I. General Subject Matter Jurisdiction 11. General Personal Jurisdiction of Wa~Hington
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I. General Subject Matter Jurisdiction The term "general jurisdiction" has at least two different meanings. In the context of subject matter jurisdiction, gen- eral jurisdiction means that the court has subject matter ju- risdiction over any kind of case except those cases that are expressly excluded, or cases over which some other court has exclusive jurisdiction.' "General subject matter jurisdiction" is the opposite of "limited jurisdiction." The latter term means that the court can hear only those cases that it has been ex- pressly empowered to hear. The Kansas district courts, thus, are courts of general subject matter jurisdiction. 'The federal district courts, on the other hand, are courts of limited juris- diction. A Kansas district court would have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit between a citizen of Japan against a citizen of Saudi Arabia concerning a tort committed in Bra- zil. A federal court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over such a case, however, because federal courts are not em- powered to entertain a suit between two aliens that does not arise out of federal law (except for some admiralty claims). A Kansas district court could not actually entertain such a case, however, unless it also had "personal jurisdiction" over the defendant. That would probably be impossible in the hy- pothetical case, unless the Saudi Arabian defendant consent- ed to jurisdiction in Kansas, or had very extensive "presence" in Kansas. In other words, the defendant would have to be subject to what we now call "general personal jurisdiction" in Kansas. 11. General Personal Jurisdiction The term "general personal jurisdiction" is of fairly recent origin. Its usage began with a highly influential article by pro- fessors Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman in 1966.' "General jurisdiction," in this sense, means personal jurisdiction to entertain a suit against a defendant that does not arise from the defendant's connection with the forum state. It is contrasted to "specific jurisdiction," which would support a suit against the defendant only if the cause of ac- tion arose from the defendant's contact with the forum state. Before the landmark decision in International Shoe v. State of Wa~hington,~the distinction between what we now call spe- cific and general personal jurisdiction was not part of our general theory of jurisdiction. Under the territorial power theory of jurisdiction reflected in Pennoyer v. NeS4 personal jurisdiction meant general jurisdiction. Only three bases for personal jurisdiction were possible: consent, domicile, or physical presence. 'The state of the defendant's domicile or residence could exercise jurisdiction over him or her for any cause of action. Likewise if the defendant consented to juris- diction, or if the defendant could be found by a process server (continued on next page) FO( 1. st ,e ROBERT( URISDICTIC)N AND FOI. ed., 3 :01 (1999). 7 A .A T.....+-"* rthut T. vor, ,v,L,,LL,, a,,u ,,,,a,una--u ,. r te: A Suggej 26 U.S. 31( 5 U.S. 714 3URNAL OF THE K;4NSAS BAR ASSOCIATION APRIL 2007 - 27 LEGAL ARTICLE: GENERAL JURISDIC 'TION... I while physically present in the state, he source of the cause of action. If the de- as permissible bases for jurisdiction, re- or she could be sued, there regardless of fendant had substantial contact with the quired the exercise of some legal fiction. where the cause of action arose. state and the cause of action arose from If the corporation was chartered by that Some special statutes, the nonresident that contact, the Court said, jurisdiction state, it could be considered a domicili- motorist statutes, could provide personal has always been upheld. On the other ary, and thus subject to jurisdiction on jurisdiction over a nonconsenting non- hand, if the defendant had only slight that basis. If a foreign corporation con- resident even without personal service contact with the state and the cause of sented to jurisdiction, then it could be in the state for causes of action arising action did not arise from that contact, subject to jurisdiction on that basis. If from the operation of a motor vehicle jurisdiction has always been denied. the foreign corporation did not consent, in the state.5 Widespread recognition of But where the cause of action arose however, the only other permissible ba- the distinction between what we now from the defendant's in-state contact, sis was physical presence. But a corpo- call general and specific personal juris- even if the defendant had only limited ration, unlike an individual human, has diction really began with International contact with the state, jurisdiction had no physical body. Where can a corpo- Shoe. There, in attempting to determine sometimes been upheld and sometimes ration be physically present? To resolve the limits on state court jurisdiction im- not. And where the defendant's contacts this problem, state legislatures enacted posed by the 14th Amendment's due with the state were substantial, continu- statutes requiring all foreign corpora- process clause, the U.S. Supreme Court ous and systematic, jurisdiction was tions "doing business" in the state to adopted the current "minimum contacts" sometimes upheld even if the cause of formally qualify. As part of the qualifi- test as a limit on a state court's ability to action did not arise from the defendant's cation process, the corporation was re- subject a defendant to its authority. In contact with the state. This fourth cate- quired to designate some agent within the course of the majority opinion, the gory is what von Mehren and Trautman the state who would be authorized to Court re-examined a great many prior used the term "general jurisdiction" to receive service of process on the corpo- decisions dealing with due process and describe. ration's behalf. Some states, including personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. In analyzing cases falling in these two Kansas,' also required the corporations The opinion organized those older cases indefinite categories, the courts were to consent to jurisdiction based on into four categories. The distinction be- directed to weigh and balance several service of process on some designated tween the categories turned on two fac- factors to determine whether the defen- public official, usually the secretary of tors: the extent of the defendant's con- dant's contacts satisfied the "minimum" state. The fact that the "consent" thus tact with the state and the geographical necessary for "specific jurisdiction" or obtained was not really a product of the whether they were sufficiently "substan- corporation's own decision did not seem tial, systematic, and continuous" to sat- to trouble anyone. isfy the constitutional standard for "gen- A foreign corporation could not avoid eral juri~diction."~ jurisdiction by simply refusing or failing to qualify. Other statutes treated the cor- 111. Doing Business Statutes poration's activity in "doing business" in the state as manifesting the corporation's In most of the cases the Supreme "presence" there. Such statutes permit- Court looked at in framing its deci- ted the exercise of jurisdiction over such sion in International Shoe, the ostensible nonqualifying foreign corporations by question the courts were looking at was service in the state on some designated of- whether the defendant's activity in the ficial or agent. Usually these "doing busi- state constituted "doing business" under ness" statutes did not limit jurisdiction statutes designed to permit the exercise to cases arising from the corporation's of jurisdiction over foreign corporations in-state activity. doing business in the state. These "doing Our current Kansas statutes authoriz- business" statutes were enacted at a time ing jurisdiction over qualifying corpora- when Pennoyer power theory of jurisdic- tions8 do not expressly limit jurisdiction tion prevailed. to causes of action arising within the Fitting jurisdiction over corporations state, and the Kansas Supreme Court into that theory, which recognized only has now held that they are not so consent, domicile, or physical presence ere interstate judici:11 system's i~nterest in ol btaining the rnost efficient resoluticIn of contrsoversies, 6. In World- Wzde Elkswagen v. 44 and (5) the shal.ed interest:; of all statc:s in ad- .", 8 8 . I. U.S. 286, 292 note 10, (1 980), tne >upreme. vanclng-..- tundamental substantrve pol~c~PT Court listed five interests to consider: (1) the 7. I<.S.A 17-7301; K.S.A 40-21 8 (ir burden on the defendant, (2) forum's inter.est coml in adjudicating the case, (3) plaintiffs inter.est 8. 1 in obtaining convenient and effective relief, ,,,(A\ 28-APRIL2007 THEJOURNAL OF THE IC4NSAS BAR ASSOClATION LEGAL ARTICLE: GENERAL JURISDICTION... I limited.9 Our statute authorizing juris- and ongoing, could not be "doing busi- of the plaintiff and the defendant, the in- diction over nonqualifying corporations ness."" Cases had held that extending terest of overall litigational convenience, expressly states that it is not limited to a state's jurisdiction over a foreign cor- the interests of the states involved, etc. causes of action that arise within the poration in such mere solicitation cases It would be unfair to subject a defen- state. It applies to any cause of action would be a denial of due process of law. dant to jurisdiction in a state where the that arose while the corporation was do- The issue actually argued in the In- defendant had no contact. There had to ing business here, i.e. a cause of action ternationdl Shoe case was whether the be at least a "minimum" of contact or it that arose while the corporation was corporation's activity in the state of would be a denial of due process. De- "present" in the state.'' So corporations, Washington constituted "doing busi- fining that minimum required the inter- domestic or foreign, qualifying or non- ness" under the Washington statute and est balancing referred to above.