ISSUE 1 | July 2014 Central Africa Report

Status and dynamics of the political situation in

Yolande Bouka

Summary Once hailed as a peacebuilding success story, Burundi has recently experienced escalating political tensions that threaten the stability of country ahead of its 2015 general elections. Frictions between political actors stem partly from the closing of the political space by the government, which prevents the opposition and civil society from operating freely in the country. Moreover, attempts by the ruling party to allow President to run for a third mandate, in violation of the current constitution, have raised concerns about the democratic future of the country. Additionally, UN reports alleging that the CNDD-FDD has taken steps to arm and train its youth wing, the Imbonerakure, and recent violent incidents attributed the youth chapter, have heightened fears of a relapse of political violence.

In 2010 Burundi held its first general election by universal suffrage in 17 years. While the polls were intended to mark the end of the immediate post-transition period and the consolidation of democratic governance after decades of war and crisis, the contested results increased tensions and entrenched the ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party. The country experienced two years of instability and violence that was generally blamed on the activities of the CNDD-FDD youth wing (the Imbonerakure), the intelligence services and the police. Most opposition leaders fled the country, leaving a political vacuum.

While violence had subsided by the end of 2012, paving the way for the return of the exiled leaders in 2013 under negotiated security guarantees brokered by the UN, uncertainty remains about the stability of the country as it gears up for elections in 2015. Indeed, recent political and legislative developments, such as the passing of a new and restrictive media law, a controversial new framework for the national land commission (CNTB), a disputed review of the constitution by the ruling party, and a rift between the CNDD-FDD and its coalition partner, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), have created a tense political environment. CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT

A year ahead of the next general The war was triggered in 1993 by the elections, a number of questions arise. assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the What are the potential effects of the first democratically elected and the first contested legislative changes on the Hutu president of the country. Ndadaye, political dynamics of Burundi? What are a member of the moderate Front for the concerns of the opposition and civil Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), was society with regards to the ruling party’s killed by Tutsi military officers opposed to actions? How can the recent behaviour a political shift after decades of Tutsi rule of the CNDD-FDD be explained? What by UPRONA. are the short and long-term security risks Initially a cross-communal party, of such sustained political tensions? Is UPRONA became dominated by the there a possibility of a return to ethno- Tutsi elite shortly after the country’s political violence? independence. Its tenure was marked

The Arusha Peace Agreement put an end to a 12-year civil war that claimed the lives of some 300 000 Burundians

This report, which is based on field by multiple episodes of ethnically research and interviews conducted in engineered violence against Hutus by the the Burundian capital, Bujumbura, in Tutsi-controlled military in 1965, 1972 February 2014, has the aim of analysing and 1988. Ndadaye’s murder triggered the status and dynamics of the political violent ethnic reprisals, which eventually situation in Burundi. It is divided into developed into a full-blown civil war. five sections. The first part analyses the FRODEBU splintered following Ndadaye’s background to Burundi’s current political assassination, with the more radical framework. The second explores the membership splitting from the party and morphing into the CNDD and its armed nature of and the contributing factors to wing, the FDD.1 the current political crisis. The report then assesses the quality and breadth of the The Arusha peace agreement was the political space as the country approaches result of intense negotiations between the 2015 elections. The fourth section 20 Burundian groups and political examines the potential implications of the parties. The main parties to the talks security and stability situation in Burundi. were UPRONA, FRODEBU, the CNDD 21 October Finally, the way forward in preparation of and the Party for the Liberation of the successful and transparent elections next Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU). While the year is addressed. political wing of the CNDD headed by Leonard Nyangoma signed the Arusha 1993 Arusha, consocialism and agreement, the FDD refused to do so, power-sharing declaring the CNDD political leadership The war in Burundi illegitimate. This split the CNDD further Burundi’s contemporary political is triggered by the and resulted in the formation of the more framework is anchored in the Arusha assassination of radical CNDD-FDD under the leadership Peace and Reconciliation Agreement Melchior Ndadaye, the of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye. and its various protocols. This agreement first democratically elected and first Hutu was signed in the year 2000 and put an Typifying the situation in Burundi as a president of the country end to a 12-year civil war that claimed political conflict with important ethnic the lives of some 300 000 Burundians. dimensions,2 the Arusha agreement

2 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi had, among other things, the aim of and reaped the benefit of the demise arrest of the party’s former chairman, developing a system of democratic of two main political rivals, namely Hussein Radjabu, who was believed to governance for the country that FRODEBU and the Forces Nationales de be the party’s successor to Nkurunziza at would ensure the security of ethnic Libération (FNL), both of them Hutu- the next elections. So, almost as early as minorities. The consocialist agreement dominated parties.4 the ascent to power by Nkurunziza and was to ensure power sharing at the his inner military circle they demonstrated The CNDD-FDD’s first term was political level by dividing executive their willingness to suppress opposition characterised by a combination of powers between a president and two within and outside the CNDD-FDD. notable successes and worrying trends. vice-presidents from different political On the one hand, under Nkurunziza’s It was against this backdrop of increased parties and ethnic backgrounds. In leadership, the FNL signed a deal political repression that Burundi prepared addition, it required that a high majority effectively putting an end to the last for the 2010 general elections. In the to pass legislation and amend the remnant of rebel activity. Negotiations months before the polls the ruling party constitution.2 This provision was not initially stalled as the FNL refused to used all the resources at its disposal to only aimed at preventing legislative recognise the legitimacy of the 2005 engineer favourable electoral conditions domination by a single ethnic group, indirect presidential elections. After fierce for the CNDD-FDD and to restrict but also to promote dialogue and fighting between government forces and the political space. For example, the consensus across political divides. the FNL, the rebel group unexpectedly party made multiple attempts to have Furthermore, to promote power sharing signed a ceasefire in September 2006. electoral rules ratified that would give in the security sector, the agreement However, the ceasefire was violated by the CNDD-FDD an advantage. One of made provision for the various armed both the government and the FNL on these was an attempt to introduce an groups to be integrated into the existing numerous occasions as negotiations electoral code that would transfer some army and for the army not to comprise continued tenuously. Finally, in May of the responsibilities of the electoral more than 50 per cent of a single ethnic 2008, an agreement was signed. In the commission to the president.

There was also evidence of the CNDD- Even in the early years of his mandate, FDD hindering the opposition’s ability President Nkurunziza displayed a tendency to compete freely and efficiently in the electoral process. Rights of assembly, to silence dissent by force of public demonstration and of political expression were violated regularly. Members of the opposition and of civil group. The rationale of this compromise following year the FNL joined the political society were intimidated, harassed and was that ethnic balance would ensure fold when it officially registered as a arrested by the police and the intelligence the stability of the armed forces, prevent political party. services on numerous occasions.6 UN, ethnic violence and reduce the possibility However, even in the early years of diplomatic and NGO reports7 have of a coup d’état.3 As a result of this his mandate, President Nkurunziza documented the ruling party’s use of provision, the army received an infusion displayed a tendency to silence dissent the Imbonerakure to intimidate the of Hutu soldiers, removing the previous by force. One prominent example is opposition. Many members of the youth domination of the Tutsi elite. the suspension of the accreditation wing are demobilised CNDD-FDD fighters In addition to preparing the way for a new of the non-government organisation who have allegedly been re-armed by constitution and detailing the transitional Forum for the Strengthening of Civil the party to disrupt opposition political political arrangement, the Arusha Society (FORSC). This occurred after meetings.8 FRODEBU and the FNL also agreement stipulated that the first post- it had threatened to disclose the accused the ruling party of creating transitional president would be elected names of individuals they suspected dissident groups within their parties and by the national assembly. It was under of being involved in the assassination of offering financial incentives to leading this framework that Pierre Nkurunziza of of anti-corruption campaigner Ernest opposition figures so that they would the CNDD-FDD was elected Burundi’s Manirumva.5 In addition, dissent among join the CNDD-FDD. The aim, they said, president in 2005. While not a signatory members of the CNDD-FDD also resulted was to weaken parties with strong Hutu to the Arusha agreement, the party in the dismissal of 22 of its members bases that were a potential challenge the signed a final peace agreement in 2003 from parliament in 2008 shortly after the CNDD-FDD.9

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The electoral season started in May UPRONA’s participation in the legislative 2010 with local elections. The CNDD- elections was seen as betrayal by FDD won 65,5 per cent of the vote, some members of the coalition, but it while the runner up, the FNL, received resulted from strategic consideration. 14,5 per cent. Even before the official The Constitution stipulates that the results had been released the opposition vice-presidents must be from a different accused the ruling party of fraud and ethnicity and from different political demanded that the results be invalidated. parties. In addition, 40 per cent of In particular, the FNL accused the the ministerial positions and national ruling party of falsifying poll results assembly seats have to go to the Tutsi. and intimidating voters. International UPRONA, being the most prominent and observers, while admitting that some popular Tutsi party in Burundian politics, minor irregularities had been observed, thus had an assured position not only in declared that the results were for the the executive branch, but the legislative most part valid,10 while the electoral branch as well. commission (CENI), credited for its In the aftermath of the elections, neutrality, denied the opposition request. violence and instability gripped Burundi In response to these results the throughout 2011 and most of 2012. opposition created a coalition of Reports by the UN and human rights 12 parties, which included the organisations document numerous cases FNL, Sahwanya-FRODEBU (one of of torture, disappearances, extrajudicial

40 per cent of ministerial positions and national assembly seats have to go to the Tutsi

FRODEBU’s splinter parties), the killings and massacres. These were CNDD, the Movement for Solidarity and committed mainly by government forces, Before 2010, Democracy (MSD) and the Union for but also by the FNL, which raised the CNDD-FDD held Peace and Development (UPD), calling fears that Burundi was on its way to a it the Alliance for Democratic Change resumption of fully fledged armed hostility 59 of 106 (ADC-Ikibiri). This coalition contested the between the political parties.11 seats in the national results and boycotted the remainder of In addition, members of the media and assembly the elections, notably the presidential civil society continued to be harassed election in June, the national assembly and arrested during this period. and elections in July, and local Opposition members were forbidden administrative elections in September. to meet and many of them were found Nkurunziza ran unopposed and captured murdered, while leading opposition the presidency with 92 per cent of the leaders such as Agathon Rwasa (FNL), vote. UPRONA decided at the last Alexis Sinduhije (MSD) and Pancras minute to rejoin the electoral process, Cimpaye (FRODEBU) fled the country.12 but the damage had been done. The It is important to note that the post- party won only 17 of the 106 seats while election violence was mostly political in After 2010, the CNDD-FDD increased its seats in nature, pinning Hutu against Hutu in an the CNDD-FDD won the national assembly from 59 to 81, intense struggle to win over the Hutu thereby ensuring their almost complete constituency. UPRONA and the Tutsi 81 seats dominance of the assembly and a return were for the most part left out of the to a de facto single party state. violence and political struggle.

4 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi In hindsight, to most observers, to be one of Nkurunziza’s most important 2. A new law governing the land the election boycott was clearly a rivals, left him with a reduced popularity commission (Commission Nationale miscalculation by opposition leaders.13 and less viability as a candidate. des Terres et Autres Biens, CNTB). Their hope was to undermine the 3. Constitutional amendments credibility of the elections and the CNDD- Setting up the political crisis proposed by the CNDD-FDD. FDD by boycotting the remainder of the The 2015 elections should be the litmus The Arusha agreement provided for the electoral process. However, Nkurunziza test of Burundi’s democratic system. establishment of a transitional justice was able to maintain domestic and However, the current political climate programme that would include a Truth international legitimacy. Although challenges the possibility of peaceful and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) the international community was of and legitimate elections. Indeed, the and a Criminal Tribunal to deal with the the opinion that the CNDD-FDD had politicisation of state institutions over 15 engaged in unsavoury practices during the past decade in order to restrict the most serious crimes. The TRC was the electoral process, it also considered political space has stifled the opposition’s to be a non-judicial body mandated the internal division and lack of discipline ability to mount a credible challenge to to determine the causes and nature among the opposition parties as having the ruling party. of the Burundian conflict, to identify crimes committed since the country’s independence, and to identify individuals The 2015 elections should be the litmus test who committed acts of genocide, crimes of Burundi’s democratic system against humanity and war crimes during the various episodes of violence. The Tribunal was to be a judicial mechanism contributed to their demise. Confirmation Moreover, the current tensions between that would address, prosecute and by the international observers that the the ruling party and the parliamentary punish crimes of genocide, crimes elections met their basic standards opposition, which consists of UPRONA, against humanity and war crimes. meant that international support of the FRODEBU-Nyakuri and three Batwa However, only in April 2014 did the outcome was only logical. Participation delegates, has left the national assembly government unilaterally move to establish in the elections by UPRONA gave further deadlocked over constitutional changes a TRC, but unaccompanied by a Criminal legitimacy to the process. that could have a serious effect on the Tribunal, despite strong objections by upcoming elections and the country’s The boycott and the ensuing post- the opposition, civil society and the future political landscape. For the past 16 election crisis had a devastating impact international community. The framework year, the CNDD-FDD has unilaterally on the image of the extra-parliamentary of the transitional justice programme drafted and adopted controversial new opposition and the credibility of some of has been a point of contention between legislation to protect the party’s interests, its leaders. It paralysed the opposition’s the CNDD-FDD and UPRONA for over thereby turning the national assembly ability to contest the CNDD-FDD within a decade. After national consultations into a place where little to no dialogue existing institutions and lost it the in 2009 that indicated that Burundians between the CNDD-FDD and the opportunity to constitute a blocking wanted truth, justice and reparations to opposition occurs. minority in parliament. The CNDD-FDD anchor the country’s transitional justice had gained sufficient seats to pass many Recent relations between UPRONA and programme for crimes committed laws championed by the executive, some the CNDD-FDD have been so antagonistic between 1962 and 2008, the CNDD-FDD decided that priority should be placed of which imposed greater restrictions that the political partnership between on the establishment of the TRC, rather on political activity. In addition, the the two parties and the health of the than trying to seek retributive justice.17 post-election crisis gave the ruling party democratic system is being jeopardised. UPRONA argued that this approach the opportunity to damage opposition As the elections approach, some positions taken by the ruling party on sensitive would simply promote impunity and networks in the country through politically issues have resulted in a hardening of advocated for the implementation of the motivated arrests and killings. The long relations between the two parties. The transitional justice programme outlined in absence of opposition leaders from the mains points of contention are:14 the Arusha agreement.18 domestic political scene also dimmed their status. For instance, the three-year 1. A government-proposed structure of This divergence in opinion should be exile of Agathon Rwasa, once believed transitional justice. understood through the prism of the

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passage of time. While UPRONA was when tit-for-tat violence following indeed in power during many of the Ndadaye’s assassination resulted in a country’s episodes of violence, many of second Hutu exodus and a wave of the main decision-makers and suspects Tutsi displacements. While the 1993 are no longer in positions of power or Hutu refugees and the Tutsi internally even alive. Similarly, many of the victims displaced persons (IDPs) were less of the events of 1965 and 1972 are often victims of expropriation, many dead or are no longer in the country. still struggle today to regain their The passage of time also makes it properties. difficult for testimonies and evidence to The Arusha agreement provided for be gathered. On the other hand, war the creation of a land commission crimes committed by former CNDD-FDD responsible for ’(i) Examining all cases combatants who are currently in power of land owned by old caseload refugees are more recent and this may contribute and state owned land; (ii) Examining to the party’s reservations about disputed issues and allegations of abuse implementing a criminal prosecution in the (re)distribution of land and ruling mechanism. on each case in accordance with the The CNDD-FDD’s sudden adoption, above principles.’ 20 The revision of laws after years of inertia in this regard, of governing the commission enacted in a law establishing the TRC was, with December 2013 expanded the CNTB’s the exception of UPRONA’s François jurisdiction to all land disputes, i.e. not Kabura, second vice-president of the only to those resulting from conflict- national assembly, attended by no other induced displacements, but also to cases member of the parliamentary opposition. that may have been solved by earlier land By forgoing the establishment of a commissions. criminal tribunal, the adoption of the Some opposition and civil society law effectively shields members of the representatives have accused the CNDD-FDD from prosecution for crimes new law governing the CNTB of committed during the civil war. having a pro-Hutu bias.21 Many of The second point of contention between those consulted, particularly those the CNDD-FDD and UPRONA is the of Tutsi background, argue that this government’s 2013 review of the CNTB, revision will enable the commission to which manages land conflict resulting wrongfully expropriate Tutsi land without from the war and other episodes of compensation based on a simple violence.19 There have been two main accusation of land grabbing. waves of mass displacement in Burundi. While UPRONA voted against the In the first, which occurred in the wake measure, the CNDD-FDD together with of ethnic violence in 1972, some 300 some members of FRODEBU-Nyakuri 000 Hutu fled the country. The UPRONA had sufficient votes to pass the law. government subsequently redistributed The ruling party claims that UPRONA’s their land, issuing new land titles. While opposition to the law is rooted in the fact some of the land was given to Hutu April 2014 that under its leadership much of the land individuals, some of whom were relatives was acquired illegally or redistributed When government of the exiled Hutu, a far greater share poorly. They defend the new tribunal as a unilaterally moved to was parcelled out to the Tutsi which tool that will speed up the process since establish a TRC, but contributed to the ethnicisation of land many cases get held up for years in the unaccompanied by a conflict in Burundi. Criminal Tribunal, despite regular justice appeal process, frustrating strong objections The second wave of displacement repatriations and heightening tensions derived from the events of 1993, over land disputes.

6 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi However, the most important conflict two vice-presidents with a ’powerful’25 UPRONA, wrote to Nduwimana declaring between the two parties stems from the prime minister, who could come from the his action illegal. President Nkurunziza proposed constitutional changes that same party as the president, and a mostly then dismissed Busokoza,26 which was were drafted by the CNDD-FDD at the ceremonial vice-president. In addition, it quickly followed by the resignation of the end of last year. The dispute does not is proposed to restrict access to seats in three UPRONA cabinet ministers. rest in the amendment of the constitution the National Assembly to parliamentarians Article 128 of the Constitution states that, per se, as there was a general consensus whose parties have won at least five ’In the case of resignation, death or of that the electoral code needed to be per cent of all votes cast, instead of the any other cause of definitive cessation amended22. However, two important current two per cent. of the functions of a Vice-President of matters drew the ire of UPRONA and civil The proposed changes would the Republic, a new Vice-President of society, and alarmed the international consolidate the power of the CNDD- the Republic originating from the same community. First, the CNDD-FDD FDD and jeopardise the ethnic power ethnicity and of the same political party unilaterally drafted an extensive revision balance that was hard won and is as their predecessor is appointed.’ of the constitution without consulting essential for Burundi. The opposition’s President Nkurunziza attempted to other stakeholders. The opposition was concerns were increased when at coax Bonaventure Niyoyankana, a taken by surprise in November 2013 the beginning of 2014 the ruling party former president of UPRONA, to replace when it came to light that the Council of ignored the consensus struck at a Nditije and to submit a list of UPRONA Ministers was reviewing the revised bill.23 two-day consultative workshop on the nominees to replace Busokoza and the Secondly, the extent of revisions is revision of the constitution in December three ministers. seen by some as an abrogation of the 2013. It was convened by the president However, Niyoyankana, under pressure current constitution and a dismissal of of the national assembly and participants from former UPRONA president Nditije the Arusha accords. Among the most included members of government, the and core of the party, refused to play into controversial proposals is the removal of opposition, civil society and religious President Nkurunziza’s hand, forcing him article 302, which stipulates that the first groups. Among other things, it was to turn to Concilie Nibigira, Niyoyankana’s post-transition president is to be elected agreed to leave any revision of the former vice-president, to give him a list by the national assembly. This would only number of presidential mandates until of potential UPRONA candidates. Her leave article 96, which stipulates that a after the 2015 elections. acquiescence gained her the leadership president is to be elected by universal of the government-approved wing of suffrage, renewable once. Adoption of Despite this, the CNDD-FDD submitted UPRONA. By mid-February, all vacant this revision could open the door for its bill,to a vote. However, UPRONA positions had been filled by pro- Nkurunziza, who was once elected by and FRODEBU managed to block its government UPRONA members, who the national assembly and once by a ratification despite the ruling party’s were almost immediately disowned by popular vote, to run for a third term. efforts to influence and intimidate their own party. Critics argue that the Arusha agreement reticent members of the assembly. The explicitly states that ’no one may serve constitutional revision fell one vote short It should be noted that even before the more than two presidential terms’.24 of passing. current crisis, UPRONA was split between a wing that was conciliatory to the CNDD- Moreover, the opposition and civil society The mounting tension between the FDD and another that had greater support accuse the CNDD-FDD of attempting CNDD-FDD and UPRONA finally came to from the core of the party and refused to weaken the power-sharing and a head this February when the CNDD- to work with government. Until recently, consocialist nature of the constitution. FDD Minister of the Interior, Edouard pro-government UPRONA members such The bill proposes the reduction of current Nduwimana, summarily dismissed as Nditijie and Busokoza had enjoyed voting quorums from a two-thirds majority Charles Nditije from UPRONA’s relatively peaceful and mutually beneficial to a simple majority. Adoption would presidency. His dismissal was linked to relationships with the CNDD-FDD. allow the CNDD-FDD, should it win over his increasingly critical public statements 50 per cent of the seats in the national against the CNDD-FDD, particularly The recent events beg the question as assembly, to legislate without interference since the passing of the new CNTB law to why the CNDD-FDD is moving so from other parliamentary parties. The bill in 2013. The dismissal so enraged the boldly to make the legislative changes also proposes to change the structure UPRONA leadership that the country’s now instead of taking the opportunity to of the executive branch by replacing the first vice-president, Bernard Busokoza of do so immediately after its 2010 victory.

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Some observers suggest that the CNDD- the internal management of opposition FDD’s forcefulness is aimed at ensuring parties. Similar to before the 2010 Nkurunziza’s third term in the belief that elections, the opposition once again he is the most popular candidate of the accuses the ruling party of creating CNDD-FDD. Every week he visits rural dissident groups within their parties. areas to build schools, play football The CNDD-FDD benefits from leadership and attend religious services with the crises within the opposition and it 27 population. routinely promotes dissension within In 2010, the CNDD-FDD and Nkurunziza parties by providing incentives to some of were riding the wave of a fresh victory their leaders in an attempt to encourage and the reality of the president’s term them to split from their parties, as limit was not one of the party’s most illustrated above.

The ruling party has taken specific steps to limit the political space available to the opposition

pressing concerns. But now, as the party Interference by government should, has failed to live up to expectations, however, not be interpreted as the sole is accused of widespread corruption source of division in opposition parties. and has lost some support because The Burundian opposition is diverse, of dismal socio-economic conditions, fragmented and obtains its majority it may be trying to buttress its position support from the urban elite. These by maintaining at its head a likable are all factors that contribute to the candidate. difficulties it has in mounting a successful challenge to the current government. Observers also interpret some of the With regard to the fragmentation of constitutional amendments proposed the opposition, it should be noted that by the CNDD-FDD as being a quiet it is divided between a parliamentary admission that, given the determination of the opposition to participate in the opposition and an extra-parliamentary upcoming elections and its own loss opposition. The former comprises the of popularity in recent years, even if it government-recognised branch of manages to win the majority of national UPRONA, FRODEBU-Nyakuri and three assembly seats in 2015, it will not have Batwa representatives. The main extra- the same margin as it has currently. parliamentary opposition parties are part Hence, the move to reduce voting of the ADC-Ikibiri and include the CNDD, quorums may be an attempt to ensure the FNL (without Rwasa at its head), the that the CNDD-FDD will maintain the MSD and Sahwanya-FRODEBU. level of legislative control it has had Even on the major issues that constitute since 2010. the main points of contention between the ruling party and some opposition Opposition and political parties and civil society, there are space divergences in position. For instance, The opposition once Apart from the measures discussed within the national assembly, FRODEBU- again accuses the ruling party of creating above, the ruling party has taken specific Nyakuri joined the CNDD-FDD on the dissident groups within steps to limit the political space available land commission vote in 2013, while it their parties to the opposition. The Minister of the boycotted the recent vote on the new Interior continually tries to interfere in land tribunal and the TRC in concert

8 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi with UPRONA and the Batwa delegates. The law stipulates that organisations Other politicians, such as MSD leader The latter, however, joined the CNDD- must give four business days’ notice Alexis Sinduhije and former UPRONA FDD in its failed attempt to amend the to local administrative authorities of a president, Charles Njitije, fled the constitution in March 2014. Because of planned rally, demonstration or party country for fear of being arrested. these fault lines between members of the meeting. The authorities then have 48 Sinduhije fled after an MSD jogging opposition, the CNDD-FDD can move its hours to forbid the meeting if they deem rally on 8 March 2014 when youth agenda forward with ease. that such an event risks endangering and police officers, deployed under public order.30 In fact, article 10 of the auspice of the new law governing A careful analysis of the internal dynamics the law states that ’the administrative public demonstrations, clashed and of many political parties exposes their authority can at any time, in spite of a dozens of MSD party members were own internal rifts as well. For example, declaration done in accordance to the arrested. After a quick trial, 21 of them FRODEBU and FNL both have multiple law, differ or put an end to any meeting, were convicted and sentenced to life political wings. Given the nature of procession, parade, gathering on public in prison for insurgency, rebellion and politics in many developing countries, roads and in public places, if required assault of law enforcement officers. where access to a political post is one to maintain public order’.31 As ’public There is now a warrant for Sinduhije’s of the few ways of gaining power and order’ is only vaguely defined in the law, arrest for participating in this so-called wealth, the manipulation of allegiances civil society members and opposition insurgency and rebellion.34 is easy and allows the CNDD-FDD to groups claim that it has now become exploit pre-existing vulnerabilities. Government efforts to restrict the political almost impossible to hold meetings in space is indicated by its clampdown In a continuation of the trend begun the provinces as local authorities often on society’s democratic checks and in 2005, the CNDD-FDD has made it deny them the right to meet.32 balances, notably that of the press. Burundian society and media are among A new media law severely restricts news reporting the most vibrant in the region35 and they and imposes heavy fines for violating vaguely have filled the void left by the exile of the extra-parliamentary opposition leaders by defined offenses questioning and challenging government. In 2013, the CNDD-FDD passed a media increasingly difficult for political parties The ruling party has also gained control law that severely restricts news reporting to engage fully in political activities and of judicial nominations by influencing the and imposes heavy fines for the violation to compete in the electoral process judicial system to neutralise opposition of vaguely defined offenses, such as by using its overwhelming majority to members. The ruling party is often able the publication of material that hinders pass very restrictive laws. A 2012 law to arbitrarily arrest opposition leaders on national unity.36 While the law has not governing opposition parties imposes fabricated charges and to then use the yet been applied, members of the media fines and prison terms for opposition courts to legitimize their incarceration, fear that as the elections draw closer, the leaders found guilty of lies or slander thereby excluding, even if temporarily, government will not hesitate to apply it to with the intent of disturbing peace and competitors from the political scene. silence dissent.37 security.28 Another law passed in 2011 For example, in December 2013, former prohibits the formation of coalitions Burundian vice-president and current Security outside electoral campaign periods.29 leader of the extra parliamentary branch For many observers the most worrying Under this law, the ADC-Ikibiri, which of FRODEBU, Frédéric Bamvuginyumvira, aspect of the growing political tensions constitutes the bulk of the extra- who was believed to be the consensus is its potential impact on the stability and parliamentary opposition, is an illegal presidential candidate for ADC-Ikibiri, security of the country. However, a return organisation and cannot operate freely in was arrested with a woman and charged to a full-blown civil war seems unlikely. the country until the government officially with adultery and debauchery.33 While certain civil society observers decides to announce the start of the The charges were later dropped, but he suggest that some members of the electoral campaign. was remanded for allegedly attempting former Burundian armed forces (Forces A law on public demonstrations passed to bribe the arresting officers and he is Armées Burundaises, FAB, which was in 2013 has further curtailed the ability expected to stand trial in front of the mostly a Tutsi army)38 have kept an eye of political parties to operate freely. anticorruption tribunal later this year. on the situation and could split from

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the army if they believe that the power- police force is accused of being used by sharing agreement is under serious the state to neutralise opponents. threat, most civil society and diplomatic The most significant security concern observers consulted believe that the is the growing presence of the army is likely to stay out of any political Imbonerakure in the countryside. The crisis, as it did during the post-election group started to make its presence violence in 2010. felt shortly before the 2010 elections The Burundian army now considers and was accused of intimidating the its task the protection of the territorial opposition. They were heavily involved integrity of the republic. It has gained in the post-election violence against a favorable reputation through members of the opposition in rural areas. its involvement in international According to some members of civil peacekeeping missions in Somalia, the society and the diplomatic community, Central African Republic and Mali. Those they have not only grown in number but

A return to full-blown civil war seems unlikely as the army will probably stay out of any political crisis

missions are not only a source of pride now also cover most of the countryside. in the armed corps, but are also an In some areas they have taken over local important source of revenue. On the one administrative authorities and the police. hand this satisfies the ambitions of high- Working outside the law, they reportedly ranking officers who might otherwise be impose curfews and arrest, beat and kill 40 inclined to get involved in politics, and individuals. on the other it keeps the ex-FAB out of The government denies using the Nkurunziza’s way. A further factor is that Imbonerakure and maintains that it because of the level of ethnic integration is merely a youth wing like any other within the army, the opportunities by party’s youth group. According to a either ethnic group to prepare a coup representative of the CNDD-FDD, crimes without the other side knowing about committed by some members of the it are limited. Most observers thus Imbonerakure are not representative of agree that the necessary elements for the group and are the acts of misguided a relapse to a politicised and ethnically individuals.41 But for most observers, polarised army, as well as pre-Arusha their documented acts of intimidation violence, are not present.39 against the opposition in the countryside, While the army is considered to be a their disruption of political meetings and the fact that they are above the stable force in Burundi, the same cannot law are a serious threat to the stability be said of the police force. The latter’s of the country as elections approach. establishment is relatively new (2004) Some civil society members, particularly and is an amalgam of former gendarmes those associated with the Tutsi ethnic (Burundian armed forces with civilian The government denies group, have expressed a concern that police duties) and former members of the using the Imbonerakure the Imbonerakure are being armed and armed political movements. The police and maintains that it trained by the ruling party. is merely a youth wing is very unpopular among the population like any other party’s as they are perceived to be poorly In April 2014, a leaked cable of the youth group disciplined and trained, and are routinely UN Integrated Office in Burundi abusive towards the general public. The (BNUB) authoritatively documented

10 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi weapons distribution to members of to challenge the nomination at the former soldiers whose backing is the Imbonerakure. The CNDD-FDD Constitutional Court. However, according essential for a successful nomination.44 vehemently rejected the allegation and to some diplomats, the opposition is likely The passing of a new and consensual called for the expulsion of BNUB’s head to lose the case for two reasons, namely electoral code is the only positive of security, Paul Debbie, who is now a) a case could be made for Nkurunziza’s recent political development on the a persona non grata in Burundi.42 In eligibility to run for a third term, and b) Burundian political landscape. Following February 2014 the ADC-Ikibiri sent a given the strong influence of the executive consultations between all political parties, warning to the UN Secretary-General on the judiciary, the court may simply give the national assembly on 25 April 2014 warning him that the ruling party in to the will of CNDD-FDD. unanimously adopted a new code for was preparing genocide. While most Many observers have, however, also the 2015 elections. The CNDD-FDD’s observers doubt that the political crisis indicated that there are signs of a rift acceptance of the electoral code came could lead to genocide in Burundi, between CNDD-FDD generals and the as a surprise to most observers as it there is consensus that should civilian members of the party. The divide was the ruling party’s first indication violent confrontations escalate, the dates back to the sacking and arrest of of a willingness to engage with the Imbonerakure would in fact be one of the former CNDD-FDD chairman, Hussein opposition. The CNDD-FDD even greatest causes of violence.43 Radjabu in 2007. He was condemned accepted to eliminate a provision that Looking ahead to 2015 to 13 years imprisonment for conspiracy required presidential candidates to hold in planning an armed rebellion. As far as university degree, a provision agreed The CNDD-FDD many people are concerned, the charges to by the CNDD-FDD and most of the The CNDD-FDD definitely has the against Radjabu were fabricated by opposition parties, but opposed by FNL incumbent’s advantage of having at its Nkurunziza’s inner circle to prevent the supporters loyal to Agathon Rwasa disposal a great deal of resources to win general from seeking the CNDD-FDD’s who would have been disqualified from the elections in 2015. Despite the CNDD- presidential nomination in 2010. running for president. The opposition and civil society have welcomed the adoption FDD’s slowly decreasing popularity, Political actors consulted for this report of the new electoral code.45 Nkurunziza has continued to travel and argue that Radjabu’s sacking clearly The opposition

The new and consensual electoral code is There is a clear determination by the the only positive recent political development opposition to participate fully in the electoral process. The consensus is that in Burundian politics the current political situation is largely a consequence of the 2010 boycott and that the opposition needs to be active campaign in the countryside to maintain indicated a consolidation of power in throughout the elections to stand a the party’s hold in the rural areas. The the hands of a very small group of the chance of challenging the CNDD-FDD. ruling party understands that its victory CNDD-FDD military elite. After the 2010 Even so, the opposition faces an uphill is contingent on maintaining its edge elections, Nkunuziza’s small military battle. It is difficult to say how, given the outside Bujumbura. Hence, the CNDD- inner circle continued to control the many difficulties placed in their way, the FDD will most likely continue to restrict direction of the party, frustrating CNDD- opposition parties will manage to carve the ability of the opposition to campaign FDD intellectuals. Observers suggest out the necessary political space so as to freely, in rural areas in particular, as it that the intelligentsia of the party would did during the 2010 electoral campaign. conduct an efficient campaign. rather rally behind Dr Gervais Rufyikiri, What is not certain is the level of the current second vice-president, for The opposition will be unable to muster resistance and resilience the opposition the 2015 elections. He is popular with the necessary voter support if it is unable will display in the months to come. technocrats and international donors, to mobilise and campaign effectively in Observers believe that the CNDD- which makes him a strong candidate. the countryside. But the parties’ ability FDD will most likely press ahead with However, the fact that he was not part to mobilise and campaign successfully is Nkurunziza as the party’s presidential of the armed rebellion and that he holds not only contingent on the political space candidate for 2015. The move would dual citizenship (Belgian and Burundian) available to them; it also depends on most likely prompt the opposition is unlikely to win him the support of their ability to consolidate their support

CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT • July 2014 11 CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT

base and to maintain a united front have been more cautious in their criticism throughout the electoral process. Will of the country’s policies in view of the individual parties like the FNL, FRODEBU fact that in recent years a number of and UPRONA be able to get their diplomats have been expelled from factions under control and move forward Burundi. Nevertheless, the UN and as unitary parties? Also, should the ADC- the US have explicitly condemned Ikibiri choose to continue to challenge the the violence between the police and ruling party as a coalition, it is imperative members of the MSD in March, and

Most observers agree that Burundi has the sovereign right to amend its constitution, but they question whether the country is ready to move away from the Arusha agreement

that its leadership settles on a clear have warned the government against its platform, a single presidential candidate attempts to amend the constitution in a and electoral list, and that these issues way that will strip it of the fundamental are decided sooner than later. power-sharing provisions stipulated in the Arusha agreement.46 International community International observers consulted for Given the Burundian government’s heavy this research agree that it is essential to dependence on the country’s foreign ensure stability and peace in Burundi. partners – 50 per cent of Burundi’s For the country to move to peaceful annual budget is funded by international and legitimate elections, they call on donors – members of the opposition all parties involved to engage in good- and civil society expect the international faith dialogue. Most observers agree community to put a significant amount that Burundi has the sovereign right to of pressure on the ruling party to amend its constitution but they question ease current tensions and to prepare whether the country is ready to move transparent elections. In the past few away from the Arusha agreement and its years, most initiatives aimed at mitigating consocialist arrangement. In any case, conflict between the CNDD-FDD and should Burundians decide to engage in other actors have been driven by the a significant revision of the constitution international community, in particular it should be as a result of broad the UN. While the BNUB’s mandate consultations and wide participation was renewed until the end of the 2014, in the decision-making process. In the reliable UN sources confirm that this is its meantime, sufficient political space last mandate, leaving the country without should be available for healthy political an important moderating voice after participation by the opposition. January 2015.

Recently the CNDD-FDD has displayed a measure of indifference to international 50% pressure. In the name of national of Burundi’s annual budget is funded sovereignty, it has passed legislation by international donors opposed by the international community. The international partners themselves

12 Status and dynamics of the political situation in Burundi Notes 1 Peter Uvin, 1999, Ethnicity and power in and Dr Christophe Sebudandi, Executive 26 Decret N° 100/25 du 01 Fevrier 2014 Portant Rwanda: different paths to mass violence, Director, AfroBaromater, personal interviews, Destitution du Premier Vice-President de la Comparative Politics 31(3):262. Bujumbura, February 2014. Republique, http://www.presidence.bi/spip. 2 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 15 Arusha agreement, Protocol II, Democracy php? article4451 (accessed 18/6/2014). signed on 28 August 2000, Article 4.a. and Governance. 27 Antoine Kabuhare, Director, IWACU, personal Constitutional amendments require a four- 16 The CDNN-FDD stated that a tribunal would interview, Bujumbura, February 2014. fifths majority in the National assembly and be established at a later time. Burundi: 28 republique du Burundi, Cabinet du a two-thirds majority in the Senate, while l’Assemblée nationale adopte le projet de loi President, Loi N.1/25 du 14 Novembre 2012 organic laws require three-fifths majority portant création de la CVR, 18 April 2014, Portant Statut de l’Opposition Politique au in the National assembly and the senate http://french.china.org.cn/foreign/txt/2014- Burundi, Articles 19-21. approval. See articles 6.5 and 6.6, Protocol II, 04/18/content_32130547.htm (accessed 29 republique du Burundi, Cabinet du Democracy and Governance. 18/6/2014). President, Loi N.1/16 du 10 Septembre 3 Protocol II, Democracy and Governance, 17 CNDD-FDD, Mémorandum du parti 2011 Portant Revision de la Loi N.1/006 Articles 11.5.d and 14.1.g. CNDD -FDD sur la Commission Vérité du 26 Juin 2003 Portant Organisation et 4 International Crisis Group, 2004, Crisis et Réconciliation et le Tribunal Spécial, Fonctionnement des Partis Politiques, Watch, no. 9: 2, http://www.crisisgroup. Bujumbura, 5 May 2007: 6. Article 8. org/~/media/ Files/CrisisWatch/2004/cw9.pdf 18 UPRONA, Mémorandum du Parti UPRONA 30 republique du Burundi, Loi N.1//28 Du (accessed 18/6/2014). sur la mise en place de la Commission 5 Decembre 2013 Portant Reglementation 5 International Crisis Group, 2009, Crisis Vérité et Réconciliation et le Tribunal Spécial, des Manifestations sur la Voie Publique et Watch, no. 76: 2, http://www.crisisgroup. Bujumbura, 17 April 2007: 6. Reunions Publiques, Article 5. org/~/ media/Files/CrisisWatch/2009/cw76. 19 The commission has been seen as a useful 31 Article 10 : L’autorité administrative peut pdf (accessed 18/6/2014). conflict resolution tool. Land is an essential à tout moment, nonobstant la déclaration 6 Between May and November 2010 the UN resource in a country where 90 per cent régulièrement faite, différer ou mettre Integrated Office in Burundi (BNUB) report of the population relies on agriculture, fin à toute réunion, tout cortège, défilé, 365 politically motivated arrests, Seventh with most of them involved in subsistence rassemblement sur la voie publique et dans Report of the Secretary-General, BNUB, farming. Land has been and continues to be les lieux publics, si le maintien de l’ordre S/2010/608: 8. a source of intense conflict in communities. public l’exige, ibid. 7 International Crisis Group, 2009, Crisis Watch, In addition, the multiple episodes of violence 32 An MSD meeting scheduled for 18 February no. 76: 2, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media have resulted in large numbers of internally 2014 in Bugendanawas is an example. Alexis /Files/CrisisWatch/2009/cw76.pdf (accessed displaced persons and refugees, some of Sinduhije, IWACU, 21 February, 2014: 3. 18/6/2014); US Department of State, 2011, whom are returning to the country. 33 rFI.fr, Burundi: le leader de l’opposition 2010 Human Rights Report: Burundi, http:// 20 Arusha Agreement, Protocol IV, écroué dans une affaire de mœurs, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/ af/154334. Reconstruction and Development, Article 8.j. 10 December 2013, http://www.rfi.fr/ htm (accessed 18/6/2014). afrique/20131210-burundi-le-leader- 21 Times Live, Political crisis in Burundi as Tutsi opposition-ecroue-une-affaire-moeurs/ 8 Maitre Isidore Rufyikiri, Former Head of the ministers quit, 5 February 2014, http://www. (accessed 18/6/2014); RFI.fr, Burundi: Burundi Bar Association, personal interview in timeslive.co.za/africa/2014/02/05/political- un opposant poursuivi pour corruption, Bujumbura, February 2014. US Department crisis-in-burundi-as-tutsi-ministers-quit1 25 February 2014, http://www.rfi.fr/ of State, 2011, 2010 Human Rights Report: (accessed 18/6/2014). Burundi, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/ afrique/20140225-burundi-opposant- 22 Between 11 and 13 March, the BNUB hrrpt/2010/af/154334.htm (accessed poursuivi-corruption/ (accessed 18/6/2014). organised a workshop in Kayanza with the 18/6/2014). 34 The East African, Burundi opposition chief representatives of major political parties and charged with rebellion: prosecutor, 12 March 9 International Crisis Group, Burundi: ensuring other actors. The objective of the meeting 2014, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/ credible elections, 2010: 9. was to assess the previous elections and news/Burundi-opposition-chief-charged- 10 european Union, Burundi: Rapport Final. to develop a strategy in preparation for the with-rebellion/-/2558/2241114/-/8d7xu0/-/ Elections communales, présidentielle, 2015 elections. At the conclusion of the index.html (accessed 18/6/2014). législatives, sénatoriales et collinaires 2010: 3. workshop, a 42-point electoral roadmap 35 Antoine Kaburahe, Director, IWACU, personal 11 International Crisis Group, Burundi: bye-bye was agreed upon, which addresses the legal interview, Bujumbura, February 2014. Arusha, 2012: 4. framework that should govern the coming electoral process, security provisions that 36 republique du Burundi, Cabinet du 12 According to BINUB, there was an increase should be in place to protect political actors President, Loi N.1/11 du 4 Juin 2013 in extrajudicial killings and/or politically and the facilitation of their activities, and the Portant Modifications de la Loi N.1/025 du motivated killings from 27 cases in 2009 management and conduct of the elections. 27 Novembre 2003 Regissant la Presse du to about 30 cases in 2010 and 61 in 2011 Burundi, Article 18.a. Report of the Secretary-General on BINUB, 23 Willy Nindorera, Consultant; Pierre-Claver S/2011/751, 2013: 9. Seventh Report of the Mbonipa, President, APRODH, personal 37 Antoine Kabuhare, Director, IWACU, personal Secretary-General on BINUB: 8. It should be interviews, Bujumbura, February 2014 interview, Bujumbura, February 2014. noted that some members of the government 24 Arusha agreement, Protocol II, Democracy 38 The post-war Burundian military is now affiliated with the CNDD-FDD were also and Governance, Article 7.3. known as the National Defense Forces. murdered during this period. 25 IRIN News, 2013. Alarm over Burundi’s 39 samuel Ngede, Political Officer 13 Personal interviews, Bujumbura, February planned constitution changes, http://www. BNUB, personal interview, Bujumbura, 2014. irinnews.org/report/99355/alarm-over- February 2014. 14 honorable Emmanuel Nkenguruste, UPRONA burundi-s-planned-constitution-changes 40 report of the Secretary-General on the Senator, Dr Julien Nimumbona, Professor, (accessed 18/6/2014). BNUB, 2013: 4.

CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT • July 2014 13 CENTRAL AFRICA REPORT

41 honorable Victor Burikukiye, Vice-President of the CNDD-FDD, personal interview, Bujumbura, February 2014. 42 Jeune Afrique, Burundi: un diplomate de l’ONU est expulsé du pays. 17 April 2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/ Article/ ARTJAWEB20140417175123/ onu-diplomatie-burundi-pierre-nkurunziza- diplomatie-burundi-un-diplomate-de-l-onu- est-expulse-du-pays.html 43 IRIN, Looming polls raise Burundi’s risk profile,17 April 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/ report/99951/looming-polls-raise-burundi-s- risk-profile (accessed 18/6/2014). 44 Personal Interviews, Bujumbura, Feburary 2014; Arc-En-Ciel N. 363, 31 January 2014, 11. 45 IRIN News. New election law a step forward for Burundi. April 28 2014., http://www. irinnews.org/report/100002/new-election- law-a-step-forward-for-burundi (accessed 18/6/2014). 46 reuters UN warns Burundi leaders against stoking political violence, April 10 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/10/ us-burundi-un-idUSBREA3923Q20140410 (accessed 18/6/2014); Voice of America, US urges Burundi to drop constitution changes, avoid ‘dark days’, 8 April 2014, http://www. voanews.com/content/reu-us-urges-burundi- to-drop-constitution-changes-avoid-dark- days/1889081.html (accessed 18/6/2014).

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