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This PDF Is a Selection from an Out-Of-Print Volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Money in Histori This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Money in Historical Perspective Volume Author/Editor: Anna J. Schwartz Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-74228-8 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/schw87-1 Publication Date: 1987 Chapter Title: References Chapter Author: Anna J. Schwartz Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7514 Chapter pages in book: (p. 413 - 428) References Abramovitz, M. 1977. “Determinants of Nominal-Income and Money-Stock Growth and the Level of the Balance of Payments: Two-Country Models under a Specie Standard.” Stanford University. Unpublished. N.D. “The Monetary Side of Long Swings in U.S. Economic Growth.” Memorandum no. 146. Stanford University Center for Research in Economic Growth. 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Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800. Oxford. 1960. Review of British Monetary Experiments, 1650-1710, by J. K. Horsefield. Economic History Review, 2d series, no. 1, pp. 119-22. Bagehot, W. 1873. Lombard Street (London: P. S. King). Barber, C. L. 1978. “On the Origins of the Great Depression.” Southern Eco- nomic Journal 44:432-56. Barro, Robert J. 1977a. “Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment in the United States.” American Economic Review 67 (March): 101-15. 1977b. “Long-term Contracting, Sticky Prices, and Monetary Policy.” Journal of Monetary Economics 3 (July): 305-16. 413 414 References . 1981. “The Equilibrium Approach to Business Cycles.” In R. J. Barro, Expectations and Business Cycles. New York: Academic Press. 1984. “Comment.” In Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz, eds., A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931. Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press. 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American’s Greatest Depression, 1919-1941. New York: Harper & Row. Choudhri, E., and Kochin, L. 1977. “International Transmission of Business Cycle Disturbances under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates: Some Evi- dence from the Great Depression.” Carleton University and University of Washington. Unpublished. Clapham, Sir. 1945. The Bank of England: A History. Vol 2. 1797-1914. New York: Macmillan. Clark, C. 1977. “The ‘Golden’ Age of the Great Economists: Keynes, Robbins et al. in 1930.” Encounter 49230-90. Clarke, Stephen V. 0. 1967. Central Bank Cooperation, 1924-31. Federal Re- serve Bank of New York. 416 References Clarke, Stephen V. 0. 1977. Exchange-Rate Stabilization in the Mid-1930s: Negotiating the Tripartite Agreement. Princeton Studies in International Fi- nance no. 4j. Conway, M. D. 1894-96. The Writings of Thomas Paine. Vol. 2. New York: Putnams. Cook, Joel. 1903. The Philadelphia National Bank: A Century’s Record, 1803- 1903 by a Stockholder. Philadelphia: W. H. Fell. Cooper, Richard N. 1982. “The Gold Standard: Historical Facts and Future Prospects. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 13: 1-45. 1984. “Is There a Need for Reform.” In The International Monetary System Forty Years after Bretton Woods. Conference Series no. 28. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 1985. “Panel Discussion: The Prospects for International Economic Policy Coordination.” In W. H. Buiter and R. C. Marston, eds., Interna- tional Economic Policy Coordination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Currie, L. 1935. The Supply and Control of Money in the United States. Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Dam, Kenneth W. 1982. The Rules of the Game. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 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