The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« Author(S): Marco Sgarbi Source: Archiv Für Begriffsgeschichte, Vol

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The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« Author(s): Marco Sgarbi Source: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Vol. 53 (2011), pp. 97-117 Published by: Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24361883 Accessed: 28-06-2016 13:41 UTC

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This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Marco Sgarbi

The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental«*

I. Introduction

The concept of »transcendental« is undoubtedly one of the most important terms in Kantian philosophy. For over one hundred and fifty years major Kan tian scholars have debated its origin and set out various interpretations.1 The Kant-Forschung has recently established four different possible sources: 1) Schulmetaphysik·,2 2) Ch. Wolff;3 3) A. G. Baumgarten;4 4) J. H. Lambert.5 The

* AU quotes are from Immanuel Kant, Kant's gesammelte Schriften (=KGS) (Berlin 1900ff.) cited by volumes and pages. I read a preliminary version of the paper at the Annual Confer ence of the British Society for the History of Philosophy entitled Transcendental Philosophy: Its Nature and its History (Manchester Metropolitan University, 15-18 April 2009). My most heartfelt thanks to Gary Banham, Constance Blackwell, James Clarke, Dietmar H. Heidemann, Seung-Kee Lee, and Rudolf A. Makkreel, for their comments to my paper. I dedicate this article to Norbert Hinske, a master in the studies of the history of concepts in the Kantian philosophy, for his eightieth birthday. 1 See Ferdinand Schmidt: De origine termini kantiani transcendens (Marburg 1873); Abra ham Gideon: Der Begriff Transzendental in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Marburg 1903); Hans Leisegang: Ober die Behandlung des scholastischen Satzes: »Quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum seu perfectum«, und seine Bedeutung in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In: Kant-Studien 20 (1915) 403-421; Hinrich Knittermeyer: Der Terminus transzendental in seiner historischen Entwickelung bis zu Kant (Marburg 1920); id.: Transzendent und Transzenden tal. In: Paul Natorp zum 70. Geburtstage von Schiilern und Freunden gewidmet, hg. von Ernst Cassirer (Berlin, Leipzig 1924) 195-214; id.: Transzendentalphilosophie und Theologie. Eine kritische Erinnerung zum 22. April 1924. In: Die christliche Welt 38 (1924) 220-226; Gottfried Martin: Immanuel Kant. Ontologie und Wissenschaftstheorie (Kôln 1958); Hans Vaihinger: Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Stuttgart 1992). For an exhaustive status quaes tionis see Norbert Hinske: Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie. Der dreiOigjahrige Kant (Stuttgart etc. 1970) 15-23. 2 See Francesco Valerio Tommasi: Kant di fronte alia tradizione del »trascendentale«: stato della ricerca e prospettive alia luce di un nuovo particolare. In: Studi Kantiani 16 (2003) 53-66; id.: Philosophia transcendentalis. La questione antepredicativa e l'analogia tra la Scolastica e Kant (Firenze 2008). 3 See N. Hinske: Die historischen Vorlagen der kantischen Transzendentalphilosophie. In: Archiv fur Begriffsgeschichte 12 (1968) 86-113; id.: Kants Weg, a.a.O. [Anm. 1] 49; ders.: Ver schiedenheit und Einheit der transzendentalen Philosophien. Zum Exempel fiir ein Verhàltnis von Problem- und Begriffsgeschichte. In: Archiv fiir Begriffsgeschichte 14 (1970) 41-68. 4 See Ignacio Angelelli: On the Origins of Kant's »Transcendental«. In: Kant-Studien 63 (1972) 117-122; id.: On »Transcendental« Again. In: Kant-Studien 66 (1975) 116-120. 5 Giorgio Tonelli: Das Wiederaufieben der deutsch-aristotelischen Terminologie bei Kant wahrend der Entstehung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In: Archiv fiir Begriffsgeschichte 9 (1964) 233-242, quoted 238.

Archiv fïïr Begriffsgeschichte · Band 53 · © Felix Meiner Verlag 2011 · ISSN 0003-8946

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aim of this essay is to suggest a différent origin and genesis of the Kantian con cept of »transcendental« through the méthodologies of Quellengeschichte and Begriffsgeschichte, investigating the philosophical and historical background of Königsberg from the beginning of the seventeenth Century to Kant and to show reasons for the shift of the concept of »transcendental« from metaphysics to logic.

II. Transcendental Philosophy in Königsberg (1600-1724)

The history of transcendental philosophy in Königsberg closely parallels the teaching of metaphysics in the German universities. There was a tendency in Germany between 1530 and 1590 to subordinate or to remove the discipline of metaphysics in the curricula of the most important Protestant universities.^ This tendency was characterized by: 1) a condition of diffuse uncertainty by the con tinuous doctrinal and theological mutations of the various reformist movements; 2) the identification of metaphysics with theology, with the conséquent teaching in the theological faculties;3) the dissémination of Philipp Melanchthon's works. Melanchthon, to whom Martin Luther gave the task of reforming the university curriculum in Protestant Germany, like many humanists did not pay attention to metaphysics. Melanchthon »completely neglected the systematic role played by metaphysics arguing that: (a) logic (dialectic) can replace metaphysics with regard to assessing principles; (b) metaphysics is useless with regard to the con cept of God and it is also pernicious and (c) the main advantage of metaphysics is to be seen in grammar.«7 »Melanchthon's exhortation ad res ipsas«, however, »implies a comprehensive metaphysical project aimed at retranslating the Aris totelian realist metaphysics in a System of ideal relations held together by men tal procédures.«8 In this process of mentalization and nominalization of metaphysics the doc trine of transcendentals became important for German philosophy after the publication of Francisco Suärez's Disputationes metaphysicae in 1600.9 »L'effet Suarez« extremely influenced the Königsberg cultural background with the dis sémination of Protestant metaphysical works of Suärezian origin such as those

6 See Joseph S. Freedman: Philosophy Instruction within the Institutional Framework of Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era. In: History of Uni versities 5 (1985) 117-166; id.: Aristotle and the Content of Philosophy Instruction at Central European Schools and Universities during the Reformation Era (1500-1650). In: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 137 (1993) 213-253. 7 Riccardo Pozzo: Logic and Metaphysics in German Philosophy from Melanchthon to He gel. In: Approaches to Metaphysics, ed. by William Sweet (Dordrecht 2005) 62. 8 R. Pozzo, ibid. 62. See Walter Spam: Wiederkehr der Metaphysik (Stuttgart, 1976) 109. 9 The first édition was published in Salamanca in 1597. See Ludger Honnefelder: Metaphys ics as a Discipline: From the »Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients« to Kant's Notion of Transcendental Philosophy. In: The Médiéval Héritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Mo dal Theory 1400-1700, ed. by R. Friedman and L. Nielsen (Dordrecht 2003) 53-74.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« 99 of Henning Arnisaeus, Jakob Martini, Christoph Scheibler, and Clemens Tim pler and with a général réévaluation of Jesuitic metaphysics. Georg Crusius was the first to deal with Suârez's metaphysics in his Disputationes metaphysicae in 1618.1° The most important and influential metaphysical work on the doctrine of transcendentals, however, was A. Calov's Metaphysica divina, which was pub lished in Rostock in 1636. It made Königsberg one of the strongholds of Lu theran metaphysics for its wide dissémination.!! Calov elaborated a new définition of the object of metaphysics, and in par ticular of ontology, which was the »ens qua ens«.i2 Calov's notion of »ens«, however, had special features, and differed from the other precedent and con temporary philosophical elaborations. It was »ens positivum, reale, actuale, incomplexum«,!3 and its investigation concerned also the transcendental affec tions.!4 The »ens«, Calov spécifiés, is that which does not imply any contradic tion.!5 What is contradictory is »non-ens« and it is in the realm of thought and intelligibility. On the contrary, the »ens« is the first object of knowledge, i.e. the »primum cognitum«.!6 The »ens« as »primum cognitum«, in fact, is not a mere abstract »ens« according to Calov, but it always needs a representational ground, i.e. a »realitas objectiva«, of an »objectum« in front of the »subjectum«. The »ens« is therefore a »cognoscibile« according to the classification of his gnosto logical doctrines!7 and not a mere intelligible, as for instance it was for Clemens Timpler.i8The transcendental affections therefore must be referred to the »ens« not as such but as a »cognoscibile« i.e. an object of knowledge in général. This

ίο See Georg Crusius: Disputationes metaphysicae (Königsberg 1618). On the first impact of Suärez in Königsberg see M. Sgarbi: At the Origin of the Connection between Logic and Ontology. The Impact of Suärez's Metaphysics in Königsberg. In: Anales Valentinos 71 (2010) 145-159. 11 On A. Calov see Walter Friedensburg: Geschichte der Universität Wittenberg (Halle 1917); Volker Jung: Das Ganze der Heiligen Schrift. Hermeneutik und Schriftauslegung bei Ab raham Calov (Stuttgart 1999); Ernst Feil: Religio. Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grund begriffs im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert (Göttingen 2001). 12 On the subject of metaphysics in Calov see M. Sgarbi: Unus, Verus, Bonus et Calovius. L'oggetto della metafisica in A. Calov. In: Medioevo (2009) 381-398. 13 Abraham Calov: Metaphysica divina (Rostock 1640) 176. « Ibid. 170. 15 Ibid. 182. 16 Ibid. 183. On the »primum cognitum« see Constance Blackwell: The Vocabulary for Natu ral Philosophy. The de primo cognito question. A preliminary Exploration: Zimara, Toletus, Pereira and Zabarella. In: Lexiques et Glossaires Philosophiques de la Renaissance, ed. by Jac queline Hamesse et Marta Fattori (Türnhout 2004) 287-308. F Calov was the first to introduce the science of gnostology and of noology into the System of metaphysics. The former deals with the knowable qua knowable, the latter with the first principles of knowledge. 18 See J. S. Freedman: European Académie Philosophy in the Late Sixteenth and Early Sev enteenth Centuries. The Life, Significance and Philosophy of Clemens Timpler (Hildesheim, New York, Zürich, 1988); Jean-François Courtine: Suârez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris 1990) 324.

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is Calov's original and innovative position in ontology, which is the basis of the shift of the notion of transcendental from metaphysics to epistemology. Signifi cantly Calov states that transcendentals did not dénoté a mere being but a »cog noscibile«, i.e. the transcendental attributes without which the »cognoscibile« would not be the object of knowledge.This formulation is extremely close to the Kantian one but there is an important différence. In Calov the transcendentals of the »cognoscibile« refer to an objective reality, to the phenomenon, to the représentation, while in Kant the transcendentals directly refer to the subject.19 Even if it is true that every »cognoscibile« is knowable for a subject, transcen dentals do not pertain to who knows according to Calov, but to the object of knowledge.20 After the second half of the seventeenth Century in Königsberg metaphysics retired again into a new kind of logic.21 The doctrine of transcendentals, how ever, was still taught in the university through the works of F. A. Aepinus, as the Vorlesungsverzeichnisse show.22 N. Hinske suggested in 1968 that Aepinus had an influence on Kant,23 which Francesco Valerio Tommasi has recently con firmed. In Königsberg Aepinus's works were taught between 1724 to 1727 by Thomas Burckhard, who was professor of Latin and rhetoric, during the alli ance of Pietists with Wolffians. Before Kant it was Aepinus, who first identified the »philosophia transcendentalis« with »metaphysica«. The second part of his Introductionis in philosophiam has the title: Philosophia transcendentalis sive metaphysica. Here Aepinus defines metaphysics as »scientia transcendentalis«24 and uses the term »transcendental« as synonymous with »transcendent« - some thing that is beyond the physical realm. The concept of »transcendental« occurs many times in his work. One mention of them is particularly important because it defines the concept of substance,25 just as Kant does in one of the two occur rences of the term in his published pre-critical writings.

19 For the impact of Calov on Kant see M. Sgarbi: Abraham Calov and Immanuel Kant. Aristotelian and Scholastic Traces in Kantian Philosophy. In: Historia Philosophica 8 (2010) 55-62. 20 According to Calov, therefore, the transcendentals are not »entia supra naturam«, as Tonelli argues confusing them with the transcendents, which have not any specific thematiza tion in his works. See G. Tonelli, I.e. [see n. 5] 238. 21 For the history of metaphysics in Königsberg see M. Sgarbi: Metaphysics in Königsberg prior to Kant (1703-1770). In: /Trans/Form/Açâo/ 33 (2010) 31-64. 22 See: Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Königsberg (1720-1804), ed. by Michael Oberhausen, Riccardo Pozzo (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1999) 29,32,35,38,41,44,47. On Aepi nus see Francesco Valerio Tommasi: Franz Albert Aepinus, l'aristotelismo tedesco e Kant. Un contributo per la storia e il senso della filosofia trascendentale tra metafisica ed epistemologia. In: Archivio di filosofia 71 (2003) 333-358. 23 N. Hinske: Die historischen Vorlagen, I.e. [see 3] 84-85. 24 Franz Albert Aepinus: Introductio in Philosophiam in VI partes distribuita. Pars II. Philosophia transcendentalis s. Metaphysica (Rostock 1714) 5. 25 F. A. Aepinus, ibid. 30: »quod si vero quaedam adsunt transcendentali substantiae con vientes disinetiones, e.g. in universalem et singularem, incompletam et completam; eae rectius

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In §2 of the De mundi Kant asserts: »matter (in the transcendental sense), that is the parts, which are here taken to be substances,«26 Then Kant explains that he was able to remain wholly unconcerned about the agreement of his own définition with that of the ordinary meaning of the word, namely, »how it is pos sible for several substances to coalesce into one thing (>unum<), and upon what conditions it dépends that this one thing is not a part of something eise.«27 In this passage Kant seems to refer to the Scholastic tradition of the disjunctive transcendentals according to Calov and Aepinus définition. The use of the term »unum«, however, does not exclude in this context that the one that Kant had in mind was the transcendental »unum«. In Aepinus, »transcendental« is used to define the intrinsic quality of God,28 in the définition of »unum«,29 »verum«,30 and »bonum«.31 In particular the transcen dental »verum« coïncides with the metaphysical »verum« in opposition to the log ical one,32 and the transcendental »bonum« coincides with essential »bonum«.33 The term transcendental also characterizes the possible and the impossible.34 Summing up, the concept of »transcendental« in Aepinus is synonymous with »essential« and »metaphysical«, but it is opposed to »logical«. In spite of the great extension with which Aepinus deals with the transcendental in his works and of his dissémination in Königsberg University, there is no real or at least determining influence on the genesis of the Kantian concept.

III. Wolff's Concept of »Transcendental« and its Influence on Kant

The influence of Christian Wolff on the formation of the Kantian concept of »transcendental« seems to be important for the first occurrence of term in Kant's published writings. In the Monadologia physica, Kant states: »but how, in this business, can metaphysics be married to geometry, when it seems easier to mate griffins with horses than to unite transcendental philosophy with geometry?«35

Parti III. Metaphysicae et tractationi de attributis entis reservantur; quam hoc loco, velut in sede sua, exponuntur.« 26 KGS II 389: »materia (in sensu transcendentali) h.e. partes, quae hic sumuntur esse sub stantiae.« See N. Hinske, Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 48. 22 KGS II 389. 28 F. A. Aepinus, I.e. [see 24] 33. » Ibid. 66. 30 Ibid. 71. 31 Ibid. 76. 22 Ibid. 71. 33 Ibid. 76. 34 Ibid. 95. Possible is »quod simpliciter esse non répugnât.« Impossible is »quod neque per finitam neque per infinitam potentiam fieri et esse potest.« 35 KGS I 475: »sed quod tandem pacto hoc in negotio metaphysicam geometriae conciliare

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Here transcendental philosophy is synonymous to metaphysics, namely, both have the same object of investigation. Ν. Hinske has therefore reconstructed the object of transcendental philosophy in order to understand the real meaning of the term. He points out that »transcendental« denoted a particular aspect of a special part of metaphysics i.e. cosmology, which was established by Wolff in De differentia nexus rerum sapientis et fatalis nécessitâtes in 1724.36 This définition of transcendental cosmology was strongly criticized by Pietists, particularly by Johann Joachim Lange.37 Therefore, four years later to avoid Pietists's charges, Wolff redefined the term supplying additional attributes to the transcendental cosmology in the Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere,38 which he then included in his Prolegomena and Cosmologia generalis. Thus the concept of »transcendental« became synonymous with »général« as in the ontology.39 Such Wolffians as Georg Bernhard Bilfinger, Friedrich Christian Baumeister and Johann Peter Reusch employed the concept in this sense. This is the context in which, according to Hinske, Kant used »transcendental«:»the term >transcen dentah, especially in a cosmological dissertation, for Kant's contemporaries im mediately reminded the new Wolffian science«,40 »in the preliminary remarks to Monadologiaphysica most probably Kant would have had in front his mind [...] the Wolffian transcendental cosmology when he used the expression >philos ophia transcendentalis.<«41 Hinske found support for his hypothesis in various passages of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in which the transcendental approach

licet, cum gryphes facilius equis, quam philosophiam transcendentalis geometriae iungi posse videantur?« 36 Ch. Wolff: De differentia nexus rerum sapientis et fatalis necessitatis nec non systema tis harmoniae praestabilitae et hypothesium Spinoase luclenta commentatio (Halle 1737) 3: »novam quandam disciplinam condere coepi, quam Cosmologiae transscendentalis nomine compellare soleo, in qua veritates maxime arduae de universo materiali explicantur, ad mentis humanae naturam intimius cognoscendam, et de Deo ex lumine rationis accuratiora ratiocinia contexenda adprime utiles.« 37 J. J. Lange: Modesta disquisitio novi philosophiae systematis de Deo, mundo et homine, et praesertim de Harmonia commercii inter animam et corpus praestabilita (Halle 1723) 66: »et quando vir cl. multa praedicat de cosmologia sua metaphysica ac transcendentali, quam tan quam novam disciplinam condere coeperit, prudentes mirantur, hac disciplinae novitatem, quae nihil habet, nisi quod iam dudum tradiderunt Spinosa, Wallisius, Hugenius, Leibnitius, alii.« See Ferdinando L. Marcolungo: Wolff e il possibile (Padova 1982) 129-130. 38 Ch. Wolff: Philosophia rationalis sive logica (Frankfurt, Leipzig 1740) 36: »datur vero etiam generalis mundi contemplatio, ea explicans, quae mundo existenti cum alio quocunque possibili communia sunt. Eae philosophiae pars, quae générales istas notiones, easque ex parte abstractas, e vol vit, Cosmologia generalis vel transscendentalis a me vocatur.« 39 Ch. Wolff: Cosmologia generalis, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ad solidam, inprimis Dei at quae natuarae, cognitionem via sternitur (Frankfurt, Leipzig 1731) 1: »quamobrem et transcendentalem appellare soleo, quia nonnisi talia de mundo hic demonstrantur, quae ipsi tan quam enti composito & modificabili conveniunt, ut adeo eodem modo se habeat ad Physicam, quo Ontologia seu philosophia prima ad philosophiam universam.« 40 N. Hinske, I.e. [see 1] 47. « Ibid. 49.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« 103 is contrasted with the empirical-physical investigation.42 This genesis of the »transcendental«, however, concerns solely the two sporadic occurrences of the pre-critical period and it explains nothing about Kant's mature transcendental doctrine. Wolff used »transcendental« to define more than just cosmology, in deed it was one of the key-concepts of his Ontologia. According to Hinske, Wolf fian ontological doctrines could not be Kant's source of transcendental, because Wolff used the term in an un-systematic way.43 I believe that it is necessary to examine the définition of »transcendental« of Wolff s Ontologia to understand the development of the history of the concept in Kant. Wolff dealt with the doctrine of transcendentals in the chapter De or dine, veritate et perfectione, that contains constant references to Suarez.44 Let us consider the concept »transcendental truth.« Transcendental truth is »ordo in varietate eorum, quae simul sunt ac se invicem consequuntur, aut, si mavis, ordo eorum, qua enti conveniunt.«45 Specifically Wolff wrote that »omne ens est verum«,46 and that the truth was grounded on the principle of non contra diction and of sufficient reason. Wolff identified the notion of transcendental truth with metaphysical truth, and significantly refers to R. Göckel's »ver itas metaphysica«.47 This can explain the reason why many times in the Kri tik der reinen Vernunft the concept of »transcendental« was synonymous with »metaphysical«.48 On the other hand transcendental truth was contrasted to logical truth, although the former was the basis of the latter.49 The identification of transcendental truth with metaphysical truth was maintained also by Bau meister in his Philosophia definitiva and in his Institutiones metaphysicae,50 and by Bilfinger in his Dilucidationes philosophicae.51

« Ibid. 50. « Ibid. 56. 44 See Jean École: Christian Wolffs Metaphysik und die Scholastik. In: Vernunftkritik und Aufklärung, ed. by Heinrich P. Delfosse, M. Oberhausen und R. Pozzo (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2001) 115-128. For a critical assessment of Suärez's legacy in Wolff see M. Sgarbi: Francisco Suä rez and Christian Wolff. A Missed Intellectuel Legacy. In: Francisco Suärez and his Legacy. The Impact of Suärezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy, ed. by M. Sgarbi (Milano 2010) 227-241. 45 Ch. Wolff: Prima philosophia sive Ontologia (Frankfurt, Leipzig 1736) 383. « Ibid. 384. 47 Rudolph Göckel: Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae fores aper iuntur (Frankfurt 1613) 312. For Göckel metaphysical truth and transcendental truth were the same. 48 See N. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 49. 49 See F.L. Marcolungo, I.e. [see 37] 115-117. 50 See Friedrich Christian Baumeister: Philosophia definitiva (Wittenberg, 1735) 87; id.: In stitutiones philosophiae rationalis methodo Wolfii conscriptae (Wittenberg 1774) 146-147. 51 Georg Bernhard Bilfinger: Dilucidationes philosophicae de Deo, anima humana, mundo, et generalibus rerum affectionibus (Tübingen 1725) 162: »non igitur, illi Philosophorum, qui veritatem transcendentalem definiunt eam affectionem qua res habet, quae ipsius essentiae et naturae debentur, contradicunt istis, qui eam definiunt per ordinem successivorum. Illi loquun tur de verdate essendi [...] Hi de verdate existendi.« See F.L. Marcolungo, I.e. [see 37] 121.

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Generally speaking it is necessary to remember that for Wolffians the »ens« is the »possibile« and therefore »the veritas trascendentalis« as »ordo eorum, quae enti conveniunt« is the set of the all conditions of possibility of the object (res, Gegenstand).«52 Wolffian »transcendental« is the same définition as Schul metaphysik of Suârezian tradition that »instead of referring to the knowing sub ject, as in Criticism, it expresses the relation between the constituent parts of the object [...] in the light of the principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason.«53

IV. Baumgarten's Concept οf »Transcendental« and its Influence on Kant

A noteworthy case for its influence on Kant is Baumgarten's doctrine of tran scendentals. First of all I want firmly to defend the thesis that Baumgarten was not a Wolffian in metaphysics, because his doctrines on being, essence and tran scendentals were very différent from those of the Wolffian tradition. Once again, in order to understand the influence of Baumgarten on Kant it is necessary to examine the relation between transcendental truth and metaphysical truth.54 Baumgarten wrote: »Veritas metaphysica (realis, objectiva, materialis) est ordo plurium in uno, veritas in essentialibus et attributis entis, transcendentalis.«55 The définition, as in Wolff, is strictly related to the concept of order. Even if the meta physical truth of Baumgarten coincides with Wolff s transcendental (or meta physical) truth, Baumgarten's transcendental truth was something more specific, which is explainable through his différent notions of essence and existence. Baumgarten redefined essence as the set of intrinsic déterminations (»essen tialia«).56 In this context in §73 Baumgarten used »transcendentaliter« as syn onymous with »unum«, and in § 98 »wesentliche« as a translation of »transcen dentalis«. Existence instead is the essence, which is determined by »affectiones« which are those intrinsic déterminations of the possible of which essence is the »ratio«.57 »Ratio [...] est id, ex quo cognoscibile, cur aliquid sit«,58 referring back Wolff's définition of essence in § 168 of his Ontologia. The »ratio« is founded on the »principium rationis«, which states that everything possible has a »ratio« i.e. nothing is without a »ratio«.59 If »affectiones« have in the essence their »ra

52 See F.L. Marcolungo, I.e. [see n. 37] 126. 53 Ibid. 54 Mario Casula: La metafisica di A. G. Baumgarten (Milano 1973) 107-108. 55 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: Metaphysica (Halle 1779) 24-25. 56 Ibid. 13. 57 Ibid. 14,16: »complexus affectionum in aliquo possibilium, i.e. complementum essentiae sive possibilitatis internae, quatenus haec tantum, ut complexus determinationum spectatur.« 58 Ibid. 5. 59 Ibid. 7.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« 105 tio sufficiens«, they are attributes; while if the essence is a »ratio insufficiens« they are modes.60 Existence, therefore, is a complément of the essence, i.e., it adds the »affectiones« to the »essentialia«.61 If also the relations are added to the being i.e. extrinsic déterminations, the détermination is called »omnimoda determinatio«.62 The »omnimoda determinatio« is »complexus omnium deter minationum in ente compossibilium.«63 The existence differs from the »omni moda determinatio« because the former is constituted by all intrinsic détermi nation, whereas the latter is by all the déterminations in général both intrinsic and extrinsic. Following these définitions of essence, existence and »omnimoda determi natio«, it is possible to explain the différence between metaphysical and tran scendental truth, which Baumgarten elaborated in § 89. Metaphysical truth is simply »metaphysische Wahrheit« i.e. it is characterized by the order of all at tributes of a thing, whereas transcendental truth is »nothwendige metaphysische Wahrheit«,64 i.e. it pertains only to what is necessarily essential.65 Angelelli elaborated against Hinske a similar argumentation, according to which all the essential properties of a being are not transcendental, but only the necessary properties. The Metaphysik Herder (1762-1764) is the first available document that re veals Kant's interest in Baumgarten's doctrine of transcendentals. It still exhibits the strong influence of Wolffian ontology. In fact in order to explain and clarify Baumgarten's obscure text Kant uses Wolff s Ontologia.66 In his classification of truth Kant removes the concept transcendental truth which would have coin cided with Wolff s metaphysical truth but later he did use it. Metaphysical truth as for Wolff , was the foundation of logical truth. Further in his explanation of

«0 Ibid. 14. si Ibid. 15-16. 62 Ibid. 42-43. 63 Ibid. 42. 64 Ibid. 25. 65 See I. Angelelli: On »Transcendental« Again, I.e. [see 4] 119-120. 66 KGS XXVIII 16-17: »Veritas vel logica: Die Übereinstimmung der Vorstellung mit der Beschaffenheit der Sache. [Veritas] vel metaphysica: Daß das praedicat (der Möglichkeit nach) der Sache zukomme. [Veritas] vel moralis: Die Übereinstimmung der Gedanken mit Worten. Die logische Wahrheit sezzt die metaphysische d.i. die Möglichkeit voraus. Waz gleich logisch unwahr ist, kann doch metaphysisch wahr seyn weil es möglich seyn kan z.E. viereckigte Krei se - Ein Einhorn, etc. Man kan logische Wahrheit im Erkenntnis haben und doch moralisch unwahr reden z.E. die Gözzenpriester mit ihren Feetischen [.] Metaphysische Wahrheit wenn die praedicate der Sache zukommen: sie kommen ihr aber zu wenn sie ihr nicht wiedersprechen. Transscendentale Wahrheit, daß die praedicate eines Dings dem Saz des zureichenden Grundes, und des Wiederspruchs gemäß sind: wenn sie als essentiae den Grund einer Sache in sich und als attributa den Grund in der Sache haben. Des Autors Definition ist nicht acht von der Metaphy sischen Wahrheit. Zwar wird metaphysisch Wahres den prineipien contradictionis und rationis gemäß seyn, und ist also eine Coordination - folglich auch Ordnung etc. Aber dies sind Schlüße aus der Definition nicht die Definition selbst.«

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transcendental truth Kant attempts to give reasons for the différent définitions of metaphysical truth and transcendental truth as Baumgarten had done, but he was not able to. Therefore Kant argues that Baumgarten's distinction is decep tive: metaphysical truth and transcendental truth are the same according to the Wolffian Standpoint. This lecture from the first half of the Sixties demonstrates that Kant had not yet understood the différence between »metaphysical« and »transcendental«, although he already made a distinction between the concepts of »metaphysical« and »logical«. Kant's analysis shows a deeper insight in the Reflexion 3765 (1764-1766)67 which is a comment on the § 89 of Baumgarten's Metaphysica. Kant states that transcendentals are concepts applicable to all things. He means that the concepts are the conditions through which it is possible to conceive everything, or better that everything is conceivable by means of them.68 Hinske notes that substantial différences emerge between Baumgarten and Kant in the définition of unity. Baumgarten's transcendental unity, which is exposed in § 37 as »inseparability per se of the essential déterminations«, would not, according to Hinske, bear any relation to Kant's assertion »every thing is not many.« The relation, there is instead, because the fact that »every thing is not many« means that the essence or the essential déterminations determine the thing in itself in an univocal way. A thing cannot be confused with others, it cannot be the others according to its specific and exclusive essential déterminations. In addition, the Kantian défini tion of transcendental unity as »every thing is not many« coincides with Baum garten's définition of »unicum transcendentale«.69 It is also important to empha size, as Hinske shows,70 that for Baumgarten transcendental truth includes the order and the agreement among essential attributes, while according to Kant »every thing is true, i.e. it cannot be denied among all possible concepts and it is in agreement with all the other things.«71 This seems to support the thesis

61 KGS XVII 287: »Man hat durch die 4 Sectionen [Unum, Ordo, Verum, Perfectum] viel leicht nur sagen wollen, daß sich die Begriffe vom Einen, Wahren, Vollkommenen auf alle Dinge überhaupt anwenden lassen. Ein iedes Ding ist nicht viel: bedeutet die transscendentale Einheit. Ein iedes Ding enthält vieles, was doch einerley ist mit einem: die metaphysische (kan größere oder kleinere Einheit seyn). Ein iedes Ding ist wahr, d.i.: es kan unter allen möglichen Begriffen nicht geleugnet werden und stimmt mit andern Dingen: transscendental. Ein iedes Ding enthält warheiten: metaphysisch, das principium der elementarsätze. (einige Dinge ent halten zwar Möglichkeit, aber nicht genug metaphysische Warheit, d.i. bedingte Möglichkeit.) Ein iedes Ding ist vollkommen, was es ist: transscendental. Ein iedes hat realitaet: metaphy sisch, es ist comparativ vollkommen. [Das] Die absolute Einheit, Warheit und Vollkommenheit besteht in der Möglichkeit, welche die Allgnugsamkeit in sich faßt, die Möglichkeit in allem respectu und alle realitaet.« 68 See N. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 65. 69 A.G. Baumgarten, I.e. [see 55] 22: »quiequid est, quod multa non sunt, est UNICUM (uno exclusive taie).« 70 See Ν. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 65. 71 KGS XVII 287.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« 107 that according to Baumgarten the transcendental truth is strictly related to the inner essence of the being, while in Kant it concerns not only intrinsic détermi nations, but also extrinsic déterminations among différent beings. That is to say, for Baumgarten there is a substantial identification between the »essential« and the »transcendental« in opposition to the »metaphysical«, while Kant on the contrary seems to resolutely distinguish them. It is not true that »in all the tra ditions of pre-Kantian transcendental philosophy, even if the deep différences in problems and scopes, >metaphysical< and >transcendental< were presented as reciprocal concepts with the same content«72 and that »it is not possible to es tablish unquestionably what led Kant to distinguish, in opposition to these tradi tions >transcendental< and >metaphysical<.73 In fact, Baumgarten established this distinction and was the Kantian source. Finally we should note that Baumgarten in his Acroasis logica used the con cept of »transcendentalis« to denote the superior concepts (»der obere oder hoehere«) which contained under them other concepts,74 in a similar way to the Kantian approach in defining the catégories as superior pure concepts of the understanding in Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In the Scotist tradition the term »conceptus transcendens« occurs, however, there are no occurrences of it or of »conceptus transcendentalis« in the eighteenth Century before Baumgarten.

V. From Ontology to Logic: the Distinction between »Transcendental« and »Metaphysical«

The problematic nature of the identification between »transcendental« and »es sential« emerges also in Lambert's interprétation of Baumgarten's doctrine of transcendentals.75 Lambert was not able to justify the distinction between »tran scendental« and the one of »transcendent«; and therefore the identification be tween »transcendental« and »essential«. »Transcendental« and »transcendent«

72 See Ν. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 68. 73 See ibid. 69. 74 A. G. Baumgarten: Acroasis logica (Halle 1773) 19: »CONCEPTUS alium sub se contin ens, respectu ipsius SUPERIOR (transscendentalis).« 73 Johann Heinrich Lambert: Anlage zur Architektonik oder Theorie des Einfachen und Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnis (Riga, 1771) 292: »Ich werde demnach nur kurz berühren, dass das Wort transcendent in der Metaphysik häufig gebraucht wird. Es kann darin nicht anders als metaphorisch vorkommen, weil es eigentlich so viel als hinübersteigend bedeutet. Wie fern es aber in der Metaphysik so viel als wesentlich bedeutet, und daher transcendentaliter unum durch wesentlich Eines, veritas transcendentalis durch we sentliche Wahrheit, perfectio transcendentalis durch innere wesentliche Vollkommenheit übersetz werden müsse, habe ich nicht finden können. Soll aber das Wort transcendent noch einen Ab druck seiner eigentlichen Bedeutung behalten, so werden wir überhaupt einen Begriff tran scendent nennen können, wenn wir denselben von seinem Gegenstande hinweg auf einen Ge genstand von ganz verschiedener Art bringen.«

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are also synonymous in J. G. H. Feder's Logik und Metaphysik76 as well as in Johann Nikolaus Tetens's Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie77 who were all Kantian sources. At the end of the Sixties, however, Kant changed his position and he began to identify »transcendental« with »essential«, in opposition to »metaphysical« according to Baumgarten. In Reflexion 4402 (1771), he states: »everything is con sidered transcendental sense (>transcendentaliter<), it is conceived »respective to the essence, while metaphysical sense, it is conceived in an absolute (»absolute«) and universal (>universaliter<) way.«78The opposition between »transcendental« and »metaphysical« and the analogy of the former with »essential« occurs also in the fragment 4025 (1769).79 In this context Kant had in mind Wolff's distinc tion between metaphysical truth and logical truth referring to the distinction between »absolute« and »respective« but evidently not regarding the distinction between »transcendental« and »metaphysical«.80 It may be true here he was be ginning to free himself from Wolffian philosophy and to embrace Baumgarten's approach in juxtaposing »metaphysical« to »transcendental« and conceiving the latter in opposition to the former as a synonym for »logical.« Hinske is certainly right when he writes that limiting the définition of »tran scendental« to »essentialia« Kant detracts it in advantage of the »metaphysical«. In fact, it is in the »metaphysical« that the entire richness of knowledge lies ac cording to Kant, as can be illustrated by the examination of the Beweisgrund. Here the intricate problem arises of how to apply the critique to the »meta physical.« Therefore, even if the »transcendental« is epistemologically weaker, it is the foundation of the »metaphysical«. The »transcendental« becomes the object of logic because it is the condition of the »metaphysical«. In this sense Kant reverses the terms of the Wolffian ontology as conceived in the Metaphysik Herder, according to which the »metaphysical« was the basis for the »logical«. I am proposing that at the end of the Sixties Kant revolutionized the way he understood the relationship between logical and metaphysical truth because of this new définition of »transcendental«. Reflexion 4027 (1769) testifies this change that brings in a new paradigm. In this fragment the »transcendental« becomes definitively a synonym of »logical«

76 Johann Georg Heinrich Feder: Logik und Metaphysik (Göttingen 1778) 270-273. 77 See Alexei N. Krouglov: Der Begriff »transzendental« bei J. N. Tetens. Historischer Kon text und Hintergründe. In: Aufklärung. Interdisziplinäres Jahrbuch zur Erforschung des 18. Jahrhunderts und seiner Wirkungsgeschichte 17 (2005) 35-76. 78 KGS XVII533. 79 KGS XVII 389: »transscendentaliter wird etwas betrachtet, wenn es beziehungsweise auf sein (eigen) Wesen als die Folge erwogen wird; metaphysice, wenn das Wesen in ansehung seiner Folgen als ein Grund betrachtet wird, (wird es respective auf das Wesen der Dinge überhaupt be trachtet, so heißt es metaphysisch).« On this fragment see N. Hinske: Kants Weg, a. a.O. [Anm. 1] 70. 80 F.L. Marcolungo, I.e. [see 37] 116.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« 109 and »essential«, and it is opposed to »real« and »metaphysical«: »the transcen dental unity is logical, respective to the essence of the thing. Metaphysical unity is real, respective to the possibility in général.«81 This is anti-Wolffian and re veals the influence of Christian August Crusius' interprétation of Baumgarten's doctrine of transcendental. In § 19 of the Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft Wahrheiten, Crusius writes that the essence can be considered in two ways, in a metaphysical sense or in a logical sense. The metaphysical essence is what is thought of a thing and what is distinguishing it from the others. It is also called actuality (»Wirklichkeit«) and it coincides with possibility in général (»Mög lichkeit«). Metaphysical essence is constituted by a »subiectum« and its »meta physische Eigenschaften«. Further, according to Crusius, the metaphysical prop erty which is not essential is a »Determination«. A détermination is a possible way (»Art«) for a thing to exist, which Crusius defines especially with Space and time. Looked at in another way, logical essence is what pertains invariably to a thing and differentiates it from the others. Logical essence pertains only to es sential properties and it is in that the transcendental unity. Metaphysical unity on the other hand is the real possibility of existence of a thing, while transcen dental unity is merely the logical essence.82 It is significant that it is here we can find the Kantian concept of transcendental as the condition of logical possibility without which any knowledge of an object would be possible, this is independ ent from its existence which, instead, would concern metaphysics.83 Here lies the irreducibility between logic and reality, that Hinske traced back to Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, but it had its origin already in the Nova dilucidatio and it was completed in the Beweisgrund after Kant's studies on Crusius's metaphysical works in the early Sixties. For this reason Reflexion 3765 must be dated back to 1763 or to the period before the Beweisgrund but after the Metaphysik Herder. The supposition of an évolution of the concept of »transcendental« in the wake of a reconsideration of the relation between metaphysical and transcen dental truth in the Beweisgrund is proved by Reflexion 5243, which is a comment to the concept of Baumgarten's »veritas metaphysica«.84 Here Kant refers to metaphysical truth in connection with his theory of existence which is developed in Beweisgrund,85 It is possible, therefore, to establish that since the beginning of the Seventies, but not later than 1772, Kant had already firmly set out, though still in an unfin ished way, his concept of »transcendental«. While Hinske affirms that the con

si KGS XVII389. 82 Christian August Crusius: Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten (Leipzig 1766) 32,36,46. On the concept of perfection in Crusius see ibid. 300-352. 83 See N. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 71. 84 KGS XVIII129: »In Verhältnis auf die data, z.E. Daß auch zu einem an sich möglichen Dinge die Bedingungen des Daseyns gegeben seyn, folglich es synthetisch möglich sey.« 85 KGS II 78.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 110 Marco Sgarbi cept of »transcendental« occurs only after the complété élaboration of Kant's philosophical system,86 my investigation demonstrates that the key-concept of the Kantian philosophy is in nuce already sketched before or at the same time of the logical doctrines (catégories). I would agree with Benno Erdmann who states that the reflections on »transcendental« represents the foundation for the transformation of the ontology in the transcendental analytic i.e. logic.87 It is unlikely or hard to demonstrate that on the doctrine of transcendentals Kant tried to »plan the table of catégories« which was Leisegang's position, according to which Kant aimed to »use the ancient ontology with its three universal and in ner predicates of the being for his critical purposes [...] and to deduce catégories from the transcendental concept of ens, unum, verum, bonum.«88 A further élaboration of the concept of »transcendental« in Kant is driven by epistemological issues during the Seventies. The set of annotations from 4805 to 4807 (1775-1776) are particularly revealing. In Reflexion 4805 Kant identifies es sential unity with transcendental unity89 as Baumgarten had done. Transcenden tal is therefore synonymous with »essential«. Kant spécifiés the threefold way in which the transcendental unity is conceivable. The unity is in the concepts and not among concepts. In a général way it concerns the agreement of properties that, as a set, constitutes a unity.90 This fragment supports Angelelli's interpréta tion against Hinske. At least two other fragments of this period seem to support Angelelli, according to whom the »transcendental« dénotés eminently the es sential unity. They are Reflexion 5738, which states: »the détermination of a thing for its essence (as a thing) is transcendental«91 and Reflexion 5741, which sup ports: »the transcendental properties of a thing are those with which the concept of a thing in général is related in an essential way.«92 Also the Reflexion 4806 establishes that what détermines the transcendentals is an essential unity.93 In Reflexion 4807 Kant makes clear that this unity is the form of the under standing and he classifies the three transcendentals of the tradition according to human faculties.94The connection of the manifold in the »unum« is the transcen dental unity and it pertains to the understanding; the reciprocal connection of

86 Ν. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 73-74. 87 Ibid. 72. 88 H. Leisegang, I.e. [see 1] 415-416. 89 KGS XVII733: »Wesentliche Einheit (transscendentale) (In Begriffen, nicht im Verhält nis der Begriffe) ist: 1. Einheit des Principii des Mannigfaltigen (das Wesen ist das prineipium); 2. Einheit der Zusammenstimmung unter einander: essentiae et attributorum; 3. Einheit der Verknüpfung und Zusammensetzung zu einem wesen.« 90 See I. Angelelli: On the Origins of Kant's »Transcendental«, I.e. [see 4] 120; id.: On »Tran scendental« Again, I.e. [see 4] 117. « KGS XVIII340. 92 KGS XVIII341. 93 KGS XVII734. 94 KGS XVII734.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« 111 the manifold is the transcendental truth and it pertains to the power of judgment (»Urtheilskraft«); the connection of the manifold in a whole is the transcenden tal perfection and it concerns the reason.95 This partition led Knittermeyer to argue that Kant modelled his doctrine of transcendentals on the »the structure of the faculty of knowledge in understanding, power of judgment and reason which, in addition to organize the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, rules the entire critical works.«96 Knittermeyer's supposition of a déduction of the logical doc trine to transcendentals97 must, as Hinske argues,98 be discarded. My investigation has set out evidence that this division was présent well be fore 1775-1776, when this annotation was written, and further it comes from concepts within the logical tradition rather than from the doctrine of transcen dentals. Kant's effort was to transform the ontological doctrines in logical no tions, or nonetheless to include ontology in transcendental logic. For Kant at this period, logic takes precedence over metaphysics, as we can see by the fact that the metaphysical truth is grounded on logical truth; and I argue that it is there fore plausible that Kant tried to apply the transcendental doctrines on logic and not vice versa.99

VI. Kant and the Transcendental Perfection

The doctrine of transcendentals is présent also in a sériés of fragments (1775 1781) that Hinske dates according to the occurrence of the concept of transcen dental perfection in the Metaphysik Dohna (1792-1793). In this lecture Kant defines the concept of perfection as following: »in every thing there is also an omnitudo - totality (every thing constitutes a whole).This manifold is the perfec tion or properly a completeness. Our author [Baumgarten] defines it >consensus variorum ad unum.< This définition, however, does not encompass the concept of omnitudo. «10° Hinske is convinced that »this interprétation of transcendental perfection through the concept of omnitudo« - or better of the complété dé termination (determinatio omnimoda)« is »a Kantian autonomous thought.«101 Hinske infers therefore that the fragments and notes that use this concept to de fine perfection are later to all the others in which this concept is absent. Reflex ionen 5744,5746,6386 are therefore antecedent to Reflexionen 3546,4028,4766, 4767,5560,5740,5743,5749,5752,5753,6386,6387. He also adds that this con

«s KGS XVII734. 96 H. Knittermeyer I.e. [see 1] 259-260. »7 Ibid. 259. 98 N. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 73. 99 Leisegang and Knittermeyer, instead, argued that Kantian logic originated from the doc trine of transcedentals, see N. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 72. κ» KGS XXVIII631-632. i°i N. Hinske: Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 61.

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cept of transcendental perfection is »the genetic presupposition to understand ail three transcendental predicates as mode of unity«102 and therefore would date late notes as for instance fragment 4806. Hinske's solution is undoubtedly elegant, but it has two weaknesses. The first is that Kant's concept of »omnimoda determinatio« cornes from Baumgarten and it is not an original Kantian concept (even if he applies it to perfection) and Kant uses it since the writings Optimismus and Beweisgrund. The second is that Hinske's solution does not explain why transcendental perfection conceived as »omnimoda determinatio« must be the basis of the three kinds of unity. It seems to me that the concept of unity lies in the background of ail three transcenden tals, and this has been true since Kant's first metaphysical attempts. The first aspect is to investigate more thoroughly. In the pre-critical period there are references to the »omnimoda determi natio« in the published writings and in the Nachlaß. In the published writings »omnitudo« and »omnimoda determinatio« have a key-role in the examination of the principle of determining reason in the Nova dilucidatio (1756) that in that period was one of the condition of the transcendental truth according to the Wolffian interprétation. The expression »omnitudo realitas« in the sixth propo sition of the second part occurs to explain the existence of God.103 In the seventh proposition of the second part in relation to God, Kant refers to »omnimoda realitatis« as the fullfillment of ail the possible ways of the being of Him.104 The concept of »omnimoda determinatio« occurs again also in the elucidation of the eighths proposition.105 But more interesting is the occurrence of »omnimoda completudo« in the paragraph of the second section devoted to the criticism of Leibniz's principle of indiscernibles which is in turn related to the topic of tran scendental unity and metaphysical unity of Reflexion 3765. In nuce in this note there is a summary of the doctrines on existence and es sence which were better further developed eight years later in the Beweisgrund. According to Kant the traditional principle of indiscernibles would affirm that ail the things that have identical characteristics should be considered one thing and that the différences would be merely their position in space. Kant criticizes this principle because for a perfect identity and unity ail the characteristics, i.e. ail the intrinsic and extrinsic déterminations, must be identical. It is necessarily a complété détermination (»omnimoda completudo«) which also includes the space.106 According to Kant, therefore, they are not identical i.e. they are not a unique being those things that differ from space, even if they have the same in trinsic déterminations. The influence of Crusius and Baumgarten is evident here

102 Ibid. 62. 103 KGS 1394. im KGS 1395. los KGS 1397. ίο« KGS 1409.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« 113 as well. Crusius also defined space as one of the two characteristics of the ex istence. Further Kant refers to Baumgarten's »omnimoda determinatio« which defines existence for the extrinsic déterminations.107 Metaphysical unity is given by the »omnimoda determinatio« or »completudo« and it dénotés a complété reality of the thing. Transcendental unity concerns the possibility of the mere intrinsic déterminations. In Reflexion 4028 (1769-1772), Kant sets out for the first time the relation ship of perfection to »completudo«: »Perfection of a thing respective to a defi nite concept [gewissen Begriff] or [respective to] regarding a concept of thing in général is the completudo rationis. The former is called specifically respective, the latter concerning the completudo rationis is called metaphysical.«108 In this fragment Kant not only relates perfection to »completudo«, but also reaffirms the connection of the latter with »metaphysical. « Already in the Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) Kant defined »relative perfection« as the agreement of the manifold to a determined rule, while the »absolute per fection« as what was in itself the ground of the reality. »Relative perfection« coincides with the définition of »respective« perfection of note 4028, which was also elaborated by Wolff. »Absolute perfection«, instead, matches the défini tion of metaphysical perfection and has a Crusian origin.109 Reflexion 4028 gives evidence that Kant had worked to conciliate transcendental with metaphysi cal perfection already in the Sixties, through the concepts of »completudo« and »omnitudo«. It is possible to find the concept of »omnitudo realitatis« in Reflexion 3812 (1764-1766),110 and in Reflexion 4120 (1769),111 in reference to God, whereas »omnimoda determinatio« appears in Reflexion 4253 (1769).112 In the light of these occurrences of »omnimoda determinatio«, »omnitudo«, and »completudo«, it is not necessary, as Hinske does,113 to give a late date to Re flexion 3546 in which there is the phrase: »perfectio entis in genere est omnitudo realitatis.«114 This leads him also to date all the other fragments that refer to perfection to this later time. Hinske's interprétation dates Reflexion 5739, which uses very early Baumgarten's définition of perfection as »consensus variorum ad unum«, well before the Reflexionen 5734 and 5742 which are, instead, evidently contemporary to it.

107 A.G. Baumgarten: Metaphysica, I.e. [see 55] 42. WS KGS XXVII390. ι09 See Giorgio Tonelli: Element! metodologici e metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768 (Torino 1959) 201. "ο KGS XXVII301. m KGS XXVII424. 112 KGS XXVII482. 113 N. Hinske, Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 61. il" KGS XVII 46.

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Baumgarten's Metaphysica is not only the Kantian source of the concept of »omnimoda determinatio« but it represents also the background for the connec tion between »completudo-omnitudo« and perfection: in particular §§803-862 which deal with the concept of God, and the foundation for Kantian thought. In § 807 a similar expression occurs, which was elaborated by Kant in Reflexion 3546 when he commented the transcendental concept of »perfectum«: »entis perfectissimo convenit omnitudo realitatum.«115 I argue, according to my dating of the fragments, that all the materials on the transcendentals of the tradition in connection with the problem of the »omni moda determinatio« became clear in Kant's mind between 1762 and 1769. This follows his own investigations in Beweisgrund and are related to also the dis tinction between existence and essence, between »logical« and »metaphysical«, which are in the very heart of the concept of »transcendental«.1^

VII. Epistemological Issues in the Concept of »Transcendental«

The use of the concept of »omnitudo« in the fragments on transcendentals of the Seventies affirms a continuity with the problems of the previous decade. How ever, as Hinske has characterized, there is an évolution in the understanding of the transcendentals in relation to the problem of the unity of consciousness.117 The fragments 5743,5745,5749 (1775-1780) are emblematic in this sense. Reflex ion 5743 states that: »to know an object is necessary: 1) the unity of the concept (object) [...]. 2) Multiplicity as détermination of this unity in combination with a consciousness, or truth. 3) totality as multiplicity which is determined through the unity, or perfection.«118 The topic of perfection occurs also in Reflexion 5745, which has various similarities with fragment 4805: »1) The unity of the object through which the manifold is in relation i.e. the concept. Unity of conscious ness. 2) Agreement of the manifold with the object according to the rules, i.e. truth. 3) Connection of all rules to a concept, i.e. principles, i.e. perfection.«119 In fragment 5749, which was composed nearby the final draft of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant wrote: »1) unity of a determinable object. 2) multipli city of déterminations and agreements with the rules of the understanding: for mal (logical) truth. 3) totality of the détermination in a complété concept of an object. Through [the complété concept] we distinguish the thing from what

115 A. G. Baumgarten: Metaphysica, I.e. [see 55] 331. For similar use of the concept see ibid. 338,342-345. ii« For a complété account of Kant's pre-critical metaphysical attempts see M. Sgarbi: Logi ca e metafisica nel Kant precritico. L'ambiente intellettuale di Königsberg e la formazione délia filosofia kantiana (Frankfurt 2010) 65-108. ι·7 Ν. Hinske, Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 62. us KGS XVIII341. ι» KGS XVIII 342.

This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Tue, 28 Jun 2016 13:41:21 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms The Historical Genesis of the Kantian Concept of »Transcendental« 115 is not (»Undinge«). These propositions are subjective and merely logical, and not metaphysical namely objective as déterminations of things.«120 It is in this note that Kant definitively sets up his logical and subjective interprétation of the transcendental in opposition to the objective and metaphysical perspective of the Wolffian tradition. In Reflexion 4767 (1775-1777) Kant defines the three transcendentals not as »transcendentaliter«, but »metaphysice«: »the manifold in a concept can be considered or in relation to a thing in itself or in relation to a thing in général. The metaphysical unity is real (»substantia«, »Ratio«, »Totum«), Metaphysical truth: »respectus ad data si conditiones datae sunt«. Metaphysical completeness (»Vollständigkeit«):»omnitudo realitatis.«121 This fragment reveals once again that the metaphysical aspect of the transcendental does not concern the mere essence, but what détermines in a complété way the object in considération. Metaphysical unity is therefore real and not simply possible, and metaphysi cal perfection is not merely the agreement of the manifold to the »unum«. It is remarkable that Kant used the concept of »Vollständigkeit« instead of »Voll kommenheit« to dénoté the perfection matching the Latin concepts of »comple tudo« and »omnitudo«. In Reflexion 4766 (1775-1777) Kant mentions for the first time that the tran scendentals are in relation to the four kinds of catégories. He writes: »unity (combination) (agreement), truth (quality), completeness (quantity).«122 This fragment was the basis for a further élaboration of later notes, which Erich Adickes dates between 1780 to 1789, but that are more probably traceable to period of the composition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1776-1780). These fragments are 5734,5739, and 5742. Specifically the incipit of Reflexion 5734 pré supposés the fragments 4766 and 4807, therefore it must be late123 and the cen tral part takes back directly Reflexion 4807. In this fragment Kant conceived the transcendental by means of the catégories of modality.This led many scholars to hypothesize that the catégories of modality were born from an accurate inves tigation of the transcendentals.124 Hinske correctly states this to be unlikely.125 In fragment 5739 Kant referred to the three modalities following Baumgarten's définition of transcendentals; thus the »unum« coïncides with possibility, the

120 KGS XVIII 342-343. 121 KGS XVII722. 122 KGS XVII722. 123 KGS XVIII339-340: »Einheit, Warheit und Vollständigkeit (transscendentale Vollkom menheit) sind die requisita ieder Erkentnis [die] respective auf Verstand, Urtheilskraft und Ver nunft (zur letzteren wird apodictische Gewisheit erfodert.d.i. vollständige Warheit). Alles abge leitet aus Einem. Alles verbunden in Einem. Das eine abgeleitet aus allem. Einheit des Subiects (Möglichkeit), des Grundes (Wirklichkeit) und des Ganzen (Nothwendigkeit). Es sind drey transscendentale criterien der Möglichkeit der Dinge überhaupt. Dreifache formale Einheit.« 12* H. Knittermeyer, I.e. [see 1] 259. 125 N. Hinske, Kants Weg, I.e. [see 1] 73.

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»verum« with reaiity, and the »bonum« with necessity.126 This coupling occurs also in § 12 of the second édition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and therefore it is possible to give a late dating of this fragment even if its strict relation with Reflexion 5734 suggests a composition between 1776 and 1780. Also the frag ment 5742 should be contemporary to the 5734 and 5739: »the unity of agree ment: possibility; the unity of combination: reaiity; the unity of déduction: neces sity. The three requisita of a définition corne from the formal unity namely from the evidence, because it is logical.«127 Fragments 5739 and 5742 are probably mere explanation of the Reflexion 5734, which deals with a threefold modality of possibility and a threefold formal unity. Reflexion 5562 is a further attempt to apply transcendentals to the threefold aspect of the modality.128 In this fragment the transcendental explains the unity of knowledge in the consciousness. For the first time the three modal catégories, which are determined by transcendentals, are related to the judgments of modality of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. This led Leisegang to argue that the judgments of modality came from the analysis of the transcendentals.129

VIII. Conclusion

My investigation of the genesis of the concept of »transcendental« in Kant has led to the following conclusions. The doctrine of transcendentals was very much alive in Königsberg and already in Calov the »transcendentals« shifted its inter est from being to the knowable, from ontology to logic. However, in the current state of research, it is impossible to détermine a real influence of the Schul philosophie on Kant in the doctrine of transcendentals. We are sure that up to 1763, Kant accepts the Wolffian doctrine of transcen dentals and the concept of »transcendental« is synonymous to »metaphysical«. Kant does not yet have a real understanding of Baumgarten's Metaphysica. Hinske therefore is right to trace Kant's first approach to transcendentals back to Wolffian writings.

126 KGS XVIII 341: »consensus unius ad varia, variorum inter se, variorum ad unum. Die drey criterien der innern Möglichkeit eines* Dinges.* (Gedankendinges z.E. Hypothese: unum, Möglichkeit; verum, Wirklichkeit; bonum, Nothwendigkeit).« KGS XVIII341. 128 KGS XVIII234: »Die transscendentalen Begriffe gehen auf die Beziehung einer Menge Vorstellungen auf ein obiect. 1. Einheit des Bewustseyns von Etwas; 2, Verbindung der Vorstel lungen unter einander in einem Bewustseyn; 3. die daraus entspringende Vorstellung des obiects. Die drey Begriffe der Möglichkeit eines Dinges [als] überhaupt: Einheit, Warheit und Vollkom menheit beziehen sich auf die drey formale Grundsatze aller Urtheile: den des Wiederspruchs, des zureichenden Grundes und der Bestimmbarkeit desselben in Ansehung aller möglichen Praedicaten (judicia categorica, hypothetica et disjunctiva).« 129 H. Leisegang, I.e. [see 1] 416.

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In the second half of the Sixties, probably in the wake of the preparatory works to the Beweisgrund, Kant goes deeply into the interprétation of Baumgar ten and the »transcendental« becomes synonymous with »essential« in opposi tion to »metaphysical«. In the wake of Crusius' reflections, instead, »transcen dental» becomes »logical« in contrast with »metaphysical«. Beginning in the Seventies, in the preparatory fragments to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, the »transcendental« establishes itself as a synonymous of »logi cal« and »essential« in opposition to »metaphysical« and »real«, and it concerns the object of knowledge in général without any reference to the experience. From this conception dérivés the concept of »transcendental« of the Einleitung of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft as an examination of the condition of the pos sibility of an a priori knowledge.130 My investigation shows that Kant did not deduce the doctrine of transcen dentals from his logic, but that both doctrines are developed simultaneously and that Kant always tried to integrate them with each other. Fragments of the se cond half of the Seventies show a progressive attempt of this intégration, which was doomed to fail. In the light of this failure we have to reinterpret § 12 of the second édition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft,131

130 KGS III 43, A 11-12/B 25. See Tilmann Pinder: Kants Begriff der transzendentalen Er kenntnis. Zur Interpretation der Definition des Begriffs »transzendental« in der Einleitung zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft (All f./B 25). In: Kant-Studien 77 (1986) 1-40. 131 On § 12 see M. Sgarbi, I.e. [see 116] 136-140.

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