Years of Ambition, 1875– 1884

chapter 2 Years of Ambition, 1875– 1884 The formal powers of the Swedish king over the foreign policy of Sweden- Norway were extensive during the first decade of the era treated in this book. According to Swedish law, the king had the formal right to declare war, enter peace, form alliances and conclude treaties. But in the second half of the 1860s an increasing number of Swedish members of parliament viewed the sheer extent of royal power in these matters as a problem. Early democratization and the parliamentary reform of 1866 had replaced the old Ståndsriksdag (the Riksdag of the four Estates) with a political assembly of two chambers, whose members were chosen in national elections. The new Riksdag empowered var- ious groups, most notably the rural population, and was a more correct rep- resentation of Swedish society. However, one rather unexpected effect of this reform was that parliament’s influence over foreign policy decreased, especial- ly because many of the new members were concerned with other issues. The Norwegian Storting, in contrast, enjoyed constitutional rights, including the screening of negotiations on alliances and treaties (except for secret matters). The new democratization did not prevent the king and his diplomats at the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm from entering into secret defensive alliances.1 In reality, however, the king’s room for manoeuvre was now as limited as his formal rights were extensive. The continuous Norwegian attempts to gain in- dependence clearly indicated that the Union was unlikely to survive any de- viations from neutrality, let alone any participation in controversial wars. In the 1870s, neutrality was considered a natural choice for Sweden- Norway both because of the absence of conflicts in its vicinity and because of its military incapability.2 The early death of 46- year- old King Charles xv on his return from a cure- stay in Aachen on 18 September 1872 still had implications for the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway. The beloved but politically little- respected monarch, whose ideas on foreign policy and defence had fallen on deaf ears, gave way to his energetic younger (by three years) brother Oscar ii, who would implement a change of course that would shape Sweden-Norway for decades to come. One consequence was felt immediately. The ascent of Charles’s and Oscar’s Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia 1 Lindberg, , 9– 22. 2 Lindberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 26. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | DOI:10.1163/9789004414389_004 Years of Ambition, 1875–1884 41 grandfather Jean Bernadotte to the joint Swedish and Norwegian throne in 1818 had been a manifestation of friendship with France. But this changed drasti- cally under Oscar ii, who looked to Germany, Europe’s new leading power after its victory over France, for friendship and protection from Russia. To Oscar, the German victory attested to the superiority of the conservative order and highlighted the danger that the destructive revolutionary ele- ments that had appeared in France posed to all of Europe. He also believed that abandoning his sympathies with Scandinavianism and France in favour of the Prussian social order would strengthen his position as monarch. Oscar thus adopted a conservative stance – which he maintained for the rest of his life – and appointed the like- minded diplomat Oscar Björnstjerna as foreign minister in order to complete the policy change. Björnstjerna had served as Sweden’s ambassador to St. Petersburg since 1865 and was not fond of his ap- pointment. He was an astute politician, and aware of the fact that this manoeuvre was little more than a declaration of intent on Oscar’s part: Oscar was capable and ambitious enough to more- or- less serve as his own foreign minister.3 Indeed, Oscar soon completed Sweden-Norway’s turn to Germany during a series of visits to Berlin, St. Petersburg and Copenhagen in 1875, in which he laid out his priorities for everyone to see. The Court also considered claiming that the Swedish- Norwegian king chose not to visit London.4 During a meeting with the German state secretary, Bernhard Ernst von Bülow, in Berlin, Oscar emphasized his sympathy with Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s anti- Catholic policies.5 In light of Oscar’s decisions, by 1875 Charles’s reign looked to have been even more of a failure than it had at the time of his death. His futile attempts to re- establish Sweden- Norway as a relevant power in European politics, his willing- ness to abandon neutrality in order to support Denmark against Prussia during the Second Schleswig War, and his inability to embrace Germany as the new leading European power, were all viewed as mistakes, and important lessons to be learned by his younger brother. During the reign of Charles, the Crown had enjoyed popular support, but had lost prestige and been weakened politically both domestically and internationally. Oscar was therefore determined to use whatever means at his disposal to regain domestic strength.6 Chancellor von Bismarck was well- aware of Oscar’s inclinations towards Germany and welcomed them – mostly for geostrategic reasons. Bismarck 3 Lindberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 28– 29. 4 Lindberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 37– 41. 5 Lindberg, Kunglig utrikespolitik, 7– 8. 6 Lindberg, Kunglig utrikespolitik, 12– 13..

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