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The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea

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The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea Bloody Monday The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea Copyright © 2009 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-584-9 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org December 2009 1-56432-584-9 Bloody Monday The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea Map of Guinea .................................................................................................................... 1 Map of Conakry .................................................................................................................. 2 Map of the September 28 Stadium and Surrounding Area ................................................... 3 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 4 Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 11 Methodology .................................................................................................................... 16 I. Background .................................................................................................................... 17 II. Prelude to Massacre at the September 28 Stadium ....................................................... 21 Choosing a Date for the Opposition Rally ....................................................................... 21 Morning March to the Stadium and Attempts by Security Forces to Block Opposition Supporters ................................................................................................................... 23 Shooting of Unarmed Protesters by Gendarmes near the Stadium .......................... 24 Clashes at Hamdalaye and Bellevue Crossroads ..................................................... 24 Attempt to Block Opposition Leaders from Entering the Stadium ............................. 25 III. Massacre at the September 28 Stadium ...................................................................... 27 Attack on Rally Participants by Security Forces inside the Stadium ............................... 28 Pursuit of Rally Participants by Security Forces outside the Stadium .............................. 33 Attack by Presidential Guard on Opposition Leaders ..................................................... 41 IV. Rape and Other Sexual Assault by Security Forces ....................................................... 47 Women Killed by Security Forces during or after Sexual Assault .................................... 48 Extreme Brutality during Sexual Assaults ....................................................................... 51 Rape with Foreign Objects ............................................................................................. 53 Abduction and Rape ...................................................................................................... 55 Psychological Impact of Rape ....................................................................................... 58 Command Responsibility for Sexual Violence ................................................................ 61 V. Attacks by Presidential Guard on the Homes of Opposition Leaders .............................. 64 VI. Government Cover-Up of the Massacre ........................................................................ 68 Intimidation of Journalists ............................................................................................ 68 Removal of Bodies from the Stadium and Morgues and Burial in Mass Graves ............. 69 VII. Military Takeover of Donka Hospital ........................................................................... 76 VIII. Attacks on Opposition Neighborhoods by Military and Civilian Militia ....................... 80 IX. Arbitrary Detentions and Abuses in Detention .............................................................. 84 Abuses at Camp Koundara............................................................................................ 85 Abuses at Camp Alpha Yaya Diallo ............................................................................... 86 X. International Response to the September Violence ....................................................... 90 XI. Need for Accountability: Identifying the Main Perpetrators of the September Violence . 93 Legal Considerations .................................................................................................... 93 Crimes against Humanity .............................................................................................. 94 Command Responsibility .............................................................................................. 95 Right to Accountability .................................................................................................. 95 National Efforts at Accountability for the September Violence ...................................... 95 Individuals Whose Criminal Responsibility Should Be Investigated .............................. 97 CNDD President Captain Moussa Dadis Camara...................................................... 97 Presidential Guard and Their Commanders ............................................................. 98 Anti-Drug and Anti-Organized Crime Unit of the Gendarmes .................................... 99 Mobile Intervention and Security Force (CMIS) ....................................................... 100 Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... 101 Map of Guinea 1 Human Rights Watch | December 2009 Map of Conakry Bloody Monday 2 Map of the September 28 Stadium and Surrounding Area 3 Human Rights Watch | December 2009 Summary At around 11:30 a.m. on the morning of September 28, 2009, several hundred members of Guinea’s security forces burst into the September 28 Stadium in Guinea’s capital, Conakry, and opened fire on tens of thousands of opposition supporters peacefully gathered there. By late afternoon, at least 150 Guineans lay dead or dying in and around the stadium complex. Bodies were strewn across the field, crushed against half-opened gates, draped over walls, and piled outside locker rooms where doors had been pulled shut by the terrified few who had gotten there first. Dozens of women at the rally suffered particularly brutal forms of sexual violence at the hands of the security forces, including individual and gang rape and sexual assault with objects such as sticks, batons, rifle butts, and bayonets. At least four women and girls were murdered during or immediately after being raped; one woman was shot with a rifle through her vagina while laying face up on the stadium field begging for her life. In the hours and days following the violence, as desperate mothers, fathers, and other family members attempted to find their loved ones, the security forces engaged in an organized cover-up to hide the number of dead. After sealing off the stadium and morgues, security forces removed scores of bodies from those places and buried them in mass graves. For several days, additional abuses—including murder, rape, and pillage—were committed by members of the security forces who had deployed throughout the neighborhoods from where the majority of opposition supporters hailed. Scores of other opposition supporters were arbitrarily detained in army and police camps where many were subjected to serious abuses, including torture. To date, the Guinean government has failed to investigate, much less hold accountable, any member of the Guinean security forces for their role in the killings, rapes, and other abuses. In the course of an in-depth, on-the-ground investigation into the events of September 28 and their aftermath, Human Rights Watch interviewed some 240 individuals, including victims wounded during the attack, witnesses present in the stadium, relatives of missing people, soldiers who participated in the violent crackdown and the government cover-up, medical staff, humanitarian officials, diplomats, journalists, and opposition leaders. The investigation found that the majority of killings, sexual assaults, and other abuses described in this report were committed by members of the elite Presidential Guard, in particular the unit at the time directly responsible for the personal security of CNDD President Moussa Bloody Monday 4 Dadis Camara. Others who committed serious abuses included gendarmes, police, and men in civilian clothes armed with machetes and knives. The serious abuses carried out by the security forces on September 28 were not the actions of a group of rogue, undisciplined soldiers, as has been argued by the Guinean government.
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