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Ethics of Digital Contact Tracing Wearables J Med Ethics: First Published As 10.1136/Medethics-2020-106958 on 14 May 2021

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Ethics of Digital Contact Tracing Wearables J Med Ethics: First Published As 10.1136/Medethics-2020-106958 on 14 May 2021 Original research Ethics of digital contact tracing wearables J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/medethics-2020-106958 on 14 May 2021. Downloaded from G Owen Schaefer ,1 Angela Ballantyne1,2 1Centre for Biomedical Ethics, ABSTRACT contexts the challenges may differ. For comparative Yong Loo Lin School of The success of digital COVID-19 contact tracing purposes we also refer briefly to the use of contract Medicine, National University of tracing technology in Australia and New Zealand. Singapore, Singapore requires a strategy that successfully addresses the 2Department of Primary Health digital divide—inequitable access to technology such Our starting point is that COVID-19 contact Care and General Practice, as smartphones. Lack of access both undermines the tracing apps are, under the right governance condi- University of Otago, Wellington, degree of social benefit achieved by the use of tracing tions, a defensible public health tool to promote New Zealand apps, and exacerbates existing social and health effective identification of COVID-19 contacts inequities because those who lack access are likely and the deployment of appropriate public health Correspondence to measures in response. Some of the risks and chal- Dr G Owen Schaefer, Centre for to already be disadvantaged. Recently, Singapore has Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin introduced portable tracing wearables (with the same lenges of deploying apps, especially to privacy, are School of Medicine, National functionality as a contact tracing app) to address the discussed below. But in a public health emergency, University of Singapore, equity gap and promote public health. We argue that those privacy risks are substantially less urgent Singapore 117597, Singapore; governments have an ethical obligation to ensure fair compared with the risks of leaving contacts of owen_ schaefer@ nus. edu. sg access to the protective benefits of contract tracing COVID-19 cases undetected and at risk of further Received 30 September 2020 during the pandemic and that wearables are an effective spreading the virus—especially when the apps are Revised 27 February 2021 way of addressing some important equity issues. The subject to standards of good governance. Accepted 4 May 2021 most contentious issues about contact tracing apps Our analysis aims to describe the ethical merits have been the potential infringements of privacy and and complications of the use of wearables in the individual liberty, especially where the use of apps or Singapore context, and to capture useful lessons other technology (such as wearables or QR codes) is for other countries considering the use of tracing required for access to certain spaces. Here we argue that wearables. wearables, as opposed to apps alone, will make a digital We propose that wearables are a ‘value add’ that contact tracing mandate more practical and explain should be developed in parallel to contact tracing some conditions under which such a mandate would be apps in order to maximise apps’ benefits and reduce justified. We focus on Singapore as a case study that has health inequities. We further argue that wearables recently deployed contact tracing wearables nationally, may make feasible digital contact tracing mandates but also reference debate about wearables in Australia for entry into public spaces, and that under the right and New Zealand. Our analysis will be relevant to conditions these mandates can be well justified. counties trialling similar portable tracing wearables. BACKGROUND ON CONTACT TRACING APPS http://jme.bmj.com/ INTRODUCTION In order to appreciate the ethics of contact tracing As COVID-19 continues to beleaguer the world, wearables, we first need to understand how they are there is sustained interest in developing and being developed in light of the limitations of contact deploying digital contact tracing tools. One of the tracing apps. Apps are designed to complement and most common forms of digital contact tracing is enhance (rather than replace) the current manual through smartphone applications (apps) that can contact tracing performed by public health officials help public health officials identify individuals or volunteers. Manual contact tracing is expensive, on October 2, 2021 by guest. Protected copyright. with whom patients with COVID-19 have been slow and labour intensive. These apps’ primary in contact. More recently, several countries have purpose is to record when two app users are in close begun developing wearable contact tracing tokens proximity for an extended duration of time. Then, as a supplement or alternative to the use of such if one user is later diagnosed with COVID-19, the apps. app data could be used to efficiently identify indi- In this paper, we use Singapore as a specific case viduals who may have been exposed to the virus study to examine the ethics of newly developed and ensure they are promptly tested themselves. A contact tracing wearables intended to supplement number of different designs have been proposed existing contact tracing apps. We focus on Singa- and developed, with variations in terms of what pore for several reasons. One, Singapore is one of data are gathered (eg, Bluetooth vs Global Posi- © Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No the first countries in the world to produce contact tioning System), how data are stored and whether commercial re- use. See rights tracing wearables, and is currently committed to public health officials are able to retrieve data and permissions. Published making the wearables available to every resident.1 from certain users (‘centralized’ vs ‘decentralized’ by BMJ. Two, the ethics of contact tracing is highly context models). Concurrently, several frameworks for the To cite: Schaefer GO, sensitive, contingent on a country’s specific health ethical oversight and governance of contact tracing 2–8 Ballantyne A. J Med Ethics conditions, technological capacity, legal protec- apps have been promulgated. Epub ahead of print: [please tions, vulnerabilities, power structures and other Contact tracing apps may be beneficial for the include Day Month Year]. local factors. We illustrate the ways in which these individual user and for the community. First, doi:10.1136/ medethics-2020-106958 socioeconomic factors contextualise contact tracing there is a potential personal benefit to users of the tools in Singapore, and indicate how in other app as they can be quickly informed of any close Schaefer GO, Ballantyne A. J Med Ethics 2021;0:1–5. doi:10.1136/medethics-2020-106958 1 Original research contact with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19, An important difficulty with contact tracing apps identified J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/medethics-2020-106958 on 14 May 2021. Downloaded from encouraging the user to seek testing that could lead to earlier by several commentators is lack of universal access.2 4–8 Some and more effective treatment. Second, there is a potential public people do not have a smartphone, or a smartphone with Blue- health benefit because the app can improve the effectiveness and tooth capabilities.4 Others may be reluctant to download a new efficiency of contact tracing, ensuring timely delivery of stay- app on their phone, whether out of suspicion of misuse or mere at- home noticesi and other public health measures that help inertia. This lack of universal access and acceptability poses two prevent further community transmission. related ethical problems—effectively protecting public health This second benefit is only possible on a ‘centralized’ model and promoting justice. of contact tracing apps, where public health officials receive the First, for the apps to effectively assist in suppressing viral app data of patients with COVID-19. We focus in this paper on transmission, there needs to be sufficient public uptake.13 Coun- centralised models of digital contact tracing, because centralised tries that have promoted national apps, like Norway and India, gathering of data accessible to public health officials is essential have fallen far short of stated targets.14 Rates of downloads may for the app to effectively assist in contact tracing. Decentralised in fact overstate the number of individuals usefully covered by models might involve less privacy risk to individuals, but they the app, since the app could be downloaded but then deleted also provide less potential public health benefit because public or deactivated. If insufficient people use an app, its utility in health officials are unable to access the data. In addition, it is protecting public safety is undermined. not clear how contact tracing wearables could be integrated into Second, those who lack access to a smartphone that can a decentralised system.6 Since wearables are not tied to an app, support contact tracing apps are more likely to be disadvantaged there would not be a ready means to easily and anonymously due to factors such as socioeconomic status, residency status or inform individuals of their exposure to someone who had tested age. This presents an equity issue because specific populations at positive. It is not a coincidence that countries such as Singapore higher risk of COVID-19 have less opportunity to benefit from and New Zealand that currently employ a centralised model protective public health initiatives. Equity refers to the absence of digital contact tracing are also the very ones considering the of avoidable or remediable difference between groups of people. deployment of wearables. Tracing wearables are a potential solution to these challenges. Contact tracing is a form of public health surveillance and To understand the equity considerations relevant to the as such raises valid concerns about privacy, liberty and propor- adoption of tracing wearables, let us consider the example tionality. Contact data are sensitive, and theoretically could be of Singapore. Due to lower rates of smartphone ownership, misused—for example, by passing the data to law enforcement some specific subpopulations known to be at greater risk of officials, which goes well beyond the public health justifica- COVID-19 (foreign workers and older individuals) are also less tion for gathering the data.
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