Following the Guidelines of Martyr Beheshti
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History Brief: Timeline of US-Iran Relations Until the Obama
MIT International Review | web.mit.edu/mitir 1 of 5 HISTORY BRIEF: TIMELINE OF US‐IRAN RELATIONS UNTIL THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION Key Facts & Catalysts By Sam Sasan Shoamanesh Looking back at key events in this US‐Iran chronicle is helpful in understanding some of the traditional causes of friction and mistrust between Tehran and Washington. A reference to the annals of US‐Iran relations will also be valuable in appreciating that the policies of the past sixty years have not been advantageous to US interests and on the contrary, have resulted in blowbacks, which still vex the relations to this day. 1856: Genesis of Formal Relations | Diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States began in 1856. 1909: American Lafayette in Iran | In 1909, Howard Baskerville, an American teacher and Princeton graduate on a Presbyterian mission in Tabriz, Iran, instantly becomes an Iranian national hero where after joining the Constitutionalists during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905‐1911, loses his young life while fighting the Royalists and the forces of the Qajar king, Mohmmad Ali Shah’s elite Cossack brigade. He is remembered as saying: ʺ[t]he only difference between me and these people is my place of birth, and this is not a big difference.ʺ To this day he is revered by Iranians. Second World War | Until the second World War, the US had no interest or an active policy vis‐à‐vis Iran and relations remained cordial. 1953 C.I.A. Coup | In 1951, Prime Minister Mossadegh and his National Front party (“Jebhe Melli”), a socio‐democratic, liberal‐secular nationalist party in Iran, nationalize the country’s oil industry. -
Iran's Air Forces: Struggling to Maintain Readiness by Farzin Nadimi
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1066 Iran's Air Forces: Struggling to Maintain Readiness by Farzin Nadimi Dec 22, 2005 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Farzin Nadimi Farzin Nadimi, an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, is a Washington-based analyst specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf region. Brief Analysis ecent events, including the launch of Iran's first space imaging satellite, the announcement that Russia is R selling Iran twenty-nine Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) mobile short-range surface-to-air missile systems for $700 million, and the crash of an air force C-130 transport plane into an apartment block in Tehran, have focused attention on Iran's evolving air and aerospace power capabilities, as well as on Iran's longstanding problems in maintaining its aging fleet of military and civilian aircraft. A Force Divided Iran's air forces are divided between the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Air Force (IRGCAF). The IRIAF is by far the larger and more capable service. Its main role is to defend Iran against foreign enemies; in the event of invasion, this might include long-range offensive missions. To this end, it operates some two hundred and twenty combat aircraft (F-14A Tomcats, F-4D/E Phantoms, F-5E/F Tigers, Su-24MKs, MiG-29A/UBs, Mirage F- 1EQs, and F-7Ns) at various states of readiness; around fifteen reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4Es and RF-5As); at least one hundred training aircraft (F-5B Simorghs, FT-7s, PC-7/S-68s, and F-33 Bonanza/Parastoos); some forty-five transport/tanker aircraft (Boeing 707s and 747s, C-130E/H Hercules, and Fokker F27 Friendships); around thirty- five helicopters used for search and rescue and transport; and four P-3F Orions for maritime surveillance of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. -
Khomeinism, the Islamic Revolution and Anti Americanism
Khomeinism, the Islamic Revolution and Anti Americanism Mohammad Rezaie Yazdi A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham March 2016 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran was based and formed upon the concept of Khomeinism, the religious, political, and social ideas of Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini. While the Iranian revolution was carried out with the slogans of independence, freedom, and Islamic Republic, Khomeini's framework gave it a specific impetus for the unity of people, religious culture, and leadership. Khomeinism was not just an effort, on a religious basis, to alter a national system. It included and was dependent upon the projection of a clash beyond a “national” struggle, including was a clash of ideology with that associated with the United States. Analysing the Iran-US relationship over the past century and Khomeini’s interpretation of it, this thesis attempts to show how the Ayatullah projected "America" versus Iranian national freedom and religious pride. -
Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................ -
Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Updated May 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies May 8, 2019 Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats Kenneth Katzman to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of Specialist in Middle the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs x Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. x Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. x Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. x Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s “oppressed” and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. x Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy. -
Business in Iran After the Nuclear Deal
Presenting a live 90-minute webinar with interactive Q&A Back to Business in Iran After the Nuclear Deal: Maximizing Opportunity and Minimizing Liability Risks Navigating Remaining Sanctions and Customs Controls, Obtaining Necessary Licenses, and International Tax Planning TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 2015 1pm Eastern | 12pm Central | 11am Mountain | 10am Pacific Today’s faculty features: Mehrdad Ghassemieh, Partner, Harlowe & Falk, Tacoma, Wash. Nnedinma C. Ifudu Nweke, Senior Counsel, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Washington, D.C. Barbara D. Linney, Member, Miller & Chevalier Chartered, Washington, D.C. David B. Woodward, President & CEO, Associates in Cultural Exchange, Seattle The audio portion of the conference may be accessed via the telephone or by using your computer's speakers. Please refer to the instructions emailed to registrants for additional information. If you have any questions, please contact Customer Service at 1-800-926-7926 ext. 10. Tips for Optimal Quality FOR LIVE EVENT ONLY Sound Quality If you are listening via your computer speakers, please note that the quality of your sound will vary depending on the speed and quality of your internet connection. If the sound quality is not satisfactory, you may listen via the phone: dial 1-866-570-7602 and enter your PIN when prompted. Otherwise, please send us a chat or e-mail [email protected] immediately so we can address the problem. If you dialed in and have any difficulties during the call, press *0 for assistance. Viewing Quality To maximize your screen, press the F11 key on your keyboard. To exit full screen, press the F11 key again. Continuing Education Credits FOR LIVE EVENT ONLY In order for us to process your continuing education credit, you must confirm your participation in this webinar by completing and submitting the Attendance Affirmation/Evaluation after the webinar. -
Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21St Century
Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century A collection of papers edited by Catherine Kelleher January 2017 Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland 4113 Van Munching Hall, School of Public Policy University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742 (301) 405-7601 Editor’s note The following papers were commissioned as part of the Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century project supported by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC). The papers have two general purposes: 1) to create a body of work that provides an overview of the missile defense developments in major regions of the world; and 2) to provide emerging scholars the opportunity to conduct research, publish, and connect with each other. We believe we have succeeded on both counts. The papers written for this project will be valuable for academics and policymakers alike, and will be published and disseminated by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. This element of the project has also been successful in further bringing together a new cadre of experts in the field and developing the next generation of academics and public servants who will benefit from their participation in this project. These papers were completed in the Fall of 2016. Contributing authors Nate Frierson is a Master’s candidate and Robertson Fellow at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy. Nate contributed to the paper on NATO’s missile defense system. Nilsu Goren, a research scholar at CISSM, detailed Turkey’s missile defense history and current dilemmas. -
Why Not? E Case for an American-Iranian Alliance
BOLOGNA CENTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Why Not? !e Case for an American-Iranian Alliance Renad Mansour and Ben Hartley In an age of global uncertainty, allies and enemies must be scrutinized, and we must question why we choose to be in con#ict. Iran, as it pursues a nuclear weapon as a security guarantee, is perhaps the most important case to re-examine. "is paper argues that the United States should not only prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, it should try to make Iran an American ally. What this would look like in practice is di$cult to say. "is paper merely initiates discussion of a scenario long considered impossible, and shows that there is signi%cant mutual interest in pursuing it. While shared trust cannot occur in the current situation, o!ers of cooperation from both sides o!er the only recourse to a future without a prolonged nuclear stando! akin to that with North Korea. "e scope of this paper is con%ned to laying the groundwork for establishing potential areas of cooperation and identifying the mutual bene%ts that would arise as a result. “"e only di!erence between me and these of sanctions, the rial has depreciated people is my place of birth, and this is not a by over 75 percent.2 !e government’s big di!erence.” 1 subsidy program, although moderately — Howard Baskerville e"ective for segments of the population such as the extreme poor, has squeezed Howard Baskerville fought for the middle class. Prices for bread, rice, constitutional democracy in Iran during vegetables, and milk doubled in 2012, the 1930s, dying at the age of 24 while leaving Iranians without money for food leading revolutionary forces against and shelter.3 Unemployment is believed the Qajar royalists. -
Islamic Republic of Iran (Persian)
Coor din ates: 3 2 °N 5 3 °E Iran Irān [ʔiːˈɾɒːn] ( listen)), also known اﯾﺮان :Iran (Persian [11] [12] Islamic Republic of Iran as Persia (/ˈpɜːrʒə/), officially the Islamic (Persian) ﺟﻣﮫوری اﺳﻼﻣﯽ اﯾران Jomhuri-ye ﺟﻤﮭﻮری اﺳﻼﻣﯽ اﯾﺮان :Republic of Iran (Persian Eslāmi-ye Irān ( listen)),[13] is a sovereign state in Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi-ye Irān Western Asia.[14][15] With over 81 million inhabitants,[7] Iran is the world's 18th-most-populous country.[16] Comprising a land area of 1,648,195 km2 (636,37 2 sq mi), it is the second-largest country in the Middle East and the 17 th-largest in the world. Iran is Flag Emblem bordered to the northwest by Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan,[a] to the north by the Caspian Sea, to the Motto: اﺳﺗﻘﻼل، آزادی، ﺟﻣﮫوری اﺳﻼﻣﯽ northeast by Turkmenistan, to the east by Afghanistan Esteqlāl, Āzādi, Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi and Pakistan, to the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf ("Independence, freedom, the Islamic of Oman, and to the west by Turkey and Iraq. The Republic") [1] country's central location in Eurasia and Western Asia, (de facto) and its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, give it Anthem: ﺳرود ﻣﻠﯽ ﺟﻣﮫوری اﺳﻼﻣﯽ اﯾران geostrategic importance.[17] Tehran is the country's capital and largest city, as well as its leading economic Sorud-e Melli-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi-ye Irān ("National Anthem of the Islamic Republic of Iran") and cultural center. 0:00 MENU Iran is home to one of the world's oldest civilizations,[18][19] beginning with the formation of the Elamite kingdoms in the fourth millennium BCE. -
Kiyaei, Mousavian Discuss Nuclear Deal and Iran's Future As Regional
11/6/2015 Kiyaei, Mousavian discuss nuclear deal and Iran’s future as regional power | The Chautauquan Daily • • • Morning Lecture, Morning Lecture Recaps Kiyaei, Mousavian discuss nuclear deal and Iran’s future as regional power Sam Flynn on August 22, 2015 / 0 comments The Iran nuclear deal has stirred much debate and controversy in the United States over the last two months. Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Emad Kiyaei, two Iranians, teamed up to shed light on the nuclear deal and Iran’s perspective on the global landscape. Mousavian, a former diplomat and Iranian nuclear negotiator, and Kiyaei, executive director of the American-Iranian Council, were the final morning lecturers of Week Eight, “The Middle East Now and Next.” Mousavian is a pro-U.S. Iranian and the co-author of Iran and the United States, An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, which was published last year and chronicles U.S.-Iran relations from 1856 to the present day. The two men took the Amphitheater stage sans Mousavian’s son, Mohammed, who was scheduled to appear. Mohammed was held up by a delayed flight from Philadelphia, where he is a graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. Kiyaei questioned Mousavian on the deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its implications, significance and whether it was a good or bad deal. According to Mousavian, the international consensus is that the U.S. and its allies, the P5+1 consisting of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China and Russia, achieved their objective: to prevent every path that Iran could take to a nuclear bomb. -
Iran's Ballistic Missile Program, Sanctions, and the IRGC
Testing the Limits: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program, Sanctions, and the IRGC Michael Eisenstadt Kahn Fellow and Director, Military and Security Studies Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee March 29, 2017 Iran has the largest missile force in the Middle East, consisting of thousands of short- and medi- um-range ballistic missiles, and possibly land-attack cruise missiles.1 Although its missiles are conventionally armed, many could deliver a nuclear weapon if Iran were to ever acquire such a capability. While the nuclear accord with Iran—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was given international legal force by UN Security Council Resolution 2231— will likely defer such an eventuality, it did not impose new constraints on Iran’s missile program. On the contrary, UNSCR 2231 loosened them—and included provisions for their lifting in eight years, if not sooner.2 At current production rates, Iran’s missile force could more than double in size by the time the major limits imposed by the nuclear deal are lifted at the fifteen year mark—in 2030. By then, Iran’s growing missile and cyber capabilities could pose major challenges to regional missile de- fenses, military and critical infrastructure targets, and civilian population centers. This could make preventive action by Israel or the United States, in the event of an attempted Iranian nuclear breakout, much more costly. Finally, an Iranian nuclear missile force would be highly destabilizing. Short missile flight times between Iran and Israel, the lack of reliable crisis communication channels, and the impossibility of knowing whether incoming Iranian missiles are conventional or nuclear could someday spur Israel—and any additional regional nuclear states that might emerge in the interim—to adopt a launch-on-warning posture, undermining the prospects for a stable nuclear deterrent balance in the region. -
America and Securitization of Iran After the Islamic Revolution 1979 Till 2013; Continuation Or Change
Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume: 11, No 4, Winter 2016 PP 85-116 America and Securitization of Iran after the Islamic revolution 1979 till 2013; continuation or change Mohammad Marandi- Associate Professor of English literature, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Mehrdad Halalkhor- Ph.D Student of North American Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Received: 31/07/2015 Accepted: 30/09/2015 ____________________________________________________________________________ Abstract U.S foreign policy towards Iran has been so uncertain and variable since the beginning of this relation, but alongside of the fluctuation, some kind of consistency is distinguishable. Until the 1979, Islamic revolution Iranian people played a major role in the American anti- communism strategy in the Middle East. The U.S. grand strategy was based on its confrontation with the USSR, and Iran was the key for controlling the Middle East. The process of underpinning Iran’s power as a liberal alliance in the region was the core idea in American consideration towards Iran. After the 1979 revolution, -Iran as a regional actor, had changed its priority and no longer identified itself in the western coalition, based on American foreign policy. On the other hand, America also changed its identification of Iran as a friend and started to demonize Iran’s role in the Middle East and the world. Envisaging these trends, this very fundamental and important question will appear in the minds that: Did America have a turning point in its foreign policy towards Iran after the 1979 revolution, or was the principle of its foreign policy steady or tactical change occurred? In order to answer this question, this article going to examine the history of the U.S.