I. General Subject Matter Jurisdiction 11. General Personal Jurisdiction of Wa~Hington

I. General Subject Matter Jurisdiction The term "general jurisdiction" has at least two different meanings. In the context of subject matter jurisdiction, general jurisdiction means that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any kind of case except those cases that are expressly excluded, or cases over which some other court has exclusive jurisdiction.' "General subject matter jurisdiction" is the opposite of "limited jurisdiction." The latter term means that the court can hear only those cases that it has been expressly empowered to hear. The Kansas district courts, thus, are courts of general subject matter jurisdiction. 'The federal district courts, on the other hand, are courts of limited jurisdiction. A Kansas district court would have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit between a citizen of Japan against a citizen of Saudi Arabia concerning a tort committed in Bra- zil. A federal court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over such a case, however, because federal courts are not empowered to entertain a suit between two aliens that does not arise out of federal law (except for some admiralty claims). A Kansas district court could not actually entertain such a case, however, unless it also had "personal jurisdiction" over the defendant. That would probably be impossible in the hy- pothetical case, unless the Saudi Arabian defendant consented to jurisdiction in Kansas, or had very extensive "presence" in Kansas. In other words, the defendant would have to be subject to what we now call "general personal jurisdiction" in Kansas.

11. General Personal Jurisdiction The term "general personal jurisdiction" is of fairly recent origin. Its usage began with a highly influential article by pro- fessors Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman in 1966.' "General jurisdiction," in this sense, means personal jurisdiction to entertain a suit against a defendant that does not arise from the defendant's connection with the forum state. It is contrasted to "specific jurisdiction," which would support a suit against the defendant only if the cause of action arose from the defendant's contact with the forum state. Before the landmark decision in International Shoe v. State of Wa~hington,~the distinction between what we now call specific and general personal jurisdiction was not part of our general theory of jurisdiction. Under the territorial power theory of jurisdiction reflected in Pennoyer v. NeS4 personal jurisdiction meant general jurisdiction. Only three bases for personal jurisdiction were possible: consent, domicile, or physical presence. 'The state of the defendant's domicile or residence could exercise jurisdiction over him or her for any cause of action. Likewise if the defendant consented to jurisdiction, or if the defendant could be found by a process server (continued on next page)

FO( 1. st ,e ROBERT( URISDICTIC)N AND FOI. ed., 3 :01 (1999). 7 A .A T.....+-"* rthut T. vor, ,v,L,,LL,, a,,u ,,,,a,una--u ,. r te: A Suggej 26 U.S. 31( 5 U.S. 714

3URNAL OF THE K;4NSAS BAR ASSOCIATION APRIL 2007 - 27 LEGAL ARTICLE: GENERAL JURISDIC 'TION... I while physically present in the state, he source of the cause of action. If the de- as permissible bases for jurisdiction, re- or she could be sued, there regardless of fendant had substantial contact with the quired the exercise of some legal fiction. where the cause of action arose. state and the cause of action arose from If the corporation was chartered by that Some special statutes, the nonresident that contact, the Court said, jurisdiction state, it could be considered a domicili- motorist statutes, could provide personal has always been upheld. On the other ary, and thus subject to jurisdiction on jurisdiction over a nonconsenting non- hand, if the defendant had only slight that basis. If a foreign corporation con- resident even without personal service contact with the state and the cause of sented to jurisdiction, then it could be in the state for causes of action arising action did not arise from that contact, subject to jurisdiction on that basis. If from the operation of a motor vehicle jurisdiction has always been denied. the foreign corporation did not consent, in the state.5 Widespread recognition of But where the cause of action arose however, the only other permissible ba- the distinction between what we now from the defendant's in-state contact, sis was physical presence. But a corpo- call general and specific personal juris- even if the defendant had only limited ration, unlike an individual human, has diction really began with International contact with the state, jurisdiction had no physical body. Where can a corpo- Shoe. There, in attempting to determine sometimes been upheld and sometimes ration be physically present? To resolve the limits on state court jurisdiction im- not. And where the defendant's contacts this problem, state legislatures enacted posed by the 14th Amendment's due with the state were substantial, continu- statutes requiring all foreign corpora- process clause, the U.S. Supreme Court ous and systematic, jurisdiction was tions "doing business" in the state to adopted the current "minimum contacts" sometimes upheld even if the cause of formally qualify. As part of the qualifi- test as a limit on a state court's ability to action did not arise from the defendant's cation process, the corporation was re- subject a defendant to its authority. In contact with the state. This fourth cate- quired to designate some agent within the course of the majority opinion, the gory is what von Mehren and Trautman the state who would be authorized to Court re-examined a great many prior used the term "general jurisdiction" to receive service of process on the corpo- decisions dealing with due process and describe. ration's behalf. Some states, including personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. In analyzing cases falling in these two Kansas,' also required the corporations The opinion organized those older cases indefinite categories, the courts were to consent to jurisdiction based on into four categories. The distinction be- directed to weigh and balance several service of process on some designated tween the categories turned on two fac- factors to determine whether the defen- public official, usually the secretary of tors: the extent of the defendant's con- dant's contacts satisfied the "minimum" state. The fact that the "consent" thus tact with the state and the geographical necessary for "specific jurisdiction" or obtained was not really a product of the whether they were sufficiently "substan- corporation's own decision did not seem tial, systematic, and continuous" to sat- to trouble anyone. isfy the constitutional standard for "gen- A foreign corporation could not avoid eral juri~diction."~ jurisdiction by simply refusing or failing to qualify. Other statutes treated the cor- 111. Doing Business Statutes poration's activity in "doing business" in the state as manifesting the corporation's In most of the cases the Supreme "presence" there. Such statutes permit- Court looked at in framing its deci- ted the exercise of jurisdiction over such sion in International Shoe, the ostensible nonqualifying foreign corporations by question the courts were looking at was service in the state on some designated of- whether the defendant's activity in the ficial or agent. Usually these "doing busi- state constituted "doing business" under ness" statutes did not limit jurisdiction statutes designed to permit the exercise to cases arising from the corporation's of jurisdiction over foreign corporations in-state activity. doing business in the state. These "doing Our current Kansas statutes authoriz- business" statutes were enacted at a time ing jurisdiction over qualifying corpora- when Pennoyer power theory of jurisdic- tions8 do not expressly limit jurisdiction tion prevailed. to causes of action arising within the Fitting jurisdiction over corporations state, and the Kansas Supreme Court into that theory, which recognized only has now held that they are not so consent, domicile, or physical presence

ere interstate judici:11 system's i~nterest in ol btaining the rnost efficient resoluticIn of contrsoversies, 6. In World- Wzde Elkswagen v. 44 and (5) the shal.ed interest:; of all statc:s in ad- .", 8 8 . I. U.S. 286, 292 note 10, (1 980), tne >upreme. vanclng-..- tundamental substantrve pol~c~PT Court listed five interests to consider: (1) the 7. I<.S.A 17-7301; K.S.A 40-21 8 (ir burden on the defendant, (2) forum's inter.est coml in adjudicating the case, (3) plaintiffs inter.est 8. 1 in obtaining convenient and effective relief, ,,,(A\

28-APRIL2007 THEJOURNAL OF THE IC4NSAS BAR ASSOClATION LEGAL ARTICLE: GENERAL JURISDICTION... I limited.9 Our statute authorizing juris- and ongoing, could not be "doing busi- of the plaintiff and the defendant, the in- diction over nonqualifying corporations ness."" Cases had held that extending terest of overall litigational convenience, expressly states that it is not limited to a state's jurisdiction over a foreign cor- the interests of the states involved, etc. causes of action that arise within the poration in such mere solicitation cases It would be unfair to subject a defen- state. It applies to any cause of action would be a denial of due process of law. dant to jurisdiction in a state where the that arose while the corporation was do- The issue actually argued in the In- defendant had no contact. There had to ing business here, i.e. a cause of action ternationdl Shoe case was whether the be at least a "minimum" of contact or it that arose while the corporation was corporation's activity in the state of would be a denial of due process. De- "present" in the state.'' So corporations, Washington constituted "doing busi- fining that minimum required the inter- domestic or foreign, qualifying or non- ness" under the Washington statute and est balancing referred to above. If the qualifying were subject to general per- if so, whether it would be a denial of due cause of action arose from the contact, sonal jurisdiction in Kansas if they were process to extend that state's jurisdiction a single transaction might be enough, "doing business" here. over a corporation whose activity in the even if that contact was solicitation for There have been many judicial deci- state was solicitation for interstate com- interstate commerce. If the cause of ac- sions concerning the meaning of "doing merce. The Court's solution to the prob- tion did not arise from the defendant's business" in these statutes. Precise defi- lem was to strip away the legal fictions of in-state contact, however, much more nition of the term was not possible, but "consent" and "presence" and to frame connection between the defendant and one thing was clear: "doing business" re- a new theory of jurisdiction. The foun- the state was required. The Court noted quired some systematic, ongoing, busi- dation of jurisdiction is not the state's that if the defendant's contact was sub- ness activity by the corporation's agents coercive power, as had previously been stantial, systematic, and continuous, it in the state. A single transaction was not believed, but "fundamental fairness." would not necessarily be a denial of due "doing business," even if the cause of ac- To determine whether it is fair for a process to subject that defendant to the tion arose from that transaction. More- state to exercise jurisdiction in a given state's jurisdiction even if the cause of over, mere solicitation of business for case, a court must look at the interests action did not arise in the state. The Su- interstate commerce, even if continuous that are at stake in the issue: the interests preme Court, thus, declared that what

9. n/letriman v. Cmmpton ICTION IN ' decide,d Nov. 9, 21 DOG. See dis ed., 432- 10. K;.S.A 17-7307(c).

THEJOURNAL OF THE MSASBAR ASSOCUTION APRIL 2007 - 29 I LEGAL ARTICLE: GENERAL JURISDICTION ... I we now call general personal jurisdic- The Kansas statute was still phrased statute (and still today) was "transaction tion over nonconsenting nonresidents in terms that would be consistent with of any business." This did not mean the could be con~titutional.'~ the older coercive power theory of ju- same thing as "doing business" under risdiction. It declared that persons who the older statutes. Ongoing activity was N. The Lonc-Arm Statutes did any of the enumerated acts thereby required for "doing business," but "trans- "submitted" the person; and if the per- action of business" could be a single act. The somewhat delayed reaction of son was an individual, the individual's The long-arm statute specifically de- the states to the International Shoe de- personal representative, to jurisdiction clared, "Nothing declared in this section cision was to enact some new statutes for any cause of action arising from the limits or affects the right to serve any authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction doing of the acts. The basis for jurisdic- process by any other manner provided over nonconsenting nonresidents even tion was thus described in terms of con- by law."'"us, it left unimpaired the if they were not found in the state by sent (submission): a fictitious implied right to serve process on foreign corpo- a process server. Theses statutes, autho- consent. rations under the older "doing business" rized service of a state court's process In describing the effect of service out- statutes. The long-arm statute applied to be made outside the state in certain side the state, the statute declared that if to corporations as well as to individu- circumstances. These statutes started ap- such service was made "upon a person als, so two different methods of serving pearing in the middle 1950s, nearly 10 domiciled in this state or upon a person process on foreign corporations were years after International Shoe. Our Kan- who has submitted to the jurisdiction available in some cases. They could be sas "long-arm statute" was first adopted of the courts of this state, it shall have served out-of-state under the long-arm in 1963, 18 years after International the force and effect of service of process statute if the case arose from one of the Shoe. The statute authorized the exercise within this state; otherwise it shall have now 11 enumerated acts, or they could of specific personal jurisdiction over de- the force and effect of service by publi- be served in the state in accordance with fendants that might have only a single cation."'* The statute thus kept alive the the "doing business" statutes. contact with Kansas in six specifically language of the older theory: presence, Although the long-arm statute was ex- described types of cases.13 Process could consent, and domicile were the permis- pressly limited to cases of specific juris- be served on the defendant outside the sible bases, but the consent was implied diction, where the cause of action arose state in such cases. from the doing of the acts. from the enumerated act, the "doing The reference to the distinction be- business" statutes, as we have seen, were tween effect of service of process with- not limited to specific jurisdiction cases. in the state and service of publication In a proper case, they would permit the Mediation meant merely that the service would exercise of general jurisdiction over the Kansas & Missouri authorize in personam jurisdiction over corporation for a cause of action that domiciliaries or persons who had sub- did not arise within the state. A plain- mitted to jurisdiction, but in any other tiff might obtain general jurisdiction situation it would allow only in rem ju- over a corporation by service inside the Choose risdiction over any property the defen- state under the doing business statutes, dant might have within the state. At that but such jurisdiction could not be ob- Experience time lawyers and judges did not analyze tained by service of process outside the the basis element of jurisdiction and the state under the long-arm statute. This process of invoking it separately as we presented an anomaly. If the corpora- do today. The two concepts were com- tion was subject to general jurisdiction mingled. Scarcely anyone believed in in the state, why should it make any dif- E. Dudley Smith 1963 that inpersonam jurisdiction could ference how the process was served?7he be obtained by publication service, but problem was made more difficult than we now know that in personam jurisdic- necessary by a line of cases, mostly by Over 40 Years Litigation/Trial Experience tion can constitutionally be obtained Kansas federal courts, which took the Listed in "Best Lawyers in America" that way if no address for the defendant position that the Kansas long-arm stat- to which mail can be sent is discoverable ute extended jurisdiction to the outer Licensed in Kansas and Missouri with reasonable diligence. l5 limits of due process, and, accordingly, One of the acts that could lead to spe- that the only question in long-arm cases cific jurisdiction under the original 1963 was the constitutional one.I7 (913) 339-6757 339-6187 (FAX) vkins v. Ben guet Minin) 437 (1952 1. . K.S.A. 60-308(d). 13. The fi~rst statute, L. 1963, ck . See, e,g., Luc v. [&use 51 LorPorate Woods, Suite 300 authorized spec~hcjurlsdlct~on tor cases arl: p. 2d 1282 (D. Kan. 20v.3); (,ole Co. 33 E Supp 9393 West 110th Street out of the c:onduct de

? 30 - APRIL 2007 THEJOURNAL OF THE K;4NSAS BAR ASSOCIATION LEGRC ARTICLE: GENERAL IURISDZCTION ... I "one-step" approach derives over that party; otherwise it shall provide Thus, K.S.A 60-308(b)(l) authorizes from some language in an early Kan- in rem jurisdiction over specifcally identi- specific jurisdiction for purposes of sas Supreme Court decision.'' This ap- jed property that person may have in the causes of action arising from the enu- proach ignores the specific terms of the state." The italicized portion replaces the merated contacts with the state. K.S.A. long-arm statute. The Kansas Supreme following language in the previous sec- 60-308(b)(2) authorizes general juris- Court, in Kluin v. American Suzuki Mo- tion: "it shall have the force and effect of diction for causes of action not arising tor Corp.I9 denounced the "one-step" service of process within this state; oth- within the state if the defendant has approach. In the course of the opinion, erwise it shall have the force and effect substantial, continuous, and systematic the court noted that the statute does not of service by publication." The change contact with the state. extend jurisdiction to the limits of due was needed to bring the statutory lan- K.S.A. 60-308(c) preserves the right process. Due process would allow the guage up to contemporary jurisdictional to serve process in any other manner exercise of general jurisdiction, whereas usage. The older language was that of provided by law, specifically referring our long-arm statute is expressly lim- the "power theory" of Pennoyer, which to K.S.A. 17-7301 (service on qualify- ited to specific jurisdiction cases. What required personal service in the state for ing foreign corporations generally), 17- the court in the earlier case meant was personal jurisdiction over nonconsent- 7307 (service on nonqualifying foreign simply that the terms of the long-arm ing nonresidents. What the statute re- corporations) and 40-2 18 (service on statute are to be broadly interpreted, not ally meant was that out-of-state service foreign insurance companies). that those terms were to be ignored. could provide personal jurisdiction over The statute as enacted contains an un- The Court in the Kluin case noted residents and also nonresidents in cer- intended anomaly. It allows for specific that general jurisdiction might be avail- tain circumstances. The "circumstances" jurisdiction over parties whose in-state able under one of the "doing business" were defined in subsection (b), but the contact gives rise to one of the causes statutes, but not under the long-arm statute retained the older explanation, of action enumerated in 60-308(b)(l). statute. Nevertheless, some courts, fo- casting the circumstances in the lan- It allows general jurisdiction for causes cusing on the statement in Kluin that guage of constructive consent. The new of action that did not arise in the state the long-arm statute does not authorize statute retains the constructive consent if the defendant has substantial, con- general jurisdiction, took the position language but eliminates the unnecessary that Kansas does not recognize general reference to "service within the state." jurisdiction at That position con- Similarly, the older reference to the flicted with the cases that had upheld effect of service on one who had not LAW OFFICES OF general jurisdiction under the "doing "submitted" was expressed in terms business" statutes." of "service by publication." In 1963, SPETH& KING To resolve these conflicts and to elimi- hardly anyone would have believed that @ Suite 230 R.H. Garvey Bldg. nate the anomaly ~osedby making the service by publication could have pro- 300 West Douglas availability of general jurisdiction de- duced anything but in rem jurisdiction Wichita, KS 67202 pend on whether process was served in over Kansas-based property in the case e-mail: [email protected] the state or outside the state, the Kansas of nonresidents. The present language Judicial Council recommended a change simply eliminates the unnecessary refer- 35% in the long-arm statute that would ex- ence to service by publication. + Referral Fees pressly authorize general jurisdiction in K.S.A. 60-308(b)(b) is now divided cases where that would be consistent into subsections. Subsection (1) retains + All Expenses Advanced with the 14th Amendment due process all of the references to specific acts that clause.- The resulting statute became can subject a nonresident to specific + Settlements or Trial ve July 1, 2006. As enacted it is jurisdiction. Subsection (2) is new and hat different from the Judicial provides as follows: 'X person may be :il's version." considered to have submitted to the ju- + All types and sizes R.>.A. 60-308(a)(I) was amended to risdiction of the courts of this state for of cases read,: "Service of process may be made a cause of action, which did not arise on any party outside the state. If upon a in this state if substantial, continuous + Proven track record nerrt Y"'""" 3~ domiciled in this state or upon a and systematic contact with the state is of success person I who has submitted to the juris- established that would support jurisdic- dictio~I of the courts of this state, such tion consistent with the Constitution of PERSONAL INJURY service shall provide personal jurisdiction the U.S. and of this state." + Hall. 200 1Can. 597,6 WRONGFUL DEATH zaha Ins. G --- 274 Kan. 888, 568 IJ.Ld8LY (LOO 29 Kan. App. 2d 526, 28 P.3d luf~j,rev. de- See, e.g., the Court of Appeals nied, 272 K :an. 1419 (. (316) 264-3333 orriman v. C7rompton Cop, 133 I? 22. L. 20(16, ch. 49. + lblished in Kan. App. 2d) (2005 1-800-266-3345

THEJOURNAL OF THE KANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION APRIL 2007 - 3 1 LEGAL ARTICLE: GENERALJURISDICTION ... ' tinuous, and systematic contact with terclaims) declares that "[a] pleading A person may be considered to the state. But what iE the defendant has may state as a counterclaim any claim have submitted to the jurisdic- substantial, continuous, and systematic against an opposing party not arising out tion of the courts of this state if contact and the cause of action arose of the same transaction," etc. But what substantial, continuous and sys- within the state, but not from one of the of a claim that does arise out of the same tematic contact with this state is enumerated causes?The statute seems to transaction but is not a compulsory established that would support exclude jurisdiction in such a case, but counterclaim? A strict reading of the text jurisdiction consistent with the that result would be make no sense. This would indicate that such a claim would Constitution of the United States anomaly was not a part of the statute as neither be compulsory since it falls with- and of this state, whether or not proposed by the Judicial Council. in one of the exceptions to Rule 13(a), the cause of action arose in this Most courts would probably construe nor would it be permissive, since it does state. the statute to avoid the anomaly if a case arise out of the same transaction. That like the one last suggested should arise. result, however, would make no sense, That is the way courts have treated a so most courts have ruled that such V. Merriman v. Crompton Corp. similar anomaly in Rules 13(a) and (b) counterclaims are permissive, despite On Nov. 9, 2006, the Kansas Su- of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the language of Rule 13(b) . preme Court announced its decision which also appears in K.S.A. 60-213(a) Following that approach, courts in Merriman v. Crompton Carp." The and (b). Under Rule 13(a) (compulsory should rule that jurisdiction should be case was a class action brought against counterclaims), a pleader must plead proper over any party that has the con- several defendants alleging a conspiracy as a counterclaim any claim that it has stitutionally requisite substantial con- to fix prices on some chemicals used in against an opposing party that arose out nection to Kansas, regardless of where the production of automobile tires. The of the same transaction as the opposing the cause of action arose. However, to petition sought damages, attorneys' fees party's claim. There are, however, a few be safe, the Legislature might consider and other relief under the Kansas Re- exceptions, where counterclaims arising amending K.S.A. 60-308(b) (2) to read straint ofTrade All the defendants out of the same transaction are not com- as follows: were foreign corporations. The alleged pulsory. Rule 13(b) (permissive coun- price fixing conspiracy was formed out-

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32 - APRIL 2007 THEJO URNAL OF THE KANSAS BAR ASSOCUTION - LEGAL ARTICLE: GENERAL TURISDICTION ... side of Kansas. The class representative plaintiff bought two the plaintiff had to pay an inflated price for the two tires. The I tires in Kansas at a price that was alleged to be inflated due to tires were not manufactured in Kansas, but they entered Kan- the price-fixing conspiracy. sas through the stream of commerce, and the Court found I Some of the defendant corporations were qualified to do that the defendant that manufactured them had sufficiently I business in Kansas and were served in accordance with K.S.A. directed that commerce to Kansas to satisfy even the more re- 17-7301. Some were not qualified but were nevertheless do- strictive view of the "stream of commerce" theory of purpose- ing business here, and they were served in accordance with ful a~ailment.'~ K.S.A. 17-7307(c). Others were served outside the state un- Although only that one defendant had contact with Kansas der K.S.A. 60-308. that would satisfy the long-arm statute, the Court ruled that the The defendants objected to personal jurisdiction on the contact of that defendant in pursuance of the conspiracy could ground that they lacked sufficient contact with Kansas to be be imputed to the other co-conspirators. The Court found that subject to jurisdiction here. The trial court and the Court of such exercise of specific jurisdiction was constitutional. Appeals agreed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. So now, the combination of subsection (b)(2) of the new The Court of Appeals opinion ruled that since the cause of long-arm statute and the Merriman case, which clarifies the action did not arise from any contact with the state, the Kan- availability of general jurisdiction under the "doing business" sas long-arm statute did not authorize jurisdiction. Plaintiff statutes make it very clear that Kansas does authorize general argued that K.S.A.17-7301 and 17-7307(c) authorized gen- personal jurisdiction. w eral jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals rejected that con- tention, declaring that Kansas law did not authorize general About the Author I jurisdiction. Robert C, Casad is thejohn H. andjohn M, Kane Profisor The Kansas Supreme Court granted a petition for review of Law Emeritus at the University of Kansas, where he taught and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. In a very thor- for more than 37 years, mostly in the areas of civil procedure, ough opinion by Justice Marla J. Luckert, the Supreme Court federal courts, and conflct of laws. A native Kansan, he holds unanimously ruled that both K.S.A. 17-7301 and 17-7307 B.A. and M.A. degrees fFom the University of Kansas; his D. (c) do authorize general jurisdiction. The Court then decided degree fFom the University of Michigan, and S' D. degree fiom that the exercise of general jurisdiction in the case did not Harvard University. offend due process of law. The qualifying defendants had expressly consented to jurisdiction, and so no further examina- tion of the scope of their in-state activity was necessary to sat- DO7 Robert L. Gernon Award isfy due process. In the case of the non-qualifying defendants, for vu~atandingService to Continuing I the Court had to look further to determine whether their Educ;ation in contacts with the state were sufficiently substantial to satisfy the constitutional standard for general jurisdiction. Quoting In 2005 the Kansas CLE Commission established the Wright and Miller's "Federal Practice and Procedure," the Robert L. Gernon Award for Outstanding Service to Con- Court stated the test as follows: tinuing Legal Education in Kansas. 'The award is named for Kansas Supreme Court Justice Robert L. Gernon In order for general jurisdiction to lie, a foreign corpo- (1943-2005), whose career included tireless devotion to ration must have a substantial amount of contacts with the training, education, and prc ism of at torneys the forum state. In assessing contacts with a forum, in Kansas and across the nation. courts consider (1) whether the corporation solicits Any organization or attorney mar nas oeenI Instrumen- business in the state through a local office or agents; (2) tal in providing quality continuing legal education to whether the corporation sends agents into the state on a the attorneys in Kansas is eligible to receive the award. regular basis to solicit business; (3) the extent to which Consideration will be given to nominees who have a re- the corporation holds itself out as doing business in the cord of demonstrated excellen ~d comn~itment forum state, through advertisements, listings, or bank to continuing legal education I d includ ing the accounts; and (4) the volume of business conducted in 2006-2007 compliance period. the state by the c~rporation.~~ The award recipient must have aemonstrarea a unlque commitment to continuing legal education in Kansas. The Court found that only one of the nonqualifying corpo- Outstanding service to continuing legal education as a rations had sufficient contact to satisfy that standard. presenter, writer, or speaker are among the factors that will The Court nevertheless upheld specific jurisdiction over the be considered in the selection process. other defendants who were served under the long-arm statute. 'The Kansas Continuing Legal Educati mission 7he Court ruled that price-fixing was a "tortious act" within will select an award recipient and will notlry me person, the me aning of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2). Although the conspiracy or or!;anizatio~ 1, in writ ing. 'The presentat ion of thc award may ha we been formed outside the state, the tort occurs where will Ile deternnined by the connmission and the award recipi ent. the inj ury is incurred. The injury occurred in Kansas when . For lllU1C 1 IILOZIII~LIVII 011 LIIC IIVIIIII~~~IVI~process, MILLERFE CTICE AND please: visit th e Kansz; CLE Commission Web site at 987). m. The no mination package must be post- Crornpton I

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