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Vojenská História 3/2009 Časopis Pre Vojenskú Históriu, Múzejníctvo a Archívnictvo

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Vojenská História 3/2009 Časopis Pre Vojenskú Históriu, Múzejníctvo a Archívnictvo VOJENSKÁ HISTÓRIA VOJENSKÁ HISTÓRIA Časopis pre vojenskú históriu múzejníctvo a archívnictvo 3/2009 VYDÁVA VOJENSKÝ HISTORICKÝ ÚSTAV V BRATISLAVE 1 VOJENSKÁ HISTÓRIA © VHÚ Bratislava 2009 Príspevky vyjadrujú názory autorov a nemusia byť totožné so stanoviskom vydavateľa a redakcie. 2 VOJENSKÁ HISTÓRIA ŠTÚDIE POZADIE NEPRIJATEJ DEMISIE MINISTRA NÁRODNEJ OBRANY GEN. I. TR. FERDINANDA ČATLOŠA V JANUÁRI 19411 IGOR BAKA BAKA, I.: Th e background of an unaccepted demission of the commanding general Ferdinand Čatloš. Vojenská história, 3, 13, 2009, pp. 3–15, Bratislava. Th e author of the study, based on the analysis of literary sources and some contempo- rary documents concerned, extensively describes the background of the power fi ght between the radical wing of the Slovak People‘ s Party of Andrej Hlinka led by Vojtech Tuka – the Prime Minister and the conservative wing of the party led by Jozef Tiso, the President of the Slovak Republic. Meanwhile he focuses on the circumstances of the mission of Ferdinand Čatloš i.e: the political pressure on the Minister of the Na- tional Armed Forces caused by the power fi ght in the state; HSĽS authorities attempt to intervene the scope of power of the Minister of the National Armed Forces within the solution of personnel issues in the Slovak Army; an incident of Š. Jurech. Military History. Slovakia. WWII. Ferdinand Čatloš – Th e Misnister of the Nation- al Armed Forces. Okolnosti tzv. Lichardusovho puču (mocenského prevratu v štáte radikálnym krídlom Hlinkovej slovenskej ľudovej strany), ktorý mal prebehnúť v januári 1941, ako aj úloha ministra národnej obrany gen. Čatloša v celej kauze doteraz neboli bližšie objasne- né. Rovnako pomerne neznáme je pozadie Čatlošovej demisie, ktorú v tom čase podal do rúk prezidenta J. Tisa, a jej súvislosť s pripravovaným prevratom. Došlo k nej v čase napä- tej vnútropolitickej krízy medzi tzv. konzervatívnym a radikálnym krídlom v HSĽS. V tejto súvislosti sa často konštatuje, že Čatloš sa svojím konaním v konečnom dôsledku priklonil k Tisovmu krídlu, keďže ten jeho demisiu neprijal, a tým prípravy gardistického puču pre- kazil. K tejto problematike však zatiaľ neboli publikované žiadne relevantné dokumenty, in- formácie pochádzajú najmä z povojnových výpovedí priamych aktérov, a v prípade Čatloša sa (často nekriticky) citujú jeho vlastné pamäti.2 V publikovanom príspevku chcem objasniť 1 Štúdia bola vypracovaná ako súčasť grantu APVV č. 0352-07 Slovensko-nemecké vzťahy v rokoch 1938– 1945. 2 Určitú pozornosť venoval tejto otázke F. Vnuk, avšak nepresne. Ako bezprostrednú príčinu Čatlošovej demisie 3 VOJENSKÁ HISTÓRIA niektoré okolnosti tejto kauzy, najmä na základe zachovaných dobových dokumentov ne- meckej proveniencie. Chcem poukázať najmä na skutočnosť, že o Čatlošovej demisii sa ro- kovalo na pozadí vypätej vnútropolitickej krízy, ktorá bola dôsledkom vrcholiaceho mocen- ského zápasu medzi radikálnym a konzervatívnym krídlom v HSĽS. Súčasťou tohto zápasu sa do určitej miery stal aj boj o získanie vplyvu nad armádou. Samotný Čatloš bol do tohto obdobia považovaný za prívrženca radikálneho krídla, na čele ktorého stál predseda vlády Vojtech Tuka. Dobrým vzťahom medzi ním a Tukom sa Čatloš netajil už v roku 1939. Krátko po vojne proti Poľsku dokonca nariadil pre vtedajšieho podpredsedu vlády ušiť generálsku uniformu.3 Svoju podporu radikálom deklaroval aj v ob- dobí vnútropolitickej krízy, ktorá predchádzala známym salzburským rokovaniam. Ako príklad možno uviesť jeho účasť na stretnutí veliteľov Hlinkovej gardy (HG) v Ru- žomberku 19. mája 1940 4 Čatloš pritom vystúpil aj s vlastným prejavom, ktorý možno chápať ako vyjadrenie podpory radikálov, aj keď viaceré jeho formulácie boli diplomatic- ky dvojznačné, bez otvorenej kritiky jednej alebo druhej strany.5 Čatlošova prítomnosť na stretnutí nezostala bez pozornosti nemeckého vyslanca Hansa Bernarda: „Zvlášť zaujímavé je to, že na zasadaní sa zúčastnil aj minister obrany Čatloš v civile a v krátkom prejave vyslo- vil vraj plný súhlas s požiadavkami HG.“6 Nemecký vyslanec v tejto súvislosti hlásil, že Čat- loš v rozhovore s nemeckým vojenským atašé mjr. Heinrichom Beckerom tvrdil, že na za- sadanie HG v Ružomberku prišiel náhodne. Na druhej strane Čatloš sa mal pred ním vy- jadriť, že súhlasí so sťažnosťami Alexandra Macha (hlavný veliteľ HG) voči Ferdinandovi Ďurčanskému (minister vnútra a zahraničných vecí), hlavne pokiaľ ide o otázku riešenia ži- uviedol vyšetrovanie podozrenia o príprave gardistického puču (ten mal prebehnúť 8. 1.) samotným preziden- tom Jozefom Tisom. Relevantné dokumenty sa však o tom nezmieňujú, aj keď určité súvislosti vylúčiť nemož- no. Nesprávne je tiež ďalšie Vnukovo tvrdenie, že Čatloš odvolal demisiu hneď na prvom stretnutí s preziden- tom 11. 1. 1941. VNUK, F.: Mať svoj štát znamená život. Politická biografi a Alexandra Macha. Bratislava 1991, s. 240-242; Naopak, podľa M. S. Ďuricu Čatloš podal demisiu ešte pred pučom, ktorý sa mal podľa neho usku- točniť až 21. 1. 1941. Tiso ju podľa neho neprijal preto, lebo hrozilo zneužitie armády zo strany Tuku, ktorý zastupoval Čatloša, v prospech samotného puču. Čatloš tak podľa Ďuricu zachránil Tisu a prispel k znemož- neniu Tukových plánov. Ďurica však pri svojej interpretácii nevychádza z relevantných dokumentov, ale len zo spomienok bývalého ministra hospodárstva Gejzu Medrického. ĎURICA, M. S.: Jozef Tiso. 1887-1947. Životo- pisný profi l. Bratislava 2006, s. 287-288; Najnovšie venoval pomerne veľkú pozornosť okolnostiam puču P. So- kolovič v monografi i o Hlinkovej garde. Autor pritom vôbec nepostrehol, že dostupné pramene sa rozchádzajú ohľadne dátumov, kedy sa mal samotný puč konať. Cituje pritom tak F. Vnuka, ako aj spomienky G. Medric- kého. Samotný spor radikálov a konzervatívcov v januári 1941 pritom vôbec neanalyzoval v širšom kontexte. Rozhodujúci predsa bol postoj Nemcov, tí mali posledné slovo. Vo vzťahu k Čatlošovi autor konštatuje, že je- ho účasť na sprisahaní nie je možné jednoznačne potvrdiť. Na druhej strane jeho proklamovaný podiel na lik- vidácii puču nespochybňuje. SOKOLOVIČ, P.: Hlinkova garda 1938-1945. Bratislava 2009, s. 304 – 310. 3 Hotová mala byť 1. 10. 1939. Na jej príprave sa preto pracovalo „vo dne v noci“. Na verejnosti sa však v nej na- koniec Tuka pravdepodobne nikdy neukázal. Vojenský historický archív (VHA) Bratislava, f. Fondové oddele- nie Kabinet ministra 1939-1944, šk. 4, Denník Kabinetu ministra, s. 5; f. Ministerstvo národnej obrany (MNO) 1939-1945, spisy dôverné, šk. 53, č.j. 155 452. 4 Čatloš bol pozvaný už na januárové porady so župnými a okresnými funkcionármi HG v Trenčianskych Tep- liciach, na ktorých radikáli koordinovali spoločný postup pri predkladaní svojich požiadaviek vláde. Ospra- vedlnil sa však pre pracovnú zaneprázdnenosť. Gardistov však na diaľku ubezpečil, že „v duchu bude s nami“. Slovenský národný archív (SNA), f. Národný súd (NS), A 898, Tn ľud 8/46, A. Mach. 5 Prítomným gardistom sa prihovoril okrem iného aj týmito slovami: „...My keď vidíme, že pracujete za nový svet, nové slnko, my sa cítime dobre, ako každý človek na slnku. My vojaci sa dnes dívame z takéhoto stano- viska na Vás a očakávame, aby ste vydali tón, ktorý nepozná ohľadov, ktorý ide napred, lebo nazad ísť nemôže- me. Buďte uistení, že máte celú oporu v slovenskej armáde, nakoľko sme presvedčení, že...z takéhoto širokého fóra nemôže vzísť nič špatného.“ SNA, f. NS, II A –947, Tnľud 12/47, F. Čatloš. 6 VHA Bratislava, f. Archívna zbierka 11, šk. 9, dok. č. 341514-5, hlásenie nemeckého vyslanca na Zahraničný úrad (Auswärtiges Amt – AA) z 21. 5. 1940. 4 VOJENSKÁ HISTÓRIA dovskej otázky.7 Čatloš sa postavil aj za A. Macha, potom čo Tiso krátko po ružomberskom zhromaždení prijal jeho demisiu z funkcie hlavného veliteľa HG. Vyslanec Bernard si k to- mu poznamenal: „Na otázku o postoji ministra obrany mi Tuka vyhlásil, že Čatloš mu nazna- čil, že v prípade jeho demisie aj sám podá demisiu. Verí tomuto vyhláseniu.“8 Ako je známe, Tukovu a Čatlošovu demisiu Tiso nakoniec neprijal.9 Napätie medzi obidvoma tábormi sa po salzburských poradách, kde Nemci presadili zmeny v slovenskej vláde v prospech radikálov10, ešte vystupňovalo. Koncom roka 1940 musel Tiso odrážať Tukov tlak na personálne zmeny vo vláde, vystupňovala sa tiež medi- álna vojna, keďže šéfom Úradu propagandy (ÚP) sa po Salzburgu stal jeden z popredných radikálov Karol Murgaš. Čatloš sa aj v tomto období prikláňal k radikálom. Nemecký vy- slanec Manfred von Killinger o ňom dňa 1. októbra 1940 písal ako o „jednom zo štyroch oporných stĺpov spolupráce s Nemeckom“.11 V ďalšom hlásení z 27. októbra uviedol, že „mi- nister obrany Čatloš je dosť rozumný na to, aby rozpoznal, že vlak nových čias nemožno zadr- žať. Preto sa prispôsobil novej línii, hoci predtým ešte kolísal. To isté urobila prevažná väčšina dôstojníkov, no hlavne zmýšľanie mladších dôstojníkov možno označiť za národnosocialistic- ké. Poddôstojníci a mužstvo, pokiaľ vôbec majú porozumenie pre politické problémy, zmýšľajú národnosocialisticky. Všeobecne sa predpokladá, že sa armáda pri tomto spore zachová neu- trálne.“12 Samozrejme, vyslancovo hodnotenie politických nálad v dôstojníckom zbore tre- ba brať s rezervou, je zjednodušujúce, pričom nezohľadňuje široké spektrum názorov, kto- ré tu panovali. Politické napätie prerástlo v januári 1941 do otvorenej krízy. Tá sa vyhrotila potom, čo Ti- so dostal informácie, že radikálne kruhy za tichého súhlasu nemeckého vyslanca Killingera chystali proti nemu gardistický puč. Tiso v tejto súvislosti vystupňoval svoj boj za odvola- nie šéfa ÚP K. Murgaša,
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