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Caitlin Schmelzer “”: The Unofficial Battle of the Cold War Spring 2014

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“Miracle on Ice”: The Unofficial Battle of the Cold War

The USSR-US Olympic hockey match during the became a symbol of the politicization of the international sports arena and served as a pseudo-battle during the Cold War between capitalist America and communist with the Americans as the victors. First, I will explore the history of Soviet and American athletic programs and their past- politicized athletic experiences in order to prove the notion of sport as a means to air international conflicts. Then I will explain the political tensions occurring between the U.S. and

Soviet Union during the 1980 Winter Olympics. Furthermore, I will evaluate the physical nature of hockey against the events of the match. Additionally, I will describe the reactions of the athletes and people of both nations to the contest. Lastly, I will examine the response of Soviet and U.S. leadership to the event, along with the U.S. political exploitation of the American peoples’ morale.

Physical Culture in the

In order to understand the degree to which the Soviet Union placed political validation on athletics, one needs to have an understanding of the intensity to which the government controlled physical culture throughout the state. 1 I will be focusing on the structure of the program in which the Soviet players of the 1980 Olympic hockey team participated from the 1960’s through the

1980’s. The athletic program was formed on the basis of creating a stronger communist society, one that could prove the supremacy of the socialist ideology, as well as politically validate the

Soviet state on an international stage. The USSR held the belief that sport was the dominant medium in which to influence international politics, thus the government initiated a physical

1The references for the entirety of this section: Sport in Soviet Society (207-369); Sports, politics and communism (1-134); Sport Under Communism (47-49) 3 culture program to increase Soviet control of global affairs. The realm of sport up until this time had been recreational activities for factory workers. The state aimed to influence labor productivity through physical exercise; these exercises would rejuvenate the workers, help them fight against physical and mental idleness, and fatigue. By increasing their quality of living, officials believed the workers would increase their production rates. The USSR, experiencing a decrease in health nationwide, decided to implement this physical culture program beyond the factory, into all levels of society. It also believed that the athletic training would provide character training that would nurture the growth of the communist ideology and future leaders of the nation. As a result, the government aimed to increase the number of amateur and professional athletes statewide. Current professionals, labeled “Masters of Sport,” were required to volunteer as coaches, and school or club instructors; unfortunately, this resulted in the performances of recreational athletes being overlooked in order to focus energy and facilities on those athletes with potential. During this time, the state realized sport as a means of social control; by controlling how citizens used their leisure time, it could better utilize physical culture. Therefore, sport became a means in which to morally educate citizens, as well as prepare the entire nation to defend the Motherland, creating both a utilitarian and social role for sport.

This revitalized program included all age groups, as well as different programs for each age group. Initially, the age limit for training started at 14, but after a re-evaluation, a new category was added that lowered the age to 10. There were five groups as well as a separate category for service members:

1) “Bold and Skillful” : Boys and Girls aged 10-13

2) “Sporting Reserve” : Boys and Girls aged 14-15

3) “Strength and Courage” : Boys and Girls aged 16-18 4

4) “Physical Perfection” : Men aged 19-39; Women aged 19-34

5) “Fitness and Health” : Men aged 40-60; Women aged 35-55

The focus of the first two categories was to introduce sport into daily life as well as nurture any talent that could lead to international success. These age groups participated mainly through physical education classes, which aimed to improve the future health of the nation through a nationwide introduction of physical exercise into schools. The third age group focused on military training; these students had to pass a civil defense test, and endure gas mask training, as well as rifle shooting. For these tests, there was a system created to assess performance; students had a minimum amount of points needed in order to pass, though it was universal knowledge that merely achieving minimum scores was not acceptable. Each student was given one year of training in order to reach the pass mark; in addition, each student had certain academic requirements to uphold:

1) Each student must be knowledgeable in “Physical Culture and Sport in the USSR.”

2) Each student must know and adhere to the rules for personal and public hygiene.

3) Each student must know the basic rules of civil defense and be able to wear a gas

mask for one hour.

4) Each student must be able to explain the importance of, and to perform a set of,

morning exercises, such as track and field, cross-country skiing, swimming, pull-ups,

rifle firing, and hiking.

The students trained in this category were expected to either become service members or work in factories. The fourth age group included those who chose to work in the factories. The previous physical training, as well as the exercises maintained at this point, would decrease the number of absences at work due to illness, allow workers to be more physically and mentally vigilant, 5 provide them with the energy necessary to handle changing technology, and increase productivity. This meant the state could guarantee that free time was being spent in a healthy and officially accepted manner. Those students from the third age group choosing to become service members would then enter the “Soldier-Sportsman” program; a program aimed at maintaining the physical and mental health, as well as assuring military readiness of the Soviet army. The fifth category was created in order for those citizens past the age for military participation to contribute to the physical culture movement and improve their health; those individuals that were older than the approved age limit could participate with doctor’s permission. However, all participants in every age group were expected to partake in competitions, nationally and internationally, to help achieve the main of socialist supremacy. Athletes most often did this by achieving “Master of Sport” status, which required athletes to perform on the same level with current world achievements and records. The only higher status was “Master of Sport,

International Class,” which was awarded for success in Olympic, World or European championships. The Soviet team was the first team to achieve this class at the World

Championships in 1965. Once an individual received the “Master” status, the USSR national sports committee presented them with a badge and certificate, as well as a monthly allowance.

However, this status came with responsibilities: they had to adhere to the sporting code of ethics, instruct and train others in physical culture, improve the cultural and political standards of the

Soviet Union, compete nationally and internationally for the state, and submit to medical examinations. If an individual did not adhere to these rules, they would be stripped of their title, athletics rankings, and awards. One could also lose his or her title by accepting illegal payments, participating in fixed matches or by behaving in an unacceptable manner in public or during matches. 6

Intensive training and increased athletic talent led to the institution of professional sportsmen. One of the most extensive implementations of that idea was the identification of physical prowess at an early age. The main purpose was to identify those children with potential to become champions with minimal training time. The government provided separate funding for those promising athletes that would offer experienced trainers, superior facilities, and a rigorous training plan, though it was less intensive than the process used by the Chinese. The different levels of physical education are as follows:

1) Children’s or youth schools: resembling that of American after-school sporting

programs2

2) Schools of higher sports skills: a more intensive training schedule for athletes who

show increasing talent capable of international success

3) Sports boarding schools

The Soviet government demanded these boarding schools generate Olympic victors as a means to prove national strength against capitalist powers. Some schools focused their attention on one sport, while others had up to ten; however, the schools could only have training programs for

Olympic sports with the exception of chess. Training athletes in sports that could not garner international attention would have been considered useless. Most children would begin between ages 7-12 and would remain at the school until the age of 18. Each child had to be invited to attend a boarding school; an invitation usually came upon exemplary performances during school games. Each invitee had to participate and pass a 10-day entrance exam to assess physical endurance and determine potential for talent growth; however, a poor academic history could prevent admission. Upon entrance, younger students would start focusing 12 hours a week on sports, while older students could spend up to 23 hours a week training in their sport. The USSR

2 Ice hockey had a separate youth school for gifted boys ages 6-7. 7

Ministry of Education provided funding for the schools for all expenses, allowing the children to receive a free education. Every student was provided with boarding, food, clothing, and equipment. Throughout their training, they had to adhere to certain standards to maintain their place; their diet was strictly monitored, they were subjected to frequent medical examinations, and were required to properly nurture their talent. Medical examinations included heart, blood, urine, and muscle tissue tests, as well as examination of both parents and grandparents. The students were expected to specialize in a particular sport early on to increase the chance of their international success. However, these schools were severely criticized. People accused the entire institution of sports boarding schools as favoritism for talented athletes, leading those not chosen for admittance to be neglected. The coaches and trainers were accused of forcing their athletes to reach physical peaks too early and allowing sports to dominate academics. In addition, families complained that the schools created a lack of familial bonding and argued that children’s mothers should provide meals. Despite public reservations, the schools remained open and continued producing champions.

Why would these children want to sacrifice their childhood, their bodies to a sport? In the

Soviet Union, becoming an athlete was a revered occupation; professional athletes were heroes fighting for their country, the socialist ideology, in sporting arenas around the world.

Furthermore, professional athletes and coaches were rewarded for their success; monetary awards, traveling abroad, cars, apartments in the city, income from sports tournaments and displays, monthly lotteries- all financed by the government. Moreover, those sports related to military training—fencing, shooting, weightlifting and other combat sports—were the most extensively financed. In addition, upon graduation from a boarding school, an active athlete attended a higher education institution for physical culture. There were two academic options: 8 physical education—teaching of physical sport and culture—or athletics—specialized training in an individual sport; the athletics route was unofficially considered the more prestigious of the two; regardless, each athlete was required to have a scientific and technical knowledge of sport.

Those students that completed their education could teach or train at any organization in the state. Other institutes offered education in sports medicine, polytechnics, and research of physiology.

Meanwhile, the Soviet government continued to utilize sport as a political instrument by publishing political matters, concerns, and speeches in sports periodicals. In 1975, there were over forty periodicals dedicated to sport, all more preferred than non-sport periodicals; though, it was difficult to obtain copies due to lack of publication. The state also emphasized that the sports fields and arenas build the type of men necessary for military success, aligning sports ethics with those of “nationalism, militarism and imperialism”. In fact, the military had direct command over sport since 1923. There were Sports Clubs of the Army in every military district dedicated to training young people, similar to the “Soldier-Sportsman” program previously mentioned. That same year, the Dinamo Club was introduced as a partisan sports club; participants were mainly internal security members or border guards, such as KGB members. Later Dinamo was opened to the public; however, it was still maintained by security officials. These clubs allowed professional athletes to register as service members in order to maintain “amateur status.” 3 By

1972, the majority of players on the Soviet national ice hockey team were service members.

Even though their methods were considered excessive, the USSR maintained an impressive

3 Up until the late 1990’s, the International Olympic Committee did not allow professional athletes to participate in the Games. By registering as service members, the professional Soviet athletes were considered “amateurs” and permitted to play. Though many questioned the “amateur” status of the Soviet athletes, no one formally filed a complaint to the IOC. The IOC started permitting NHL and other professional players to participate in the Games in 1998. 9 international record. For example, after only incorporating ice hockey into their athletic program in 1954, the national Soviet Ice Hockey team won gold at their first world competition in 1956.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union used their physical development to gain support for the communist states and their ideology in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin

America. Soviet officials maintained that by building adequate sporting facilities for these states, providing qualified coaches and trainers, and offering the financial means for travel and accommodations to international competitions, they would persuade them to change to a socialist ideology. This meant the current socialist states would increase their number of international supporters.

Soviet International Sporting History

The Soviet Union created this physical culture because of their belief that sport influenced international politics, as evidenced by the unsportsmanlike conduct throughout their

Olympic and international career. Unsportsmanlike conduct in this case includes unnecessary violence, disregard for official procedures and rules, as well as the united and peaceful nature of the . The first instance of unnecessary violence occurred against Great Britain. In

1945, the Football Association extended an invitation to the Soviet football team to tour Britain as a means to break down political and national barriers. As a result, the Soviet and British

European football teams held their own “battles” from 1945-1954, in which both teams resorted to sabotage. The Soviet Union, who had sent a “club” team to participate in the tour, required that their team only play against other club teams. Apparently, they aimed to increase their chances of victory, which would increase their political stance within the West. Losses to these teams could mean dismissal of the entire team, as well as the players being forced to work in 10 factories or labor camps. Despite requesting only club teams, the Soviets were scheduled to play

Arsenal, a professional British team. This particular match is centered on controversy; the

English accused the Soviets of shirt pulling and late tackling; while the Soviets accused the

English of playing with extreme physicality, a method not supported by the USSR. The last game of the tour, involving The Glasgow Rangers, witnessed relentless body checking by the

Soviets and vigorous tackling by the Rangers. Then, during the 1952 Summer Olympics, after a loss to the Yugoslav national team, Joseph Stalin disbanded the military unit comprising the majority of the Soviet football team in punishment. These quasi-battles continued until football decidedly became a less viable means of political-athletic warfare. 4 Four years later at the 1956

Summer Olympics, the Soviet water polo team played against the Hungarian team in a match nicknamed “Blood in the Water.” The game occurred on the verge of political upheaval between the Soviet and Hungarian governments, during which the Red Army had invaded Hungary in order to restore socialist order. Players on both sides demonstrated violent behavior in order to broadcast political opposition before an international audience. A Soviet player hammer-locked a

Hungarian, a hold in which an arm of one contestant is held twisted and bent behind his back by his opponent, followed by another Soviet player delivering a “haymaker”, a punch in which the fist is swung wildly in order to knock out the opponent. The athletes were fighting constantly throughout the match, both above and below the water. One Hungarian player was hit so forcefully that his brow was split and he bled in the water, hence the name of the match. Another incident, though not displaying violence in sporting, occurred during the time of

Czechoslovakia’s “Prague Spring” in 1968. Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia after the

Czech government attempted to liberalize the country from the communist bloc. As a result, the other athletes at the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympic Games shunned Soviet athletes and the

4 “Cold War Football” (64-79); “Oscillating antagonism” (82-96) 11

Soviet Union lost athletic contacts with foreign countries. 5 In addition, the Czech national hockey team went on to defeat the Soviet team at the 1968 Grenoble Winter Olympics in France; following these incidences the Czech and Soviet teams continued a rivalry marked by hostile matches.6

Furthermore, the Soviet Union exhibited unsportsmanlike conduct by neglecting to follow procedure, as well as by endangering the Olympic spirit. In the years following WWII, the national Soviet team received an invitation to join the International Amateur Athletics

Federation (IIAF), membership in which was required for Olympic participation, to take part in the 1946 Oslo European Championships. Despite its desire to participate in the Olympic Games, the Soviet government had given no reply; however, the Soviet team arrived unannounced to the competition. Despite their disregard for the official rules for participation, Sigfrid Edstrom, the founder of the IIAF and International Olympic Committee (IOC) member, allowed the Soviets to compete as a goodwill gesture.7 Tensions continued at the Soviet Olympic debut at the 1952

Winter Olympics, when Soviet officials refused to have their athletes reside in the collective

Olympic Village, declaring that Soviet athletes required separate housing from capitalist Western athletes. According to USSR representatives, the Western athletes would corrupt the Soviets with their capitalist ideology and degenerate practices i.e., drinking, sex, religious rituals8. In addition, at these Games, the Soviet team maintained a scoreboard tracking the medal count between themselves and the American athletes. In the years following, at the 1976 Montreal Games, a

Soviet fencer was disqualified for illegally wiring his epee in order to increase the hits against his

5 The IOC did not begin staggering the Winter and Summer Olympic Games until after 1992. The following Winter Games were held in 1994, while the Summer Games were in 1996. 6 Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (82-145); “Cold War expatriot sport” (47-54) 7 The following year, the USSR officially joined the IIAF but did not participate in the Olympic Games until 1952. 8 The Soviet Union did not participate in religious rituals of any kind; it was considered an act against the communist ideology. 12 opponent. At those same Games, after a Soviet diver vanished following a poor performance,

USSR officials declared he was abducted, and threatened to withdraw from the Games if he was not returned. It was later revealed he had run off with an American woman; consequently, after the Games, he remained in Canada, seeking refuge from the Soviet government. These incidents contradict the intended goal of the Olympic Games: international peace and cooperation.9

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has continued their negligence, by claiming to have won every

Olympics since it began participating until its disintegration in 1991; one exception is the 1980

Winter Olympics in which the USSR hockey team was defeated by the U.S. team. These performances maintained the Soviet understanding that the success of a nation’s ideology is parallel to the success of their athletic program.10

American Sport Culture

Contrary to the Soviet regime, the American athletic program during this period remained largely autonomous from government control, although the U.S. government did maintain that sports helped the development of one’s character and provided character training for future leaders. For a long time in the West, professional athleticism was not deemed a worthy career; therefore, individuals were responsible for their own physical, financial, and moral resources.

However, as international sporting events became more popular, Americans became more athletic. Still, U.S. athletic programs were motivated primarily by profit instead of political justification, focusing more on the individual rather than the whole. In addition, unlike the Soviet athletes, whose training expenses and facilities were provided by the state, the American athletes were amateurs, whose training took place largely on a collegiate level. One notable difference

9 Chu and Segrave, (120) 10 “Oscillating antagonism” (83-86); Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (101-168); Sport Under Communism (49-50); “Soviet Sport and Soviet Foreign Policy” (316); Sports, and communism (85): “Superpower Sport” (256) 13 between the Soviet and American programs emerged due to the narrow scope of American athletics. The majority of American victories occurred in a concentrated area of sports such as track and field and swimming, thanks to universities providing the funds for such programs; the

Soviet athletic program, however, participated in nearly every Olympic sport. As a result, the

United States used non-governmental methods to increase their performance, including improving training efforts at the collegiate level, exploiting college athletic programs to enhance athletes, and intensifying physical education classes and their requirements in schools nationwide. Athletics focused on middle class white males, creating the “American Society of the Future,” in which amateur American athletes, under the supervision of strict coaches, competed and trained, working equally as hard in their respective sport as in their occupation. As an unfortunate result, by bettering the American opinion of professional athletes and introducing professional leagues, the best athletes forfeit their amateur status and Olympic eligibility, in order to play in these leagues in the hopes of receiving money and fame. Perhaps the most prominent disparity occurs in the official interpretation of victory for both nations. U.S. athletes do not have the official political task of international success; their victories were seen as a win for the individual as well as the American people. On the other hand, Soviet athletes were cautioned that victories solely proved the dominance of ideology and that losses would have consequences; athletes’ performances were a reflection of the State as a whole, not the individual athlete. The State did not advertise the personal sentiments of its athletes, only the supremacy of its governance through sport. However, similar to the Soviet Union, the United States participated in sporting exchanges in which American athletes entered into underdeveloped states, where they provided training and development of athletes, trainers, officers, and youth 14 groups to the peoples’ of those countries; if the country was more developed, the American athletes would hold exhibitions and matches within those states.11

Despite attempts at nationalizing the American athletic program, the system has remained chiefly independent of the government with few proposed legislations coming to fruition. From

1950-1973, the government declared that federal involvement was necessary in order to maintain the level of physicality needed to compete against the world’s leading athletes, specifically the

Soviet Union. The victorious entrance of the Soviet Union into international competition brought a brief debate over governmental financing of the U.S. national team; however, American attitudes ultimately determined that the sportsmen should take nothing from the government, by any means. In addition, the U.S. Congress began to question the government’s role in American athletic culture; Senator John Butler (R-MD) introduced a resolution that called on American athletes to participate in the 1956 Melbourne Olympics only if the Soviet athletes were disqualified for professional status. The resolution did not gain support from the American public nor Congress; although it did create worry among officials that a Soviet victory at the

1956 Olympics would reflect badly on the American government. As result, several bills were introduced that would have provided funding to the 1956 U.S. national team by way of the

President’s emergency fund; all the bills died on the Congress floor. In the years following, several attempts were made to initiate a federalized sports program, ones that would be privately funded and would focus on building facilities, encouraging younger students to participate in physical activities, thereby helping to improve underdeveloped sports, and to provide qualified coaches and trainers, as well as increase the number of women competing on the international level. Although none of these plans were implemented, the government did create an Interagency

11 Sports, politics and communism (83-85); Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (84-104); “The “muscle gap”” (123-142); “Superpower Sport” (249-150); Going for the Gold (6) 15

Committee of International Athletics, whose responsibilities included monitoring athletic problems at all levels that would affect international competition i.e., funding, facilities, and community support. Even with the initiation of this agency, sponsorships for international athletes remained private, in contrast to the Soviet Union.12

International funding and national athletic programs were not the only methods by which the government attempted involvement in sports. In 1972, Title IX of the Education

Amendments Act of 1972 was established, guaranteeing equal funding for men’s and women’s educational opportunities, which remarkably increased participation of girls and women in sports. Government intervention continued when President Jimmy Carter signed the Amateur

Athletic Act in 1978, which established a United States Olympic Committee, as well as national governing bodies (NBG) for each Olympic sport and legal protection to individual athletes.13

This act allowed active athletes to hold 20% of the voting influence within the organization, and established procedures for US Olympic Team roster selections; however, the act only concerns international competition. 14

United States International Sporting History

Despite the U.S. athletic program being self-governed, the American government has often used the Olympics as a means to air political grievances. During the 1908 Summer

Olympics in London, the American flag was not represented along with the flags of the other participating nations. In retaliation, during the opening ceremonies, the American flag bearer refused to dip the flag to regard King Edward VII; this incident brought about the American

12 “Federal Involvement in Sport” (400-417); U.S. Congressional Record (3789) 13 This act is a response to the events of the 1972 Olympics Games in Munich, Germany. 14A People’s History (203-204); 36 U.S. Code § 220506 16 saying that,” this flag dips to no earthly king.” 15 In addition, at the 1936 Berlin Games, the gold medal victory of African American track and field star Jesse Owens was portrayed by most

Western states as a response against Nazi “master race” propaganda. Following World War II, the U.S. government consistently opposed allowing Socialist states to participate in the Games, particularly the Soviet Union and East Germany. Nonetheless, the International Olympic

Committee approved the entrance of both nations to the Games. The 1968 Mexico City Summer

Games witnessed the extension of dissatisfaction of African American athletes into the Olympic arena. Harry Edwards, an American supporting the Civil Rights movement in the United States, persuaded African American athletes to refuse participation under the American flag, and essentially boycott the Games; sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos, both black athletes agreed to compete in the Games. During the events, Smith set a world record, winning gold, and

Carlos won the bronze medal; while on the medal stand, the two athletes lowered their heads during the playing of the American anthem and raised gloved fists in a salute to black power.

The blatant display of political demonstration resulted in the expulsion of both athletes from the

Olympic Village within hours of the act. At those same games, African American U.S. boxer,

George Foreman celebrated a gold medal win by waving the American flag to all corners of the ring, a stark contrast to the preceding events. Upon return to the States, Carlos and Smith were received with support from only parts of the black community; the U.S. National Olympic Team as a whole supported the equality of African American players, but not necessarily the demonstration itself. In later years, the U.S. government had planned to exploit the 1976

Montreal Games as means to promote democratic society, but the poor performance of U.S. athletes inadvertently exalted socialist sport, thus, in the Soviet mindset, proving the supremacy

15 “Politics and Protest” (153); The American flag bearers have continued the tradition, refusing to dip the American flag for the Olympic host country’s leadership. 17 of socialist ideology. This lackluster performance of the American athletes during the Montreal

Games influenced the reaction to the 1980 Olympic Games, adding pressure to perform well, not only for prestige, but also to boost American morale during a time of political and economic turmoil.16

USSR-USA Athletic Encounters

Upon the Soviet Union’s entrance into the Olympic Games, the international sports world became an arena in which to air political tensions between the USSR and the United States. As I argue, this is in large part because sporting competitions offer a safe environment in which to hold “battles” without weapons or threat of nuclear intervention. Each battle has a clear set of rules, constant supervision by referees to ensure fair play, as well as penalties for foul play and breaking of rules. Events such as the Olympics provide a highly publicized opportunity for these countries to “war,” in which there is a clear-cut winner and loser, and a definite end. As Philip J.

Noel Baker concludes, “sport is the best weapon in the struggle for peace on earth.”17 The truth of this statement is evident when examining the exchanges between athletes and coaches of both countries: while the media and governments were often hostile and judgmental of their respective counterparts, the sporting competitors demonstrated goodwill amongst themselves.

The competing individuals and their trainers appeared to respect one another, pushing and challenging each other to be faster, stronger, better at their sport, sometimes even looking to the other for training strategies. The same friendly attitude extended to their citizens; Cold War tensions did not stop the public from applauding and cheering the performances of Soviet athletes. Arkady Vorobyov, an ex-world champion weightlifter, recalls his first encounter with

16 A People’s History (171-175); “Politics and Protest” (153-155); Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (136-172) 17 Quoted in “Just the Beginning” (7) 18

American athletes in 1950 at a competition in Paris. He remembers his first athletic meeting with his chief competition, American Stanley Stanczyk; both competitors received the same score but due to a weight differential, Stanczyk won. During the medal ceremony, Stanczyk told Vorobyov to move to the top step with him; the American admitted that he was scared after the Russian’s performance and looked forward to the challenge at future matches.18 In a 1959 exhibition between U.S. and Soviet athletes, the Soviet team accepted American athlete Ray Saddler, christening him “Vaska”. Upon the end of the competition, Saddler met with the team to offer his goodbyes and wish them good luck at their future meetings.19 According to Gavriil Korobkov,

Former Coach of the Soviet Athletics Team, despite political hostility, Soviet and American athletes were friendly and welcoming to each other; they remained rivals in their respective sports, but after the matches, the opponents would cordially shake hands.20 In the following year at the 1960 Squaw Valley Olympic Games, succeeding a Soviet defeat to Czech rivals, the

Soviet captain, Nikolai Sologubov gave advice to their next opponents, the Americans. He recommended taking oxygen to battle the mountainous altitude, many players followed the advice, and the Americans took the gold medal. Many have debated the motivation behind this action; Olympic optimists argue it was done in the Olympic spirit, while others believe that the

Soviets merely did not want the Czech team to win gold. Political tensions between Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had grown during this time; the Czech government had begun implementing changes to their Soviet-based economy, which the USSR did not support. One famous encounter occurred at Madison Square Garden in 1961, between high-jumpers Valery Brumel (USSR) and

John Thomas (U.S.), both considered champions in the event. The media reacted to Brumel’s defeat of Thomas in the 1960 Olympics in Rome by portraying the contest as a means for

18 “The World of Records” (79-81) 19 “Testing Service to the “Queen”” (23-32) 20 According to Korobkov, in ancient times, the handshake symbolized the close of a military conflict. 19

Thomas to exact revenge and re-claim U.S. prestige in this event. Brumel easily defeated

Thomas, who did not make a successful jump, to the cheers of the American citizens. The fact that the athlete was Russian did not matter; the American public praised a good performance regardless of nationality.21 The two countries as of 1975 held seventeen matches against each other, alternating as hosts; out of the seventeen tournaments, the Soviet Union won thirteen of them. Perhaps, one of the matches most important to the Soviets, occurred in basketball. The

Soviet Union, having never defeated the Americans in Olympic competition, were determined to beat the Americans in the sport they created. The USSR finally achieved that at the Munich

Summer Games of 1972, overpowering the Americans to win an Olympic gold medal; however, this result was met with formally lodged protests by the American team, refusing their silver medals. By contrast, Soviet athletes touring America recall pleasant receptions. Olga Korbut, a

Soviet gymnast in 1974, remembers people holding signs saying, “-we love you.” Just the year before, Peggy Fleming, former U.S. figure skater, filmed a movie, “Peggy Fleming

Visits the Soviet Union,” chronicling her experiences during a tour in Russia. The Soviet people met her with a warm-welcome and admired her skills. She expressed her delight at her tour and the reactions of the public, who continued to greet her with cheers and applause throughout her performances, declaring that she “liked it here.”22 These sporting exchanges were important, in that Soviet and American athletes, as well as their citizen counterparts, were able to become acquainted with one another and develop an understanding of each other’s culture and country.23

Politics of the Time

21 “Just the Beginning” (7-16) 22 “Peggy Fleming” (168-169) 23 Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (76-77); “Twenty Four Rounds” (23-53); “Superpower Sport” (257-259) 20

The influence of politics on the Olympics Games changed dramatically after the 1972

Munich Games. During the Munich Games, Palestinian terrorists managed to enter the Olympic

Village and kidnap eleven Israeli athletes; they planned to use the hostages as bargaining tools to release Palestinians from Israeli prisons. After attempts to negotiate with the terrorists, German officials granted the Palestinians access to an airplane; however the tragedy ended in a shootout, resulting in the deaths of all eleven hostages, five terrorists, and a German police officer. Prior to the 1972 Olympics, feuding countries did not express their politics in a blatant manner at the

Games due to the Olympic goal of international peace. Although athletes themselves often performed subtle political displays, of which their governments had no prior knowledge, the athletes as previously mentioned were punished for their actions, sometimes by their respective government or even by the International Olympic Committee. However, after this controversy, neither the Olympic Committee nor the world could pretend that politics did not influence the

Olympics; it had established the Games as a political stage. As a result, politics were more publicly displayed during the following Games and the increased opposition between the Cold

War superpowers during this time only furthered the idea of athletics as a political arena.24

In the years leading up to the 1980 Winter Olympics, the U.S. government had been dealing with the devastating loss of the Vietnam War, economic turmoil, an oil crisis, and a shameful performance at the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympics. American morale was at an all- time low, leading the U.S. government to adopt a forceful manner in order to protect American global interests. Then, on November 4th, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in in Tehran, Iran was overrun and fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were taken hostage by Iranian students—a shattering blow to an already dying American self-esteem. Meanwhile, on December 27, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, an act that the Soviet Union called a “short-term regional action to

24 Nationalism (30); Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (146-152); “Olympic Massacre” 21 bolster a flailing regime in a bordering country.”25 The U.S. government interpreted the action as an attempt by the Soviet Union to expand and occupy Afghanistan. The U.S. government had already been dissatisfied after the announcement that the Soviet Union would host the 1980

Summer Olympics in ; the invasion only worsened tensions. U.S. Secretary of State

Cyrus Vance reacted openly, stating that the Olympic Committee’s decision was a “violation of fundamental Olympic rights.” He explained that every national team had a right to compete within the Olympics; however, for a Communist state to host the Games was a “breach of international peace.”26 For the Olympic Committee to choose a warring country as a host site, meant that the Olympics tacitly supported the political ideology of that country. In contrast, the

Soviet government accepted the decision as recognition of both the political legitimization of the

Soviet Union and the understanding that Communism was superior to Capitalism on an international level. The U.S. government, in retaliation for Afghanistan, issued the Soviet Union an ultimatum. Understanding the weight that the USSR leadership placed on international competition as means for political validation, on January 20th President Jimmy Carter announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic if Soviet troops did not retreat from Afghanistan by February 20, a mere four weeks in the future. In addition, he urged other countries to enter into a boycott. President Jimmy Carter hoped for a good performance at the Winter Olympics to increase American support during this difficult time, as well as improve American opinion of him on the cusp of re-election.27

Throughout the entirety of the 1980 Winter Olympics Games, these heightened Cold War tensions were showcased by the amount of FBI and KGB agents both undercover and publicly appointed to the Olympic Village. The Soviet government did not trust the American

25 “Dropping the Torch” (60) 26 Department of State Bulletin (50) 27 Do You Believe in Miracles?; The Political Olympics (IV-17); Keeping the Faith (471-490) 22 government and therefore delegated KGB agents to guard the Soviet athletes. The Soviet ice hockey team had a significant KGB presence; officials were worried about an incident similar to the 1972 Olympics occurring to the team due to the political conflict.28

Pre-Game Expectations

The majority of people, both Soviet and American, expected the same outcome for the

USSR-US match: Soviet victory. The legacy of the Soviet hockey team was that of veteran players, who were disciplined and well trained in their craft. The Soviet athletes were labeled as militiamen and police officers on their Olympic applications but were anything but amateur in their sport. The Soviet hockey team had won seven gold medals in its nine Olympic competitions and four in a row at the point of the 1980 Winter Olympics; the team had only lost one game in the previous four Olympiads. The Soviet team had only lost the gold once at the 1960 Squaw

Valley Games in California; the United States won the gold and the USSR received the bronze.

Just weeks prior to the Olympics, the Soviet team had played the Americans in a fundraising exhibition game at Madison Square Garden. The experienced Soviet players effortlessly beat the

Americans, who succumbed to intimidation, 10-3; however, this game allowed the Americans to study the Soviet’s techniques.29

While the perception of the Soviet team was that of respect, the American team was regarded differently. Many identified the American players as amateurs, youthful and lively.

There were concerns about the regional rivalries among their current collegiate teams; some players’ had competed against each other months before the Olympic training camp. Americans doubted if the young men would be able to form a coherent team able to transcend such

28 Boys of Winter (98) 29 Boys of Winter (1-110); Do You Believe in Miracles? 23 oppositions. Only one American player had competed internationally before, the rest were inexperienced; in addition, the U.S. team was the youngest in the competition with an average age of 22. How could a team that had only been playing together for six months acquire the necessary skills to beat teams that had been together for years? The Russians did not believe it was possible. Soviet goalie Vladisav Tretiak stated that “the Americans were never really counted as an opponent.”30 Even the American hockey coach, , did not believe it was possible, telling his players that a win over the Soviet team was not probable but with adequate training, a bronze medal might be feasible. However, the U.S. team proved to be skilled enough to win four of their five Olympic games, while the fifth ended in a tie. 31 The sudden success of this young, American team brought hope and delight to the American people; most spectators in the crowd did not know about hockey, they just simply enjoyed the excitement.32

The expectations for the game, despite the reservations about the American team, were high; the 8,500-person venue was crammed with a crowd estimated at over 12,000. The authorities, understanding the anticipation building around the game, assigned extra police to monitor the arena; moreover, the referees were required to check thoroughly all the players’ equipment for tampering prior to the game. The ABC television network, predicting a substantial profit, unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Soviet team to change the start of the game to

7:00 p.m. in order to air the event live. With the first non-neutral ice in Olympic history, the

Soviet team expected the defeat of the Americans in their own country, whereas the Americans hoped for a victory against the infamous Soviets at home.33

30 Do You Believe in Miracles? 31 Teams received 2 points for every victory and 1 point for a tie. At the end of the competition, the three teams with the most points won the gold, silver, and bronze medal, respectively. 32 “The First Big Victory”; “The Americans Advance”; “Recognition and Respect” Do You Believe in Miracles?; Going for the Gold (26-32) 33 “Recognition and Respect” 24

The USSR-US Hockey Game: The Battle Begins

The perception that sporting competitions are governed by their physical nature, allows the violence of hockey to lend itself to “battle-like” analogies. This is a large part of the reason that the USSR-US hockey match was seen as such a symbolically important game. Hockey creates an environment of romanticized masculinity, a world in which belligerence, strength and domination are revered and respected. Hockey players are warriors in the realm of sports: body checks against glass boards, pucks flying at 100mph, fighting and injuries.34 The only other sports that naturally employ violence are boxing and martial arts, both of which focus solely on fighting. In hockey, violence does not solely mean fighting; in fact, fighting is not vital to the process of the game and usually results in penalties that benefit the opposing team. The

International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF), the governing body of international hockey, does not allow fighting in Olympic or European matches35; collegiate level fighting is also strictly prohibited by the NCAA. 36 In truth, only professional North American hockey includes fighting as an integral part of the game.37 In fact, a great deal of matches in North America do not involve excessive fighting; the exceptions are usually rivalry matches, which are can be marked by particularly vicious behavior. As Graham Scambler, author of “Sport and society: History, power and culture,” claims, “[i]llegitimate violence is the result of commercialization and professionalization of sport in the 20th century.” He believes that this “commercialization” and

“professionalization” has led to violence becoming rational, organized, and merely an instrument

34 “Miraculous” (225) 35 The Soviet hockey program itself did not allow fighting. If a player did engage in fighting, they could be punished in a similar manner to that mentioned above in the Soviet Union Physical Culture section. However, it is said that officials did little to enforce this rule. 36 If a player is serving a , they are temporarily ejected from the game. This results in their team playing with one less player for either a 2 or 5-minute period. The opposing team’s advantage is called a power play. 37 For a list of fighting penalties refer to Appendix 2 25 to the game.38 Hockey has incorporated violence into the very nature of the game. A player’s main defensive strategy is a check; the majority of hockey violence is a result of body checking; in fact, checking constitutes 80% of all hockey injuries39. The USSR-US match had particularly fierce body checks from both sides.40Throughout the game, several legal checks were particularly physical. In the second period, American Ken Morrow delivered an open-ice check that immediately stopped the Soviet player. In the third, American Ramsey tackled Soviet player Alexander Maltsev, “as if he were a linebacker taking down a ballcarrier.”41 Minutes later, U.S. player checked USSR player Valery Kharlamov against the boards, the Soviet player fell and smacked his helmet against the ice. In addition,

U.S. players, in order to block shots, would throw their bodies in front of 100mph moving pucks to prevent goals; it is said that by the end of the game, most U.S. players were black and blue from these blocks.42

During the game, there were six penalties recorded, a standard amount for any hockey game.43 However, several cases of unsportsmanlike behavior occurred during the game that were not penalized. During the first period, USSR player Alexander Skvortsov reportedly climbed onto U.S. player Buzz Schneider’s back, in what was described as a “mid-ice mugging” by writer

Wayne Coffey. Another uncalled penalty minutes later was by U.S. player Mike Ramsey, who tripped USSR player Viktor Zhluktov with his stick. In the second period, U.S. skater Mark

Johnson tripped USSR skater Alexander Golikov with his stick; there was no whistle. Right after, USSR player attempted to gain puck control from U.S. player John

38 Sport and Society (94-95) 39 Ice Hockey Injuries 40 For a list of body checks refer to Appendix 3 41Quoted in Boys of Winter (236) 42 Boys of Winter (113-234); Going for the Gold (26-42); “Fighting debate renewed”; “Boards want ban” 43 For a box score of the game refer to Appendix 1 26

Harrington by violently swinging his stick, like a hatchet, in his direction. However, he did not make contact nor was the whistle blown. Halfway through the second period, U.S.

Jim Craig skated behind the net to retrieve the puck, when USSR player Vladimir Petrov attempted to steal the puck from him. Mike Ramsey retaliated by cross-checking Petrov in the head, sending him into the boards44. Petrov pushed back, as Ramsey dropped his stick in preparation for a fight, but the referee blew his whistle. Neither Petrov nor Ramsey received a penalty; however, was given a minor penalty for delay of game. At the end of the second period, USSR skater Vladimir Krutov was cross-checked by U.S. defenseman Ken

Morrow; he crashed into U.S. goalie Craig as a result. Krutov’s helmet hit Craig’s mask, knocking Craig backwards onto the ice. Players from both teams engaged in skirmishes around the net, all while the goalie remained on the ground. Once Craig stood up, the referee, who had been more concerned with a possible injury, issued only two penalties, both for unsportsmanlike conduct, to American Morrow and Soviet Krutov. During the third period, U.S. goalie Craig hit

USSR Valery Kharlamov in the face with his stick for standing too close to his crease,45 again no whistle.46

The physicality of hockey manifests itself in not only checking and fights, but also injuries.

Injuries play a major role in any sport, though many hockey players endure significant bodily damage and play through broken noses, broken ribs, and ruptured spleens. They even have stitches administered on the bench in order to not miss any playing time. During the game at

Madison Square Garden, American Mark Johnson endured ligament damage from a body check.

Despite his injury, he worked with medical staff in the weeks following in order to play in the

44 When a player checks an opponent by using the shaft of his stick with both hands. Cross-checking is an illegal check. 45 The crease is the area directly in front of the goal, in which the goalie stands. 46 Boys of Winter (113-234); Going for the Gold (26-42) 27

Olympics. Then, during the U.S. game against the Czechs, Mark Johnson was again injured. A

Czech player, after realizing their team was going to lose, swung his stick at Johnson. The stick hit Johnson in the shoulder and he had to be carried to the locker room; despite sharp pains in his shoulder, he returned four days later to play against Romania.47 If a player misses a playing shift for a minor injury, the team and staff note the absence. Since the coach primarily controls the roster, he documents it. There are hundreds of hockey players, all of which could have been chosen instead, willing to replace someone at a moment’s notice, ready to play hard and commit themselves to their team, and play through injuries. The team remembers it. They play hard, get hit hard, suffer from bruises and cuts; but they do not complain and are ready to skate on the next shift. So why should someone else miss their shift because of a minor injury? In fact, many players try to conceal injuries because they do not want to miss games.

Theories for Soviet Loss

The question remains, how did the amateur Americans defeat the professional Soviets?48

Many attribute the Soviet loss to the amount of pressure the Soviet regime placed on its players.

The hockey players were told, according to player Boris Mikhailov, that their only job was to win first place. The Soviets, whose conditioning and plays were created from scientific research, who were forced to train nine months of the year, kept from their family, their children, could not lose; there should not have been any question of their victory. The Russian players needed to attain victory to maintain their lifestyle; if they lost, the government could take away their apartments, income, and titles. American coach Herb Brooks acknowledged that, “[t]he

Russians have to be good hockey players to lead a good life. They are hungrier than we are. They

47 Boys of Winter (113-234); Going for the Gold (26-42); “Miraculous” (225-229) 48 The references for the entirety of this section: “Iceman”; “Uphill Climb”; “Let the Pressure Fall on Me”; “Glorious Gold”; Going for the Gold (124); Dropping the Torch (7-9); One Goal (240); Do You Believe in Miracles? 28 are doing everything in their power to show that their way of life is a good way of life, and they are doing it through the vehicle of a sports team. We don’t have to do that.”49 In interviews, the

Soviet players blamed their coach. Following the exhibition at Madison Square Garden, Soviet coach Viktor Tikhonov sent two stars, veteran players, defensemen Vladimir Lutchenko and

Sergei Babinov, back to Moscow. The Soviet Union predominantly retired their athletes by age

30 and Lutchenko was already 31. The players lost their teammate weeks before the Olympics, creating tension between them and their coach. Viacheslav Fetisov, a Soviet defenseman, has stated that, “[Lutchenko’s] experience and skill is what you needed in a game like that.”50 Then, at the end of the first period, Tikhonov replaced famous Soviet goalie , with back-up goalie . Player Sergei Makarov said that, “[t]he whole team was not happy when Tikhonov made the switch,” while , said, “[i]t felt like a big hole had been put in our team.”51 Tikhonov later remarked that replacing Tretiak was his “worst mistake” and remains his “biggest regret.”52 However, Tikhonov places blame on the Soviet regime, as well. He questioned how the Soviets were supposed to be unstoppable, with “ragtag equipment” and “too few indoor rinks.”53 Robert Edelman, a professor of Russian history and the history of sport, claims that Soviet hockey players would often play games outside, even during a blizzard, and that often any outside lights were turned off to save electricity, leaving them to play in the dark. He continues, saying that many players did not have sticks and that many wore bicycle helmets instead of hockey helmets. U.S. trainer Gary Smith remembered Soviet trainers asking

49Quoted in “Iceman” 50 Quoted in Boys of Winter (64) 51 Quoted in Dropping the Torch (8-9) 52 Boys of Winter (91) 53 One Goal (240) 29 for a few Band-Aids, and taking a whole box. He observed that the Soviets, “the greatest team in the world, a superpower, they didn’t have anything. It was actually kind of sad.”54

American coach Herb Brooks remarked that the Soviets had looked bored, almost sleepwalking, throughout the entire tournament. During the game, Soviet players exhibited this behavior; during the last seconds of the first period, Soviet players slacked in performance, ready to head to the locker room. Russian defensemen Vasily Pervukhin and Zinetula Bilyaletdinov, thinking the last few seconds did not matter, relaxed; this allowed the Americans to score and tie the game. Soviet coach Tikhonov remarked that his players had grown lazy, “parasitic.” U.S. captain said about Soviet Boris Mikhailov:

What does he care? I was watching him in 1972 when I was a senior in high school, and he was a champion. He was with the best team then, and he’s with the best team now. He’s done everything, won everything. Doesn’t there come a time when it doesn’t matter anymore whether you win again? If you’re the Pittsburgh Steelers and you’ve won four Super Bowls, do you have to win a fifth to prove that you’re good?”55

One common theory is that the Soviets were too confident; that they did not take the

Americans seriously. Soviet goalie Tretiak has stated, “[w]e were way stronger, nobody ever doubted that. We were professionals and they were just students. Simply put, we did not respect their team and you cannot do that in hockey.”56 American coach Herb Brooks remarked that “the

Soviets weren’t taking Americans seriously, they were there for vacation and to take home a medal.”57 Why would they be worried? The Soviet hockey team had already beaten everybody.

The fact that the Soviets had not been in a losing position could have affected the outcome.

American players recall, that during the final minutes of the game, the Soviets were speaking to each other in anxious tones, that they began taking random shots and the team that had begun to

54 Quoted in Boys of Winter (33) 55 Quoted in Boys of Winter (65) 56 Do You Believe in Miracles? 57 Do You Believe in Miracles? 30 panic, no longer using skill to make goals but chance. In addition, the Soviets did not pull their goalie in the final minute of the game. Usually, when a team is only one goal down, the coach will pull the goalie to allow an extra skater on the ice; the extra skater often helps the team score a goal to tie the game. Soviet players recall that Tikhonov never practiced this play, that they had never had a reason for it. Many American players felt that, had the Soviets pulled their goalie, the Russians would have overwhelmed them and scored again.

On the other hand, some hockey experts believe it was not what the Soviets lacked but what the Americans brought that was the game changer; specifically, American coach Herb

Brooks. Anatoli Tarasov, one of the founders of Soviet hockey, observed that, “[t]he line-up of the 1980 Olympic champions-not so impressive. A couple of classy defensemen, about five individually strong forwards-and that is all. But the trump card of the U.S. team this time was its coach, Herb Brooks.”58 From the start of training camp, coach Herb Brooks understood that regional rivalries might impede the development of the team, therefore he made himself the common enemy. He was strict, often impersonal; he made it known that every player had the same chance of being cut from the roster; he once even threatened to cut the team captain, Mike

Eurizone just to prove his point. His actions yielded the intended results; instead of a group of rivals, he had created a camaraderie amongst his players, made them a team—in contrast to the

Soviets, who did not exhibit this sense of friendship. He continued to utilize this strategy throughout the tournament, not allowing his players to be interviewed; he did not want one player to feel more important because of an interview, he wanted his players to remain a team, not individual players. In addition, Brooks observed the Soviet training methods. He utilized their methods, conditioning his players to be able to maintain Soviet speed and intensity. He exploited the youthfulness of his team, which many considered a disadvantage, not only to match

58 Quoted in Going for the Gold (124) 31

Soviet speed, but also to overwhelm the Russians with forceful checks; instead of keeping his players on the ice for a minute at a time like the Soviets, Brooks replenished his players every 30 seconds. This meant that the Americans always had fresh legs and could tire the Soviet players more easily. In addition, Brooks often employed a staff member in the stands with a two-way radio, communicating the opponent’s habitual plays and relaying advice. Many attribute

American success to the fact that the opponents did not intimidate Brooks. Brooks often made fun of the Soviet players, their faces, noses, hairstyles, stone expressions; he humanized them.

He was attempting to erase the star-struck reaction of his players, who were fans of the Soviet players and often greeted them with wonderment; it allowed the Americans to place themselves on the same level as the Soviet players, to raise their confidence.

Post-Game Reactions

Some historians contend that political ideology is not related to the Olympic Games nor do athletic tournaments have any influence on political relations of the time.59 However, Derick

L. Hulme Jr., author of The Political Olympics, states that, “the nature of sport and that of international politics is strikingly similar. The fiercely competitive aspect of sport correlates closely with the environment in which world leaders must function.” The response of the

American and Soviet athletes, the American people, as well as the U.S. and Soviet governments to the 1980 USSR-US hockey game support the idea that athletic contests provide an arena in which to release international tensions in a non-lethal manner.

The reaction of the American and Soviet players and spectators during the game helped to solidify the notion that this game was more than just hockey. Americans crowded into the

59 The references for the entirety of this section: Keeping the Faith (471-596); “The Nation Celebrates Lake Placid”; The Political Olympics (IV-77); Dropping the Torch (10-11); One Goal (217-222); Boys of Winter (235-263); “Miraculous” (221-232); Do You Believe in Miracles? 32 arena, tickets sold out; the happenings of the game helped boost American morale during a politically tense time more than any attempts on the part of U.S. leadership. Former U.S.

President Gerald Ford concedes that, “[w]ith communications what they are, a sports triumph can be as uplifting to a nation’s spirit as, well, a battlefield victory.”60 Every goal, block and hit by the American team was met with roars of cheering; consequently, those of the Soviet team were met with heckling. After every U.S. goal, the entire American team would flood the ice in celebration; the Soviets remained stoic following their own goals, confident in their ability to score. During the last period of the game, the Soviets were ahead by one goal; the Americans then tied the game at 3-3 and the crowd starting cheering and chanting “U-S-A,” so loudly the buildings along the street began to shake. The Soviet official present at the game subsequently closed and locked the doors of their suite preventing any visitors. The U.S. team scored the final and winning goal; it was the first time in twenty years that the U.S. had the lead against the

Soviets in hockey. During the final seconds of the game, the Americans in the stands were shouting and waving American flags. As the U.S. team won the game 4-3, the entire team and staff flooded the ice, celebrating while the crowd flooded the streets doing the same. The Soviet team remained on the ice, the young players stunned and the veterans smiling at the antics of the young American team. One Soviet player confessed, “We won so often, [we] no longer felt the thrill the Americans showed, on one hand it was great to see emotions but for us it was very bitter.”

Immediately following the game, the Soviet coach began shouting at his players, blaming them for the loss. On the other side of the arena, the American players began singing “God Bless

America” in their locker room; by this time, President Jimmy Carter had already called in order to congratulate the team on their victory. He told them, “We were watching the TV with one eye

60 Sports III., XLI, #2 (July 8, 1974), p. 16 33 and Iran and the economy with the other.”61 Later, one of the Soviet players, a Latvian, made a point to congratulate the American coach directly in front of the Soviet coach, despite a warning of the dangerous consequences. In addition, following the game, during a mandatory urinalysis test, the two American players, Eric Strobel and Mark Johnson, were faced with Soviet players

Boris Mikhailov and Valery Kharlamov.62 Mikhailov, the Soviet captain simply told them, “Nice game.”63 Russian player Valeri Vasiliev asked the American physician, a native Latvian, the

Americans’ secret, the doctor simply said, “[f]ountain of youth.”64 Meanwhile, an U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz had broadcasted the win to a neighboring Soviet intelligence vessel, near the

Mediterranean Sea; later two Soviet patrol planes radioed American fighters to offer their congratulations. The U.S. Vice President, Walter Mondale, who had been present at the game, stated that, “[w]e don’t have to prove our way of life is better through state-run sports, we can do it through amateur bodies.”65

After the conclusion of the Olympics, the cleaning committee found over a hundred empty bottles of vodka in the Soviet hockey team’s rooms; some Soviet players admit to drinking to an American gold medal. Days later, the U.S. beat Finland and won an Olympic gold medal; the Soviet team won the silver medal. The Soviet players did not return to have their silver medals inscribed and many admitted to throwing their medals in the garbage. Goalie

Tretiak confessed, “[i]t’s not an honor to win silver medal in USSR.”66 On the plane to Moscow, coach Tikhonov yelled at his players, blaming them for the loss; the player Vasiliev grew angry, grabbed him by the neck and threatened to kill him. Upon the homecoming of the Soviet athletes,

61Do You Believe in Miracles? 62 Randomly selected players from either team were required to give urine samples to test for illegal doping. 63 Quoted in One Goal (217) 64 Quoted in One Goal (221) 65 “The Nation Celebrates Lake Placid” 66 Do You Believe in Miracles? 34 the Soviet people pushed aside the hockey players in order to congratulate the other medal winners, many of whom were silver and bronze medal winners themselves. Communist bureaucrats told the Soviet players that this loss would be the most critical mistake of their lives.

Pravda did not print anything regarding the game the following day nor in the general Olympic wrap-up; with no other Soviet media in which to report the happenings of the Games, the Soviet people were unaware of the outcome of the game. Current Russian hockey player Evgeni

Nabokov, a child in 1980, recalls never having been told the story of the match, despite his intense involvement in the sport67. Coincidentally, Pravda did not report anything concerning the

1952 Olympic football loss to Yugoslavia nor the 1972 defeat to the national Canadian hockey team.

Conversely, the Soviet party officials did not have the same indifferent attitude as the

Soviet people and media. Some Soviet players recalled that party officials threatened to kill the players, holding a private meeting with the coaching staff and veteran players; in contrast, Soviet

General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, remained virtually silent on the matter of the game. During a meeting with Brezhnev, Tikhonov tried to explain the loss; reportedly, Brezhnev “almost hugged him,” and told him, “Viktor, I know you’re better than the Americans.”68 Current

Russian hockey players have stated that, even playing the sport growing up, the events of the game had never been revealed to them. Presently, there are no pictures or memorabilia of the

Lake Placid game in the Russian Ice Hockey Federation building. In addition, the resort, which houses mementos from all international Russian hockey tournaments, does not include the

67 Chizov, Vancouver (AP) 68 Do You Believe in Miracles? 35

1980 game; however, there is memorabilia from a 1972 loss to the Canadian team, a worse loss in terms of sport.69

On the other hand, the U.S. government and economy capitalized on the American victory. The US hockey team received numerous endorsement deals in addition to the first ever group prize from the American Institute for Public Service for “the greatest public service performed by an individual 35 or under.”70 The American people capitalized on the success of the American team, minutes after the game people were selling commemorative merchandise along the street of the arena, television networks constantly played highlight reels; the next day companies started production on documentaries, books, movies and merchandise in honor of the

1980 U.S. hockey team and their “Miracle on Ice.”71 Overnight a group of unknown college hockey players became national heroes.

The unexpected victory of the American hockey team provided President Carter an opportunity to increase U.S. morale during the Presidential campaign season. In his memoirs, he writes that, “I was hoping this victory and the gold medal were an omen of better days ahead.”72

He publicized the young men as “modern-day American heroes.”73 He exploited the win to garner support for the Moscow Olympic boycott; the deadline for the retreat of Soviet troops from Afghanistan had passed two days before the game. He thought the people would be more willing to come together and protest the Games, but it proved to hinder his campaign. The

American people, excited by the hockey win, wanted to watch their athletes beat the Soviets in

Moscow. Despite the American public’s discontent with the boycott, Carter enforced it and convinced several other nations to boycott as well; in fact, 65 countries did not participate in the

69 Chizov, Vancouver (AP) 70 Vinocur, NYT 71 Vinocur, NYT 72 Keeping the Faith (489) 73 Weisman, NYT 36

Moscow Games.74 From the Soviet perspective, this boycott diminished the state’s goal of improving Soviet international influence, as well as socialist superiority. The boycott meant that the amount of media coverage declined drastically. The U.S. government banned American- broadcasting companies from honoring their contracts, while the exposure that did occur presented the Soviet Union in a negative manner. The negative attention was detrimental for the state’s international relations. Several foreign officials, including Kurt Waldheim, secretary general of the United Nations, rejected invitations to the Games, not wanting to be politically associated with the USSR. It has been suggested that succeeding Soviet General Secretary

Mikhail Gorbachev formed the “Perestroika” movement, in which the Soviet Union practiced an

“open” policy toward international relations, in part as a response to this overwhelming negative attention. “Perestroika” is often noted by historians as being a major trigger in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

President Carter had also hoped to boost his popularity in time for re-election later that year; he thought the gold medal and the boycott would help prove that he could properly handle international relations. He had also been working diligently to negotiate the return of the

American hostages in Tehran. However, Jimmy Carter proved unable to impress the American people, resulting in the election of Ronald Reagan. Also, while waiting to be officially sworn in to presidency in January of 1981, Reagan provided assistance to the hostage negotiations. During this time, Carter was able to negotiate the return of the American hostages. Because of this participation, Reagan became associated with the masculine and militarist character of the U.S. hockey team to drive his political agenda, halting Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and consenting to

Gorbachev’s changing infrastructure, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this way,

74 It is noted that not all countries refused participation because of the boycott; some countries simply did not have the economic means to send their athletes. 37 the influence of the 1980 U.S. hockey team demonstrated endurance through time. Even though

Reagan received the approval that Carter desired, Carter can be proud of the fact that, under his administration, with the boycott, no civilian lives were taken by means of warfare. The USSR-

US hockey victory and the boycott allowed Carter to defend his nation and its policies in a non- lethal manner.

This history of Soviet and American governments playing out their international grievances through sporting tournaments, as well as the nature of both nations’ athletic programs, allows the 1980 USSR-US Olympic hockey game to be seen as a quasi-battle in a time of political tension. The intense and emotional reactions of the American leadership and the

American people support this reading, as does the passive-aggressive reaction of their Soviet counterparts. The events of the match, along with the physical nature of hockey, underscore the perception of this contest as a Cold War battle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Recently, with the increasing political tensions between the United States and Russia, the

2014 Winter Games in Sochi offered an opportunity for a “new battle” concerning these two superpowers during the US-RUS hockey game. The national Russian team had not won an

Olympic medal since the 2002 Winter Olympics while the American team earned the silver medal in 2010. With the dynamics reversed, Russians, playing in their home country and the

Americans playing in “enemy territory,” the Americans dealt the Russians a loss in their own country. If President Carter had not promoted a boycott, perhaps the Americans could have achieved this triumph thirty-four years ago.

38

Appendix 1

Box Score of Game75:

Period 176:

03:25 Hooking Penalty USSR77: Boris Mikhailov

09:12 Goal: USSR Vladimir Krutov

14:03 Goal: USA Buzz Schneider

17:34 Goal: USSR Sergei Makarov

19:59 Goal: USA Dave Christian

End Period: 2-2

Period 2:

00:58 Holding Penalty USA78: John Harrington

02:18 Goal: USSR Alexsandr Maltsev

09:50 Delay of Game Penalty: Jim Craig

17:08 Unsportsmanlike conduct USSR79: Yuri Lebedev

17:08 Unsportsmanlike conduct USA: Ken Morrow

End Period 2: 3-2 USSR

Period 3:

06:47 High-sticking Penalty USSR80: Vladimir Krutov

08:39 Goal: USA Mark Johnson

10:00 Goal: USA Mike Eruzione

75 Boys of Winter (264) 76 A hockey game consists of three 20-minute periods, in between which there are 20:00 intermissions. 77 The act of using the stick to help a player or goalkeeper to restrain an opponent. 78 Restraining an opponent's by grabbing their body, equipment or clothing with the hands or stick. 79 Explanation of the nature of this unsportsmanlike conduct is detailed below. 80 Touching an opponent with the stick above shoulder level. 39

End of Period: 4-3 U.S.

End of Game: 4-3 U.S.

Appendix 2

The following are IIHF Fighting Penalties81

1) Match Penalty: Player is ejected from game. Another player serves a 5-minute penalty in

addition for fisticuffs82.

2) Minor Penalty: Player retaliates with a blow or attempted blow. Player serves 2-minute

penalty.

3) Game Misconduct (Unsportsmanlike conduct): First player to intervene in fisticuffs

already in progress receives game ejection.

4) A player may receive a double minor (4-minutes) or match penalty for continuing

fisticuffs after being told to stop by referee.

5) A particularly excessive fisticuff may result in a match penalty and 10-minute

misconduct penalty.83

Appendix 3

Body checks:84

6) Back check: To hinder an opponent heading toward and into the defending zone

7) Body check: Use of the body on an opponent.

a. Side check: To shove the shoulder, upper arm, hip and elbow into the opponent,

along the boards in order to separate them from the puck.

81 IIHF 2010 Official Rule Book P. 73 82 Fisticuffs is the act of discarding one’s gloves and fist fighting another player. 83 Penalties 4 and 5 are both issued at the discretion of the referees. 84 Definitions retrieved from nhl.com 40

b. Hip check: To drop to a half-crouch and drive his hips toward an opposing player,

sending the opponent off balance, often falling to the ice.

c. Shoulder check: To shove the shoulder into an opponent.

8) Forecheck85: To check an opponent in his end of the rink, preventing an offensive rush.

85 The back check and forecheck both consist of a body check on open ice, as opposed to along the boards. These are all legal checks. 41

Works Cited

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