Agrigentum - 262 Bc
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VU Research Portal The impact of empire on market prices in Babylon Pirngruber, R. 2012 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Pirngruber, R. (2012). The impact of empire on market prices in Babylon: in the Late Achaemenid and Seleucid periods, ca. 400 - 140 B.C. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 25. Sep. 2021 THE IMPACT OF EMPIRE ON MARKET PRICES IN BABYLON in the Late Achaemenid and Seleucid periods, ca. 400 – 140 B.C. R. Pirngruber VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT THE IMPACT OF EMPIRE ON MARKET PRICES IN BABYLON in the Late Achaemenid and Seleucid periods, ca. 400 – 140 B.C. ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. -
Historical Background Italy, Due to the Threat There from Throw the Entire Balance Over in the Following the Defeat of Hasdrubal Barca Hannibal
• The numerical superiority they enjoyed with their new mercenaries; • The superior quality of their legions, probably the finest in the Roman army; and, • Overconfidence bred from seven years of campaigning without a serious defeat. Had the Scipios actually faced only 35,000 Carthaginians with over 50,000 legionnaires and mercenaries as they believed, their chances for success would have been good. But Hasdrubal Barca had two additional detachments: 3,000 Numidian cavalry under Masinissa and 7,500 warriors under Indibilis. And Hasdrubal Barca also were unable to obtain more troops from had a trick up his sleeve that was to Historical Background Italy, due to the threat there from throw the entire balance over in the Following the defeat of Hasdrubal Barca Hannibal. Instead, the Scipios hired on a favor of Carthage. at Dertosa (see issue Nr. 4 of C3i for large body of 20,000 Celt-Iberian Dertosa Battle Module) by the Scipio mercenaries. The Celt-Iberians were a While Hasdrubal Barca observed the brothers in 215 BC, Carthage responded mix of those two peoples, found mainly Romans from his position at Amtorgis, by sending reinforcements. Two armies in the wilds of central Spain. They had a he ordered the forces of Hasdrubal were dispatched, one under Hasdrubal's reputation for ferocity and fighting skill. Gisgo, Masinissa and Indibilis to younger brother Mago, and another Both sides confidently planned to take concentrate at Mago Barca's camp under a political rival of the Barca clan, the offensive in 211 BC. near Castulo. Once these forces were Hasdrubal Gisgo. For the next three united, it appears he intended to move years (214-212 BC), the three Publius and Gnaeus Scipio knew that north against the Romans with his Carthaginian armies battled the two Hasdrubal Barca was encamped north combined forces. -
Symbolic Victory Signaling Strength Through Battlefield Choice (Paper in Progress)
Symbolic Victory Signaling Strength through Battlefield Choice (Paper in Progress) Richard Jordan August 7, 2014 Abstract Strong states can fight riskier battles in order to signal their strength and con- clude wars. I open with the broad question, why do some battles end wars, while others do not? I argue that Clausewitz' conception of decisive victory does not describe the majority of war-deciding engagements. The larger literature on bar- gaining and war proves equally unhelpful: while it predicts war termination should correlate with its duration (since fighting causes beliefs to converge), empirical tests have failed to corroborate this hypothesis. Focusing on the game theoretic litera- ture, I suggest this failing results from the assumption that generals cannot choose their battlefields. I argue that where and how a general fights conveys information: stronger states can (and will) fight on more difficult ground and for more difficult objectives than weak states. This decision conveys information to an enemy; this additional information increases our ability to predict war termination. In short, strategic risk is a costly signal in war. After developing this logic informally, I develop it further in a formal, game theoretic model of symbolic victory. Finally, I briefly illustrate the model with cases from the Second World War and the Second Punic War. 1 In 1800 Daniel Steibelt, a pianist of some renown, challenged the young Ludwig van Beethoven to an improvisational duel. Confident in his abilities, Steibelt played a quintet of his own composition and then|in an unmistakable insult|improvised on one of Beethoven's own themes. Furious, Beethoven strode to the piano, on his way snatching the cello part of Steibelt's quintet. -
Engineering an Empire: Carthage
Hi. I’m Peter Weller for the Name: _____________________ History Channel. Join me while we explore Engineering An Empire: Carthage. Carthage *Carthage is in modern day Tunisia near the capital city of Tunis in North Africa. *Carthage dominated the Mediterranean world for over 600 years. *Roots in Phoenicians…4th century BC Empire dominating the Mediterranean. *By 650 BC nobody messes with Carthage who were wealthy. (Population 300,000) *For two centuries Carthage dominated the Mediterranean. But a rival across the sea to the north was developing into a military power…Rome. Start @ 15:30 into film. 1. Why are Rome and Carthage in conflict over Sicily? *Rome saw Carthage as a spear pointed right at the heart of Rome that had to be taken out. *Punic Wars named after the Latin word Punici = Rome’s word for the Phoenicians. 2. How do the Romans acquire Sicily? 3. Who was Hamilcar Barca? 4. How was a Quinquereme different from a Trireme? 5. How did the Romans improve their navy? 6. In the battle over the Aegates, why were the outnumbered Romans able to defeat the Carthaginians? 7. How did this effect Hamilcar’s forces in Sicily? 8. What did Rome gain in the victory? *Rome required Carthage pay a huge tribute in attempt to cripple it. 9. Carthage turned to _______________ to amass wealth. 10. What happened to Hamilcar in the battle for Rome? 11. Who was Hannibal Barca? 12. Describe the force that Hannibal marched to Rome with in 218 BC: 13. How did the Gauls respond to Hannibal’s army after they crossed the Rhone? 14. -
ROMAN POLITICS DURING the JUGURTHINE WAR by PATRICIA EPPERSON WINGATE Bachelor of Arts in Education Northeastern Oklahoma State
ROMAN POLITICS DURING THE JUGURTHINE WAR By PATRICIA EPPERSON ,WINGATE Bachelor of Arts in Education Northeastern Oklahoma State University Tahlequah, Oklahoma 1971 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the Oklahoma State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS May, 1975 SEP Ji ·J75 ROMAN POLITICS DURING THE JUGURTHINE WAR Thesis Approved: . Dean of the Graduate College 91648 ~31 ii PREFACE The Jugurthine War occurred within the transitional period of Roman politics between the Gracchi and the rise of military dictators~ The era of the Numidian conflict is significant, for during that inter val the equites gained political strength, and the Roman army was transformed into a personal, professional army which no longer served the state, but dedicated itself to its commander. The primary o~jec tive of this study is to illustrate the role that political events in Rome during the Jugurthine War played in transforming the Republic into the Principate. I would like to thank my adviser, Dr. Neil Hackett, for his patient guidance and scholarly assistance, and to also acknowledge the aid of the other members of my counnittee, Dr. George Jewsbury and Dr. Michael Smith, in preparing my final draft. Important financial aid to my degree came from the Dr. Courtney W. Shropshire Memorial Scholarship. The Muskogee Civitan Club offered my name to the Civitan International Scholarship Selection Committee, and I am grateful for their ass.istance. A note of thanks is given to the staff of the Oklahoma State Uni versity Library, especially Ms. Vicki Withers, for their overall assis tance, particularly in securing material from other libraries. -
A Glimpse Into the Roman Finances of the Second Punic War Through
Letter Geochemical Perspectives Letters the history of the western world. Carthage was a colony founded next to modern Tunis in the 8th century BC by Phoenician merchants. During the 3rd century BC its empire expanded westward into southern Spain and Sardinia, two major silver producers of the West Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Rome’s grip had tight- © 2016 European Association of Geochemistry ened over the central and southern Italian peninsula. The Punic Wars marked the beginning of Rome’s imperial expansion and ended the time of Carthage. A glimpse into the Roman finances The First Punic War (264 BC–241 BC), conducted by a network of alliances in Sicily, ended up with Rome prevailing over Carthage. A consequence of this of the Second Punic War conflict was the Mercenary War (240 BC–237 BC) between Carthage and its through silver isotopes unpaid mercenaries, which Rome helped to quell, again at great cost to Carthage. Hostilities between the two cities resumed in 219 BC when Hannibal seized the F. Albarède1,2*, J. Blichert-Toft1,2, M. Rivoal1, P. Telouk1 Spanish city of Saguntum, a Roman ally. At the outbreak of the Second Punic War, Hannibal crossed the Alps into the Po plain and inflicted devastating mili- tary defeats on the Roman legions in a quick sequence of major battles, the Trebia (December 218 BC), Lake Trasimene (June 217 BC), and Cannae (August 216 BC). As a measure of the extent of the disaster, it was claimed that more than 100,000 Abstract doi: 10.7185/geochemlet.1613 Roman soldiers and Italian allies lost their lives in these three battles, including The defeat of Hannibal’s armies at the culmination of the Second Punic War (218 BC–201 three consuls. -
The Ptolemies: an Unloved and Unknown Dynasty. Contributions to a Different Perspective and Approach
THE PTOLEMIES: AN UNLOVED AND UNKNOWN DYNASTY. CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE AND APPROACH JOSÉ DAS CANDEIAS SALES Universidade Aberta. Centro de História (University of Lisbon). Abstract: The fifteen Ptolemies that sat on the throne of Egypt between 305 B.C. (the date of assumption of basileia by Ptolemy I) and 30 B.C. (death of Cleopatra VII) are in most cases little known and, even in its most recognised bibliography, their work has been somewhat overlooked, unappreciated. Although boisterous and sometimes unloved, with the tumultuous and dissolute lives, their unbridled and unrepressed ambitions, the intrigues, the betrayals, the fratricides and the crimes that the members of this dynasty encouraged and practiced, the Ptolemies changed the Egyptian life in some aspects and were responsible for the last Pharaonic monuments which were left us, some of them still considered true masterpieces of Egyptian greatness. The Ptolemaic Period was indeed a paradoxical moment in the History of ancient Egypt, as it was with a genetically foreign dynasty (traditions, language, religion and culture) that the country, with its capital in Alexandria, met a considerable economic prosperity, a significant political and military power and an intense intellectual activity, and finally became part of the world and Mediterranean culture. The fifteen Ptolemies that succeeded to the throne of Egypt between 305 B.C. (date of assumption of basileia by Ptolemy I) and 30 B.C. (death of Cleopatra VII), after Alexander’s death and the division of his empire, are, in most cases, very poorly understood by the public and even in the literature on the topic. -
< ;-Thames & Hudson
Philip Matyszak and Joanne Berry OF THE ROMANS With 217 illustrations, 135 in color -<�;- Thames & Hudson HALF-TITLE Bronze bust of (1616). Decius Mus typified the Augustus, formerly Octavian, warrior aristocracy of the early 27-25 BC. Republic, when Roman leaders FRONTISPIECE Fourth-century were expected to command from mosaic of a house on a lake. the front. PREVIOUS PAGE Bust of Lucius OPPOSITE Romulus and Remus Cornelius Sulla, 138-78 BC. being suckled by the wolf, thought BELOW Decius Mus addressing the to be an Etruscan statue of the sth Legions, by Peter Paul Rubens century BC. © 2008 Thames & Hudson Ltd, London All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any other information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2008 in hardcover in the United States of America by Thames & Hudson Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10110 thamesandhudsonusa.com Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 2008901001 ISBN 978-o-soo-25144-7 Printed and bound in Singapore by Tien Wah Press (Pte) Ltd The Triumph of Quintus Fabius by Samuel Elliot (1849). Fabius celebrated two triumphs, the first in 233 sc after his defeat of the Ligurians, the second in 209 sc after he recaptured Tarentum (which Hannibal had taken three years previously). Livy claims that Fabius brought back to Rome 30,000 captives and thousands of pounds of gold and silver, but he left behind statues of Tarentum's warrior gods -unlike his rival Marcellus who had stripped the temples of Syracuse in 211 sc. -
The Tyrannies in the Greek Cities of Sicily: 505-466 Bc
THE TYRANNIES IN THE GREEK CITIES OF SICILY: 505-466 BC MICHAEL JOHN GRIFFIN Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Leeds School of Classics September 2005 The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I would like to thank the Thomas and Elizabeth Williams Scholarship Fund (Loughor Schools District) for their financial assistance over the course of my studies. Their support has been crucial to my being able to complete this degree course. As for academic support, grateful thanks must go above all to my supervisor at the School of Classics, Dr. Roger Brock, whose vast knowledge has made a massive contribution not only to this thesis, but also towards my own development as an academic. I would also like to thank all other staff, both academic and clerical, during my time in the School of Classics for their help and support. Other individuals I would like to thank are Dr. Liam Dalton, Mr. Adrian Furse and Dr. Eleanor OKell, for all their input and assistance with my thesis throughout my four years in Leeds. Thanks also go to all the other various friends and acquaintances, both in Leeds and elsewhere, in particular the many postgraduate students who have given their support on a personal level as well as academically. -
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Zama Hannibal vs Scipio Zama is a simulation of the climactic battle of the Second Punic War: the decisive struggle between the Roman Republic and Carthage for control of the Western Mediterranean. The war began in 218 BC, with the Carthaginians led by Hannibal, one of history’s greatest commanders. The two nations clashed for over a decade, with each experiencing triumphs and defeats. Following the Battle of the Great Plains in 203 BC, a ceasefire was negotiated. It was broken following a Carthaginian attack on a stranded Roman fleet in the Gulf of Tunis. Determined to finally win the war, Roman General Scipio Africanus led an invasion force into North Africa, the Carthaginian homeland. The opposing armies met near the town of Zama. Despite being outnumbered, the Romans were able to defeat the Carthaginians. With that victory the Romans had effectively won the war. Zama is part of DG’s Battles of the Ancient World series, that emphasizes simple but realistic design features to show critical aspects of classical era combat. Special rules for leadership, missile fire, and elephants are included. Available January 2017 Target Market • Ancient History buffs Up-Sells & Cross-Sells • Chalons (DG Folio Series Game) • Caesar's Wars (DG Mini Series Game) • Belisarius's War (DG Mini Series Game) • Battles of the Ancient World (DG Box Game) Selling Points • Folio-game/low price Stock no • 1639 MSRP • $19.95 UPC Code • 09510901639 Contents • One 17x22 inch terrain map • 100 die-cut counters • One Standard & Exclusive Rules booklet Place your order today! P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA. -
Fig. 295. Suni, Domus Di Chirisconis. Interno Della Tomba 6. Fig. 296
Fig. 295. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 6. Fig. 296. Suni, domus 10 di Chirisconis. Portello che introduce nella cella D. 268 Fig. 297. Suni, domus 5 di Chirisconis. Particolare del portello che introduce nella cella E. Fig. 298. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello. 269 Fig. 299. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. Fig. 300. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. Fig. 301. Suni, domus 10 di Chirisconis. Portello d’ingresso. 270 Fig. 302. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 5. Fig. 303. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 10. 271 Fig. 304. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 4. Fig. 305. Suni, domus di Chirisconis. Interno della Tomba 5. 272 12 – NURAGHE CHIRISCONIS 12/13 filari, nel quadrante settentrionale, mentre per il resto non è in alcun modo leggibile il pro- filo di pianta che comunque si può ipotizzare di Provincia -Nuoro forma circolare con una circonferenza di circa 36 Comune - Suni metri. Località - Chirisconis o Pedrasenta Sul piano di crollo è visibile un tratto della camera per una altezza di circa 3 metri con7/8 Posizione - IGM Foglio 206 IV NE Sindia filari di pietre di piccole e medie dimensioni 40°19’49” – 3°51’27” disposte a file orizzontali con numerose zeppe di Quota - m 288 s.l.m. rincalzo. Purtroppo, lo stato di notevole rovina del monumento non consente di valutare l’artico- lazione interna dei vani. Il monumento è arroccato su un’altura basal- Nell’area circostante laterizi e ceramiche di tica a meno di 200 metri dalla necropoli ipogeica età romana. -
Historical Background
Historical background Carthage and Rome were both emerging superpowers of the Mediterranean. Rome built its power upon the infantry and conscription system. No matter how many defeats the Romans suffered, they were always able to overcome the enemy by recruiting new troops. Carthage’s wealth came from trade and the strength of its navy. Both superpowers had been allies fighting against their common enemy - the mighty Pyrrhus, King of Epir. But it took them only 12 years to be turned into enemies. The casus belli was the Carthaginian attempt to gain control over Sicily. Rome considered this a major threat towards its control over the entire Italian peninsula. he First Punic War lasted 23 years. In 264 BC, the Romans laid laid siege to Saguntum, the Romans objected, making it another ca- T siege to Syracuse and forced this small kingdom to break its al- sus belli. In 218 BC Hannibal raised an army and crossed the Alps, liance with Carthage and become yet another ally of Rome. The Car- defeating Publius Scipio at the Ticinus River. Right after, Hannibal thaginians thought that they could overcome the Romans just as they invaded Italy, achieving his most significant victory in the Battle of did Pyrrhus – by fortifying important cities and keeping their naval Cannae in 216 BC annihilating entire Roman army in the process. superiority. Rome had no navy, thus it was supposed to lose the war in However, Hannibal refrained from besieging the Rome itself and in- the long term anyway. stead decided to cut off the Romans from their allies, who – just as However, in 262 BC the Romans successfully besieged the fortress Capua and Tarentum – begun to switch sides.