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1.3-1.5 Voting Methods Some Announcements

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1.3-1.5 Voting Methods Some Announcements 1.3-1.5 Voting Methods Some announcements • Homework #1: Text (pages 28-33) 1, 4, 7, 10, 12, 19, 22, 29, 32, 38, 42, 50, 51, 56-60, 61, 65 (this is posted on Sakai) • Math Center study sessions with Katie Greene (TA). Tuesday and Wednesday 7pm-9pm in Kirby 120. • Second Math colloquium this afternoon at 4pm in Manchester 016. Attend and write summary for 2 bonus points on next exam. • Another colloquium will be this Wednesday at 4pm in Manchester 016. Today’s Goals • To examine some different methods for evaluating election results, including Borda Count, Plurality-with-Elimination (IRV), and Pairwise Comparison. • Work through some examples. Last Time In our last class we learned some of the lingo for elections and saw the different types of ballots that we can use for an election. We saw how the Plurality Method was a quick and easy way to pick a winner but didn’t always represent the will of the voters. Plurality Method Of all the methods, the Plurality Method is the most susceptible to insincere voting (also called tactical voting). Insincere voting is the practice of voting against one’s own interest in order to sway the election. Think: In 2000, some voters who would have preferred Nader voted for Gore because they were afraid of ‘wasting their vote’. Last Time We had a running example last time: favorite ice cream flavor. The choices were Chocolate (C), Cookie Dough (CD), Mint Chocolate Chip (M), and Vanilla (V). Here’s the preference schedule. Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD There were 64 total voters. Remember that Vanilla was the winner using the Plurality Method but it also had the most last-place votes. Borda Count The Borda Count Method requires a preference ballot. For each ballot, the candidate ranked last gets 1 points. The candidate ranked second to last gets 2 points, and so on. If there are N candidates, the top candidate gets N points. There are variations on this. For example, we may not give points to all candidates, or we might weight the points differently. This is a Modified Borda Count. 2015 Heismann Award The Heismann Award is decided using a Borda Count Method. Player 1st 2nd 3rd Total Points (3pts.) (2pts.) (1pt.) Derrick Henry 378 277 144 1,832 Christian McCaffrey 290 246 177 1,539 DeShaun Watson 148 240 241 1,165 Baker Mayfield 34 55 122 334 Keenan Reynolds 20 17 86 180 Borda Count Example Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD Vanilla got 23 1st place votes (with 4 points each), 3 3rd place votes (worth 2 points each), and 38 4th place votes (worth 1 point each). Thus the total for Vanilla is 136. Similarly, Chocolate’s total is 180. Mint Chocolate Chip’s total is 156 and Cookie Dough’s total is 168. Chocolate wins! But Chocolate came in last using the Plurality Method. Plurality-With-Elimination This is also what we call Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). The idea is that we eliminate the loser from preference ballot and retally the votes. Only 1st place votes are counted. In the first round, we tally the 1st place votes. A candidate must have a majority to win. Otherwise we eliminate the candidate with the fewest 1st place votes and tally again. This continues until one candidate has a majority (or there is a tie). IRV example In our ice cream election, Chocolate has the fewest 1st place votes so we eliminate it. Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD The effect of this is that Mint Chocolate Chip now has 3 more 1st place votes. The tally now is Vanilla (23), Mint Chocolate Chip (23), and Cookie Dough (18). No flavor has a majority. IRV example Cookie Dough had the fewest 1st place votes in our new tally, so we now eliminate it :-( Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD The effect of this is that Mint Chocolate Chip now has 18 more 1st place votes. The tally now is Vanilla (23), Mint Chocolate Chip (41). Mint Chocolate Chip wins! Reality TV competitions Your book claims Reality TV shows (such as American Idol or The Voice) use IRV. In reality they are a hybrib between IRV and traditional runoffs. The Method of Pairwise Comparisons With a preference schedule, it is possible to compare any pair of candidates by eliminating all others. In the Method of Pairwise Comparisons we compare each pair of candidates, the winner of each comparison is given a point (1/2 point for ties). The winner is the candidate with the most points. Pairwise Comparison Example Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD Cookie Dough (33) beats Chocolate (31) Pairwise Comparison Example Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD Chocolate (44) beats Mint Chocolate Chip (20) Pairwise Comparison Example Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD Chocolate (41) beats Vanilla (23) Pairwise Comparison Example Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD Cookie Dough (33) beats Mint Chocolate Chip (31) Pairwise Comparison Example Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD Cookie Dough (38) beats Vanilla (26) Pairwise Comparison Example Number of voters 18 8 20 15 3 1st CD V M V C 2nd C C C CD M 3rd M M CD C V 4th V CD V M CD Mint Chocolate Chip (41) beats Vanilla (23) Pairwise Comparison Example Our tally is then, • Chocolate (2) • Cookie Dough (3) • Mint Chocolate Chip (1) • Vanilla (0) Cookie Dough Wins! Condorcet Criterion In an election, a Condorcet Candidate is one that beats all other candidates in a head-to-head (pairwise) comparison. The Condorcet criterion states that such a candidate should be the winner. In our ice cream election, Cookie Dough is a Condorcet candidate. So who really won? We saw 4 different voting methods (Plurality, Borda Count, IRV, Pairwise Comparison). Each gave a different winner. Several mathematicians, including Condorcet, Borda, and Arrow, have tried to establish fairness criteria for elections. Unfortunately, every voting method violates some fairness criteria. This is the gist behind Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Section 1.6). Additional Methods There are many additional methods which are not mentioned in your book (some are in the exercises). Here are three that we will discuss: • approval voting • least worst defeat • ranked pairs Approval Voting We have already seen an approval ballot in which voters select all acceptable options. Candidates are given 1 point each time they are selected on a ballot. The winner is the candidate with the most points, that is, the candidate that is acceptable to the most voters. Approval Voting Examples Suppose we have 3 candidates (A,B,C). There are 8 different ballot types, but realistically there are only 6. Results: • 15: A,B • 20: A,C • 25: B,C • 10: A • 15: B • 15: C Final Tally: A(45), B(55), C(60). C wins! Least Worst Defeat • First candidates are compared using Pairwise Comparison. • Each candidate’s worst loss is recorded. • From these losses, the candidate with the smallest margin in defeat is selected as the winner. In essence, we are selecting the candidate who loses the best, or is the best of all bad options. Note that a Condorcet Candidate always wins using LWD. LWD example Since Cookie Dough was a Condorcet Candidate (and never lost) it is the winner using LWD. Let’s look at the other matchups. We will record each loser and by how much they lost. • Chocolate v. Cookie Dough (C -2) • Chocolate v. Mint Chocolate Chip (M -24) • Chocolate v. Vanilla (V -18) • Cookie Dough v. Mint Chocolate Chip (M -2) • Cookie Dough v. Vanilla (V -12) • Mint Chocolate Chip v. Vanilla (V -18) LWD example • The worst defeat for Chocolate was -2. • The worst defeat for Mint Chocolate Chip was -24. • The worst defeat for Vanilla was -18. Hence, Chocolate is second, Vanilla is third, and Mint Chocolate Chip is last. Ranked Pairs The method of Ranked Pairs uses a directed graph with vertices and arrows. • / •T • • / • We will replace the vertices with the candidates. Ranked Pairs The vertex at the beginning of an arrow is called the source and the vertex at the end is called the target. A / BT C D / E A is the source of four arrows but the target of no arrows.
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