not all) small countries have registered high Southern 2686 2488 economic growth. In particular, Botswana and Africa Namibia have all done better than the conti- West Africa 1696 889 nental average. Table 8. Regional Per Capita Income

26 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 EMERGING RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Graph 4. Per Capita Income, Un-weighted and Weighted

Size is a surprising determinant of a Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique) have country’s economic growth prospects, a find- emerged in recent years from conflicts that ing that starkly contrasts the usual assumption reduced their economic foundations to near that big countries will, all other things being ruin. The relatively high growth these countries equal, do better because of their larger markets experienced in the 2005-12 period is, of and the greater likelihood that they will have course, important but is partially a statistical significant raw materials, by dint of their larger mirage that reflects the simple restarting of surface area. Larger countries, as demonstrated economic engines at the onset of peace. by the trajectories of DRC, Ethiopia, and Whether that growth can be sustained is a Nigeria are harder to manage and pose real separate issue. The post-conflict economic challenges to how governments project power “bump,” as welcome as it is for the countries over distance. that have endured such trauma, is another rea- It is notable that each of Africa’s three son why actual economic growth in Africa may giants has had a and a history of con- be less than the statistics suggest. siderable violence over their post-indepen- Africa’s stronger economic performance dence . In contrast, the relatively good has been pervasive but not universal. There are record that small countries have had suggests warning signs. We believe that the relatively that economic management is aided by rela- good continental economic performance in tively compact populations. It may also be the recent years has been due to relatively high case that the impact of natural resources in commodity prices fuelled especially by China some small countries (e.g., oil in Equatorial and difficult governance decisions that African Guinea) will be proportionately greater. countries have made. It is now clear what some When it comes to growth rates of indi- called the commodity “supercycle” is over, if it vidual countries for the period under review, ever really existed, and African countries are there is clearly considerable variation. likely to face less robust export earnings in the Amongst the relatively high performers, it is near future. The “taper” by the U.S. Federal perhaps notable how many (Liberia, Angola, Reserve may also cause the depreciation of

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Graph 5. Average Per Capita Income some and a decline in the number has certainly evolved from what The Economist of foreign investors seeking African projects, if called “The Hopeless Continent” in 2000. they can get more for their money by investing However, we find that some achievements in in U.S. Treasuries. areas that the U.S. has identified as critical are in danger of being reversed, not shared by all Conclusion countries, or are overblown once a more There have been significant accomplishments nuanced analysis is conducted. across Africa over the last 15 years. The num- These conclusions are not surprising ber of wars has decreased, multiparty elections because nation-building, democratization, and are now held routinely in the vast majority of proper economic management are each countries, and economic growth is projected extremely difficult processes to manage and across the continent to average four to five per- many African countries are attempting to cent in the next two years. The image of Africa undertake at least two of these simultaneously.

Top quartile Second quartile Third quartile Bottom quartile Liberia South Africa Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Uganda Kenya Senegal Angola Tanzania Congo, Rep. Malawi Ghana Zambia Niger Gambia, The Rwanda Botswana Chad Cote d’Ivoire Central African Republic Sudan Togo Guinea Sierra Leone Congo, Dem. Rep. Mali Swaziland Mozambique Namibia Gabon Madagascar Nigeria Burkina Faso Benin Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Mauritania Burundi Zimbabwe Table 9. Economic growth (GDP per capita), 2005-12

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There are thus bound to be setbacks and out- 10 The Index of Economic Freedom regional right reversals. In the next two to three years, scores for 2014 are: Central Africa, 49.4; East Africa, 58.3; Horn, 48.1; Southern Africa, 55.9; and West the ultimate challenge for American policy- Africa, 54.1, where the higher the score, the greater makers will be to appreciate the extremely dif- the economic freedom. ficult context in which reform processes are 11 (Number reported for Middle East is for 2011). The source for this and following charts and evolving so as not to oversell welcome, albeit tables: , World Development Indicators. ultimately short-term, accomplishments. The http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development- descent of Mali into civil war serves as a par- indicators. 12 ticular warning in this regard. PRISM These calculations were done before Nigeria rebased its GDP figures. 13 These calculations were made before Nigeria released its recalculated GDP figures.

NOTES Photos

1 Human Security Report. www.hsrgroup.org Page 14 photo by Pierre Holtz. A boy in the town 2 At http://ffp.statesindex.org/images/fsi-trendmap- of Birao in northern CAR which was largely burnt down 2008-2013-hires.png. during fighting in 2007. From http://commons.wikimedia. 3 See http://populationpyramid.net/sub-saharan-africa org/wiki/File:Birao_burnt_down2.jpg licensed under the 4 Council on Foreign Relations, Nigeria Security Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Tracker, http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/ Generic license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ p29483 by-sa/2.0/deed.en. Photo reproduced unaltered. 5 http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/ freedom-world-2014?gclid=CIu-2qrjy7wCFfFDMgod91IACw#. UuF9cm0o6Uk. 6 This paper uses data from several different sources. The definition of the world areas varies some- what from source-to-source. For instance, different countries may be included in “developing Asia.” These variations in definition do not affect the larger conclusions drawn by the paper. 7 This paper divides Africa into Central, East, Horn, Southern and West regions. It general it does not include island countries. Again, the data by Africa region is not completely uniform. Some sources provide data for Somalia, some do not. The advent of South Sudan is also treated differently by source. Again, these variations should not have an impact on overall generalizations. 8 The Freedom House scores for the regions are: Central Africa, 5.8; East Africa, 4; Horn 6.4; Sothern Africa 3,65; and West Africa, 4.2, where the lower the score indicating greater freedom. 9 At Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/index/

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