Emerging Risks and Opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Emerging Risks and Opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa BY JEFFREY HERBST AND GREG MILLS his article examines the recent past and prospective developments (over a 2-3 year time- frame) for sub-Saharan African countries in three areas of major concern to American T foreign-policy makers: peace and security, democracy and governance, and economic growth and development. Each topic area is discussed separately at the continental level to place sub-Saharan Africa in comparative perspective, at the regional level, and then at the country-level. Attention is given to recent, specific country incidences to establish possible trends. Peace and Security While in the 1960’s and 1970’s, Asia was the region with the most armed violence (as measured by number of casualties), Africa suffered from the most conflict in the following two decades. In the 2000’s, especially with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a notable number of peace settle- ments in Africa, the continent ceded its role as the leading arena for conflict, although wars still continued, notably in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia. From 2000 to 2006, more wars ended, on average, in Africa each year than began. More recently, however, there have been fears that Africa will regain its position as the world area where conflict is most heavily located. Part of this concern can be tied to U.S. pullbacks from Iraq and Afghanistan. However, recently, there has also been the breakout of conflict in a number of countries. The advent of civil war in Mali and the subsequent French intervention is particularly notable because Mali had been seen as a good performer and had received significant U.S. military aid to professionalize its army. There has also been the emergence of less surprising conflict in Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan, both poor, divided and weak states. Finally, violence in Nigeria has increased as the army seems unable to suppress Boko Haram. There are also warning signs that the settlement in Mozambique—site of one of the great successes in African conflict resolution—are coming undone, although we do not believe that political settle- ment will be challenged. Jeffrey I. Herbst is the 16th president of Colgate University. Greg Mills is the Director of the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation. PRISM 5, NO. 2 FEATURES | 15 HERBST & MILLS Average Number of Conflict Average Number of Conflict Decade Onsets per Year Terminations per Year 1950-1959 0.1 0.3 1960-1969 2.1 1.3 1970-1979 2.0 2.0 1980-1989 2.6 2.3 1990-1999 4.0 3.9 2000-2006 2.4 3.1 Table 1. Number of Conflict Onsets and Terminations in Sub-Saharan Africa (1950-2006)1 It is therefore not surprising that the Fund these schisms in the absence of massive further for Peace Failed State Index for 2013,2 which reform by states. In particular, urban concen- includes a number of military, ethnic, political trations of large numbers of energetic yet and institutional variables designed to predict unskilled, unemployed and frustrated youth, state fragility, shows that overall many African is a cause for concern. states have lost ground over the past five years. The state institutions critical to suppress- As a result, African states remain dispropor- ing conflict—armies, police, intelligence ser- tionately represented globally amongst the vices—are weak. And the surrounding coun- states that are most vulnerable to conflict. The tries may export conflict (as happened to Mali) following table from the Fund for Peace shows as there are more than enough guns for low- their estimation of the forty most vulnerable level conflict to emerge. The period of relative countries. African countries have seven of the peace in the 2000’s can better be understood ten lowest positions and, perhaps more strik- as a low point in the cycle that was natural ing, eight of the ten spots between 11 and 20. after the flare-up on the continent in the Africa, despite the gains that have been made, 1990’s when a number of wars began due to is still home to the most countries that are vul- the shuffling of cards that came with the end nerable to conflict. of the Cold War and the consequent end of Given the number of fragile states that external support for regimes in Addis Ababa, continue to exist in Africa, it was probably Kinshasa, Mogadishu, and Monrovia, among incorrectly assumed that the period of relative others. peace that Africa experienced in the 2000’s was Accordingly, there is probably no one a permanent condition. There are too many structural factor supporting the upsurge in the predictors of conflict present in Africa for con- number of countries experiencing conflict. flict to not re-emerge. The states are poor, the Rather, given the preconditions for conflict, it governments weak, and societies are divided was inevitable that the conflict curve would by ethnicity, religion, and geography. pick up after a period of relative peace. No one Population numbers and changing demo- could be particularly surprised about CAR and graphics (Africa’s population will increase South Sudan, although the details will always from 949 million currently to 1.7 billion by be novel, but Mali holds out a warning that 2040 and to 3.5 billion by 2090 at current even those countries that have seemingly trends3) can only serve to further intensify 16 | FEATURES PRISM 5, NO. 2 EMERGING RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1 Somalia 11 Iraq 21 Syria 31 Mauritania 2 Congo (D. R.) 12 Cote d’Ivoire 22 Uganda 32 Timor-Leste 3 Sudan 13 Pakistan 23 N Korea 33 Sierra Leone 4 South Sudan 14 Guinea 23 Liberia 34 Egypt 5 Chad 15 Guinea-B 25 Eritrea 35 Burkina Faso 6 Yemen 16 Nigeria 26 Myanmar 36 Congo (Rep) 7 Afghanistan 17 Kenya 27 Cameroon 37 Iran 8 Haiti 18 Niger 28 Sri Lanka 38 Mali 9 CAR 19 Ethiopia 29 Bangladesh 38 Rwanda 10 Zimbabwe 20 Burundi 30 Nepal 40 Malawi Table 2. Forty Most Vulnerable Countries accomplished a great deal can disintegrate been there for some time (e.g., Somalia) and quite rapidly. are also the subject of significant policy atten- Trying to predict future violence is tion (e.g., South Sudan). In terms of potential extremely difficult. At the regional level, coun- downside and significance to American policy- tries in the different parts of Africa are all well makers, Kenya is the state that stands out as represented in the Fund for Peace Index with having the greatest potential for violence, and the exception of Southern Africa. Zimbabwe is that would be a new arena of immediate con- ranked 10th from the bottom by the Fund for cern for policymakers. In the Index’s five year Peace but it is the only Southern African coun- review between 2008 and 2013, Kenya is actu- try that seems currently at risk. We agree with ally the sub-Saharan African country that dete- the implied judgment that Mozambique is not riorated the most in the rankings, after Libya currently at risk. and Mali (which both fell apart in that Certainly, Nigeria stands out as extremely period), Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Eritrea. vulnerable and is rated 16th by the Fund for While the source of the violence has been in Peace. Given its size and position in West part contained by the election pact between Africa, and its role as a global supplier of gas the two main ethnic protagonists as repre- and oil, anything that happens in Nigeria must sented by vice president William Ruto (a be of significant concern to American policy- Kalenjin) and president Uhuru Kenyatta makers. As the chart below suggests4, violence (Kikuyu), there is no guarantee that the com- in Nigeria has been episodic but there is no pact will hold. Al-Shabab is another source of evidence that the government has found a potential destabilization and is unlikely to dis- means of controlling the instability. Indeed, sipate so long as there is strife in Somalia, the Nigerian security forces are such a blunt Kenyan forces are in situ, and members of the instrument that their operations tend to antag- Somali population in Kenya can potentially be onize many populations who observe inno- mobilized against the government. cents being killed almost carelessly in the hunt The failed states model presupposes a for the terrorists. descent into violence, along the lines of Most of the other African states in the Somalia, Mali or the CAR. However, African “bottom twenty” of the failed state index have states exist on a spectrum of failure, where PRISM 5, NO. 2 FEATURES | 17 HERBST & MILLS state functions may be weak and fail to deliver International Responses to Upsurges in basic services and the state slowly atrophies. Violence There is no one, sudden violent moment. This is the arc that both Kenya and Nigeria may be The French intervention in Mali was a surprise proceeding down. These conditions may create and harkened back to a previous era of more insidious long-term challenges for European interventions in former colonies. Western policy-makers, given both their Our view is that the French intervention in lengthy period of stagnation and decline with- Mali is probably not a harbinger of a new out external media or government attention. period of adventurism because the conditions The larger the state, almost by definition, in Mali were uniquely tied to the continuing the more severe the consequences of failure. evolution of Libya, where Paris had also been However, it is clear that sudden violence in the first-mover.