Miff US Decision Making on Missile Defense by Yeonmin Cho Bachelor
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US Decision Making on Missile Defense by Yeonmin Cho Bachelor of Public Administration, Ewha Women’s University, 1995 Master of Public Administration, Syracuse University, 1996 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2009 miff UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH Graduate School of Public and International Affairs This dissertation was presented by Yeonmin Cho It was defended on April 24, 2009 and approved by Phil Williams, Professor, Public and International Affairs Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Lecturer, Public and International Affairs James C. Roberts, Professor, Political Science, Towson University Dissertation Chair: Donald M. Goldstein, Professor, Public and International Affairs ii Copyright © by Yeonmin Cho 2009 iii US Decision Making on Missile Defense Yeonmin Cho, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2009 The world entered the nuclear age in 1945 when the United States first acquired nuclear capability. The United States enjoyed a strategic monopoly but only for a couple of years until the Soviet Union tested its nuclear device in 1949. Since then, the United Kingdom, France, and China joined the exclusive nuclear club, and the threat of nuclear weapons has become one of the most daunting challenges of the world. Almost immediately after the United States developed nuclear weapons in the 1940s, it began to explore a way to destroy an incoming nuclear warhead before it reached its target in the United States in order to negate the dangers of nuclear weapons. Smaller scale threats coming from the Third World or rogue states and possibly terrorist organizations are serious factors to be reckoned with, but the nuclear threat from the Soviets was the backbone of US strategic thinking after WWII and until the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the long history of missile defense, the strategic environment experienced fundamental shifts, the most significant being the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the United States has shown rather consistent support for missile defense. Missile defense policy changes were seen but they did not coincide with the rise or fall of the Soviet threat. This is the central research question of this study: how has US missile defense policy been able to survive for decades despite fundamental changes in the security environment? The main interest of this study is the decision making process. Essentially, this study attempts to discover the central force behind US missile defense policy. In this effort, this study proposes three competing perspectives: the security perspective, the bureaucratic politics iv perspective, and the congressional perspective. Was it the external security factor? Was it the executive branch of the US government? Or was it Congress that brought about the policy decisions? This study argues that new strategic developments play an extremely important role in triggering policy changes, but Congress was instrumental in materializing missile defense policy changes. v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. XIV LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. XVI 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CASE SELECTION ................................... 2 1.2 IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY .................................................................... 3 1.3 METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY............................................................... 5 1.4 CAPSULE HISTORY OF MISSILE DEFENSE.............................................. 7 1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY ............................................................... 9 1.6 COMPETING EXPLANATIONS – THREE PERSPECTIVES .................. 11 1.6.1 Security Perspective ...................................................................................... 11 1.6.2 Bureaucratic Politics Perspective ................................................................. 19 1.6.3 Congressional Perspective ............................................................................ 25 2.0 SECURITY PERSPECTIVE .................................................................................... 33 2.1 JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION..................................................................... 34 2.1.1 The Policy Turn ............................................................................................. 34 2.1.2 Johnson Administration’s Original Stance ................................................. 36 2.1.3 Deterrence, MAD, and Arms Control ......................................................... 39 2.1.4 The China Threat and ABM Deployment ................................................... 43 vi 2.1.5 Summary ........................................................................................................ 46 2.2 NIXON ADMINISTRATION........................................................................... 48 2.2.1 The Policy Turn ............................................................................................. 48 2.2.2 Nixon’s ABM – Safeguard ............................................................................ 50 2.2.3 From Strategic Superiority to Strategic Sufficiency .................................. 53 2.2.4 Summary ........................................................................................................ 62 2.3 REAGAN ADMINISTRATION....................................................................... 63 2.3.1 The Policy Turn ............................................................................................. 63 2.3.2 The Technical Optimism and Increased Resources ................................... 64 2.3.3 The Strategic Development: Imbalance of power ...................................... 68 2.3.4 MX controversy ............................................................................................. 71 2.3.5 Summary ........................................................................................................ 75 2.4 BUSH ADMINISTRATION ............................................................................. 76 2.4.1 The Policy Turn ............................................................................................. 76 2.4.2 From SDI to Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) .......... 77 2.4.3 Strategic Debates in a New World ............................................................... 81 2.4.4 Summary ........................................................................................................ 86 2.5 CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ..................................................................... 88 2.5.1 The Policy Turn ............................................................................................. 88 2.5.2 From Technology Readiness to Deployment Readiness Program ............ 89 2.5.3 Proliferation of WMD ................................................................................... 95 2.5.4 Summary ...................................................................................................... 100 2.6 CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER ............................................................ 102 vii 3.0 BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS PERSPECTIVE .................................................. 106 3.1 JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION................................................................... 107 3.1.1 Department of Defense: Secretary McNamara and the Military ............ 109 3.1.2 Secretary of State Dean Rusk ..................................................................... 114 3.1.3 National Security Adviser Walt Rostow .................................................... 116 3.1.4 President Lyndon Johnson ......................................................................... 117 3.1.5 Interplay ....................................................................................................... 119 3.2 THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION ............................................................... 121 3.2.1 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird ............................................................ 122 3.2.2 Gerard Smith: SALT Delegation Chief ..................................................... 124 3.2.3 Secretary of State William Rogers ............................................................. 127 3.2.4 National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger .............................................. 130 3.2.5 President Richard Nixon ............................................................................. 136 3.2.6 Interplay ....................................................................................................... 139 3.3 REAGAN ADMINISTRATION..................................................................... 141 3.3.1 The White House Staff ................................................................................ 142 3.3.2 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger ................................................. 144 3.3.3 Secretary of State George Shultz ............................................................... 146 3.3.4 Outsiders....................................................................................................... 150 3.3.5 President Ronald Reagan ...........................................................................