Money and Modernization: Liquidity, Specialization, and Structural Change in Early Modern England
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European and Chinese Coinage Before the Age of Steam*
《中國文化研究所學報》 Journal of Chinese Studies No. 55 - July 2012 The Great Money Divergence: European and Chinese Coinage before the Age of Steam* Niv Horesh University of Western Sydney 1. Introduction Economic historians have of late been preoccupied with mapping out and dating the “Great Divergence” between north-western Europe and China. However, relatively few studies have examined the path dependencies of either region insofar as the dynamics monetiza- tion, the spread of fiduciary currency or their implications for financial factor prices and domestic-market integration before the discovery of the New World. This article is de- signed to highlight the need for such a comprehensive scholarly undertaking by tracing the varying modes of coin production and circulation across Eurasia before steam-engines came on stream, and by examining what the implications of this currency divergence might be for our understanding of the early modern English and Chinese economies. “California School” historians often challenge the entrenched notion that European technological or economic superiority over China had become evident long before the * Emeritus Professor Mark Elvin in Oxfordshire, Professor Hans Ulrich Vogel at the University of Tübingen, Professor Michael Schiltz and Professor Akinobu Kuroda 黑田明伸 at Tokyo University have all graciously facilitated the research agenda in comparative monetary his- tory, which informs this study. The author also wishes to thank the five anonymous referees. Ms Dipin Ouyang 歐陽迪頻 and Ms Mayumi Shinozaki 篠崎まゆみ of the National Library of Australia, Ms Bick-har Yeung 楊 碧 霞 of the University of Melbourne, and Mr Darrell Dorrington of the Australian National University have all extended invaluable assistance in obtaining the materials which made my foray into this field of enquiry smoother. -
Monetization of Fiscal Deficits and COVID-19: a Primer
The Journal of Financial Crises Volume 2 Issue 4 2020 Monetization of Fiscal Deficits and COVID-19: A Primer Aidan Lawson Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements Greg Feldberg Yale University Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Other Economics Commons, and the Public Administration Commons Recommended Citation Lawson, Aidan and Feldberg, Greg (2020) "Monetization of Fiscal Deficits and COVID-19: A Primer," The Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 2 : Iss. 4, 1-35. Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol2/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Monetization of Fiscal Deficits and COVID-19: A Primer Aidan Lawson† Greg Feldberg‡ ABSTRACT Monetization—also known as “money-financed fiscal programs” or “money-printing”— occurs when a government finances itself by issuing currency or other non-interest-bearing liabilities, such as bank reserves. It poses real risks—potentially excessive inflation and encroachment on central-bank independence—and some paint it as a relic of a bygone era. The onset of the COVID-19 crisis, however, forced governments to spend heavily to combat the considerable economic and public health impacts. As government deficits climbed, monetization re-entered the conversation as a way to avoid the massive debt burdens that some nations may face. This paper describes how monetization works, provides key historical examples, and examines recent central-bank measures. -
Is Monetary Financing Inflationary? a Case Study of the Canadian Economy, 1935–75
Working Paper No. 848 Is Monetary Financing Inflationary? A Case Study of the Canadian Economy, 1935–75 by Josh Ryan-Collins* Associate Director Economy and Finance Program The New Economics Foundation October 2015 * Visiting Fellow, University of Southampton, Centre for Banking, Finance and Sustainable Development, Southampton Business School, Building 2, Southampton SO17 1TR, [email protected]; Associate Director, Economy and Finance Programme, The New Economics Foundation (NEF), 10 Salamanca Place, London SE1 7HB, [email protected]. The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service. Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States and abroad. Levy Economics Institute P.O. Box 5000 Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000 http://www.levyinstitute.org Copyright © Levy Economics Institute 2015 All rights reserved ISSN 1547-366X ABSTRACT Historically high levels of private and public debt coupled with already very low short-term interest rates appear to limit the options for stimulative monetary policy in many advanced economies today. One option that has not yet been considered is monetary financing by central banks to boost demand and/or relieve debt burdens. We find little empirical evidence to support the standard objection to such policies: that they will lead to uncontrollable inflation. -
DEBASEMENTS in EUROPE and THEIR CAUSES, 1500-1800 Ceyhun Elgin, Kivanç Karaman and Şevket Pamuk Bogaziçi University, Istanbu
June 2015 DEBASEMENTS IN EUROPE AND THEIR CAUSES, 1500-1800 Ceyhun Elgin, Kivanç Karaman and Şevket Pamuk Bogaziçi University, Istanbul [email protected] Abstract: The large literature on prices and inflation in early modern Europe has not sufficiently distinguished between price increases measured in grams of silver and price increases due to debasements. This has made it more difficult to understand the underlying causes of the variation across Europe in price stability and more generally macroeconomic stability. This paper first provides a continent-wide perspective on the proximate causes of inflation in early modern Europe. We establish that in northwestern Europe debasements were limited and price increases measured in grams of silver were the leading cause of inflation. Elsewhere, especially in eastern Europe, debasements were more freequent and were the leading proximate cause of price increases. The existing literature on debasements based mostly on the experience of western Europe emphasizes both fiscal and monetary causes. We then investigate the fiscal causes of debasements by making use of a new dataset covering 11 countries from western, southern and eastern parts of the continent for the period 1500 to 1800. Our probit regressions suggest that fiscal demands of warfare, low fiscal capacity as measured by tax revenues, and lack of constaints on the executive power were all associated with higher likelihood of debasements for early modern Europe as a whole. Our empirical analysis also points to significant differences between the west and the east of the continent in terms of the causes of debasements. Warfare and low fiscal capacity appear as the leading causes of debasements in eastern Europe (Austria, Poland, Russia and the Ottoman empire). -
By “Fancy Or Agreement”: Locke's Theory of Money and the Justice of the Global Monetary System
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Volume 6, Issue 1, Spring 2013, pp. 49-81. http://ejpe.org/pdf/6-1-art-3.pdf By “fancy or agreement”: Locke’s theory of money and the justice of the global monetary system LUCA J. UBERTI American University in Kosovo Rochester Institute of Technology Abstract: Locke argues that the consent of market participants to the introduction of money justifies the economic inequalities resulting from monetarization. This paper shows that Locke’s argument fails to justify such inequalities. My critique proceeds in two parts. Regarding the consequences of the consent to money, neo-Lockeans wrongly take consent to justify inequalities in the original appropriation of land. In contrast, I defend the view that consent can only justify inequalities resulting directly from monetized commercial exchange. Secondly, regarding the nature of consent, neo-Lockeans uncritically accept Locke’s account of money as a natural institution. In contrast, I argue that money is an irreducibly political institution and that monetary economies cannot develop in the state of nature. My political account of money has far-reaching implications for the normative analysis of the global monetary system and the justification of the economic inequalities consequent upon it. Keywords: Locke, metallism, chartalism, consent, equality, global monetary system JEL Classification: B11, E42, Z10 The extent to which Locke’s principles of justice (or ‘Law of Nature’) justifies permissible material inequalities is a long-standing terrain of contention in the neo-Lockean tradition. While some critics (e.g., left- libertarians) have argued that the way Locke’s law regulates original resource appropriation contains extensive egalitarian provisions (Vallentyne, et al. -
Unconventional Monetary Policies and Central Bank Profits: Seigniorage As Fiscal Revenue in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis
Working Paper No. 916 Unconventional Monetary Policies and Central Bank Profits: Seigniorage as Fiscal Revenue in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis by Jörg Bibow* Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and Skidmore College October 2018 * The author gratefully acknowledges comments on an earlier draft from: Forrest Capie, Charles Goodhart, Perry Mehrling, Bernard Shull, Andrea Terzi, Walker Todd, and Andy Watt, as well as research assistance by Julia Budsey and Naira Abdula. The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service. Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States and abroad. Levy Economics Institute P.O. Box 5000 Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000 http://www.levyinstitute.org Copyright © Levy Economics Institute 2018 All rights reserved ISSN 1547-366X ABSTRACT This study investigates the evolution of central bank profits as fiscal revenue (or: seigniorage) before and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–9, focusing on a select group of central banks—namely the Bank of England, the United States Federal Reserve System, the Bank of Japan, the Swiss National Bank, the European Central Bank, and the Eurosystem (specifically Deutsche Bundesbank, Banca d’Italia, and Banco de España)—and the impact of experimental monetary policies on central bank profits, profit distributions, and financial buffers, and the outlook for these measures going forward as monetary policies are seeing their gradual “normalization.” Seigniorage exposes the connections between currency issuance and public finances, and between monetary and fiscal policies. -
Comparative European Institutions and the Little Divergence, 1385-1800*
n. 614 Nov 2019 ISSN: 0870-8541 Comparative European Institutions and the Little Divergence, 1385-1800* António Henriques 1;2 Nuno Palma 3;4;5 1 FEP-UP, School of Economics and Management, University of Porto 2 CEPESE, Centre for the Study of Population, Economics and Society 3 University of Manchester 4 ICS-UL, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon 5 CEPR, Centre for Economic Policy Research COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE LITTLE DIVERGENCE, 1385-1800 ? Ant´onioHenriques (Universidade do Porto and CEPESE) Nuno Palma (University of Manchester; Instituto de CiˆenciasSociais, Universidade de Lisboa; CEPR) Abstract Why did the countries which first benefited from access to the New World – Castile and Portugal – decline relative to their followers, especially England and the Nether- lands? The dominant narrative is that worse initial institutions at the time of the opening of Atlantic trade explain Iberian divergence. In this paper, we build a new dataset which allows for a comparison of institutional quality over time. We consider the frequency and nature of parliamentary meetings, the frequency and intensity of extraordinary taxation and coin debasement, and real interest spreads for public debt. We find no evidence that the political institutions of Iberia were worse until at least the English Civil War. Keywords: Atlantic Traders, New Institutional Economics, the Little Divergence JEL Codes: N13, N23, O10, P14, P16 ?We are grateful for comments from On´esimoAlmeida, Steve Broadberry, Dan Bogart, Leonor Costa, Chris Colvin, Leonor Freire Costa, Kara Dimitruk, Rui P. Esteves, Anton´ıFuri´o,Oded Galor, Avner Grief, Phillip Hoffman, Julian Hoppit, Saumitra Jha, Kivan¸cKaraman, Mark Koyama, Nuno Monteiro, Patrick K. -
Monetization and Growth in Colonial New England, 1703-1749
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MONETIZATION AND GROWTH IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND, 1703-1749 Peter L. Rousseau Caleb Stroup Working Paper 16190 http://www.nber.org/papers/w16190 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 July 2010 The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2010 by Peter L. Rousseau and Caleb Stroup. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Monetization and Growth in Colonial New England, 1703-1749 Peter L. Rousseau and Caleb Stroup NBER Working Paper No. 16190 July 2010 JEL No. E42,N11 ABSTRACT We examine econometrically the real effects of paper money's introduction into colonial New England over the 1703-1749 period. Departing from earlier analyses that focus primarily on the depreciation of paper money in the region, we show that expansion of the money stock promoted growth in modern sector activity and not the other way around. We also find that bills emitted for seigniorage purposes had a positive effect on the modern sector, while bills issued through loan banks did not. Peter L. Rousseau Department of Economics Vanderbilt University VU Station B #351819 2301 Vanderbilt Place Nashville, TN 37235-1819 and NBER [email protected] Caleb Stroup Department of Economics Vanderbilt University VU Station B #351819 2301 Vanderbilt Place Nashville, TN 37235 USA [email protected] 1. -
Merchantilist Institutions for a First but Precocious Industrial Revolution
Working Papers No. 156/11 Merchantilist institutions for a first but precocious industrial revolution The Bank of England, the Treasury and the money supply, 1694-1797 Patrick O’Brien Professor of Global Economic History London School of Economics and Political Science © Patrick O’Brien November 2010 Department of Economic History London School of Economics Houghton Street London, WC2A 2AE Tel: +44 (0) 20 7955 7860 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7955 7730 2 Merchantilist institutions for a first but precocious industrial revolution The Bank of England, the Treasury and the money supply, 1694-1797 I One topical implication of the ongoing programme of attending more closely to the state's role in the construction and development of institutions behind the First Industrial Revolution has been that historians are re-engaging with a theme in financial history that virtually disappeared from view while cliometricians focussed on proximate determinants of long run growth.1 Thus the wider purpose of this paper is to recall the well documented interactions of England's financial institutions with internal trade and external commerce and to bring into relief the related support they accorded over the long eighteenth century to the operations of an exceptionally powerful fiscal state and its mercantilist strategies of promoting British economic interests at home and overseas.2 The restoration and widening of this discussion in political economy is predicated, however, upon elaborating upon knowledge out there in secondary and primary sources upon the sustained -
Elizabeth I and the Great Debasement Help the Queen Tackle England’S Currency Troubles
Elizabeth I and the Great Debasement Help the Queen tackle England’s currency troubles Queen Elizabeth I, unknown artist © National Portrait Gallery, London This activity… Suggestions for use Supports: Pupils step into the role of the Queen’s KS3 History, Unit 5 advisers in this activity. They help Elizabeth I: how Elizabeth I analyse, understand and successfully did she tackle respond to the currency troubles facing the problems of her reign? England in 1560. Helps pupils to: A card-sort activity and decision-making Key Stage 3 Evaluate Elizabeth I’s task are included in the PowerPoint History decisions and effectiveness as a monarch. resource. Unit 5 This activity is designed Analyse Elizabeth I’s Use this activity to: to follow a response to the crisis visit to the caused by the debasement Introduce or brainstorm some of the Coins & Kings of England’s coinage. exhibition or aims or qualities a monarch might want the KS3 lesson: (for example, to appear strong and Monarchs and Investigate what caused the Mint Elizabeth I’s currency powerful). You may also consider the troubles and how they monarch’s responsibilities such as the affected the economy and economy, military, religious policy etc. society. Ask pupils to sort, analyse and prioritise Develop speaking and evidence and information about the listening skills and write crisis facing Elizabeth I in 1560. or argue persuasively using causal factors and Explain aspects of Elizabethan society historical vocabulary. during the queen’s reign to help Requires: contextualise the pupils’ research. PowerPoint projector or interactive whiteboard. Ask pupils to write (or give orally) a report describing England’s currency Print outs of card sort problems and an analysis of what caused activity (included below). -
1893. Congressional Record-Senate
1893. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE. 1207 JosephS. Root, to be postmaster at Charles City, in the county PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY. of Floyd and State of Iowa, in the place of Eugene B. Dyke, re Medical Depa1·trnent. moved. Justus J. Hetsch, to be postmaster at Newport, in the county Maj. Henry R. Tilton, surgeon, to be deputy surgeon-general, of Campbell and State of Kentucky, in the place of Anne W. Jenks, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, August 12, 1893, vice Jane removed. way, retired from active service. Hamilton A. Belchert to be postmaster at Farmington, in the Oa1:alry a·rm. county of Franklin and Sbte of Maine, in the place of Josiah H. r First Lieut. Alfred M. Fuller, Second Cavalry, to be captain, Thompson, resigned. August 14, 1893, vice Eaton, Second Cavalry~ deceased. Henry F. Libby, to be postmaster at Pittsfield, in the county of Second Lieut. David L. Brainard, Second Cavalry, t{) be first Somerset and State of Maine, in the place of Henry F. Libby, lieutenant, August 14, 1893, vice Fuller, Second Cavalry, pro whose commission ex-pired January 29,1891. moted. Harry B. Parker, to be postmaster at Bucksport, in the county Second Lieut. Walt-er M. Whitman, Second Infantry, to be of Hancock and State of Maine, in the place of Guy W. McAllis second lieutenant, May 3, 1893, with rank from November 20, ter, whose commission expired March 19, 1893. 1892, vice Andrew, First Cavalry, resigned. FrankL. Thayer, to be postmaster at Waterville, in the county .Infantry arm. of Kennebec and State of Maine, in theplaceoiWillardM. -
Good Or Bad Money? Debasement, Society and the State in the Late Middle Ages
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by LSE Research Online Working Papers No. 140/10 Good or Bad Money? Debasement, Society and the State in the Late Middle Ages . David Chilosi and Oliver Volckart © David Chilosi, and Oliver Volckart May 2010 Department of Economic History London School of Economics Houghton Street London, WC2A 2AE Tel: +44 (0) 20 7955 7860 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7955 7730 Good or Bad Money? Debasement, Society and the State in the Late Middle Ages David Chilosi and Oliver Volckart Abstract This paper revisits the question of debasement by analysing a newly compiled dataset with a novel approach, as well as employing conventional methods. It finds that mercantile influence on monetary policies favoured relative stability, and wage-payers did not typically gain from silver debasement. Excess demand for bullion was not a major cause of debasement. Yet monetary issues were important. Warfare made the debasement of silver but not of gold more likely. Regime types had an importance comparable to that of warfare: Princes debased silver more often than monetary unions and especially city-states. It is likely that fiscal debasements were more frequent in principalities, not least because princes debased for fiscal reasons also in the absence exceptional needs. The conclusion discusses the implications of the findings. 1. Introduction As a corollary to the revival of interest in medieval trade, scholars have increasingly stressed that ‘medieval money matters’ (Wood, 2004). Under the conditions of a commodity money system with an inelastic supply of bullion, the level of monetisation and therefore commercialisation is assumed to have crucially depended on the supply of hard money as determined by mining output and the balance of trade (cf.